ALHAJI SULEIMAN AKINBAMI v. OANDO PLC & ORS
(2013)LCN/6491(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 7th day of November, 2013
CA/EK/33/2013
JUSTICES
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ALHAJI SULEIMAN AKINBAMI Appellant(s)
AND
1. OANDO PLC
2. ADEYANJU OLAJIDE GEORGE
3. MR. ABIODUN FAGBUARO
4. MR. TUNDE FAGBUARO
5. MR. OBA OYINFUNSO FAGBUARO
6. MRS. ADUNNI ADARABIERIN (Nee FAGBUARO)
7. MRS. OJA ADEBAYO (Nee FAGBUARO)
8. MRS. OJA AFOLABI (Nee FAGBUARO)
9. MR. EBENEZER OYINDAMOLA FAGBUARO
10. MRS. KIKELOMO (Nee FAGBUARO)
11. MR. KOLA FAGBUARO
12. MRS. ADEBOLA ADEPARUSI (NEE FAGBUARO)
13. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF EKITI STATE
14. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS AND HOUSING EKITI STATE Respondent(s)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION MUST BE DETERMINED BEFORE THE SUBSTANTIVE SUIT
The law is settled that where a preliminary objection is issued against the competence of a procedural step or an appeal, such objection must be determined first before the hearing of the substantive matter connected to the procedural step or the appeal. See: AMOO v. ALABI (2003) 15 NSCQLR 133; PEENOK INVESTMENT LTD. V. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD. (1983) 4 NCLR; DEV. CO. LTD. V. ISAIAH (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723) 168 AT 177. PER GALINJE, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT LEAVE OF COURT IS REQUIRED TO ARGUE A PRELIMINARY OBJECTION RAISED TO THE COMPETENCE OF AN APPEAL
It is settled that where a preliminary objection to the competence of appeal is raised either in the brief or separately, the Respondent raising such objection must seek for the leave of the Court to argue same before the hearing of the appeal. Where that is not done the preliminary objection will be deemed waived and abandoned and thereby liable to be struck out.
In ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE v. G.O UDE (2006) 17 NWLR (PT.1008) 436 at 452, PARAGRAPHS G – H, Musdapher, JSC (as he then was) said: –
“Before I proceed to deal with the remaining issues for the determination of the appeal, I observe the Respondents have raised a preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal, but at the hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the respondents did not apply or seek leave of court to raise (sic) the said objection, The preliminary objection in this case not having been raised and argued at the appeal the objection is deemed abandoned.”
See: NSIRIM V. NSIRIM (1990) 3 NWLR (PT.138) 285 at 297; ONOCHIE V. ODOGWU (2006) 2 SCM 95; (2006) 6 NWLR (PT.975) 65. Also in OFORKIRE & ANOR v. MADUIKE & ORS (2003) 5 NWLR (PT.812) 166 at 178 PARAGRAPHS D-E, Uthman Mohammed, JSC, said: –
“I agree with the Learned Counsel that a party in the Court of Appeal having a Preliminary Objection against any of the grounds of appeal must give the Appellant three days’ notice before the objection is heard. The notice of preliminary objection can be given in the Respondent’s brief, but a party filing it, in the brief, must ask the court for leave to move the notice of objection before the oral hearing of the appeal commences. Otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived and therefore abandoned.” PER GALINJE, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT MERE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE CONFERS TITLE IN RESPECT OF LAND
The law is settled that a mere production of documents of title, such as certificate of occupancy and sales agreement does not confer title in respect of a parcel of land it purports to cover on the party that produced such documents unless he had the title before the certificate was issued to him.
See: KYARI V. ALKALI (2001) FWLR (Pt.60) 1481, (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.724) 412; OGUNLEYE v. ONI (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.135) 745, SECTION 34 LAND USE ACT. PER GALINJE, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT WHERE PARTIES HAVE EMBODIED THE TERMS OF THEIR CONTRACT IN A WRITTEN DOCUMENT, EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CAN NOT BE USED TO CONTRADICT THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT
In OLAMIDE LARMIE V. DATA PROCESSING MAINTENANCE & SERVICE LTD. (2005) 24, NSCQLR 320 at 337 Onnoghen, JSC, said:-
“It is the law that where parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument. In the present case the oral testimony of the Appellant regarding the meeting of 3rd March, 1992 as it concerned the agreement between the parties with particular reference to the issue of terminal date of the contract, which testimony is at variance with paragraph 3 of exhibit B was to contradict the contents of the said Exhibit B which Section 132(1) of the Evidence Act 1990 frowns upon and such evidence was inadmissible in law and the trial Court ought not to have acted upon same.”
See: UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. v. OZIGI (1994) 3 NWLR (PT.333) 385; EKE V. ODODFIN (1961) ALL NLR 842; COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD v. KAMSON (1955) 21 NLR 75; MOLADE V. MOLADE (1958) SCNLR 206. PER GALINJE, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT DECISIONS ARE RESTRICTED TO THE CLAIMS SUBMITTED BY PARTIES
A Court is not a charitable organization or an all purpose tribunal. Courts decisions are restricted to the claims submitted for adjudication. In the instant case, the trial court restricted its findings to the Appellant’s claims. This in my view is correct. See: EKPEYONG v. NYONG (1975) 2 SC 71; JERIC NIGERIA LTD. v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA (2000) 4 NSCQLR 254 at 273. The rule that calls for consideration of all the issues placed before the court is only applicable if the issues are so connected to the claims submitted for adjudication.
See: 7-UP BOTTLING CO. LTD. v. ABIOLA AND SONS BOTTLING CO. LTD (2006) 6 NSCQLR 905. PER GALINJE, J.C.A.
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By the amended writ of summons and statement of claims both dated 3rd day of November, 2010, and filed on the 12th of November, 2010, the Appellant herein claimed against the Respondents the following reliefs:
(A) A Declaration that the sales of the premises known and called OANDO FILLING STATION lying and situate at 36, Ajilosun Street, Ado-Ekiti to the plaintiff by the Administrators of the Estate of Late Chief Oyindamola Fagbuaro, the Odofin II of Ado-Ekiti is proper, lawful, regular and valid.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the Statutory Right of Occupancy in respect of the piece or parcel of land being and lying at 36, Ajilosun Street, Ikere Road, Ado-Ekiti properly described and edged red on the survey plan No:-EK/0236/2009/006 dated 6th March, 2009 prepared by Femi Falade, a licensed Surveyor,
(c) An Order directing, compelling and or mandating the 1st and 2nd Defendants to forthwith deliver up possession of the said premises to the plaintiff as a bonafide owner by purchase.
(d) A sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only as general damages for trespass, economic injury, trauma, stress and or inconveniences suffered by the plaintiff on the account of the refusal by the 1st and 2nd Defendants to yield up possession and for the continued occupation and use of the premises by the said 1st and 2nd Defendants despite the expiration and/or determination of their lease agreement on the 31st March, 2009.
(e) A perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants, their agents, servants, assigns and privies from committing further or any act of trespass on the said premises forthwith.
The 1st and 2nd respondents filed their joint Amended Statement of defence and counter claim on the 4th of January 2011 while the 3rd – 12th Defendants filed their joint statement of defence and defence to counterclaim on the 17th May, 2011. Appellant filed reply to the statement of defence to the 1st and 2nd respondents’ statement of defence and the 1st and 2nd Defendants strangely filed a statement of defence to the 3rd-12th Respondents’ statement of defence. Issues having been joined, the case proceeded to trial. At the end of the trial and in a considered judgment which was delivered on the 26th of September, 2012, Adeyeye, J., dismissed both the plaintiffs claims and the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ counter claims on the ground that the claims were not established.
It is against that judgment that the Appellant who was the plaintiff at the lower court has brought this appeal. His notice of appeal at page 307 of the record of this appeal dated and filed on the 21st November, 2012 contains five grounds of appeal.
Parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument, Appellant formulated four issues for determination of his appeal. These issues are hereunder reproduced as follows:-
1. Whether or not the judgment of a court that is ambiguous and or failed to resolve vital and fundamental issues submitted for its adjudication would be set aside.
2. Whether or not a lease agreement which has lapsed by effluxion of time and without a renewal of same by the lessee can still vest on such lessee the same right of leasehold.
3. Whether or not a statutory or legal document applied for before instituting a suit with all pre-requisite conditions duly complied with; and a certificate of confirmation of same was latter (sic) awarded; can be said to have been processed and obtained during the pendency of such suit.
4. Whether or not a party who has willfully and knowingly waived his contractual right can later complain of an infringement or violation of same.
The 1st and 2nd Respondents in their joint brief of argument issued a notice of preliminary objection to the competence of the notice of appeal on the ground that the appeal is against the decision of the trial judge and not against the decision of the tower court.
Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondent also raised objection to the competence of the first issue for determination of the appeal as formulated by the appellant, which he argued that it does not arise from any of the grounds of appeal, The preliminary objection is argued at Page 3 Paragraphs 3.1 Page 5 Paragraphs 3.13. Thereafter two issues are formulated on behalf of the Respondent for the determination of the appeal. They read as follows: –
ISSUE 1
Whether the interest of the 1st Respondent has been validly determined in the property in dispute.
ISSUE 2
Whether the Appellant validly acquired any title or interest in the property in dispute so as to entitle him to the reliefs claimed by him.
The 3rd – 14th Respondents did not file briefs of argument and so were not heard in argument.
The law is settled that where a preliminary objection is issued against the competence of a procedural step or an appeal, such objection must be determined first before the hearing of the substantive matter connected to the procedural step or the appeal. See: AMOO v. ALABI (2003) 15 NSCQLR 133; PEENOK INVESTMENT LTD. V. HOTEL PRESIDENTIAL LTD. (1983) 4 NCLR; DEV. CO. LTD. V. ISAIAH (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.723) 168 AT 177.
At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Debola Adeyemi, Learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondent identified and adopted the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ brief of argument that is dated and filed on the 5th of July, 2013. Learned counsel did this after Mr. E. K. Adetifa, Learned counsel for the Appellant had identified and adopted the Appellants brief of argument. There was no mention of the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ notice of preliminary objection by Adeyemi, Esq., of counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents throughout the hearing of the appeal. It is settled that where a preliminary objection to the competence of appeal is raised either in the brief or separately, the Respondent raising such objection must seek for the leave of the Court to argue same before the hearing of the appeal. Where that is not done the preliminary objection will be deemed waived and abandoned and thereby liable to be struck out.
In ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE v. G.O UDE (2006) 17 NWLR (PT.1008) 436 at 452, PARAGRAPHS G – H, Musdapher, JSC (as he then was) said: –
“Before I proceed to deal with the remaining issues for the determination of the appeal, I observe the Respondents have raised a preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal, but at the hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the respondents did not apply or seek leave of court to raise (sic) the said objection, The preliminary objection in this case not having been raised and argued at the appeal the objection is deemed abandoned.”
See: NSIRIM V. NSIRIM (1990) 3 NWLR (PT.138) 285 at 297; ONOCHIE V. ODOGWU (2006) 2 SCM 95; (2006) 6 NWLR (PT.975) 65. Also in OFORKIRE & ANOR v. MADUIKE & ORS (2003) 5 NWLR (PT.812) 166 at 178 PARAGRAPHS D-E, Uthman Mohammed, JSC, said: –
“I agree with the Learned Counsel that a party in the Court of Appeal having a Preliminary Objection against any of the grounds of appeal must give the Appellant three days’ notice before the objection is heard. The notice of preliminary objection can be given in the Respondent’s brief, but a party filing it, in the brief, must ask the court for leave to move the notice of objection before the oral hearing of the appeal commences. Otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived and therefore abandoned.”
The 1st and 2nd Respondents’ preliminary objection having been abandoned, it is hereby struck out.
Having dealt with the preliminary objection, I will now proceed to consider the appeal. The facts of the case that gave rise to this appeal are simple and straight-forward. By a deed of lease dated 30th day of June, 1969, which was executed between Late Chief Oyindamola Fagbuaro and AGIP PLC (which later became OANDO PLC), the 1st Respondent was granted a lease of the premises currently housing the 1st Respondent’s filling Station at Ajilosun, Ado-Ekiti for a period of 40 years, commencing from 1st day of April, 1969 and ending on the 31st day of March, 2009. The lease agreement provides among other things, the following conditions:
“(c) That the company shall have the right to an option for a further period of twenty (20) years if notice of the exercise of such option be given in writing to the landlord by the company at least Ninety (90) days before the expiration of the said original term provided that such extension shall be on the same terms and conditions as are herein contained, place at that time for such, lands having the same characteristics and peculiarities as the demised premises, provided further that such revision of the rent shall not take into consideration any increased value of the land caused by the building or buildings and improvements erected by the company.
(e) To grant to the company the first right of pre-emption at the same price at which third parties have offered or may offer to purchase the same should the Landlord decide to sell the demised premises at any time.
(f) To enable the company to consider whether or not to exercise its rights or pre-emption (which right is hereby expressly conferred on the company), the Landlord shall give three (3) Months previous written notice to the company of any intention on the Landlord’s part to sell the demised premises.
(g) Should the company decide not to exercise its right of preemption as aforesaid, the Landlord shall nevertheless not sell or convey the demised premises to any other oil or Petrol Company (except Associate and or Subsidiary Companies of the Company). In the event of any sale or conveyance the Landlord shall take a covenant from a prospective purchaser or purchasers of the demised premises so that the said purchaser shall consent and concur in this present demise for the reminder of the term hereby created and shall observe and perform all covenants and conditions herein contained and on the part of the Landlord to be performed and observed.
The Landlord shall indemnify the Company against any loss or damage the Company may suffer by reason of the Landlord not taking the aforesaid covenant from a prospective purchaser or purchasers,”
The 3rd – 12th Respondents, who were heirs to Late Chief Oyindamola Fagbuaro and therefore successor in title to the demised premises, sold the premises to the Appellant who was a former dealer with the 1st Respondent on the 25th day of October, 2005. Agreement to that effect was admitted as Exhibit D7 at the lower court. After having sold the land in dispute, Chief Akin Ojo, Learned Counsel for the 3rd Respondent, by a letter dated 9th September, 2008, purportedly gave the right of pre-emption to the 1st Respondent as contained in the lease agreement. This letter was followed by a quit notice dated 25th of September, 2008. The failure of the 1st Respondent to comply with the quit notice gave rise to the suit that brought about this appeal.
Based on the facts, I have enumerated above and having carefully read the briefs of argument of the parties in this appeal, I am of the firm view, that the only issue calling for the determination of this appeal is whether the Appellant’s root of title which is the Sale Agreement of 25th of October, 2005 conferred a valid title to the disputed land on the Appellant.
The Appellant’s claims at the lower court are for declarations that:
(1) The Sale Agreement of 25th October, 2005 is proper, lawful, regular and valid
(2) He is entitled to the statutory Right of Occupancy on the basis of the same agreement.
(3) General damages
(4) Perpetual injunction
After a thorough review of the evidence before it, the lower court found that the Sale Agreement of 25th October, 2005 is improper, unlawful, irregular and invalid and therefore declined to declare that the Appellant is entitled to the statutory right of occupancy over the disputed land. The decision of the lower court is a direct response to the claims of the Appellant. The issues for determination of the appeal as formulated by the Appellant cannot therefore properly determine the issues in controversy between the parties which were settled by the trial Court. The Appellant’s claims were not for determination of the lease agreement, as he was not a party to that agreement. Since his major claim is for declaration that he is entitled to statutory right of occupancy, he had the burden under Section 137 of the Evidence Act to prove his case with credible evidence before he could be entitled to the judgment of the Court. He was required to do so on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of his opponent’s case.
See: OLANIYAN v. OYEWOLE (2011) 14 NWLR (pt. 1268) 445; IMADE V. OTABOR (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt.544) 20 at 27; MADUMMA V. JAMBO (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 736) 461 at 475 – 476. The Appellant’s averments at paragraphs 10 and 17 of his statement of claim at the Lower Court read as follows:-
“10. The administrators of the estates of Late Chief Oyindamola Fagbuaro have sold the said premises to the plaintiff and sales Agreement was duly executed to that effect. The said sales Agreement shall be relied upon at the trial of this suit.
17. At the trial of this suit, the plaintiff shall in addition to all the above herein referenced document rely on the following:
(a) An Addendum to an agreement for the sales of Land made on 28th October, 2005 and which was dated 29th October, 2005.
(b) An Addendum made pursuant to the Land Sales Agreement dated 28th October, 2005 between the Administrators of the Estate of Late Chief Oyindamola Fagbuaro II, the Odofin of Ado-Ekiti and Alhaji Suleiman Akinbami and which was dated 24th February 2009,
(c) Affidavit of Sales and change of ownership filed at the Registry of Ado-Ekiti High Court on 1st April, 2009 and which was sworn to by the 3rd Defendant (Abiodun Fagbuaro) in favour of the plaintiff and
(d) other relevant documents incidental to the determination of the subject matter of this suit.”
At Page 247 of the record of this appeal, the Appellant, who gave evidence as PW1, testified as follows:
“I was approached sometime ago that the family………………………wanted to sell the land. After agreeing on the price I paid for I have something to show to the Court that the land has been sold to us. I have among other things, the sale agreement between me and the family of Oyindamola Fagbuaro.”
At Page 248, Paragraph 2, the same witness testified thus:-
“Apart from the sale agreement, I have other documents, I have certificate of occupancy issued by the state Ministry of Land and Housing. I have the original copy of the certificate of occupancy. I have an addendum regarding additional payment as respect of the land. I can identify the addendum as exhibit.”
From the pleadings and the evidence led at the Lower Court, which I have highlighted above, the Appellant is clearly relying on documents of title in proof of his title to the disputed land. The law is settled that a mere production of documents of title, such as certificate of occupancy and sales agreement does not confer title in respect of a parcel of land it purports to cover on the party that produced such documents unless he had the title before the certificate was issued to him.
See: KYARI V. ALKALI (2001) FWLR (Pt.60) 1481, (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt.724) 412; OGUNLEYE v. ONI (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt.135) 745, SECTION 34 LAND USE ACT.
Now, the Appellant derives his title to the disputed land from the sale agreement of 25th October 2005. From the evidence available before the lower Court, the sale agreement was executed during the pendency of the lease agreement that was executed between Late Chief Oyindamola Fagbuaro and the 1st Respondent. The sale agreement was clearly in breach of the lease agreement which provided that the 1st Respondent shall have the first right of pre-emption whenever the landlord decided to sell the demised land. What then is the effect of the breach of the lease agreement on the sale agreement of 25th October 2005 and whether the evidence that the sale agreement will take effect on the 1st of April 2009 will save the sale agreement? In OLAMIDE LARMIE V. DATA PROCESSING MAINTENANCE & SERVICE LTD. (2005) 24, NSCQLR 320 at 337 Onnoghen, JSC, said:-
“It is the law that where parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument. In the present case the oral testimony of the Appellant regarding the meeting of 3rd March, 1992 as it concerned the agreement between the parties with particular reference to the issue of terminal date of the contract, which testimony is at variance with paragraph 3 of exhibit B was to contradict the contents of the said Exhibit B which Section 132(1) of the Evidence Act 1990 frowns upon and such evidence was inadmissible in law and the trial Court ought not to have acted upon same.”
See: UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. v. OZIGI (1994) 3 NWLR (PT.333) 385; EKE V. ODODFIN (1961) ALL NLR 842; COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD v. KAMSON (1955) 21 NLR 75; MOLADE V. MOLADE (1958) SCNLR 206.
Also in, THE OWNERS OF THE M. V. LUPEX v. NIGERIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING LTD (2003) 14 NSCQLR 801 at 814, Uthman Mohammed, JSC, held that where parties have chosen to determine for themselves that they would refer any of their dispute to arbitration instead of resorting to regular Courts, a prima facie duty is cast upon the courts to act upon their agreement.
It is not the business of the Court to formulate agreement for parties before it or to rewrite the one already made by them. Once parties have freely entered into an agreement, the court is duty bound to enforce such agreement and extrinsic or oral evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the agreement. Whether there was addendum that provided for future effective date of sale agreement between the 3rd-12th Respondents and the Appellant, such Addendum cannot alter the position of the sale agreement, as it was executed in breach of the lease agreement and without the knowledge of the 1st Respondent. Any addendum to the sale agreement is an extrinsic evidence that has added no value to the Appellant’s case. At Page 302 Paragraph 1, the Learned trial Judge held:-
“It is beyond argument in the light of the foregoing that the condition precedent to the sale of the land in dispute was not complied wih by the 3rd – 12th defendants. The sale of the land in dispute having been done in contravention of the lease agreement, the plaintiff cannot be said to have acquired a valid title to the land in dispute.
And what is more, Exhibits D4, D5 and D7 clearly showed that the land was sold to the plaintiff in 2005 when the lease was to expire in 2009. This in my view is a clear evidence of the breach of the lease agreement which cannot confer a valid title on the plaintiff.”
I entirely agree with the Learned trial Judge. By the holding hereinabove, the Learned trial Judge had effectively determined the claim before him. There was no claim for declaration that the lease agreement had elapsed by effluxion of time. A Court is not a charitable organization or an all purpose tribunal. Courts decisions are restricted to the claims submitted for adjudication. In the instant case, the trial court restricted its findings to the Appellant’s claims. This in my view is correct. See: EKPEYONG v. NYONG (1975) 2 SC 71; JERIC NIGERIA LTD. v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA (2000) 4 NSCQLR 254 at 273. The rule that calls for consideration of all the issues placed before the court is only applicable if the issues are so connected to the claims submitted for adjudication.
See: 7-UP BOTTLING CO. LTD. v. ABIOLA AND SONS BOTTLING CO. LTD (2006) 6 NSCQLR 905.
For all I have said, this appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. Accordingly, same is hereby dismissed. The Appellant shall pay N30,000 (Thirty Thousand Naira) as cost of prosecuting this appeal to the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in advance the lead judgment of my learned brother, Paul Adamu Galinje, JCA just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning of my learned brother in the said lead judgment and the conclusion reached therein. In this regard, I am in tandem with my learned brother, Galinje, JCA that the appeal deserves to be dismissed and I also dismiss it. Again, I subscribe to the consequential order made with regard to costs.
FATIMA OMORO AKINBAMI J.C.A.: I have read in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, JCA.
The Appellant herein being dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower Court caused a Notice of Appeal to be filed on his behalf on the 21st of November, 2012. The said Notice of Appeal contains five grounds of appeal.
The 1st and 2nd Respondents raised preliminary objection to the competence of the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the appeal is against the decision of the trial Judge and not against the decision of the lower Court. They also raised objection to the competence of the first issue for determination of the appeal as formulated by the Appellant.
The 3rd – 14th Respondents did not file brief of argument therefore were not heard in argument.
The issues arising in this appeal were comprehensibly dealt with by my learned brother in the leading judgment. I have nothing to add. I agree that this appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. I also dismiss the appeal and abide by the orders as to costs.
Appearances
E. K. Adetifa, Esq., with B. T. Oluwole, Esq.For Appellant
AND
Mrs. Adebola Adeyemi for the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
Taiwo Ogunmoroti, Esq., with Ayantunde Adeleke, Esq., and Paschal Ike, Esq., for the 3rd to 12th Respondents.For Respondent
