ALIYU N. SALIHU & ORS v. ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA & ORS
(2013)LCN/6563(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Monday, the 2nd day of December, 2013
CA/K/396/2007
RATIO
WHAT CONSTITUTES A COMPLAINT UNDER THE LAW
What constitutes a complaint under the law is “allegation made orally or in writing to a court with a view to its taking action under this Criminal Procedure Code that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but except where the con otherwise requires, it does not include a police report “See section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Per ITA G. MBABA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
DALHATU ADAMU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
ITA GEORGE MBABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ALIYU N. SALIHU & 1 OR Appellant(s)
AND
ROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA (RTEAN) AND OTHERS Respondent(s)
ITA G. MBABA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Kaduna State in Suit No.KDH/KAD/19CA/2005, delivered on 25th May, 2006 by Hon. Justices H. A. L. Balogun and I. Aliyu, sitting in appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Learned Chief Magistrate No. 2, Ibrahim Taiwo Road, Kaduna, wherein their lordships dismissed the appeal of the Appellants herein against the decision of learned Chief Magistrate, who had earlier held that he had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint brought against the Accused/Appellants and had dismissed their preliminary objection on 14/6/2005.
Appellants were charged at the Chief Magistrate’s Court on 8/4/2005, for criminal conspiracy, trespass and theft, contrary to sections 97, 286, 287 and 343 of the Penal Code Law, Cap 110 Laws of Kaduna State 1991. The Accused/Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Appellants, as accused persons, filed a preliminary objection to the trial on 5/5/2005, challenging the competence of the complaint. Their reason was that the Complainants (Respondents) were not competent to file the case, because they were not KDS Excos of the 1st Complainant/RTEAN; that the secretary of the Association was not in possession of the complaints and so the action was not maintenable by them; they also said that the dispute between the parties that led to the filing of the case was leadership tussle and civil.
By the letter contained in a letter-headed paper of Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria, dated 14/3/2005, the 1st to 5th Respondents, as complainants, had filed application for criminal summons to issue against the Appellants and the 6th Respondent (as accused persons). Their allegation was that
“on the 6th March, 2005, the three accused persons conspired and trespass (sic) into the secretariat of the said Association without our consent, they got into the offices open (sic) the doors and made away with the following items:- A Ruck (sic) carpet, office curtain and one enlargement of our National President Kaduna Branch. ”
The substance of the appeal at High Court was that the Chief Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the complaint against the Appellant, as the said complaint did not contain the necessary ingredients and facts which constitute offence of criminal conspiracy, criminal trespass and theft to constitute the offence or the offences alleged and or such facts or information from which the court judiciously and judicially have reason to believe or suspect that an offence (or the offences) alleged has been committed by the accused persons; as such that the trial magistrate court cannot assume jurisdiction over the facts and take cognisance of the complaint of the complainants and proceed with the criminal trial; that the facts or information in the letter of complaint (dated 14/3/2005) was no more than a plain civil claim or complaint.
Of course the court below had held that the learned Chief Magistrate Court was right to hold that it had jurisdiction; that it rightly took cognisance of the complainants’ letter, by virtue of section 143 (d) and (e) of the C.P.C, Appellant filed their Notice of Appeal on 2/8/2006 and raised three (3) grounds of appeal, as per pages 98 to 101 of the Records of Appeal, as follows:
“GROUND 1.
The lower court erred in law, reached a wrong decision and occasioned substantial miscarriage of justice, when it considered the complaint of the respondents, in their application for a criminal summons, a direct criminal complaint, that the facts therein constitute the offences under section 97, 286, 287 and 343 of the penal code law which the Trial Magistrate Court can assume jurisdiction over the Appellants and take cognisance of the alleged offences under section 143 (d), (e) of the C.P.C.; even though the purported complaint does not contain substantial ingredients of the offences.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR OF LAW
a) It is trite law that a trial court can assume jurisdiction over an allegation or allegations of facts, which from the facts it incorporates the necessary ingredient, which constitutes the offences the Accused Persons, are alleged to have committed.
b) The lower Court considered the purported complaint of the respondents to have constituted the offences under sections 97, 286, 282 and 343 of the penal code law even though the complaint did not contain the necessary ingredients of the offences alleged.
GROUND 2:
The lower Court erred in law when it held that “It is not correct, in our opinion, to say that all the ingredient of the offences must be contained in the complaint before a Court takes cognisance of the offence”.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR OF LAW:
a. Section 143 (d) & (e) required that the allegation of facts must constitute the offence and or furnish the reasons to take cognisance of alleged offence.
b. The facts contained in the application for criminal summons does not disclose the facts which constitute the alleged offences in sections 97, 286, 282 and 343 of the penal code law.
GROUND 3:
The Lower Court erred in law and misdirected itself in the construction of section 1 and 143 (d) & (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Kaduna State in its determination of the powers of the trial Magistrate Court to take cognisance of the facts in the Application for criminal summons against the Appellants, thereby wrongly vested the trial Magistrate Court with the jurisdiction to take cognisance and proceed against the Appellants (Accused Persons) which jurisdiction the trial Magistrate does not have as per the complaint in the Application for criminal summon before it.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR OF LAW AND MISDIRECTION:
a. It is trite law a trial court can assume jurisdiction over an allegation or allegations of facts, which from the facts it incorporates the necessary ingredients, which constitutes the offences the Accused Persons are alleged to have committed.
b. Section 143 (d) & (e) requires that the allegation of facts must constitute the offence and or furnish the reasons to believe that an offence has been committed for a trial Court to take cognisance of an alleged offence.
c. The facts contained in the application for criminal summons does not disclose the facts which constitute the alleged offences in sections 97, 286, 287, and 343 of the penal code law.
d. The lower Court considered the purported complaint of the respondents to have constituted the offences of sections 97, 286, 282 and 343 of the penal code law even though the complaint did not contain the necessary ingredients of the offences alleged.”
Appellants also obtained the leave of the court below to appeal and argue grounds of mixed law and facts and on grounds of facts alone as per the Notice and grounds of appeal. That was on 20/7/06.
They filed their Brief of argument, with the leave of this court, and the same was deemed duly filed on 26/5/2010. A lone issue was formulated for determination, thus;
“Whether, in consideration of the substance of the application for criminal summons, filed by the 1st to 5th Complainants/Respondents before the trial Chief Magistrate court, dated 14h of March 2005/ there are facts and information which sufficiently constitute offences under the penal code law or discloses the grounds to premise the reason to believe that an offence or offences were committed by the Accused persons/Appellants, upon which the trial chief magistrate can rightly assume jurisdiction and take cognisance of their complaint and proceed with a Criminal Trial against the Accused Persons, thereby justifying the Judgment of the High Court on appeal, that the trial chief magistrate had jurisdiction and properly took cognisance of the complaint under section 743 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Kaduna State and dismissed the Appeal?”
The Respondents too filed their Brief with the leave of this Court, and the Brief was deemed duly filed on 7/2/2011. The Respondents also filed a Notice of preliminary objection on 15/11/2010, on the grounds that:
“(1) The appellants failed to comply with order 76 rule 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2007.
(2) The appellants had taken their plea at the Magistrate Court before challenging the validity of the complaint.
(3) Leave of the lower court which is sitting in its appellate jurisdiction was not sought and obtained before commencing this appeal.
(4) The grounds of appeal of the appellants of mixed law and facts,”
They argued the preliminary objection in the Respondents Brief, pages 4 – 9.
The Respondents, on the appeal, also distilled a lone issue for determination, as follows:
“whether the lower court was right in holding that the learned magistrate properly took cognisance of the respondents’ direct criminal complaint dated 14th March, 2009 on the ground that there is no need for the complaint to contain all the ingredients of the offence.”
Appellants too filed a reply Brief on 21/2/2011, in response to the preliminary objection.
At the hearing of the Appeal, on 28/10/2013, the Counsel on both sides, on behalf of the parties adopted their briefs, after the Respondents had argued their preliminary objection as per pages 4 to 9 of the Respondents’ brief. They moved this court, accordingly.
As it is expected, we have to consider the preliminary objection first being a threshold Issue. I have already listed the grounds on which the preliminary objection were hosted. Grounds (a) (c) and (d) can be readily dismissed, as there is evidence before us that Appellants sought and obtained the leave of the lower court to appeal, as stipulated in sections 241(1) and 242 (1) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.
Pages 102 and 103 of the Records of Appeal carry the Order of the High Court, allowing the Appellants to bring this appeal, thus:
“Order granted. The Appellants are given leave to appeal against the judgment of High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, delivered on 25th May, 2006…”
The of the prayers had listed the request to appeal on grounds of mixed law & facts. Of course, in dealing with appeals, it is the Records of the Appeal, duly transmitted to the appellate court by the lower court, that must be relied upon and the same is binding on all the parties and on the Appellate Court. See the case of Orok vs. Orok (2013) LPELR 20377 (CA); GARBA vs. OMOKHODION (2011) NWLR (pt. 1269) 145.
The ground (b) alleges that appellants had taken their plea at the magistrate’s court before challenging the validity of this appeal. That appears to be a stranger to this appeal as it is an issue not raised in any of the grounds of appeal nor considered by the lower court in the ruling when it dismissed the objection by the Appellants to the trial by the Chief Magistrate’s Court. Moreover, the new objection sought to be introduced by the respondents as another reason the case ought to have been heard by the chief magistrate’s court, was never raised at that court nor at the High court on appeal. It cannot be smuggled into this court by the back door, without the Respondents doing the needful, which is to file a Respondents’ Notice, under Order 9 Rule 2 of the Court of Appeal Rules, and obtain leave to raise a fresh issue, that the ruling of the learned chief magistrate could still have been sustained on a ground other than the one relied upon by the court, that is, that Appellants had already taken their plea before raising the preliminary objection, See the case of LATEJ VS. FABAYO (2012) 9 NWLR (pt.1304) 159; ADAMAWA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY AND ORS VS CHUBADO BATTI TIJJANI AND 23 ORS (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 615) 330.
The preliminary objection is therefore without merit and is dismissed.
Arguing the Appeal, learned counsel for the Appellant, Bello Ibrahim Esq., reproduced, extensively, the of the judgment of the High Court and said that even from the of the judgment the lower court contradicted itself when it said: “It is not correct in our opinion to say that all the ingredients of the offence must be contained in the complaint” and went on to hold that “once the facts in the complaint state the facts of the allegation of the offence committed in our opinion is enough to make a court take cognisance of the offence”; He said that the latter position contradicts the former.
He contended that all facts of allegation must be contained in the complaint, and that means all the necessary ingredients of the offence must be seen and disclosed from the printed record of the complaint; that the facts as disclosed in the complaint (pages 21 of the Records), do not disclose all the facts of the allegations and the ingredients of the alleged offence.
He submitted that it is not every application for criminal summons and not every complaint filed before a court that qualifies as a proper criminal complaint over which a count can assume jurisdiction, take cognisance of the complaint or facts and information therein; that a criminal complaint must contain facts, information or substance from which all the ingredients of an offence can be completely identified.
Counsel reproduced the contents of the complaints by the 1st to 5th Respondents, analysed it and said that the same does not reveal offences of criminal conspiracy, criminal trespass an making away with rug carpet, office curtain and one enlargement of the National President Kaduna Branch; that the same does not constitute the offence of theft known and provided in the Penal Code Law of Kaduna State.
He submitted that the findings of the High Court on the issue, on page 98 of the Records, were not supported by and factual truth and that the complaint of the 1st to 5th Respondents does not conform with a complaint contemplated by section 1 of the C.P.C.; that a complaint under section 1 of the C.P.C. must be one in which it can be inferred from the facts that an offence or offences known to law has been committed; that to determine whether a complaint has or constitutes an offence or the alleged offences, the facts in the complaint are to be weighed in an imaginary scale of measurement, or has to be compared with the relevant provisions of the Penal Code alleged to have been contravened, to be sure that the facts of the complaint disclose the elements of the offence or offences and that the same conform with the ingredients and elements of the offence; that in this case, it will amount to commandeering innocent persons to undergo the trauma and severe process of unjust criminal trial, if the appellants are subjected to the trial, over a claim which ought to be a civil claim before a civil court.
He urged us to consider the entire complaint of the Respondents vis-a-vis sections 97, 286, 287, 342, and 345 of the Penal Code, as well as sections 1 and 143 of the Criminal Procedure Code, being the relevant provisions, in the determination of the competence of the complaint before the trial magistrate, as that was what the learned Chief Magistrate and the appellate High Court ought to have done. He submitted that section 143 (d) and (e) are clear, plain and unambiguous and must be given their simple and ordinary meanings. He relied on the case of A. G. FEDERATTON vs. ABUBAKAR (2007) 10 NWLR (PT.1041) 1 AT 144 – 145.
He urges us to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellants, allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the lower appellate court.
In their response, the Respondents, through their counsel, J. O. K. Irefefe Esq (who settled the brief), reproduced the full contents of their complaint for issuance of a criminal summons against the three accused persons, (as per page 21 of the Records), and submitted that the judges of the lower court were right in holding that the trial Magistrate properly took cognisance of the respondents’ complaint, in that there was no need for the said complaint to state/contain all the ingredients of the offences alleged therein. He relied on section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court to entertain a direct criminal complaint from individuals.
He referred us again to the complaint and analysed what the Appellants did in the office, when they got into it, without the respondents’ permission.
Counsel’s poser was: “whether the complaint as in page 21 of the records of proceedings must contain all the ingredients of the offences alleged in the complaint before it can qualify as a complaint?”
He quickly answered in the negative and relied on section 1 of the Criminal Code, as to the definition of complaint. He submitted that all a complaint needs to state, for a court to take cognisance of (that is, take judicial notice in official capacity), is to state orally or in writing that someone known or unknown has committed an offence; that it is not the law that the facts in the complaints, must constitute all the ingredients of the offence. He relied on section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code. He added that it is after taking cognisance of the complaint, the examination of the said complaint and the summary trial in Cap XVI of the Criminal Procedure Code, that the Magistrate Court will determine if there are ingredients of the offences showing prima facie case, warranting the Magistrate to charge the Accused Person.
He relied on sections 143 (d) and (e), 146 and 155 – 160 of the Criminal Procedure Code; NASIRU vs. COP (1980) 1 – 2 SC 94 at 113 – 114.
He urges us to dismiss the appeal.
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
To determine whether the learned appellate High Court was right in dismissing the appeal of the Appellants and holding that the learned trial Chief Magistrate was right in taking cognisance of the complaint, it has to be resolved whether a complaint must contain all the ingredients of the offence(s) alleged in the complaint before it can qualify as such for trial. That appears to be the main contention of the Appellants, which has frustrated the commencement of trial of the alleged wrong doings of the Appellant at the Magistrate’s Court, since May 2005, causing all the legal gymnastics at two different layers of appeal, thus far, with the resultant waste of judicial time, money and resources. The full of the complaint of the Respondents which brought about this appeal is as per page 21 of the Records of appeal. It states as follows:
“We hereby apply for criminal summons against the three accused persons in the following terms:
1) The 1st and 2nd accused persons were formally leaders of the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (TREAN) Kaduna State branch now on suspension. We are the interim leaders of same.
2) That on the 6th of March, 2005, the three accused persons conspired and trespassed into the secretariat of the said association without our consent they got into the offices, open (sic) the doors and made away with the following items; A ruck (sic) carpet, office curtain and enlargement of our national president Kaduna branch.
Whereof the actions of the accused persons constitute the offences of criminal conspiracy, trespass and theft, contrary to sections 97, 286, 287 and 343 PC,”
Appellants were confronted with the above complaint on 8/4/2005 at the Chief Magistrate’s Court, where they took their plea, individually, thus:
“I understand the complaint. It is not true,”
The prosecution had sought adjournment to marshall out evidence to prove the complaint, when it said:
“We have enough oral and documentary evidences to prove our case, we therefore, most humbly apply for a date for hearing,”
The Appellants did not oppose that application, but rather used the time to argue their motion for their bail, pending the hearing. Of course they were granted bail, despite the opposition of same by the prosecution.
Appellants’ objection to the trial, as per their notice of preliminary objection, filed on 5/5/2005, challenged the competence of the case, on the grounds that the suit was incompetent; that the Respondents were not the KDS (Kaduna State) Excos of the 1st complainant (TREAN); that the secretary of the Association was not in possession of the complaints and so the action was not maintainable; finally, that the dispute between the parties that led to the filing of the case was leadership tussle and civil (page 8 of the Records).
I think those issues or grounds which the Appellants raised to challenge the trial by the learned Chief Magistrate would have been credible points of defence at the hearing of the case, as they appear to be Appellants’ lines of defence to the complaints by the Respondents. Thus, at the time Appellants raised those grounds to stop the trial, they were jumping the gun, as the Respondents were yet to lead evidence to establish their right or claim to the 1st Respondent’s office in Kaduna, and to show that Appellants were no longer entitled to get into the said office and take custody of any item therein, if in fact the Appellants went there, and took away those items.
It is the duty of the Respondent to prove and justify every allegation they raised in their said complaint, including the allegation that Appellants are no longer the leaders of the Association or had been suspended and that they (Respondents) are now the authentic leaders, and competent to bring an action, criminal or civil, in the name of the 1st Respondent.
I think Appellants’ premature objection rather pre-empted the trial and it was presented and pursued, most prematurely, in my opinion, to the detriment of the Appellants themselves, who appear to be the losers, as long as the trial of the main complaint remains to be heard and disposed of, to let them off the chains/pains of a pending criminal trial. Also, by pre-empting the trial, the Appellants in-geniusly exposed their ‘under belly’ and possible defences, to their opponents to exploit.
Sometimes, legal prudence and tact would suggest that an accused person refrains from jumping up with preliminary objection to his trial, and doing so in a manner that compromises his defence(s); he rather stays quite and tactful as the cat waits for its prey, calculating and seeking the best time to launch its attack, such that, by the time it makes its moves, the game is won! A premature objection only makes the prosecution wiser to amend and correct the charge, and to develop stronger and more encompassing web to ensnare its prey!
I think the Appellants were ill advised to raise the objection and keep pursing it at different levels of appeal, subjecting themselves to all the expenses and wastes. I have said repeatedly, that such actions that seek to frustrate the trial substantive case at the lower court, by use of interlocutory appeals to stall the trial, is an affront to the principles of sound adjudication and it borders on abuse of the court process, and brings no benefit even to the party that orchestrates the absurdity.
In the case of AUSTIN NWANA ESQ v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC: CA/K/166/2004 an unreported decision of this court, delivered on 1/11/2013, pages 6 and 7 thereof, we said:
“It has been has been stated, several times, that interlocutory appeals should not be embarked upon where that would amount to frustrating expeditious determination of the substantive matter at the lower court, exposing litigants to unnecessary hardship, waste of resources and judicial time, which, at the end, brings no benefit to any party, nor advances the interest of justice. See the case of ADEYINKA AJIBOYE vs. FRN [2013] 17 WRN 127 held (9) and (10), where this court cautioned, as follows:
“I think Counsel who are advising litigants aggrieved by interlocutory decisions of court should, themselves, be advised against subjecting their clients to avoidable hazards, suffering and spending, which premature appeals entail. Sometimes, a little patience and tact, on the part of Counsel, would suggest lying low, and marking down what could have been a point of interlocutory appeal, and opting to take it up at the end of the trial, if the final verdict becomes unfavourable, that is, where the issue for interlocutory appeal would not cease to be live issue in the final judgment of the trial court.
Thus, where a party has cause to disagree with an interlocutory ruling of the trial court, over an issue which the party will not be foreclosed to raise at the final judgment of the substantive matter, I think the party (or his Counsel) should not rush to the Court of Appeal on the issue and stall the trial of the case at the lower court, since he will still be heard by the trial court, whether or not the interlocutory appeal succeeds, and his right of appeal will not be extinguished at the final judgment.”
See also UNITED FOAM PRODUCTS NIGERIA LTD. VS. OPOBIYI [2012] 6 NWLR [PT.1297] 429, where an appeal against an interlocutory ruling, delivered on 27/1/2009 had stalled the substantive matter until the appeal was disposed of on 27/1/2012!
Section 143 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Kaduna State State as follows:
“Subject to the provisions of chapter XIII and XIV and to any limitation on the powers of the court, a court may take cognisance of an offence –
a) When an arrested person is brought before it under section 40 or 41;
b) Upon receiving a first information Report under section 118;
c) Upon receiving a complaint in writing from the Attorney-General;
d) Upon receiving a complaint of facts from any person which constitute the offence;
e) If from information received from any person other than a police officer it has reason to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed,”
The sub-sections (d) and (e) above are relevant to this appeal, as the complaint of the Respondents fall under that category. And by sub-section (e), the discretion is that of the court to construe the complaint and decide whether “it has reason to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” by the accused person alleged by the information, is that of the court of trial.
What constitutes a complaint under the law is “allegation made orally or in writing to a court with a view to its taking action under this Criminal Procedure Code that some person whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but except where the con otherwise requires, it does not include a police report “See section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
There is nothing in the above definition, nor in the section 143 (d) and (e) of the Criminal Procedure Code to suggest that a simple complaint made to the court (be it oral or written) that a person has committed an offence should contain or disclose all the ingredients of the offence(s) alleged in the complaint (information) for it to be competent.
It even sounds strange and unreasonable to me to expect a complaint or a charge to carry and disclose all the ingredients of the offence(s) alleged in it, at the stage of drafting the complaint or charge. It is usually at the trial, that the prosecution is expected to lead evidence to establish the ingredients of the offence(s) in the charge, not at the time of drafting the charge or information!
What the complainant or prosecution is required to satisfy at the time of raising the complaint or a charge is to disclose an offence known to law, to which the accused person is expected to make his plea. And in the court, he must be informed, promptly in the language that he understands, and in detail, the nature of the offence, and allowed the enabling environment or atmosphere to take his plea. See the case of BLESSING V FRN (2013) 12 WRN 36; (2012) LPELR-9835 (CA), where we held:
“It can be seen that the Appellant had no valid point of complaint on this issue, after the Court had ruled on being satisfied that the charge was read and explained to the Appellant in the manner that she appeared to understand, perfectly, before taking her plea. All the cases cited by the Appellant in support of proper procedure for arraignment were good laws and rather went in support of the manner of arraignment of the Appellant at the Lower Court. I believe the intendment of the law, as per Section 187 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law (or Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act) was to protect an accused person’s right of fair hearing as stipulated in Section 36 (6) of the 1999 Constitution that:
“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to
(a) To be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence
(b) To be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
(c) To defend himself in person or by a legal practitioner of his own choice
(d) …………………….
(e) Have, without payment the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the offence”
In the case of Yusuf vs. State (supra) held 4, the Supreme Court said:
“At the commencement of a criminal trial, the accused will be arraigned by the Court, that is the charge preferred against the accused will be read over to him, and he will be asked if he understands the charge and whether he pleads guilty or not. This is a fundamental procedure in criminal trial, and failure to adhere to the procedure renders the trial defective, null and void, It is as though nothing took place. (Yahaya vs. State (2002) 3 NWLR (pt.754) 289; Effiom vs. State (1995) 7 NWLR (PT.373) 507; Madu vs. State (1997) 7 NWLR (PT.482) 386 referred to)”
See also the case of CHUKWU VS. STATE (2005) 1 NWLR (pt.908) 520 at 540 – 541; TOBBY v. STATE (2001) 10 NWLR (pt.720) 23; LUFADEJU VS. JOHNSON (2007) 8 NWLR (pt.1037) 535.
See also the case of OJI v. FRN (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt.668) 920, where we held:
“…Appellant never raised any complaint at the trial, that he did not understand English language or the proceedings in the Court at the time he was arraigned and tried; he entered his plea of guilty, after the charge had been read and explained to him, to the satisfaction of the Court, that he (Appellant) appeared perfectly to understand same; …The law is well defined and settled, on what the trial court should do in such circumstances, when it is satisfied that the charge has been read to the accused person, and he appears to understand the same perfectly and pleads… to the charge. Of course, it is the duty of the trial court to satisfy itself that the appellant understands the charge read and explained to him, perfectly,”
I think the learned counsel for the Appellants was in serious error to have thought and argued that the complaint upon which the Appellants were arraigned should have disclosed all the ingredients of the offences alleged in the complaint before the learned Chief Magistrate could assume jurisdiction to try the case. That grave error, I think, misled him to subject the Appellants to avoidable waste of judicial time, money and other resources in pursuit of shadows, instead of the substantive matter, which, I believe, would have been disposed of by now.
I resolve the issue against the Appellants as I uphold the decision of the learned Appellate High Court.
Appellants shall pay the cost of this appeal assessed at Fifty Thousand Naira (N50,000.00) only.
DALHATU ADAMU, J.C.A.: I have read the draft of the lead judgment of my learned brother I. G. Mbaba JCA in this appeal. I agree with his conclusion that the issue should be resolved against the appellants. The decision of the learned trial judge is hereby upheld by me. I abide by the order on costs as made in the lead judgment.
HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Ita Mbaba, JCA. His Lordship has ably considered and resolved the issues in contention in this appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide the conclusions reached therein. I have nothing more to add.
Appearances
Bello Ibrahim Esq.For Appellant
AND
J. O. K. Irifefe Esq., for the 1st to 5th RespondentsFor Respondent
