ALFRED AKPORIDO & ORS V. PETROLEUM TRAINING INSTITUTE
(2012)LCN/5660(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 15th day of November, 2012
CA/B/139/2005
RATIO
APPEAL: AN ISSUE NOT COVERED BY ANY OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL IS NOT COMPETENT
On the preliminary objection, it is trite that an appellate court can only hear and decide on issues raised on the ground of appeals filed before it and an issue not covered by any of the grounds of appeal in incompetent and will be struck out. See CROSS RIVER STATE NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION V. ONI (1995) 1 SCNJ 218. ADELAJA V. FANOIKI & ANOR (1990) 2 NWLR (PT. 131) 137 AT 148. It is also significant to note that the grounds of appeal must arise from the judgment. See MERCANTILE BANK PLC & ANOR V. NWOBODO (2005) 7 SC (PT. III) 1.PER TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A.
APPEAL: THE ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS CONCERNING THE PROLIFERATION OF ISSUES
Proliferation of issues has been condemned by the apex court in several cases. See OGOYI V. UMAGBA (1995) 9 NWLR (PT. 419) 283 at 297, MOZIE & ORS V. MBAMALU & ORS (2006) 15 NWLR (PT. 1003) and ADEWA V. FANOIKI (1990) 2 NWLR (PT. 131) 137.PER TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: HOW THE COURTS SHOULD TREAT MATTERS OF JURISDICTION
I am in agreement with the counsel for the Cross-Appellant in his submission that once an issue of jurisdiction is raised it should be examined by the court in all its entirety. See OLOBA V. AKEREJA (1988) NSCC (PT. 11 120 at 129.PER TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
(1) ALFRED AKPORIDO
(2) GODWIN ONAKPOMA
(3) MRS FLORENCE OTASOWIE Appellant(s)
AND
PETROLEUM TRAINING INSTITUTE Respondent(s)
TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is the Judgment in respect of an appeal by the Appellants and the cross-appeal by the Cross-Appellants against the Ruling of Delta State High Court delivered on 25/6/04 by R.N. Pemu J (as she then was).
The Appellants were the Plaintiffs at the court below. The Plaintiffs by paragraph 20 of their joint Statement of Claim claimed jointly and severally against the Defendant (now the Respondent/Cross Appellant) as follows:
“1) “A mandatory order that the Plaintiffs having been regularly retired from the services of the Defendant are entitled to their retirement benefits.
2) An order of Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendant, its privies, assigns and agents from withholding, disturbing and or tampering with the retirement benefits of the Plaintiffs therein.”
The Defendant by paragraph 4 of its Statement of Defence challenged the competence of the action thus:
“(a) The Defendant shall before or at the trial contend that the Plaintiffs’ action is incompetent for misjoinder of parties and causes of action as the Plaintiffs do not have a joint employment with the Defendant and that the Delta State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiffs’ claim.
(b) In the alternative the Defendant shall urge this Honourable Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim as the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the reliefs and that the entire case discloses no reasonable cause of action, it is frivolous speculative gold digging and brought in abuse of the process of this Honourable Court.”
There is no doubt that the Defendant/Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government. In fact the Plaintiffs/Appellants in paragraph 6 of their joint Statement of Claim averred that much as follows:
“The Defendant is a parastatal of the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources invested with the powers amongst others to provide courses of institution Training and Research in Petroleum Technology and to produce technicians and other skilled personnel required to run the Petroleum Industry.”
On 15/5/2003 the Defendant filed a motion on notice dated 14/4/2003 praying for “striking out this suit in its entirety as this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim. TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the grounds for this application are:
1) “That the Defendant has been sued in its official capacity as agency of the Federal Government.
2) By Section 251 (1) p, q and r of the 1999 Constitution, the Federal High Court has and exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil cases and matters to determine the claims as formulated.
3) By virtue of the above section the Delta State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this case.
4) By Section 2 (o) of the Public Protection Act Cap 379 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 the Plaintiffs’ action is statute barred as it was instituted outside the three months period prescribed by the Act”
The learned trial Judge, after listening to the submission of counsel on both sides held that the action was statute-barred and struck Suit No. EHC/168/2001 out on that ground.
Being dissatisfied with the Ruling of the lower court, the Appellants on 13/9/2004 filed notice of appeal containing two grounds of appeal.
The grounds of appeal shorn of the particulars are as follows:
“GROUNDS OF APPEAL
GROUND ONE
The learned trial Judge misdirected herself in law when she stated as follows:
In all, I am of the view for reasons earlier adduced that this action is statute-barred. I find it unnecessary to consider the reliefs sought (underlining ours) as failure of the Plaintiff to bring this action within the time limited by the statute is fatal to their case.
This makes the Application before me meritorious and accordingly it succeeds and consequent upon this Suit No. EHC/168/2007 is hereby struck out, being statute-barred, with N2,000.00 costs in favour of the Defendants.
GROUND TWO
The learned trial Judge erred in law in delivering a judgment which was based on facts not pleaded nor relied upon in the statement of Defence.”
After transmission of record, the Appellants filed their brief deemed filed on 27/5/08 in which they formulated three issues for determination as follows:
ISSUE No. 1
Whether or not – (i) the Learned Trial Judge was right to give judgment to the Respondent in circumstances in which what was pleaded before the lower court by the Defendant in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Defence appearing at page 16 of the record of proceedings was completely different from the issues set out in the application which the Learned Trial Judge dealt with and gave judgment against the Appellant.
ISSUE No.2
Was it right for the lower court to award judgment to the Respondent on issues not pleaded in Statement of Defence?
ISSUE NO.3
Having regard to the fact that the Defendant had clearly shown by his pleading the manner it would be prosecuting its case did it amount to a denial of fair hearing to the Appellant when the Lower Court not only aided the Respondent to change course by putting forward a case contrary to his pleading but also awarded judgment to the Respondent on the basis of this deviation?”
In the Appellants’ brief settled by John Alele for Appellants, learned counsel argued all the issues together. He quoted extensively from the learned Author of Bullen and Leake 12th Edition by I.H. Jacobs at pages 3 to 4. He also cited (i) KYARI V. ALKALI (2001) 11 NWLR (PT. 724) page 472 at 433 – 434 (ii) MAKWE V. NWUKOR (2001) 1 NWLR (PT. 733) page 236 at 382 and a host of other cases. He submitted that each of the authorities together with the passage in the book of Bullen and Leake stressed:
(a) “The need for absence of surprise.
(b)The need for each party to know the case that he is to meet.
(c) The need for the court to be aware of what it would adjudicate upon.
(d) The need to hear the other party.”
He stated that the Plaintiffs were denied all the above by the court below. He submitted that the necessary details needed for the invocation of the preliminary objection to the competence of the action were not pleaded hence the Plaintiffs were misled. He added that if the Defendant conceived that the Plaintiffs’ case as set out in the Statement of Claim was not sufficient to give them the relief which they sought it was for the Defendant to disclose such inadequacy that would rob the Plaintiffs of the relief they claimed or rendered their case unsustainable. He finally urged the court to resolve the issues in favour of the Appellants and allow the appeal.
The Respondent in its response filed a notice of preliminary objection on 16/1/2009 objecting to the appeal on three grounds.
(1) “The two grounds of appeal upon which the appeal is predicated did not arise from the ruling and neither of the ground constitutes a challenge of the ratio of the decision/ruling purportedly appealed against.
(2) That grounds 1 and 2 in the grounds of appeal complained in the main that the appeal Respondent did not plead protection by the Public Officers Protection Act. This complaint did not form the basis of any argument at the lower court and therefore did not form the ratio of the ruling of the trial court.
(3) The Appellants having filed two incompetent grounds of appeal distilled three issues which are unrelated to the purported grounds of appeal and the ruling appealed against.”
The Respondent incorporated the argument on the preliminary objection in the Respondent’s brief settled by C.A. Ajuyah learned counsel for the Respondent. C.A. Ajuyah submitted that:
(a) “The two grounds of appeal and the three issues formulated did not arise from the ruling of the court below and should be struck out. He relied on SARAKI V. KOTOYE (1992) 1 NWLR (PT. 264) 156 at 184 and IKWEKI V. EBELE (2005) 11 NWLR (PT. 936) 397 at 425.
(b)The Appellant having filed only two grounds of appeal could not distill three issues from them. He submitted that the three issues being not related to any of the grounds should be discountenanced.”
In his main submission on the appeal, learned Respondent’s counsel formulated one sole issue for determination to wit:
“Was the learned trial Judge wrong in striking out the suit on the Respondent’s application that the action is statute-barred?”
Learned counsel relying on NWAKA V. H.O.S. EBONYI STATE (2008) 2 NWLR (PT. 1073) 756 at 773, ONADEKO V. UBN PLC (2005) 4 NWLR (PT.916) 440 at 460, FAYEMI V. L.G.S.C. OYO STATE (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 254) 907 at 973, submitted that:
(i) “The appellants did not commence the action within the 3months provided in Section 2 of Public Officers’ Protection Act and the learned trial Judge was right in striking out the suit.
(ii) The Respondent’s notice of motion was flawless in law.
(iii) The appellant could not rightly complain on appeal that the procedure adopted was wrong having responded to the objection on its merit.”
Learned counsel for the Respondent finally urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
There is a cross-appeal in this matter.
By its notice of cross-appeal dated 13/5/2010, the Respondent/Cross-Appellant challenged the Ruling of Pemu J (as she then was) on one sole ground thus:
‘The learned trial judge erred in law in not determining whether the Delta State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit by virtue of S. 251 of the 1999 Constitution when
a) By motion dated 14th April 2003 and filed on 15th April 2003 Defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the Delta State High Court to entertain the suit by virtue of S. 257 of the 1999 Constitution.
b) The trial judge was under a legal duty to determine the issue of jurisdiction raised before her.”
The Cross-Appellant sought the following relief:
i) “That pursuant to S.16 of the Court of Appeal Act the Court of Appeal do determine the issue of jurisdiction on the basis of the claim, provisions of the Constitution, arguments on record and or argument in the brief.
ii) An order allowing the cross-appeal and striking out the Plaintiffs’ claim on the additional ground that the Delta State High Court lacked jurisdiction to determine the suit.”
In the Cross-Appellants’ brief deemed filed on 7/2/2011, C.A. Ajuyah SAN formulated one issue for determination in the cross-appeal.
“Was the learned trial Judge right in declining to determine whether by virtue of Section 251 (1) (p), (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution the Delta State High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter?
Learned senior counsel submitted that it was not in doubt that the Cross-Appellant was a Federal Government Institution established by Petroleum Training Institute Act No. 37 of 1972 and by virtue of that it was a Federal Government Agency. He relied on UNIVERSITY OF ABUJA V. OLOGE (1996) 4 NWLR (PT. 445) 706 at 722 and NEPA V. EDEGBERO (2002) 12 SC. (PT. 11) 119.
He submitted further that the claim to entitlement to pension from a Federal Government Agency under the provision of the Pension Act was a matter of the administration and management and it affected the validity of the executive administrative action a decision of that agency. He relied on ADEKOYE & 6 ORS V. N.S.P.M.C. (2009) 1 – 2 SC. (PT.1) 155 at 172 – 178. In conclusion learned senior counsel submitted that the decision of Adekoye’s case was a binding decision and that the Delta State High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the Cross-Respondent by virtue of S. 251 of the 1999 Constitution. He urged the court to allow the cross-appeal as it had merit.
The Cross-Respondents in their brief settled by A.J. Oshokpelua, their counsel formulated one sole issue for determination as follows:
“Whether this suit ought or would have been struck out even if the learned trial judge had applied Section 257 (1) (p), (q) and (r) of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the Cross-Respondent submitted that the cross-appeal lacked merit, having been founded on a wrong misconception that this case ought to have been struck out on grounds that it is Federal High Court Civil Procedure Rules 2009 and Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004. He urged the court to dismiss the cross-appeal. He relied heavily on ADH LTD V. AMALGAMATED TRUSTEES LTD (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 320) Page 1008 at 1018, and OTUBU V. UNIVERSITY OF JOS (2002) FWLR (PT. 109), page 1717 at 1734.
I have carefully considered all the submissions of learned counsel on both sides both in respect of the preliminary objection and the main appeal.
On the preliminary objection, it is trite that an appellate court can only hear and decide on issues raised on the ground of appeals filed before it and an issue not covered by any of the grounds of appeal in incompetent and will be struck out. See CROSS RIVER STATE NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION V. ONI (1995) 1 SCNJ 218. ADELAJA V. FANOIKI & ANOR (1990) 2 NWLR (PT. 131) 137 AT 148. It is also significant to note that the grounds of appeal must arise from the judgment. See MERCANTILE BANK PLC & ANOR V. NWOBODO (2005) 7 SC (PT. III) 1.
It is in the light of the above that I will consider the preliminary objection.
I must state right away that the two grounds of appeal filed by the Appellants arose from the Judgment of the court below. They are connected to the controversy between the parties.
However, it is clear that the Appellant have formulated and proliferated issues from two grounds of appeal and that issue 3 as formulated by the Appellant is totally irrelevant to any of the grounds of appeal. Proliferation of issues has been condemned by the apex court in several cases. See OGOYI V. UMAGBA (1995) 9 NWLR (PT. 419) 283 at 297, MOZIE & ORS V. MBAMALU & ORS (2006) 15 NWLR (PT. 1003) and ADEWA V. FANOIKI (1990) 2 NWLR (PT. 131) 137.
For the above reasons I hold that the preliminary objection succeeds in part, issue 3 as formulated by the Appellant is incompetent and it is hereby struck out.
Now to the main appeal and the cross-appeal.
I have deeply considered the issues as formulated in the appeal and cross-appeal. I am of the respectful view that the following issues constitute the essence of the two appeals
(1) “Whether the learned trial judge was right not to have considered the question of lack of jurisdiction as raised by the Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
(2) Whether or not the court below lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
I shall therefore consider the appeal in line with the two issues. I am in agreement with the counsel for the Cross-Appellant in his submission that once an issue of jurisdiction is raised it should be examined by the court in all its entirety. See OLOBA V. AKEREJA (1988) NSCC (PT. 11 120 at 129. In fact this was not disputed by the Cross-Respondent. It is not in doubt that the Defendant objected to the court’s jurisdiction vide its motion filed on 14/4/2003 and filed on 5/5/2003. He objected on two grounds:
(1) “That the action ought to have been filed in the Federal High Court as Delta State High Court lacked jurisdiction.
(2) By Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Protection Act the Plaintiffs’ action was statute-barred.
It needs be stated at this juncture that the Appellants/Cross-Respondents’ contention as per their argument in the Cross-Respondent’s brief was that the lower court ought to have transferred the suit to the Federal High Court since it lacked jurisdiction under S. 251 (1) (p), (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution and as decided even by the apex court, in ADETONA V. IGELE GENERAL ENTERPRISES LTD on 14/1/2011 in Suit No. SC/237/2005, the suit being an action against a federal agency and the subject matter of the claim being pension matter which clearly is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. See ADEKOYE & 6 ORS V. NSPMC (2009) 1 – 2 SC (PT. 1) 155 at 172 – 178. The court below lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim. One is therefore not surprised about the stance of the Appellants/Cross Respondents on this issue.
The grouse of the Appellants/Cross-Respondents was that the Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant in its statement of defence did not supply the necessary details to sustain its objection that the action was statute-barred. I find it very difficult with due respect to agree with this Appellants/Cross-Respondents’ view. Whatever the statement of defence lacked in details was applied by the Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents’ counsel in his reply to the submission of counsel for the Defendant/Respondent page 28 of the Record of Appeal. He stated that the cause of action arose in 1985. The Plaintiffs instituted the action on 16/5/2001 – about 16 years after the cause of action arose. I therefore have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned trial Judge that the action was caught by S. 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act 1990. In my view, the action was statute-barred.
However, the learned trial Judge would not have needed to go into the provisions of Public Officers Protection Act 1990 if he had considered and held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action by virtue of S. 215 of the 1999 Constitution.
Having gone this far I hold that this appeal lacks merit. I resolve all the issues raised in favour of the Respondent. I resolve all the issues raised in the cross-appeal in favour of the Cross-Appellant. This appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The cross-appeal however has merit. It is hereby allowed.
On consequential orders are to be made by this court. The Cross-Appellant in the relief sought in the notice of cross-appeal urged the court:
(a)To pursuant to S.15 of the Court of Appeal Act determine the issue of jurisdiction on the basis of the claim, provisions of the Constitution, arguments on record and arguments in the brief.
(b) Allow the cross-appeal and STRIKE out the Plaintiffs’ claim on the additional ground that the Delta state High court lacked jurisdiction to determine the suit.
The Cross-Respondent on the other hand urged the court to take into consideration the provision of S. 22 (3) of the Federal High Act and Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act 2004 and transfer the matter to the Federal High Court.
I have deeply considered the above arguments. To my mind, all the facts needed for this court to take a decision and make consequential orders are already before me. There is no need for additional evidence.
Could the High Court have ordered the transfer of the suit to the Federal High Court or should this court do this? Learned counsel for the Appellant on this point drew strength from the provision of Section 22 (3) of the Federal High Court Act 2004 which reads:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, no cause or matter shall be struck out by the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja on the ground that such cause or matter was token in the High Court instead of the Court and the judge before whom such cause or matter is brought may cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate Judicial Division of the court in accordance with such rules of court as may be in force in that High Court or made under any enactment or law empowering the making of rules of court generally which enactment or law shall by virtue of this subsection be deemed also to include power to make rules of court for the purpose of this subsection.”
Learned counsel for the Appellant/Cross-Respondent relied heavily on the Supreme Court case of ADH LTD V. AMALGAMATED TRUSTEES LTD (Supra) to urge the court to order the transfer of the case to the Federal High Court. With due respect to learned counsel, the case of ADH LTD V. AMALGAMATED TRUSTEES LTD (Supra) is no longer good law in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court in FASAKIN FOODS NIGERIA LTD V. M.B. SHOSANYA in Suit No. S.C.312/2001 delivered on 28/4/2005 where the Supreme Court declared the provision of Section 22(3) of the Federal High Court Act invalid in the face of Section 233 and 239 of the 1979 Constitution.
According to Niki Tobi JSC in his Judgment in the case:
“Section 22 (3) of the Federal High Court Act lacks the strength and capacity to ruin the common law tradition. The subsection was too ambitious and this court will cut it to size. I also cut it.”
It therefore follows from the above that the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant/Cross Respondent is a non-sequitur. See also AWOLOYE V. BOARD OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE (1990) 2 NWLR (PT. 133) 490.
It is clear that the court below lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
It is also clear that the suit itself is statute-barred.
I shall therefore invoke the provision of S. 15 of the Court of Appeal Act in this appeal. It reads:
“The Court of Appeal may, from time to time, make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal, and may amend any defect or error in the record of appeal, and may direct the court below to inquire into and certify its findings on any question which the Court of Appeal thinks fit to determine before final judgment in the appeal, and may make on interim order or grant any injunction which the court below is authorized to make or grant and may direct any necessary inquiries or accounts to be made or taken, and, generally shall have full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted in the Court of Appeal as court of first instance and may re-hear the case in whole or in part or may remit it to the court below for the purposes of such re-hearing or may give such other directions as to the manner in which the court below shall deal with the case in accordance with the powers of that court, or, in the case of an appeal from the court below, in that court’s appellate jurisdiction, order the case to be re-heard by a court of competent jurisdiction.
In C.G.G. (N.G) LTD V. CHIEF LAWRENCE OGO (2005) 2 S.C. (PT. 2) 50, a similar situation arose before the Supreme Court. The suit was in respect of a matter which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of Federal High Court but which was instituted before Rivers State High Court. The Defendant urged the court to strike out the suit for want of jurisdiction. The learned Judge instead of taking the objection to jurisdiction, dismissed the application on technical grounds.
The Defendant appealed to this court and won an appeal. The Plaintiff/Respondent being aggrieved appealed to the Supreme Court subsequently.
Tobi JSC in the lead Judgment had this to say:
“It is clear … that the State High Court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter, including the decision the court arrived of on the issue of procedure. When the matter went on appeal to the Court of Appeal the court ordered that the matter be remitted to the High Court to decide on the issue of jurisdiction, was the Court of Appeal right in remitting the matter to the High Court? I think not. Jurisdiction is a matter of strict and hard law which can be taken by on appellate court. It is not a matter of fact which is within the purview of the trial judge, Jurisdiction is a radical and crucial question of competence of the court which both the trial court and the appellate court have equal right to take … In the circumstance, the Court of Appeal should have invoked Section 16 jurisdiction to take the issue of jurisdiction in limine. See generally NNAJI V. CHIEF CHUKWU (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 81) 180; ADEAGBO V. ALHAJI YUSUF (1993) 6 NWLR (PT. 301) 623; CHIEF EJOWHOMU V. EDOK-ETER MANDILAS LTD (1986) 5 NWLR (PT. 39) 7; IGWESHI V. ATU (1993) 6 NWLR (PT. 300) 484; JADESIMI V. OKOITE-EBOH (1986) 7 NWLR (PT. 76) 264.”
In the light of the above, and having earlier held that the action of the Plaintiff/Appellant in the court below was statute-barred but that however the court below lacked jurisdiction to entertain the said action based on the provision of S. 251 of the 1999 Constitution. I hereby set aside the decision and order of the court below striking out the suit for being statute-barred.
The lower court lacked jurisdiction to make such finding. Instead, I hereby strike out the claim before the lower court for want of jurisdiction.
In conclusion the appeal fails in its entirety. It is accordingly dismissed. The cross-appeal however succeeds. Each party shall bear his own cost.
GEORGE OLADEINDE SHOREMI, J.C.A.: I read in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother Tunde Oyebanji Awotoye, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusions reached. I adopt same as mine. The appeal fails and it is dismissed. The Cross/Appeal succeeds. No order as to cost.
TOM SHAIBU YAKUBU, J.C.A.: Having been privileged to have read the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother TUNDE OYEBANJI AWOTOYE, JCA., I am in total agreement with his reasoning and conclusion that the Appellants’ appeal failed whilst the Respondent’s/Cross-Appellant’s appeal succeeded.
The learned trial Judge had the duty to have first considered and determined the respondent’s challenge to his jurisdiction to entertain the action of the appellants’ by virtue of Section 251 (1) (p) (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), before proceeding to take any further step in the matter before him.
The criticality of the question or challenge to the jurisdiction of an adjudicating tribunal such as the trial court in the instant case, is that jurisdiction is the bedrock upon which a trial or proceeding is anchored. That is why that question or challenge must be first settled by the court before taking any further step in the proceeding.
The authorities on this principle of the law are very many. Just see Okoye & Ors V. Nigerian Construction & Furniture Co. Ltd (1991) 7 SCNJ (Pt.11) 365 at 381 381; Attorney-General, Lagos State V. Dosumu (1989) 6 SCNJ L34 at 140 Or (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.II) 552 at 555; Attorney-General, Anambra State & Ors V. Attorney-General of Federation & Ors (1993) 7 SCNJ (Pt.II) 245 at 291; Ajayi V. Adebiyi (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) 137 at 182 (SC).
The Respondent/Cross-Appellant, indisputably is a Federal Government Institution, having been established by the Petroleum Training Institute Act No. 37 of 1972. Hence, it is a Federal Government Agency.
The claim of the appellants at the court below borders on their pension entitlements from the respondent. Therefore, by virtue of Section 251 (1) (p) (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, it is the Federal High Court only which was donated and invested with the jurisdiction to entertain the claim and certainly not a State High Court, such as the court below. See: Ladoja V. INEC (2007) All FWLR (pt.3771 934 (SC); Obi V. INEC & Ors (2007) All FWLR (pt.378) 1116 (SC) and more recently Hon. Justice Raliat Elelu-Habeeb V. The Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation & 2 Ors (2012) All FWLR (pt.529) 1011 at 1049 – 1050 (SC).
It is for this reason and the more elaborate reasoning of my Lord Awotoye, JCA in the lead judgment that I agree that the Cross-Appeal has onions and it be allowed, whilst the appellants’ appeal is dismissed.
I abide by the order as to costs.
Appearances
A.J. OSHIOKPELUAFor Appellant
AND
T.E. UWHUBETIAE (with him T.O. OBARE)For Respondent
