APC v. BUBA & ORS
(2022)LCN/16239(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(GOMBE JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Tuesday, May 10, 2022
CA/G/42/2022
Before Our Lordships:
Jummai Hannatu Sankey Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ibrahim Shata Bdliya Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ebiowei Tobi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) APPELANT(S)
And
1. MOHAMMED ABUBAKAR BUBA 2. NASIRU MUH’D ZAILANI 3. GARBA MAMMAN KABIYESI 4. ABDULLAHI ADAMU 5. UMAR ISA 6. SAIDU UMAR 7. YAHAYA ABDULLAHI 8. MUHAMMED MAGAJI 9. AISHATU MUH’D PANDAYA 10. FATI ABUBAKAR 11. AHMED BALA SAMBO 12. NASIRU BABAJADA 13. BABANGIDA SAINI 14. JIBRIN YAHAYA 15. BAPPARI SALEH 16. HAMZA MUSA 17. DANHIRU IBRAHIM 18. SHEHU MAKANIKI 19. MUSA ABUBAKAR 20. UBA ADAMU 21. ALH. SALIHU JAURO 22. SHAMSUDDEN JAURO 23. MUHAMMAD WAZIRI DANDORIYA 24. MAGAJI IBRAHIM 25. DOMA SARKIN RAFI 26. MALAMI KUDI ZANGOMARI 27. GIDADO AKKO 28. ALH. ADAMU MUH’D MANGA 29. ALH. MUHAMMED ADAMU 30. BUILDER MAHMOOD YUSUF KUMO 31. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT WHAT IS IMMORAL MAY BE ILLEGAL
This makes very interesting and convincing reading. It makes great moral sense but most times legality is not morality. The point made severally is that what is immoral may not necessarily be illegal. The above reasoning can certainly be justified by morality but the main issue here is whether this can be justified in the realm of legality. Whether this will be legally justified is a function of what and how the apex Court of the land has interpreted the position of the law. I say this with all sense of responsibility because, by the doctrine of stare decisis, all Courts in Nigeria are to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court which is the highest Court of the land. By the principle of stare decisis, the opinion of Courts lower than the Supreme Court of Nigeria on a decision of the Supreme Court is irrelevant because all are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court. It does not lie in the mouth of any Judge of the High Court or this Court to say the decision of the Supreme Court is wrong even if we do not agree with it. See P.D.P. vs Hon. Dr Harry Oranezi (2017) 12 S.C. (pt II) 1; Eperokun & Ors vs UNILAG (1986) 4 NWLR (pt 34) 162; Nwabueze vs The People of Lagos State (2018) 3-4 S.C. (pt 1) 55. The best a Court can do is to try to distinguish the facts of the case the Supreme Court has decided on from the case before it. If a Court lower than the Supreme Court can distinguish the facts in both cases, then the Court can decide not to follow the decision of the Supreme Court based on the well-established principle that decisions of Courts are authorities for what it actually decided. See Okafor vs Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (pt 64) 129; Adegoke Motor Ltd vs Adesanya & Anor (1989) LPELR-94 (SC). PER TOBI, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN FORMULATE ITS OWN ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION
The law allows a Court to formulate its own issue, the only caveat is that the issues formulated by the Court must flow from the grounds of appeal as the general law is that issues must be based on the ground of appeal while the ground must be based on the judgment of the Court. See Okonkwo v. Ezeaku & Anor (2020) LEPLR (SC); Yusuf & Anor vs State (2019) LPELR-46945; K.R.K. Holdings Nigeria Ltd vs First Bank of Nigeria Ltd & Anor (2016) 12 S.C. (pt II) 85; Adelekan vs Ecu-Line NV (2006) 3 FWLR (pt 325) 4595. PER TOBI, J.C.A.
THE IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTION TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
As clearly stated by the lower Court which represents the true position of the law, jurisdiction is very fundamental to judicial proceedings. It is referred to as the life wire of a Court. A Court without jurisdiction should not attempt to go into a matter because the whole proceedings and the decision reached will be a nullity. See Umanah v. Attah NSCQR Vol 27 2005 P. 706; Chief of Air Staff vs Iyen (2005) LPELR-3167(CA); Dangana & Anor v. Usman & Ors (2012) LPELR-25012 (SC).
Jurisdiction to a Court is like water to a fish and breath to a human being. Just like fish cannot survive outside water and a human being cannot survive without breath, so a Court without jurisdiction cannot adjudicate on a matter before it. A Court without jurisdiction is like a king without a kingdom. A Court must not lobby for jurisdiction and at the same time, a Court must not be intimidated to decline jurisdiction when the law confers same on it. Jurisdiction is conferred on a Court by law and not by the consent of parties and when determining whether a Court has jurisdiction, the relevant document is the statement of claim. See Azubuogu v. Oranezi & Ors (2017) LPELR-42669(SC); Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund vs Fidelity Bank & Ors (2021) LPELR-56625 (SC); Agbule v. Warri Refinery & Petrochemical Co Ltd (2013) 6 NWLR (pt 1305) 318. PER TOBI, J.C.A.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND JUDICIAL POWERS
I must however hasten to add that jurisdiction is different from judicial powers. I am compelled to say this because sometimes both are used interchangeably and misunderstood by parties. There is a difference between judicial powers and jurisdiction. They are not one and the same thing. Judicial powers which is a more general term refers to the powers conferred on a Court by law to adjudicate with the aim of promoting justice in settling dispute between parties. This is a general power conferred on Courts by the Constitution. Jurisdiction on the other hand is the specific power on a particular Court to adjudicate on a specific subject matter. For instance, while Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution confers judicial power on the Courts, Section 251 of the same Constitution streamlines the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The implication of this is that a Court with judicial powers does not necessarily have the jurisdiction to try a matter before it. In Babalola v. Obaoku-ote & Anor (2004) LPELR-5259(CA) this Court held:
“It is also pertinent to define judicial power and jurisdiction. The judicial powers of the Court are vested in the Courts according to the Constitution – Section 6 of the 1979 Constitution and also Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution. Since it is fundamental that the rights of parties in litigation are determined on the substantive law in force at the time of the act in question – the 1979 Constitution shall be the operative statute for the purpose of this appeal – as the Constitution in operation as the law in force at the time of the complaint of the appellant Omisade v. Akande (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 55) 158; Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) pg. 539, Bank of Baroda v. Iyalabani Ltd. (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 539) pg. 600. Terms judicial power and jurisdiction are frequently used interchangeably – there is a clear distinction between the two. “Jurisdiction is defined as the power of the Court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties.” In other words – jurisdiction is the authority of the Courts to exercise judicial powers which is the totality of powers a Court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction to hear a case. You must first have jurisdiction before you can proceed to exercise power. Judicial power is a very wide expression apart from its meaning as the power which every sovereign authority must possess to enable it settle and decide controversies between its subjects and itself, it also co-exist with the power of the State to administer public justice and again with the power of the State to make laws and execute them as well. Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296.”
Similarly in Abacha v. FRN (2014) LPELR-22014 (SC), the apex Court held:
“Section 6(1) of the 1999 Constitution has vested the judicial powers in the Court to which the Section relates. Judicial powers has been interpreted in BRONIK MOTORS & ANOR v. WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 14 NSCC 26 at 253 to mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity possess to enable it settle and decide controversies between its subjects. Judicial power is co-extensive with the power of the state to make laws and execute them.
Jurisdiction in contrast to judicial power is the authority or legal weapon which a Court must possess to decide matters that are litigated before it or take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision, see ENYADIKE v. OMEHIA & 4 ORS (2010) 11 NWLR (pt.1204) 92 at 112.” PER TOBI, J.C.A.
EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the composite ruling of Hon. Justice Hiliary Ide Osho Oshomah of the Federal High Court, Gombe Division delivered on 2/3/2022 wherein His Lordship dismissed the preliminary objection raised by the Appellant, the 1st Defendant/Applicant in the lower Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to determine the matter before it. The 1st-30th Respondents in this judgment were Plaintiffs in the lower Court who commenced a suit against the Appellant and the 31st Respondent, as Defendants in the lower Court. In that suit, they challenged the action of the Appellant in refusing to hold democratically the Local Government Area Congresses in Akko Local Government Area of Gombe State to elect its Local Government officials in the Congress, which is a violation of the Constitution and the Guidelines of the Appellant. Despite the fact that no election was held, the Appellant announced names of people who were by consensus deemed elected. The 1st–30th Respondents who are party members interested in contesting in the said congress in Akko Local Government were denied the right to contest as no election was conducted into the party offices at the congress. They paid for their Expression of Interest and Nomination forms for the said congress, but they were denied the right to contest. This, the 1st–30th Respondents alleged, is contrary to the Constitution and the Guidelines of the Appellant which is their party. Three suits were instituted by different Plaintiffs in the lower Court with similar complaint against the party. The three suits are: FHC/GM/CS/3/2021, FHC/GM/CS/4/2021 and FHC/GM/CS/5/2021. The 1st–30th Respondents indicated interest and paid for the forms following the announcement by the Appellant that Local Government Congresses will be held across the 36 States of the Nation in line with Articles 11 and 16 of the Constitution of the Appellant. Despite paying for the form, they were not given the forms or even allowed to contest for the Local Government Congress. No election held, but results were published based on consensus arrangement. Consequent upon this, the 1st–30th Respondents sought the following reliefs in the suit filed before the lower Court on 17/9/2021 against the Appellant and the 31st Respondent to wit:
“1. A DECLARATION that having regard to Article 11, 12, 13, 12.10, 12.11, 12.12, 12.13, 13.10, 13.11, 16 and 20 (i) and other relevant provisions of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress, 2018 and the Party’s Guidelines for the Local Government Areas (LGA) Congresses, 2021, the 1st Defendant must conduct the LGA Congress in Akko Local Government Area of Gombe State, in accordance with the said Guidelines.
2. A DECLARATION that having not conducted the LGA Congresses in Akko Local Government Area in accordance with the Guidelines for LGA Congresses, 2021, the 1st Defendant is in breach of the provisions of its Constitution and the said Guidelines for the LGA Congresses, 2021.
3. AN ORDER setting aside and/or nullifying the results purportedly emanating from the LGA.
4. Congresses in the 11 Wards of Akko Local Government, Gombe State, announced by the 1st Defendant, as no such Congresses ever took place.
5. AN ORDER directing the 1st Defendant to reschedule and conduct fresh LGA Congresses in Akko Local Government Area in accordance with the 1st Defendant’s published Guidelines for the Conduct of the LGA Congresses, 2021.
6. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st Defendant from dealing with, recognizing or continuing to recognize any person or persons announced or published, presented or being paraded as winners of the purported LGA Congresses in Akko Local Government Area, declared by the 1st Defendant or its Agent.
7. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 2nd Defendant from dealing with, recognizing or accepting from the 1st Defendant or its Agents any result purporting to have emanated from the Ward Congresses held on the 4th of September, 2021 in Akko Local Government Area of Gombe State.”
The Appellant filed a Notice of preliminary objection on 28/10/2021 challenging the jurisdiction of the lower Court to entertain the suit and prayed the Court to dismiss or strike out the suit. This Preliminary Objection was predicated on four grounds, namely: that the action is an intra-party matter and therefore non-justiciable; the 1st–30th Respondents have not disclosed any cause of action against the Appellant, the 1st–30th Respondents lacks the locus standi to institute the action against the Appellant; and finally that the suit based on the above has become academic and therefore, an abuse of the process of the Court. For completeness, I will reproduce the prayers sought in the preliminary objection found at page 112-113 of the record. The Notice reads thus:
“The 1st Defendant shall further pray this Honourable Court to dismiss and/or strike out the Plaintiff’s suit in its entirety for want of jurisdiction.
GROUNDS OF THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
1. The subject matter of the Plaintiffs’ suit is an intra-party issue or internal affair of the 1st Defendant’s political party which this Honourable Court cannot adjudicate upon.
2. The Plaintiffs’ suit does not disclose a valid cause of action against the 1st Defendant
3. The Plaintiffs have no locus standi to maintain this action against the 1st Defendant
4. That the Plaintiffs’ suit is academic and constitutes an abuse of Court process.”
The lower Court consolidated the suits and delivered a composite ruling in which His lordship overruled the preliminary objection in suit Nos: FHC/GM/CS/3/2021 and FHC/GM/CS/5/2021, and upheld the preliminary objection in suit No: FHC/GM/CS/4/2021. This appeal is therefore a sister appeal to CA/G/41/2022 relating to Suit No FHC/GM/CR/3/2021.
The 1st–30th Respondents in response to the preliminary objection argued that though the matter culminating to this appeal arose from an intra party dispute, it is still justiciable since it falls within the exception to the general rule which ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain disputes arising from an intra party dispute. The main thrust of the opposition by the Respondents at the lower Court was that the Appellant has a duty to conduct the LGA Congress in line with the Constitution and the Guidelines of the party and that failure to comply with the party Constitution and Guidelines makes the intra party dispute justiciable. The 1st–30th Respondents case is that the Appellant which was the 1st Defendant in the lower Court violated the provisions of its constitution and Guideline by refusing to give the Expression of Interest and Nomination Form to the 1st–30th Respondents, and in not democratically conducting the LGA Congress election. The lower Court was therefore, confronted by the two positions presented by the learned counsel on behalf of parties who are all senior members of the Inner Bar. Both backed up their position with judicial authorities. For avoidance of doubt and for completeness, I will state the two positions again. The 1st Defendant/objector/Appellant in this appeal has vehemently stated that the matter relating to the election of party official in the Local Government Area Congresses, is intra-party matter and therefore not justiciable. On the other hand, The Plaintiffs/1st–30th Respondents are stating in very clear terms that the matter before the Court is justiciable been a matter that is challenging the action of the Party which was done in gross violation of the Constitution and the Guidelines of the Appellant. The lower Court after listening to the argument of both Counsels agreed with the position of the Respondents’ Counsel and thereby assumed jurisdiction relying and referring to the following provisions of the law, Sections 6 (6)(a), 223, 251(1)(q) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), 85(3) of the Electoral Act and cases of APC vs Okorodudu & Anor (2019) LPELR-47762 (CA); Musa vs Umar (2020) 11 NWLR (pt 1735) 213; Erue & Anor vs Okotie Eboh & Ors (2017) LPELR-42655; Onuoha vs Okafor (1983) NSCC 494; Mato vs Hember & 2 Ors (2017) LPELR-42765; Boko vs Nungwa (2019) 1 NWLR (pt 1654) 395. Putting it clearly and simply, the preliminary objection failed in the lower Court, it was overruled and dismissed. It will not be out of place to hear His Lordship himself in his 42 pages composite ruling found at pages 277-318 of the record and specifically at page 299 when His Lordship held:
“To my mind, where there is non-compliance with the above mandatory constitutional provisions, the aggrieved party whose personal, proprietary or contractual interest is affected thereby or against whom there is imputation of crime, has the right of access to Court. To hold otherwise is to encourage arbitrariness, anarchy and lawlessness in the running and the management of Political Parties in Nigeria, which will have dire consequences on the Government and the general citizen of this country. Thus, the Court is provided this leeway to always intervene where arbitrariness, impunity, capriciousness and constitutional question is the crux and not where the matter involves only a political question.”
This makes very interesting and convincing reading. It makes great moral sense but most times legality is not morality. The point made severally is that what is immoral may not necessarily be illegal. The above reasoning can certainly be justified by morality but the main issue here is whether this can be justified in the realm of legality. Whether this will be legally justified is a function of what and how the apex Court of the land has interpreted the position of the law. I say this with all sense of responsibility because, by the doctrine of stare decisis, all Courts in Nigeria are to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court which is the highest Court of the land. By the principle of stare decisis, the opinion of Courts lower than the Supreme Court of Nigeria on a decision of the Supreme Court is irrelevant because all are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court. It does not lie in the mouth of any Judge of the High Court or this Court to say the decision of the Supreme Court is wrong even if we do not agree with it. See P.D.P. vs Hon. Dr Harry Oranezi (2017) 12 S.C. (pt II) 1; Eperokun & Ors vs UNILAG (1986) 4 NWLR (pt 34) 162; Nwabueze vs The People of Lagos State (2018) 3-4 S.C. (pt 1) 55. The best a Court can do is to try to distinguish the facts of the case the Supreme Court has decided on from the case before it. If a Court lower than the Supreme Court can distinguish the facts in both cases, then the Court can decide not to follow the decision of the Supreme Court based on the well-established principle that decisions of Courts are authorities for what it actually decided. See Okafor vs Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (pt 64) 129; Adegoke Motor Ltd vs Adesanya & Anor (1989) LPELR-94 (SC).
I must quickly add that a judge should not distinguish the facts of cases just because he does not want to follow the decision and just for the fun of it.
I do not know why I am saying this here but it may or may not come handy in this judgment. I must however say without prejudice that the reasoning of His Lordship clearly makes a lot of moral sense to ensure that party leaders do not abuse power and make themselves institution of their own and become ‘godfather’ of their party thereby destroying the principles of internal democracy. For anyone who has the fear of God, he should reject been referred to as ‘godfather’ because God is the Father and he has no father. This is on the lighter side.
I will now return to the decision of the lower Court. At pages 303-304 of the record which contains the ruling of the lower Court, His lordship held:
“In my view, all that this principle of law is saying is that the Court has jurisdiction and the aggrieved member has the right to access Court for redress where the Political Party goes about its affairs arbitrarily and lawlessly without regard for its Constitution and guidelines as well as the Nigerian Constitution and Electoral Act, if such arbitrary actions infringe on the constitutional provisions as it relates to the right and interest of the affected member. It will no more be about Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act but about the constitutional power vested in Courts to prevent the arbitrary use of powers and breach of the constitution by political parties in a State governed by democratic ethos. That clearly denotes the thin line of exception between what is justiciable and what is not in the question of intraparty disputes and internal affairs of a politicial party. I so hold.
What grants jurisdiction is the non-compliance with either the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and/or the Party’s Constitution and/or Regulation and Guidelines of the Political Party. A Political Party must obey its constitution, Regulations and Guidelines. See Hope Uzodinma vs Senator Izunaso (2010) 5 MJSC, pt 1 27 B and Akpatason vs Ajoto & Ors (2019) EJSC vol 121, 1. Maybe, I should quickly make haste to add that the term “Internal Affairs of the party or Intra party dispute” is not a magic wand or a blank cheque to political parties to act arbitrarily or capriciously and neither is it a poison chalice that once raised, the Courts like piteous Pilate must without more immediately wash off their hands.”
The lower Court took the above decision which only addressed the preliminary objection. From the record of appeal, it is clear that both parties are set for the hearing of the matter since all the pleadings were in. The 1st–30th Respondents’ writ and statement of claim as Plaintiffs in the lower Court is found at pages 3-109 while the statement of defence/counter-claim of the Appellant as 1st Defendant is found at pages 131-196. The lower Court decided to take the preliminary objection and rule on it separately and decided to fix a date for the hearing of the substantive matter. This is therefore an interlocutory appeal. It has limited the hand of this Court as we cannot delve into issues which can affect the substantive case. One very important issue in this respect is, whether the Appellant actually violated the Constitution and Guideline of the party when instead of conducting the congress election decided to go for a consensus arrangement and thereby excluding the 1st–30th Respondents. If the lower Court had taken the preliminary objection together with the substantive suit as was done in a number of cases with similar facts, it would have given us the latitude to explore the Constitution and Guidelines of the party. In the present circumstance, we cannot go that way and that far. We have to limit ourselves to the preliminary objection since that is what is before us. I should not by this comment to be misunderstood to be saying that the lower Court was wrong in separating the preliminary objection and the substantive matter. It is a matter of style and I must respect it though I feel it would have been better if his lordship took both together by taking the ruling on the preliminary objection first and then pass his judgment on the substantive matter. Be that as it may, I will caution myself so that I do not make pronouncement on the substantive matter at this interlocutory stage. With this caution and adhering to same, I will make sure, I do not make pronouncement on the substantive suit at this stage of the interlocutory matter. See Agwu & Ors v. Julius Berger (Nig) Plc (2019) LPELR-47625(SC); Cil Risk & Asset Management Ltd v. Ekiti State Govt. & Ors (2020) LPELR-49565(SC)
The Appellant, that is the party APC dissatisfied with the ruling filed an appeal in this Court on 8/3/22 containing 7 grounds found at pages 246-254 of the record. The Appellant through his learned Counsel, Prof. Mamman Lawan (SAN) formulate 6 issues for determination from the 7 grounds as follows:
1. Whether or not the Learned Trial Judge was not wrong in holding that the 1st–9th Respondents’ suit was justiciable and hence a Pre-election matter in wrong interpretation and misapplication of the provisions of Section 85 (3) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Section 6 (6) (a), 36 (1) and 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)? (Distilled from Ground 1 of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.)
2. Whether or not the Learned Trial Judge was not wrong in assuming jurisdiction to adjudicate on the 1st–9th Respondents’ suit bordering on internal processes of a political party? (Distilled from Ground 2 of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.)
3. Whether or not the Learned Trial Judge was not wrong in holding that the 1st–9th Respondents’ suit disclosed a valid cause of action against the Appellant? (Distilled from Ground 3 of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.)
4. Whether or not the Learned Trial Judge was not wrong in holding that the 1st–9th Respondents had no locus standi to institute their action before the lower Court? (Distilled from Ground 4 of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.)
5. Whether or not the Learned Trial Judge was not wrong holding that the 1st–9th Respondents’ suit is not academic and does not constitute an abuse of Court process? (Distilled from Ground 5 of the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.)
6. Whether or not the Learned Trial Judge was not wrong when in its consolidated ruling delivered on 2nd March, 2021, in respect to the matters before it, viz:
The Learned Respondent’s Counsel, Paul Erokoro (SAN) formulated the following 6 issues for determination in this appeal:
1. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that suit no: FHC/GM/CS/5/2021 instituted by the 1st–30th respondents was justiciable?
2. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that it had jurisdiction to entertain suit no: FHC/GM/CS/5/2021 instituted by the 1st – 30th respondents?
3. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that suit no: FHC/GM/CS/5/2021 instituted by the 1st–30th Respondents disclosed reasonable cause of action?
4. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the 1st–30th Respondents had the locus standi to institute suit no: FHC/GM/CS/5/2021?
5. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that suit no: FHC/GM/CS/5/2021 instituted by the 1st–30th respondents is not academic and abuse of Court process?
6. whether the trial Court was right when it held that the appellant’s preliminary objection failed on all grounds as it relates and pertains to the 1st–30th respondents’ suit, suit no: FHC/GM/CS/5/2021 and suit no: FHC/GM/CS/5/2021, but succeeds as it relates and pertains to suit no: FHC/GM/CS/4/2021?
For a proper flow of this judgment, I will briefly summarize the submission of the Learned Silks for the parties starting with Prof. Mamman Lawan, SAN who settled the Appellant’s brief on 22/3/22, and then I will proceed to Paul Erokoro SAN who settled the Respondents’ brief of 19/4/22. Both senior Counsels adopted their respective briefs on 26/4/22 setting the stage for the judgment of this Court. Let me quickly add that the Appellant filed a reply brief on 22/4/22.
I had earlier in this judgment itemized the issues for determination formulated by both counsel and so I will not have to repeat them here. I will start with the submission of Prof. Mamman Lawan, SAN counsel to the Appellant. Learned silk argued issues 1 and 2 together in urging Court to resolve the issues in favour of the Appellant while arguing that the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that the 1st-30th Respondents’ suit was justiciable. Counsel submitted that in determining a dispute relating to a political party in Nigeria, reference must be made to Section 285(14)(a)-(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,1999, as amended and not Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Section 6(6)(a), 36(1) and 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The above Sections refer to pre-election matters for which Courts have jurisdiction but those Sections are not applicable to this case as this is an intra party matter. He referred to APC V. MOSES (2021) ALL MWLR (PT. 12) P. 495; AGUMA V. APC (2021)14 NWLR (PT. 1776) 351 AT 406 PARAS A-G; HON OLAIDE ADEWALE AKINREMI & ANOR V. MUTTAKA BALA SULAIMAN & 17,915 ORS (UNREPORTED) APPEAL NO. CA/ABJ/CV/1020/2021; APC & 2 ORS V. MUTTAKA BALA SULAIMAN &17,914 ORS (UNREPORTED) APPEAL NO. CA/ABJ/CV/1034/2021; DR. TONY MACFOY & 3 ORS V. MUSA MUHAMMAD CHOLA & 1,322 ORS (UNREPORTED) APPEAL NO. CA/ABJ/CV/03/2022.
The lower Court’s refusal to consider the case of APC V. MOSES (supra) which are on all fours with the facts of the case learned senior counsel submitted, is fatal to the decision particularly based on the principle of stare decisis
Counsel in clarifying the error of law made by the lower Court submitted that Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act,2010 (as amended) is not a jurisdiction conferring provision but merely a provision that directs political parties to be democratic in their operations. Also, Sections 6 (6)(a), 36(1) and 255 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provide for the judicial powers, fundamental rights to fair hearing and general jurisdiction of the lower Court. These provisions never stated expressly or even impliedly confer jurisdiction on the lower Court in an intra party dispute.
It is settled law, learned silk submitted that where there is a general provision on a matter in a statute and a specific provision on the same issue, the specific provision will prevail over the general provisions. It is on this basis that learned silk submitted that the specific provisions of Section 285(14) (a)-(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,1999 (as amended) and Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) will prevail over Section 6 (6)(b),36(1) and 255 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).
Counsel further submitted that no Court of law can adjudicate on the issue of the leadership of a political party either at Ward, Local Government, State, Zonal, Regional or National levels, as a political party is a voluntary association just like a club. This is because no Court of law has jurisdiction to adjudicate on how a political party conducts its affairs and that of the choice of the candidate as this issue is purely an internal affair of the political party even if the party is in breach of its Constitution and guidelines. The only cause of action which the Court has jurisdiction to determine is unlawful or wrongful substitution. He relied on the following cases: AGI V. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (PT.1648) 548; APC V. KARFI (2018) 6 NWLR (PT.1616) 479; UGWUEGEDE V. ASADU (2018) 10 NWLR (PT.1628) 460; SALIM V. CPC(2013)6 NWLR(PT. 1351)501 AT 521-522 PARAS E-B; CPC V. OMBUGADO (2013)18 NWLR (PT.1385)66 AT 119,PARAS A-C, ADETAYO V. ADEMOLA (2010) ALL FWLR (PT.533) 1806 AT 1823-1828; TERVER KAKIH V. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (PT.1430) 374 AT 413H-414,417A-C,
Issues 3 and 6 were argued together, learned silk submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that the 1st-30th Respondents’ suit disclosed a valid cause of action against the Appellant relying on a cloud of cases including ANUKWU V. EZE (2012)11NWLR (PT.1310)P.50
Counsel further submitted that once this honourable Court holds that the subject matter of the suit is an intra-party dispute the question would be whether there is any wrong recognized and protected by law which the Appellant has done to the 1st–30th Respondents? Learned senior Counsel answers this question in the negative. He further submitted that the kind of wrong which will give rise to a valid cause of action must be known to law or “a legal wrong”. Hence since actions arising from intra-party disputes are not recognized as legal wrong except matters arising from the conduct of party primaries, then the 1st-30th Respondents’ case is devoid of any valid cause of action against the Appellant. In such a situation, no Court has jurisdiction since the absence of a cause of action obliges a Court to strike out the suit. He referred to ORJI v. UGOCHUKWU (2009) 14 NWLR (PT.1161) 207 AT 283-284, PARAS H-D; ABUBAKAR V. FALOLA (1997)11 NWLR (PT.530) AT 638. It is the submission of counsel specifically on issue 6 that the Court was wrong in making different pronouncements in his composite ruling.
Let me quickly handle this issue 6 which in my opinion is not starter. A Court has the powers to consolidate cases and rule accordingly and in so doing can make different pronouncements on each of the consolidated matter since the decision of Court is based on the evidence before it. The lower Court in my opinion gave the reason why the ruling in Suit No. FHC/GM/CS/4/2021 could not go the same way as the others. Whether the Court was right or wrong is not what is in issue here but that the lower Court could not have made different pronouncement on similar cases. The Court can do so since there are different facts before the Court.
On issue 4, Counsel submitted that once this honourable Court resolves issues 1, 2 and 3 in favour of the Appellant, it will be glaring that the 1st-30th Respondents’ do not have the locus standi to maintain this action. Furthermore, Counsel submitted that by virtue of the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), APC Guidelines for Local Government Congresses 2021 as well as an avalanche of judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court and this honourable Court, for a member of a political party to be regarded as an “Aspirant”, he must have purchased and filed the Expression of interest form as well as the Nomination form. He must equally have been screened by the party and cleared to contest the election. The mere evidence of payment of Expression of Interest form as well as Nomination form is insufficient to classify a member of a political party as an aspirant.
There is nothing, counsel submitted in the 1st-30th Respondents’ suit that established that they had any interest different from any common member of the Appellant’s Political party especially since they admitted in their pleadings that they never filed any Expression of interest form as well as Nomination form. Counsel further submitted that it is a well settled principle of law that a party can only have the locus standi to institute an action if he can sufficiently show his legal interest in the subject matter of the suit and establish that his right is infringed upon or is in danger of being infringed upon. He relied on the following cases: AG LAGOS STATE V. EKO HOTELS LTD (2006) 9 SCNJ 104, FAWEHINMI V. PRESIDENT, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2007) 9 NWLR (PT.1054) 275; YAR’ADUA V. C.P.C. (2011)10 SC7; OJUKWU V. OJUKWU (2008) 12 SC (PT.III)1; PACER MULTI-DYNAMICS LTD V. THE M.V. “DANCING SISTER” (2012) 1 SC (PT.II) 75, THE ADMINISTRATORS/EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF GENERAL SANNI ABACHA V. SAMUEL DAVID EKE-SPIFF (2009) 2-3SC (PT.II) 93 and MAKINDE V. ORION ENGR. SERVICES (UK) LTD (2014)11NWLR (PT.1471) P.1
On issue 5, it is the submission of counsel for the Appellant that based on the submissions above, issue 5 will naturally be resolved in favour of the Appellant referring to a lot of cases including Macfoy vs U.A.C. (1962) 3 ALL E.R. 1169; Shelim vs Gobang (2009) 37 WRN 32 and State vs Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (pt 1351) 481. He finally urged Court to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the lower Court.
I will now turn to the submission of Paul Erokoro, SAN, learned counsel for the 1st–30th Respondents. He also formulated 6 issues and argued issues 1 and 2 together, and similarly issues 3 and 6 together as his learned friend did. On issues 1 and 2, it is vehement submission of counsel that the 1st–30th Respondents case is that the Appellant violated the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution, the Electoral Act, and its own Constitution and the Guidelines and in such a situation to arbitrary use of power, the Court should intervene even though it is an intra party dispute. He relied on APC vs Moses (supra), Onuoha vs Okafor (supra), Sheriff vs P.D.P. (2017) 14 NWLR (pt 1585) 212; Mato vs Hember & Ors (2017) LPELR-42765 (SC). He relied heavily on Section 6 (6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria and Section 85(3) of the Electoral alleging that those provisions were violated.
On issues 3 and 6, learned silk submitted that the 1st–30th Respondents have disclosed reasonable cause of action against the Appellant having shown that they are members of the party and had paid the required fee for the Expression of Interest and Nomination form in readiness for the election. He referred to A.G. Federation vs A.G. Abia State (2001) 11 NWLR (pt 725) 689; Yusuf vs Akin Dipe (2000) 8 NWLR (pt 669) 376 and Yare vs NSW & IC (2013) 12 NWLR (pt 1376) 173 among other cases.
Learned silk for the 1st– 30th Respondents also agued issues 4 and 5 together. He answered the questions in the affirmative after copiously stating the position of the law on locus standi and what will amount to academic exercise and abuse of Court process referring to relevant cases on the subject. It is finally submitted that this Court should dismiss the appeal and affirm the composite ruling of the lower Court.
The Appellant filed a reply brief but there is nothing new in the reply brief that is worthy of mention as it mostly placed more emphasis on the argument made in the Appellant’s brief.
It is now the turn of this Court to decide this appeal assisted by the submissions of learned counsel for the parties but guided by the provision of the law. Though Learned Senior Counsel for the parties formulated 6 issues for determination but it is my considered view that the issue before this Court for determination is narrow. This is because the determination of the issue whether a Court has jurisdiction to determine the intra party dispute between the parties will settle the other issues involved in this appeal. The other issues involved in this appeal which are whether, the 1st–30th Respondents disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the Appellant: whether the 1st–30th Respondents have the locus standi to sue the Appellant and finally whether the action is not an academic issue can all be settled and determined by answering the question: whether the lower Court has jurisdiction to entertain the intra party dispute between the parties. I say this with all sense of responsibility, as the facts of the case culminating into this appeal revealed in the record of appeal. The 1st–30th Respondents as card-carrying members of the Appellant who paid the necessary fees for the Expression of Interest and Nomination form certainly will have a reasonable cause of action and locus standi to institute the action since they were denied or was not given the opportunity to contest for offices of the party at the Local Government Area Congress. The point I am making is, if I hold that in the circumstance of the case on appeal, the intra party dispute is not such that the jurisdiction of the Court is oust, the other issues as to reasonable cause of action and locus standi will naturally go in favour of the Respondents. If however, I hold that the action is not justiciable, the other issues will naturally be resolved in favour of the Appellant.
The main issue therefore for determination in my opinion in this appeal out of the 6 issues formulated by each of the parties in their brief is issues 1 and 2 in each of the briefs of the parties. The issues which deal with jurisdiction were argued by both Counsel together. I want to make it straight and simple for they say, there is beauty in simplicity. I am saying this to lay foundation for formulating my own issue for determination. The law allows a Court to formulate its own issue, the only caveat is that the issues formulated by the Court must flow from the grounds of appeal as the general law is that issues must be based on the ground of appeal while the ground must be based on the judgment of the Court. See Okonkwo v. Ezeaku & Anor (2020) LEPLR (SC); Yusuf & Anor vs State (2019) LPELR-46945; K.R.K. Holdings Nigeria Ltd vs First Bank of Nigeria Ltd & Anor (2016) 12 S.C. (pt II) 85; Adelekan vs Ecu-Line NV (2006) 3 FWLR (pt 325) 4595.
Operating under the liberty of the law, I will formulate a sole issue for determination which is:
Whether in the circumstance of the facts before the Court, the lower Court was right to have assumed jurisdiction in the intra party dispute brought before it?
This is the main thrust of the appeal as far as I am concerned. The main question to answer therefore in determining this appeal is, whether the lower Court was right in the composite ruling where he dismissed the preliminary objection and assumed jurisdiction to entertain the dispute brought before it. The ancillary question to answer is, whether having agreed that the matter between the parties is an intra party matter, was the 1st–30th Respondents able to show that this matter falls under any of the exceptions recognized by law allowing a Court to adjudicate upon it. This is the narrow issue involved in this appeal. If I hold that the facts disclosed in the record of appeal does not fall within the purview of the exception to the general principle that intra party dispute are a no go area for any Court, the appeal will succeed and be allowed. If on the other hand, I hold that the exceptions apply to this case, the appeal will fail and be dismissed. I am emboldened to narrow down the issue before this Court in this appeal in the light of the concession made by the Learned Senior Counsel to the 1st–30th Respondents which is that the dispute before the lower Court is not a pre-election matter but rather an intra party dispute. In the light of that concession, I do not think it will serve any useful purpose for me to delve into all the argument of the learned silk for the Appellant on Section 285 (14)(a),(b)(c) and Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act and the cases referred to in that regard. The arguments of learned silk on those sections are to show that the matter is not a pre-election matter but rather an intra party matter. This has narrowed the scope of this judgment. I intend therefore to remain within the limit of the life issue before this Court.
The case of the 1st–30th Respondents as advanced by their Counsel, Paul Erokoro, SAN is that the action of the Appellant is a violation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Electoral Act and the Constitution and guidelines of the party. It is the vehement submission of Counsel referring to a line of cases including APC vs Dele Moses & Ors (supra) that the inability of the Appellant to adhere to its constitution and guidelines is an exception to the principle that intra party disputes are non-justiciable. It is the submission of Counsel that once there is a complaint of non-compliance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Electoral Act, the Party’s Constitution and Guidelines, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be ousted. In other words, in such a situation, a Court can adjudicate in such matters. The lower Court agreed with this position referring to the constitutional provisions of Sections 6 (6)(a), 232 and 251 of the Constitution and Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act.
The Respondent’s case in driving home this point at page 7 of the Respondent’s brief submitted thus:
“A careful look and consideration of the pleadings and the relief sought by the 1st-30th Respondents in their suit at the trial Court (see pages 3-12 of the Record of Appeal), will reveal that the case of the 1st-30th Respondents at the trial Court, centered on the Appellant’s arbitrariness and the gross violation of its constitution and Guideline by its failure to conduct the LGA Congresses which were scheduled for 4th September 2021. In APC vs Moses (2021) 14 NWLR (pt 1796) 278 at 321, paras. A-B the Supreme Court, while upholding the principle in Onuoha vs Okafor (1983) 4 NSCC 494, reiterated that:
‘Members of political party would do well to understand and appreciate the finality of a party’s decision over its domestic or internal affairs. The Court would only interfere where the party has violated its own rule’”
The Appellant’s Counsel on the other hand using the same case of APC vs Moses (supra) submitted that once the matter before the Court deals with intra party dispute, a Court of law has no jurisdiction to entertain same even if the action of the Appellant violates the constitution of the Appellant. These two views are parallel views as there is no meeting point. Incidentally, both Counsels referred to the case of APC vs Moses (supra). In the circumstance, I will have to take a little excursion into the case law in the course of this judgment. Before I do that, I need to state clearly again that the issue I am dealing with here has to do with whether the lower Court had jurisdiction in intra party matters.
As clearly stated by the lower Court which represents the true position of the law, jurisdiction is very fundamental to judicial proceedings. It is referred to as the life wire of a Court. A Court without jurisdiction should not attempt to go into a matter because the whole proceedings and the decision reached will be a nullity. See Umanah v. Attah NSCQR Vol 27 2005 P. 706; Chief of Air Staff vs Iyen (2005) LPELR-3167(CA); Dangana & Anor v. Usman & Ors (2012) LPELR-25012 (SC).
Jurisdiction to a Court is like water to a fish and breath to a human being. Just like fish cannot survive outside water and a human being cannot survive without breath, so a Court without jurisdiction cannot adjudicate on a matter before it. A Court without jurisdiction is like a king without a kingdom. A Court must not lobby for jurisdiction and at the same time, a Court must not be intimidated to decline jurisdiction when the law confers same on it. Jurisdiction is conferred on a Court by law and not by the consent of parties and when determining whether a Court has jurisdiction, the relevant document is the statement of claim. See Azubuogu v. Oranezi & Ors (2017) LPELR-42669(SC); Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund vs Fidelity Bank & Ors (2021) LPELR-56625 (SC); Agbule v. Warri Refinery & Petrochemical Co Ltd (2013) 6 NWLR (pt 1305) 318.
I must however hasten to add that jurisdiction is different from judicial powers. I am compelled to say this because sometimes both are used interchangeably and misunderstood by parties. There is a difference between judicial powers and jurisdiction. They are not one and the same thing. Judicial powers which is a more general term refers to the powers conferred on a Court by law to adjudicate with the aim of promoting justice in settling dispute between parties. This is a general power conferred on Courts by the Constitution. Jurisdiction on the other hand is the specific power on a particular Court to adjudicate on a specific subject matter. For instance, while Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution confers judicial power on the Courts, Section 251 of the same Constitution streamlines the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The implication of this is that a Court with judicial powers does not necessarily have the jurisdiction to try a matter before it. In Babalola v. Obaoku-ote & Anor (2004) LPELR-5259(CA) this Court held:
“It is also pertinent to define judicial power and jurisdiction. The judicial powers of the Court are vested in the Courts according to the Constitution – Section 6 of the 1979 Constitution and also Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution. Since it is fundamental that the rights of parties in litigation are determined on the substantive law in force at the time of the act in question – the 1979 Constitution shall be the operative statute for the purpose of this appeal – as the Constitution in operation as the law in force at the time of the complaint of the appellant Omisade v. Akande (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 55) 158; Mustapha v. Governor of Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) pg. 539, Bank of Baroda v. Iyalabani Ltd. (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 539) pg. 600. Terms judicial power and jurisdiction are frequently used interchangeably – there is a clear distinction between the two. “Jurisdiction is defined as the power of the Court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy between the parties.” In other words – jurisdiction is the authority of the Courts to exercise judicial powers which is the totality of powers a Court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction to hear a case. You must first have jurisdiction before you can proceed to exercise power. Judicial power is a very wide expression apart from its meaning as the power which every sovereign authority must possess to enable it settle and decide controversies between its subjects and itself, it also co-exist with the power of the State to administer public justice and again with the power of the State to make laws and execute them as well. Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296.”
Similarly in Abacha v. FRN (2014) LPELR-22014 (SC), the apex Court held:
“Section 6(1) of the 1999 Constitution has vested the judicial powers in the Court to which the Section relates. Judicial powers has been interpreted in BRONIK MOTORS & ANOR v. WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 14 NSCC 26 at 253 to mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity possess to enable it settle and decide controversies between its subjects. Judicial power is co-extensive with the power of the state to make laws and execute them.
Jurisdiction in contrast to judicial power is the authority or legal weapon which a Court must possess to decide matters that are litigated before it or take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision, see ENYADIKE v. OMEHIA & 4 ORS (2010) 11 NWLR (pt.1204) 92 at 112.”
The lower Court and the Respondents’ Senior Counsel has referred to certain provisions of the 1999 Constitution to submit that the lower Court had jurisdiction to determine the intra party dispute which the facts culminating to this appeals buttresses. The Sections as stated above are Sections 6 (6)(a), 223 and 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. I will now consider whether these provisions confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to determine intra party dispute. Section 6(6)(a) of the 1999 Constitution is a provision that confers judicial powers on the Court and has nothing to do with jurisdiction, Section 4 confers legislative powers on the Legislative arm of government. Section 5 confers Executive powers on the Executive arm while Section 6 confers judicial powers or judicial arm. This is a general judicial powers conferred on the Courts of record in Nigeria and does not provide for the jurisdiction of the Court. I agree with Prof Mamman Lawan (SAN) submission to the effect that Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution which confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court does not provide that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction in intra party dispute. I had mentioned above that jurisdiction is conferred by statute, Section 251 does not confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to interfere or settle intra party dispute.
There is one more constitutional provision to determine whether jurisdiction is conferred on the lower Court in the matter before it. This is the provision of Section 223 of the Constitution which provides thus:
“223. (1) The constitution and rules of a political party shall-
(a) provide for the periodical election on a democratic basis of the principal officers and members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political party; and
(b) ensure that the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political party reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria.
(2) For the purposes of this section –
(a) the election of the officers or members of the executive committee of a political party shall be deemed to be periodical only if it is made at regular intervals not exceeding four years; and
(b) the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political character of Nigeria only if the members thereof belong to different states not being less in number than two-thirds of all the states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja”
This provision has no relationship with the matter before the lower Court as it does not confer jurisdiction on the lower Court in intra party dispute except that it states that the Constitution of the party should make provision for periodic election on democratic basis of its principle officers and members of the Executive Committee or other governing body of the political party. This provision has nothing to do with Ward or Local Government Area Congresses as that cannot come within the definition of principle officers and members of the Executive Committee or other governing body of the Political Party. This has to do generally with the main organs of the Political Party at the Federal level hence while defining the scope of Section 223 (1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, the Subsection 2(b) talks about Federal character in relation to State. The lower Court in my view is therefore wrong in using those provisions to assume jurisdiction in an intra party dispute.
The provision in the Electoral Act which the lower Court used to confer jurisdiction on in the intra party dispute before it is Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act. This section again does not make reference to congresses but focus is again on election to Executive Committee, other governing bodies or nominated candidates for any elective office specified under the Act. This does not include Ward and Local Government Congresses. The lower Court relied on provisions of the Constitution and Electoral Act which do not confer jurisdiction on it in intra party disputes. I agree entirely with the learned Appellant’s Counsel that the constitutional provision and the provision of the Electoral Act referred to by the lower Court and the learned senior counsel to the 1st – 30th Respondents do not confer jurisdiction on the lower Court on intra party matters. For the avoidance of doubt, there is nothing in the provision of both the Nigerian constitution and the Electoral Act which confers jurisdiction on intra party matters on any Court in Nigeria.
When there is a dispute between members of a party or between a member or members on the one hand and the party on the other hand on leadership issues or management of the party which does not involve people outside the party, it is an intra party dispute. See Senator Dahiru & Anor vs APC & Ors (2016) 12 S.C. (pt vi) 1; Rt. Hon. Chief Asuquo vs Hon. Ekpo & Anor (2019) LPELR-48168 (CA), PDP vs Badaire (2020) ALL FWLR (pt 1024) 170; Kalgo vs Faruk (2008) LPELR-4495 (CA). When it is purely and exclusively a dispute that has to do with the members of the party or between the members and the party which has no effect on non-members of the party it is an intra party matter. The word ‘intra’ by normal English usage means within. A dispute which is within the party can be referred to as a domestic or internal affair. It can be said to be a family affair. It is a family dispute which a third party should not be involved in solving and the involvement of a third party will make such a party a busybody. This Court in the case of APC vs Sulaiman & 17914 (unreported) Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/1034/2021 cited by learned counsel to the Appellant, as defined intra party dispute in these words:
“Indeed the facts leading to the institution of this suit in the Court below, reveal clearly that the suit is an outcome of the ward congresses of the Appellant (APC) conducted in Kano State. Congresses of political parties are to be distinguished from primary election. A primary election is the process whereby a political party’s member nominate or select candidates of that party to contest or run in a general election. Party congresses are generally conducted to select the leadership of a political party. Thus it is considered as an internal affair of the political party…..I hereby hold that the subject of this appeal is not a pre-election matter. in so doing, we are by the principles of stare decisis bound by APC vs Moses and APC vs Aguma which are later in time to APC vs Umar.”
This definition is necessary because both Senior Counsel have admitted that this is an intra party dispute. The implication therefore is that the lower Court assumed jurisdiction over an intra party dispute. The question is that it does not seem that there is a statute that confers jurisdiction on a Court in intra party dispute. This will now take me to consider the case law on the point. I must mention here that both Counsel before the lower Court seem to have almost exhausted the case law on the issue and so I will mostly look at the cases as supplied by the learned Counsel on behalf of the parties and the cases the lower Court relied on in resolving the sole issue I formulate in this appeal. In doing that, I must warn myself as earlier stated that a case is only authority for the point and issue decided and also the decision of the Supreme Court is truly supreme and gain superiority over any decision of the Court of Appeal or the High Court provided the facts are materially similar.
Having established this, I will now look at the case law to determine whether a Court of law has jurisdiction to entertain an action dealing with intra party dispute. The general position of the law as established in a cloud of cases is that no Court has the power to delve into the internal dispute of a party as the party should be able to sort out itself without any external interference – not even by a Court. This general principle however has with time recognized some exceptions to forestall arbitrary use of power and to promote internal democracy. This desire to ensure that internal democracy is practiced is clearly what must have made the lower Court take the decision it did. As I had mentioned earlier, no matter how morally justified this can be, it is still subject to the current decisions of the Supreme Court on the point with similar facts. The issue before the lower Court for determination is whether the lower Court had jurisdiction to entertain the intra party dispute on the facts of the case before it, which has shown in the record and admitted by the learned Counsel to the parties relate to the Local Government Area Congress for the Akko Local Government Area of Gombe State. In this regard and based on the principle that cases are authorities for the issues and points decided, the only cases that can serve as authorities are cases dealing with congresses of political parties and not cases dealing with primaries. In this regard, most of the cases the lower Court relied on are not on party congress but rather on pre-election matters. The law clearly is that on intra party dispute except such dispute falls within the exception stated in the case law, such matter is not justicable while pre-election matters are justiciable. Based on that, the following cases referred to by the lower Court will not serve as authorities for this Court to follow as they were decided on pre-election matter and not on intra party dispute. The cases are APC vs Okorodudu (supra); Mato vs Hember (supra) and Boko vs Nungwa (supra). This does not mean the cases will be completely disregarded as the principles stated can be of general application like some of the cases I will refer to. However, when there is an authority which is apt on the point, such an authority will be preferred such as APC vs Moses (supra) and APC vs Aguma (supra). The only case which deals with congress apart from the two cases mentioned above is Erue vs Okotie-Eboh (supra) which is a decision of the Court of Appeal. On the side of the 1st–30th Respondents’ Counsel he made reference to Sheriff vs P.D.P. (2017) 14 NWLR (pt 1585) 212 which is a case that went on appeal to the Supreme Court but Counsel cited the Court of Appeal decision. I wonder why, I certainly cannot justify this for whatever reason. This is not commendable at all. The majority decision of the Court of appeal in Sheriff vs P.D.P. (supra) was overruled and set aside by the Supreme Court. I will however opine that the facts in that case is not applicable as the facts of the case culminating into this appeal are not the same, however since Learned silk has cited it, the decision of my Learned brother Gumel, JCA buttress the point that a Court can only decide on whether the party acted arbitrarily where the appropriate jurisdiction of the Court has been invoked. In other words, that decision to my mind is stating that it is only when the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the intra party dispute that it can then go further to determine whether the party acted illegally with impunity or not. This case in my view does not help the case of the 1st – 30th Respondents. The other major cases the 1st – 30th Respondents’ Counsel relied on are APC vs Moses (supra) and Onuoha vs Okafor (supra).
I will now take an excursion into the case law on the point of whether intra party disputes are justiciable or not. I will start with the case of Ufomba vs INEC & Ors (2017) LPELR-42079 (SC) where the Supreme Court per Sanusi, JSC held as follows:
“….what he ventilated merely relates to nomination of members or leaders of the party. The issue now is, are claims against the nomination of members or leaders of the political party justifiable? My simple answer to that question is a capital “NO”. The law is trite that Court’s jurisdiction is ousted in matters dealing with internal affairs or resolution of a political party regarding nomination or leadership of that political party as in this instant case….
There is no gainsaying and it is even settled law, that power or right to sponsor or nominate a candidate for an election is purely a domestic affair of the political party. This also presupposes that issue of leadership and/or membership of a party is an internal or domestic affair of a party. It is within the political party’s jurisdiction and is indeed “No go area” for Courts, as they lack jurisdiction to delve into such affair or matters. The Court’s jurisdiction is ousted because such subject matter is non-justiciable. See PDP v Sylva (2012)13 NWLR (Pt.1316) 85.”
In the same case, Ogunbiyi, JSC held:
“By the nature of the claims put forward by the appellant, there is a clear invitation to the trial Court to determine leadership disputes in the 2nd respondent. This, clearly and as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the 2nd and 4th respondents, is not an exception to Onuoha V. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244. Also in the locus classicus case of Emenike V. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1315) 556, Fabiyi JSC, in his lead judgment said:-
”The Courts have no power to compel a political party to sponsor a candidate outside the thin and limited powers conferred under Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). The jurisdiction of the Court relates to whether complaints in respect of primary election for nomination of a candidate were conducted in line with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the Constitution and the Party guidelines.”
In his contribution to Emenike V. PDP case supra, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC made it very clear that limited jurisdiction would be invoked if primaries were not conducted in accordance with “Party’s Constitution and Guidelines.
As rightly submitted on behalf of the 2nd and 4th respondents, to consider whether election has been conducted in accordance with Party Constitution and Electoral Guidelines, the Courts cannot be invited to decide, who the leader of such a party is, as that would be beyond the jurisdiction of such Courts in the light of Onuoha V. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244.
Also, in the case of PDP V. Sylva supra this Court, restated clearly that the right to nominate or sponsor a candidate for an elective position is a domestic right of a political party. It follows therefore that the issues of leadership and membership are internal affairs of a political party. In other words, it is not open for a Court to inquire into, the membership/leadership of a political party….
On the foregoing conclusion, the lower Court was very clear in its pronouncements at pages 710 and 711 of Volume 2 of the record of appeal which were reproduced earlier in the course of this judgment. The finding by the lower Court, cannot in the circumstance be faulted. The matter at hand is “an intra-party affair.” The concept of the phrase was defined by this Court in PDP V. K.S.I.E.C. (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 968) 565 at 577 as-
“A dispute between members of the party inter se, or between a member on the one hand and the party on the other.”
Also in PDP V. Sylva (supra) at page 146 this Court held thus:-
“Consequently, the Court does not have jurisdiction to make appointments of persons to hold party offices, represent a party in elections or to determine any dispute arising from the internal affairs of a political party.”
The general principle therefore is that, once a matter arises from an intra party dispute, no Court has jurisdiction to look into it, and should not touch same like the forbidding fruit in the Garden of Eden. It appears to be a ‘no go area’. This is the general principle but like in most principles in law, there are exceptions to this principle. The apex Court in a line of cases has stated circumstances in which the Court can exercise jurisdiction over a matter arising from an in intra party dispute. The exceptions are as stated in a few cases including APC vs Moses (supra) which both counsels relied on. If the person seeking the Court’s intervention in an intra party matter is able to prove any of the following, the dispute will move from the status of non-justicability to justiciable. These are firstly when such power of intervention by the Court is conferred on it by statute, secondly, the commission of crime is imputed and thirdly where there is a claim for damages for breach of the personal contractual right of the person.
In APC vs Moses (supra) which arose from Rivers State, the Appellant invited all its members interested in participating in congresses to fill positions in the ward to obtain nomination forms. The 1st-10th Respondents in that case instituted an action in the High Court seeking an order to the effect that only members who had paid for nomination forms as at 5/5/2018 should be entitled to contest the election in the ward congress. The Appellant raised a preliminary objection on the ground that it was an intra party matter for which the Court had no jurisdiction. The lower Court assumed jurisdiction after overruling the preliminary objection. The appeal to the Court of Appeal on that point was allowed. There were other grounds of appeal but I will limit myself to the ground relevant to this appeal which is on whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between which is an intra party dispute arising from election on ward election. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the apex Court had this to say on whether a Court has jurisdiction to determine intra party dispute. Augie, JSC at page 320 held as follows:
“There has to be a point at which political parties will leave the Court out of their domestic wrangles or internal leadership tussles. To widen the net and allow the Court to be seen as an integral part of the political struggle for power, is not in the interest of anyone….a political party is supreme over its own affairs, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to question the exercise of its discretion, one way or the other.”
Citing the cases of Dalhatu vs Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt 843) 310 and Onuoha vs Okafor (1983) 14 NSCC 494 and Agi vs P.D.P. (2017) 17 NWLR (pt 1595) 386, the apex Court held that persons who have freely joined a political party has consented to abide by the rules and regulations of the party and therefore they are expected to abide by them It is also expected that the party should also comply with its Constitution and Guidelines. The question is, if there is sufficient evidence that the party did not comply with its own constitution, which is the complaint of the Respondents, should a Court interfere by examining in what way the constitution and guidelines of the party not complied with? In answer to this question, I will refer to the same case of APC vs Moses (supra) where his lordship Agim, JSC had this to say:
“The general law is that a political party, being a voluntary organization or association, disputes over its internal affairs are non-justiciable and a Court has no jurisdiction to entertain them unless such power is expressly conferred on it by statute or the commission of crime is imputed or there is a claim for damages for breach of the personal contractually right of a person. As held by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Onuoha vs Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244 at 254 ‘the practice of the Court is not to run associations (corporations and unincorporated associations) for the members. It leaves the members to run their association’
The Court further held per Aniagolu, JSC thus:
‘…the issue raised on whether the various internal committee proceedings of the party were regularly conducted and whether there was lapse in the observance of the rules of natural justice are issues which the Court will go into after it has decided that the matter is one in respect of which it will exercise jurisdiction. In my view, this is not a matter which the High Court ought to have assumed jurisdiction. It would have been different if the appellant has sued for a breach of contract between himself and the party, claiming damages for breach of contract”
The real issue in this appeal is whether what the Respondents complained about amounts to the ‘unless’ which can constitute an exception to the general principle of non-interference of Court on intra party dispute. The first lifeline stated in APC vs Moses (supra) as an exception to the general principle is when there is a statutory provision that confers power expressly on a Court to interfere on intra party and domestic affairs. I had mentioned above in this judgment that there is no express or implied provision that confers powers on the Court to adjudicate on intra party dispute. The first exception therefore does not avail the Respondents and does not apply to this case on appeal.
The second lifeline which can be an exception to the general rule is, when there is an imputation of the commission of crime on the part of the Appellant. I have gone through the statement of claim in the record I cannot see anywhere there was an imputation of the commission of crime against the Appellant.
The third lifeline which will make a Court assume jurisdiction in an intra party dispute is when there is a breach of the personal contractual right of the Respondents. The lower Court decision seems to be based on this exception. This is made clear by the reasoning of the Court at page 299 of the record where the lower Court held;
“To my mind, where there is non-compliance with the above mandatory constitutional provisions, the aggrieved party whose personal, proprietary or contractual interest is affected thereby or against whom there is imputation of crime, has the right of access to Court.”
From the case of APC vs Moses (supra), it would appear that the proof that a person who wants an exception on the ground that his personal contractual right has been breached, is a claim for damages in the reliefs sought. To my mind, apart from making an averment in the statement of claim, the Respondents needed to have gone further to claim for damages for such breach of personal contractual right. The evidence that they paid for the form is not sufficient proof that their personal contractual right has been breached as that only entitles them to contest but does not confer on them a right to be elected. I also make bold to say looking at the record again, there is no claim for damages for the breach of the perceived personal right of the Respondent. The absence of any allegation on the infringement of any personal right which would lead to a claim for damages made the Court not to interfere with the domestic matter of the party in Abdulkadir & Anor vs Mamman & Ors (2003) LPELR-10287. To urge a Court to intervene in an intra party dispute, the person who wants the intervention has the duty to show that the circumstance of the case falls within the exceptions stated above, after all, the law is settled which is to the effect that he that alleges must prove. See Sections 131,132 and 133 of the Evidence Act 2011; Sharing Cross Educational Services Ltd v. Umaru Adamu Enterprises Ltd & Ors (2020) LPELR-49567(SC).
A Court as an unbiased umpire will not make a case for any of the parties before it. See Akere & Ors vs Gov. of Oyo State & Ors (2012) LPELR-7806 (SC). The duty is on the Respondents to clearly show by his averment in the statement of claim that their personal contractual right were breached. This must be clear evidence before the Court and not an issue that the Court will infer from the pleadings or a fact that will come out from the submission of counsel. There is no such averment in the statement of claim of the 1st-30th Respondents in the lower Court. The lower Court seems to draw the conclusion from the inference in the pleading. A Court cannot make inference except the inference is based on the evidence already before the Court. In this regard, this Court per Abba Aji, JCA (now JSC) in Amuzie v. State (2014) LPELR-22830(CA) in this regard held thus:
“The trial Court has so frequently speculated and inferred to arrive at his verdict of convicting the Appellant. It was held per Tobi, JCA (as he then was) in OKEKE V. STATE (supra) AT 281 PARAS A-B, as follows: “Frequent inferences and speculations on the part of a Court indicates that the matter has not been sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt in all aspects. The Court is therefore tempted to draw inferences and embark on speculations to fill the vacuum in the evidence. If the Court draws the inference and makes the speculations within the evidence available to it, it is within the law but the moment it undertakes the twin exercise completely outside the evidence, a Court of appeal will not allow it to do so.”
A Court exists to do justice and therefore can make reasonable inference from documents presented to it and be guided by such inference to arrive at a just decision. This is because a Court of law is not a zombie, however the point must be made that while a Court can draw inference in arriving at its decision but the decision must not be based on speculation. A decision is based on speculation when it is based or founded on nothing but the imagination of a Court. On the other hand, an inference can be drawn based on evidence that ordinarily exist and presented to the Court. See Tafida v. Abdulsalam & Ors (2020) LPELR-51344(CA). The lower Court based its decision on the fact presented in the statement of claim that the 1st-30th Respondents are members of the Appellant. They paid the fees for Expression of Interest and Nomination forms for the congress election. By this evidence the lower Court was encouraged to draw the conclusion that the 1st-30th Respondents’ personal contractual right were breached. This conclusion may not be totally misplaced but the fact remains that a Court can only determine this at the trial after it must have assumed jurisdiction as this is an issue that can properly be determined at the substantive stage of the proceedings. Apart from that, it is also important to realize that the issue of the personal contractual right of a person is not an issue for the inference of the Court but should be an issue which is expressly brought out in the statement of claim. There is yet another fundamental question, which is whether, the 1st-30th Respondents have shown in any of the paragraphs in the statement of claim that they have rights under the party’s Constitution to be cleared to contest the election once he has paid for the form or picked up same. This omission in the case of the 1st-30th Respondents in my opinion is fatal to their case and consequently the decision of the lower Court. Aside from that, the fact that there is no claim for damages as proof of the breach of the personal contractual rights of the 1st-30th Respondents makes the inference of the lower Court out of order as the 1st-30th Respondents could not take advantage of the exception on the breach of the personal contractual right of the 1st-30th Respondents.
The concern of the 1st-30th Respondents which the lower Court agreed with in its ruling is that the Appellant arbitrarily used its powers in difference to its own Constitution and the Guidelines. In other words, the Appellant acted ultra vires its power when it denied the 1st-30th Respondents the opportunity of contesting in the Local Government congresses. This morally will appear as a good ground for a Court to intervene, after all, the Constitution and the Guidelines will ordinarily also bind the party. See Johnson & Anor vs Eze & Anor (2020) LPELR-49636(CA). It can be argued as it has strongly been argued by Learned Silk for the 1st-30th Respondents that the Appellant’s failure to comply with its Constitution and Guideline should be a ground for the intervention of a Court to forestall abuse of power. It would seem to me that the mere fact that the party did not comply with the party Constitution and Guideline on its own will not warrant the intervention of a Court without sufficient pleading and evidence that such non-compliance affected the personal contractual rights of the 1st-30th Respondents or in fact breached them. While the Respondents had attempted to show that there was non-compliance, there is no clear averment in the pleading that their personal contractual rights were breached by the action of the Appellant. The challenge here is that since it is an intra party dispute, the 1st-30th Respondents need to have shown that their case falls within the exception before the Court can further investigate or interrogate at the trial whether there was compliance with the Appellant’s constitution and Guidelines.
The main thrust of the 1st-30th Respondents case is the issue of non compliance with the Appellant’s Constitution and Guidelines and not the breach of their personal contractual rights. If this is the ground stated by the 1st to 30th Respondents for the demand for the intervention of the Court in an intra party dispute, the Court by inference cannot substitute it for another ground. The Supreme Court had held in general terms that non-compliance with the party constitution and guideline perse is not a ground to make justiciable, an intra party dispute which ordinarily is not justiciable. What we feel about the issue does not matter as by the doctrine of stare decisis, both the lower Court and this Court is bound to follow the decision of the Supreme. The question now is what is the Supreme Court’s position on a situation such as this when the complaint of the 1st-30th Respondents is on the grounds of non-compliance with the party Constitution and Guidelines?
Though the facts may not necessarily be at all fours but the point addressed is of general application on the matter. I am making this short comment because I am very aware that a case is solely an authority for what it decides. See Igwe vs State (2021) LPELR-55336 (SC). In this regard, the Supreme Court has made a pronouncement which we are bound to follow. The pronouncement which is apt on this point was made in the case of Rt. Honourable Igo Aguma vs APC & Ors (2021) 14 NWLR (pt 1796) 351. In that case, the Appellant challenged the action of the National Working Committee of the 1st Respondent (APC) in appointing a Caretaker Committee to replace the State Executive Committee of the party in Rivers State without regard to the statutory members, which the Appellant belongs. In other words, the Appellant challenged the appointment and inauguration of the Caretaker Committee by the National Working Committee on the ground that same was not done in furtherance of the Constitution of the party as provided by the party’s Constitution. In the case before this Court on appeal, the 1st-30th Respondents challenged the powers of the Appellant for the refusal to conduct the Local Government Congresses in line with the party’s constitution and Guidelines and thereby denying them the opportunity to contest. This conduct by the Appellant done without regard for the party Constitution and Guidelines should attract the attention of the Court to avoid arbitrary use of power and impunity which can lead to anarchy. On the point whether non-compliance with the party constitution and Guidelines is a ground to make justiciable an intra party dispute, the Supreme Court per Agim, JSC had this to say in the Aguma vs APC (supra) case at pages 406-407 of the judgment as reported:
“The claim by the Appellant that the 1st Respondent violated its own constitution cannot vest him with the locus standi to institute an action in respect of the claim. He has no right of action against his Political Party concerning its decisions or actions on its internal affairs. This is because the Political Party is a voluntary organization or association. As a member of the party, he has no right of action against his Political Party for breach of its constitution concerning the internal affairs of the party. He has no personal right to be a member of the executive or committee or caretaker committee of the Rivers State Chapter of the 1st respondent. The right to determine who should lead or manage the said River State Chapter of the 1st respondent as a member of the State Executive Committee belongs to the 1st respondent which right it exercises through a majority of its members through its congresses organized by the NWC or directly by the NWC in the case of appointment of a caretaker committee. The appellant has not alleged that his contractual right or any of his personal right has been breached by the action of the 1st respondent or that the action or decision of the 1st respondent involve some imputation of a crime against him. See Abubakari & Ors. v. Smith & Ors.(1973) 6 SC 31 and Ufomba v. INEC & Ors. (2017) LPELR-42079 (SC), (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt.1582) 175.
The doctrine of ultra vires has no application in the internal affairs of a voluntary association. So the decision of the National Working Committee of the 1st respondent appointing its River State Caretaker Executive Committee cannot be challenged in Court as being contrary to the appellant’s constitution. As held by Lord Denning in Institution of Mechanical Engineers v. Cane (1961) A.C. 696 at 724 the doctrine of ultra vires has no application in the internal affairs of a voluntary association of individuals. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Onuoha v. Okafor (supra) and PDP v. Sylva (supra) and by the Court of Appeal in Abdulkadir & Anor v. Mamman & Ors. (supra), Chinwo v. Owhonda (supra) and in Okoroafor & Ors v. Emeka (CA/E/10/2015) of 14-4-2015). It is emphasized in all these decisions that a member of a voluntary organization cannot sue for breach of the internal constitution and regulations of the organization in the internal affairs of the organization.”
(underlined for emphasis)
The case of the 1st-30th Respondents ran into trouble water as stated above when they did not expressly state in their statement of claim that the action by the Appellant affected their personal contractual right. As mentioned earlier this is not a point for this Court to infer or to be contained in the address of the Learned Silk for the 1st-30th Respondents.
Learned Silk for the Appellant has referred this Court to the cases of this Court in the Abuja and Kano divisions decided this year in similar circumstance of LGA congresses where this Court held that the lower Court in Kano has no jurisdiction in intra party dispute. These are the unreported decision in APC vs Sulaiman & Others; Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/10334/2022 delivered on 17/2/2022 per H. N. Tsammani JCA, Akinremi & Anor vs Sulaiman & Others Appeal No: CA/ABJ/CV/1020/2021 delivered on 17/2/2022 per B. S. Georgewill, JCA; Gagarawa & 2 Ors vs PDP & 6 Ors Appeal No. CA/KN/39/2021 delivered on 14/1/2022 per H.A.O. Abiru, JCA; Macfoy & 3 Ors vs Chola & Others, Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/03/2022 delivered on 17/4/2022 per Gafai, JCA. I have read the judgments of my learned brothers, I see no reason whatsoever to depart from the reasoning and conclusions reached in those judgments on the issue of non-justiciability of intra party matters. I will quote from the decision of H. N. Tsammani, JCA in APC vs Sulaiman & Ors where his Lordship stated thus:
“Having found as above, it is my firm that the suit the subject of this appeal is predicated on the APC Ward Congress to elect Ward leaders in Kano State. In other words, their claim is squarely and snugly within the realm of the party’s leadership dispute and therefore an intra party dispute. it has long been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Onuoha v Okafor & 7 Others (1983) 14 NSCL 494 at 499-507 that where the relief sought is on the leadership or intra party dispute between members of the same political party, only the party can resolve the dispute…. The law therefore is that no Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints on matters pertaining to intra party disputes of political parties…Any dispute arising from the action of the political party in that regard, is exclusively within the purview of the internal affairs of the party. Such decision cannot be the subject of any determination by any Court. it is not justiciable. I accordingly hold that the learned trial Judge erred grievously when he assumed jurisdiction, heard and determined the dispute.”
Having looked at the case law, I make bold to say that the 1st-30th Respondents did not place before the lower Court in their pleadings that they are qualified to come under any of the exceptions to the general principle governing intra party disputes.
Based on the principle of stare decisis, I am under obligation to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in Aguma vs APC & ors (supra); APC vs Moses (supra) and I am persuaded by the decisions of my learned brothers of this Court stated above. It is therefore immaterial whether the Appellant violated its own constitution and guideline. Once it is an intra party matter such as the one culminating into this appeal, a Court has no jurisdiction to enquire into it particularly when the 1st-30th Respondents did not state as part of his claim that their personal contractual right with the party was breached and no claim for damages is included in their reliefs sought.
With due respect to His Lordship of the Federal High Court, Gombe Division, he assume jurisdiction over a matter he has no jurisdiction to entertain, been a matter arising from an intra party dispute. While I agree with the lower Court that the term ‘intra party dispute’ “should not be seen as a magic wand or a blank cheque for political parties to act arbitrarily or capriciously” but the fact still remain that, there are strict condition which the 1st-30th Respondents need to show if it must come under the exceptions. The 1st-30th Respondents in this appeal have not satisfied those conditions to ensure that the facts of the case culminating to this appeal falls into one of the exceptions. It is safer to draw this conclusion in the light of the Supreme Court case of Aguma vs APC (supra) and APC vs Moses (supra).
A decision such as this may be misconstrued by leadership of political parties to mean endorsing their excesses but that is not the intention of this judgment and indeed the judgment of any Court. Their excesses have made some judges assume jurisdiction over intra party dispute even when the exception have not be proved before the Court. I can understand and appreciate that but the law as stated by the Supreme Court remains the law. The Court exists to do justice and promote justice in its decision. The law is made to regulate the action of people operating under same to ensure compliance. No Court will endorse arbitrary use of power hence in balancing the general principle that intra parties are not justiciable, the apex Court has stated above recognizes some exceptions. They were created to ensure that there is no abuse of power by any person in authority at whatever level. In view of the legal position, it behooves on political parties to ensure that people of integrity and high moral content are giving leadership position in them as misuse of power by a party leader can cost the party so much damage. When leaders of party lack integrity and high moral content and thereby arbitrarily use the power given to them, it promotes ‘god fatherism’ in politics. Persons without integrity or values have no business in politics. A decision of this nature may just be a costly price to pay for lack of internal democracy and for allowing people without conscience to be in leadership of parties. Sadly, the 1st-30th Respondents who are complaining now, if they were the beneficiaries of the action of the Appellant, it would have been celebration time for them. Now, they are at the receiving end and they are in Court. This rat race will stop when everyone in any position of leadership or followership comes to terms with the fact that we were all created by God and he gives power and position to people to use same justly for the benefit of man and to his glory. Political parties should promote internal democracy when they have problem within themselves and their members, they should sort it out amicably leaving out the Court. The hands of the Courts in Nigeria is full and should not be further over burdened with internal political disputes which many a times after the decision of Court they disregard for political solution. My humble counsel, instead of coming to waste precious time of the Court in intra party matter before going to find political solution, party members should go straight to find political solutions as a family will do without involving the Court.
The decision of this Court is obvious by now. The relief the Appellant is seeking in this appeal is as stated hereunder:
1. An order of this Honourable Court allowing the appeal and setting aside in its entirety the ruling of the lower Court delivered on 2nd March 2022.
2. An order of this Honourable Court dismissing and/or striking out the 1st-30th Respondents’ writ of Summons and suit in its entirety
3. Such further order or orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in favour of the Appellant in the circumstance.
I have no difficulty in allowing the appeal and setting aside the ruling of Hon Justice H. I. O. Oshomah of the Federal High Court, Gombe Division in suit No. FHC/GM/CS/5/2021- Mohammed Abubakar B and 29 Ors vs APC & Anor delivered on 2/3/2022 on the ground that the lower Court assumed jurisdiction over an intra party dispute which in the circumstance of the facts of the case, it had no jurisdiction to entertain. Having so held, I strike out the writ of summons of the 1st–30th Respondents in its entirety.
Parties are to bear their respective cost.
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother, Ebiowei Tobi, J.C.A. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion. I will however add a few words.
As stated in the lead judgment, this is a sister-appeal to Appeal No. CA/G/41/2022, both of which arose from the composite ruling of the Federal High Court, Gombe Division delivered in three suits, namely: FHC/GM/CS/3/2021; FHC/GM/CS/4/2021 and FHC/GM/CS/5/2021.
The thrust of the case before the lower Court was whether or not the Federal High Court was clothed with jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the subject matter being an intra-party dispute between the Claimants before the lower Court (now Respondents) and the Defendant (now Appellant). The Respondents’ claim was centered on the complaints that ward congresses scheduled to take place in Akko Local Government Area of Gombe State were not conducted, even though they had bought Expression of interest and Nomination Forms to contest.
The Appellant raised a preliminary objection to the hearing of the suit on four grounds. Therein, the lower Court was called upon to determine whether the lower Court had jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of the suit, being the ward congresses of a political party; or whether, as an intra-party matter, the lower Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate over the suit.
In its judgment, the lower Court held that, pursuant to Sections 6(6) (a) & (b), 233, &251 (q) of the Constitution in conjunction with Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act, it was clothed with jurisdiction. It therefore dismissed the preliminary objection. The reasoning of the learned trial Judge is that Sections 6(6) (a) & (b) along with 251 (q) of the Constitution vested it with jurisdiction over the suit.
However, I agree with my learned brother that the terms “jurisdiction” and “judicial power” mean two different things.
‘Judicial power’ means the power which every sovereign authority must have to decide controversies between its subjects or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. In short, it means the authority of the Court to adjudicate upon and decide any matter before it which is within its jurisdiction – Abacha V FRN (2014) LPELR-3154(SC) 98, E-F, per Kekere-Ekun, JSC; AG Lagos State V Dosunmu (1989) LPELR-3154(SC) 80, G, per Obaseki, JSC; Adesanya V President of the FRN (1981) LPELR-147(SC) 71-72, D-A, per Obaseki, JSC.
The ‘jurisdiction’ of a Court, on the other hand, refers to matters over which a Court may adjudicate as expressly stipulated by the Constitution or by enabling statutes – Akeem V FRN (2018) LPELR-4389(CA) 37, B, per Otisi, JCA; Idemudia V Igbinedion Univ., Okada (2015) LPELR-24514(CA).
The term ‘inherent jurisdiction of the Court’ does not mean the same thing as ‘the jurisdiction of the Court’. The two terms are not interchangeable. The source of the statutory jurisdiction of the Court is the statute itself, which will define the limits within which such jurisdiction is to be exercised; whereas the source of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is derived from its nature as a Court of law – Yonwuren V Modern Signs (Nig) Ltd (1985) LPELR-3529(SC) 34-36, B-A, per Sowemimo, JSC.
Therefore, ‘judicial powers’ are bestowed on Courts by virtue of Section 6(6) of the Constitution and are to be exercised as bestowed by the Constitution or any law duly made creating other Courts. Such judicial powers are vested in Courts enumerated in Section 6(5) of the Constitution, being Courts established for the Federation. While jurisdiction defines the power of the Court to inquire into facts, apply the law, make decisions and declare judgment. The Constitution and statutes which set up Courts, cloak them with powers and jurisdiction of adjudication which are basically substantive and procedural. See Enyi V Benue State JSC (2021) LPELR-54437(CA) 32; Dingyadi V INEC (2011) LPELR-950(SC).
Therefore, while the judicial power of Nigeria as a sovereign State is also vested in the lower Court, among other Courts, to wit: The Federal High Court, being one of the Courts listed in Section 6(5) of the Constitution, its jurisdiction is defined and circumscribed by Section 251 of the Constitution. Therein, it is unquestionable that the lower Court is not vested with jurisdiction to hear and determine matters relating to intra-party disputes between members of a political party inter-se, or between the political party and its members.
Furthermore, Section 223 of the Constitution (supra) and Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act (supra) certainly cannot be stretched out of shape and distorted to accommodate the rights and personal interest of the Respondents with regard to their ambitions to be the chairmen of their political party selected through ward congresses. It cannot be seriously contended that the Respondents have a personal right or a fundamental right to be the ward and/or Local Government chairmen of the executive committee of their party. Rather, the personal rights of members of a political party must be construed strictly within the context of Section 285(14) (a)-(c) of the Constitution (supra), i.e., relating to the processes of a primary election. The personal rights in this context cannot be interpreted at large to include any and every action or omission of a political party which a member perceives to be inimical to his personal interest, desire and/or ambition. If such were to be the case, then Courts would be inundated and enmeshed in endless disputes between members and their political party; which disputes are essentially family/internal/domestic disputes to be resolved by the processes set up within the party itself, same not being legal wrongs created and provided for by the Constitution and/or the Electoral Act, but are in the nature of political wrongs. This must be the rationale for the finding and timely warning of his lordship, Augie, JSC in APC V Moses (supra) 320, A thus:
“There has to be a point at which political parties will leave the Courts out of their domestic wrangles or internal leadership tussles. To widen the net and allow the Courts to be seen as an integral part of the political struggle for power, is not in the interest of anyone.”
I cannot but agree more!
Since learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents has readily conceded that the claim does not fall within the precincts of Section 285(14) (a)-(c) of the Constitution, which exclusively provides for pre-election matters, then the exposition of the law in this regard is as stated and re-stated in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in APC V Moses (supra) and Aguma V APC (supra), and the lower Court is so bound.
By these decisions, the settled law is that Courts do not have the vires to delve into the internal/domestic/family affairs of a political party, being a voluntary association to which members ascribe to willingly, as its jurisdiction is ousted by law. Such matters, described as intra-party, are non-justiciable. Consequently, all Courts lower in hierarchy to the Supreme Court, must bow and kowtow to it.
See also the recent decisions of the Court of Appeal on these issues: APC V Sulaiman & others (Unreported) Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/10334/2022, judgment delivered on 17th February, 2022, per Tsammani, JCA; Akinremi & another V Suleiman & others (Unreported) Appeal No. BJ/CV/1020/2021, judgment delivered on 17th February, 2022, per Georgewill, JCA;Macfoy & 3 others V Chola & others (Unreported) Appeal No. CA/ABJ/CV/03/2022, judgment delivered on 17th April, 2022, per Gafai, JCA; and Gagarawa & 2 others V Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) & 6 others (Unreported) Appeal No. CA/KN/39/2021, judgment delivered on 14th January, 2022, per Abiru, JCA.
In view of this, I hold that the learned trial Judge erred when he sought to cover and cloaked the lower Court with jurisdiction using Section 6(6) (a) & (b) and Section 251 (q) of the Constitution (supra), as well as Section 223 of the Constitution and Section 85(3) of the Electoral Act. The judicial power and inherent jurisdiction vested in the Court by these provisions do not extend to the determination matters concerning non-existent legal rights or non-justiciable rights or political issues.
From all I have said, it is evident that the suit of the Respondents before the lower is non-justiciable as it is not within the province of a Court to select for a political party the manner or mode in which it chooses to select candidates for its leadership in its Ward, Local Government and State Congresses. Therefore, in resolving issues one and two, I agree with learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the Respondents, who were contenders in the ward congresses scheduled to elect officers into the State Executive Committee of their party in Gombe State, and not aspirants in a primary election into public office, cannot invoke the limited jurisdiction vested in the lower Court pursuant to the express provisions of Sections 285(14) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). I do so hold.
Following on the heels of these findings, I find that since the claim of the Respondents is non-justiciable and therefore not proper for judicial determination, there can be no valid cause of action for the lower Court to look into. By the same token, the Respondents were not clothed with the requisite locus standi or legal standing to approach the lower Court to enforce rights that were non-existent, and so, the case is academic.
It is for these reasons and for the comprehensive reasons set out in the lead judgment, that I also find merit in the appeal. I allow it and abide by the consequential orders made therein.
IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA, J.C.A.: I had the advantage of a preview of the erudite judgment of my learned brother, EBIOWEI TOBI, JCA, just delivered.
I agree, completely, with the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by my learned brother that the appeal is meritorious. It is for the reasons therein contained in the lead judgment of my learned brother which, I adopt as mine (with profound gratitude) that I too, do allow the appeal. The ruling of the lower Court in Suit No. CA/G/42/2022, delivered on the 2nd day of March, 2022, is hereby set aside. I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
Prof. Mamman Lawan, SAN, with him, Ibrahim Aliyu Nassarawa Esq and Adekunle Taiye Falola Esq. For Appellant(s)
Paul Erokoro, SAN, appeared, with him, S.M. Kumo Esq., Fatima T. Abdullahi Esq. and Gift Obetin, Esq. – for 1st to 30th Respondents
J.W. Nimfas, Esq. – for 31st Respondent. For Respondent(s)
