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ANWAR SURAJO v. THE STATE (2018)

ANWAR SURAJO v. THE STATE

(2018)LCN/11748(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 22nd day of June, 2018

CA/K/163C/14

 

JUSTICES

UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ANWAR SURAJO Appellant(s)

AND

THE STATE Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHEN A PERSON INITIATES A COURSE OF CONDUCT

It was also submitted that whoever initiates a course of conduct is responsible for the subsequent result provided that such a result will ensue in the normal cause of events per MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A. 

 

MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): 

This appeal is against the Judgment of the High Court of Kano State delivered on 6th day of January, 2014 in Charge No. K/168C/2011 wherein the trial Judge convicted the Appellant/Accused for culpable homicide, punishable with death and sentenced him accordingly under S.221 (a) of the Penal Code by hanging.

Dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence, the Appellant had lodged an appeal vide an initial Notice of Appeal filed on 5th November, 2014 which was amended by grant of Motion filed on 3  7  2014 and granted on 20  11-14. The Amended Notice of Appeal dated 2  7  14 and deemed filed on 20  11  14 is, for ease of reference, reproduced as below:
“AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL:
GROUND 1
The decision of the Honourable Trial Court is unreasonable, unwarranted and cannot be supported having regard to the weight of evidence.
GROUND II
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law when His Lordship held as follows:-In addition, the circumstances of the testimony of Pw3 also shows that the deceased Basiru Hassan made a dying declaration to him to wit  if he dies it was Anwar to (Sic-that) had stabbed him. In association also with the above dying declaration of the deceased made to PW3 Section 40 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. In view of the above quoted testimony of PW3, the dying declaration of the deceased vis-a-vis the provisions of the above quoted Section 40 (1) and (2) I find and hold that it was the accused Anwar Surajo that caused the death of the deceased.
PARTICULAR OF ERROR
i. The statement made by PW3 referred to and relied upon by the prosecution does not quality as a dying declaration.
ii. The statement did not constitute a situation whereby Court infer dying declaration. This is because the statement did not have any connotation or flavour of being made in anticipation of death.
iii. The statement regarded as dying declaration is not positive, as it is difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the maker (the deceased) of that statement had a settled belief that he would die from the alleged injury he was said to have suffered.

  1. The statement regarded as dying declaration shows that the deceased had the hope of staying alive at the time of his stabbing, hence, the statement is unclear, imprecise and not free from ambiguity, and as such works against the invocation of the Section 40 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
    GROUND III
    The learned Trial Judge erred in law when His Lordship of the Court before linked the cause of death of the deceased on record to an act of the Appellant.
    PARTICULARS OF ERROR
    i. Exhibit 6 tendered by the prosecution stated that the primary cause of death of the deceased herein was due to sudden development of cardiopulmonary arrest after he had been successfully operated by the Medical Doctor attending to him. Cardiopulmonary arrest according to Stedmans Dictionary simply means cardio arrest.
    ii. Admittedly, there is evidence on record that the Appellant stabbed the deceased but there is no evidence that the cardio arrest which killed the deceased was as a result of the appellant stabbing the deceased.
    iii. A calm review of the evidence on record and the available authorities on the issue of homicide more particularly AHMED V STATE (2001) 18 NWLR (PT. 746) 622 shows that the prosecution failed to link the cause of death to any act of the Appellant.
    iv. In the entire circumstance of this case, it was not established that the act of the Appellant led to the death of the deceased herein.
    GROUND IV
    The Learned Trial Judge erred in law when His Lordship held that the prosecution proved his case beyond reasonable doubt.
    PARTICULARS OF ERROR
    i. Since the prosecution failed to link the cause of death to any act of the Appellant, the prosecution could not be said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.
    ii. All that the prosecution succeeded in establishing against the appellant before the Learned Trial Judge is a case of causing hurt by dangerous means on the decease contrary to Section 248 (ii) of Penal Code and punishable with a term of 3 years imprisonment or with fine or both.
    iii. On the face of evidence on record that the deceased died of cardio arrest to any act of the Appellant, the Appellant is entitled to a verdict of discharge and acquittal from the offence of culpable homicide which he was charged for.
  2. In medical parlance and even from populous commonsense experience, there are several causes which could have led to the development of cardio arrest by the deceased.
    v. For the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, evidence ought to have been led if any that the cardio arrest developed by the deceased and which eventually killed him was due to the stabbing of the deceased by the Appellant. Moreover, there was an intervening event by way of surgical operation. There is no such evidence on record.
    GROUND V
    The Learned Trial Judge erred in Law when he relied on the confessional statement credited to the Appellant when it is apparent that the said statements were legally inadmissible.
    PARTICULAR OF ERRORS
    i. There is overwhelming evidence that Exhibits 7, 7A, and 8A were product of oppression and demand.
    ii. Exhibits 7, 7A 8 and 8A run riot of Section 29 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
    4. RELIEFS SOUGHT FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
    An order of this Honourable Court setting aside the judgment of the Honourable Court below and to discharge and acquit the Appellant of the offence of culpable homicide.Alternatively
    An order of that Honourable Court substituting the verdict of guilty of culpable homicide entered by the Honourable Court below with a verdict of guilty for the offence of causing hurt by dangerous means contrary to Section 248 (ii) of the Penal Code and to discharge and acquit the Appellant for the offence of culpable homicide.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Notice of Appeal, the Record of appeal was transmitted on 1  4  2014. Upon the filing of the Appellants Brief of Argument, by leave of this Court, the Appellant being out of time, the said Appellants Brief of Argument filed on 2  7 – 2014 but deemed filed on 20 -11  2014 was greeted by the Respondents brief of Argument filed on 10- 3 – 2015.

In the Appellants Brief of Argument, the following Issues have been formulated for resolution, thus;
1. Taking into consideration the failure of the prosecution to link the cause of the death on record to any act of the Appellant, can it be said that the prosecution has established a cause of culpable homicide against the Appellant (Ground 3)

  1. On a calm review of the evidence on record and the available authorities, more particularly the case of Ahmed V. The State (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 522, can it be said in the entire circumstances of this case that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubts (Grounds 1, 2 and 4).

On its part, the respondent formulated a sole Issue thus;
whether the trial Court was right when it held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant for the offence of culpable homicide under S. 221 of penal code.

A look at the issues formulated by the parties shows that the Appellants Issue number one and the Respondents Issue are the same; while the Appellants Issue one can be subsumed in its 2nd Issue as the said second Issue simply queries whether an ingredient of the offence charged i.e. the commission of the offence by the Appellant had been established.

I shall determine the Appeal on the Appellants Issue Two. Understandably, the two Issues 1 and 2 were argued together, thus;
1. That death has occurred of the victim
2. That the death was caused by the Appellant and that the Appellant had the intention of causing death of the deceased or to cause him grievous bodily injury.

The Learned Counsel submitted that for the offence to be proved it must be established in chronological sequence that death has occurred, what the cause of death was that it was the accused that caused the death in question. The case of Ahmed V. The State (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 622 @ 642 H  D, per Ayoola, JSC was relied upon to contend that the causal cause of death is the Biological cause, which must be proved, first before the consideration of whether that act can be linked to the Appellant.

The Learned Counsel for the Appellant, arguing on the or sequential order of proof concedes that the first ingredient had been proved, i.e. the death of a person as charged. Counsel says that ingredient was well established, by the prosecution and agrees with the findings of the trial Judge as expressed on pages 97 to 99 of the record. That the trial Judge correctly and rightly dealt with this ingredient.

The Learned Counsel submitted that there was no doubt that the Appellant stabbed the deceased, but that there was no proof that the death was caused by the act of the Appellants stabbing. Learned Counsel contended that if it cannot be so established or if it was uncertain, then the Appellant cannot be said to have caused the death. It was also argued that the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses, i.e. Pw1  Pw6 were hear say evidence contrary to the findings of His Lordship of the trial Court.

It was also submitted that the evidence of Pw3 did not amount to res gestae i.e. dying declaration as held by the trial Court in that the deceased was not under a firm belief that he was going to die when he said if he dies it was Anwar that had stabbed him; Sunday Akpan V. State (1967) NMLR 185; Oruakpor Okafor V. The State (1967) NMLR 189 were relied upon. Counsel however emphasised that there was no doubt that the Appellant herein stabbed the deceased. Counsel agreed that the Appellant Volunteered Exhibit 7A to the Police when he was transferred to the Criminal Investigation Department.

The Learned Counsel referring to page 20 of the record where the Appellant denied making the statement and yet page 34 of same record where in Cross – examination, the appellant stated that he was not beaten before any statement was taken, at least not at the CID, submitted that from that piece of evidence from the appellant himself it was futile and unjust for anybody to contend on his behalf that he did not stab the deceased; that it will be noted that Justice is a two way traffic; i.e. to the Appellant, to the deceased and to the society at large, refers to Josiah Vs State (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 125 @ 141 paragraphs G  H.

That by Exhibit 6, the deceased has been shown to have died, but not immediately after he was stabbed.

That deceased was stabbed on 18  11  10, operated upon at the Muritala Mohammed Specialist Hospital on 19  11  10 and died on 21  11  2010. Counsel quotes Exhibit 6 as relevant to show that the patient developed car-dio pulmonary arrest about 3.00pm on 21  11 -2010 and resuscitation attempts failed. That there was no proof that the cardio pulmonary arrest was caused by the act of stabbing; that it could as well be a result of carelessness in post Operation Management.

It was contended that a stab by a knife though a lethal weapon is a less lethal than a gun  that was shot at the deceased head, yet the cause of death that occurred 3 days after was held in Ahmed Vs State not to have been proved or linked to the gun shot. That witnesses who could have testified on this missing link did not. That such description of the injury as would have come from those that took him to Hospital or witnessed the attack or even the Doctor who treated him would have been the evidence of the missing link; that none was available as there was in Bakare Vs The State(1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 52) 5 79 @ 592 D  E . where Obaseki JSC stated thus:
any person who plunges a dagger into the head of a human being to the depth of 1/2 to 3/4 and inflicting an injury of that depth and length (1 to 2) does not expect his victim to live.

That there was an intervening event of suture as against Ahmed V. State where there was none, yet culpability was held not to have been proved. Counsel wondered whether it was the stabbing or cardiac arrest that caused the death. Ultimately, it was submitted that the trial Judge had no evidence linking the cardiac arrest that caused the death as per the medical report Exhibit 6, on the Appellant. That had the trial Judge considered the medical report it would have been entitled to reject or accept it upon the facts led by the prosecution as done in Aforlette V. The State, (supra).

That the cause of death should not be speculative. See Anyawu Vs The State (supra) referring to Shade V. The State (2009) 2 NWLR (Pt. 939) 320 paragraph G  H and 321 paragraph A  D, it was contended that for evidence to ground conviction, it must be such that be scrupulously and mercilessly scrutinised such that nothing shall be taken for granted as the liberty of a subject was at Stake.

That the evidence of death by cardiac arrest has not been mercilessly scrutinised such as to link it with the act of the Appellant. Upon this said lacuna, we have been urged to discharge and acquit the Appellant. In the alternative, it was argued that since provocation could not avail the Appellant, he should be convicted for causing hurt by dangerous means contrary to Section 248 (1) of the Penal Code and allow the sentence to run from the date of his conviction by the learned trial Judge. That the conviction for culpable homicide punishable with death be set aside and the appeal allowed.

RESPONDENTS REPLY
It was argued that the first ingredient of the offence being that the Accused Persons victim is dead has been proved by Exhibit 6. That the Accused/Appellant admits of this fact or does not dispute it. All the prosecution witnesses confirm the death. On the second ingredient of the offence, it was argued that it could be inferred from the circumstances. Relying on Ahmed Vs The State (supra) and Chukwu V State (2012) Vol. 12 MJSC (Pt. 11)1 @ page 23, it was argued that while the duty on the prosecution was to establish the cause of death and its linkage to the accused person, on the authority of the same Chukwu V. State (2012) Vol. 12 MJSC (Pt. 11) 1 at page 23 paragraph A  D that the cause of death could be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Bagudu V State (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 305) 634 @ 639  640; Adamu Dan Kato V Kano N. A. (1956) 1 FSC 25 also relied upon.

It was also submitted that whoever initiates a course of conduct is responsible for the subsequent result provided that such a result will ensue in the normal cause of events; R. V. Malcherec (1981) WLR 690 and the Book The law of crimes in Nigeria by Kharisu Sufyan Chukol, Ahmadu Bello University Press Ltd, Zaria, 2010, Page 47, also relied upon; that appellant was responsible for whatever happened to the deceased as a result of the stabbing on the head and chest inflicted by him. Reference was made to cases and materials on criminal Law, published by Philade Co. Ltd, Lagos 2008 Page 439 to the effect that even an intervening surgical and medical treatment, so long as it was reasonably proper under the circumstances and applied in good faith, will not absolve a person of culpability where a person does grievous harm to another who had recourse to treatment where death results from either the injury or treatment; he will be deemed to have caused the death of that other person, provided the treatment was reasonably proper and applied in good faith.

It was therefore submitted that the death was caused by the stab wound inflicted as the progeny of the injury, treatment and surgery that culminated in the death.

That the chain of events was such that the causal link of the death to the act of the Appellant was obvious. That the evidence of Pw3 Pw6 Pw2 were such that the attack on the victim i.e. stab wound by Knife seen on his chest and his (Pw3) statement that deceased said if he died, the Accused/Appellant was responsible, were such that quilt of the Appellant as the cause of the death was obvious. That the law of causation as espoused by chaundry was clearly in support of the conclusion of the trial Judge; that the Appellant caused the death, on the last ingredient, it was argued that the nature of injury had been testified to, by the evidence of Pw2  who testified as to the nature of injury in these words. ……I went and found Basiru where he was lying at dead I found him in a pool of his blood on his head and at his neck………..

That Pw3 said when we went to Basiru where he was shouting I saw a knife sticking out of Basiru and Basiru was saying if he dies, it was Anwar that stabbed him…..

In cross-examination, Pw3 reconfirmed that he saw the deceased in a pool of his blood with a knife tucked to his chest; that he was stabbed at the upper chest and neck region.

That Pw6  the I.P.O corroborated these evidence when he said he saw the deceased with bandage on his neck with blood all over his body; that the deceased was unconscious and could not recognise any person around him.

It was finally urged that the finding of the trial Judge that by the stabbing of the deceased at such Vital areas of the body, he must have known that death would be probable and not likely consequence of his act, was in order.

That the conviction and sentence were therefore, right and should be upheld and this appeal be dismissed.

A study of the record of appeal and the Briefs of Argument, puts this appeal within a very narrow compass.

In the charge of culpable homicide punishment with death, the 3 ingredients thereof as laid down by law are so trite and settled that all the parties are in one accord in this respect. In this instance, the first ingredient being the proof of death has been established. All the prosecution witnesses testified to the death of the victim Basiru Hassan. The Respondents Counsel concedes and rightly too, as expected of a minister in the temple of Justice who will not as he is not expected to, insist against the grain of justice for his client, as his first duty is to the Court and the Administration of justice and then to his client, commendably, Appellants Counsel has settled this by stating that it will be futile to deny that death of the victim has been proved.

On the 2nd (second) element of the offence as charged, it is obvious to me that the cause of death had been proved. It was the act of the Appellant stabbing the deceased at the vital parts and in this case, the chest region near the neck and head leading to haemorrhage or bleeding. Exhibit 6 is the Medical report that reports that death was caused by pulmonary Cardiac Arrest.
The evidence of Pw2 and Pw3 and indeed the other witnesses that they saw the deceased with a knife tucked or sticking to his chest and in a pool of his blood is clear evidence that the chest area was stabbed.
That delicate area where it is common knowledge that the cardiac (heart) lies, certainly bled profusely. Loss of blood and asphisiasis i.e. cut off of oxygen circulation and arrest or cessation of the heart function, will it not be common sense to conclude or infer that the cessation was caused by the arrest initiated by the causative action of stabbing the chest by the Appellant who had been proved to be the perpetuator
Furthermore, the statement of the Appellant, confessional in nature as Exhibit 6 confirms and corroborates this fact of stabbing. It is conceded by his counsel. What is more, as rightly submitted by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent, the causation theory operates against the Appellant, herein. Once an act or injury is proved to be caused by the Appellant, the fact that there is an intervening treatment or surgery will not absolve the causative agent, so long as the intervening action i.e. surgery or treatment/management was reasonable in the circumstance and proper.
See P. A. Onamade, J as he then was in cases and materials on criminal law. Published Philade Co. Ltd, Lagos, 2008:
See also The law of crimes in Nigeria by Kharisu Sulyan Chukkol Ahmadu Bello University Press Ltd; Zaria 2010 page 47.
The prosecution, in the instant case, had testified that Medical and Surgical intervention took place but to no avail as, the victim of the Accused/Appellants stabbing action died on the 3rd day, resuscitation having failed.

The chains of events have not been shown to have been broken.
The intervening surgery and management have not been shown to be unreasonable. The burden was on the Respondent to so show, this is because when an act is shown to have been done in an official capacity, there is a presumption of regularity in its favour. See S.167 (d) of the Evidence Act.
The Medical Surgery and Management at the Murtala Mohammed Hospital Kano is presumed to have been regularly and properly done and therefore the fact of same is not a vitiating factor to the causative action of the Appellant and the resultant death of the victim has not been shown to be caused by any other act of another person other than the Appellant.
It should also be noted that by virtue of S. 314 Criminal Code if a person dies within a period of 1 year, and one day of an injury caused by an accused that accused or person is presumed to be the cause of the death and the deceased presumed to have died from the said injury. Indeed while the case of Shade Vs State (Supra) is good law and a binding one for that matter to ensure that the guilt of an accused person is proved beyond reasonable doubt and that no lacuna in the chain of event on causation exist, I am, in this case, strongly of the view that the law will be failing in its duty of protecting the society if it will jettison situations where a clear and established fact of death is established; and where it is admitted and proved sundrily and corroboratively to be by the stabbing viciously done at delicate parts of the human body such as the upper chest and neck region and head leading to profuse Bleeding of the victim and who is taken for an intervening medical attention, which he never recovered from.
Would it be Justice to avoid a life saving intervention because of the desire to secure conviction without opposition on that score
I do not think it reasonable. That will be the inference to draw from the submissions of the learned defence Counsel, in my humble view, with respect.
My understanding of the position of the law is that where the act of the accused does not cause instant death, then the intervening act must be traceable to the action of the Accused for him to be said to be have caused the death.

By Section 26 of the Penal Code, applicable to Kano State of Nigeria, an event can be caused partly by an act or acts and partly by an omission or series of omissions.
The above notwithstanding, the principles of common law on causation applies in Kano State. Causation seeks to establish a link between an event which has occurred and the antecedent factor or factors leading to it.
An event is said to be caused by a factor or factors if that event would not have occurred without the factor or factors.
The deceased was savagely attacked. There was no evidence showing a predisposing factor or risk to the cardiac arrest and death, 3 days afterwards, upon the profuse bleeding from injury caused to him by the Appellant.
The possibility of death caused by other causes had been excluded, as the cardiac arrest can clearly be attributable to the act of stabbing that caused loss of blood. The profuse consequential effect may as well be construed as the actus reus, and the mens re a being the intent to kill which may be inferred as the only reasonable animus, and utmost, the animus of intending to cause grievous harm or injury that has led to death that is foreseeable and not unexpected nor surprising to a reasonable person, exists. The subjective test to be deployed in finding liability against such an accused, as the Appellant herein, should be applied.
In R. V. Eguabor, (1962) 1 ALL NLR 541, the Appellant stabbed X on the foot protest over land acquisition by Government resulting in gangrene from which in the deceased (X) died. His conviction for Murder was upheld by the West African Court of Appeal.
You find your victim as you meet him; an underlying condition not withstanding. What is more, the issue of causation implies a scenario of strict liability. It is a strict offence. The rebuttal evidence can only come from Accused/Appellant that presumption in law, that his act or omission ultimately caused the ensuing death has not been negated by him.
The appellant as an Accused had sought to show that he was also attacked and sustained injuries. This, he had, not specified nor described to the Court to serve as corroboration of his defence. The Courts will note this fact as a reason not to doubt or not to believe him on that aspect of defence.
See Lase Vs State (2018) 3 NWLR Pt. 1607, page 502 @ 529 – 530 per Ogunbiyi JSC.

That is to say, in the matter on appeal, though the victim, Basiru Hassan did not die instant, the fact or action of surgery and Management in Hospital was an intervening act necessitated by the Appellants act of the savage stabbing at the chest/neck and head and its consequential bleeding, cardiac arrest and death.
Furthermore, the cause of death could be inferred from the circumstances of the case; See Kato Dan Adamu Vs Kano N. A.,  Chukwu V. State, aptly referred to by the Respondents Learned Counsel in his Brief of Argument.
The Learned trial Judge in further support of its finding that the death was caused by the Appellant alluded to the evidence of Pw3 on what he heard the victim  Basiru said before he died. The Learned Counsel had argued that it was not evidence of res gestae or dying declaration as thought the Learned trial Judge.
The Respondents Learned Counsel, thinks that it was on my part, I associate myself with the learned trial Judge and the Respondents Counsel as after all, a person in a pool of blood from a stab wound, with a knife tucked on his chest will definitely be making a statement in the belief of imminent or immediate death. See S. 40 (1) of the Evidence Act the hope of recovery, not with standing. In this case, there was no evidence that he was not in danger of imminent death nor that he was not expectant or in fear of death. He was, and hence the statement identifying his assailant. In any case, even if he had entertained the hope of recovery and not gone for medical treatment, his death could still not be divorced from the act of the Appellant as I had shown above.
On the last ingredient of the offence charged, it is trite that a man intends the natural consequences of his action in this case, being the grievous injury which the Appellants Counsel conceded to that his client caused on the deceased and for which Counsel seeks a substitution of conviction and sentence. The proved grievous injury inflicted on the thoracic chest Area and head leading to loss of Blood and of course asphyxiasis, i.e. loss of oxygenated blood that causes cardiac Arrest cannot but be the natural consequences or at worst the probable consequences of the act of the accused/Appellant. It cannot be a likely consequence.

That clearly brought the Appellants proved offence under S. 220 of the Penal Code punishable under S. 221 (b) thereof; the case of Ibo V. State (1971) 7 NSCC page 246, per Lewis JSC relied upon by the Respondent is clearly in applicable as correctly distinguished from the facts of this case, where the nature of the injury was stated and was such that intent or knowledge that death could reasonably be inferred or imputed to the Appellant. On the whole, unlike in Ahmed Vs State supra where there is Medical report and in addition witnesses evidence as to the type of and nature of injury, the cause of death was obvious or could be inferred. See also Chukwu Vs State (supra).
In the circumstances above and in the face of the prosecution evidence including the exhibits, it is obvious that the cause of death may be referred from the circumstances as disclosed. See Oamhen V. State (1984) 4 SC 218 @ 219.
In Ahmed V. State (supra) relied upon by the Respondent, there was no medical report; here there was and the description of injury given was such that corroborated the oral testimonies of prosecution/witnesses such that the cause of death could and was reasonably drawn and attributable to the Appellant.
On the whole, the testimony of Pw2 and Pw3 who took the deceased to the hospital and Pw6 are such that had clearly established just as expected by Ahmed Vs The State (supra) that the cause of the death had been proved.

I must commend the ingenuity and candidness of the Respondents Counsel in this case. The Learned Counsel, Musibau Adetunbi, ESQ. exhibited dexterity, learning and commendable sense of justice in his Brief of Argument as a Minister of Justice should be. He advocates and the Court announces the dictates of Justice by the oracles as ordained in our jurisprudence of evidence and Criminal Law.

The statement of the appellant. Exhibit 4 however raises the defence of self defence although this was not raised or addressed at the trial by the Accused/Respondents Counsel and not even considered by the trial Judge, the law is that a Court should examine all possible defences disclosed by the evidence led and to find accordingly on the totality of the case presented by the prosecution.

By his cautionary statement Exhibit 4, the Appellant said the Deceased/Victim stabbed him with a horn at their renewed fray where he alleged that they had earlier fought and he in turn stabbed the deceased with broken bottle and that there was a retreat by the victim and he, on his part went to the police to report.

There was no corroboration of the said report made by him. At the renewed fray, the appellant said a horn was used on him. There was no proof of any injury sustained and/or treatment administered on him. To the contrary he went or retreated and went and brought a knife which he used ferociously, when he had time to retreat. He admitted that his injury at the first encounter (if any) was less serious than what he inflicted on the deceased. Serious doubt will be cast on the evidence of purported injury caused to the Appellant as per his statement as none was proved nor alluded to by the witnesses or even the police. He proved none himself. I think no injustice has been caused to the Appellant herein.
(1) The Appellants twin Issues argued together, which is the same as the Respondents lone issue is resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

(2) The Judgment of the trial Court convicting and sentencing the Appellant to death for culpa able homicide under Section 220 (1) is supported by the evidence led.
(3) Accordingly, this appeal ought to be dismissed

This Appeal is dismissed and the conviction and sentence of death by hanging as pronounced by His Lordship, Nura Sagir Umar J., of the High Court of Justice, Kano State in charge No. K/168C/2011 is affirmed.

UZO IFEYINWA NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.: I read in draft form, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed Ambi-Usi Danjuma, JCA. I agree with his reasoning and final conclusion. However, I must add that in a murder charge, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the death of the deceased but that it actually did. If there is the possibility that the deceased died from other causes than the act of the accused, the prosecution has not established the case against the accused person. AUDU V STATE (2003) 7 NWLR (PT. 820) 516, UGURU V STATE (2002) 9 NWLR (PT. 771) 90, R.V. OWE (1961) 2 SCNLR 354, R.V. NWOKOCHA (1949) 12 WACA 453.

In the instant appeal, the prosecution proved that the deceased was stabbed and that he died three days later after a surgery to save his life as a result of the stab wound inflicted on him by the Appellant.
In OCHIBA V THE STATE (2011) LPELR 8245 the Supreme Court per Adekeye JSC held that:
“In every case where it is alleged that death has resulted from the act of a person, a link between the death and the act must be established and proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
In the instant case, the hospital intervention with surgery still could not save the deceased from the injuries sustained by the stab wounds, inflicted on him by the Appellant.

For this and the more comprehensive reasoning in the lead judgment, I also find the appeal unmeritorious. It is dismissed. The judgment and sentencing of the lower Court is hereby affirmed.

RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft form, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, JCA. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion reached thereat. My Lord has lucidly and eloquently dealt with all the issues raised. I too must agree that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal is unmeritorious. It is dismissed. I also affirm the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the lower Court.

 

Appearances

Musibau Adetunbi, Esq.For Appellant

 

AND

Salisu A. Marmara, Esq. (Deputy Director, Legal Drafting Ministry of Justice, Kano State)For Respondent