ALHAJA RISIKAT DABIRI OYEGBEMI & ANOR v. MR. FATAI AROMIRE & ORS
(2012)LCN/5373(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 17th day of May, 2012
CA/L/176/2002
RATIO
MAXIM: DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS
The doctrine of lis pendens is of common law origin. The full maxim is “Lis pendent nihil innovetur” that is “Law suit pending nothing new to be done”. The rationale behind the doctrine is that no law suit would be brought to a successful end if parties were allowed to change their position during its pendency.
In the 9th Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary at page 950, lis pendens is defined variously as follows: “(1) pending law suit (2) The jurisdiction, power or control acquired by a court over property while legal action is pending (3) A notice recorded in the chain of title to real property, required or permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation and that any interest acquired during the pendency of the suit are subject to its outcome”
Furthermore, according to the Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 7th Edition by Roger Bird at Page 207, LIS PENDENS refers to a pending suit, action, petition, or matter, particularly one relating to Land.
In Olori Motors v. UBN Plc (2006) 10 NWLR Pt. 989 Pg. 586 at Pg.625, the Supreme Court held quoted Idigbe JSC in Ogundiani v. Araba supra who discussed the doctrine of lis pendens thus:
“The doctrine of lis pendens prevents the effective transfer of rights in any property which is the subject matter of an action pending in court during the pendency in court of an action. In its application against a purchaser of such property, the doctrine is not founded on the equitable doctrine of notice actual or constructive – but upon the fact that the law does not allow to litigant parties or give to them, during the currency of the litigation involving any property, rights in such property, (i.e. the property in dispute), so as to prejudice any of the litigating parties. As was stated in Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 26 LJ (NS) Equity Reports 797 at 80…”
In In Bua v. Dauda (2003) 13 NWLR Pt. 838 Pg. 657 at Pg. 686, the Supreme Court stated categorically as follows:
“The situation in which the doctrine of Lis Pendens operates is fairly clear: Where Litigation is being prosecuted in regard to property and one of the parties purports to transfer by sale the legal estate in that property to a 3rd party, who may have no notice of the Litigation, the transaction of sale is ineffective, see Osagie v. Oyeyinka (1987) 2 NSC 480 at 849. That purchaser gets nothing because the doctrine is not founded upon the fact of actual or constructive notice of the litigation but upon the fact that the Law does not allow to any litigant party rights to alienate property in dispute while proceedings are pending so as to prejudice the opposite party: see Bank of Nigeria Ltd (sic) v. Ashiru (1975) 6-7 SC 99.”
Also, on the same page, the Supreme Court set out certain conditions whereby the doctrine of lis pendens would apply. The court held as follows:
“For the doctrine of lis pendens to apply, it must be shown (a) that at the time of the sale of property, the suit regarding the dispute about the said property was already pending: see Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 26 L.J. (N.S) Eq. R 797 at 803; (b) that the action or lis was in respect of real property: it never applies to personal property: see Wigram v. Buckley (1894) 3 Ch. 483 at 492-493; (c) that the object of the action was to recover or assert title to a specific real property: that is to say, an action in a subject matter adverse to the owner in respect of some substantive right which is proprietary in nature: see Calgary and Edmonton hand co. v. Dobinson (1974) 1 All E R 484 at 489; and (d) that the other party has been served with the originating process in the pending action:
See Dresser UK Ltd. v. Falcongale Freight Management Ltd. (1992) 2 All ER 450 at 523.”
More recently in the case of Enekrue v. IMB Ltd (2007) All FWLR Pt.349 Pg. 1053 at 1073, the Supreme Court per Tobi JSC quoted emphatically Barclays Bank v. Ashiru supra as follows:
“we think that it should be mentioned that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to every suit.
It applies to a Suit in which the object is to recover or assert title to a specific property; the property however, must be real property for the doctrine has no application to personal property.”
The court went further on the same page:
“In order for the doctrine of lis pendens to apply, the Party relying on it must prove the following:-
(1) The object of the Suit must be to recover or assert title to a specific Property
(2) The property must be real property
(3) At the time of the sale of the property, the Suit in question was pending.”
Thus in Akiboye v. Adeko supra at page 437, the court held that:
“A party claiming the benefit of the doctrine of lis pendens in a matter has the burden to show:
(1) That there is in fact an alienation pendent lite;
(2) That there has been a successful termination (that is, in judgment or order) of the pending suit at the time the alienation is made; and
(3) That the alienation pendent lite has prejudiced or affected the other party.” PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
ACTION: ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TOWARDS ENGAGING IN SELF-HELP
The principle is settled that the court cannot be hamstrung by a party who changes the status quo during litigation. Thus, if a party cannot prove its case, the court is not obliged to indulge the party because it had changed its position during litigation and it may suffer the consequences if the case is resolved against such a party. In consequence, a party who resorts to self help cannot enjoy any favour from the court. That is the essence of the dictum of Nnaemeka-Agu JSC in Registered Trustees Apostolic Church v. Olowoleni (1990) 4 NWLR Pt. 158 Pg. 514 at 537 where he said:
“Once parties have turned their dispute over to the courts for determinations, the right to resort to self-help ends. So it is not permissible for one of the parties to take any step during the pendency of the suit which may have the effect of fostering upon a court a situation of complete helplessness or which may give the impression that the court is being used as a mere subterfuge to tie the hands of one party while the party helps himself extra judicially. Both parties are to wait the result of the litigation and the appropriate order of court before acting further.” PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A.
ACTION: MEANING AND NATURE OF LIS PENDENS
Lis pendens, the expression is made up of two Latin words. The first is lis. The second is pendens. The word LIS means a piece of litigation, a controversy. The word pendens conveys the connotation of pending. The two words put and read together generally mean a pending law suit. The expression is a useful Latinism that has given its name to a Notice required in some jurisdiction to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation and that any interest accrued during the pendency of the suit must be subject to the outcome of the litigation. Traditionally, this Notice was called the Notice of LIS Pendens. But 20th Century American Lawyers have shortened the phrase to merely lis pendens. See: Bryan Garner, a Dictionary of modern legal usage, Second Edition page 350. This reflects and confirms the traditional racing colloquial language of the Americans and the Americans. The doctrine which is embedded in the Common Law gives Notice to person by way of warning that a particular property is the res of litigation and that a person who acquires any interest in it must know well ahead that the interest will be subject to the Decision of the Court on the property. See: Matthew Okechukwu Enekwe vs. International Merchant Bank & 2 Ors. (2006) 11 -12 SC 3.
The doctrine of LIS Pendens is not a general application, it is restrictive, and it concerns only the effective transfer of rights in any property which is the subject matter of an action pending in court during the pendency in court of the action. This position is already settled by the definite pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the subject.
If we examine the main complaint of the Appellants as stated in their pleadings and canvassed at the trial it was all about the activities leading to the approval and installation of the 1st respondent as Ojora of Lagos. Their argument (Appellants) cannot be accommodated on the shade of the doctrine of Lis pendens, to say, that it covers not only properties, but extends to personal or choses in action. The doctrine does not extend beyond real property. The Supreme Court in the case of Ogundiani vs. Araba & Barclays Bank of Nig. Ltd (1978) 5 & 7 SC 55 at 80 stated:
“The doctrine of Lis pendens is part of our law. It presents the effective transfer of rights in any property which is the subject-matter of an action pending in court during the pendency in court of the action. Any purchaser whether he has notice actual or constructive or not is bound by the doctrine and buys nothing from a litigant vendor.”
Also see: John A. Osagie vs. Alhaji S.O. Oyeyinka & Anor (1987) 6 SC 199 at pp 208-209. PER SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. ALHAJA RISIKAT DABIRI OYEGBEMI
2. MR. AMIDU ORETUYI
(For themselves and on behalf of Oyegbemi Ojora Family) Appellant(s)
AND
1. MR. FATAI AROMIRE
2. OBA OF LAGOS IN COUNCIL
3. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE
4. LAGOS MAINLAND LOCAL GOVERNMENT Respondent(s)
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Hon. Justice I.A. Sotuminu of the High Court of Justice, Lagos State delivered on the 7th of September, 2001 in which the Honourable Chief Judge dismissed the claim in its entirety. The facts which led to this appeal are as follows:
Chief Taoridi Akapo was the immediate past Chief Ojora of Lagos who died on the 7th of May, 1993. The Ojora Chieftaincy Family comprises of three ruling houses, to wit – Adejiyan, Oyegbemi and Olumokun. On the death of Chief Taoridi Akapo, it was the turn of Oyegbemi Ruling House to select the next Chief Ojora of Lagos. The 1st Appellant, PW4 at the High Court and the 1st Respondent belong to the same Oyegbemi Ruling House. The 1st Respondent had earlier instituted suit No. LD/1790/93 challenging the nomination of PW4 as the Ojora elect representing the Oyegbemi Ruling House and consequently obtained an interim order in motion No. LD/456M/93 restraining PW4 and others from taking further steps in the installation of PW4 as Ojora. The interim order was discharged on 11/10/93. The Lagos State Government then approved the appointment of the 1st Respondent as Chief Ojora of Lagos on May 18, 1994 as contained in its official Gazette No.32 Vol. 27 of 20/9/94.
The Appellants thereafter instituted this suit at the High Court of Lagos State in 1994 via suit No. LD/3288/94 against the Respondents claiming the following reliefs:
(a) A declaration that the 1st Defendant has not been appointed, selected or elected by the elders and the heads of the Oyegbemi Ojora ruling House as the nominee/candidate of the Oyegbemi-Ojora ruling house for the vacant position of Chief Ojora of Lagos.
(b) A declaration that the purported presentation of the 1st Defendant by himself, the 2nd defendant or any person whatsoever to the 3rd defendant as the nominee or candidate of the Oyegbemi-Ojora Ruling House for the vacant position of Chief Ojora of Lagos is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(c) A declaration that the purported approval of the appointment of the 1st defendant as the Chief Ojora of Lagos with effect from 18.5.94 by the Military Administrator of Lagos State vide the Ojora of Lagos (Approval of Appointment) Notice 1994 contained in No. 32 volume 27 of Lagos State of Nigeria Official gazette dated 20.9.94 is illegal, unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) An injunction restraining the 1st defendant from parading himself or being paraded or represented by any person whatsoever as the Chief Ojora of Lagos.
(e) An order of injunction restraining the 1st defendant from occupying the Chief Ojora’s palace at Ijora, Lagos and from performing all the functions and enjoying all the privileges appertaining or appurtenant to the office of Chief Ojora of Lagos either by himself or through his agents.
(f) An order of court mandating the 1st defendant to account for his illegal Management of the properties belonging to the Ojora Chieftaincy family either by himself or by his agents from 5.6.94 being the date of his illegal installation as Chief Ojora of Lagos till the date of judgment.
(e) An order of court mandating the 5th defendant to set in motion forthwith the process(es) for the nomination, selection, appointment, approval and installation of the proper, legal, lawful and constitutional Chief Ojora of Lagos from the Oyegbemi Chieftaincy house of the Ojora Chieftaincy family in Lagos.
To prove their case, the Appellants called 4 witnesses and tendered some documentary exhibits. The 1st and 2nd Respondents also called 4 witnesses and tendered documentary exhibits. The 3rd Respondent though participated in the trial did not call any witness. In particular the 1st and 2nd Respondents in support of their case relied heavily on Exhibits R-R50 (on page 606-65 6 of amended record Vol. II) as proof of all the activities and ceremonies leading to the installation of the 1st Respondent as the Ojora of Lagos. While on the other hand, evidence was led for the Appellants that the 1st Respondent had earlier instituted suit No. LD /1709/93 (Exhibit L seen at page 580 of amended record Vol. II) challenging the earlier nomination of pW4 as the nominee of Oyegbemi Ruling House for the post of Ojora of Lagos and consequently obtained an interim order in suit No. LD/456M/93 (Exhibit P seen at page 587 of amended record vol. II) restraining PW4 and late Oba Kasali Asheni vide Exhibit P15 (seen at page 603 of amended record Vol. II) and that all the purported activities and ceremonies leading to the nomination, selection and installation of 1st Respondent as Ojora of Lagos as related in Exhibits R-R50 took place during the pendency of suit No. LD/1790 /93 in particular.
The gravamen of the Appellants’ case at the lower court, where they were the Claimants was that the application of the doctrine of lis pendens made it illegal, null and void for the Lagos State Government to have approved and installed the 1st Respondent as the Ojora of Lagos during the pendency of the earlier suit No. LD/1790/93 filed by the 1st Respondent, and while the interim injunction restraining the government from further action on the chieftaincy matter obtained by the same 1st Respondent in this appeal but the 1st Defendant at the lower court pursuant to his motion in suit No. LD/ 456M/93 was still extant.
At the end of the trial, in a well considered judgment, the Hon. Chief Judge dismissed the Claimants/Appellants’ case in its entirety. Hence this appeal.
Parties filed their respective briefs and issues have been joined. From the two grounds of appeal contained in the amended notice of appeal filed by the Appellants on 26/2/09, the Appellants distilled a sole issue for determination as follows as contained in the amended brief filed on 26/2/09 deemed filed on 16/3/09:
“Whether the doctrine of lis pendes is not applicable to the facts of this case which would render invalid all the activities and ceremonies leading to the installation of the 1st Respondent as the Chief Ojora of Lagos including his purported selection and presentation by Chief Lasisi Ojora (formally the 2nd Respondent, whose name has been struck out) to the 2nd Respondent and approval by the 3rd Respondent.”
The 1st Respondent’s Counsel in the amended brief filed on 17/2/12 distilled the following issue for determination:
“Whether the doctrine of LIS PENDENS is applicable in a matter of succession to a Chieftaincy title to vitiate the appointment, nomination, selection, approval and enthronement of a successful candidate to a Chieftaincy Stool”
Incidentally the 2nd Respondent was not represented by any counsel and did not file any brief. The 3rd Respondent’s amended brief was filed on 21/2/12 wherein he also identified the same issue for determination. The 4th Respondent’s brief was filed on 9/4/09 and the same issue was identified for determination.
At the hearing of the appeal, the 1st and 3rd Respondents’ counsel raised and argued their preliminary objections to an argument canvassed by the Appellant. The kernel of the objection as raised and argued by both counsel is that the Appellants cannot canvass new issues on appeal which were never advanced at the lower court. Both Segun Onakoya Esq. in the 1st Respondent’s brief settled by him and Mr. S. A. Quadri in the 3rd Respondent’s brief settled by him argued that the offending issue is subsumed in the only issue canvassed by the Appellant for determination.
Both counsel argued that the argument of the Appellant at page 15 para 3.20 of the Appellants’ brief should be struck out as going to no issue. Both learned 1st and 3rd Respondents’ counsel urged this court to strike out paragraph 3.20 in the Appellants’ brief.
1st respondent’s counsel argued that at no time at the lower court was the point canvassed that the law is that during the pendency of a suit, no party is entitled to destroy the subject matter of the suit. 1st Respondent’s counsel argued the point that the Appellant did not distill any issue from the omnibus ground of appeal and that ground as such should be deemed abandoned. In so far as the Appellants cannot formulate two issues out of the other ground of appeal, the effect is that the argument is not derived from any issue and cannot be countenanced by this court. Counsel cited Teriba v. Adeyemo (2010) 4 Pt.11 MJSC Pg. 76; Okonobor v. Edegbe (2010) 2-3 MJSC pg. 45. Counsel submitted that without leave of court, this fresh point cannot be raised and argued by the Appellants. Learned 3rd Respondent’s counsel on his own part argued that the issues for determination in the appellate court cannot be formulated to be wider than the grounds of appeal from which they derive their existence. Counsel further submitted that a ground of appeal against a decision must not only relate to the decision but should further be a challenge to its ratio decidendi.
The Appellants filed a composite reply to the 1st, 3rd and 4th Respondents’ briefs. In answer to the preliminary objections raised by the 1st and 3rd Respondents as set out above, learned Appellants’ counsel argued that the argument in paragraph 3.20 of the Appellants’ brief does not amount to arguing a fresh issue on appeal but of arguing a subsidiary issue for a proper elucidation of the principal issue. He cited Agbetoba v. LSEC (1991) 22 NSCC Pt. 11 Pg. 14 at 24; (1991) 4 NWLR Pt. 188 Pg. 664 at Pg. 682.
On the preliminary objection, the following paragraph is the paragraph under attack:
“Furthermore with or without the application of the doctrine of lis pendens, it is settled law that when a Suit is pending in Court nobody should act in such a manner to overreach or destroy the subject matter of the Suit.”
I am of the view and I agree with learned Appellants’ counsel that the argument in paragraph 3.20 of the Appellants’ brief is a natural progression of the argument in respect of the substantive issue for determination. By no stretch of the imagination can it be termed a new issue.
An issue is different from arguments in support of that issue. Many arguments, major and subsidiary may emanate while arguing an issue. The arguments do not become different issues by the mere fact that they seek to expand or elucidate on the argument of the issue in controversy. In fact the argument complained of is a general proposition of the law that flows from the issue in controversy. In Agbetoba v. LSEC cited supra, Karibi-Whyte JSC held as follows on this point:
“It is not only undesirable, but also confusing to split a ground of appeal into more than one issue. The
practice of splitting grounds of appeal is likely to confuse consideration of principal issues with subsidiary issues, whereas, the principal issues are essential for the determination of the case, the subsidiary issues are formulations towards the elucidation of the principal issues. They cannot justifiably be regarded as issues for determination.”
I agree with the Appellants’ counsel that the argument in paragraph 3.20 of the Appellants’ brief cannot be regarded as a separate issue but rather an expansion which throws light on the argument on the main issue.
The preliminary objection by the 1st and 3rd Respondents’ counsel, in my view is completely misconceived and is mere grasping at straws and should be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.
Now the sole issue for determination as agreed by all the parties in dispute is that the trial court held that the doctrine of lis pendens is not applicable to the facts of the case.
Learned senior counsel for the Appellants, Mr. Deji Sasegbon SAN first criticized the approach of the learned trial judge in dealing with the Appellants’ assertation that the doctrine of lis pendens is applicable to the facts of this case. Senior counsel argued that it was wrong of the learned trial judge to hold that since the subject matter of the dispute was not real property, the doctrine of lis pendens was inapplicable.
Learned senior counsel argued that the learned trial judge relied on the opinion of Idigbe JSC in Barclays Bank Nig. Ltd v. Ashiru & ors (1978)6 & 7 SC 99 at 128 wherein his Lordship had held that the doctrine does not apply to every suit but to where the object is to recover or assert title to a specific real property. Learned counsel however quoted Idigbe JSC extensively in Ogundiani v. Araba (1978) 6-7 SC 55 to submit that it was wrong to follow Barclays Bank v. Ashiru, because in the former case reported in the same law report, Hon. Justice Idigbe had opined that the doctrine of lis pendens prevents the effective transfer of rights in any property which is the subject matter of an action pending in court during the pendency of such an action. [Underlining for emphasis).
Senior counsel argued that in the Ogundiani case, the Supreme Court did not support the view that the doctrine only applies to real or specific property. Learned senior counsel, also in support of the proposition that the Supreme court had taken the view that the doctrine of lis pendens is of general application to all suits cited oputa JSC in Osagie v. Oyeyinka (1987) 3 NWLR pt. 59 pg. 144 at 156. He also cited Abdulimhen v. Namme (1992) 8 NWLR pt. 258 pg.202; Oshinowo v. NBN Ltd (1998) 11 NWLR pt. 574 pg.408 at 417, Umoh v. Tita (1999) 12 NWLR Pt.631 pg. 427 at 436; Okafor v. AG Anambra state (1988) 2 NWLR Pt.79 Pg. 736 at 739; Domas v. Ogiri (1997) 1 NWLR pt. 481 Pg. 322; Dan-Jumbo V. Dan-Jumbo(1999) 11 NWLR Pt.627 Pg.445
Learned senior counsel argued that the distinction between real or specific property and personal property is of no significance in the application of the doctrine of lis pendens since the doctrine is aimed at the preservation of the res, the subject matter of an action from being destroyed by any of the litigating parties during the pendency of the suit in Court. Learned senior counsel at the hearing of the appeal referred this court to the case of Akinkugbe v. Ewulum Holdings Nigeria Ltd (2008) 42 WRN 1 at 22.
Learned senior counsel submitted for the Appellant that from the preponderance of judicial authorities by both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal cited above and contrary to the holding of the learned trial Chief Judge, that the doctrine of lis pendens applies only to real or specific property, the doctrine is of general application to every suit and applies to both tangible and intangible res as regards both the right to property as in Barclays Bank Nig. Ltd v. Ashiri & Ors (supra) or funds as in Agwaramgbo v. UBN (2001) 4 NWLR Pt. 702 Pg. 1 and right to a declaration or to decide who succeeds to the rulership in Chieftaincy matter as in Domas v. Ogiri (supra); and the instant case in hand or the taking of an administration with a will annexed during the pendency of a litigation over the will as in Dan-Jumbo v. Dan-Jumbo (supra) to prevent the effective transfer of subject-matter of litigation [tangible or intangible res) during the pendency of the suit.
Learned counsel further submitted that the stool or office of the Chief Ojora of Lagos for the right to decide who succeeds thereto) is an intangible res which needs to be preserved during the pendency of an action on it by the doctrine of lis pendens. There was ample evidence before the lower court that after the meeting of Oyegbemi Ruling House for the nomination of Ojora-elect on 7/9/93 at which PW4 was returned as the choice of the ruling house, the 1st Respondent challenged the nomination by instituting Suits No. LD/L790/93 (Exhibit L) and LD456M/93 (Exhibits PP16) on pages 580, 587 -601 of amended record Vol. 2.
Counsel insisted that there was also uncontroverted evidence before the trial court that pursuant to the Ex-parte Motion filed by the 1st Respondent, he was granted an interim injunction by the court restraining all the Defendants in that case. It was not in dispute that at the time, all the purported activities and ceremonies leading to the installation of the 1st Respondent as Ojora of Lagos as recounted in exhibits R-R50 on page 607- 656 of the amended record Vol. 2 were carried out during the action which he himself instituted in relation to the declaration of PW4 as Ojora-elect representing Oyegbemi family against PW4 and late Oba Kasali Asheni was still pending in the court. In fact, there was evidence before the lower court that as at the dates of the purported meetings of Saturday, 25th September and Sunday the 3rd of October, 1993 purportedly called by Oba Kasali Asheni to deliberate on the nomination of Ojora of Lagos, the late Oba was under a restraining order by virtue of a motion ex parte filed by the 1st Respondent which order was discharged on 4/10/93. Even as at the dates of the meetings of 9th October, 1993 during which the 1st Respondent was selected as the Ojora-elect and 13th October, 1993 where the nomination of 1st Respondent was purportedly unanimously endorsed, the substantive action Suit No. LD/1790/93 was still pendng in court.
Senior counsel contended that the fact that the interim order of injunction, Exhibit P15 had been discharged did not make any difference to the situation since Suit No. LD/ 1790 /93 was all along pending in court and until the suit is disposed of, it was not proper in law to destroy the subject-matter of the suit, which is the selection of the candidate for the post of Chief Ojora of Lagos. Counsel argued that the key requirement for the attachment of lis pendens is the initiation of notice. The filing of the legal action i.e. Exhibits L & P is the trigger. Counsel submitted that if the filing of Exhibit L & P preceded the selection of the 1st Respondent as Ojora-elect, the 1st respondent takes the title subject to a cloud on the title. If on the other hand, the selection precedes the filing of Exhibits L & P, lis pendens does not apply. The pertinent challenge to the utility of lis pendens involves not a question when it became operational, but if how long it remained so. As a general rule therefore, once the doctrine of lis pendens comes into operation with respect to a particular litigation, it remains in operation until the rendition of a final decision that put a definite end to the litigation.
In reply, learned 1st Respondent’s counsel, Mr. Segun Onakoya – Life Bencher submitted that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to every suit, but rather to a suit in which the object is to recover or assert title to a specific property and that property must be real property, for the doctrine has no application to personal property. He cited the Supreme Court in Barclays Bank v. Alh. Ashiru supra where Wigram v. Buckley (1984) 3 Ch 485 & 492-493 was cited with approval. He also cited First Atlantic Guaranty Cap v. Tillerson 916 A 2nd 153 at 157 (DDC 2007); Olori Motors & Co v. UBN Plc (2006) 6 MJSC Pg. 55, BUA v. Danda (2003) 9 MJSC Pg.173 at 180, Enekwe v. IMB Ltd (2007) 1 MJSC Pg.207
Counsel said that there is no contention about the fact that the subject matter of litigation is succession to the vacant Ojora chieftaincy stool which is not real property. Learned 1st Respondent’s counsel submitted that the two suits instituted and the subsequent Application and granting of an interim injunction was to protect himself and not for the benefit of the Appellants. It was therefore to serve as a shield to him and not a sword for the Appellants to wield.
Counsel further submitted that the injunction was a remedy granted to the 1st Respondent to restrain the Appellants from performing the ceremonies of the Chieftaincy installation. Counsel also made the point already made by the Appellants’ counsel that in any event, as at the 9th of October, 1993 when the 1st respondent was selected as the Ojora-elect, and on the 13th October, 1993 when his selection was confirmed, there was no restraining order against him or against the Appellants as stated in Exhibit M at page 582 of the records. He cited Akiboye v. Adeko (2011) 6 NWLR Pt. 1244 Pg.415 at 437
Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent argued the view that since there is no appeal against the finding of fact by the trial judge that relevant law and guidelines for the nomination of the 1st Respondent was not breached, the doctrine cannot vitiate his appointment. Counsel also cited FAAN v. Greenstore Ltd (2009) 10 NWLR Pt. 1150 pg.649; S.E. Co Ltd v. NBCI (2006) 7 NWLR Pt. 1978 Pg. 198; Saidu v. Abubakar (2008) 12 NWLR Pt. 1100 Pg.261. In this regard, the trial court held that Oba Kasali was the Arole as at 7th May, 1993 and in that capacity rightly summoned the meeting at which the 1st Respondent was selected and subsequently confirmed. This very crucial finding distinguishes this case from that of Doma v. Ogiri (1997) 1 NWLR pt. 481 pg.322
Counsel also made the effort to clear the air on the relevance or otherwise of the case of Ojukwu vs. Military Governor of Lagos State (1986) 1 NWLR Pt. 18 Pg. 621 at 637 with the instant case. He insisted that that case bears no relevance to the instant case for the clear and simple reason that the 1st respondent had already been installed when this case LD/3288/94 was instituted. The case LD/1790/93 had since been discontinued and therefore the Appellants cannot invoke the point of being overreached when there was no subsisting action against them by anyone at the time the 1st Respondent was installed. It was only after the 1st Respondent was installed that this action was instituted.
Learned 1st Respondent counsel distinguished the cases cited by learned senior counsel for the Appellants as all relating to alienation of real property as opposed to personal property or chieftaincy stool. Counsel also distinguished the case of Amaechi v. INEC (2008) 5 NWLR Pt. 1080 Pg. 227 from the facts of this case and insisted that the position of the apex court as enunciated in that case is consistent with the law that only a victorious party to an action can invoke the doctrine of lis pendens. Learned 1st Respondent’s counsel submitted that in so far as the Appellant has not appealed against the substantive finding of the trial court, the Appellant has not discharged the burden to show that a situation of helplessness was in fact foistered on the court which has led to a miscarriage of justice and for which reason the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. Counsel argued that the appeal is academic and should be thrown out as the only person challenging the 1st Respondent’s occupation of the chieftaincy has died. He cited Shettima v. Goni (2011) 10 NJSC Pg. 53 at Pg. 131-132.
As I observed earlier, the 2nd Respondent did not file any brief and did not enter appearance during the hearing of this appeal. The 3rd Respondent’s counsel. Mr. S.A. Quadri proffered the same argument as learned 1st Respondent’s counsel in all material particulars in relation to the application of the doctrine of lis pendens and those arguments need not be repeated exhaustively here. Suffice it to say that learned 3rd Respondent’s counsel argued that there is no doubt the basis of the Appellants’ argument in this appeal is not a challenge to the procedure that threw up the nomination of the 1st Respondent but that the nomination and eventual enthronement of the 1st Respondent had been affected by the doctrine of lis pendens.
Learned counsel submitted that the doctrine of lis pendens will be inapplicable where the person alleged to have benefited from the subject matter is, at the end of proceedings, found to have succeeded in the suit. The doctrine only operates to defeat any transfer of property which is subject matter of litigation if the part (or his privy) who claims to be entitled to the property turns out to emerge victorious at the end of hearing the case (which is so pending) on the merit. That is, it is only when the party complaining that an act had been done pendete lite might have won the case that on the merit that the doctrine can be invoked.
Counsel cited Akiboye v. Adeko supra to support the position that the doctrine of lis pendens is normally invoked after the party complaining about the act which was done during the pendency of a particular suit has won that suit on the merit.
On his part, learned 4th Respondent’s counsel, Mr. Steve Abu in the brief settled by him also concurred in almost all particulars with the briefs settled by the learned counsel to the 1st and 3rd Respondents on the issue of whether the doctrine of lis pendens is relevant to the facts of this case. Counsel submitted that the superior authorities are of the view that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to this case.
His second strident argument is that since the Appellants did not appeal against the specific findings of the trial court on pg. 548 of the record, counsel submitted that the implication of this is that those findings will remain valid and conclusive as between the parties hereto. Counsel cited Iseru vs. Catholic Bishop Warri Diocese (1997) 3 NWLR Pt. 495 Pg.529; Timtim & Anor vs. Chief Amabebe & Ors (1953) WACA 374.
Counsel further submitted that an appeal court will interfere with a decision based on matters of facts when it is clear that the decision is perverse. Where there is ample evidence that the trial court evaluated the evidence and made proper findings thereon, the court of appeal will not interfere therewith. He cited Aboshim vs. Ugah (1993) 2 NWLR Pt.278 pg.752; Odubeko vs. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR pt. 272 pg.747; Kokoroowo vs. Ogunbanbi (1993) 8 NWLR pt. 313 pg. 627; Onwubgufor vs. Okoye (1996) 1 NWLR pt. 424 Pg.259. Counsel submitted that there is nothing in the judgment and most especially the findings of the honourable learned trial Chief Judge which is perverse.
Counsel concluded that since no miscarriage of justice had occurred in this case, the circumstances does not warrant that the judgment of the lower court be reversed. He cited the following cases Estate of Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (2003) FWLR pt. 144 Pg. 583; Osisanya v. Odugbesi (2005) All FWLR; Amadi v. NNPC (2000) FWLR Pt. 9 Pg. 1527; Afribank Nig. Plc v. Shanu (1997) 7 NWLR pt. 514 pg. 601; Inah v. Ukoi (2003) FWLR pt. 143 Pg. 407; Nwabueze v. Okoye (1988) 4 NWLR Pt. 91 Pg. 664; Oshodi v. Eyifunmi (2000) 13 NWLR Pt. 684 Pg.332
Let us examine the findings of the trial judge. At the trial court, the Hon. Chief Judge had held as follows at page 548 of the record:
“I have carefully considered the contention of the Plaintiffs that suit No. LD/1790/93 in particular which was instituted by the 1st Defendant was still pending when all activities and ceremonies leading to his installation were carried out and that such activities were impliedly caught by the doctrine of lis pendes and therefore null and void. I have also painstakingly gone through all the authorities cited in the address of the learned counsel to the plaintiffs to buttress up the argument. I however find it difficult to be lured into this view point; moreso that in Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Alhaji Adam B. Ashiru & 2 Ors (1978) 6 & 7 S.C. 99 at 128, the Supreme Court had this to say, inter alia;
“In passing however, we think that it should be mentioned that the doctrine of lis pendes does not apply to every suit. It applies to a suit in which the object is to recover or assert title to a specific property; the property, however must be real property for the doctrine has no application to person (sci) property see Wigram v. Buckley (1894) 3 Ch. 483 at 486 and 492-3”
And in Umoh v. Tita (1999) 12 NWLR Pt. 631, Pg. 427 at 436 paras G-H cited along with others by the Learned Counsel to the Plaintiffs, Obadina, J.C.A. too opined:
“The purport of the doctrine of lis pendes is to prevent a party to a litigation in respect of real property from transferring the property the subject-matter of the litigation to a third party during the pendency of the case and thereby pre-empt the result of the action to the prejudice of the opposing party;… Consequently, the doctrine affects a purchaser who buys property, the subject matter of litigation, during the pendency of such litigation, not because he (the purchaser) is caught by the equitable doctrine of notice, but because the law does not allow the litigant parties and give to them pending the litigation, rights in the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposing party; therefore ‘pendente lite nihil innovetur’. ”
Her Ladyship then concluded at page 550 of the records as follows:
“In as much as the conduct of the 1st Defendant as complained of is reprehensible, it cannot be disputed that no real property is the subject matter of litigation in this suit and none has been allegedly transferred during pendency of this suit by any of the parties thereto. I therefore hold that the doctrine of lis pendens is not applicable to the fact in these Proceedings.”
We must remember that the main complaint of the Appellants as stated in their pleadings and canvassed at the trial was that all the activities leading to the approval and installation of the 1st Respondent were carried out when suit No LD/1790/93 and the exparte interim injunction granted in LD/456M/93 were still extant. Thus the arguments of the Appellant are:
1. That the doctrine of lis pendens applies to all manner of properties – that is real or personal or choses in action.
2. That in view of the institution of Suit No. LD /1790 /93 and LD/456M/93 by the 1st Respondent pursuant to which the 1st Respondent was granted an interim injunction there was no basis for him to have been installed as the Ojora of Lagos.
It seems to me that the narrow issue in controversy in this appeal is whether the doctrine of lis pendens is of general application to all law suits or only suits relating to real property.
The doctrine of lis pendens is of common law origin. The full maxim is “Lis pendent nihil innovetur” that is “Law suit pending nothing new to be done”. The rationale behind the doctrine is that no law suit would be brought to a successful end if parties were allowed to change their position during its pendency.
In the 9th Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary at page 950, lis pendens is defined variously as follows: “(1) pending law suit (2) The jurisdiction, power or control acquired by a court over property while legal action is pending (3) A notice recorded in the chain of title to real property, required or permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation and that any interest acquired during the pendency of the suit are subject to its outcome”
Furthermore, according to the Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 7th Edition by Roger Bird at Page 207, LIS PENDENS refers to a pending suit, action, petition, or matter, particularly one relating to Land.
In Olori Motors v. UBN Plc (2006) 10 NWLR Pt. 989 Pg. 586 at Pg.625, the Supreme Court held quoted Idigbe JSC in Ogundiani v. Araba supra who discussed the doctrine of lis pendens thus:
“The doctrine of lis pendens prevents the effective transfer of rights in any property which is the subject matter of an action pending in court during the pendency in court of an action. In its application against a purchaser of such property, the doctrine is not founded on the equitable doctrine of notice actual or constructive – but upon the fact that the law does not allow to litigant parties or give to them, during the currency of the litigation involving any property, rights in such property, (i.e. the property in dispute), so as to prejudice any of the litigating parties. As was stated in Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 26 LJ (NS) Equity Reports 797 at 80…”
In In Bua v. Dauda (2003) 13 NWLR Pt. 838 Pg. 657 at Pg. 686, the Supreme Court stated categorically as follows:
“The situation in which the doctrine of Lis Pendens operates is fairly clear: Where Litigation is being prosecuted in regard to property and one of the parties purports to transfer by sale the legal estate in that property to a 3rd party, who may have no notice of the Litigation, the transaction of sale is ineffective, see Osagie v. Oyeyinka (1987) 2 NSC 480 at 849. That purchaser gets nothing because the doctrine is not founded upon the fact of actual or constructive notice of the litigation but upon the fact that the Law does not allow to any litigant party rights to alienate property in dispute while proceedings are pending so as to prejudice the opposite party: see Bank of Nigeria Ltd (sic) v. Ashiru (1975) 6-7 SC 99.”
Also, on the same page, the Supreme Court set out certain conditions whereby the doctrine of lis pendens would apply. The court held as follows:
“For the doctrine of lis pendens to apply, it must be shown (a) that at the time of the sale of property, the suit regarding the dispute about the said property was already pending: see Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 26 L.J. (N.S) Eq. R 797 at 803; (b) that the action or lis was in respect of real property: it never applies to personal property: see Wigram v. Buckley (1894) 3 Ch. 483 at 492-493; (c) that the object of the action was to recover or assert title to a specific real property: that is to say, an action in a subject matter adverse to the owner in respect of some substantive right which is proprietary in nature: see Calgary and Edmonton hand co. v. Dobinson (1974) 1 All E R 484 at 489; and (d) that the other party has been served with the originating process in the pending action:
See Dresser UK Ltd. v. Falcongale Freight Management Ltd. (1992) 2 All ER 450 at 523.”
More recently in the case of Enekrue v. IMB Ltd (2007) All FWLR Pt.349 Pg. 1053 at 1073, the Supreme Court per Tobi JSC quoted emphatically Barclays Bank v. Ashiru supra as follows:
“we think that it should be mentioned that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to every suit.
It applies to a Suit in which the object is to recover or assert title to a specific property; the property however, must be real property for the doctrine has no application to personal property.”
The court went further on the same page:
“In order for the doctrine of lis pendens to apply, the Party relying on it must prove the following:-
(1) The object of the Suit must be to recover or assert title to a specific Property
(2) The property must be real property
(3) At the time of the sale of the property, the Suit in question was pending.”
Thus in Akiboye v. Adeko supra at page 437, the court held that:
“A party claiming the benefit of the doctrine of lis pendens in a matter has the burden to show:
(1) That there is in fact an alienation pendent lite;
(2) That there has been a successful termination (that is, in judgment or order) of the pending suit at the time the alienation is made; and
(3) That the alienation pendent lite has prejudiced or affected the other party.”
Learned Appellants’ counsel cited Ogundiani v. Araba, Osagie v. Oyeyinka and Abhulimhen v. Namme supra to convince us on the generality of the applicability of the doctrine to all litigation. Suffice it to say that all the above cited authorities had to do with sale of land or property and none dealt with alienation of personal property or choses in action. During the hearing of the appeal, the Appellants’ counsel cited Ajibayo v. Ewulum Holdings supra. Incidentally the case revolved around damages for trespass on premises in which the claimant was in possession. It does not aid the case of the Appellants at all.
Apart from that, learned Appellants’ counsel emphasized some passages out of con in that all the passages extensively quoted in Ogundiani v. Araba, Osagie v. Oyeyinka supra showed clearly that the causes of action in those cases were landed property.
Appellants’ counsel also cited Doma v. Ogiri supra, Umoh v. Tita (1999) 12 NWLR pt. 63 pg. 427 at 436 and quoted Opene JCA. He also referred us gleefully to Oguntade JCA (as he then was) in Okafor v. AG Anambra State. Incidentally, Umoh v. Tita and Doma v. Ogiri were decisions of the court of Appeal while Okafor v. AG Anambra state was a court of Appeal decision reversed by the Supreme Court. I daresay the position of Oguntade JCA (as he then was) in 1988 in Okafor v. AG Anambra State to the effect that real property and declaratory reliefs form tangible and intangible res which can prejudice litigating parties cannot be differentiated, cannot hold good today in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court on the applicability of the doctrine of lis pendens. I am bound by the Supreme Court authorities herein before cited to hold that the doctrine can only be invoked in relation to real property in litigation. In Ajuwun v. Akanni & Ors (1993) NWLR Pt.316 Pg.182 at Pg.197-198 per IGUH JSC, it was held thus:
“It is indisputable that the doctrine of lis-pendens affects a purchaser who buys property, the subject matter of litigation, during the pendency of such litigation, not because the purported purchaser is caught by the equitable doctrine of notice, but because the law does not allow parties to a suit, and give them, pending the litigation, rights in the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party. But the doctrine of lis pendens only applies to a suit in which the object is to recover or assert title to a specific property which however, must be real property as the doctrine has no application to personal property. Accordingly, where there is a sale of, or conveyance in respect of a land in dispute by either side to a litigation, even though the alienation be for ever so good a consideration, yet if it was made pendent lite, the purported purchase would be ineffective and must be set aside as void.”
See also Enibros Foods Processing Company Ltd v. Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (2007) 9 NWLR Pt. 1039 Pg. 216; Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) 6 SCNJ 316. Thus a chieftaincy stool cannot come within the meaning of “any property” or “property” as decided by the various authorities. I agree with the learned Chief Judge on this point of law.
Now, let us consider the facts and circumstances of this case. Even though the 1st Respondent obtained a restraining order exparte in motion LD/456M/93, which order was discharged on 4/10/93, there was still a subsisting substantive suit by the 1st Respondent against the Appellants in suit No. LD/1790/93. As at the time the meeting and subsequent nomination and installation of the 1st Respondent took place, there was no restraining order against any of the parties. Thus, no contempt charges could have been activated against any of the parties.
There is no doubt that it was wrong of the Respondents while litigation was on to have gone ahead to install the 1st Respondent, their action can only be criticized as reprehensible and nothing more since there was no pending restraining order against them. If the trial court had found the nomination and installation irregular, it would have been set aside without any hesitation since parties cannot present the court with a fait accompli to overreach the other party. The principle is settled that the court cannot be hamstrung by a party who changes the status quo during litigation. Thus, if a party cannot prove its case, the court is not obliged to indulge the party because it had changed its position during litigation and it may suffer the consequences if the case is resolved against such a party. In consequence, a party who resorts to self help cannot enjoy any favour from the court. That is the essence of the dictum of Nnaemeka-Agu JSC in Registered Trustees Apostolic Church v. Olowoleni (1990) 4 NWLR Pt. 158 Pg. 514 at 537 where he said:
“Once parties have turned their dispute over to the courts for determinations, the right to resort to self-help ends. So it is not permissible for one of the parties to take any step during the pendency of the suit which may have the effect of fostering upon a court a situation of complete helplessness or which may give the impression that the court is being used as a mere subterfuge to tie the hands of one party while the party helps himself extra judicially. Both parties are to wait the result of the litigation and the appropriate order of court before acting further.”
The surprising part of this appeal is that the Appellants have not appealed against all the findings of fact made by the learned trial judge in favour of the Respondents and they are therefore not being challenged. In so far as there is no challenge to the findings of the trial court, there cannot be said to have been any miscarriage of justice to warrant the judgment of the trial court being set aside on any ground. The sole issue submitted to this court for determination is resolved in favour of all the Respondents.
The judgment of the trial court delivered on 7/9/01 in suit LD/3288/94 is hereby affirmed, I award N50, 000 costs to each of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Respondents against the Appellants.
SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.C.A.: I had the honour of reading in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, OGUNWUMIJU, JCA, just delivered and I am in complete agreement with it. I intend to add a few words of my own in total support.
Lis pendens, the expression is made up of two Latin words. The first is lis. The second is pendens. The word LIS means a piece of litigation, a controversy. The word pendens conveys the connotation of pending. The two words put and read together generally mean a pending law suit. The expression is a useful Latinism that has given its name to a Notice required in some jurisdiction to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation and that any interest accrued during the pendency of the suit must be subject to the outcome of the litigation. Traditionally, this Notice was called the Notice of LIS Pendens. But 20th Century American Lawyers have shortened the phrase to merely lis pendens. See: Bryan Garner, a Dictionary of modern legal usage, Second Edition page 350. This reflects and confirms the traditional racing colloquial language of the Americans and the Americans. The doctrine which is embedded in the Common Law gives Notice to person by way of warning that a particular property is the res of litigation and that a person who acquires any interest in it must know well ahead that the interest will be subject to the Decision of the Court on the property. See: Matthew Okechukwu Enekwe vs. International Merchant Bank & 2 Ors. (2006) 11 -12 SC 3.
The doctrine of LIS Pendens is not a general application, it is restrictive, and it concerns only the effective transfer of rights in any property which is the subject matter of an action pending in court during the pendency in court of the action. This position is already settled by the definite pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the subject.
If we examine the main complaint of the Appellants as stated in their pleadings and canvassed at the trial it was all about the activities leading to the approval and installation of the 1st respondent as Ojora of Lagos. Their argument (Appellants) cannot be accommodated on the shade of the doctrine of Lis pendens, to say, that it covers not only properties, but extends to personal or choses in action. The doctrine does not extend beyond real property. The Supreme Court in the case of Ogundiani vs. Araba & Barclays Bank of Nig. Ltd (1978) 5 & 7 SC 55 at 80 stated:
“The doctrine of Lis pendens is part of our law. It presents the effective transfer of rights in any property which is the subject-matter of an action pending in court during the pendency in court of the action. Any purchaser whether he has notice actual or constructive or not is bound by the doctrine and buys nothing from a litigant vendor.”
Also see: John A. Osagie vs. Alhaji S.O. Oyeyinka & Anor (1987) 6 SC 199 at pp 208-209.
I am in full agreement with the lead judgment, and also bound by the Supreme Court authorities herein before cited to hold that the doctrine can only be invoked in relation to real property in litigation.
For the more elaborate and detailed reasoning in the lead judgment, I too have affirmed the judgment of the trial court delivered on the 7/9/01. I abide by the order as to costs contained in the lead judgment.
M.A. DANJUMA, J.C.A.: The trial Honourable Chief Judge of Lagos state, I. A Sotiminu, I had on the 7th day of September, 2001 dismissed the Plaintiff’s case in its entirety when he held that the doctrine of lis pendete lite was inapplicable to the suit relating to a challenge to the selection and installation etc of a chief (the Ojora of Ijora) a chieftaincy claim as it was held to be applicable only to suits relating to real or corporeal property.
I have been availed the benefit of a preview of the lead Judgment just delivered by my Lord Ogunwumiju, JCA in this appeal and I agree with her reasoning and conclusion that the principle of lis pendete lite is inapplicable to incorporeal claim or choses in action i.e. suits that do not relate to real proprietary subject matters.
Although, property has been defined in Jurisprudence to relate to both choses in rem i.e. property based and choses in action which simply refers to intangible right of action, e.g, action in tort, contract etc that do not relate to material property such as land, leasehold, tools and chartels, Lis pendelitis has been circumscribed by the decision of the Supreme Court to the corporeal tangent of the meaning. In Olori Motors v. UBN Plc, (2006) 10 NWLR pt. 989, page 589 at 625 the Supreme Court has made it plain, beyond equivocation, that the doctrine of lis pendete litis applies only to transfers or dealings in corporeal property during the pendency of a suit. It is intended to prevent the overreaching of the other side and the alteration in the character of real property that may occur such that the other party might have been prejudiced and/or the court foisted with a situation of a fait accompli i.e. helplessness. I do not subscribe to the reasoning that incorporeal rights such as a right of action or suits that do not relate to real property may be covered.
Transfers of shares or documentary deeds or bills such as Treasury bills may not even qualify as Real property claim.
I am fortified further in agreeing that the appeal has no merit because it is trite that a chieftaincy claim is a claim to an honor. There is no proprietary entitlement to be preserved against alienation; neither can it be destroyed. See Digest of Nigerian case law by Olisa Chukwurah page 24 wherein the learned author Posited thus:-
“The court should decline to entertain an application if the claim is to a bare dignity or honour without material benefit incident thereto. A Chieftaincy is a mere dignity, a position of honour of primary among a particular section of a Native community Adanji V. Hunvoo (1908) NLR”
That being the case, it is my view that the suit as filed with its reliefs do not relate to corporeal interest such that the doctrine of litis pendent lite can apply.
The applicability of this doctrine had been well articulated and settled in a plethora of decisions of the apex court, including Enyibros foods processing company Ltd. & Chief Christopher Enyinwa vs. (1.) Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation. (2.) Charles Ndubuisi Mbamalu 2007 153 LRCN 62; Osagie v. Oyeyinka (1987) 3 NWLR (pt. 59) 144; Abhulimhen v. Namwe (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.258) 172. Umoh v. Tita (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 631) 427 etc.
The leading Judgment has so articulately captured the law and the facts and I do not have anything more helpful than to agree that the appeal lacks merit and must fail. Appeal dismissed. I abide by the consequential order relating to costs of N50,000 as entered.
Appearances
Mr. Deji Sasegbon SAN, with him: Chukwudi AdinkiniFor Appellant
AND
Segun Onakoy, with him: Tunde Onakoya, Kunle Jimoh Esq, Emmanuel Adebayo – for the 1st Respondent
S. A. Quadri, with him: B. A. Quadri Mrs – for the 3rd Respondent
Steve Abu – for the 4th RespondentFor Respondent
