AKEBONO INDUSTRIAL COMPANY NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS v. OBINYA PLASTICS LIMITED & ORS
(2013)LCN/6285(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 11th day of June, 2013
CA/OW/136/2011
JUSTICES
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. AKEBONO INDUSTRIAL CO. NIG. LTD
2. TZON YOW JACK
3. HUANG CHIEN HSIANG
4. KUO HUANG EMMY
5. NGOZI OKPARA
6. OBIAJULU ONYEKA NZEKA Appellant(s)
AND
1. OBINYA PLASTICS LTD.
2. XEDUSON NIG. LTD.
3. KOSINEX VENTURES LTD.
4. CHIJIOKE UGORJI
5. MR. DAMIAN AGHAMELU
6. FIDELITY BANK PLC
7. ZENITH BANK PLC
8. BANK PHB PLC
9. AFRI BANK PLC
10. GUARANTY TRUST BANK
11. DIAMOND BANK PLC
12. UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC
13. FIRST BANK NIG. PLC
14. OCEANIC INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
15. INTERCONTINENTAL BANK PLC Respondent(s)
RATIO
THE PRINCIPLE OF LOCUS STANDI
It is now well settled that locus standi is the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. Indeed, it is the standing which a party has to enable him invoke the judicial powers of the court. If a party does not have the requisite locus or legal capacity or standing to sue, he cannot invoke the said judicial powers because in such a situation, the court will not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate over the dispute presented to it. See PRINCE ADENOLU ODENEYE v. PRINCE DAVID OLU EFUNUGA (1990) 11-12 SC 122; THOMAS v. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669; IJELU & ORS v. LAGOS STATE DEVELOPMENT & PROPERTY CORPORATION & ORS. (1992) NWLR (pt.266) 414; SENATOR ABRAHAM ADESANYA v. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ANOR. (1981) NSCC pg. 146; ATTORNEY GEN. OF KADUNA STATE v. MALLAM UMARU HASSAN (1985) NWLR 9 (pt. 8) 483. PER OKORO, J.C.A.
FACTOR TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PERSON HAS LOCUS STANDI TO INSTITUTE AN ACTION
In determining whether a person has locus standi to institute an action, it is now well settled that it is the originating process that the court examines and in this case, the petition filed by the 1st – 4th respondents. See ANOZIA v. A.G. LAGOS STATE (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 207.The main issue in the petition filed by the 1st – 4th respondent at the court below has to do with the winding-up of the 1st appellant herein. That being the case, the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) Cap C20 Vol. 3 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 makes ample provisions regarding how to locate a person with locus standi to present a winding-up petition of a company. My duty in this appeal is therefore to inquire into the petition of the 1st – 4th respondents to see whether they could be said to fall within the purview of the provisions of the Act alluded to above. In other words, does the petition of the petitioners (1st – 4th respondents) disclose any locus in the petitioners to clothe the court below with jurisdiction or power to determine the petition?
Section 410 of CAMA provides:
“An application to the court for the winding-up of a company shall be by petition presented subject to the provisions of this Section by
(a) the company;
(b) a creditor, including a contingent or prospective creditor of the company;
(c) the official receiver;
(d) a contributory;
(e) a trustee in bankruptcy to or a personal representative of a creditor or contributory;
(f) commission under Section 323 of the Act;
(g) a receiver if authorized by the instrument under which he was appointed;
(h) by all or any of those parties, together or separately.”
Sub-section 2 of Section 410 further provides as follows:-
“Notwithstanding anything in sub-section 1 of this Section:-
(a) a contributory shall not be entitled to present a petition for winding-up unless – (i) The number of members is reduced below two or (ii) The shares in respect of which he is a contributory or some of them were originally allotted to him or have been held by him and registered in his name for at least 6 months during the 18 months before the commencement of the winding-up of the company.
(b) C and d of this subsection are not reproduced because they are not relevant to our present endeavours.”
In overruling the preliminary objection of the appellants herein the learned trial judge held as follows:
(a) That the 1st – 4th respondents are shareholders of the 1st appellant.
(b) That the 4th respondent is a contingent or prospective creditor of the 1st appellant.
Now, can we locate the above findings of the learned trial judge in the pleadings of the 1st – 4th respondents vis-a -vis Section 410 of CAMA (supra)? PER OKORO, J.C.A.
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A. (Delivering the leading Judgment): By a petition dated the 29th day of April, 2010 and filed on the 5th May, 2010, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondents (as petitioners), prayed the Federal High Court sitting in Owerri for the following orders against the appellants and the 5th to 17th respondents to wit:
“(1) That 1st respondent be wound up by the court under the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act.
(2) AN ORDER that the assets of the 1st respondent be shared in accordance with the shareholding structure between the petitioners and the 1st respondent.
(3) Any order that may be made in the circumstances.”
The facts which are relevant to the determination of this case are as contained in the petition as the appellants are not challenging any of the facts averred and even referred to these facts in their brief of argument. The salient facts as contained in paragraph 5 of the petition ire as follows:
1) The 1st to 3rd respondents were allotted shares of the 1st appellant and at this time the 4th respondent was already a shareholder in the said 1st-3rd respondents. After the allotment of the shares, share certificates were issued to the 1st to 3rd respondents and the 4th respondent became a signatory to the bank accounts of the 1st appellant.
2) Later, the 1st to 4th respondents discovered that even after issuing share certificates to them, the 1st to 4th appellants failed to effect the relevant changes at the Corporate Affairs Commission but instead they added three fictitious names to wit:
(i) Aziz Kagu (ii) Madu Kagu and (iii) Atomids Amakwe all of Plot 75 Monguno Road, Maiduguri, Borno State.
3) Thereafter, the 1st-4th respondents found out that there was no reflection of the share capital paid for and allotted to them.
In paragraph 14 of the said petition, the 1st-4th respondents herein made the following concluding statements to wit:
“14. The petitioners shall on the following grounds contend at the hearing that the 1st respondent has no lawful directors or shareholders and accordingly that a company without Directors/Shareholders has seized to exist:
(a) The Search Report has as Directors/Shareholders the names listed in sub-section 7 (b) above.
(b) The purported Annual Returns have other diverse names, some including a dead person, other including persons unknown and unidentified as Directors.
(c) Additionally, there is nothing in the file of the 1st respondent at the Corporate Affairs Commission, Abuja showing how the Directors/Shareholders listed in the purported Annual Returns emerged.
(d) The 2nd to 7th respondents made up names as they pleased without any lawful resolutions.
(e) In the process the 2nd to 7th respondents excluded the 1st to 3rd petitioners who are lawful and actual shareholders.”
The appellants filed a NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION on 30th June, 2010 praying the lower court to strike out the petition on the ground that the said court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the petition because the petitioners lack the locus to present the petition and or maintain same.
On 9th of July, 2010, the appellants and 1st to 4th respondents adopted their respective written addresses while other counsel for the other parties added their weight on different sides. Thereafter Ruling was reserved to 27th July, 2010.
On the said 27th July, 2010, the learned trial judge delivered the court’s Ruling holding that the 1st to 4th respondents as shareholders of the 1st appellant have the locus to maintain the petition and that the court has jurisdiction to hear the case. The appellants were dissatisfied with the said Ruling, hence on 19th January, 2011, they lodged an appeal against the said Ruling after obtaining the leave of this court. The said notice of appeal contains three grounds of appeal out of which the Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, Chief Eze Duruiheoma SAN, has formulated one issue for the determination of this appeal. The said lone issue is contained on page 2 of the Appellants’ brief of Argument filed on 5/8/11 but deemed properly filed on 2/3/12. It states:
“In all the circumstances of this matter, was the lower court right to hold that it has the necessary jurisdiction to hear this petition because the petitioners have the locus standi to present same?”
In the 1st to 4th Respondents’ brief of argument settled by Ukpai
O. Ukaira Esq. and filed on 3/4/12, one issue is also distilled. It is in tandem with that of the Appellants though couched differently. May I also reproduce it as follows:
“Does the averment in the petition clothe the Petitioners with the requisite locus standi to present the petition?”
Learned counsel for the 9th, 10th and 12th Respondents, Chukwuemeka Ibeziako Esq. also filed a brief on 3/4/12. His lone issue is exactly as couched by the appellants. There is no need to reproduce it again. The other Respondents did not file any brief of argument. I shall determine this appeal based on the sole issue herein distilled by the parties particularly the version as couched by the Appellants.
Arguing this issue, the learned SAN for the appellant rehearsed the principle of locus standi and submitted that it is the originating process, in this case, the petition, that must be read with a view to discovering if the necessary locus is disclosed therein, relying on the case of LADEJOBI v. SHODIPO (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 596. It is his contention that in order to know whether the petition of the Petitioner has disclosed any locus in the petition to clothe the court with jurisdiction, a close look at the provisions of Section 410 of CAMA in relation to the pleadings is necessary. Learned Senior Counsel therein reproduced Section 410 of CAMA. Thereafter he faulted the decision of the court below on its decision: (1) that the petitioners are shareholders of the 1st appellant and (2) that the 4th respondent is a contingent or prospective creditor of the 1st appellant. It is his argument that the learned trial judge relied on paragraph 5 of the petition to arrive at the above conclusion. He however submitted that even the most strained interpretation of the averments of the petitioners in the entire petition does not support the conclusion that the petitioners are shareholders or members of the 1st appellant. On who is a member of a company, learned Senior Counsel cited Section 79 of the Act.
Based on the provision of Section 79 of CAMA, the learned Silk submitted that there is nothing said or pleaded in the petition that brings the petitioners within the ambit of the Section. According to him, for the avoidance of doubt it is not the pleading of the petitioners that they are shareholders of the company nor did they plead that they agreed in writing to become members. That all the petitioners pleaded was that shares of the 1st respondent were allotted to the 1st to 3rd petitioners. He opined that the above pleading falls short of the further requirements of Section 79(3) which requires that each member of a company having a share capital should hold at least one share. That the pleading of the petitioners failed to state how many shares or value of shares each of them held.
The learned Silk further submitted that whenever the locus standi of a party is challenged, the onus is on him to prove that he has the necessary locus. He cited the case of ADETONA v. ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK LTD. (2009) 3 NWLR (pt. 1129) 577. It is his view that the appellants failed to bring themselves within the ambit of Section 79 of the Act.
As to who is a contributory, he refers to Section 207 of the Act and the case of GENERAL & AVIATION SERVICES LTD v. THAHAL (2000) 14 NWLR (Pt.686) 108 at 115 paras G-H; C.B.D.I v. COBCC NIG. LTD. (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 890) 376. It is learned Senior Counsel’s argument that the case of NICON INSURANCE CORP v. NOGA HOTEL NIG. LTD. (2003) ALL FWLR (Pt.184) 253-254 paras G-B relied upon by the learned trial judge is not applicable to this case.
On the decision of the learned trial judge that the 4th respondent is a contingent or prospective creditor, he submitted that the petition does not disclose any creditor/debtor relationship, whether contingent or prospective, between the 4th respondent and the 1st appellant.
In conclusion, he submitted that since the status of the 1st to 4th respondents is in dispute they ought to have first asked the court for declaration that they are shareholders before they could have the locus to sue. He urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellants.
In his response, the learned counsel for the 1st- 4th respondents emphatically submitted that the 1st – 4th respondents have the locus standi to maintain this petition. Here, the learned counsel for the 1st-4th respondents also sermonized on the principles of locus standi and reproduced Section 410 of CAMA. Referring to the definition of contributory in Section 403 of the Act, he submitted that a shareholder or a member of a company is a contributory. That in order to determine whether the 1st to 3rd respondents are by their averments in the petition, shareholders or members of the 1st appellant, we must refer to paragraph 5 of the petition which facts were verified by an affidavit and are unchallenged. He submitted that the totality of the paragraph is that the 1st-4th respondents bought shares in the 1st appellant and paid for them and that the shares paid for were allotted to them but the appellants failed to effect the change in the Corporate Affairs Commission. It is also that the shares certificates were issued in the name.
On the argument that the 1st to 4th respondents lack the locus to sue because their names are not in the register of members and that they did not plead the number of shares they have, he submitted that the appellants cannot be allowed to reap benefit from their own fraud.
He places reliance on the case of NICON INSURANCE CORPORATION v. NOGA HOTEL NIG. LTD. (2003) ALL FWLR (Pt. 184) 253-254 paras G-B. Learned counsel submitted that by Section 147 of CAMA, the share certificate issued is prima facie evidence of the title of member to those shares. On the issue of failure to state the number of shares held by the 1st-4th respondents, learned counsel argued that this is unnecessary at this stage. As regard the 4th respondent, he submitted that there is no doubt that he is both a director of the 1st appellant and also a signatory to their accounts. He contended that on the totality of the averments in the petition, the 4th respondent is a contingent or prospective creditor of the 1st appellant.
In conclusion, he submitted that there is no dispute on the status of the 1st-4th respondents as shareholders. That there is no challenge to the facts in the petition. Therefore, according to him, there was no need for a declaratory relief as suggested by the learned Silk. He urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st to 4th respondents.
The learned counsel for the 9th, 10th and 12th respondents made submission in support of the case of the appellants. The submissions are substantially the same and there is no need to summarize them here. He also urged this court to allow this appeal.
It is now well settled that locus standi is the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. Indeed, it is the standing which a party has to enable him invoke the judicial powers of the court. If a party does not have the requisite locus or legal capacity or standing to sue, he cannot invoke the said judicial powers because in such a situation, the court will not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate over the dispute presented to it. See PRINCE ADENOLU ODENEYE v. PRINCE DAVID OLU EFUNUGA (1990) 11-12 SC 122; THOMAS v. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 669; IJELU & ORS v. LAGOS STATE DEVELOPMENT & PROPERTY CORPORATION & ORS. (1992) NWLR (pt.266) 414; SENATOR ABRAHAM ADESANYA v. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ANOR. (1981) NSCC pg. 146; ATTORNEY GEN. OF KADUNA STATE v. MALLAM UMARU HASSAN (1985) NWLR 9 (pt. 8) 483.
In determining whether a person has locus standi to institute an action, it is now well settled that it is the originating process that the court examines and in this case, the petition filed by the 1st – 4th respondents. See ANOZIA v. A.G. LAGOS STATE (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 207.The main issue in the petition filed by the 1st – 4th respondent at the court below has to do with the winding-up of the 1st appellant herein. That being the case, the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) Cap C20 Vol. 3 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 makes ample provisions regarding how to locate a person with locus standi to present a winding-up petition of a company. My duty in this appeal is therefore to inquire into the petition of the 1st – 4th respondents to see whether they could be said to fall within the purview of the provisions of the Act alluded to above. In other words, does the petition of the petitioners (1st – 4th respondents) disclose any locus in the petitioners to clothe the court below with jurisdiction or power to determine the petition?
Section 410 of CAMA provides:
“An application to the court for the winding-up of a company shall be by petition presented subject to the provisions of this Section by
(a) the company;
(b) a creditor, including a contingent or prospective creditor of the company;
(c) the official receiver;
(d) a contributory;
(e) a trustee in bankruptcy to or a personal representative of a creditor or contributory;
(f) commission under Section 323 of the Act;
(g) a receiver if authorized by the instrument under which he was appointed;
(h) by all or any of those parties, together or separately.”
Sub-section 2 of Section 410 further provides as follows:-
“Notwithstanding anything in sub-section 1 of this Section:-
(a) a contributory shall not be entitled to present a petition for winding-up unless – (i) The number of members is reduced below two or (ii) The shares in respect of which he is a contributory or some of them were originally allotted to him or have been held by him and registered in his name for at least 6 months during the 18 months before the commencement of the winding-up of the company.
(b) C and d of this subsection are not reproduced because they are not relevant to our present endeavours.”
In overruling the preliminary objection of the appellants herein the learned trial judge held as follows:
(a) That the 1st – 4th respondents are shareholders of the 1st appellant.
(b) That the 4th respondent is a contingent or prospective creditor of the 1st appellant.
Now, can we locate the above findings of the learned trial judge in the pleadings of the 1st – 4th respondents vis-a -vis Section 410 of CAMA (supra)?
I have already held in this judgment that it is the petition filed by the 1st – 4th respondents that can locate their capacity to sue in this case. Both the appellants and the 1st – 4th respondents have made reference to paragraph 5 of the petition as the paragraph which can determine the status of the 1st – 4th respondents. It becomes imperative that the said paragraph 5 be reproduced in this judgment for ease of reference. It states:-
“5. FACTS ON WHICH THE PETITION IS BROUGHT:
(1) The 4th petitioner is a trader and in the course of his trade he, and one of his partners, the 5th respondent established a relationship with the 1st respondent.
(2) The 4th petitioner and the 5th respondent in order to enhance their trade incorporated the 1st to 3rd petitioners.
(3) With the incorporation of the 1st to 3rd petitioners the fortune of the 1st respondent boomed.
(4) In order to still take further advantage of the increasing business opportunity the 4th petitioner and the 2nd to 4th respondents agreed on a restructuring of the 1st respondent.
(5) It was on the basis of this agreement that the 1st to 3rd petitioners became sister companies of the 1st respondent and shares allotted to 1st to 3rd petitioners and the 4th petitioner made a signatory to some of the accounts of the 1st respondent. The share certificates of 1st respondent were also issued to and in the names of the 1st to 3rd petitioners. At this time the 4th petitioner was already a share holder in the 1st to 3rd petitioners. The share certificates aforementioned have disappeared, taken away by the 5th respondent whose whereabouts is presently unknown. The 5th respondent was induced by the 2nd to 4th respondents to take away the share certificates in the same way he did in respect of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the 1st respondent.”
From the above averment in paragraph 5 of the petition, the following facts are unassailable:
(1) The 1st – 3rd respondents were allotted shares of the 1st appellant.
(2) The share certificates of 1st appellant were also issued to and in the name of the 1st to 3rd respondents.
(3) The 1st – 3rd respondents later discovered that even after issuing the share certificates, the 1st – 4th appellants had not effected the change in the membership at the Corporate Affairs Commission. On the contrary, they added three (3) new exotic names of non-existent persons.
(4) The 4th respondent is a shareholder in the 1st – 3rd respondents and a signatory to the bank accounts of the 1st appellant.
(5) There was no reflection in the corporate affairs commission of the shares paid for and allotted to the 1st to 3rd respondents.
(6) The 2nd to 6th appellants excluded the 1st to 3rd respondents who are lawful and actual shareholders.
(7) Regrettably, the Memorandum and Articles of Association, the Forms C02, C07 and other relevant documents were not found in the file of the 1st appellant at the Corporate Affairs Commission.
Incidentally, the above discernible facts were verified by an affidavit and there is no indication whatsoever that the appellants have challenged those facts. There is no doubt that the 1st – 4th respondents are saying in their petition that they bought shares in the 1st appellant and paid for them for which share certificates were issued to them but that the appellants have failed to effect a change at the Corporate Affairs Commission.
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants had contended that the respondents lack the requisite locus standi to institute this petition for the winding-up of the 1st appellant because their names are not in the Register of members and that they did not plead the number of shares allotted to them. For me, such argument is, untenable. To accede to such argument will amount to allowing the appellants to reap benefit from their alleged fraud committed on the 1st – 4th respondents. I am prepared to hold and I do hereby hold that the 1st to 3rd respondents are shareholders of the 1st appellant though their names were not included in the company’s register. There is no challenge to the fact that they bought the shares of the 1st appellant and were issued with share certificates. It was therefore the responsibility of the appellants to include the name of the 1st – 3rd respondents in the Register of shareholders. The failure of the appellants to perform their obligation to the 1st – 3rd respondents ought not and should not be allowed to work against the interest of the 1st – 3rd respondents. For the avoidance of doubt, I say again that the 1st – 3rd respondents are shareholders of the 1st appellant and by Section 410 of CAMA (supra) they are entitled to or put it in legal parlance, they have the locus standi to file this petition. See NICON INSURANCE CORPORATION v. NOGA HOTEL NIG. LTD. (2003) FWLR (Pt.184) 231 at 253-254 paras G-B.
As regards, the 4th respondent, the learned trial judge held that he is a creditor of the 1st appellant – contingent or prospective. He also held that he is a contributory. Section 403 of CAMA gives the definition of a contributory as a shareholder or member of a company. There is averment in the petition that the 4th respondent is not only a shareholder but also a signatory to the accounts of the 1st appellant. This has not been challenged because the learned Silk for the appellants did not give a summary of the facts but referred this court to the facts as stated in the petition. A person who avers that he is a shareholder and a signatory to the accounts of the 1st appellant is, to my mind eminently qualified to be accorded audience in a court of law in a petition to wind-up the said company. I so hold.
Now, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants had referred to Section 79 of CAMA (supra). In paragraph (1) thereof, it states that –
“The subscribers of a company shall be deemed to have agreed to become members of the company and on its registration shall be entered as members in its register of members.”
I hold that it is the duty of the functionaries of the company to enter names of members in the register. If, as I held earlier, they fail to do so, it cannot be counted against the members. Although the learned Silk made a heavy weather on section 79 of the Act, I have not seen the substance of his argument therein. It has not and cannot change the bare facts averred in the petition that the 1st – 4th respondents are shareholders of the 1st appellant. Whether they are or not is a matter of evidence to be led at the trial. It is not at this stage that they have to prove that. The learned senior counsel also argued that the case of NICON INSURANCE CORPORATION v. NOGA HOTEL NIG. LTD. (supra) is inapplicable in this case. With due respect to the learned Senior Counsel, my view is that apart from the fact that he did not give reasons to back up his argument, the said case is apposite and applies in all fours to the instant case. As it stands, I hold that the 1st – 4th respondents have shown in the petition that they are shareholders of the 1st appellant and by Section 410 of CAMA (supra) they are eminently qualified to present this petition at the court below. And because they have locus standi to present the petition, the lower court has the jurisdiction to hear the case. Thus the lone issue is resolved in favour of the 1st – 4th respondents.
Having resolved the sole issue in this appeal against the appellants, I hold that this appeal is devoid of any scintilla of merit and is hereby dismissed. The Ruling of the Federal High Court delivered on 19/1/11 in suit No. FHC/OW/CP/97/2010 is hereby upheld. I award costs of N50,000.00 in favour of the 1st to 4th respondents.
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read before now the lead judgment of my learned brother, J. I. Okoro, JCA just delivered.
I agree entirely with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at that the appeal is devoid of any merit. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the ruling of the lower court delivered on the 19th January, 2011.
I endorse the consequential order as to costs.
PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading the draft of the lead judgment of my learned brother, JOHN I. OKORO, JCA. I am in total agreement with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at in the said lead judgment and I adopt them as mine. I too hold that this appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. The Ruling of the Federal High court delivered on the 19th day of January, 2011 in Suit No. FHC/OW/CP/97/2010 is hereby upheld. I abide by His Lordship’s order as to costs in favour of the 1st – 4th Respondents.
Appearances
Chief Eze Duruiheoma Esq. (SAN) with
Ken Eze Esq.,
F. O. Izugbokwe Esq.,
N. C. Nwachukwu (Mrs.),
J. C. Arisukwu Esq. and
Chidinma Duru (Mrs.)For Appellant
AND
U. O. Ukairo Esq. for the 1st – 4th respondents
B. N. Nwaobasi Esq. for the 7th respondent
C. Ofoha Esq. for the 9th, 10th & 12th respondents (holding the brief of C. C. Ibeziako Esq.)
J. E. Okodogbe Esq. for the 14th respondentFor Respondent
