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AKPAN v. STATE (2022)

AKPAN v. STATE

(2022)LCN/16163(CA)

In the Court of Appeal

(CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, April 01, 2022

CA/C/393C/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Raphael Chikwe Agbo Justice of the Court of Appeal

Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Balkisu Bello Aliyu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

IKAMA OKON AKPAN APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

THE POSITION OF LAW WHERE AN ACCUSED PERSON DOES NOT OBJECT WHEN HIS CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT IS BEING TENDERED

 If an accused person does not object when his confessional statement is being tendered, the only reasonable conclusion is that it was made voluntarily. See SHURUMO V. THE STATE (2010)19 NWLR (prt.1216) 73, OMIRINDE V. F.R.N (2017) LPELR – 44971 (CA), HABIBU V. STATE (2016) LPELR – 26006 (CA) and NWACHUKWU V. STATE (2004) 17 NWLR (prt.902) 262 at 273.
Now having failed to timeously object to the admissibility of the appellant’s statement at the trial Court, same were properly admitted and it will appear to be too late in the day to seek to supply a remedy to a dented or a crucified matter, which can hardly be revived. “It is too late in the day to seek to retract such confessional statement after its admission without objection from the defence. It is always taken as an afterthought, which Courts are not ready to remedy.” Per AUGIE, JSC in MUHAMMAD V. STATE (2017) LPELR – 42098 (SC) (pages 17-18 paras C). PER SHUAIBU, JC.A.

THE DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION IN A MURDER CHARGE

The prosecution in a murder charge owes a duty to discharge by proving the death of the victim as the responsibility of an accused by act or omission, intentional act or omission of the accused with knowledge that it could cause grievous bodily harm or death. In other words, in a charge of murder, the burden is on the prosecution to prove:
(a) that the deceased died,
(b) that the death was caused by the accused, and
(c) that the accused intended to kill the victim or grievously harm him.
OKETAOLEGUN V. STATE (2015)13 NWLR (prt.1477) and OLADAPO V. STATE (2020)7 NWLR (prt.1723) 238 at 250.

By virtue of Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011, the guilt of an accused person may be established through one or both of these three methods of evidential proof that is:
(a) by direct evidence of witnesses, or
(b) by circumstantial evidence or

(c) by reliance of a confessional statement of an accused person voluntarily made. PER SHUAIBU, JC.A.

THE MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LAST SEEN

The doctrine of last seen simply means that the law always presumes that the person last seen with the deceased is presumed to be responsible for his death, provided the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming and leads to no other person or persons but him. See ESSEYIN V. STATE (2018)14 NWLR (prt.1645) 491 at 505 – 506, MADU V. STATE (2012) 15 NWLR (prt.1324) 405 and ADENIJI V. STATE (2001) 13 NWLR (prt. 730) 375. In OLADAPO V. STATE (supra), it was held that where it has been confirmed by available evidence that the deceased was with the appellant up to the time of her death, then the doctrine of last seen obviously applied against him. That being the case, the accused person has a duty to give an explanation relating to how the deceased met his/her death. In the absence of such explanation, a trial or even an appellate Court will be justified in drawing the inference that the accused person killed the deceased. [IGABELE V. THE STATE (2006) 6 NWLR (prt.975) 100 and ESSEYIN V. STATE Supra]. PER SHUAIBU, JC.A.

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appellant was charged before the High Court of Akwa Ibom State sitting at the Ikot Ekpene Judicial Division on a one count charge as follows:-
“STATEMENT OF OFFENCE
MURDER punishable under Section 326 (1) Cap. 38, Vol.2, Laws of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, 2000.
PARTICULARS OF OFFENCE
IKAMA OKON AKPAN on the 25th day of March, 2012 at No. 70 Ikot Ibong Road, Ikot Ekpene Judicial Division murdered ROSE AKPAN UDO (F).

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and the trial commenced with the prosecution calling six witnesses and tendering 10 Exhibits. The appellant testified in his defence and called no other witness. At the end of the trial and in a reserved but considered judgment delivered on the 5th day of July, 2018, appellant was found guilty of the offence charged and was accordingly convicted and sentenced to death by hanging.

​Dissatisfied with the judgment, appellant appealed to this Court on 6/8/2018 and his initial notice of appeal contains three grounds of appeal at pages 145-149 of the record of appeal. By leave of this Court granted on 30/4/2020, appellant amended his grounds of appeal and the amended grounds of appeal contain five grounds of appeal.

At the hearing of the appeal on 2/3/2022, Julius O. Idiege, Esq., adopted and relied on the appellant’s brief of argument filed on 24/12/2018 in urging this Court to allow the appeal. Akaninyene Akpan Assistant Chief State Counsel, Ministry of Justice, Akwa Ibom State adopted and relied on the respondent’s brief of argument filed on 29/5/2020 in urging this Court to dismiss the appeal.

The appellant distilled two issues for the determination of this appeal as follows:-
1. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that Exhibit 7 qualifies as a confessional statement.
2. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that it was the appellant who killed the deceased.

The respondent on the other hand distilled a sole issue for determination thus:
Whether from the totality of the evidence, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.

I shall utilize the two issues formulated by the appellant, the undoubted owner of the appeal. Before delving into the merits, it is pertinent to state the facts of the case giving rise to the appeal albeit, briefly:
On 25/3/2012, the appellant visited the deceased in her house at No.37 Sanni Ogun, Ikot Ekpene and together went out in the afternoon and never returned back. All efforts to reach out to the deceased proved abortive as her phone line was switched off. And two days later, the lifeless body of the deceased was recovered along Ibong road, dumped in a bush at Ikot Otu village, Ikot Ekpene. The appellant was arrested two months after the incident but he claimed that he only had a sexual intercourse with the deceased who later went out to ease herself. It was while easing herself that she screamed, he rushed out and found the deceased on the floor. The appellant also claimed that immediately he saw that the deceased had died, he lost all sense of awareness due to shock.

The first issue is whether Exhibit 7 qualifies as a confessional statement wherein learned counsel submit that a confessional statement comprises of two essential elements that is, the statement must have been made voluntarily and same must contains an admission by the maker stating or suggesting that he committed the crime for which he is charged. Counsel contend that Exhibit 7 was recorded by someone other than the appellant and that same was made in the course of interrogation of the appellant. Thus, the statement was systematically and intensively questioned the appellant to elicit from him inadmissible evidence.

As regards the second element of confession, counsel contend that the appellant was charged for the offence of murder but however, the appellant confessed to having taken the deceased away for sexual intercourse. He submit that there is nothing in Exhibit 7 stating or suggesting that in taking the deceased for sexual intercourse, the appellant had intended to cause the death of the deceased or to cause the deceased grievous bodily harm and or that the sexual intercourse was in prosecution of any unlawful purpose. In aid, counsel cited and relied on Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the cases of ADEBAYO V. STATE (2014) LPELR – 22988 (SC) and NKIE V. F.R.N. (2014) LPELR – 22877 (SC), in urging this Court to hold that the finding of the lower Court that Exhibit 7 is a confessional statement is a perverse finding that is not derived from the evidence placed before the lower Court.

On the part of the respondent, counsel submit that Exhibit 7 qualifies as a confessional statement as same was made voluntarily having been tendered without objection and which statement suggested inferences that the appellant committed the crime. He highlighted the contents of Exhibit 7 and contend that the only logical conclusion to be inferred therefrom is that the appellant killed the deceased while being with her alone in an unoccupied compound.

Counsel submitted further that the objection of counsel on ground of involuntariness of Exhibit 7 was too late in the day as same was never raised during trial where the question of voluntariness of confessional statement was to be tested. He referred to SAMAILA V. STATE (2016) ALL FWLR (prt. 818) 849 and OSENI V. STATE (2012) ALL FWLR (prt.619) 1010 to contend that it is too late to seek to retract confessional statement after its admission without objection as doing so would be taken to be an afterthought.

On the appellant’s imputation that Exhibit 7 was a by-product of interrogation to systematically elicit inadmissible evidence, counsel submit that interrogation is part of investigation and that the evidence of pw6 to that effect was never challenged or controverted under cross-examination. And that where an adversary fails to cross-examine a witness upon a particular matter, the implication is that he accepts the truth of that matter as led in evidence. He referred to IGHALO V. THE STATE (2016)17 NWLR (prt.1540)1 and ESENE V. THE STATE (2017) LPELR – 41912 (SC).

By virtue of Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011, a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with an offence stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. Furthermore, a confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if at the time of making the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient in the opinion of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable or supposing that by making it would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature.

The law is settled that the proper stage at which an accused person should challenge an alleged confessional statement during trial is when the statement is tendered in evidence by the prosecution. See IKEMSON V. STATE (1989) 3 NWLR (prt.110) 455, AFOLALU V. STATE (2009) 3 NWLR (prt.1127) 161 at 193 and OSENI V. STATE also reported in (2012) LPELR – 7833 (SC).

It is pertinent to state here that the appellant made two statements respectively on 28/5/2012 and 30/5/2012 and both were tendered and admitted through pw6. On page 109 of the record, pw6 testified thus:-
“The statement of accused person was volunteered in English Language. That is the accused spoke to me in English Language. I recorded same in English. I read it over to him and he acknowledged same as his statement and then signed same.”
He testified further that:
“After recording the statement of 30/5/2012, I took the accused to my superior police officer and the accused endorsed the confessional statement form before my SPO.”

I have stated that an objection to admissibility or otherwise of a confessional statement must be brought timeously at the time the prosecution seeks to tender such statement. In the instant case, the appellant did not object to the admissibility his statements of 28/5/2012 and 30/5/2012 and same were admitted as Exhibits 6 and 7 respectively. If an accused person does not object when his confessional statement is being tendered, the only reasonable conclusion is that it was made voluntarily. See SHURUMO V. THE STATE (2010)19 NWLR (prt.1216) 73, OMIRINDE V. F.R.N (2017) LPELR – 44971 (CA), HABIBU V. STATE (2016) LPELR – 26006 (CA) and NWACHUKWU V. STATE (2004) 17 NWLR (prt.902) 262 at 273.
Now having failed to timeously object to the admissibility of the appellant’s statement at the trial Court, same were properly admitted and it will appear to be too late in the day to seek to supply a remedy to a dented or a crucified matter, which can hardly be revived. “It is too late in the day to seek to retract such confessional statement after its admission without objection from the defence. It is always taken as an afterthought, which Courts are not ready to remedy.” Per AUGIE, JSC in MUHAMMAD V. STATE (2017) LPELR – 42098 (SC) (pages 17-18 paras C).

It is also my view that the fact that Exhibit 7 was recorded during further interrogation does not ipso facto renders it involuntary in the absence of duress, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the appellant. Interrogation is synonymous to investigation and cannot in the context of police investigatory duties implies compulsion. There is nothing in law that makes a statement inadmissible because it was obtained by questioning the accused person. See HAMZA V. STATE (2019) 16 NWLR (Prt. 1699) 418 at 435.

Also on whether Exhibit 7 qualifies as confessional statement within the contemplation of Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011, a confession may either be an outright admission or suggesting the inference that the accused person committed the crime. In Exhibit 7, appellant stated inter alia that:-
“The main purpose of going there was for sexual intercourse. I sex her only once when she demanded to go and urinate in the toilet while I was still in the room, I overheard her shouting … I rushed to the toilet. I met her lying flat on the floor while facing up, some white foam was coming out from her mouth …. This happened about 5.00pm because of fear I left the corpse there in that compound till 10.00pm. I hired a cyclist whose I do not know and offer him one thousand (N1,000) and removed the woman corpse to Ikot Otu village and abandoned the corpse there and went away.”

What is discernible from the above excerpts is that the appellant and the deceased were together at No. 70 Ibong Road alone in an uninhabited compound. And that she died at about 5:00pm but rather waited till 10:00pm in the night to dispose of the corpse of the deceased which in my humble view suggest having a hand in her death. I therefore cannot but agree with the findings of the learned trial judge on page 138 of the record thus:-
“Instead of acting transparently, the accused who knew he had something to hide surreptitiously kept mute after the deceased allegedly fell down. He arranged to dump the body in another village where he would not be linked with the killing. He did not report to the family of the deceased or the police but simply disappeared into thin air.”

I therefore resolved the first issue against the appellant.
The second issue is whether the learned trial was right in finding the appellant guilty for killing the deceased and thus questions the evaluation of the evidence adduced at the trial. Learned counsel for the appellant listed the essential elements of the offence of murder and submit that the prosecution must establish not only that the act of the accused person could have caused the death but that in actual fact the deceased died as a result of the act of the accused person to the exclusion of all other possibilities. In otherwords, the evidence must establish that the death was a direct and not merely a remote result of the act of the accused.

Counsel contend that none of the witnesses called by the prosecution led evidence to show that the act of the accused caused the death of the deceased and not even the appellant stated in his extra-judicial statement, Exhibits 6 and 7 or in his oral evidence that the deceased died as a result of the appellant’s action and therefore the learned trial judge was wrong to have held that the appellant killed the deceased. It was submitted that where as in this case it was impossible to identify the precise cause of death from the evidence, the accused person must be acquitted relying on the authority in the case of EFFIONG V. STATE (2018) ALL FWLR (prt.944) 710 at 735.

It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that since pw5 (medical doctor) testified before the trial Court as to the cause of death of the deceased, the trial Court erred in law to have admitted the autopsy Exhibits 3, 3A – C through him and this Court was urged to exclude the autopsy from the record as the Court has the inherent jurisdiction to do so. Again, counsel submit that it is clear from the autopsy, the cause of death of the deceased was trauma which could be caused by a bathtub and therefore it cannot be said that the evidence of pw5 suggests that the appellant caused the death of the deceased.

He submit further that the legal question is not what the appellant supposed to do, which he did not do, rather the question is did the deceased died as a result of a grievous bodily harm inflicted on her by the appellant or whether she died because the appellant kill her.

Counsel submit that it is only when the accused person fails to offer an explanation that the doctrine of last seen applies and that the doctrine does not apply to the instant case because the appellant has offered satisfactory explanation on the cause of death of the deceased in Exhibit 7.

In response, counsel for the respondent submit that the circumstantial evidence before the lower Court revealed that the death of the deceased resulted from the singular act of the appellant. The evidence of pw1 and pw3 according to counsel established that the appellant was the last person seen with the deceased as such bears full responsibility for her death. She submit that the last seen doctrine raises a presumption that the person(s) last seen with a deceased person bears full responsibility for any ensuring death, citing and relying on OGEDENGBE V. STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (prt 752) 1724 at 1741 and ILIYASU V. STATE (2015) ALL FWLR (prt. 793) 1961 at 1991.

Still in argument, counsel submit that the appellant failed to give explanation at the earliest opportunity relating to how the deceased died and the feeble attempt was an afterthought merely designed to exculpate himself. The appellant’s explanation according to learned counsel was debunked by the evidence of pw5, the medical doctor whose evidence was summarized in the Autopsy report showing that the deceased had multiple deep bruises and ecchymosis of the upper limbs and head. The Autopsy report also show evidence of bleeding from both ears and nostrils.

On the potency of Autopsy report, Exhibit 3, 3A – C, counsel argued that same was never objected to at the point of tendering during trial and being legally admissible, a party cannot be allowed to object it on appeal. That apart, the issue regarding the potency of the autopsy report does not formed part of the judgment of the lower Court. Reliance was placed on ABOKOKUYANRO V. STATE (2012)2 NWLR (prt.1285) 530 to the effect that parties must be consistent in their case both at trial and on appeal as the appellate Court cannot go outside the issues raised and settled by the trial Court.

As to the appellant’s allusion that the cause of death of the deceased is not linked to the appellant but was due to trauma which could be caused by a bathtub, counsel referred to the evidence of pw5 who emphatically stated that the cause of death of the deceased is trauma due to head injury. Eventhough, he admitted under cross-examination that the cause of death could be by a bathtub but he was very explicit that such cases are rare. Counsel reiterated that there is no evidence of bathtub before the lower Court and pw6 confirmed that the toilet in No.70 Ibong road is outside the room.

The prosecution in a murder charge owes a duty to discharge by proving the death of the victim as the responsibility of an accused by act or omission, intentional act or omission of the accused with knowledge that it could cause grievous bodily harm or death. In other words, in a charge of murder, the burden is on the prosecution to prove:
(a) that the deceased died,
(b) that the death was caused by the accused, and
(c) that the accused intended to kill the victim or grievously harm him.
OKETAOLEGUN V. STATE (2015)13 NWLR (prt.1477) and OLADAPO V. STATE (2020)7 NWLR (prt.1723) 238 at 250.

By virtue of Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011, the guilt of an accused person may be established through one or both of these three methods of evidential proof that is:
(a) by direct evidence of witnesses, or
(b) by circumstantial evidence or
(c) by reliance of a confessional statement of an accused person voluntarily made.

In the present case, the prosecution at the trial relied on the last two methods of evidential proof. From the record, the death of Rose Akpan Udo was not in doubt. In other words, the appellant is not denying the fact that the deceased, his erstwhile friend, has died on 25th day of March, 2012 the very day he visited her in her house at 37 Sanni Ogun Street, Ikot Ekpene.

The appellant’s main contention is that he was not responsible for her death. The respondent’s contention on the other hand is that there exists a strong circumstantial evidence against the appellant. The evidence of pw1 and pw3 cumulatively shows that on 25th March, 2012 they were at home, No.37 Sanni Ogun Street, Ikot Ekpene with their mother, the deceased when the appellant came in the afternoon and took the deceased out. And that by evening when she did not return they started calling her phone line but same was switched off. It was only on the second day that the lifeless body of their mother was recovered along Ibong road dumped in a bush. In essence, the evidence of pw1 and pw3 establishes that the appellant was the last person seen with the deceased.

The germane question is who was responsible in causing the death of the deceased? As stated earlier that there was no eyewitness account as to who witnessed the commission of the crime. However, the evidence of pw1 and pw3 are intandem with the appellant’s own evidence that he was the last person seen with the deceased penultimate to her death.

The doctrine of last seen simply means that the law always presumes that the person last seen with the deceased is presumed to be responsible for his death, provided the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming and leads to no other person or persons but him. See ESSEYIN V. STATE (2018)14 NWLR (prt.1645) 491 at 505 – 506, MADU V. STATE (2012) 15 NWLR (prt.1324) 405 and ADENIJI V. STATE (2001) 13 NWLR (prt. 730) 375. In OLADAPO V. STATE (supra), it was held that where it has been confirmed by available evidence that the deceased was with the appellant up to the time of her death, then the doctrine of last seen obviously applied against him. That being the case, the accused person has a duty to give an explanation relating to how the deceased met his/her death. In the absence of such explanation, a trial or even an appellate Court will be justified in drawing the inference that the accused person killed the deceased. [IGABELE V. THE STATE (2006) 6 NWLR (prt.975) 100 and ESSEYIN V. STATE Supra].

The next germane question is did the appellant proffered explanation relating to how the deceased met her death? In his extra-judicial statement of 28/5/2012, appellant denied going out with the deceased in the following words:-
…”on that day I visited the woman with my mate 90 AK 158 KMN. As she told me to go and that she will be going to Ikono, I left alone back to Ibong road to take palm wine.”

In his additional statement of 30/5/2012, appellant explained that he went to the deceased’s house on 25/3/2012 and took her to an uninhabited compound where he had sexual intercourse with her. The deceased according to him demanded to go and ease herself wherein he overheard her shouting, he rushed and met her lying flat and white foam gushing out from her mouth. It was also the appellant’s explanation that he did not report to either the police or her family because of fear. Nonetheless, the appellant left the corpse in the compound around 5:00pm but only to resurfaced at about 10:00pm with a cyclist to remove the corpse to Ikot Otu village and abandoned same and went away.

The explanation relating to how the deceased met her death by the appellant is nothing but a feeble attempt to exculpate himself from the crime. The circumstantial evidence available pointed irresistible to the appellant being culpably responsible to the death of the deceased. He did not discharge the evidential burden of casting reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s evidence tending to establish his guilty criminal mind or mensrea. In otherwords, the appellant has not been able to refute the evidence marshaled against him by the prosecution. The learned trial judge aptly captured the case of the appellant regarding how the deceased met her death on page 138 of the record that:-
“I am emboldened in my believe because one cannot fail to wonder why the accused first denied having been with the deceased or even knowing about her death? It can only mean that he knew something about the crime and set out deliberately to conceal the events that led to the death of the deceased.”

I have earlier held the view that the appellant in Exhibit 7 confessed to the commission of the crime which invariably supported the presumption of his guilt by the application of the doctrine of last as well as the evidence of pw1, pw3 and pw4 all of which corroborated and supported his responsibility in causing the death of the deceased.

Learned counsel for the appellant has urged this Court to discountenance the autopsy report because same was tendered through the medical doctor who prepared the said report. Generally, medical evidence is not always needed in murder cases except where necessary to prove death and causes of death. There is no denying the fact that the autopsy was tendered and admitted through pw5 and that same reflected his findings on what caused the death of the deceased, Rose Akpan Udo. The witness did not give further evidence as to the contents of Exhibit 3, 3A – C, but when cross-examined, pw5 said:-
“The cause of death as found by me has been stated in the medical report including trauma”. It is possible that a bathtub could have caused the trauma but it is rare.”

Let me state in unequivocal terms that the fact that the autopsy report, Exhibit 3, 3A – C was tendered and admitted through the medical doctor does not render the report inadmissible as a medical report can even be tendered and admitted through the investigating police officer and be relied upon without calling the medical doctor who prepared it. Furthermore, to call the maker of the report is a matter of choice given by the law. In the instant case, the option chosen by the prosecution in calling the doctor who prepared the autopsy report does not in my view make the report inadmissible or deficient in terms of probative value. Similarly, the imputation of bath tub as one of the factors that could cause the trauma does not arise in this case because of the absence of any shread of evidence to contradict the clear finding of pw5 that the deceased died of severe injury due to trauma with blunt object. After all, Court can properly infer from circumstantial evidence that the death of the deceased was caused by the act of the accused even without hearing medical evidence.

Finally, on the question as to whether the learned trial judge considers the defence of the appellant that he failed to report the incident as a result of fear, the Court no doubt has a duty to consider every defence available to an accused person, as disclosed by the facts of the case, whether raised or not, no matter how improbable that defence might be. I agree with the submission of the respondent that the defence of fear though appears to be a conjecture but the trial Court duly considered all the available defenses including the issue of fear but found none to be available to the appellant. Learned trial judge concluded rightly in my view on page 140 of the record thus:-
“At the scene of crime, the accused could not show the pw6 the toilet where the deceased allegedly slumped and died. The accused told the pw6 that he neither reported the death to the police or the deceased person’s family. In other words, despite the fact that the person with whom the accused was in an intimate relationship with, allegedly slumped on her own accord and died, the accused found it convenient to dispose of her body and just walk away.
This account is highly improbable. I reject it as totally false.”

The second issue is also resolved against the appellant.

On the whole, this appeal shall be and it is hereby dismissed for lacking in merit. The decision of the trial Court is accordingly affirmed.

RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Shuaibu, JCA and I agree with him that there is want of merit in this appeal. I join him in dismissing the appeal.

BALKISU BELLO ALIYU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read before today, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, M. Shuaibu, JCA. I am at one with his reasoning and conclusion reached and I adopt them as mine in also dismissing this appeal for lack of merit. I dismiss this appeal. I affirm the judgment of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State delivered on the 5th July, 2018.

Appearances:

Julius Idiege, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Akaninyene Akpan, Asst. Chief State Counsel, MOJ, AKS. For Respondent(s)