AMINU CHINDO & ORS v. LAMALANG SANDA
(2016)LCN/8212(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 25th day of February, 2016
CA/J/279/2014
RATIO
APPEAL: CONDITION PRECEDENT: WHETHER THERE CAN BE AN APPEAL WHERE THE CONDITION PRECEDENT HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED
It is trite that where that condition precedent is necessary but has not been fulfilled, there is no appeal. See Nalsa & Team Associates V NNPC (1991) LPELR-1935 (SC); & Olowosoke V Oke (1972) 11 SC 1. per. JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
APPEAL: CONDITIONS FOR AN APPEAL TO BE AS OF RIGHT
For an Appeal to be as of right from the High Court, it must fall under Section 241 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Where it does not, leave must be obtained in order to ignite the jurisdiction of this Court. The effect of not complying with this Constitutional provision for an Appeal where leave is required, is that it becomes fatal to the Appeal. per. JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION; THE IMPORT OF THE WORD “SHALL” AND “LEAVE” IN SECTION 241 OF THE CONSTITUTION
The use of the word “shall” in the above provision makes leave a mandatory requirement which an Appellant cannot escape where his Appeal is outside the scope of Section 241 of the 1999 Constitution. This is because the word “shall”?? when used in a statute connotes a command or what is legally unavoidable or inescapable, and is mandatory.
While “leave” is defined as: “seeking permission to appeal”. See Sirika V Bello (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1232) 452 at 466, paras E-F; & Ekwerekwu V Egboche (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 194 at 203, para F; Metal Construction (WA) Ltd V D.A. Migliore (1990) LPELR-1869 (SC). per. JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
STATUTORY INTERPRETION; THE IMPORT OF THE WORD “SHALL” AND “LEAVE” IN SECTION 241 OF THE CONSTITUTION
The use of the word “shall” in the above provision makes leave a mandatory requirement which an Appellant cannot escape where his Appeal is outside the scope of Section 241 of the 1999 Constitution. This is because the word “shall”?? when used in a statute connotes a command or what is legally unavoidable or inescapable, and is mandatory.
While “leave” is defined as: “seeking permission to appeal”. See Sirika V Bello (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1232) 452 at 466, paras E-F; & Ekwerekwu V Egboche (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 194 at 203, para F; Metal Construction (WA) Ltd V D.A. Migliore (1990) LPELR-1869 (SC). per. JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
COURT: JURISDICTION; WHEN CAN A COURT OF LAW EXERCISE THEIR POWERS AND WHEN CAN AN AGGRIEVED PERSON APPEAL AS OF RIGHT
It is settled law that Courts of law can only exercise their powers where they possess jurisdiction in the matter. The power of a Court does not fall from heaven but can only be exercised if the Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. Under Section 241(1) (a) and (b) of the said Constitution, a person aggrieved by a decision of the High Court can appeal as of right in:
(1) “An appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases”
(a) Final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court or a High Court sitting at first instance;
(b)Where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings;
(c) Decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution;
(d)Decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to whether any of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution has been, or is likely to be, contravened in relation to any person;
(e) Decisions in criminal proceedings in which the Federal High Court or a High Court has imposed a sentence of death;
(f) Decisions made or given by the Federal High Court or a High Court-
(i) Where the liberty of a person or the custody of an infant is concerned,
(ii)Where an injunction or the appointment of a receiver is granted or refused,
(iii) In the case of a decision determining the case of a creditor or the liability of a contributory or other officer under any enactment relating to companies in respect of malfeasance or otherwise,
(iv) In the case of a decree nisi in a matrimonial cause or a decision in an admiralty action determining liability, and
(v) In such other cases as may be prescribed by any law in force in Nigeria.” Section 242 of the same Constitution provides for other situations wherein Appeals from the Federal High Court and State High Courts to the Court of Appeal are allowed, but with leave. For ease of reference, it provides as follows:
(1) “Subject to the provisions of Section 241 of this Constitution, an appeal shall lie form the decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal with the leave of the Federal High Court or that High Court or the Court of Appeal.” per. JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SAIDU TANKO HUSSAINI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. AMINU CHINDO
2. BENJAMIN YUNUSA
3. TIMOTHY YINUSA – Appellant(s)
AND
LAMALANG SANDA – Respondent(s)
JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
This is an Appeal against the Judgement of the High Court of Justice, Gombe State in Suit No. GM/68A/2014 delivered on 27th February 2014. The Court below, sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, dismissed the Appeal of the Appellants. The Appellants aggrieved by the decision of the Court below, filed this Appeal vide its Notice of Appeal on 08-04-14.
The Appellants, as Plaintiffs, first instituted this action before the trial Upper Area Court, Boh on 22nd May 2013, claiming title to the land in dispute. In a bid to prove their claim, the Appellants adduced evidence through four witnesses. The Respondent contested the claim and instead counter-claimed, contending that the land was founded and cleared by his grandfather many years ago. The Respondent called a total of six witnesses in a bid to prove his counter-claim.
At the close of trial, the trial Judge of Upper Area Court, Boh delivered Judgement awarding title to the land to the Respondent on 01-07-13.
Dissatisfied, the Appellants appealed to the High Court of Gombe State clothed in its appellate
jurisdiction, which Court after hearing the Appeal, dismissed same on 27-02-14 for lacking in merit. Still displeased with this Judgement, the Appellants further appealed to this Court. As afore-said, their Notice of Appeal was filed on 08-04-14 wherein they complained on two grounds.
When the Appeal was called up for hearing on the 01-02-16, Mr. Bawa, learned Counsel for the Appellants adopted and relied on the Appellants’ Brief of argument filed on 05-10-15, as the Appellants arguments in the Appeal. He prayed the Court to set aside the Judgement of the Court below and grant the reliefs sought at page 84 of the Record of Appeal. Likewise, Mr. Yila, learned Counsel for the Respondent, adopted and relied on the Respondent’s Brief of argument filed on 05-11-15 as the Respondent’s arguments in the Appeal. He prayed the Court to dismiss the Appeal for lacking in merit.
At the close of arguments, the Court raised one issue suo motu and invited both learned Counsel to the respective parties to address them thereon, to wit: whether, this Appeal, being an Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, and
also an Appeal on facts, the Appellants sought the leave of Court before filing same, by virtue of Section 242 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to Appeal.
In answer to this issue, learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that by virtue of Section 242 of the 1999 Constitution (supra), the Appellants were required to seek leave; and that they did seek leave from the Court below to Appeal. He however admits that proof of such leave purportedly granted was not contained in the Record of Appeal, but offered no further explanation for its alleged exclusion. On his part, learned Counsel for the Respondent contends that the Appellants did not seek the leave of the Court below to Appeal, as is obvious by its absence from the printed Record. He therefore applied that the Appeal be struck out.
Both learned Counsel distilled two issues apiece in their respective Briefs of argument. Since they are virtually the same in content, I intend to adopt the issues crafted by the Appellants in the determination of the Appeal. They are set out hereunder as follows:
1. Whether from the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing
the Appeal of the Appellants without analysing issues two and three to ascertain their propriety or otherwise. (Ground 2)
2. Whether from the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the Appeal without making a proper finding, yet heavily relied on the findings of the Upper Area Court, Boh erroneously. (Ground 1)
Issue one:
Whether from the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the Appeal of the Appellants without analysing issues two and three to ascertain their propriety or otherwise.
Under issue one, learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that as a general rule an intermediate Court like the lower Court, has a duty to pronounce on all the issues before it. That it is only the Supreme Court that has the power to isolate just one issue amongst others presented to it for determination and resolve an Appeal based on it. He relies on Ikechukwu V FRN (2015) 3 SCM 61 at 65. He contends that pages 79-82 of the Record of the Court below clearly portrays the contention of the
Appellants that the duty placed upon the lower Court was not fulfilled or discharged, and that this has thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Counsel submits that an Appeal is a continuation of the original claim and an appellate Court is under an obligation to resolve the issues that emanate from the claims at the trial Court. He relies on Kayili V. Yilbuk (2015) 2 SCM 161-170.
Counsel submits that issues two and three reflected at page 80 of the Record of proceedings of the Court below are issues that emanates from the claim of Appellants right from Upper Area Court Boh, being the Court of first instance. He submits that the neglect, default and refusal of the Court below to analyse issues two and three (at page 80 of the Record of the trial Court) denied the Appellant the right to be heard, which has breached their Constitutional right to fair hearing enshrined in Section 36 of the Constitution, 1999 (as amended) and it has thus occasioned a miscarriage of justice. That therefore, this Court has the right to revisit same. He submits that since it is only the Supreme Court that has the power to isolate just one issue amongst others and determine
an Appeal based on it, the lower Court was in substantial error to ignore issues raised by the Appellants and proceeded to find in favour of the Respondent.
In response, learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that it is a settled principle of law that the duty of evaluation of evidence is pre-eminently that of the trial Court, which alone has the benefit of seeing and hearing witnesses in Court in the course of their testimonies. As a general rule therefore, that an appellate Court would not disturb the findings of a trial Court unless it is proved that the findings are not supported by the evidence on Record. Counsel submits that the Court below exercised its duty to evaluate the evidence on record before it; and on such a premise, pronounced on all the issues, as well as convinced itself that all the findings of the trial Court were supported by evidence. He relies on Eyo V Onouoha (2011) Vol. 195 LRCN R6, 46; (and pages & 79-82 of the Record). He contends that the duty placed on the Court below by law was fulfilled, and that therefore there was no miscarriage of justice. He further submits that the Appellants were properly accorded their right
to fair hearing as enshrined in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
Therefore, they cannot be heard to complain that the trial Court did not give them fair hearing. He relies on Ndukauba V Kolomi (2005)4 NWLR pt. 915 page 411 at pages 429-430 paras H-D; and pages 29, 49, 72-78 of the Record of proceedings.
Issue two:
Whether from the evidence on record, the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the Appeal without making a proper finding, and yet heavily relied on the findings of the Upper Area Court Boh erroneously.
Learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that, where the trial Court fails to evaluate evidence properly, an appellate Court is entitled to intervene and re-evaluate such evidence. He relies on Tukur V UBA (2012) 10 SCM 139 at 145.
He contends that pages 52-58 of the Record of the trial Upper Area Court Boh shows the testimonies of DW1, DW2, DW3, DW4 as well as DW5 were not properly evaluated; and that the testimony of PW2 contradicted that of the Respondent/Defendant that they do not share boundary with anybody.
Counsel submits that if the trial Court as well as the Court below analysed issues two and three of the Appellants Brief of argument, they would have discovered that the Respondent/Defendant did not know the actual size of the farmland in dispute which the trial Upper Area Court Boh took cognizance during its visit to the locus in quo. He referred to pages 49-51 of the Record.
Counsel furthers submit that where the lower Court has been guilty of an improper use of its powers in the performance of adjudicative functions, the Court of Appeal has power to correct the error. He relies on Fakunle V Oke (2009) 26 WRN 151; & Olodo V Josiah (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 653 at 664-665.
In response to the Arguments canvassed on behalf of the Appellant, learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that he adopts all his arguments in respect of issue one. He adds that where the trial Court properly evaluates all the evidence before it and an appellate Court affirms such, then the duty of this Court is not to disturb it. He relies on Eyo V Onuoha (supra).
Counsel further submits that the trial Court was fair to all the parties and that the evidence
of all the defence witnesses was properly evaluated. He argues that the testimony of PW2 did not contradict that of the Plaintiff/Appellants Statement of claim; and he refers to page 53 of the Record. He submits that the Defendant/Respondent had accurately identified and knows the size of his farmland (pages 49-50 of the Record). He relies on Odiche V Chibogwu (1994) 7-8 SCNJ 325.
Counsel submits that from the totality of evidence led at the Court below, the decision of the trial Court is supported by the evidence adduced. He submits that it is trite law that the Plaintiff shall succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence. That where a trial Court, clearly evaluated the evidence of the parties and justifiably appraised the facts before it as appears in the Record, as in the instant case, it is not the business of an appellate Court to substitute its own views of the facts for those of the trial Court. He relies on Omotayo V Co-operative Supply Association (2011) Vol. 202 LRCN 142.
Findings:
Before embarking on a consideration of the Appeal on
its merit, it is both prudent and useful to advert to the true nature of the right of Appeal to this Court. It is therefore imperative to determine the issue raised suo motu by this Court, which basically is: whether or not the Appeal is competent before the Court. Section 241 and Section 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (as amended) create two different rights of appeal, namely:
(i) The right of appeal as of right (Section 241(1); and
(ii) The right of appeal with the leave of Court (Section 242).
Whereas an intending appellant can validly exercise his right of appeal as of right at will within the time fixed by statute, leave of either the lower Court or this Court is a condition precedent to his exercise of the right of appeal with leave. It is trite that where that condition precedent is necessary but has not been fulfilled, there is no appeal. See Nalsa & Team Associates V NNPC (1991) LPELR-1935 (SC); & Olowosoke V Oke (1972) 11 SC 1.
It has not been disputed that the facts in the instant case are that firstly, the Appeal has arisen from the Judgment of the Gombe State High Court sitting in its
appellate jurisdiction; and secondly, that it is an appeal on facts. It therefore follows that the right to appeal thereon can only be exercised with leave. Both Counsel are ad idem or on the same page with the law on this. However, the point of departure is, whereas Counsel for the Appellant contends that the Appellants sought the leave of the lower Court to appeal, but could not offer such proof of such leave having been granted; Counsel for the Respondent argues that no such leave was sought as is evident by its conspicuous absence from the Record of proceedings. Consequently, the question is: whether or not the Appellants obtained the leave of the Court below, as claimed, before filing this Appeal, in compliance with Section 242 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), this being an Appeal from a decision of the High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, and also being an Appeal on mixed law and facts.
Learned Counsel for the Appellants concedes that the Appellants are required to seek leave to appeal from the decision of the High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Section 242 of the 1999 Constitution. He however submits
that the Appellants did obtain the leave of the Court below to appeal against its decision to this Court. He however agrees that there is no evidence of such leave in the Record of Appeal. On his part, learned Counsel for the Respondent argues that the Appellants did not seek the leave of the lower Court to appeal as is obvious from the Record. Since leave is fundamental, he therefore applies that the Appeal be struck out.
For an Appeal to be as of right from the High Court, it must fall under Section 241 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Where it does not, leave must be obtained in order to ignite the jurisdiction of this Court. The effect of not complying with this Constitutional provision for an Appeal where leave is required, is that it becomes fatal to the Appeal.
The use of the word “shall” in the above provision makes leave a mandatory requirement which an Appellant cannot escape where his Appeal is outside the scope of Section 241 of the 1999 Constitution. This is because the word “shall”?? when used in a statute connotes a command or what is legally unavoidable or inescapable, and is
mandatory.
While “leave” is defined as: “seeking permission to appeal”. See Sirika V Bello (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1232) 452 at 466, paras E-F; & Ekwerekwu V Egboche (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 194 at 203, para F; Metal Construction (WA) Ltd V D.A. Migliore (1990) LPELR-1869 (SC).
It is settled law that Courts of law can only exercise their powers where they possess jurisdiction in the matter. The power of a Court does not fall from heaven but can only be exercised if the Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter.
?Under Section 241(1) (a) and (b) of the said Constitution, a person aggrieved by a decision of the High Court can appeal as of right in:
(1) “An appeal shall lie from the decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal as of right in the following cases”
(a) Final decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Federal High Court or a High Court sitting at first instance;
(b)Where the ground of appeal involves questions of law alone, decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings;
(c) Decisions in
any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution;
(d)Decisions in any civil or criminal proceedings on questions as to whether any of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution has been, or is likely to be, contravened in relation to any person;
(e) Decisions in criminal proceedings in which the Federal High Court or a High Court has imposed a sentence of death;
(f) Decisions made or given by the Federal High Court or a High Court-
(i) Where the liberty of a person or the custody of an infant is concerned,
(ii)Where an injunction or the appointment of a receiver is granted or refused,
(iii) In the case of a decision determining the case of a creditor or the liability of a contributory or other officer under any enactment relating to companies in respect of malfeasance or otherwise,
(iv) In the case of a decree nisi in a matrimonial cause or a decision in an admiralty action determining liability, and
(v) In such
other cases as may be prescribed by any law in force in Nigeria.”
Section 242 of the same Constitution provides for other situations wherein Appeals from the Federal High Court and State High Courts to the Court of Appeal are allowed, but with leave. For ease of reference, it provides as follows:
(1) “Subject to the provisions of Section 241 of this Constitution, an appeal shall lie form the decisions of the Federal High Court or a High Court to the Court of Appeal with the leave of the Federal High Court or that High Court or the Court of Appeal.”
Thus, this Appeal not being as of right under one of the instances specified in Section 241 of the Constitution and having not been specifically provided for by any other law in force, an appellant has not the freedom of an eagle, soaring free in the open wide blue skies, to appeal against the decision of a High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction. He therefore mandatorily has to seek the leave of Court if he hopes to be granted audience before this Court.
Where an appeal can only be lodged with the leave of Court, it is the leave that confers
jurisdiction on the Court. It is thus vital and fundamental that leave must be obtained before the Appeal is filed. See Ikweki V Ebele (2005) LPELR-1490(SC) 1 at 42.
By the same token, the two grounds of Appeal centre on facts and not on law alone. Consequently, the failure to obtain the leave of Court, where such is necessary, to file a particular ground of appeal from which an issue is raised for the resolution of a case, renders both the ground of appeal and the issue so formulated there from, incompetent. Where the leave of Court is required to appeal, until such leave is granted, no valid Notice of Appeal would be deemed to have been filed. Thus, an appellate Court lacks the jurisdictional competence to hear and determine any Appeal filed without the leave thereof, where such leave is mandatory. See Ene V Asikpo (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 477 at 509, paras B-C; Gambomi V Bintumi (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1217) 463 at 471, paras F-G; Nwachukwu V State (2007) LPELR-8075 (SC); Owuda V Lawal (1984)4 SC 145; & Adetutu V Aderohunmu (1981) 1 SCNLR 515.
In FBN Plc V TSA Industries Ltd (2010) LPELR-1283 (SC) 1 at 49, Adekeye, JSC stated the law clearly
thus:
?A Notice of Appeal in the process of appeal is a very important document, as it forms the foundation of the appeal.
If it is defective, the appellate Court must strike it out on the ground that it is incompetent. The question of whether or not a proper notice of appeal has been filed in the lower Court is a question which touches on the jurisdiction of the appellate Court. If no proper notice has been filed, then there is no appeal for the Court to entertain. Anadi V Okoti (1972) 7 SC 57; CBN V Okojie (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) pg. 488; Olanrewaju V BON Ltd (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 364) pg. 622.
Again in Imunze V FRN (2014) LPELR-SC.354/2011 1 at 13-14, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC had this to say on the subject:
The Constitution confers on the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals. The jurisdiction is statutory and also controlled by the rules of Court. The Court of Appeal would lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal if an appellant fails to comply with the statutory provisions or the relevant rules of Court… The originating process in all appeals is the Notice of
Appeal. Once it is found to be defective the Court of Appeal ceases to have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in whatever form. See Olowokere V African Newspapers (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) 583.”
In the instant case, since it is evident that the Appellants intend to appeal against the Judgment of the Gombe State High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, they require the leave of that High Court or this Court to so appeal. Additionally, the grounds of Appeal are grounds of mixed law and facts for which leave is also required. Where an aggrieved person who requires leave to appeal fails to obtain such leave before bringing such Appeal, the Appeal is incompetent.
A Notice of Appeal is the foundation of the proceeding before an appellate Court. It is the initiation process of any appeal. Where a Notice of Appeal contains any error, or is defective or deficient, it becomes incompetent. Any appeal founded on an incompetent notice, is invalid and renders any proceeding founded on it also invalid, null and void. An appellate Court has power to strike it out for being incompetent as it touches on the issue of jurisdiction. See Obidoa V
Marchie (2010) LPELR-4668 (CA).
What we are dealing with here therefore is an incompetent Appeal which ousts the jurisdiction of this Court. Where an appeal requires leave of Court to be obtained and such leave was not sought and obtained, such an Appeal is incompetent ab initio, cannot be entertained and so will be struck out. This is obviously because a Court of competent jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to hear an incompetent Appeal. In the instant case, the Appeal being incompetent, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine it on its merits. See Ekwerekwu V Egboche (supra) 206, paras D-F.
This is an issue which touches on jurisdiction; and jurisdiction is the lifeline on which the Court can adjudicate on a matter. Where an appeal is adjudged incompetent ab initio, the appellate Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and determine same, since the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and it squarely touches on the competence of the Court to entertain and adjudicate on same.
Consequently, the submission of learned Counsel for the Appellants that he sought leave from the Court below is nothing but a mere contention which is not
supported by any evidence on the Record. Since such is not contained in the Record of proceedings, by which we are bound, the Appellants cannot be said to have obtained the leave of the Court below. Failure to seek and obtain leave before filing the Appeal therefore, makes the Appeal incompetent.
Instead, the Appellants, by filing a Notice of Appeal from the decision of the trial High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction without leave, is equated to having not filed anything before this Court, and the jurisdiction of this Court is by virtue of that very reason, ousted. See: Kashadadi V Sarkin Noma (2007) LPELR-1673 (SC); The Nigeria Airforce V Shekete (2002) LPELR-3193 (SC); UBN Plc V Sogunro (2006) LPELR-3393 (SC); Akinwale V BON (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt. 704) 448; Nwosu V Offor (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 487) 274; (1997) 1 SCNJ 193; NNS Co. Ltd V Establissment Sima of Vaduz (1990) LPELR-2004 (SC); Nwadike V Ibekwe (1983) 1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 718; Oluwole V LSDPC (1983) 5SC 1; State V Omeh (1983) 5 SC 20; Ojemen V Momodu II (1983) 1 SCNLR 188. This Court has therefore been robbed of jurisdiction to determine the Appeal on its merit and, the absence of the
requisite leave has rendered the Appeal incompetent. This therefore renders the Appeal inchoate and there obviates any further need to consider the two issues submitted for the determination of the Appeal.
In consequence, the legal effect is that this Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Justice, Gombe State in Suit No. GM/68A/2013 delivered on 8th April, 2014, is incompetent. It is liable to be struck out without a hearing on the merits. It is accordingly struck out. Costs of N50, 000.00 is awarded to the Respondent against the Appellants.
SAIDU TANKO HUSAINI, J.C.A.:
I had the privilege of reading in draft form the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Jummai Hannatu Sankey, JCA. I agree with her reasoning and final conclusions that the Appellant not having sought leave to appeal from the appellate decision of the Gombe State High Court in Suit No. GM/68A/2014, the Appeal to this Court is incompetent and same ought to be struck out. I make that order accordingly, striking out Appeal No. CA/J/279/2014.
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.: I have read
in advance a draft copy of the judgment just delivered by my lord JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JCA, and I am in complete agreement with the sound reasoning and impeccable conclusions reached therein. I have absolutely nothing more to add.
I too hold that the Appeal is incompetent and it is hereby struck out. I shall abide by all the consequential orders, including the order as to cost.
Appearances
Adamu Bawa, Esq. For Appellant
AND
Japhil Yila, Esq. For Respondent



