LawCare Nigeria

Nigeria Legal Information & Law Reports

National Industrial Court

AMACHREE MAC JAJA JOHN & 3 ORS -VS- THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF Rivers State Rivers State & 1 OTHER

admin 0

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE F. I. KOLA-OLALERE

 

Date: February 06, 2020     Suit No: NICN/PHC/71/2018

Between:

 

  1. Amachree Mac Jaja John
  2. Gift Egboh
  3. Collins O. Nmehielle
  4. Amadi Wisdom

(For themselves and representing the class of 350      ———————-         Applicants

Workers who were unlawfully disengaged from

Rivers State Road Traffic Management

Authority, Port Harcourt)

 

And

 

  1. The Attorney-General of Rivers State
  2. Rivers State Road Traffic Management                ——————–                       Respondents

Authority (TIMARIV)

 

Representation:

Isah Seidu with D.L. Ndeori for the Applicants.

  1. Enebeli, Principal State Counsel, Rivers State Ministry of Justice for the 1stRespondent.

No Counsel for the 2ndDefendant.

 

COURT’S JUDGMENT

  1. On June 20, 2018 the applicants commenced this action against the respondents byOriginating Summons pursuant to Order 3 Rules 1 & 17 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017; Section 318 (1) (c) (e) & (g) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court for the determination of the following questions:
  2. Whether having regards to the provisions of Section 318 (1)(c), (e) & (g) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (As Amended), the Applicants who are Staff of the Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority, an Agency established by the laws of the Rivers State House of Assembly are Civil Servants in the employment of Rivers State Government whose employment is governed by the Civil Service Rules.
  3. If the answer to the poser in 1 is in the affirmative, whether the Applicants are not entitled to their salaries, wages, pension, gratuity and emoluments from June 2015 till June 2018 as at the time of the institution of this suit and same still running until their employment is duly determined in line with the Civil Service Rules.
  4. From the Originating Summons, the applicants are seeking for the following reliefs from the respondents:

(a)    A Declaration that the Applicants (Staff of Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority (TIMARIV) ) an agency that came into existence by the Laws duly enacted by the Rivers State House of Assembly are Civil Servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government and their employment can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules and by no other means, that is; having attained the statutory retirement age of 65 years and/or having worked in the Civil Service of Rivers State Government for a continuous period of 35 years, whichever is earlier in time.

(b)    A Declaration that the Applicants are entitled to their salaries, wages, pension, gratuity and emoluments from June 2015 till June 2018 and same still running until the determination of their respective employments in line with the Civil Service Rules.

(c)    A Declaration that it is tantamount to unfair labour practice for the Respondents to have refused, failed and/or neglected in paying the Applicants their accrued salaries, wages, emoluments for work done and/or even when their employment with the Rivers State Government still subsist.

(d)    A Declaration that the purported oral “disbandment” of the Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority by the Rivers State Government is unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

 

(e)    An Order mandating the Rivers State Government to pay the Applicants their outstanding salaries (of Three Years and still running) and all other entitlements.

 

(f)      An Order of mandatory injunction restraining the Respondents and/or whosoever from further intimidating, illegally tempering with the employment of the Applicants until same is determined in line with the Civil Service Rules and no other means.

(g)    An Orderof mandatory injunction compelling the Respondents to pay forthwith to the Applicants their salaries, wages and emoluments due and still running from June 2015 till June 2018 and same still running.

(h)    An Orderof mandatory injunction compelling the Respondents to remit the Applicants accrued pension and gratuity to their respective PFA’s.

(i)      An Orderof mandatory injunction compelling the Respondents to pay the Applicants their Seven Months’ salary for work already done before the disbandment of the 2nd Respondent by the Rivers State Government.

(j)      The sum of N800,000,000.00 (Eight Hundred Million Naira) being general damages.

 

The originating Summons is supported by statement and a 17 paragraphed affidavit deposed to by the applicant and a written address.

  1. Summary of the primary objection

On February4,2019 counsel to the 1stRespondent/Applicant filed Notice of Preliminary Objection pursuant Order 18 Rules 2(2) of The National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, praying for an orders, dismissing this suit for want of jurisdiction.

The grounds of thisapplication are premised on the lack of Jurisdiction and competence to entertain this suit and also on the validity of the originating processes.

  1. In support of the Preliminary Objection, the 1stRespondent filed a 16 paragraphed affidavit together with a written address; wherein counsel formulated issues for determinationthis way:
  2. Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit?
  3. Whether this suit is an abuse of court process?

iii.            Whether this Honourable Court can determine this suit without pleadings?

  1. Whether having regard to Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) the Defendant/Applicant is a person who is entitled to be heard in defence of the separate, distinct and personal claim of each of the Applicants/Respondents?

 

  1. Arguing issue one, counsel submitted that the lumping together of the several and distinct claims/causes of action of each of the Applicants/Respondents is a feature which prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. That this court is not competent to exercise it adjudicatory jurisdiction to hear and determine, as single right to judicial relief, the several and distinct rights of the Applicants/Respondents, citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 1 All NLR 587; C.C.B. (Nig.) Plc.v. Rose [1998] 4 NWLR (Pt. 544) Pg. 37@39 Ratio 2; unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA.PH/50/2016 – Civil Service Commission Rivers State v. Mrs. Justina Jumbo & Anor and contended that the cause of action of each of the applicants/Respondents is separate, distinct, personal and severable. He continued that the error in the instant action as presently constituted goes beyond mere procedural irregularity of misjoinder of parties. Rather, it is one that touches on the substantive rights of the Applicants/Respondents to enforce the alleged breaches of their personal contract of service with TIMARIV, citing Bemil Nigeria Limited v. Marcus Emeribe[2009] LPELR-CA/A/203/2005. He argued further that Order 13 Rule 14(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 is inapplicable in the instant case.

 

  1. Referring to paragraph 14 of their Affidavit in support of their Originating Summons,counsel contended that the claimants’ employment was determined on June 20, 2015 while this action was instituted on June 20, 2018; three years after the alleged determination of their employment. He submitted that this suit is statute barred for been brought contrary to the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act; citing Ibrahim v. J.S.C [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1; Ntuks v. NPA [2007] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1051) 392 at 428.

 

  1. Arguing issue two of whether this suit is an abuse of court process, counsel submitted that in view of the argument in issue one, this suit is an abuse of process of this court and should be accordingly be dismiss. He referred the court toAfrican Reinsurance Corporation v. J.D.P Construction Nig. Ltd. [2003] 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 609 at 635 Paragraphs F-H; Jimoh v. SETRACO (Nig.) Ltd. & 2 Ors [1998] 7 NWLR (Pt. 558) 527 at 535.

 

  1. Arguing issue threewhether this Court can determine this suit without pleadings, counsel referred the court to Order 3 Rule 17(1) of the Rules of this court and maintained that it is the case of the applicants that they are employees of the respondents. He went on that their employments were terminated by the respondents and that they are being owed for work done. To him, the 1strespondent/Applicant in disputing this fact, filed Counter affidavit and further Counter affidavit joining issues with the facts contained in the Applicants/Respondents’ Affidavit and Further Affidavit; citing Alfa v. Attai [2018] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1611) Pg. 56 at 85 – 86. He contended that Originating Summons is not appropriate for the commencement of this case.

 

  1. Arguing issue 4 of whether the respondent/Applicant is a person who is entitled to be heard in defence of the separate, distinct and personal claim of each of the Applicants/Respondents, counsel submitted that having regard to Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (as Amended), the 1strespondent/Applicant is a person entitled to be heard in defence of the separate, distinct and personal claims of each of the Applicants/Respondents. To him, it isa mandatory requirement of giving parties in an action an opportunity to put forward their case, which is rooted in Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (as Amended). He went on that the 1strespondent/Applicant will be denied the opportunity of putting forward its case to meet or answer the claims of each of the Applicants/Respondents in the instant suit as presently constituted; citing Adigun v. A.G Oyo State [1987] 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678 at 709.

 

  1. Responding to the notice of preliminary objection, the applicants/respondents filed reply written address to the 1strespondent’s written address wherein counsel framed an issue for determination thus:

Whether or not this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit as filed by the Claimants.

 

  1. Counsel urged the court to take judicial notice of the unreported cases with Suit No: NICN/PHC/107/2013 betweenMr. George C. Kaizer v. Ignatius Ajuru University of Education & Ors and the one with Suit No: NICN/YEN/89/2015 – Amachree Mac Jaja John & Ors v. The Attorney General of Rivers State. He again cited the case ofAkinsanya v. Coca-Cola Nig. Ltd [2012] 28 NLLR (Pt.79) pg. 7 at 191 paragraphs D-E.

 

Counsel submitted that it is trite law that once common interest is established, actions in representative capacity stands; citing Ukpong v. CFED [2007] 1 MJSC pg. 18 andAdamu & Ors v. Nig. Security Printing & Minting [2014] NLLR (Pt.159) pg. 729 at 750 paragraphs G-B.

 

  1. Counsel submitted further that by Order 13 Rule 1of the Rule of this court and given the common interest of the applicants/Respondents coupled with the fact that the same issue of law and fact arise for determination in this suit.He maintained that there is nothing wrong in all the applicants/Respondents coming together and initiating the instant suit as they did. He went on that the law is settled that it is more convenient, advantageous, cost effective and prudent to have the issue determined in a single action than for each of the applicants to embark on the luxury of filing his own separate action to seek his own reliefs over the same grievance, citing N.E.L.M. Ltd. v. Omotusi (Supra) @ 355, paragraphs C-F; National Electricity Liability Management Limited v. Emmanuel Sunday Omotusi & 400 Ors [2016] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1541) 314. He contended that the rule permitting joinder of causes applies where, if such persons were to bring separate actions; a common question of law or fact will arise. Furthermore, he argued that joinder of causes of action is designed to prevent multiplicity of actions and thus, save the parties unnecessary costs.

 

  1. Counsel contended that the case of the applicants/respondents is one that constitutes an abuse of court processand so, the affidavit of the Respondent/Applicant is bereft of facts with respect to how the present suit constitutes an abuse of court process, citing C.A.C v. I.T.P.C.N. [2016] 2 NWLR (Pt.1496) 236 at 250-251, paragraphs F-A.

 

  1. On whether this case as presently constituted is caught up by statute of limitation or not, counsel referred the court to the decision of this Court, delivered on 26th May, 2014 in Suit No: NICN/PHC/107/2013 betweenMr. George C. Kaizer v. Ignatius Ajuru University of Education & Ors. Counsel argued that having regards to the extant provisions of sections 16 and 40 of the Limitation Laws of Rivers State Cap.80, Laws of Rivers State of Nigeria 1999. To him, the instant suit filed within 5 years from the date of the cause of action to the commencement of the instant suit cannot by any stretch of imagination be statute barred as misconceived by the respondents/Applicants. He referred the court to the decision of Justice P.I. Hamman delivered on 13th June, 2018 in Suit No: NICN/YEN/89/2015 between Amachree Mac Jaja John & Ors V. The Attorney General Of Rivers State andSifax (Nig.) Ltd v. Migfo (Nig.) Ltd. [2018] 9 NWLR (Pt.1623) pg. 138 at 196, paragraph F.

 

  1. On whether there exist substantial issues of fact warranting the direction of parties to file pleadings as contented by the Respondent/Applicant, counsel submitted that there is no substantial dispute of fact existing in this suit and if any minor dispute exist, same can be resolved having regards to the exhibits attached to the aforementioned processes before the Court, citing Habib (Nig.) Bank Ltd v. Ochete [2001] 3 NWLR (Pt.699) pg. 114 at 135 paragraphs D-E; Etim v. Obot [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt.1207) pg. 108 at 156-157 paragraphs H-D.Counsel urged the court to discountenance the contention of the Respondent/Applicant to the effect that mere filing of affidavits and counter affidavits are not enough grounds for ordering the filing of pleadings in this case.

 

  1. The 1st defendant filed reply on point of law to the claimants/respondents’ written address; on whether there is nothing wrong in all the Applicants/Respondents coming together and initiating the present suit as joint Applicants,counsel referred the court to Bemil Nigeria Limited v. Marcus Emeribe [2009] LPELR-CA/A/203/2005.

 

On whether this action is statute barred by Sections 16 and 40 of the Limitation Law of Rivers State or whether these Laws are applicable,counsel referred the court to the case of Barr. Alex I. Ndubuisi v. Attorney-General/Commissioner for Justice Anambra State & 2 Ors. (Unreported) Suit No. NICN/EN/122/2012 delivered on the 25th day of September, 2013; Dr. Atonte Diete-Spiff v. Governor of Bayelsa State & Anor. (Unreported) Suit No. NICN/CA/31/2012 delivered on 26th day of July, 2013. He maintained that this action is clearly outside the three months’ period prescribed by the Officers Protection Act.

  1. SUMMARY OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CASE

The Originating Summons is supported by statement and a 17 paragraphed affidavit deposed to by one Mr. Amachree Mac Jaja John the 1st applicant together with a written address wherein counsel formulated issues for determination thus:

  1. Whether having regards to the extant provision of Section 318 (1)(c),(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) the Applicants are not Civil Servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government and their employment can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules either by having attained the statutory retirement age of 65years and/or having worked for a continuous period of 35 years; whichever is earlier in time?
  2. If the answer to issue 1 is in the affirmative, whether the Applicants are not entitled to their accrued salaries, wages,       pensionsand gratuities until their employment is determined in line with the Civil Service Rules?

 

  1. Arguing the two issues together, counsel submitted that the Applicants respectively contended and rightly so that by virtue of Section 318(1)(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) they are Civil Servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government and that their employment, being one with statutory flavour can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules – either by having attained the statutory retirement age of 65 years and/or having worked in the employment of the Rivers State Government for the period of 35 years; whichever is earlier in time. Hecited in supportSection 318(1)(c) & (g); Udonsek v. Akwa Ibom State Government & Ors [2015] 56 NLLR page 562 at 600 – 602 andGovernor Kwara State v. Ojibara [2006] 18 NWLR (Pt.1012) page 645 at 660 – 662.

 

  1. Counsel submitted further that the constructive determination of Applicants’ employments is not within the contemplation of the law with respect to employment which enjoys statutory flavour, having regards to the extant provisions of Section 318 (1)(c),(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended); therefore, the act of the respondents in constructively determining the Applicants’ employment without due process of the law is not only illegal but ultra vires the powers of the Respondents, it is unconstitutional, null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever; citing Iderima v. R.S.C.S.C. [2005]16 NWLR (Pt.951) pg. 378 at 403 paras. E-G andUdo v. C.S.N.C. [2001] 14 NWLR (Pt.732) pg. 116 at pages 164-165, pars. H-H.

 

  1. Responding to the Originating Summons, the 1stRespondent filed a 13 paragraphed counter affidavit deposed to by  one Lebatom Fiitogether with a written address, wherein his counsel formulatedone issue for determination of the court as:

Whether the Applicants are entitled to the reliefs sought against the 1st Defendant?

 

  1. Arguing this issue, counsel submitted that the answer to this issue is clearly in the negative and that in considering the issue, it is necessary for the Court to consider the following ancillary issues for determination:
  2. Whether the Deponent to the Applicants’ Affidavit has the authority of the Applicants to depose to the said Affidavit?
  3. Does the Applicants’ employment have statutory flavor
  4. Can this Honourable Court adjudicate on issues relating to the powers of the 1stDefendant to disband the 2ndDefendant?

 

  1. Arguing issue a, on whether the Deponent to the Applicants’ Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons has the authority of the Applicants to depose to the said Affidavit? Counsel submitted that by paragraph 5 of the Affidavit in Support of the Applicants’ Originating Summons, the deponent deposed that he had the authority to make the said deposition by virtue of Exhibit 1, which purportedly contains the names and signatures of persons authorizing him to sue. He submitted that the said Exhibit 1 is undated; therefore, lacks evidential value. In the circumstance, the deponent to the Applicants’ affidavit does not have the authority to institute this action on behalf of the other Applicants or parties, citing Dr. I.O.C Abara v. Igbo (Alias Prince Okwor) [2013] LPELR-21246(CA) andGlobal Soaps & Detergent Ind. Ltd. v. NAFDAC [2011] All FWLR (Pt. 599) 1025 @ 1047.

 

  1. Arguing issue b, on whether the Applicants’ employment have statutory flavour? Counsel submitted that the evidence of the Applicants did not show that their employments have statutory flavour,as such only arises where the employment of the employee and his removal is governed by statute.Thus, the mere fact that an employer is created by statute does not elevate all its employees’ employment to the status of being protected by such statute. He contended further that the court must confine itself to the terms of contract of service between the parties, which provides for their rights and obligations; citing Imoroame v. WAEC [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303.Olufeagba Vs. Abdul Raheem [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 512) 1033 andFakuade v. O. A. U. T. H [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47.

 

  1. Counsel went on that the Applicants’ letters of Employment, Exhibit 3 contained provisions for Applicants’ Probationary Period, Conditions of Employment, Disengagement Terms, Salaries, Pension Scheme etc; and that the Applicants’ Contract of Employment was not incorporated in the Civil Service Rules. Therefore, the Applicants are strictly bound by the terms of their contract of employment with the 2nd Defendant. Hence the Applicants’ assertion that their employment can only be determined upon attaining the retirement age of 65 years and/or having worked for period of 35 years is misconceived. He submitted that the duty to appoint, remunerate and discipline the Applicants lies with the 2nd Defendant, hence the 1st Defendant cannot be held liable for the non-payment or otherwise of the salaries of the Applicants.

 

  1. Counsel continued that the 1st Defendant is not the employer of the Applicants and that the position of the 1st Defendant is firmly supported by the status of the 2nd Defendant as a body corporate with perpetual succession and that it has common seal as well as power to sue and be sued and also to recruit its employees; referring to Section 37(1) & (2), and Section 50 of the Rivers State Road Traffic Law No. 6, 2009 (“the Traffic Law”).

 

  1. Arguing issue c, on whether this Court can adjudicate on issues relating to the powers of the 1st Defendant to disband the 2nd Defendant;counsel submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear any suit challenging the powers of the Governor to disband the 2nd Defendant asthat relief of challenging the disbandment of the 2nd Defendant by Rivers State Government is unlawful is not within the contemplation of Section 254(c)(1)(a – m) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (as Amended); citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNJ 391.On the while, counsel submitted that the Applicants have not shown that the 2nd Defendant infringed on their rights in any manner and thata court of law can only adjudicate on disputes alleging the violation of the rights of the Applicants; referring to Oloriode v. Oyebi [1984] 5 S.C. 1.

 

  1. In reaction to the Respondents’ counter affidavit and written address, counsel the Applicant filed reply on point of law and submitted in respect of the undated document that, while it is conceded that an undated document has no evidential value; it is the law that oral evidence on the date left out in the document is admissible to show when the document was written and from what date it is intended to operate, citing Ogbahon v. Regd. Trustees, C.C.C.G [2011] FWLR (Pt.80) pg. 1496 at 1520.

On representative capacity, counsel submitted that the Respondents lack in law the requisite vires to challenge the representative capacity in which the Applicants commenced this suit, citing  EIF Pet. (Nig.) Ltd v. Umah [2018] 10 NWLR (Pt.1628) pg. 428 at 453, paragraphs D-H.

  1. On the statutory nature of the Applicants’ employment, counsel referred the court to Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt.1157) pg. 83 (SC) and Exhibit 3 particularly the “PROVISIONAL OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT” its clause 2 patently states in line with the contention of the Applicants that they are Civil Servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government. He continued that both Respondents are the employers of the Applicants, citing Animba v. Integrated Corporate Services Ltd & Anor [2015] 57 NLLR (Pt.195) 268.

 

In respect to issue “c” of whether this Court can adjudicate on issues relating to the powers of the 1stDefendant to disband the 2ndDefendant, counsel referred the court to Udonsek v. Akwa Ibom State Government & Ors [2015] 56 NLLR page 562 at 600 – 602 paragraphs G-H.

 

  1. COURT’S DECISION

I have carefully read through the facts of this case, the arguments on the preliminary objection and those on the Originating Summons; from all of this, I am of the considered opinion that the following issues need resolution:

  1. ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
  2. Whether or not the applicants can jointly sue the respondents as they did in this case or whether the 1strespondent can challenge the representative capacity by which the applicants sued the respondents.
  3. Whether or not this case is statute barred by the provision of the Public Officers’ Protection Act.

iii.         Whether or notthis case is an abuse of court processes.

  1. Whether or not this case was properly commenced by Originating Summons.

 

  1. B. ON THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS; Issues to resolve are:
  2. Whether or not this Court can adjudicate on issue relating to the power of the 1stRespondent to disband the 2ndRespondent.
  3. Whether or not the Applicants’ employmentsare with statutory flavour.

iii.         Whether having regards to the extant provision of Section 318 (1)(c),(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended), the Applicants are Civil Servants with the Rivers State Government and that their employments can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules.

  1. If the answer to issue 1 is in the affirmative, whether the Applicants are not entitled to their accrued salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities until their employmentsare determined in line with the Civil Service Rules?

 

31.In resolving the issues framed on the Preliminary Objection, the 1st one is Whether or not the applicants can jointly sue the respondents as they didand whether the 1strespondent can challenge the Applicants’ representative capacity in this case.

 

Counsel to the respondents/applicantscontended in his address in support of the preliminary objectionat pages 1023 to 1027 and under his arguments on issue 4 in the same address at pages 1031 to 1033 of the record that the Applicants lump up several and distinct claims/ causes of action together and that same is in breach of the provision of Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended) because; the respondent/applicant is being denied fair hearing on the said lumped up claims. To counsel, the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction hasbeen affected on the case.

 

By the Originating Summons before the court, the 1st to 4th applicants are suing for themselves and representing the class of 350 Workers who were unlawfully disengaged from Rivers State Road traffic Management Authority, Port Harcourt. In paragraphs 5 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, it is stated by the 1st applicant/respondent that he had the mandate, consent and authority of the other Applicants to make this deposition on behalf of the other applicants/respondents. Also, in paragraphs 9, 10, 13 and 15 of the same affidavit; it is before the court that their employments were governed by the Civil Service Rules and that they were all expected to be in the service of the respondents till they reach the statutory retirement age of 65 years or 35 years in service.The applicants/respondents maintained that they have common grievance and reliefas they were all being owned 7months’s salary for work already done before the disbandment of the 2nd respondent/applicant in June 2015.

 

  1. The law is that, when an action is brought in a representative capacity, those represented must have common interest and common grievance. Furthermore, the relief sought must, in its nature, be beneficial to all those who are being represented; see the case ofAlafia & Ors v. Gbode Ventures Nigeria Ltd & Ors [2016] LPELR-26065(SC).

 

From the depositions in paragraphs 9, 10, 13 and 15 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, all the applicants/respondents have a common interest and common grievance; also, their reliefs before the court are the same. Therefore, I find that they can bring this case in a representative capacity. Besides, this case was instituted on behalf of the class of 350 workers who were alleged to have been unlawfully disengaged by the respondents. In the circumstances, I agreed with the counsel to the applicants/respondents and hold that it is expedient, more convenient, advantageous, cost effective, prudent and less cumbersome to have the issue determined in a single action than for each of the applicants/respondents to embark on the luxury of filing his own separate action to seek his own relief/redress over the same grievance.

 

  1. Moreover, it is trite that the 1strespondent/applicant, who is not amember of the group that the applicants/respondents are representing; cannot challenge the representative capacity of the applicants/respondents.It will be futile for the respondents/applicants in this case toso challenge applicants/respondents’ authority of such representation because, if theywin, the respondent/applicant cannot share in the victory,neither will their loss affect the 1strespondent/applicant adversely; as the respondent cannot be more Catholic than the Pope. See the case of SPDC Nigeria Ltd. v. Edamkue & Ors. [2009] LPELR-3048 (SC): [2009] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 1 SC. Consequently, I hold that the respondent/applicant has no right to challenge the representative capacity of the applicants/respondents. In addition, I hold that the argument of the respondent/applicantagainst the representative capacity of the applicants/respondentslacks merit and it is hereby refused.I further hold that the applicants/respondents in the instant case can and have rightly sued the respondents/applicants in a representative capacity before this Court.

 

34.Whether or Not this Case is Statute Barred by the Provision of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act

Counsel to the respondents/applicantscontended at pages 1027 to 1030 of the record thatby the provision of section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, this case is statute barred. It is worthy of note that the Supreme Court has held in its recent decision in the case of National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 Ors. v. Ajibola Johnson & 10 Ors [2019]2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247 @ 270-271;that the provision of section 2 of the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply to contracts of service. It held further in the cited case that the appellants were not covered by the provisions of section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act and so; do not enjoy the umbrella of the Act in the contract of service involving the respondents so as to render the respondents’ action stature barred. See also the recent decision of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria inHon. Emeka Mbonu v. Etche Local Government Council; unreported with Suit No:NICN/ABJ/365/2014, delivered on March 5, 2019 (https://www.nicnadr.gov.ng/judgement/details.php?id=3313).See also another unreported decision of this Court in NICN/PHC/ 87 / 2017 between Alukwe Okpara v. Attorney General of Rivers State and 1 Ors.

 

From the reliefs endorsed on the Originating Summons at pages 2 to 4 of the record; the applicants/respondents are inter alia seeking for declaration that they are entitled to their salaries, pensions, gratuities and emoluments from June 2015 to June 2018 from the respondents/applicants. I find that this action is on contract of service and based on case law position on the provision of section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act and the contract of service as shown above; I hold that the provision of section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act is not applicable to this case. Consequently, I further hold that this matter is not barred by the said Act.

 

  1. Whether This Case is An Abuse of Court Processes

At page 1030 of the record under their issue 2, the respondents/applicants argued thatthe filing of this case is abuse of court process.The Law is that common features of all cases of abuse of court process arethe improper use of judicial process by a party in litigation, to interfere with the efficient and effective administration of justice, to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent. An abuse of process does not lie on the right to use a judicial process but rather in the manner of the exercise of the right. It consists of the intention, purpose or aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the adversary; and to interfere with the administration of justice. It is the inconveniences and inequities in the aims and purposes of the action that makes it an Abuse of Court process.See the case Union Bank Plc.v. Olatunji[2013] LPELR-CA/K/95/2011 per Abiru, JCA.

 

  1. Counsel to the respondents/applicants in the instant case has not shown the Court how the applicants/respondents’ suit hasinterfered with the efficient and effective administration of justice,how it has irritated and annoyedthem. Neither has counsel exposed the offensive manner of the exercise of the applicants/respondents’ rights. Again, the respondents/applicants have not revealed the intention, purpose or aim of the applicants/respondents in exercising their rights to have harassed, irritated and annoyed the respondents/applicants and how it hasinterfered with the administration of justice. In the circumstance, I find and hold thatthe filing of this case by the applicants/respondentsis not an abuse of court process.

 

  1. Whether or not this Case was Properly Commenced By Originating Summons.

The Applicants filed this Originating Summons on June 20, 2018 under Order 3 Rules 1 & 17 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017; Section 318(1)(c)(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 ( As Amended) and Under the Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court.

 

Order 3 Rule 2(1) NICN (CP) Rules, 2017 provides that Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Complaint include: all matters in which the Court has exclusive jurisdiction as provided in section 254C(1) paragraphs (a)-(k) and (m) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria. Order 3 Rule 3 of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017 provides that Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons: include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which this Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria.

 

  1. Order 3 Rule 17(1) of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017 states that an Originating Summons shall be accompanied by:

(a).  An affidavit setting out the facts relied upon to sufficiently identify the cause or causes of action in respect of which the claimant claims relief or remedy;

(b).  Copies of the instrument indicating part(s) sought to be construed (other than an enactment) and other related documents;

(c).  A Written Address containing the issues to be determined and succinct argument of the issues.

Provided that where a suit raises a substantial dispute of facts or is likely to involve substantial dispute of facts, it shall not be commenced by way of Originating Summons but by Complaint as provided for in Rules 8 and 9 of this Order.

 

Order 3 Rule 17(2) of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017 states that; where in the opinion of the Court, a suit commenced by Originating Summons raises substantial issues and dispute of facts, the Court shall not strike out the matter, but may order its conversion to Complaint and direct the parties to file and exchange pleadings and conduct the trial of the case in accordance with the Rules of the Court governing trial.

 

  1. From the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the case of the applicants/respondents do not include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreementsor any other instrument relating to their employment, labour and industrial relationsalone, it also includeissue of their right salaries, wages, emoluments for work done and again. It is again challenging the disbandment of the 2nd respondent by the respondent/applicant, which raises substantial dispute of facts. In the circumstance, I find that the case of the applicants/respondents is not merely on interpretation of law but it is on determination of their rights aswell; it also includes determining whether the Civil Service Rules of Rivers State is applicable to their case.

The law is that, where the facts on a suit are likely to be in dispute, such matter cannot be initiated in Court by Originating Summons; see the case of Ikpeazu v. Ekeagbara & Ors [2016] LPELR-40847(CA).From the depositions in paragraphs 1 to 16 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and those in paragraphs 2 to 13, particularly paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit;denying the depositions in the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, I find that there are substantial disputes in the facts of this case, which can only be properly determined by Complaint. I hold, therefore that the particulars of paragraphs 1 to 16 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons fall under the proviso of Order 3 rules 17 (1) of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017; and so, this suit ought to have been commenced by Complaint as provided for in rules 8 and 9 of Order 3 of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017. Consequently, I hold that this matter ought not to have been initiated byOriginating Summons.

 

  1. However, Order 3 Rule 17 (2) of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017 provides that‘where in the opinion of the Court, a suit commenced by Originating Summons raises substantial issues and dispute of facts; the Court shall not strike out the matter, but may order its conversion to Complaint and direct the parties to file and exchange pleadings, and conduct the trial of the case in accordance with the Rules of the Court governing trial’. In the interest of doing substantial justice to this case, the Court will not strike out this case on the basis of commencing same by a wrong procedure. Based on the provision of Order 3 Rule 17 (2) of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017; I herebyOrder the conversion of the Originating Summons in the instant case to Complaint.

 

  1. It is my firm view that directing counsel to the applicants/respondents to go and file their Complaint with the consequential filing of statement of defence, written statements on oaths of parties’ witnesses etc. will further and unnecessarily prolong the period of adjudication on this case. It is to be noted that parties have filed their final written addresses in this case based on the affidavits in support, the affidavit in counter of the Originating Summons and on the documents frontloaded and relied on by the parties. In this rare and hard situation, I find that the parties have conducted this trial on record under Order 38 Rule 33 of the NICN (CP) Rules, 2017so as to enable the Court to give its final decision on the adopted final written addresses; even though there is no express consent of the parties to adopt this procedure before the Court. This position of the Court is further strengthened by the attitude/stance of the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court in similar situations where they have insisted that Courts of first instance are to give their final decisions at once in similar situations so as to allow them to holistically handle the appeal instead of ordering a retrial.

 

  1. For instance, in the case of Agbaso v. Iwunze & Ors [2014] LPELR-24108(CA) the Court of Appeal held thus on what a court must do when faced with an objection to its jurisdiction in a suit:

It is normal for a Court, particularly one whose decision is not final in a matter, when faced with the challenge to its jurisdiction, to also discuss and consider the issues in contention on the merit, where the Court has opportunity to consider the substantive issues, together with the application challenging its jurisdiction. This ingenious practice has come to serve a very useful legal role in our jurisprudence, as it tends to kill time and cure the defect which would occur, if the trial Court’s decision on jurisdiction is over-ruled by the appellate Court, requiring the case to be heard and determined on the merits. Thus, where the trial Court had gone further to consider the case on its merits, in the alternative, even after declining jurisdiction, the appellate Court would have a basis to go ahead to determine the appeal on substantial issues, as considered by the lower Court. Of course, the alternative would have been to remit the case back for trial on the merits, had the issues not been resolved by the trial Court, at the point of considering the issue of jurisdiction.

 

  1. See again the case of Enukeme v. Mazi [2014] LPELR – 23540 (CA) where the Court of Appeal held that:

It is also a common practice now, to hear motions/objections raised against the hearing of a suit, together with the substantive matter, where time is of essence to determine the substantive matter. This practice has been incorporated into the hearing of election petitions. See section 38(5) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended…”

 

  1. In Inakoju v. Adeleke [2007] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423 @ pg. 622 paragraphs B-C & pg. 699 Paragraphs B-C, the Supreme Court Per Niki Tobi JSC held on the desirability of hearing objection to jurisdiction and the substantive suit together this way:

In a case brought by originating summons where the whole evidence required to determine the merits of the case is in the form of affidavit evidence already filed before the court, it may be prudent to hear together the arguments as to jurisdiction and the merits of the case.

 

  1. Based on these appellate Courts’ decisions as shown above, I hereby proceed to give my judgment on the substantive matter; the Originating Summons in this case.

 

  1. Resolution of the Substantive Matter; The Originating Summons

 

Whether this Court can adjudicate on the power of the 1stRespondent to disband the 2ndRespondent.

The 1st Respondent in this case is the Attorney-General of Rivers State while the 2nd Respondent is the Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority (TIMARIV) where the applicants were working before the Authority was disbanded.

Counsel to the applicantsargued that the Court has power to look into or adjudicate on the power of the 1st respondent to disband the 2nd respondent; citing in support of this contention, the case of Udonsek v. Akwa Ibom State Government &Ors[2015] 56 NLLR page 562 at 600 – 602 paragraphs G-H.I tried reading up this cited authority but the citation given by counsel is wrong and so, I could not find the authority, neither could I verify/confirmthe quotation allegedly lifted from the said authority. It is the duty of counsel to give accurate citation of cases referred to and which he wants the Court to make use of in his favour on any case. In this particular circumstance, the applicants have failed to satisfy this requirement; hence, the cited authority and the alleged quotation lifted therefrom are hereby discountenanced in this judgment.

  1. In paragraph c) of his written address in counter of the Originating Summons, the Respondents’ counsel raised objection to the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on issues relating to the powers of the Governor of Rivers State through the 1stRespondent to disband the 2ndRespondent; see page 959 of the record. To him, the issue of disbandment is not a labour or employment issue as provided in section 254C (1) (a – m) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended).

 

Section 17(1) and (2) of National Industrial Court Act, 2006 provides that:

(1) The Court shall have power to make an order of mandamus requiring any act to be done or an order of prohibition prohibiting any proceedings, cause or matter, or an order of certiorari removing any proceedings, cause or matter into the Court for any purpose.

(2) The power conferred on the Court by this section to make an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari may be exercised notwithstanding that the order is made against an officer or authority of the Federal, State or Local Government as such.

The jurisdiction of this court is governed both by Section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and Section 254C(1)(a – m), (2), (3), (4) & (5) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999(As Amended), which confers an expanded jurisdiction on this Court.

  1. A State Governor or the State Government through the State Governor has the power to make policy decisions; to re-organize or disband a Ministry, authority or an Establishment within the confines of the law for it to be operative; by virtue of the provision of section 5(2) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended).However; by virtue of the provision of section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended), the Court also has rights to inquire into and/or quash a policy decision of a State Governor/Government where such decision and/or executive action is taken outside the provisions of the law.Particularly when such decision adversely affects the employment rights of the employees and I so find. From the averments in the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, I further find prima facie that the disbandment of the 2nd respondent by the 1st respondent affected the employments, salaries and other entitlements of the applicants in this case. Therefore, I hold that this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the power of Rivers State Government through the 1st respondent to disband the 2ndrespondent by virtue of the provisions of section 17 (1) & (2) of the NIC Act, 2006 and section 254C (1) (a-m) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended).

 

  1. Whether The Applicants’ Employments Are With Statutory Flavour.

It is the argument of counsel to the Applicants at paragraphs 3.1 to 3.7 of his written address in support of the Originating Summons that the employments of the Applicants with the Respondents are with statutory flavour. To him, by the provision of Section 318(1)(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended), they are Civil Servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government and that their employments being such with statutory flavour; can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules – either by having attained the statutory retirement age of 65 years or by having worked in the employment of the Rivers State Government for the period of 35 years, whichever is earlier in time. He cited in support the case ofUdonsek v. Akwa Ibom State Government & Ors (supra) andGovernor Kwara State v. Ojibara [2006] 18 NWLR (Pt.1012) page 645 at 660 – 662.

 

  1. Counsel to the Respondents argued that the evidence of the Applicants did not show that their employments have statutory flavour; which only arises where the employment of the employee and his removal are governed by statute as the Applicants’ contract of employment were not even incorporated in the Rivers State Civil Service. Therefore, the Applicants are strictly bound by the terms of their contracts ofemployment with the 2ndRespondent and that the Applicants’ assertion that their employments can only be determined upon attaining the retirement age of 65 years or having worked for period of 35 years is misconceived. In paragraph 1.4 of the applicants’ reply on Point of Law at page 977 of the record, counsel to the Applicants referred the Court to clause 2 of Exhibit 3 of the provisional offer of appointment that it was patently stated that the Applicants are civil servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government.

 

  1. The Law is that where the conditions for appointment and/or for determination of a contract of service are governed by requirements as stated in an enabling law or Decree or regulations deriving their source from law, then the determination of such appointment must be done by satisfying such statutory provisions. It is in such situation that the contract of employment is said to be laced with statutory flavour; see Ahmed v. ABU & Anor [2016] LPELR-40261 (CA) and NEPA v. Adesaaji [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 202) 498 CA 545-546, paragraphs B-C. See also paragraph 27 of a recent decision of this Court in the unreported case of Alabi David Uanzekin   v. United Bank for Africa Plc. with Suit No: NICN/IB/ 110 / 2014; judgment of which was delivered on November 19, 2019.

 

  1. The Documents frontloaded and relied on by parties are not marked and so, we can only refer to them by their titles and pages on record. In the letter of offer of employment of Alalibo Isoboye David at page 66 of the record, its paragraph 1; under Disengagement Terms states:

During the period of your probation, either party (you or the authority) may terminate the employment contract by providing one week notice in writing or pay in lieu on a pro rata basis. After confirmation, a one-month notice or pay in lieu would be furnished by either party seeking the termination of employment.

Its paragraph 3 also states:

Where you are found wanting on matters and behaviour considered by the Authority to be of severe nature (as reflected in the Employees’ Handbook on which you will be briefed), the Authority may exercise the option of summary dismissal without pay.

 

  1. In respect of the Provisional Offer of Employment of Nimfas Ige at page 69 of the record, it is stated in paragraph 2 of the letter that:

Your appointment is subject to the Conditions of Service of the Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority and the Public Service Rules.

 

It is the contention of counsel to the applicants that the applicants are staff of the River State Road Traffic Management Authority; see paragraphs 6 & 8 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons.Hefrontloaded the Rivers State Road Traffic Law at pages 22 to 63 of the recordbut he did not frontload the Conditions of Service of the 2nd Respondentneither did he frontload the Public Service Rules.Furthermore, there is no evidence that the applicants areCivil Servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government; whose employment can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules.

 

  1. Counsel to the applicants did not show the Court the Law, the specific statute or Rules contravened in determining the employments of the applicants. Even though the counsel contended thatthe employments of the applicants are governed by the Conditions of Service of the Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority and the Public Service Rules he did not cite any part of the civil service Rules that the respondents have contravened. Besides, it is not the employments of all the applicants that are governed by the Civil Service Rules; some are not. See for instance, the letters of employments of Awongo J. Eferebo at page 64(a), N. O. Collins at page72 and Rita Pepples at page 75 of the record. Their employments are not governed by the Civil Service Rules but merely by the conditions of service of the 2nd respondent.

 

Consequently, I find that counsel to the applicants has failed to satisfy the Court that the employments of the applicants are laces with statutory flavour. Thus, I hold that the employments of the applicants are not with statutory flavour.

 

  1. Whether the Applicants are Civil Servants with the Rivers State Government and their employments can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules.

The position of counsel to the applicants is that, the applicants were Civil Servants with the Rivers State Government and that their employments can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rules. However, he has not shown the court how he came to this position; even though he maintained that the employments of the applicants were governed by the conditions of service of the Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority (the 2ndrespondent) and the Public Service Rules; it is not stated in their conditions of service that the applicantswere to work up to the statutory retirement age of 65years and/or to have worked for a continuous period of 35 years; whichever is earlier in time before their employment can be determined. There is nowhere in the Rivers State Traffic Law relied on by the applicants where it is stated that their employments can only be determined in line with the Civil Service Rule, neither is it stated in their terms of employment that their retirement age of 65years or that they must have worked with the 2nd respondent for a continuous period of 35 years; whichever is earlier.

 

  1. Inthe letter of offer of employment at page 66 of the record, Paragraph 1 is the Parties’ Disengagement Terms and it states:

During the period of your probation, either party (you or the authority) may terminate the employment contract by providing one week notice in written or pay in lieu on a pro rata basis.After confirmation, a one-month notice or pay in lieu would be furnished by either party seeking the termination of employment.

 

  1. The above quotation from Exhibit C.3, presupposes that the relationship between the applicants and the respondents can be determined after confirmation, by giving one month notice and not as contained in the Civil Service Rules as argued by the applicants’ counsel before the court. He did not refer to any Civil Service Rule in his argument, which to him was contravened by the respondents in determining the applicants’ employment. The respondents’ counsel also generally denied the fact that the applicants were civil servants of Rivers State Government in their defence. As it is, this issue was not satisfactorily argued by the parties before the Court. The applicants who averred to this fact have the onus of proving it to the satisfaction of the Court; but they have failed to do that in the instant case.Therefore, I find and hold thatthe provision of Section 318 (1)(c),(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended) is not applicable to this case. I further hold that the applicants were not Civil Servants in the employment of the Rivers State Government; neither was their employmentsgoverned by the Civil Service Rules. This relief lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.

 

  1. Whether the Applicants are entitled to their accrued salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities until their employment is determined in line with the Civil Service Rules

In paragraph 15 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the applicants deposed that “I know as fact that the Applicants were owed 7 (Seven) Months’ salary for work already done before the disbandment of the 2ndRespondent by the Rivers State Government sometimes in June 2015. Attached herewith and marked Exhibit 4 is printout of Applicants’ salaries”. However, the applicants’ counsel abandoned this issue completely in his address in support of their Originating Summons and he did not apply the said printout pleaded in this paragraph to their case in his address.

 

The printout, which the applicants’ counsel tagged Exhibit 4 pleaded is all together 30 pages, see pages 902 to 932 of the record. Pages 902 to 912 is a Zenith Bank Plc. printout of 30/11/2014 in the name of AUTH(T: NGN42,891,644.95. Pages 913 to 932 contains printout titled “Rivers State Road Traffic Management Authority (TIMARIV) Payroll for the month of October 2014” Apart from these information I could garnered from this document, I really cannot make out anything from it because the applicants failed to address the Court on the relevancy of the document to their claims.It is the duty of theapplicants’ counsel to link the applicants’ evidence with his pleading and not to just dumb documents before the court without relating them to their case.

 

  1. It is worthy of note that the Rivers State Government disbanded the 2ndrespondent on June 20, 2015; see paragraph 14 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. The 1st respondent on the other hand, merely and generally avers in paragraph 14 of its counter-affidavit against the Originating Summons that the 1strespondentdoes not,neither does the Rivers State Government owe the applicants any salaries, wages or emolument. As it is before the Court, the seven months accrued salaries of work allegedly done by the applicants before the 2nd respondent was disbanded, their other wages, pensions, gratuities being claimed until their employments are determined in line with the Civil Service Rules are not satisfactorily proved before this Court and I so hold. I further hold that this claim fails and it is hereby dismissed.

 

  1. On the whole I hold and order as follows:

 

On The Preliminary Objection

  1. I hold that the applicants can and rightly jointed together to sue the respondents as they did in this case.
  2. I hold that the 1st respondent cannot challenge the representative capacity by which the applicants sued the respondents in this case because he is not a member of the applicants’ group.

iii.         I hold that this case is not barred by the provision of the Public Officers’ Protection Act going by the recent decision of the Supreme Court.

  1. I hold thatthis case is not an abuse of court processes.
  2. I hold that this case was not properly commenced by Originating Summons because of the serious disputes in facts between the parties.

 

On The Originating Summons:

  1. I hold that this Court can adjudicate on issue relating to the power of the 1st Respondent to disband the 2nd Respondent by virtue of the provision of section 17 of the NIC Act, 2006.
  2. I hold that the Applicants’ employments are not with statutory flavour since it can be determined by either party by merely giving a month’s notice or payment of a month’s salary in lieu of the determination by their terms of employment.

iii.         I hold that having regards to the provision of Section 318 (1)(c),(e) & (g) of the Constitution of the FRN, 1999 (As Amended); the Applicants are not Civil Servants with the Rivers State Government.

  1. I further hold that the applicants’ employments can be determined not in line with the Civil Service Rules but their terms of employments as stated in their letters of employment.
  2. Finally I hold that the Applicants are not entitled to any accrued salary, wages, pensions, gratuities because this claim was not proved to the satisfaction of the Court in this case.

 

Judgment is entered accordingly; I make no order as to cost.

 

 

Hon. Justice F. I. Kola-Olalere

Presiding Judge

 

 

 

 

 

admin

Website:

Related Story