ALHAJI SALISU ALARAMA RIMIN GADO v. ALHAJI RABIU ILIYASU (2014)

ALHAJI SALISU ALARAMA RIMIN GADO v. ALHAJI RABIU ILIYASU

(2014)LCN/7147(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Monday, the 28th day of April, 2014

CA/K/187/2004

RATIO

WORDS AND PRIVILEDGES: FAIR HEARING

Fair hearing postulates that where a person’s legal rights or obligations are called into question, he should be accorded full opportunity to be heard before any adverse decision is taken against him with regard to such rights or obligations. It is an indispensable requirement of justice that an adjudicating authority, to be fair and just, shall hear both sides, giving them ample opportunity to present their case. Accordingly, a hearing can only be said to be fair when, inter alia, all the parties to the dispute are given a hearing of an opportunity of a hearing. If one of the parties is refused or denied a hearing or is not given an opportunity to be heard, such hearing cannot qualify as a fair hearing under the audi alteram partem rule – Otapo v. Sunmonu (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt 58) 587, Gakus Vs Jos International Breweries Ltd (1991) 6 NWLR 1Pt 199) 614, Olumesan Vs Ogundepo (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt 433) 628.

WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH EVIDENCE EVALUATED BY THE TRIAL COURT

It settled that evaluation of evidence adduced before the court is the exclusive preserve of the trial Court and where the records of proceedings show that a trial Court assessed the evidence produced before it and accorded probative value to them and placed them side by side on an imaginary weighing scale before coming to a conclusion and making a finding of fact on side of the evidence that tilts the scale, such a finding must be accorded due weight so long as it is not unreasonable and not perverse. In other words, an appellate Court will not interfere with the evaluation of evidence carried out by a trial Court and will not substitute its own views for that of the trial Court unless the conclusion reached from the facts is perverse – Ajibulu Vs Ajayi (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1392) 483, Ikumonihan Vs State (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1392) 564.

CONTRACT: WHETHER A PARTY TO A CONTRACT CAN READ INTO A WRITTEN AGREEMENT A TERM NOT EMBEDDED IN IT

It is settled law that parties are bound by the contract they voluntarily entered into and cannot act outside the terms and conditions contained in the contract and neither of the parties to a contract can after or read into a written agreement a term which is not embodied in it – African International Bank Ltd Vs Integrated Dimensional System Ltd (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1328) 1, Lagos State Government Vs Toluwase (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt 1336) 555.

A court too must treat as sacrosanct the terms of an agreement freely entered into by the parties as parties to a contract enjoy their freedom to contract on their own terms so long as same is lawful. It is not the business of the court to rewrite a contract for the parties and it should thus not add to or subtract from or import any provision into the contract. The duty of the court, where a dispute arises between parties to a contract, is to construe the surrounding circumstances, including the written or oral statement, so as to effectuate the intention of the parties – Omega Bank (Nig) Plc Vs O.B.C. Ltd (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt 928) 547, BFI Group Corporation Vs Bureau of Public Enterprises (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt 1332) 209, Daspan Vs Mangu Local Government Council (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt 1338) 203, Afrilec Ltd Vs Lee (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt 1349) 1. per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

WORDS AND PHRASES: EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

Now, evaluation of evidence entails the assessment of evidence so as to give value and quality to it. It involves a reasoned belief of the evidence of one of the contending parties and disbelief of the other or a reasoned preference of one version to the other. There must be on record how the court arrived at its conclusion of preferring one piece of evidence to the other – Idakwo Vs Nigerian Army (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt.857) 249, Oyekola vs Ajibade (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt 902) 356, Imoh vs Onanuga (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt 1376) 139 and Al-Mustapha Vs State (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt.1383) 350. Per HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ITA GEORGE MBABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ALHAJI SALISU ALARAMA RIMIN GADO Appellant(s)

AND

ALHAJI RABIU ILIYASU Respondent(s)

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the Kano State High Court in Suit No K/275/1998 delivered by Honorable Justice M. A. Haliru on the 24th of July 2003. The Respondent, as plaintiff, commenced the action in the lower Court against the Appellant, as defendant, by a writ of summons dated the 13th of May, 1998 and his claims were for:
i. A declaration that the Plaintiffs tide to the house of Rimin Gado at R/Gado Local Government is valid and subsisting.
ii. A declaration that the purported sale of the Plaintiffs house to the Defendant is illegal, null, void and of no effect.
iii. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant whether by themselves, their servants, agents, privies or whatsoever from trespassing or interfering with the Plaintiffs title and exclusive possession of the said house.

The Appellant counterclaimed against the Respondent as follows:
i. A declaration that the Defendant has acquired tide over the house situate at Rigiyar Malamai, Bakin Kasuwa in Rimin Gado Town, Rimin Gado Local Government of Kano State by an offer conditional upon the expiration of a stated time, the consideration having been initially agreed upon.
ii. A declaration that the Plaintiff’s title to the said house has in fact been terminated by the acceptance of the said offer by the Defendant.
iii. A declaration that the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is that of sale and not pledge.
iv. A declaration that the sale between the Plaintiff and Defendant is valid and subsisting.
v. A declaration that the collection of rent by the Defendant is valid, legal and effective, the Defendant having bought the house from the Plaintiff.
vi. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Plaintiff whether by himself, servants, agent, privies whatsoever from trespassing or interfering with the Defendant’s title to the said house.
vii. An order compelling the Plaintiff to collect the balance of N85,000.00 from the Defendant as full and final settlement of this agreed consideration for the house.
viii. General damages.

From the case presented by the parties before the lower Court, it was an agreed fact that there was a transaction between the Appellant and the Respondent in respect of a house belonging to the Respondent lying and being at Rijiyar Malamai, Bakin Kasuwa in Rimin Gado Town, Rimin Gado Local Government of Kano State and whereby the Appellant gave the Respondent the sum of N15,000.00. The dispute before the lower Court was as to the nature of the transaction; while the Respondent alleged that he borrowed the said sum from the Appellant and for which he pledged his said house, it was the case of the Appellant that the sum was part payment of the agreed purchase price of N100,000.00 for the sale of the house.

The matter proceeded to trial and in the course of which the Respondent called four witnesses in proof of his case while the Appellant called three witnesses in proof of his case and there was evidence before the lower Court that the Appellant had since entered into possession of the house and had let same to tenants. At the conclusion of trial, the lower Court agreed with the case of Respondent and it entered judgment in his favour. The lower Court directed the Respondent to pay the sum of N20,000.00 to the Appellant in redemption of the pledge within two weeks and it ordered the Appellant to vacate the property in question and surrender same thereof to the Respondent within thirty days. The Appellant was dissatisfied with the judgment and he caused his Counsel to file a notice of appeal dated the 25th of August, 2003 against it. The notice of appeal contained four grounds of appeal.

In agitating the case of the Appellant on this appeal, his Counsel filed a brief of arguments dated the 5th of February, 2007 and the brief was deemed properly filed by this Court on the 25th of Jun e, 2009. The Respondent did not file a brief of arguments in response.
It is trite that the failure of a respondent to file a brief of arguments does not relieve an appellant of the onus of showing that the appeal should be allowed on the grounds canvassed because the judgment of a trial Court is valid and subsisting until set aside by an appellate Court and the arguments of Counsel are not binding on the Court; the Court must still assess the arguments – Eya Vs Olopade (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt.1259) 505, Independent National Electoral Commission Vs Nyako (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt 1262) 439 and Akila Vs Director General, State Security Service (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1392) 443.

At the hearing of the appeal on the 19th of March, 2014 both the Appellant and the Respondent and their respective Counsel were absent from Court despite service of hearing notice on them. This Court deemed the Appellant’s brief of arguments, which was settled by I. N. Ambule Esq., as having been argued under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 9(4) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2011.

Counsel to the Appellant distilled two issues for determination in the brief of arguments and these were:
i. Whether the learned trial Judge was wrong when he gave judgment to the Respondent based upon Exhibit 1-1A without the consideration of the defence witnesses’ evidence before it, in spite of the fact that Exhibits 1-1A are weightless.
ii. Whether the trial Judge was wrong when he ordered the discharge of the DW3 after his examination-in-chief and cross-examination without the opportunity for the re-examination of the DW3 by the Appellant’s Counsel.

The two issues shall be resolved separately. On the first issue for determination, Counsel to the Appellant stated that civil cases are decided on a preponderance of evidence and that in deciding in whose favour evidence preponderates on any given issue, the lower Court has a duty to consider the totality of the legally admissible evidence before it, ascribe probative value to it and put it on an imaginary scale to determine where the balance tilts. Counsel stated that the weight of evidence that would preponderate in a case is evidence that can be described as being substantial and that it is such evidence that will justify the findings for the proponent of a case and as such the case of a plaintiff in any given matter must preponderate so sufficiently on credible evidence as to satisfy a finding in his favour. Counsel referred to the cases of Mogaji vs Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91, Kalejaiye vs Ogundana (2002) FWLR (Pt 85) 297, amongst others. Counsel thereafter referred to the statement of the lower Court in the judgment that the document made in Hausa and English languages and tendered as Exhibit 1-1A was unimpeachable and to the testimony of the Appellant on the making of the document and stated that the lower Court placed heavy reliance on the exhibit and it ignored the testimony of the Appellant to the effect that he was only lettered in Arabic language and not in Western alphabets. Counsel stated that the finding of the lower Court that the exhibit was unimpeachable was not correct and that the lower Court did not properly evaluate the evidence led by the defence witnesses and that if the lower Court had done so, it would have come to a different conclusion. Counsel urged this Court to resolve the first issue for determination in favour of the Appellant.

The complaint of the Appellant on this issue for determination is that the lower Court did not properly evaluate the evidence led by the defence witnesses at the trial before making the finding that the document tendered by the Respondent as Exhibits 1-1A was unimpeachable. Now, a trial Court has two duties in respect of the evidence led by parties in a trial. The first is to receive into its records all the relevant evidence, and this is called perception. The second is to thereafter weigh the evidence in the con of the surrounding circumstances, and this is evaluation. A finding of fact by a trial Court involves both perception and evaluation – Guardian Newspapers Ltd Vs Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1256) 574, Nacenn Nigeria Ltd vs Bewac Automotive Producers Ltd (2011) 11 NWLR (Pt.1257) 193, Wachukwu Vs. Owunwanne (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt.1266) 1, Lafia Local Government Vs The Executive Governor of Nasarawa State (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt.1328) 94.

It is trite that it is the primary responsibility of a trial court to evaluate the evidence presented by parties before it, ascribe probative value to the evidence and then come up with a decision. This is regulated by time honoured procedure designed to mete out justice to both parties before the court. The procedure is crucial in its observance. The trial court is enjoined to place the totality of the testimonies of both parties on an imaginary scale. One side of the scale will contain the evidence of the plaintiff while the other side will harbor the evidence of the defendant. The court must then weigh them together to see which side is heavier than the other. This is in terms of quality, not quantity. To help the court in this regard, it should consider whether the evidence led by a party in its totality is relevant, admissible, credible, conclusive and more probable than that adduced by the other party. Once these considerations fall into line, the court will then apply the relevant Laws to the facts or evidence adduced. In order to reach a decision – Mogaji vs Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91, Adeleke vs Iyanda (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.729) 1, Okoko Vs Dakolo (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 401, Tippi Vs Notani (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt 1249) 285, Momoh vs Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt.1270) 217.

In deliberating on the respective cases of the parties, the lower Court in the judgment summarized the testimonies of the plaintiff witnesses and of the defence witnesses and proceeded thus:
“Now the issue for determination is the title to the house in dispute in relation to whether the plaintiff sold it to the defendant or pledged it. In the plaintiffs attempt to prove that it was not a sale, he testified and tendered Exhibit 1 in Hausa but translated into English as Exhibit 1A it goes thus:
‘4-9-96.
I, A. Rabiu hereby pledge my house to Mallam Salihu Alaramma. The house is neighbouring his house at the sum of N15,000.00 (Fifteen Thousand Naira only) and I promise to sell the house to him on 4/12/96.

This agreement is made in the presence of the following witnesses:-
1. Mallam Haruna Na’ibi.
2. Mallam Sani Iliyasau.
3. Maje Dangi
4. Alhaji Lawan Ahmad

Signed                        Signed
………………            ………………
A. Rabiu                      M. Salihu

The plaintiff testified that he never sold the house and called other witnesses in that regard including PW2 Sani Iliyasu (who attested Exhibit 1), PW3 Haruna Ladan (also a signatory to exhibit 1), PW3 (sic) Lawal Ahmad Rimin Gado, the scribe to District Head who attempted an arbitration between the parties. In fact it is PW3 Lawa Ahmad R/Gado, also a signatory to Exhibit 1 who laid bare the crux of the matter and clearly put the Plaintiff’s case on a solid ground.

In the case for the defendant he testified and admitted to the issue of pledge as well as Exhibit 1 but said he was only literate in Arabic. But a clear examination of Exhibit 1 and show that he signed in a smattering printed form of Roman lettering. The attempt to impeach Exhibit 1 therefore fails on the score.

As regards his remaining two witnesses, DW2, Mohd Sani and DW3 Iliyasu Ali, their testimony completely failed to impeach Exhibit 1 by showing if DW1 was tricked into executing it. This being the case, I uphold Exhibit 1 in its entirety. In fact there is no weight to be attached to the evidence of DW3 Iliyasu Ali who was so incompetent as to fail to recall the home of his grandmother through whom he alleged he was related to the plaintiff.

In the light of the absolute validity of Exhibit 1 establishing a pledge, with a promise to sell at a future date, the pledge remains perpetually redeemable and promise being why a promise cannot ground an order of specific performance’ as only an action for award of damages remains open to the defendant on the promise, and I so hold, and I therefore dismiss the defendant counter claim for declaration dated 29/12/98. In the end I hereby find for the plaintiff as per his writ of summons and order him to pay N20,000.00 to the defendant within 2 weeks from today while the defendant shall surrender possession of the house to the plaintiff within 30 days of today.”

It cannot be contested that, in the above quoted portion of the judgment, the lower Court carried out an evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties on Exhibit 1-1A. It is obvious that in considering the evidence and upholding the sanctity of Exhibit 1-1A and placing reliance on it, the lower Court only acted in accordance with some firmly established principles of law. It is settled law that parties are bound by the contract they voluntarily entered into and cannot act outside the terms and conditions contained in the contract and neither of the parties to a contract can after or read into a written agreement a term which is not embodied in it – African International Bank Ltd Vs Integrated Dimensional System Ltd (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1328) 1, Lagos State Government Vs Toluwase (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt 1336) 555.

Further, the reliance placed by the lower Court on Exhibit 1-1A to debunk the oral testimonies of the defence witnesses accords with the legal principle that says that where parties present oral evidence and documentary evidence, the latter should be used as a hanger from which to assess the credibility of the oral evidence and a trial Court should lean in favour of the party with the documentary evidence – Bunge Vs The Governor of Rivers State (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt 995) 573, Egharevba Vs Osagie (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt 1173) 299, Cameroon Airlines vs Otutuizu (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt.1238) 512. The submission of Counsel to the Appellant that the lower Court did not properly evaluate the testimonies of the defence witnesses is thus not correct.

A decision of a Court is said to be perverse (a) when it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings; or (b) where it has been shown that the trial court took account of matters which it ought not to have taken into account or shut its eyes to the obvious; or (c) when such a decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice; or (d) when the circumstance of the finding of facts in the decision are most unreasonable – Onu Vs Idu (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt 995) 657, Momoh Vs Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt.1270) 217. Counsel to the Appellant did not show that the judgment of the lower Court was characterized by any of these anomalies. This court cannot thus tamper with the evaluation of evidence carried out by the lower Court and/or with the finding made therefrom. The first issue for determination is resolved against the Appellant.

On the second issue for determination, Counsel to the Appellant stated that by virtue of the provision of section 189(3) of the Evidence Act (applicable at the times material to this suit) the Appellant counsel had a right to re-examine the third defence witness after the conclusion of his cross-examination and that there was nothing on the records showing that the Appellant’s Counsel was afforded that opportunity by the lower Court. Counsel stated that each party to a dispute before a Court of law or any other tribunal must be given a fair hearing and that fair hearing means adequate opportunity given to a party to present his case before the court and he referred to the case of Ship Care Ltd Vs Owners of M. V. Fortunato (2003) FWLR (Pt 179) 1238. Counsel stated that the Appellant, in the instance case, was not given an adequate and/or equal opportunity to present his case as the Respondent at the lower Court because he was not allowed to re-examine the third defence witness, and that perhaps facts might have emerged which could have enable the lower Court come to a different conclusion. Counsel stated that the Appellant was denied fair hearing and that this occasioned a miscarriage of justice and he referred to the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution and the case of Aji Vs Chad Basin Development Authority (2004) All FWLR (Pt.237) 424 on the right of a party to fair hearing and stated further that if one of the parties to a matter is refused or denied a hearing or is not given an opportunity of being heard, such hearing cannot qualify as fair hearing under the audi alteram partem rule; he referred to the case of Olumesan vs Ogundepo (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.433) 628. Counsel urged this Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant.

The concept of fair hearing adumbrated under this issue for determination is the same as fair trial and it entails so much in the judicial process. As a matter of law, it is the pivot upon which the entire judicial process or the administration of justice revolves. It is the keystone of the trial process as no trial can be sustained unless it accords with the principles of fair hearing, which also involves the twin common law rules of natural justice rules, audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua – Emerah Vs Chiekwe (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt 462) 536, Okeke vs Nwokoye (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt. 635) 495.
Fair hearing postulates that where a person’s legal rights or obligations are called into question, he should be accorded full opportunity to be heard before any adverse decision is taken against him with regard to such rights or obligations. It is an indispensable requirement of justice that an adjudicating authority, to be fair and just, shall hear both sides, giving them ample opportunity to present their case. Accordingly, a hearing can only be said to be fair when, inter alia, all the parties to the dispute are given a hearing of an opportunity of a hearing. If one of the parties is refused or denied a hearing or is not given an opportunity to be heard, such hearing cannot qualify as a fair hearing under the audi alteram partem rule – Otapo v. Sunmonu (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt 58) 587, Gakus Vs Jos International Breweries Ltd (1991) 6 NWLR 1Pt 199) 614, Olumesan Vs Ogundepo (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt 433) 628.

This right to be heard is so fundamental a principle of our adjudicatory process that it cannot be compromised on any ground – Nwokoro Vs Onuma (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 136) 22 at 35, Iwuoha Vs Okoroike (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt 429) 231, Olufeagba Vs Abdul-Raheem (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt 1173) 384. It is perhaps to underscore the inviolability of this right of a party to a dispute to fair hearing that a provision guaranteeing the right to every citizen of this country is firmly ensconced in section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Hence, fair hearing is not only a common law right but also a constitutional right – Bamgboye vs University of Ilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt 622) 290, Agip (Nig) Ltd Vs Agip Petroli International & Ors (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt 1187) 348, Agbiti Vs Nigerian Navy (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt 1236) 175.
The right to fair hearing does not, however, exist in absolute terms. The concept of fair hearing postulates that it is the duty of a Court to create a conducive environment and atmosphere for a party to enjoy his right to fair hearing, but it does not say that it is part of the duty of the Court to make sure that the party takes advantage of the atmosphere or environment so created to exercise his right to far hearing. It is not part of the business of a Court to compel a party to exercise his right to fair hearing. Where a party fails, refuses or neglects to take advantage of or utilize the environment created by a Court to exercise his right of fair hearing he cannot turn around to complain of lack of fair hearing – Independent National Electoral Commission Vs Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt 806) 72, Dantata Vs Mohammed (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt 1302) 366, National Films & Video Censors Board Vs Adegboyega (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt.1307) 45. The question whether a party has been afforded an opportunity to exercise his right of fair hearing depends upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and the test to be applied in each case is an objective one based on the impression of a reasonable and fair minded observer at the trial – Action Congress of Nigeria Vs Lamido (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt 1303) 560 and Eastern Breweries Plc, Awo Omamma Vs Nwokoro (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt 1321) 488, Akila Vs Director General, State Security Service (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt 1392) 443.

The complaint of the Appellant in this appeal is that he was not afforded an opportunity by the lower Court to re-examine the third defence witness after cross-examination by the Respondent’s Counsel. It is not in question that re-examination of a witness after cross-examination by the adversary is a right that enures in the party that called the witness but it is a right which is not compulsory for a party to exercise, and where a party elects to exercise the right, he cannot be denied by a trial Court. Thus, before a party can complain of denial of right of re-examination it must be evident from the records of appeal or from some other document that the party indeed elected to re-examine the witness and the lower Court refused to grant him the opportunity to do so. The denial of right of re-examination cannot be assumed. Looking at the proceedings on the testimony of the third defence witness in the records of appeal, there is nothing to suggest that the counsel to the Appellant at any time after the cross-examination erected to re-examine the witness and/or protested the discharge of the witness by the rower court after the cross-examination without being allowed to re-examine. Rather what it showed was that after the cross-examination and discharge of the witness, Counsel to the Appellant applied for an adjournment to call two more witnesses. A read through the trial proceedings in the lower Court in the records of appeal show that the trial suffered several adjournments by reason of the absence of the Appellant and his counsel from court. The records show that after the close the Respondent’s case, the Appellant and his Counsel eventually showed up and that the Appellant testified as the first defence witness and thereafter sought for an adjournment for further trial. On the next adjourned date the Appellant and his counsel were absent from court whereupon the lower Court closed the case of the Appellant and set the matter down for judgment. The lower Court delivered the judgment as scheduled and the Appellant subsequently filed an application to have the judgment set aside and to be allowed to reopen his case to call further evidence. The lower Court granted the requests and reopened the case of the Appellant. The Appellant called two more witnesses and thereafter sought for an adjournment to call another two witnesses. The matter was adjourned five times for the Appellant to call his further witnesses and it was when it was obvious that he was not forthcoming with the witnesses that the lower Court adjourned the matter for judgment. It is clear from the records that the Appellant was given an adequate and a more preferential opportunity than the Respondent to present his case by the lower Court and the impression of a reasonable and fair minded observer at the trial will have is that the Appellant was accorded a fair hearing. The assertion of the Appellant on fair hearing was puerile and baseless. The second issue for determination is resolved against the Appellant.

In conclusion, this Court finds that this appeal is completely devoid of merit and it is hereby dismissed. The judgment of the Kano State High Court in Suit No. K/275/1998 delivered by Honorable Justice M. A. Haliru on the 24th of July 2003 is affirmed. These shall be the orders of this Court.

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading the lead judgment of my learned brother, H. A. O. ABIRU, JCA, just delivered. I agree with his conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed. I too dismiss same.

I also abide by the consequential orders contained in the lead judgment.

ITA G. MBABA, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading the lead judgment of my learned brother, H.A.O. ABIRU JCA, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion on the issues, that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

I too dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.

Appearances

No appearance for the partiesFor Appellant

AND

For Respondent