ANAMBRA STATE GOVERNMENT & ANOR v. GLORIA OBIORA
(2013)LCN/6277(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 10th day of June, 2013
CA/E/400/2008
JUSTICES
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. ANAMBRA STATE GOVERNMENT
2. ONITSHA NORTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT Appellant(s)
AND
GLORIA OBIORA Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE CARDINAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
The of a statute or rule is the primary essential source of its meaning. The words of a governing are of paramount concern, in their con, is what the means. We cannot depart from the words of the law – A verbis legis non est recedendum Udo Udoma JSC rightly put it in the case of Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (1981) 2 NCLR 293 at 296.
“It is a principle of interpretation that the language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evident meaning, and that a constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defect its evident purpose…..”In the instant case, the learned trial judge was right to have held first that:
“Section 4 of Law No. 7 of 2001 as indeed, the entire Law, was passed by the Anambra State House of Assembly. The payment to councillors therein from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State is prescribed by the State House of Assembly.
This is pursuant to its undisputed power under Section 120(4) of the Constitution”.
And also that:
“is this power circumscribed by Section 124 (4) of the Constitution? A close look at the said section will reveal that it is not meant to prohibit the payment of salaries of persons other than those stipulated therein from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
If that was the intention of the constitution, it would have been clearly stated. I am therefore of the view that Section 4 of the Law No. 7 of 2001 is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the Constitution”. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT AN APPELLANT CAN BE HEARD TO CONTEST CLAIMS OF THE RESPONDENT NOT CHALLENGED IN THE LOWER COURT
the Appellant cannot be heard to contest the claims of the respondent which were not challenged, or contradicted in the court below.
See P.T.F. v. I.F.M.S. Ltd. (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 794) 586.
Aprofim Eng. Const. Ltd. v. Sidor Ltd. (2006) 13 NWLR (pt. 996) 73. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE J.C.A.: (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of J.I. Nweze J. at the Onitsha Judicial Division of the High court of Anambra State in Suit No. 0/368/2003.
By a writ of summons issued on 12/6/2003 followed by a statement of claim filed on 11/6/2003, the Respondent as plaintiff claimed against the Defendants/Appellants jointly and severally as follows:-
i. Declaration that the Plaintiff has complied with the provisions of the State proceeding law as well as the Local Government Law relating to service of notice which is the maximum legal requirement.
ii. N55 million naira being under payment of Plaintiffs salaries form June 1999 to May, 2012.
iii. N1.14 million naira being Plaintiffs entitlement for accommodation.
iv. N1.14 million naira being Plaintiffs entitlement as furniture allowance.
v. N1.4 million naira being Plaintiff’s entitlement as severance gratuity.
vi. An order directing the 1st Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the claimed sums from source, out of the State Joint Local Government Account from monies due to the 2nd Defendant from the said Account.
Pleadings were exchanged, of note is that paragraph 14 of the Statement of defence of the Defendants Appellants contends as follows:-
(a) All rules of statutory/constitutional interpretation combine to remove the Plaintiffs salary and allowances outside the competence or jurisdiction of the State House of Assembly and the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission.
(b) The reliefs being sought by the Plaintiff are inchoate and/or incapable of being granted which ever on (sic) looks on them.
(c) The Plaintiff cannot make any claim of right based on an enactment or actions there inconsistent with 1999 constitution and therefore null and void.
The facts of the case are as follows: In 1999, the Respondent was elected as a councilor to serve in the 2nd Appellant’s council and she served as such.
Their remuneration was not fixed until 2001 when the Anambra State Public officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001 was passed into law.
The law was based on the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilisation and Ficscal Commission. The Law was in Section I thereof, deemed to have come into force on the 29th May, 1999.
The amount provided in the Law as remuneration for the councilors was higher than what the 2nd Appellant was paying the councilors. This led to several demands on the 2nd Appellant to pay the difference. It was its refusal that led to this case. The Respondent’s evidence in proof of her case was neither challenged nor contradicted.
She was in fact not cross-examined.
The Respondent tendered the Anambra State public officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001 as Exhibit P1. Based on its provisions, she worked out what was due to her and her colleagues and sent it to the Appellants.
A copy of the computation was tendered as Exhibit P4. After the submission and adoption of written addresses, the learned trial judge identified two issues in his judgment for the determination of the case. The first is whether the Plaintiff/Respondent who served the 2nd Defendant/Appellant as a duly elected councilor is entitled to be paid in line with the provisions of the Anambra State public officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001.
The second is if the Answer to the first is in the affirmative, who is liable to pay her?
On the first Issue, the learned trial judge held at pages 70 – 71 of the record that:
“…the combined effect of Sections 1, 4 and 6 of the Law show that councilors are entitled to be paid under it. The Law having been deemed to have come into effect on 20th May, 1999, covered the entire period the Plaintiff was a councilor. It should follow therefore that the Plaintiff is entitled to remuneration as provided therein.
The Defendant in their defence have however contended that the law is null and void in so far as it charges the salary of the councilors on the consolidated revenue fund of the state.
The argument is however flawed in that even if that section is declared null and void, it does not extinguish the debt due to the plaintiff’
Still at page 71 of the record, the learned trial judge continued:
“It only means that it will have to be satisfied from a source other than the consolidated revenue fund of the State. Similarly, the argument that the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission lacks the constitutional competence to extend its powers to the Local Government Council or any Office therein is of no moment. The reason is that Law No. 7 of Anambra State is a Law passed by the Anambra State House of Assembly and applied as a State and not as a Federal enactment. Indeed, the law is in line with the spirit of Section 124(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999”.
On the Second Issue, the trial court held inter alia from pages 71 – 72 of the Record that:
“The more important question in my view is the effect of Section 4 of Law No. 7 on the liability of the 1st Defendant. The Section provides that the remuneration, salaries and allowances payable to the Public Officers shall be charged upon the consolidated revenue fund of the State. This is funds under the exclusive control of the 1st Defendant. This in my view, means that in so far as the Section is valid, it imposes liability on the 1st Defendant to pay the public Officers concerned. The Defendant has contended that the Section is void for inconsistency with Section 124 (4) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”
Still at page 72 of the record, the learned trial judge continued:
“A close look at the said Section will reveal that it is not meant to prohibit the payment of salaries of persons other than those stipulated therein from the consolidated Revenue Fund.
If that was the intention of the Constitution, it would have been clearly stated. I am therefore of the view that Section 4 of Law No. 7 of 2001 is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the Constitution. The funds are exclusively managed by the State Government that is the 1st Defendant without any contribution from the 2nd Defendant. It follows that the Plaintiff can sue the 1st Defendant to pay money due to her from the fund.
In the circumstances, not only is the 2nd Defendant liable for nonpayment of salary of its workers, the 1st
Defendant is also liable for not making the payment as provided by law. In the circumstances therefore, the Defendants are jointly and severally liable to the Plaintiff for this long outstanding debt”.
In the final analysis, the learned trial judge entered judgment in favour of the Respondent as against the Appellants in the total sum of N9, 920,000.00.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal containing five grounds of appeal before this court on 2/7/08.
The Appellants said grounds of appeal devoid of their particulars are as follows:
Ground 1.
Misdirection in law
The learned trial judge misdirected himself in law when he held thus:
“…The defendants in their defence have however contended that the law is null and void is so far as it charged the salary of councilors on the consolidated revenue fund of the state. The argument is however flawed in that even if that section is declared null and void, it does not extinguish the debt due to the Plaintiff…Similarly, the argument that the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal commission lacks the constitutional competence to extend its powers to the Local Government Council or any office therein is of no moment.
Ground 2
Error in Law
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that the Anambra State Public Officers Law No. 7 of 2001 is in line with the spirit of Section 124(1) of the 1999 constitution and that Section 4 of Law No. 7 of 2001 is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the 1999 constitution.
Ground 3
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held that not only is the 2nd Defendant/Appellant liable for non-payment of its workers, the 1st Defendant/Appellant is also liable for not making the payment as provided by law.
Ground 4
The learned trial judge erred in law when he entered judgment in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent in the sum of N5, 500.000.00 (five million, five hundred thousand naira) only as under payment of salaries from June, 1999 – May 2000. Anambra State Public Officers Law did not make such provision.
Ground 5
The learned trial judge erred in law when he gave judgment in favour of the Plaintiff/Respondent in the sum of N8, 920,000.00 (Eight million, Nine hundred and twenty thousand naira only) being furniture allowance, accommodation and severance allowance.
Parties exchanged and adopted their respective briefs of argument.
Learned counsel for the Appellants nominated three (3) issues for determination as follows:
1(a) Whether the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission has the competence to make recommendation for the salaries and emoluments to be paid to local government councilors?
(Ground 1).
1(b) If the answer to issue “1a” above is in the negative, whether any recommendation made by the said commission in that regard and all other acts predicated thereon are not null, void and of no effect?
2. Whether Section 4 of the Anambra State Public Officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001 (which was predicated on the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission) is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the 1999 constitution and therefore null and void to the extent of its inconsistency?
(Ground 2).
3. Whether the learned trial court was right when it relied on Law No.7 of 2001 to hold that the respondent was entitled to her claims and to have entered judgment against the appellants jointly in the sum of N8, 920,000.00. (Grounds 3, 4 and 5).
Learned counsel for the Respondent on the other hand formulated two (2) issues for determination as follows:-
1. Whether the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission has the competence to make recommendations for the salaries and emoluments to be paid to local government councilors and whether section 4 of the Anambra State Public Officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001 (which was predicated on the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission) is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the 1999 Constitution and therefore null and void.
2. Whether the learned trial court was right when it relied on Law No. 7 of 2001 to hold that the respondent was entitled to her claim and considering the fact that the respondent was never cross-examined by the appellants, the trial court was right to have entered judgment against the appellant jointly in the sum of N8, 920.000.00.
Learned counsel for the Appellants argued Issues Nos. 1 and 2 together and submitted that a holistic reading of the provisions of articles 31 and 32 of Part 1 to the third schedule to the 1999 constitution, Sections 84(1) and (4) and 124(1) and 4 of the said constitution as well as section 6(1)(d) parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Mobilisations, Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act clearly show that the only offices for which the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission has the competence to determine their salaries and emoluments as far as the local government councils are concerned are those of the “Auditor General of the Local Government Councils of a State and Chairman and Members of the State Local Government Service Commission.
Counsel submitted that a local government councilor is not one of such public officers for whom the commission has the competence to determine appropriate remuneration. In other words, the list of public officers for whom the commission has the competence to determine their remuneration as set out in the said Sections of the Constitution and the Commission’s Act are, no doubt, exhaustive and clearly excludes councilors at the local government level. The enumeration of one thing, said counsel, is the exclusion of the other.
He referred to the cases of Dada v. Adeyeye (2005) 6 NWLR (pt. 920) 1 at 19.
Abacha v. FRN (2006) 4 NWLR (pt. 970) 239 at 309 – 310.
He submitted that the learned trial court’s finding that foregoing contention is of no moment in that “Law No. 7 of Anambra State 2001 is a law passed by the Anambra State House of Assembly and that it applies as a State and not as a Federal enactment” is to say the least perverse and has occasioned a serious miscarriage of justice. The fact that it is a law passed by the Anambra State House of Assembly does not detract from the fact that its foundation was faulty and that nothing good ever come out of a faulty or bad foundation.
Counsel noted that Section 3 of the Anambra State House of Assembly Public Officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001 made it clear that it relied on the said recommendation of the Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal Commission to make provision (in the Schedule to the said law) for the salaries and emolument to be paid to the Local Government Councilors.
Counsel submitted that the learned trial court was in error when it relied on the said Law No. 7 of 2001, deemed void having been based on the ultra vires recommendation of the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission to hold that the respondent was entitled to her claims.
He submitted further that even the Anambra State House of Assembly was in error when in Section 4 other law No.7 of 2001, she charged the salaries and emoluments of local government councilors on the consolidated revenue fund of the State.
Learned counsel for the Appellant referred to the provisions of Sections 120 and 124 of the 1999 constitution and submitted that section 124(4) duly circumscribed the power of the Anambra State House of Assembly with respect to the salaries and emoluments of office holders that can be charged upon the consolidated revenue funds of the State. That, the salaries and emoluments of local government councilors are certainly not one of such funds that can be charged upon the consolidated revenue fund of the State as prescribed by Section 124(4) of the constitution.
Section 4 of the Public Officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001 (which purportedly charged the salaries and allowances of Chairmen and the councilors of the local government on the consolidated revenue fund of the State) is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 124(4) of the constitution and to that extent is null and void.
Counsel referred to the case of A.G. Lagos State v. A.G. Federation (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1 at 24 and urged that issues 1 and 2 be resolved in favour of the Appellants.
On Issues 1 and 2, Learned counsel for the Respondent first referred to the provisions of article 32(c) and (d) of the third schedule of the 1999 constitution and submitted that one of the functions of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission is to make recommendation for the salaries and emoluments to various offices including those of legislators.
Counsel submitted that Section 32(d) of the third schedule to the constitution supports the above position of the law in the sense that the words “Political Office holders” and the last sentences of that Section which states “and holders of the offices mentioned in Section 84 and 124 of this constitution” show that the other Political Office holders not specifically mentioned ire not excluded by the law.
He submitted that the draftsman of the Constitution intended from the wording of this section, to include and cover other political office holders whom were not listed under Sections 84 and 124 of the 1999 constitution. Counsel referred to the case of Ojukwu v. Obasanjo (2004) 12 NWLR (Part 886) 169 and 236 where Edozie JSC held:
“I will expatiate by reference to Section 318 of the 1999 constitution where the following words used in Section 317 (1)(b) of the Constitution are defined thus – ‘office’ means any office the appointment to which is by election under the constitution”.
Counsel referred to Section 7 (1) of the 1999 Constitution which deals with the system of local government by democratically elected local government councils and submitted that the appointment of the Respondent into the ‘office’ of a councilor of the 2nd Appellant is by election under the 1999 constitution.
On the provisions of Section 6 (d) and parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act, referred to by the Appellants, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the law was enacted and came into force on the 29th day of December, 1989, before the 1999 constitution. In other words, the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act predated the 1999 constitution, and is currently in operation, by the saving clause in Section 315(1) (a) of the constitution.
He submitted that though the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act in parts A and B of the First Schedule did not include the Local Government Chairmen and councilors, that the effect of Section 7(1) 318, 315(1) and article 32(d) of the Third Schedule all of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria on the Act, is to expand the Act and bring it into conformity with the aforesaid provisions of the 1999 constitution.
The Act cannot be construed in any way to make it clash with the 1999 constitution.
Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that Sections 84 and 124 of the 1999 constitution did not provide that only those offices listed and no other, shall have their remuneration charged to the consolidated Revenue Fund, by the National or State Assemblies. He said the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission has the competence to recommend salaries and emoluments to be paid to the Local Government Councilors.
Counsel submitted further that upon the enactment of the Anambra State Public officers Salaries Law No. 7 of 2001, the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilization and Fiscal Commission, disappears and losses its character in deference to the Law No. 7 of 2001. The Law, he said is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Counsel submitted that Law No. 7 of 2001 is contemplated by the provisions of Sections 120(2), 120(4) and 121(2) of the 1999 Constitution. On the first, being a law that appropriated money for the payment of salaries of specified offices. On the second, being a law prescribed by the House of Assembly of Anambra State and thirdly, being an appropriation bill for the issue from the consolidated Revenue Fund of the State of the sums necessary to meet the expenditure.
Finally, all Issues 1 and 2, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission has the competence to make recommendations for the salaries and emoluments to be paid to the Local Government Councilors and that the Law No. 7 of 2001, which was predicated on the commission’s recommendation, is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the 1999 Constitution.
The learned counsel for the Appellant could not be seriously heard to have argued that the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission has no competence to make recommendations for the salaries and emoluments to be paid to Local Government councils or that Law No. 7 of Anambra State is null and void because it claims to have been based on the recommendations of the Revenue Mobilization
Allocation and Fiscal Commission.
In the first place, article 32(d) of the third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) made pursuant to the provision of Section 153(1)(h) of the said Constitution enjoins the Commission to “determine the remuneration appropriate for political office holders, including the President, Vice-President, Governors, Deputy Governors, Ministers, Commissioners, Special Advisers, Legislators and the holders of the offices mentioned in Section 84 and 124 of the Constitution….”
Before then, in article 32(c) of the same Act, the Commission shall have power to “advise the Federal and State Governors on Fiscal efficiency and methods by which their revenue can be increased”.
These aforementioned provisions of the 1999 constitution stand to modify and expand the provision of Section 6(1) (c) and (d) of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act Cap. R7 Laws of the Federation 2004, an existing law by virtue of Section 315(1) of the constitution.
By Section 6(1) (c) and (d) of the Act, the commission shall have power to (c) advise the Federal, State and Local Government on Fiscal efficiency and methods by which their revenue is to be increased and (d) determine the remuneration appropriate to the holders of the offices as specified in part A and B of the First Schedule to this Act”.
Learned counsel for the Appellants could not be right when he argued that the determination of the remuneration of Local Government councilors could not be done by the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission because Section 6(1)(d) does not envisage Local Government Councilors as specified in parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Act. The truth is that the provisions of article 32 (d) of the third schedule to the 1999 Constitution which broadly extends the powers of the commission to determine the remuneration of appropriate political office holders including ‘legislators’ not only supersedes but also expands and modifies the provisions of Section 6(d) of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission Act.
The learned trial judge was therefore right not to have invalidated the Anambra State Public Officers Salaries Law No.7 of 2001 on account of the fact as contended by the learned counsel for the Respondent that the law was based on the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.
Again, in this respect, I do agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that upon the enactment of Law No. 7 of 2001 by the Anambra State House of Assembly, the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission disappears and looses its character, in deference to the Law No. 7 of 2001.
In other words, the validity vel non of the Anambra State Law No. 7 cannot be dependent on the recommendation of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.
On Issue No 2, the learned counsel for the Appellant was equally on a wrong footing when he argued that the provision of Section 4 of Anambra State Law No.7 of 2001 which charged the payment of the emoluments of the Local Government Councilors on the consolidated Revenue Fund is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 124 of the 1999 Constitution.
Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the remuneration of the offices to be charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund under Section 124 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is prescribed by the provisions of Section 124(4) which mentioned the State Local Government Service Commission but not the Local Government Councilors. To the contrary, I am of the considered opinion that the provision of Section 124 of the Constitution is inclusive and not exclusive.
In other words, the provision of Section 124 of the 1999 Constitution guarantees that the salaries and emoluments of those officers mentioned in Section 124(4) are charged and paid under the Consolidated Revenue Fund but does not preclude the charging and payment of other salaries if and when authorized by law to be charged under the Consolidated Revenue Fund.It is for this reason that the provision of Section 120 particularly 120(3) and (a) of the same 1999 Constitution declare that:
(3) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any Public Fund of the State other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State, unless the Issue of those moneys has been authorized by Law of the House of Assembly of the State.
(4) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State or any other public Fund of the State except as prescribed by the House of Assembly.
It is clear that the provision of Section 124 of the 1999 Constitution does not exclude, or prescribe the payment of the salaries of other Public Officers otherwise than those mentioned in Section 124(4) under the consolidated Revenue Fund of the State.
The of a statute or rule is the primary essential source of its meaning. The words of a governing are of paramount concern, in their con, is what the means. We cannot depart from the words of the law – A verbis legis non est recedendum Udo Udoma JSC rightly put it in the case of Nafiu Rabiu v. The State (1981) 2 NCLR 293 at 296.
“It is a principle of interpretation that the language of the Constitution, where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evident meaning, and that a constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defect its evident purpose…..”In the instant case, the learned trial judge was right to have held first that:
“Section 4 of Law No. 7 of 2001 as indeed, the entire Law, was passed by the Anambra State House of Assembly. The payment to councillors therein from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State is prescribed by the State House of Assembly.
This is pursuant to its undisputed power under Section 120(4) of the Constitution”.
And also that:
“is this power circumscribed by Section 124 (4) of the Constitution? A close look at the said section will reveal that it is not meant to prohibit the payment of salaries of persons other than those stipulated therein from the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
If that was the intention of the constitution, it would have been clearly stated. I am therefore of the view that Section 4 of the Law No. 7 of 2001 is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the Constitution”.
In the light of the foregoing, Issues Nos. 1 and 2 are resolved against the Appellants.
Learned counsel for the Appellant adopted his submission on Issues Nos. 1 and 2 in his treatment of Issue No. 3. He merely added that assuming without conceding, that the said law is not null and void of no effect as contended above, it shall be their further contention that the learned trial court was also wrong when it held that Section 4 of the Law of 2001 imposed a liability on the 1st Appellant to pay the respondent.
On Issue No 3, learned counsel for the Respondent reiterated the fact that Section 4 of LAW No. 7 of 2001 is not inconsistent with Section 124(4) of the 1999 Constitution and reminded us that the Appellants did not contradict the claims of the Respondent in any form in the trial court.
I adopt my reasoning and conclusions on Issues Nos. 1 and 2 also as applicable to Issue No. 3. What remains is to add that the learned trial Judge was also not in error to have held at page 72 of the record of appeal that:
“In the circumstances, not only is the 2nd Defendant liable for nonpayment of the salary of its workers, the 1st Defendant is also liable for not making the payment as provided by law in the circumstances therefore, the Defendants are jointly and severally liable to the Plaintiff for this long outstanding debt”.
This is because the 1st Appellant was indeed obliged to comply with the provision of Section 4 of Law No. 7 of 2001 which charged the salaries of Public Officers in Anambra State including the respondent on the consolidated Revenue Fund of the State.
The Consolidated Revenue Fund of a State, is an account, into which Funds raised or received by the State are paid into. Monies shall be withdrawn from this account to meet the expenditure that is charged upon the fund by the Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an appropriate law, supplementary appropriation law or law passed in pursuance of Section 121 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
See e.g. section 120 of the 1999 constitution.
Finally, or Issue No. 3, the Appellant cannot be heard to contest the claims of the respondent which were not challenged, or contradicted in the court below.
See P.T.F. v. I.F.M.S. Ltd. (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 794) 586.
Aprofim Eng. Const. Ltd. v. Sidor Ltd. (2006) 13 NWLR (pt. 996) 73.
Issue No. 3 is also resolved against the Appellants.
Having resolved the three (3) Issues in this appeal against the Appellants, the appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
There shall be costs of N30,000.00 in favour of the Respondent against the Appellants.
ISAIAH OLUFEMI AKEJU, J.C.A.: My learned brother, Mojeed Adekunle Owoade JCA gave me the opportunity of reading before now the judgment just delivered. I am in full agreement with the reasoning therein and the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit. The appeal is dismissed by me while I abide by the award of costs in favour of the respondent.
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I agree.
Appearances
T.U. OgujiFor Appellant
AND
Chudi Obieze with S. O. Achukwu OnonyeFor Respondent
