ALHAJI NUHU AYINLA v. MR. BOBSON EMMANUEL AKINNULI & ANOR (2012)

ALHAJI NUHU AYINLA v. MR. BOBSON EMMANUEL AKINNULI & ANOR

(2012)LCN/5536(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 5th day of July, 2012

CA/L/288A/2006

RATIO

PROCEDURE: REQUIREMENT FOR INITIATING A PROCESS

In Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR Pt. 1043 Pg. 521, the Supreme Court was quite emphatic on the interpretation of section of 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act. At page 531 of the NWLR, Onnoghen JSC held unequivocally that the combined effect of section 2 (1) and section 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act is that the name of a practitioner must be on the roll to enable him practice as a barrister and solicitor or for the purpose of any particular office proceeding since the law is that for a person to be qualified to practice as a legal practitioner he must have his name on the roll. Thus a law firm is not a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll and cannot therefore practice as such by signing documents which would be filed as process in the Nigerian court. As a practical point how do you determine which counsel’s signature is on the process, without calling oral evidence?

In the recent authority of SLB Consortium v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR Pt. 1252 Pg. 317 and Oketade v. Adewumi (2010) 8 NWLR Pt. 1195 Pg. 63 at 74 that point was settled beyond paradventure. In Oketade v. Adewumi at Pg. 74 of the NWLR the Supreme Court held that where a process is issued in the name of a firm and not in the name of a legal practitioner, it is not a mere technicality that can be trashed aside. It is fundamental to the judicial process. Such process is incompetent, invalid, null and void.

Also in SLB Consortium Ltd v. NNPC, the Supreme Court after emphasizing the importance of jurisdiction as a threshold issue and citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 held that a court can only be competent where the case coming up before the court was initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that a process prepared and filed in a court of law by a legal practitioner must be signed by the legal practitioner and it is sufficient signature if the legal practitioner simply writes his own name over and above the name of his firm in which he carries out his practice. The practitioner may write or stamp his own name on top of the firms’ name. The court held that a signature without a name is incurably bad. Rhodes-Vivour JSC said emphatically that all processes filed in court are to be signed as follows: (a) First signature of counsel (b) second – full name of counsel clearly written (c) Third – who counsel represents (d) finally name and address of law firm. See also the recent case of First Bank v. Maiwada SC/204/2002 delivered on 25th May 2012. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.

JURISDICTION: WHEN CAN THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION BE RAISED

It is trite that an issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time before judgment and even on appeal. There is no doubt that competence is an essential element of jurisdiction. See Sokoto State Government v. Kamdex Nig Ltd (2007) 3 SCNJ Pg. 94; (2007) 7 NWLR Pt. 1034 Pg. 466; FRIN v. Gold (2007) 11 NWLR Pt. 1044 Pg. 1. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.

DAMAGES: DISTINCTION BETWEEN GENERAL DAMAGES AND SPECIAL DAMAGES

The position of the law is that general damages relate to all items of loss which the Plaintiff is not required to specify in his pleadings in order to permit proof and recovery in respect of them at trial. However, special damages relate to all items of loss which must be specified by the Plaintiff before they may be proved and recovery granted. See Professor Akinkugbe v. Ewulum Holdings (2008) 12 NWLR Pt. 1098 Pg. 375; R. O. Iyere v. Bendel Feed & Flour (2008) 12 NWLR Pt. 1119 Pg. 300. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.

RELIEF: EFFECT OF A RELIEF THAT DOES NOT REFLECT THE CAUSE OF ACTION

It is a settled position of the law that where a relief does not reflect the cause of action and the available evidence a court of law will throw out the matter. See Uzuokwu v. Ezeonu II (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) at Pages 784 – 785 paras G-C. PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.

WORDS AND PHRASES: MEANING OF AN ISSUE

JUSTICES

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ALHAJI NUHU AYINLA Appellant(s)

AND

MR. BOBSON EMMANUEL AKINNULI & ANOR Respondent(s)

HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Lagos State presided over by Abiru J. delivered on the 9th May 2005. The Appellant as 1st Defendant at the trial court appealed against the judgment. This is a sister appeal to the one filed as CA/L/288/06. The facts that led to this appeal are as follows:
Both the Appellant and 1st Respondent traced origin of their titles to a common grantor – the 2nd Respondent.  The property subject matter of this action is a row of fourteen (14) shops at plot 210, Lagos Badagry Expressway.
The case of the Appellant on the pleadings and evidence is that, he was originally a tenant in the block of shops owned by the 2nd Respondent. He had been a tenant since 1993. However, in 1997, he purchased the shops from the 2nd Respondent. He was issued with a purchase receipt and a Deed of Assignment was executed in his favour.  The purchase receipt and Deed of Assignment both made in 1997 were tendered and admitted as “Exhibits D1 and D2”. He subsequently put tenants in the shops.
The case of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent as can be gathered from the pleadings and evidence is that, in 1999, he purchased the property known as plot No. 210, Lagos/Badagry Expressway. According to the Plaintiff/1st Respondent, the said property comprised of six flats with a row of fourteen shops. Exhibit P2, P5 and P6 were given to him as evidence of the fact that he had purchased the aforementioned property.
In proving his case, Plaintiff called three witnesses, while the defence (put together) called five witnesses. At the end of the day, the learned trial judge granted in part the claim of the Claimant, and dismissed the counter-claim of the Appellant. Appellant, being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment has now appealed to this court.
The Appellant filed an amended notice of appeal on 1st February 2011. The successful party at the lower court also filed a notice of cross appeal on 5th February 2010. The cross appeal was filed by the Claimant/Cross Appellant against the judgment of Justice H.A.O. Abiru of the High Court of Lagos, Lagos State dated 9th of May 2005 for awarding an extremely low sum of N=100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira only) as the general damages to the Claimant/Cross Appellant and for declining jurisdiction on Claimant/Cross Appellant’s second relief.
The Appellant’s counsel identified 4 issues for determination as follows:
“1. Whether the 1st Respondent’s writ of summons and statement of claim signed by Rhodes & Rhodes were not incompetent. Ground 1 of the Amended notice of appeal;
2. Whether Appellant proved purchase of the 14 shops from the 2nd Defendant and if so, whether, the learned trial judge was not in error in dismissing the counter-claim of the Appellant; grounds 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10;
3. Whether the 2nd Defendant, having sold the 14 shops to the Appellant in 1997, she still had any title to convey to the Plaintiff in 1999 and whether in the face of want of title in the 2nd Defendant, Plaintiff was entitled to any declaration of title to the 14 shops; grounds 15 and 17; and
4. Whether the learned trial judge was not in error in adjudging the Appellant a trespasser on a parcel of land which belong to him and for which he was in possession. Ground 16.
The above issues 2-4 of the Appellant’s brief was also adopted by the 1st Respondent. The 2nd Respondent also adopted the  Appellant’s issues as formulated.
I have crystallized the relevant issues germaine to the determination of the appeal as follows:

APPEAL
1. Whether the 1st Respondent’s writ of summons and statement of claim signed by Rhodes and Rhodes were not incompetent (Appeal)
2. Whether the 2nd Defendant/2nd Respondent having sold the 14 shops to the 1st Defendant/Appellant in 1997, she still had any title to convey to the Plaintiff/1st Respondent in 1999 and whether in the face of want of title in the 2nd Respondent, the 1st Respondent was entitled to any declaration of title to the 14 shops. (Appeal)
Please note that issues 2 and 4 of the Appellants are subsumed in issues 1 and 3 and an answer to issues 1 and 3 suffices to answer all complaints raised by the Appellant.

I have painstakingly set out the relevant issues in order to highlight what are the relevant issues in controversy in this appeal calling for our opinion. However, the 2nd issue for determination by the Appellant is an issue that has been thoroughly thrashed in the sister appeal CA/L/288/06. This court had concluded on the merit of that point and found that the finding of the trial court was right to the effect that the 1st Respondent herein was the lawful owner of all the land he claimed and granted declaration of title to both the story building and the shops adjourning same to him. It would amount to vain repetition to repeat our findings and reasons in this appeal. It will be a waste of precious judicial time.
However, the first issue for determination identified by the Appellant will be determined. If the court finds that the lower court had jurisdiction then all other issues would be considered. If not, there ends the issues raised in this appeal. It would be of no use to condescend to determine the other issues which have already been determined.

ISSUE ONE
On this issues, learned Appellant’s counsel argued that the 1st Respondents’ writ of summons and statement of claim upon which the trial court gave its judgment which is on page 1-4 and page 105 – 106 of the record are defective since the 1st Respondent’s counsel signed the writ of summons, original statement of claim and amended statement of claim as “Rhodes & Rhodes” and not in the name of a legal practitioner contemplated by sections 2 and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act. He submitted that the incompetence in the writ and statement of claim robes the court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He cited Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 19 WRN 1; Ogunchie v. Mba (1994) 4 NWLR Pt. 336 Pg. 75 at 86.
In the 1st Respondent’s brief filed on 20th November 2009, the learned counsel adopted only three of the four issues identified by the Appellant. Therefore only three issues were taken cognisanze of by the 1st Respondent. He conveniently ignored the most important issue which is the one based on the competence of the court to entertain the action. If he, like an ostrich will bury his head in the sand while his huge body is showing, and pretend that he is hiding from prying eyes, we cannot. The Appellant’s counsel has raised a valid question of jurisdiction which we cannot ignore if the 1st Respondent’s counsel can. The 2nd Respondent’s counsel did not also address this issue of jurisdiction.
In Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR Pt. 1043 Pg. 521, the Supreme Court was quite emphatic on the interpretation of section of 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act. At page 531 of the NWLR, Onnoghen JSC held unequivocally that the combined effect of section 2 (1) and section 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act is that the name of a practitioner must be on the roll to enable him practice as a barrister and solicitor or for the purpose of any particular office proceeding since the law is that for a person to be qualified to practice as a legal practitioner he must have his name on the roll. Thus a law firm is not a legal practitioner whose name is on the roll and cannot therefore practice as such by signing documents which would be filed as process in the Nigerian court. As a practical point how do you determine which counsel’s signature is on the process, without calling oral evidence?
In the recent authority of SLB Consortium v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR Pt. 1252 Pg. 317 and Oketade v. Adewumi (2010) 8 NWLR Pt. 1195 Pg. 63 at 74 that point was settled beyond paradventure. In Oketade v. Adewumi at Pg. 74 of the NWLR the Supreme Court held that where a process is issued in the name of a firm and not in the name of a legal practitioner, it is not a mere technicality that can be trashed aside. It is fundamental to the judicial process. Such process is incompetent, invalid, null and void.
Also in SLB Consortium Ltd v. NNPC, the Supreme Court after emphasizing the importance of jurisdiction as a threshold issue and citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 held that a court can only be competent where the case coming up before the court was initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that a process prepared and filed in a court of law by a legal practitioner must be signed by the legal practitioner and it is sufficient signature if the legal practitioner simply writes his own name over and above the name of his firm in which he carries out his practice. The practitioner may write or stamp his own name on top of the firms’ name. The court held that a signature without a name is incurably bad. Rhodes-Vivour JSC said emphatically that all processes filed in court are to be signed as follows: (a) First signature of counsel (b) second – full name of counsel clearly written (c) Third – who counsel represents (d) finally name and address of law firm. See also the recent case of First Bank v. Maiwada SC/204/2002 delivered on 25th May 2012.

Let us look at the processes being attacked by this appeal. The offending writ of summons is on page 2 of the Record and was said to have been issued by Rhodes and Rhodes and signed with a flourish by an unnamed person on 25th June 2002. The original statement of claim of 25th June 2002 is on page 3-4 and signed by an unknown person over the name of the firm of Rhodes & Rhodes. The amended statement of claim on page 46-48 suffer from exactly the same virus. They were not signed by any legal practitioner known to law and are therefore incompetent and incapable of actuating or setting up the court’s jurisdiction to hear any legal issues therefrom.
This issue gave me some anxious moments. The writ in this case was issued on 25th June 2002 – about 10 years ago. The case was heard on the merit and judgment delivered on the merit since 2005. The two appeals were filed since 2006 by all the parties. It has been taken on the merit in respect of the sister appeal No CA/L/288/2006, the findings and orders of the learned trial judge were upheld. Now this lethal issue has cropped up which goes to the jurisdiction of the trial judge. It is trite that an issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time before judgment and even on appeal. There is no doubt that competence is an essential element of jurisdiction. See Sokoto State Government v. Kamdex Nig Ltd (2007) 3 SCNJ Pg. 94; (2007) 7 NWLR Pt. 1034 Pg. 466; FRIN v. Gold (2007) 11 NWLR Pt. 1044 Pg. 1. In this case, the Appellant sought and obtained leave on 26th January 2011 to raise and argue this fresh issue on appeal. Now what do we do in view of the fact that this case has been taken at two tiers of court on the merit. The answer sadly is clear. It is sad because precious judicial time has been wasted and litigants have wasted time and financial resources. Oguntade JSC addressed this point on page 534 NWLR of the report in the judgment in Okafor v. Nweke. The point was made in that case that it would be an unnecessary adherence to technicality to anull the process. His Lordship observed that the issue raised is not a question of disobedience or non compliance with court rules which may be waived, deemed waived by counsel or with persuation waived by the courts. His Lordship stated that we are obliged to ensure that our substantive laws are strictly enforced and observed. It only stands to reason and good sense. No objection on substantial law can be waived by either party. Having held thus, I am constrained to strike out the writ of summons and statement of claim filed by the 1st Respondent as Plaintiff at the trial court. Having struck out the said processes, the proceedings on which they were based is also null and void and of no effect whatsoever. So also is whatever the merit of all appeals emanating from the null proceedings of the trial court. This issue is resolved in favour of the Appellant.

CROSS APPEAL
In the cross appeal, the Cross Appellant identified 2 issues for determination stated below:
“1. Whether the sum of N=100,000.00 (one hundred thousand Naira only) awarded as the general damages against the 1st Respondent is not extremely low to warrant the intervention of the appellate court.
2 Whether the learned trial judge was right to have declined jurisdiction on the 2nd relief of the Cross Appellant/Claimant. GROUND 1.
The 1st Cross Respondent and 2nd Cross Respondent agreed essentially on the issues as identified by the Cross Appellant already set out above.
The first issue raised is as to the quantum of general damages awarded against the 1st Cross/Respondent which cross appeal complained is too low. Learned Cross Appellant’s counsel argued that the Cross Appellant succeeded on his claim of ownership of the entire property known as No. 210, Badagry Expressway, Ojo, Lagos. The Respondents failed to establish their counter claim on the ownership of the row of 14 shops which forms part of property known as 210, Badagry Expressway, Ojo, lagos. See page 296 and paragraph 3 of page 318 of the record of appeal. The 1st Respondent testified that he had collected the rent of the said 14 row of shops from the time the Cross Appellant purchased the property in July, 1999 till the time of judgment in May 2005.
The Cross Appellant/Claimant had by his amended statement of claim claimed the sum of N5,000,000.00 (five million naira only) as general damages for trespass of 1st and 2nd Respondents jointly and severally. See pages 105 -106 of the record of appeal.
The trial judge by his judgment found 1st Respondent a trespasser on the row of shops since the Cross Appellant became the owner in July 1999 but awarded only of N100,000.00 (one hundred thousand Naira) only against him.
On this issue, the learned counsel for the 1st Cross Respondent replied that an award of general damages claimed by the Cross Appellant is within the discretion of the court and the court is obliged to grant general damages not as restituo in intergrum but on a presumption of the consequence of the act complained of. The Cross Appellant claimed general damages and the court cannot award special damages. He cited Oseyomon v. Ojo (1997) 52 LRCN Pg 2100; Comm for Works Benue v. Devcom Ltd (1988) 3 NWLR Pt. 83 Pg. 420; Ladejobi v. Oshodipa (1989) 1 NWLR Pt. 99 Pg. 610.
We can see that the 2nd Cross Respondent raised essentially the same arguments in defence as the 1st Cross Respondent. Let us look at 4th leg of the reliefs claimed by the Cross Appellant at the trial court which was stated as follows:
“An award of N=5,000,000.00 (five Million Naira) only as general damages from (sic) trespass from the 1st and 2nd Defendants jointly and severally.”
There is no doubt that the case put up by the Cross Appellant in the pleadings and the evidence at the trial court was one for general rather than special damages. The Cross Appellant is bound by his pleadings and evidence and cannot on appeal seek to make a case that was not made at the trial court. See Comm Benue v. Devcom supra.

It is a settled position of the law that a court ought not to award what is not claimed and accordingly a party claiming specific damages must say so clearly and unambiguously and the pleadings thereto must leave nothing to chance.
Learned counsel in the Cross Appellant’s brief referred to various deposition in some motions particularly a counter affidavit. That evidence with respect cannot take place of specific averments claiming special damages in the pleadings and evidence led on oath in proof of such averments.
The position of the law is that general damages relate to all items of loss which the Plaintiff is not required to specify in his pleadings in order to permit proof and recovery in respect of them at trial. However, special damages relate to all items of loss which must be specified by the Plaintiff before they may be proved and recovery granted. See Professor Akinkugbe v. Ewulum Holdings (2008) 12 NWLR Pt. 1098 Pg. 375; R. O. Iyere v. Bendel Feed & Flour (2008) 12 NWLR Pt. 1119 Pg. 300.
I must reiterate that the Cross Appellant did not plead or prove special damages which would be the specific amount of the whole rents lost by him from the acts of the adjudged trespasser. In the circumstances, the trial judge was right to have exercised its discretion to award only N=100,000.00 as general damages as claimed by the Cross Appellant. The trial judge in such a situation is only obliged to compensate the Claimant for general inconvenience suffered as a result of the trespass. If the Claimant wanted restitution, he should have claimed special damages. This issue is resolved in favour of the 1st Cross/Respondent.

ISSUE TWO
The Claimant had by his amended statement of claim dated 9th of February, 2005 claimed for:
“An order directing the 2nd Defendant or in her stead, the Chief Registrar of the High Court of Lagos State to sign a “Deed of Rectification” to incorporate a new survey plan to rectify the survey plan No. SJA/095/92/L annexed to the Statutory Right of Occupancy registered as No. 55 at page 55 in Volume 1998L at the land registry, Alausa and Deed of Assignment registered as No. 77 at page 77 in Volume 2055″ as his second relief.
Learned Cross Appellant’s counsel argued that the 2nd Cross Respondent had made it an issue in her statement of defence as 2nd Defendant at the trial court by stating at paragraphs 13 (iii) & (iv) thus:
“(iii) The shops which are incorporated in the latter agreement fell outside the certificate of occupancy No. 89/89/2003D and Certificate of Occupancy No. 53/53/1998L are unrelated to and far away from the property situate at and known as No. 210 Lagos Badagry Expressway, Ojo, Lagos State.”
Counsel argued that since it appeared that the vendor had given him a wrong or defective survey plan he was entitled to have it rectified by an order of court. Learned counsel for 1st Cross Respondent argued that the issue of relief on the rectification of Deed came after the institution of the suit, subject matter of this appeal which relief maintains its distinct cause of action. The Cross Appellant’s amended statement of claim dated 9th February 2005 is devoid of any fact to justify the grant of relief 2 (rectification).
Learned counsel or 2nd Cross Respondent argued that furthermore, the grant, revocation, amendment or rectification of a statutory right of occupancy is within the exclusive preserve of the Governor of Lagos State. The discretion to review or rectify is ministerial and not judicial or quasi judicial. The court cannot get involved in the rectification of a C of O as such requests are to be directed to the Governor.
He cited C.G.G. Nig Ltd V. Asaagbara (2000) FWLR Pt. 17 Pg. 119 to support the submission that a court cannot confer or assume jurisdiction it does not possess.
The learned trial judge in refusing the said second relief of the Claimant/Cross Appellant held that he did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on a claim which has not formed part of the issue before him. The rationale for his conclusion was that there was nowhere in the pleadings where the parties joined issue on whether or not the survey plan attached to the 2nd Defendant/Respondent’s certificate of occupancy, Exhibit P7, was faulty and as such deserving of rectification.
I have to agree on a close examination that the pleadings of the Cross Appellant mainly address the original reliefs 1- 4 which are contingent upon facts bordering on the Cross Appellant’s right to a declaration of the to the disputed land and not on rectification of a defective survey plan.
In other words, the relief 2 in contention does not reflect any cause of action and at the same time fall short of the requisite facts in the Cross Appellant’s pleading to justify its grant. Although the issue of defect in the survey plan came up in the process of giving evidence by the Cross Appellant’s expert witness, the Cross Appellant nonetheless never deemed it fit to amend his pleadings to be in line with the testimony of his witness on record (PW3 – Surveyor.)
It is a settled position of the law that where a relief does not reflect the cause of action and the available evidence a court of law will throw out the matter. See Uzuokwu v. Ezeonu II (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 200) at Pages 784 – 785 paras G-C.
In the same vein, where a party as in the instant case of the Cross Appellant has not pleaded facts to justify the grant of a relief canvassed, both the trial court and the Appellate court will be incompetent to grant the relief. Consequently the court is limited or circumscribed to what it can grant or award on the reliefs sought. See Okolo v. UBN Ltd (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 539) Pg. 646 paras C-D.

Furthermore, the phrase “an issue” was defined by the Supreme Court in Ibori v. Agbi (2004) 6 NWLR Pt. 868 Pg. 78 to mean that question which if decided in favour of the Claimant, will in itself give a right to relief or would but for some other consideration, in itself give a right to a relief and if decided in favour of the Defendant will in itself be a defence. Whether the survey plan attached to Exhibit P7 was correct was never made an issue by the Cross Appellant in his pleadings and evidence and he cannot claim a relief therefrom.
I agree that the relief was properly struck out by the trial judge. I resolve this issue in favour of the Cross Respondents.
Earlier on in this appeal, I resolved the first issue of whether the process initiating the action at the trial court was competent in the negative and against the Respondents and consequently struck out the writ of summons and statement of claim. The effect of that is that all the other questions determined go to no issue. They were considered merely because this is the penultimate court and the obligation exists to determine all pertinent and burning issues (not repetitive) submitted for determination between the parties. In conclusion, this appeal is allowed.
The judgment of the Lagos State High Court delivered on 9th May 2005 in suit LD/1461/02 is hereby set aside as a nullity. I make no order as to costs.

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.: I read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, JCA just delivered and I agree with him that the Writ of Summons together with the Statement of Claim signed by Rhodes & Rhodes, are incompetent and are liable to be struck out. The Supreme Court in a long time of cases has held that a process signed by a law firm is incompetent since the law firm was not called to the bar but a legal practitioner. It follows that the Writ of Summons and the Statement of Claim signed by Rhodes & Rhodes in this case are incompetent. See Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 3 SC (Pt.2) 55 at 66 – 67; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 4 SC (Pt.1) 86.
Consequently, the said Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim are hereby struck out. I abide by all the consequential orders made in the lead judgment, that relating to costs, inclusive.

SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.: I had the great honour of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother OGUNWUMIJU JCA. which I am in complete agreement with. I just will add a word of my own.
The issue of defective originating processes signed by a legal practitioner not known to law is one finally settled by the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The suit becomes incompetent, and thus robs the court in which it is placed, the jurisdiction to hear it. See Okafor v. Nwoke (2007) 3 SC (P.11) 53 at 66 – 67; Ogundele v. Agiri & Ors. (2009) 12 SC (Pt.1) 135 at 165 – 166; Oketade v. Adewunmi (2010) 2 – 3 SC (Pt.1) 140 at 147; 1st Bank of Nig. Plc v. Alh. S. Maiwada (unreported) SC. 204 delivered on the 25/5/12.
I am in complete agreement with the lead judgment that the suit ought to be struck out. I herby strike out the suit. I abide by the consequential order contained in the lead judgment.

Appearances

RASAQ OKESIJI WITH HIM K. A. FAGBEMIFor Appellant

AND

O. A. OLULOWO – FOR THE 1st RESPONDENT
S. O. AJAYI – FOR THE 2nd RESPONDENTFor Respondent