ALHAJI MURAINA AJANI & ORS v. MRS TAIWO
(2011)LCN/4389(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 22nd day of March, 2011
CA/I/27/04
RATIO
CAUSE OF ACTION: WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE LAW TO A CAUSE OF ACTION
The applicable law to a cause of action is the law prevailing at the time the cause of action arose notwithstanding that the law had been revoked. See :- Oba J.A. Aremo II v. S.F. Adekanye & 2 ors supra, at page 17 tines 20-40; Olaniyi Aroyehun v. University of Ibadan (1968) N.W.L.R 253. PER SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.
LIMITATION PERIOD: WHETHER TIME FOR COMMENCING AN ACTION RUNS WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS KNOW ABOUT THE TRANSACTION
Also time runs whether or not the plaintiffs know about the transaction, Knowledge of the plaintiffs is therefore immaterial. See:- Wulemotu Ajibona v. Alhaji Surajudeen Kolawole (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 476) 22, 34-35. The appellants are therefore caught inside the web of section 3 of the limitation Edict of Oyo state 1989. The court will not lend the plaintiff a helping hand in his bid to bolster up a state claim. See:- Sosan & ors v. Ademuyiwa & ors. (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 27) 241 at 256. Delay defeats equity and equity helps the vigilant and not the indolent. PER SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.
CONFLICTS OF AFFIDAVITS: WHETHER ORAL EVIDENCE WOULD BE HEARD WHERE THERE ARE CONFLICTS OF AFFIDAVITS ON CRUCIAL FACTS
The law is already settled, on this point See:- Akinsete v. Akindutire (1966) N.S.C.C. 157 at 158 Onyeama, J.S.C, (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the court stated:- “In the face of the direct conflicts of affidavits on crucial facts, the learned judge we think, should have heard oral evidence from the deponents or such other witnesses as the parties may be advised call” PER SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOSEPH SHAGBOR IKYEGH Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ALHAJI MURAINA AJANI & ORS Appellant(s)
AND
MRS TAIWO Respondent(s)
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court Justice, Oyo State presided over by Jimoh, J, delivered on the 16th day of July, 2003.
The appellants were the plaintiffs at the Lower Court and their claims as contained in the writ of summons dated the 21st day of February, 2001 and filed same day, read as follows:-
(1) “Declaration that the plaintiffs are the persons entitled to a grant of certificate of Statutory Right of occupancy in respect of all the piece or parcel of Land situate, lying and being at Mafikuyomi town, Oki, off Iwo Road, Ibadan Oyo State, more properly described and delineated in a plan to be filed later.
(2) Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, her servants, agents, privies or any other person or persons claiming through her from trespassing further on the land in dispute in any manner whatsoever dealing with the land or laying it to waste against the interest of the plaintiffs in this case.”
The brief facts of this case as related by the appellants were that they were the plaintiffs at the Lower court. The parties had filed and exchange their pleadings. At the close of pleadings the Defendant/Respondent filed an Application on 28th January, 2003 praying for “an order setting the suit down for hearing and disposing the points of law raised in paragraph (3, 7, 9, of the statement of Defence of the Defendant/Applicant…”
After listening to the counsel of both parties the trial court granted the Application and dismissed the plaintiffs suit Being dissatisfied with the ruling of the trial court, the appellant filed a notice of appeal dated 29th July, 2003 filed five grounds of appeal against the ruling of the Lower Court.
From the Five grounds of appeal, the appellants formulated three issues for determination as follows:-
(1) Whether the presumption contained in Section 130 of the evidence Act cap 112, Laws of Federation of Nigeria is irrebutable to avail the defendant/Respondent to rely on photocopies of Uncertified Deed of conveyance i.e. public documents over 20 years old as evidence of title.
(2) Whether the learned trial court was right to have relied only on the Defendant/Respondents statement of Defence without considering the plaintiff/Appellants writ of summons and statement of claim or call for oral testimonies in determining when the cause of action arose to dismiss the plaintiff/Appellant suit as being statute bared.
(3) Whether the learned trial court was correct to rely on photocopies of Uncertified Deed of conveyances (Public documents) over 20 years old to dismiss the plaintiffs/Appellants’ suit as being statute barred.
From the five (5) grounds of appeal contained in the notice of appeal, the Respondent formulated six (6) issues for determination as follows:-
(1) Whether the use of Photostat copies of the two deeds of conveyance in the application by the defendant/respondent can form an exception under Section 130 of the evidence Act 1990 as amended.
(2) Whether the two deeds of conveyance had been admitted as exhibits in the true sense of the word.
(3) Whether the trial judge was wrong to have looked into the file of the case for proper guidance.
(4) Whether in the absence of any ambiguity in the writ of summons the statement of claim and the statement of defence it was still necessary to call oral evidence to resolve the ambiguity that is not there.
(5) Whether in the case of contract the cause of action could have arisen on any other date other than the date on which the contract was executed.
(6) Whether where there is any deed of conveyance regulating the transaction, sale or transfer of land and the claim is for statutory right of occupancy the rules of customary land tenure can still apply.
Having carefully examined the three (3) issues formulated by the appellants, and the six issues formulated by the respondent, the appellant’s issues 1 and 3 are exactly similar. The respondent’s issues 1, 2 and 3 are exactly similar to the appellant’s issues 1, and 3. The appellants issue 2, covers all the areas canvassed under issues 4, 5 and 6 of the respondents brief (with slight modifications) A cursory glance at the issues formulated by the Appellants and the Respondent in their brief of argument which becomes conterminous in all respect, they raised the same question whether it was right on the part of the trial court to place reliance on Exhibits A and B, the deeds of conveyances and to dismiss the appellants suit. In this regard therefore, the sole issue for determination in this appeal is as follows:-
“Whether the trial court was right to have placed reliance on the photocopies of the deeds of conveyances attached as exhibits by the respondent to her affidavit, and to dismiss the suit of the appellant as being statute barred.”
Arguing in support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that under section 112 of the evidence Act cap. 112, Laws of Federation 1990, it is only certified true copies of Public documents that are admissible as secondary evidence in the absence of the original.
Learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial judge relied heavily on photocopies of Deed of conveyances attached to the Defendants application to dismiss the plaintiffs suit as being time barred when infact the documents were uncertified as being true copies of the original as envisaged under section 112 of the Evidence Act. Also the documents relied upon by the trial judge in calculating when the cause of action arose are in admissible. See:- Fawehinmi v. I.G.P (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt. 665) 481 at 525.
Learned counsel further submitted that the provision of section 130 of the Evidence Act is rebutable presumption. It admits of some exceptions i.e. “Unless and except so far as may be proved to be in accurate..” mere reliance on the photocopies of Deeds of conveyance attached to the Defendants’ application for dismissal of the plaintiffs suit without more did not afford opportunity to the plaintiffs to prove that the attached Deeds are in accurate. Learned counsel submitted further that the presumption in section 130 of the Evidence Act is not conclusive proof of title and does not relieve a vendor from the necessity of showing a good root of title’ See:- Omosanya v. Anifowoshe (1959) 4 F.S.C. 94, Sanya v. Johnson (1974) 1 All N.L.N (Pt. 11) 198.
Learned counsel further submitted that the trial court cannot grant the defendant’s application for dismissal of plaintiff’s suit without resolving conflicts in the affidavit evidence of the parties. The Defendant/Respondent at the lower court deposed to in paragraph 6 “that the conveyance in respect of the land purchased from Mafikuyomi while the plaintiffs/Appellants in paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of their counter affidavit denied any sale of any portion of Mafikuyomi family land and that the Defendants vendors are not members of Mafikuyomi family.” The conflict in the two affidavits are material, it must be resolved before declaring that the plaintiffs suit to be time barred. The court ought to have called for oral evidence to resolve the conflict or at best setting down the substantive suit for trial and determination See:- Falobi v.. Falobi (2000)30 W.R.N. 5O at 61-62 (lines 54-20): Akinsete v. Akindutire (1966) all N.L.R 147 at 148: Olu-Ibukun and anor v. Otu-Ibukun (1974) 2 SC 47 at 48; Uku v. Ukumagba and 3 ors (2001) 41 W.R.N. 133.
Learned counsel submitted further that it is settled law, that in order to determine whether an action is statute barred, all that the courts is required to do is to examine the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and comparing that date with the date in which the writ of summons was filed, if the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. See:- Egbe v. Adefarasin (2002) 14 W.R.N 57 or (1987) 1 N.W.L.R (Pt. 47) 20-21; Oba J.A. Aremo II v. Adekanye & 2 ors (2004) 42 W.R.N. 1 at 19-20 (lines 45-10.)
Learned counsel further submitted that the trial court was in error to have held that the provision of section 3 of limitation Edict Oyo state 1989 applies to this suit. Under the aforesaid section, a person is barred from bridging an action to recover land after the expiration of 10 years from the date on which the right of action accrued. This cause of action arose in 1974. The applicable law to a cause of action is the law prevailing at the time the cause of action arose notwithstanding that the law had been revoked. See :- Oba J.A. Aremo II v. S.F. Adekanye & 2 ors supra, at page 17 tines 20-40; Olaniyi Aroyehun v. University of Ibadan (1968) N.W.L.R 253.
Learned counsel submitted further that in the present suit, the applicable law would have been the limitation Law Cap. 64, laws of Oyo State 1978. The court was therefore in grave error to have applied the provision of Section 3 of the limitation Edict 1989, when the same is not applicable to the suit. We humbly pray this court to allow the Appeal and remit the case back to the Lower Court.
In reply to the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that, by virtue of the provision of Section 130 of the Evidence act the exception clause is “Unless and except in so far as they may be provided to be inaccurate.” The use of Photostat copies of the two deeds of conveyance did not change the contents of the two deeds of conveyance and the truth of the facts matters and description remained the same. It has not been established that the contents of the Photostat copies of the two deeds had been mutilated, and that the spirit of this proviso has been preserved.
Learned counsel submitted further that on the uncertified two deed of conveyance, which the learned trial judge based his decision, the two deeds of conveyance were not admitted as exhibits before the court, they were mere annextures to the affidavit in support of the application. What the trial judge did was to look into the file for proper guidance in the matter. In effect there was nothing to be expunged from the record.
Learned counsel submitted further that, whether the trial court had the right to look into the file of the case so as to be seized of all facts relating to the case, it is trite law that the trial judge had every right to do so. Also for the appellants to refer to the documents as exhibits was a grave misconception. See- Bature v. Savannah Bank of Nig, P.L.C (1998) 4 NWLR (pt. 546) 436 at 444; Joseph Agbahomovo v. Apata Eduyegbe & 6 ors (1999) 3 NWLR (pt. 594) 170
Learned counsel further submitted that, the appellants had laid emphasis on the fact that they were strangers to the two deeds of conveyance. However in paragraph 6 of their counter affidavit they admitted that they are members of Mafikuyomi family. In effect they are privies to the vendors in one of the deed of conveyance, the one executed by members of Mafikuyomi family in favour of the respondent’s late husband. They cannot claim to have better title than the vendors in the deed of conveyance. The appellants are silent about the ownership of land conveyed to the respondent’s late husband by the Akinpelu family of Ojaba Ibadan.
Learned counsel submitted further that on the point that the trial court had failed to call evidence to resolve the conflict in the affidavit in support of the application and counter affidavit that was not necessary as there was no conflict. In paragraph 6 of their counter affidavit the appellants admitted being members of Mafikuyomi family but were not aware of any sale of land by Mafikuyomi family. In this respect in the laws of limitation only fraud or concealment of fact will stop time running. Learned counsel submitted further that, as the trial judge put it “In the matter before me, I see no fraud or deliberate concealment of fact.”
Also time runs whether or not the plaintiffs know about the transaction, Knowledge of the plaintiffs is therefore immaterial. See:- Wulemotu Ajibona v. Alhaji Surajudeen Kolawole (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 476) 22, 34-35. The appellants are therefore caught inside the web of section 3 of the limitation Edict of Oyo state 1989. The court will not lend the plaintiff a helping hand in his bid to bolster up a state claim. See:- Sosan & ors v. Ademuyiwa & ors. (1986) 3 NWLR (pt. 27) 241 at 256. Delay defeats equity and equity helps the vigilant and not the indolent.
Learned counsel submitted further that even if the deeds of conveyance were both stamped and not registered the provision, under section 130 of the Evidence Act cannot be impugned. See:- Odunye v. Savage (1964) NMLR pg.11 at 116. In the instant case both deeds of conveyance were stamped and registered.
Learned counsel submitted further that in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the appellants counter affidavit the appellants admitted that when they entered the land in 1997 they saw flowers being planted on the land by the respondent. This act of the respondent was an act of ownership; it meant that the respondent had been on the land in dispute before the appellants. The two deed of conveyance supported this assertion. Both deeds of conveyance were executed in 1974. These documents were eye openers. They cannot be ignored. They cleared the ambiguity. So it was not necessary to call any evidence to resolve the ambiguity that did not exist.
The procedure under order 24 rules 2, High court civil procedure rules 1988 was to raise a preliminary objection. Preliminary objection can be raised any how and in any manner without the calling of oral evidence See- E.A, Emuze v. Vice Chancellor of University of Benin & anor. (1998)6 NWLR (pt 552) 142 at 145. This is even so when the points of law are not raised in the pleadings.
Learned counsel further submitted that in the case of contract or tort, it is a trite law that the cause of action accrues on the date on which the incident giving rises to the cause of action accrued. In the instant case it was a contract for sale of land between members of Mafikuyomi family and the respondent’s late husband that gave the plaintiffs the right to sue. The date on which both deeds of conveyance were executed was 1st of April 1974. The cause of action therefore accrued on that date. See:- Ibrahim Obide v. Military Administrator of Kogi State (2000) 12 NWLR (pt 680) 24 at 27; Olaosebikan v. Williams (1996) 5 NWLR (pt 449) at 477.
Learned counsel further submitted that the court could not have ignored the statement of defence and deeds of conveyance and based its ruling on writ of summons and the statement of claim alone. The appellants are trying to find shelter under a repealed limitation laws of Oyo State 1978, since the limitation Edict of Oyo state 1989 was adopted the appellants right to the law had been barred since 1984, whereas if the repealed limitation laws of Oyo state was adopted the appellant’s right to the land had been barred in 1986.
Learned counsel submitted that in their writ of summons and statement of claim the appellants claim was for a declaration that they are the persons entitled to a grant of certificate of Statutory right of occupancy. The action was filed before High court of Justice Oyo State. In the proceedings the respondent produced two deeds of conveyance for those reasons the common law applies and the Law of customary land tenure are ousted and are inapplicable. In addition the limitation Laws of Oyo State 1978 had been repealed. The trial court was therefore right when it dismissed the plaintiffs claim as being statute barred. The ruling of the court was not perverse and there was no violation of any procedural rules and he applied the right law. Finally this court is urge to dismiss all the grounds of appeal.
For the purposes of this appeal, it is important to begin by stating that the ruling of Jimoh, J, delivered on the 16/7/03, and which is the subject of the present appeal was anchored on affidavit evidence. The Respondent then the defendant/applicant at the lower court filed his motion on Notice dated 27/1/03, praying the Lower Court for an order setting the case down for hearing and disposing the point of Law raised in paragraphs 3, 7 and 10 of the statement of defence of the defendant. That the two conveyances pleaded were executed in 1974 over twenty years ago and as such enjoy the protection of Section 130 of the Evidence Act 1990 as amended and second, that the plaintiffs claim against the defendant/applicant is statutorily barred. He brought the motion under order 24 rules 2 of High Court (court procedure) Rule 1988. It was supported by an affidavit of 7 paragraph. Relevant are paragraphs 3-6 as follows:-
3. That the claim is for declaratory judgment and injunction
4. That my boss informed me and I do verily believe that two points of law were raised in the statement of defence of the defendant.
5. That my boss further informed me and I do verily believe that it is necessary for these points of Law to be disposed before trial can commence.
6. That the conveyance in respect of the land purchase from Mafikuyomi family is attached hereto and marked Exhibit ‘A’ while that in respect of land purchased from Akinpelu family is attached hereto and marked Exhibit ‘B’.
The Appellant then plaintiff/Respondent filed a counter affidavit of 12 paragraphs. Paragraphs 3-9 are relevant and set down as follows:-
3. That paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the supporting affidavit are true while depositions in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 are untrue.
4. That it was sometime in 1997 when i.e. Mafikuyomi family members discovered that some people have trespass on part of the land now in dispute by planting flowers on it.
5. That after necessary enquiries, it was discovered that it was the defendant/applicant who caused flowers to be planted on the plaintiff’s land.
6. That land in dispute belongs to Mafikuyomi family and that no member of the family has sold any portion to anybody.
7. That the conveyance intended to be relied upon were not made by members of Mafikuyomi family and the family is not aware of same until 1999 when the defendant/applicant attached a copy of it to a supporting affidavit for certiorari.
8.That our solicitor M.O. Oladejo told me and I verily believe him that by attaching Exhibits A and B to an application without more cannot confer title to the defendant.
9. That Lekan Latinwo and Madam Dorcas Adeola are not members of Mafikuyomi family and that they have no authority to execute Exhibit ‘A’.
Also found to be germane is paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit of Appellant then plaintiff/Respondent as follows:-
10. That it will be in the interest of justice to allow parties to prove their respective cases by calling their witnesses.
The learned trial judge despite the glaring conflicts in the two affidavits of the applicants and the respondent, in a considered ruling held that the motion of the defendants succeeds, and therefore dismissed the plaintiffs claim.
The crucial issue in this appeal after a very careful examination is the fact of the Respondent, who was the defendant/applicant at the Lower court in her affidavit which accompanied her motion on notice in paragraph 6 which states as follows:- “that the conveyance in respect of the land purchased from Mafikuyomi” while the Appellants then plaintiffs/Respondents to that application in paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of their counter affidavit denied any sale of any portion of Mafikuyomi family and that the Defendants vendors (respondent in this appeal) are not members of Mafikuyomi family.
The question that follows is where affidavits are in conflict on crucial facts, can such facts be ignored as done by the trial court in its ruling or will it be necessary to call oral evidence of the deponents.
This court is of the view that the trial court fell in to grave error when it ignored those crucial conflicts of facts in the two affidavits, went into the voyage of determining the instrumentality of the deeds of conveyances attached as Exhibits to the applicants affidavit, it is, of course, open to the court to act on affidavit evidence in cases in which the facts are nor disputed or in which the parties agree that this should be done, but to do otherwise may lead to a consequence of miscarriage of justice. The law is already settled, on this point See:- Akinsete v. Akindutire (1966) N.S.C.C. 157 at 158 Onyeama, J.S.C, (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the court stated:-
“In the face of the direct conflicts of affidavits on crucial facts, the learned judge we think, should have heard oral evidence from the deponents or such other witnesses as the parties may be advised call”
See also Government of Ashanti v. Adjuh Korkor, etc 4 W.A.C.A. 83 where Bannerman, J. stated:-
“It is, of course, open to the court to act on affidavit evidence in cases in which facts are not disputed or which the parties agree that this should be done and it is only fair to say that in the present case neither side asked to be allowed to cross examine any of the deponents or to call any witness.”
In the present appeal before this court the Appellant as Respondent before the lower court asked to be allowed to call oral evidence on those conflicting depositions in the two affidavits but was denied by the trial court.
More recent decisions of the superior courts in this country followed the authority of Akinsete v. Akindutire (supra). See:- Ebong v. Ikpe (2002) 21 WRN 54; Kalu Mark v. Gabriel Eke (2004) 5 NWLR (pt 865)54; Yahaya v. Waje Community Bank Ltd. (2001) FWLR (pt 46) 804:. Uku Vs.Okumagba(1974)1 All NLR (pt1): Arjay Ltd v. Airline Management Support (2004)5 S.C.M 17; Jide Taiwo & Co. v. Danbare Travels Agency Ltd. (court of Appeal Kaduna Division) in CA/K/8/99 of 10/1/2001: The Chairman National Population Commission v. The Chairman lkere Local Government & ors (Unreported) SC, III/7997. The correct position in this regard is that the trial court in respect of the ruling the subject of this appeal ought to have allowed the application of the appellant before it to call oral evidence in the face of glaring conflicts in the two affidavits.
Again this court will not jump the gun as did the trial court in determining the main issues to be tried when the main case is to be heard. Issues coming under Section 130 of the Evidence act on the deed of conveyance, executed over 20 years, parties possession of an adjoining plot of land constituting a notice to a bona fide purchaser of value, and whether registration of an instrument under Land Registration Act constitute notice of the deed to all the world e.t.c.
On the whole therefore the refusal of the Lower Court to allow the appellant before it to call oral evidence on the two conflicting affidavits, amounted to a denial of fair hearing to the appellant. I find merit in this appeal, I allow it accordingly.
In the circumstances the appeal succeeds, and it is hereby allowed. The ruling of the Lower Court delivered on the 16th of July, 2003, in suit No. 1/195/2001, Coram Jimoh, J, is hereby set aside.
An order is made by this court, that the Chief Judge, High Court of Justice, Oyo State, should reassign this suit, to recommence de novo before another judge of the court.
Costs of N30, 000:00 is awarded in favour of the Appellants.
STANLEY SHENKO ALAGOA, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment of my learned brother, Bage, J.C.A. just delivered. I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that this appeal has merit and should be allowed, I allow same and abide by the consequential orders contained therein including order on costs.
JOSEPH SHAGBAOR IKYEGH, J.C.A: I had the advantage of reading in draft the incisive judgment of my learned brother, Bage, J.C.A., with which I am in absolute agreement and adopt same as mine with the following slight addition.
In construing limitation laws, the court is enjoined to peruse only the statement of claim or writ of summons where pleadings are not filed. The issue is not to be determined on materially conflicting affidavits as did the court below in this case.
If the date the cause of action arose and the date the suit was filed are not clear or not stated in the application for a writ of summons or in the statement of claim, then the matter can be resolved by taking evidence viva-voce. It cannot, with deference to the court below, be validly done by examining documents like photocopies of deeds of conveyance attached to an affidavit to decipher when the cause of action arose as, unfortunately, happened in this case – see Udoh Trading Company Ltd. v. Sunday Abere and Another (2001) 5 SCNJ 274; Emiantor v. The Nigerian Army and Others (1999) 9 SCNJ 52; Oba Aremo II v. Adekanye and Others (2004) 7 SCNJ 218; Chief Woherem v. Emereuwa (2004) 7 SCNJ 119, 130-133.
Further, and at the risk of repetition, in the bare face of materially conflicting affidavit evidence, the court below was obliged to take oral evidence to resolve the conflict. It failed to do so. It was, with deference, an error on the part of the court below not to call for oral evidence to resolve the materially conflicting affidavit evidence – see Falobi v. Falobi (1976) 1 N.M.L.R. 169 at 178 thus:
“We have pointed out on numerous occasions that when a court is faced with affidavits which are irreconcilably in conflict the judge hearing the case, in order to resolve the conflict properly, should first hear oral evidence from the deponents or such other witnesses as the parties may be advised to call. It does not matter whether none of the parties asked to be allowed to cross-examine any of the deponents or to call any witness. Such omission by the parties should not be taken to amount to consent that affidavit evidence should be used in such circumstances. (See Akinsete v. Akindutere (1966) 1 All N.L.R. 147 at o.118; Eboh & Ors. v. Oki & Ors. (1974) 1 S.C. 179 at pp. 1890- 190; Olu -Ibukun & Anor. v. Olu-ibukun (1974) 2 S.C. 41, 48: and Uku & Ors. v. Okumagba & Three Ors. (1974) 3 S.C. 35, 56, 64-65.).”
Accordingly, I too see merit in the appeal and hereby allow it and abide by the consequential orders made by my learned brother, Bage, J.C.A.
Appearances
For Appellant
AND
Chief Ayo Fabiyi:For Respondent
