AMEH RICHARD v. THE STATE (2013)

AMEH RICHARD v. THE STATE

(2013)LCN/6468(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 27th day of November, 2013

CA/EK/67/C/2013

JUSTICE

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

AMEH RICHARDAppellant(s)

AND

THE STATERespondent(s

RATIO

THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL OR CIVIL MATTERS

Now, the law is settled that if the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action. See: SECTIONS 138(1) and (2) of the EVIDENCE ACT; ADAMU v. A.G. OF BENDEL STATE (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 284; AKPAN v. THE STATE (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 101; OJUKWU v. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 806. PER GALINJE, J.C.A.

ESTABLISHING PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, provides that every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. Flowing from the above therefore, the burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution who must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a general duty to rebut the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to the accused person. This burden never shifts. See: ALABI v. THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 307) 511 at 531 PARAGRAPH A-C; SOLOLA v. THE STATE (2005) 5 SC (Pt. 1) 135.

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein, a Police Corporal and one Corporal Akinyede Olaiya were jointly arraigned before the High Court of Ekiti State on the 31st day of October, 2012; charged with the murder of Ipinlaye Michael and Faluyi Ayo Kehinde respectively at Kota, Omuo-Ekiti on the 23rd March, 2011. They pleaded not guilty to the charge. During the trial, three witnesses testified for the prosecution and sixteen (16) documents were tendered in evidence and admitted as exhibits. The Appellants and the co-accused each testified in his defence and one witness was called in their joint defence.
At the end of the trial and in a reserved and considered judgment, Adesodun, J, found the Appellant and his co-accused guilty as charged. His Lordship convicted and sentenced each of them to death by hanging.
Being aggrieved with the decision of the lower court, the Appellant, who was the 1st accused at the lower court has brought this appeal. His notice of appeal at Pages 157 – 162 filed on the 9th April, 2013 contains four (4) grounds of appeal which I reproduce hereunder without their particulars as follows:-
1. That the lower court erred in law when it convicted the Appellant for the offence of murder without having recourse to the non-existence of motive or mens rea as an essential ingredient for the commission of such grievous offence.
2. That the lower court erred in law when it proceeded to convict the Appellant speculatively without establishing that it was indeed bullets emanating from the Appellant’s gun that actually killed the deceased victims of the fatal incident of 23rd March, 2011 at Omuo-Ekiti, Ekiti State.
3. That the lower court erred in law when it ignored the relevance of over-whelming testimonies of the 2 accused persons when they testified that 2 identification parades were conducted on 8th April, 2011 and 12th April, 2011 and wherein the 2 accused persons were not identified as the perpetrators of the shooting that led to the death at Omuo-Ekiti on that fateful day in the 1st instance, that is, the identification parade of 8th April, 2011, while the 2nd identification parade of 12th April, 2011 had only the Appellant being identified as the shooter.
4. That the judgment of the lower court is against the weight of evidence.
Parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. Mr. Gerald Ugochukwu Abonyi, learned Counsel for the Appellant, who also settled the Appellant’s brief of argument formulated five issues for determination of the appeal. At the hearing of the appeal on the 22nd of October, 2013, it was pointed out to the learned Counsel for the Appellant that it was inappropriate to formulate more issues for determination than the number of the grounds of appeal. Before the adoption of the Appellant’s brief of argument, learned Counsel withdrew the 5th issue for determination of the appeal. He therefore relied on issues 1 – 4, which I reproduce hereunder as follows:-
1. Whether the trial court was right in convicting the Appellants for the offence of murder when it was apparent from the facts of the case and the totality of evidence adduced at the trial that the Appellant was on official assignment to the scene of conflict where the offence of murder was eventually committed.
2. Whether the death of the victims in the afore-charge proffered against the Appellant cannot be described as collateral damages and excusable homicide instead of felonious homicide.
3. Whether the lower court was right when it proceeded to convict and sentence the Appellant to death for the offence of murder without forensic certification and confirmation on the particular bullets that killed the victims and the guns they emanated from.
4. Whether the lower court was right in the evaluation of the identification parade so conducted to determine the Police Officers that shot at the victims of alleged homicide.
For record purpose, I reproduce hereunder the 5th issue for determination that was withdrawn at the hearing of the appeal thus:-
“4.5 Whether the judgment of the lower court is not against the weight of the evidence adduced at the trial even in the light of the fact that they (the Appellant) and other police officers were in lawful performance of their duties).”
The Respondent formulated four issues for determination of this appeal. They read as follows:-
1. Whether the lower court was right in convicting the Appellant for the offence of murder without proof of motive or mens rea by the prosecution.
2. Whether the lower court was right in convicting the Appellant for the offence of murder in the absence of any forensic evidence that it was the bullets emanating from the Appellant’s gunshot that killed the deceased.
3. Whether the lower court was right in relying on the identification of the Appellant as the shooter of the deceased based on the identification parade conducted on 12th April, 2011.
4. Whether the lower court, upon the totality of evidence adduced rightly found the case against the Appellant proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant filed a reply brief on the 17th September, 2013, in which he replied to the four (4) issues formulated and argued by the learned DPP.
At Page 5 Paragraph 5.1, Mr. Abonyi, learned Counsel for the Appellant sought for leave to argue issues 1, 2 and 5 together. Learned Counsel went on to argue the three (3) issues together. Having withdrawn the 5th issue for determination of this appeal, it follows therefore that the argument canvassed on the withdrawn issue stands discountenanced. See: KHALIL V. YAR’ADUA (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 847) 446 at 482 PARAGRAPH E, where this Court, per Aloma Mukhtar, JCA (as she then was) said:-
“Likewise arguments covering issues that are struck out should be discountenanced, as they have no foundation to stand on. That is the position of the law.”
The burden I have now is to separate the argument in support of the 5th issue for determination of the appeal from the argument in support of the 1st and 2nd issues that were argued together with the 5th issue. Since it is a criminal case with the Appellants life on the line, I cannot jettison those arguments in support of issues 1 and 2 because of the difficulties in carrying out surgical operation to separate the two arguments.
Having come to the conclusion that the argument in respect of the 1st and 2nd issues are identifiable, I will now determine this appeal on the basis of the four (4) issues formulated by the Appellant as they are similar to the four (4) issues formulated by the Respondent.
Before I consider these issues, I will like to set up in brief the facts of the case, which are simple and straightforward. The Appellant was a Corporal in the Nigerian Police Force, attached to Omuo-Ekiti Divisional Police Headquarters. On the 23rd of March, 2011 in the morning, there was a clash between the members and supporters of two rival political parties, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) in Omuo-Ekiti town. The clash was occasioned by accusation and counter-accusations of tearing of campaign posters of candidates of the two rival political parties in the election that were soon to take place. The Divisional Police Officer led a team of seven Police Officers, including the Appellant and his co-accused at the lower court to the scene of the clash to restore law and order. The Divisional Police Officer was armed with a pistol while five (5) out of the remaining six (6) Police Officers including the Appellant were armed with AK 47 rifles. When they got to the scene, the Appellant and the co-accused that was tried and convicted along with him fired gunshots at the crowd which allegedly resulted in the death of Michael Ipinlaye and Kehinde Ayo Fasuyi.
Now, the law is settled that if the commission of a crime by a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action. See: SECTIONS 138(1) and (2) of the EVIDENCE ACT; ADAMU v. A.G. OF BENDEL STATE (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 284; AKPAN v. THE STATE (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 101; OJUKWU v. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF LAGOS STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 10) 806.

Oputa, JSC in the case of MUFUTAU BAKARE v. THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 1 at 32 defined ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ in the following words:-
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt stems out of a compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. To displace this presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt not beyond the shadow of any doubt that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the administration of justice.”
In the case of OKERE v. THE STATE (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 697) 397 at 415 – 416 PARAGRAPHS H-A, this Court had this to say on the meaning of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’:-
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt of a criminal charge does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt and it is not attained by the number of witnesses fielded by the prosecution. It depends on the quality of the evidence tendered by the prosecution. Consequently if the evidence is strong against an accused person as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence, of course it is possible but not in the least probable the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt.” See: BOLANLE v. THE STATE (2005) 1 NCC 342 at 359.
Now turning to the instant appeal, has the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as to warrant a verdict of guilt against the Appellant? The Appellant was charged with an offence of murder under Section 316 of the Criminal Code Act, Cap.C38, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 and punishable under Section 319 of the same code. Section 316 of the Criminal Code Act, provides as follows:-
“Except as hereinafter set forth, a person who unlawfully kills another under any of the following circumstances, that is to say:-
1. If the offender intends to cause the death of the person killed, or that of some other person;
2. If the offender intends to do to the person killed or to some other person some grievous harm.
3. If the death is caused by means of an act done in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose, which act is of such a nature as to be likely to endanger human life.
4. If the offender intends to do grievous harm to some person for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence which is such that, the offender may be arrested without warrant, or for the purpose of facilitating the flight of an offender who has committed or attempted to commit any such offence;
5. If death is caused by administering any stupefying or overpowering things for either of the purposes last aforesaid;
6. If death is caused by willfully stopping the breath of any person for either of such purposes is guilty of murder.
Section 319(1) of the same code provides as follows:-
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Section of this code any person who commit the offence of murder shall be sentenced to death.”
A critical appraisal of the facts of this case will show that the offence for which the Appellant is charged does not fall within Paragraphs 3 – 6 of Section 316 of the Criminal Code. This is so because the Appellant did not go to the scene of the crime to commit unlawful act, or intended to do grievous harm to some person for the purpose of facilitating the commission of offence; which is such that the offender may be arrested without warrant or for the purpose of facilitating the flight of an offender who has committed or attempted to commit any such offence. There is also no evidence that the death of the deceased was caused by administering any stupefying or over powering things or by willfully stopping his breath. In my view, the facts and evidence in support of the charge against the Appellant squarely places the offence for which the Appellant was charged and convicted under Section 316(1) of the Criminal Code and punishable under Section 319 of the same code. For the prosecution to succeed, it must prove the following ingredients:-
“1. That the death of a human being has actually taken place.
2. That such death has been caused by the Appellant.
3. That the ad that led to the death of the deceased was done with the intention of causing death.
4. That the Appellant knew or had reason to know that death would be the probable and not only a likely consequence of his act. See: OGUMO v. THE STATE (2011) NWLR (Pt. 1246) 314; GIWA v. THE STATE (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 375 at 337.
As for the first ingredient, it is very clear from Exhibit ‘A’ and ‘A1’, the medical reports, that Kehinde Ayo Fasuyi and Michael Ipinlaye died of gunshot injury. The cause of death of Kehinde Ayo Fasuyi is given as (1) Asphyxiation and (2) Gunshot injuries, while the cause of death of Micheal Ipinlaye as recorded in Exhibit ‘A1’ is Cardiac Laceration/Injury as a result of gunshot injury. There is therefore no doubt, and both parties are agreed that the death of a human being has actually taken place. The question now is whether the prosecution has established that the death of any of the human being was caused by the Appellant. Here, the evidence led at the trial is very critical to the resolution of this question.
In his argument on this issue, learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. G. U. Abonyi at one point submitted that both the extra judicial and judicial testimonies of the Appellant revealed his innocence as he denied firing into the group of youths and men causing the mayhem/chaos. However at another point, learned Counsel submitted that, the situation in which the Appellant found himself, the use of arms became necessary and exigent. This is what learned Counsel said at Page 12 Paragraph 3 of his brief: –
“My Lord, we submit with respect that in the instant case, the nature of the operation the Appellant found himself with his colleagues has proved that the use of firearm was necessary and exigent more so as the DPO of the division started the firing or took part in the firing as per pages 5 – 8 of Record of Appeal.”
A situation where the learned Counsel for the Appellant approbates and reprobates at the same time leaves one with the impression that he is trying to play a game of hide and seek with the facts of the case.
At Page 140 Paragraphs 3 – Page 141 Paragraph 2, the learned trial Judge in his judgment found as follows:-
“The evidence of Pw2 and Pw3 as well as Exhibit ‘F’ coupled with the admission by the two accused persons in their statements to the police and with their evidence in court that they fired their AK 47 rifle at the scene, that is, 1st Accused firing four rounds of ammunition and 2nd Accused firing 2 rounds of ammunition and Exhibit E that is, six expended shells of AK 47 ammunition that were recovered at the scene by PW2. All these taken together point to one direction and that is that the two accused person (sic) were responsible for the death of the two victims in this case putting it succinctly that it was the 1st accused that caused the death of Michael Ipinlaye while the 2nd accused caused the death of Kehinde Ayo Faluyi.
I therefore hold that the two accused persons have been sufficiently linked with the death of the two deceased persons in case on hand.”
This is the finding of the lower court that the Appellant is sufficiently linked with the death of Michael Ipinlaye.
The law is settled that appraisal of oral evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence is the primary duty of a Court of trial and a Court of Appeal would only interfere with the performance of that exercise if the trial court has made improper use of the opportunities of hearing and seeing the witnesses or has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted or proved facts. See: FASHANU v. ADEKOYA (1974) 1 ALL NLR (Pt. 1) 35 at 41; EKI v. GIWA (1977) 11 NSCC 96.
Clearly the overwhelming evidence at the lower court showed that the only persons that fired AK 47 at the scene of the crime that day were the Appellant and one other Policeman. The evidence of the investigating Police Officer who testified as PW2, the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant that was admitted as Exhibit ‘C1’ at the lower court, in which he admitted firing four bullets at the scene of crime as well as the evidence of PW3 who was present at the scene of crime and identified the Appellant as the one who fired the gunshot that killed Michael Ipinlaye, all point to the crucial finding of facts by the trial Court. I therefore find no reason to interfere with the finding of the trial Judge that the death of Michael Ipinlaye is caused by the Appellant.
Did the Appellant by firing that gun, intended to cause the death of a human being? Mr. Abonyi, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant, on combat operation to restore peace to a restive environment during preludes to the elections in Ekiti State – Omuo in particular on that fateful day of 23rd March, 2011 had no intention of killing, maiming or causing bodily harm to anyone until the incidence of that day that led to the death of the victims by gunfire. According to the learned Counsel, the Appellant applied the shooting of his gun to scare away attack just like his other mates did and led by their DPO who fired first.
Mr. Familoni, learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that it is not the law that motive and mens rea are essential ingredients of the offence of murder. According to the learned Counsel, all that the prosecution has to prove is any of the circumstances set out in Section 316 of the Criminal Code. In aid, learned Counsel cited NWALI v. THE STATE (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 182) 663 at 674 and ADEKUNLE v. THE STATE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 717 at 747. In resolving the question of whether the Appellant had the intention to kill the deceased, the learned trial Judge said:-
“It is in evidence that the deceased person died of gunshot injuries. See: Exhibit A-A1. The two accused persons fired jointly six rounds of AK 47 rifles ammunition. The two accused persons had been link (sic linked) sufficiently with the killing or death of the deceased persons. It should be noted that AK 47 rifle is a lethal weapon and one does not need a soothsayer to tell out of the devastating effect its ammunition or bullets would have on persons hit by such ammunition when expended. It either inflicts grievous bodily harm in or leads to death (as in the case on hand) persons hit by such ammunition).
In the circumstance of this case, it can safely be inferred that the two accused persons when they fired their AK 47 rifles whether to the air or not in the midst of a large member (sic) of people would know that such expended ammunition could cause serious damage/injury particularly to any human being hit by such ammunition. The two accused persons are trained Corporal.
The logical conclusion that can be inferred or drawn from the facts and evidence placed before this court in the instant case is to the effect that each of the two accused persons knew that the consequences of their ad of firing their AK 47 rifle could inflict bodily harm or cause the death of person hit by the expended ammunition and that they desired same.”

Section 316(1) and (2) clearly states that for anybody to be guilty under the Section, it must be proved that he intended to commit the offence described therein. The two sub-sections commence with the words “if the offender intends….” Even in the case of ADEKUNLE v. STATE (SUPRA) which was cited by learned Counsel for the Respondent, my Lord, Mahmud Mohammed, JSC, set out the 3rd ingredients of the offence of murder as follows:-
“(c) That the act or omission of the accused which caused the death of the deceased was intentional with knowledge that death or grievous bodily harm was its probable consequence.”
The case which was also reported in (2006) 26 NSCQLR 1367 at PAGE 1379 – 1380, Mahmud Mohammed, JSC, said:-
“The law is trite that where a person discharges a firearm unintentionally and without attendant criminal malice or negligence, he will be exempted from criminal responsibility both for the firing and for its consequences. See: IROMANTU v. THE STATE (1964) 1 ALL NLR 311.

I therefore do not agree with the learned Counsel for the Respondent that in murder cases, it is not the law that motive and mens rea are essential ingredients of the offence, which proof is not necessary for the prosecution to establish the case against the accused. Where the law establishing the offence provides that intention is essential for the consummation of the offence, the prosecution must lead evidence that the accused intended to commit the offence.
Intent is a state of mind in which a person seeks to accomplish a given result through a course of action. It is therefore a mental attitude which can seldom be proved by direct evidence, but must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. A state of mind existing at the time a person commits an offence may be shown by act, circumstances and inferences deducible there-from. See: THE STATE v. EVANS, 219, KANSAS REPORTS 515 at 548; PACIFIC REPORTER, 2nd SERIES, 772 at 777; STATE v. GANTT 26 N.C. APP. 554 at 217.
In the instant case, I agree with the learned trial Judge that the Appellant knew that death of human being would be the natural consequence of firing an AK 47 rifle into the crowd, but he went ahead to fire the rifle into the midst of the people. By so doing, he intended to kill or cause bodily harm to the people. The Appellant denied firing his gun in his initial statement to the Police. It was when investigation was conducted into the number of bullets allocated to the Policemen who went to the scene of crime and how many bullets were finally returned, that the Appellant owned up that he expended four (a) bullets at the scene of crime. It was this Appellant’s attitude that prompted the learned trial Judge to disbelieve his story that he fired into the air. I agree with the learned trial Judge that the Appellant’s story that he fired into the air is unbelievable. The learned trial Judge in his judgment at pages 144 – 148 of the record of appeal effectively handled the issue of self defence raised by the Appellant. I agree with him that the story of Bamisile coming to the scene of crime with boys armed with guns like pistol, AK 47 and pump action guns were never reflected in the Appellant’s extra-judicial statements to the police and such evidence being at variance with his previous statements is an after-thought and not capable of being believed. That being so, Appellant had not shown that his life was in real danger as to require the amount of force used in his defence. It was argued on behalf of Appellants that he was on official duty to quell a riotous situation and that any extra force used during that operation is excusable as such was never intended.
To embark on official operation is surely not a license to kill, but to save lives. In ADEKUNLE v. THE STATE (SUPRA) the Appellant was a Sergeant in The Nigeria Police Force. On 7th February, 1997, he was on anti-crime patrol duty along Sagamu-Benin Expressway. The Patrol team was under the command of an Assistant Superintendent of Police. Not long after the arrival of the patrol team and taken their positions, the commander of the team heard gunshots from their position. He shouted and asked who fired the gunshots. He saw the Appellant walking towards a moving bus with passengers. The Appellant replied to the commander’s question that the gunshots were fired by him when the Appellant did not offer any explanation for firing at the bus, he was quickly disarmed. The commander moved to the bus where he found three men and a girl, Alice Tominiyi, inside the bus who had been hit by the bullets from the gunshots fired by the Appellant. Alice Tominiyi eventually died of the gunshot wounds at the hospital. The Appellant was charged for the murder of Alice, convicted and sentenced to death. His appeal to the Court of Appeal and subsequently to the Supreme Court was dismissed. Appellant was convicted on the evidence of two prosecution witnesses who were the commanding officer and the Investigating Police Officer among the 7 witnesses listed.
The fact that the Appellant in that case was on official patrol did not exonerate him from culpability.
On the issue of whether the trial court was right when it proceeded to convict and sentence the Appellant to death for the offence of murder without forensic certification and confirmation on the particular bullets that killed the victim and the guns they emanated from, I am of the firm view that, where evidence before the court leaves no one in doubt as to who caused the death of the deceased and by whatever means, the question of producing forensic certification becomes unnecessary. The learned trial Judge had found at Page 140 of the record that the evidence of PW2 and PW3 as well as Exhibit ‘F’, coupled with the admission by the Appellant in his statements to the Police with his evidence in court that he fired his AK 47 rifle at the scene, all points to the fact that the Appellant was responsible for the offence for which he is charged. I find nothing wrong with that finding. In ADEKUNLE v. STATE (SUPRA) at PAGE 1382, Mohammed, JSC, held: –
“To establish the cause of death, the position of the law is that much as medial evidence is desirable it is clearly not a since qua non as cause of death may be established by sufficient satisfactory and conclusive evidence other than medical evidence showing beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the deceased in question resulted from the particular act of the accused person.” See: OKO AGWU AZU v. THE STATE (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 291) 303; AKPUENYA v. THE STATE (1976) 11 SC 269 at 278; LORI v. THE STATE (1980) 8 – 11 SC 81 at 97; EDIM v. THE STATE (1972) 4 SC 160; ESSIEN v. THE STATE (1984) 3 SC 14 at 18 and ADEKUNLE v. THE STATE (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 505 at 516.

In the instant case, I am of the firm view that a forensic report is unnecessary since there is overwhelming evidence that confirmed that it was the bullets fired from the Appellant’s gun that killed the deceased.
On the issue of identification parade, learned Counsel for the Appellant forcefully argued that the court was not right in its evaluation of the identification parade so conducted to determine the Police Officers that shot the victims of the alleged homicide. At this stage the issues raised here seem more of academic exercise, as the Appellant and his co-convict at the lower court admitted firing their guns at the scene of the crime in their statements to the Police and their evidence in Court. Their admission has overtaken whatever took place at the identification parade which was no longer an issue before the trial court. The trial court’s choice to ignore ascribing necessary weight one way or the other and ascribing probative value to same has not insulted the law.
It is in evidence that of all the Policemen that went to the scene, only the Appellant and his co-convict shot directly into the crowd. From all indication the team leader did not order them to shoot the two Policemen who took a decision to open fire on the crowd acted on their own volition and were therefore not covered by any rules of engagement. It is imperative for the security men who bear arms in this Country to exercise maximum restraint in the use of the weapons assigned to them in order not to ‘endanger the lives of the citizens that they are employed to protect’.
I have considered all the issues canvassed by parties in this appeal and I find none to be resolved in favour of the Appellants. Accordingly, this appeal shall be and it is hereby dismissed on all the grounds of the appeal.

MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Paul Adamu Galinje, JCA. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions reached therein. The instant appeal lacks merit. Indeed, the appellant was properly convicted on the charge of murder as contained in the information against him. Thus, I also dismiss the appeal and affirm his conviction coupled with the sentence.

FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI, J.C.A.: The Appellant, Ameh Richard a Police Corporal was arrainged before the High Court of Ekiti State on the 31st day of October, 2012 jointly with Corporal Akinyede Olaiya. They were charge with the murder of Ipinlaye Micheal and Faluyi Ayo Kehinde respectively at Kota, Omuo-Ekiti on the 23rd March, 2011.
The learned trial Judge, Adesodun J. found the Appellant and his co-accused guilty as charged. He convicted and sentenced each of them to death by hanging.
The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court filed Notice of Appeal on the 9th of April, 2013 containing four (4) grounds of appeal.
All the issues raised in this appeal have been eloquently dealt with by my Learned Brother PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A. in the lead judgment. I agree with his reasoning and conclusions reached therein.
I also find that all the issues canvassed by parties in this appeal are not in favour of the Appellant. I also dismiss this appeal on all the grounds of appeal.
>

Appearances

Gerald Ugochukwu Abonyi, Esq., with Miss Nkechi AmiforoFor Appellant

AND

Mr. A. O. Familoni, (D.P.P. MOJ EKITI STATE)For Respondent