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AJAGU v. JAMB (2022)

AJAGU v. JAMB

(2022)LCN/16129(CA)

In the Court of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, August 05, 2022

CA/ABJ/CV/533/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Elfrieda Oluwayemisi Williams-Dawodu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

PETER CHIEMEKA AJAGU APPELANT(S)

And

JOINT ADMISSIONS AND MATRICULATION BOARD RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT CAN READ INTO ANY ENACTMENT WORDS WHICH ARE NOT TO BE FOUND THERE

A Court should not and must not read into any enactment words which are not to be found there. Counsel relied on the cases of UBA Plc v. Akparabong Community Bank Nig. Ltd (2005) 35 WRN Pg. 98, Ogunmade v. Fadayiro (1972) 8-9 SC 1; N.U.R.M v N.R.C. (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 473) 490 at 503; Osho v. Phillip (1972) 4 SC 252, Ibrahim v. Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513 at 577. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this appeal as it is lacking in substance or merit. PER ADAH, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THEIR PLEADINGS

In Bakari v. Ogundipe & Ors (2020) LPELR-49571 (SC), it was held that it is well settled that if pleadings are to be of any use, the parties must be held to be bound by them. Muhammad, JSC, in Mr. Ibibiama F.G. Odom & Ors v. The PDP & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24351 (SC), held that:
“It is elementary yet a fundamental principle of pleading that both the Court and parties to a case are tied and bound by the pleading filed in the suit. They cannot go outside the pleadings either to introduce evidence or decide the issues in controversy. The lower Court’s finding that cross-appellant’s pleading does not contain facts on the presence of INEC, Police and SSS officials at the venue of the election to justify the reception of the testimonies of DW3, DW5 and DW6, is therefore impeccable. See Congress for Progressive Change & Anor v. INEC & 4 Ors (2012) 2 – 3 SC 1, Mrs. Vida C. Ohochukwu v. Attorney General Rivers State & 2 Ors., (2012) 2 SC (Pt. 11) 103 and Mr. David I. Karinga Stowe and Anor. v. Godswill T. Benstowe & Anor. (2012) 1 SC (Pt. 11) 86.”
See alsoDada v. Dosunmu (2006) LPELR – 909 (SC), Osoh & Ors v. Unity Bank Plc (2013) LPELR – 19968 (SC), Akpapuna & Ors v. Obi Nzeka & Ors (1983) LPELR 384, (SC).
PER ADAH, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE CAN BE A PRIMA FACIE IN A CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT

In law. in a claim for wrongful dismissal from employment, there can be no prima facie where the very letter of employment stating and or incorporating by reference the terms and conditions of the employment of the Claimant. Indeed, in law, the term of the contract of service is the bedrock of a claim for wrongful dismissal or termination of employment. See Amodu V. Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356 at P. 373 per Wali JSC. PER GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Judgment of the National Industrial Court, Abuja, delivered on 13th March, 2018, in Suit No: NIC/ABJ/349/2016.

The appellant as claimant instituted this action at the trial Court via a general Form of Complain and claimed against the respondent as defendant all the reliefs as per the Statement of Facts, thus:
1. A Declaration that the dismissal of the claimant from the employment of the Defendant by a letter dated 11th day of July, 2016 is null and void and is contrary to the provisions of Sections 030102, 030307, 160501, 160502 of the Public Service Rules 2009 regulating the terms and conditions of employment between the claimant and the Defendant.
2. An Order re-instating the Claimant to the Defendant’s employment without prejudice to all his entitlements and promotions which might have accrued to him but for his purported dismissal.
3. An Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant all arrears of salaries, allowances and dues payable to the Claimant from the date of the purported dismissal from the Defendant’s employment to the time of his reinstatement.
4. Cost of this action.

The parties joined issues, and the trial commenced on the 15th June, 2017. The claimant testified on his behalf as Claimant’s Witness (CW) and tendered several documents in evidence. While the Defendant also tendered several documents in evidence in the course of the cross-examination of Claimant’s Witness (CW). The learned trial judge in a considered judgment on the 13th March, 2018, dismissed the case of the claimant now appellant.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant appealed to this Court vide a Thirteen Grounds Notice of Appeal filed on the 22nd May, 2020. The Record of Appeal was transmitted to this Court on the 10th July, 2020.

In line with the rules of this Court, parties filed and exchanged their respective Briefs of Argument.

Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated 3rd February, 2021, was filed on 5th February, 2021, but deemed properly filed and served on the 30th November, 2021. Counsel for the appellant distilled two issues, thus:
1. Whether from the pleadings and evidence before the trial Court, the learned trial judge was correct in holding that the claimant failed to plead and prove the terms and conditions of his employment with the Defendant as to deprive the claimant of the reliefs sought; (Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Grounds of Appeal).
2. Whether the dismissal of the claimant ought not to be set aside and the claimant reinstated to his employment with the Defendant for failure of the Defendant to comply with the terms and conditions governing the determination of the claimant’s employment. (Grounds 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of the Grounds of Appeal).

Learned counsel for the respondent in his Brief of Argument distilled two similar issues to that of the appellant but couched differently, thus:
1. Whether from the pleadings and evidence before the trial Court, the learned trial judge was correct in holding that the Appellant having failed to present material facts and evidence in proof of his claims is not entitled to the reliefs sought and that the Respondent followed required procedures before dismissing the Appellant.
2. Whether in the instant case, the dismissal of the Appellant ought to be set aside and the Appellant reinstated to his employment with the Respondent.

I shall adopt the issues as submitted by the appellant in considering this appeal which I now take together.

Issues One and Two:
These issues are – Whether from the pleadings and evidence before the trial Court, the learned trial judge was correct in holding that the claimant failed to plead and prove the terms and conditions of his employment with the Defendant as to deprive the claimant of the reliefs sought; and
Whether the dismissal of the claimant ought not to be set aside and the claimant reinstated to his employment with the Defendant for failure of the Defendant to comply with the terms and conditions governing the determination of the claimant’s employment.

Learned counsel for the appellant in arguing these issues submitted that it is the duty of Claimant who instituted an action before the Court to prove his case as prescribed by Sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act. In discharging this onus, the Claimant is enjoined to put before the Court in the form of pleadings, sufficient facts that would entitle him to judgment, irrespective of whether the Defendant puts up a defense or that the defense is weak. The first duty of a claimant in an action for wrongful dismissal or termination of employment is to plead and prove the relevant terms and conditions of his employment. Counsel relied on Morohunfola v. Kwara Tech (1990) 4 NWLR Pt. 145 506 at 508, Lissensen v. Bosch Ltd (1940) 1 All E R 425 at 436.

Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the Public Service Rules is a special rules for the guidance and protection of public servants to whom it applies. It is a rule made pursuant to the provision of section 169 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and it therefore enjoys constitutional force. The rules further confer on the employee a statutory flavour which makes the relationship between the employer and the employee, though one of master and servant, but beyond the ordinary or mere master and servant relationship. Counsel cited the cases of Bashir Shitta-Bey v. Federal Civil Service Commission (1981) 1-5 SC 26, Busari v. Edo State Civil Service Commission (1999) 4 NWLR Pt. 599 364 at 374 E, Fakuade v. Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital (1993) 5 NWLR Pt. 291 47, University of Calabar v. Inyang (1993) 5 NWLR Pt. 300 117, Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR Pt. 9 599.

Learned counsel maintained that the question now is whether the respondent in dismissing the appellant from its employment complied with the Rules under which the appellant was dismissed. With the greatest respect to the learned trial judge, the obvious answer to this question is in the negative. In this respect, the appellant has, by his pleadings and evidence identified three issues of non-compliance with the public service rules; namely, the non-existence of the Board, insufficiency of the query letter and deficiency of the letter of invitation given to the appellant to attend the disciplinary committee. Counsel relied on Board Management FMC Markurdi v. Abakume (2016) 10 NWLR Part 1521 P. 536 at 568d, Ozoana v. Police Service Commission (1995) 4 NWLR Pt. 391 629, Edet v. Chief of Air Staff (1994) 2 NWLR Pt. 324, 41, Union Bank of Nig. Plc v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR Pt. 333 P. 385, Union Bank Plc v. Nwaokolo (1995) 6 NWLR Pt. 400 127 at 142e, Schroder & Co. v. Major & Co. (Nig.) Ltd (1989) 2 NWLR Pt. 101, page 1 at 13b-c, Haruna v. University of Agriculture Makurdi (2005) 3 NWLR Pt. 912 233, Federal Civil Service Commission v. Laoye (1989) 2 NWLR Pt. 106, 652, Adeniyi v. Governing Council Yaba Tech (1993) 6 NWLR Pt. 300 426 at 449g-450g, Adigun v. A. G. Oyo State (1985) 1 NWLR Pt. 4, 652, Otapo v. Sunmonu (1987) 2 NWLR Pt. 58, 587, Imoloame v. WAEC (1992) 9 NWLR Pt. 265 303 at 318e, UBN v. Ogboh (1995) 2 NWLR Pt. 380 647 at 664e, Abomeli v. NRC (1995) 1 NWLR Pt. 372 451, Nitel v. Jattau (1996) 1 NWLR Pt. 425 329, Fakuade v. Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital (1993) 5 NWLR Pt. 291.

Learned counsel submitted that it is paramount to observe that the whole essence of the disciplinary procedure prescribed by the public service rules is to ensure that the public servants are not only informed adequately of the allegations against them but also are given every opportunity to defend themselves which is the cardinal principle of natural justice as well as the provision of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. A breach of the rules necessarily involves the breach of the rule of natural justice and the provisions of Section 36 of the Constitution Counsel relied on the cases of Board of Management FMC Makurdi v. Abakume (Supra) at page 573d, Adeniyi v. Governing Council Yaba Tech (1993) 6 NWLR Pt. 300 426 at 456h. Counsel urged this Court to allow this appeal, set aside the dismissal of the appellant and reinstate him to his employment.

In response to these issues, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the terms and conditions of contract of employment are the bedrock of any case where the issue of wrongful termination of employment calls for determination and should, therefore, be pleaded and tendered by the employee who is aggrieved. The onus is on the party claiming wrongful termination to place before the Court the terms and conditions of the contract of employment, and to prove in what manner the terms and conditions were breached by the employer. Counsel relied on the cases of Ahmed v. Abu & Anor (2016) LPELR-40261 (CA), Mr. S. Anaja v. United Bank For Africa Plc (2010) LPELR-3769 (CA), Katto v. CBN (1999) NNLR (Pt 607) 390, Bamgboye v. Ilorin (1999) 6 SCNJ 295 at 323-4, Idoniboye Obu v. NNPC (2003) LPELR-1426 (SC), Nig. Gas Co. Ltd v. Dudusola (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 957) 292, Okomu Oil Palm Co. Ltd v. Iserhienrhien (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 600, Ziideeh v. R.S.C.S.C. (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 544 SC, James A. Ikuma v. Civil Service Commission of Benue State & Ors (2012) LPELR-8621, UBA v. Oranuba (2013) LPELR-20692 (CA), Olufeagba v. Abdul Raheem (2010) All FWLR (Pg. 12) 1033 Para. C, Morohunfola v. Kwara Rech (1990) 4 NWLR Pt. 145 at 508, Ikpa v. State (2017) LPELR-42590 (SC), Angel Spinning & Dyeing Ltd v. Ajah (2000) LPELR-10724 (CA), Union Bank v. Salaudeen (2017) LPELR-43415 (CA), Nigerian Army Council & Anor v. Erhabor (2018) LPELR-44958 (CA).

Learned counsel argued that the failure of the appellant to tender the letter of appointment when he had opportunity to do same in proof of his case and the JAMB’s Regulation and Conditions of Service Rules applicable to all staff of the respondent which governed the employment of the appellant is an indication that the appellant has something to hide. He maintained that the Honourable lower Court was right in upholding the dismissal of the appellant. Counsel relied on the cases ofJames A. Ikuma v. Civil Service Commission of Benue State & Ors (2012) LPELR-8621 (CA), Mr. Damian Uzoigwe v. Nigerian Railway Corporation (2020) LPELR-51750 (CA), Osuji v. Ekeocha (2009) LPELR-2816 (SC) at 31 (C-F), Polak Inv. & Leasing Co. Ltd. V. Sterling Capital Market Ltd (2018) LPELR- 46830 (CA) 66-67 (F-B).

Learned counsel for the respondent further canvassed that fair hearing or fair trial is one of the twin pillars of the rules of natural justice and is usually expressed in the Latin maxim audi alterem partem that is a person is entitled to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before any judicial order is pronounced against him so that he or someone acting on his behalf, may make such representation, if any, as he sees fit. The true test of fair hearing is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial whether from his observation justice has been done in the case. Counsel relied on the cases Yakubu v. Governor of Kogi State (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 414) 386 at 397, Ariori v. Elemo (1983) 1 SC 1, Yusuf v. Union Bank (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632, United Bank for Africa Plc v. Mrs. Doreen Nkolika Oranuba (2013) LPELR-20692 (CA), Nigeria Oil Mills v. Daura (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 601, Ojabor v. Hon. Minister of Communications & Ors., (2018) LPELR-44257 (CA), Jirgbagh v. UBN (2000) LPELR-5802 (CA).

Moreso, that by this appeal, the appellant who had admitted of his ignominious role in the unauthorized admissions’ regularization is merely seeking for a judicial rubberstamp that will allow him to continue to perpetuate his fraudulent activities in the service of the respondent until the organization becomes moribund. Counsel cited the cases of Passco Int’l Ltd v. Unity Bank Plc (2021) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1775) 224 SC, Oyegoke v. Iriguna (2001) All FWLR (Pt. 75) 448 at 460 Para. F, Diamond Bank Ltd v. Ugochukwu (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 384) 290 at 315-316, Paras. A-B, Noction v. Lord Ashburton (1914) AC 932, A.G. Federation v. Sode (1990) NWLR (Pt. 128) 500.

Learned counsel further submitted that the extant provisions of Section 6 of the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board Act, Cap J1, LFN, 2010, is clear and unambiguous. It has been held that when words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous, the word must be interpreted in its literal, grammatical or ordinary meaning without any sentiment, decoration or quibble. A Court should not and must not read into any enactment words which are not to be found there. Counsel relied on the cases of UBA Plc v. Akparabong Community Bank Nig. Ltd (2005) 35 WRN Pg. 98, Ogunmade v. Fadayiro (1972) 8-9 SC 1; N.U.R.M v N.R.C. (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 473) 490 at 503; Osho v. Phillip (1972) 4 SC 252, Ibrahim v. Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513 at 577. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss this appeal as it is lacking in substance or merit.

This case is an employment matter. The appellant from the facts before us was an employee of the respondent until he was sacked by the respondent on the 11th day of July, 2016. The appellant was recruited into service on 19th day of June, 2000, as an Administrative Officer II (a Senior Officer). His employment was confirmed after the probationary period. He was severally promoted until he rose to the rank of Assistant Director (Conraiss 13) before he was dismissed by the respondent on an allegation of a serious misconduct. The appellant at the trial Court averred that his employment was regulated by his Employment Letter dated 19th June, 2000 and the Public Service Rules, 2009, Chapter 16, Section 5, Paragraph 160501. ​

The appellant contended at the trial Court that the power to dismiss him was vested in the Board of the respondent and not in the respondent. The trial Court after hearing the case of the parties dismissed the claim of the appellant and held that the respondent followed the required procedure in the dismissal of the appellant from service.

In the instant appeal, it is necessary to state here that every contract of employment has terms and conditions which must be kept by each of the parties. The employment of the appellant from the facts before the Court is a regulated one. It was governed by the Public Service Rules. Where there is an issue such as in the instant situation, those regulations must be looked at to see if there was compliance with the rules of engagement of the parties. The facts of this case are not in any way contentious. The appellant was queried when an allegation of misconduct was raised against him. The fact of the appellant being given a fair hearing was not contested. Indeed, the appellant had every opportunity to defend himself over the allegation of misconduct.

In the instant case, there is no controversy about the fact that the appellant pleaded his employment with the respondent but he did not tender in evidence his Letter of Employment. The Letter of Employment is significant in any claim with declaratory reliefs complaining about unlawful dismissal from service. The Letter of Employment no doubt is important. It is a sine qua non to any successful challenge to dismissal from service. It is the letter that will indicate the terms of employment of the appellant. In any event, since the employment is one with statutory flavour, the regulations governing the service will be relied upon to determine whether the dismissal tally with the rules governing the employment.
Generally, in an action for breach of contract of employment, the standard principle is that the letter of appointment or employment must be tendered as it is the document that the Court will look at in considering the rights and obligations of the parties, more so, if the reliefs are declaratory. In the case of Morohunfola v. Kwara State College of Technology (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506, it was held that the letter of appointment is the bedrock upon which a plaintiff who is challenging the termination of his employment must set his case. From further decisions of the Court, pleading and evidence led in the case may be enough to resolve the issue at stake particularly where there is substantial admission of the respondent as to the issues bothering on the appointment. The only cause for worry is where there is the need to establish a major condition of the contract particularly such as touching who has the authority to sack the plaintiff.

In the instant case, the appellant as plaintiff had pleaded that his employment was governed as averred in para 6 thereof. Paragraph 6 of the appellant’s pleading reads:
6. The terms and conditions of service of the claimant’s employment is governed by two documents, namely;
i. the claimant’s letter of employment dated the 19th of June, 2000;
ii. the Public Service Rules 2009.

The appellant by his averment expressly provided that his employment is governed by these two documents. His Letter of Employment is number one on his list. By this deposition of the appellant, one should not in any way make the mistake of thinking that the Letter of Employment of the appellant was only meant to establish the fact of his employment by the respondent. The letter is among the documents governing his employment. The respondent in the statement of defence joined issue on this aspect in paras 1 and 3 of the statement of defence. These two paragraphs of the respondent’s statement read:
1. The defendant admits paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12 of the statement of facts. (The letter of appointment of the claimant dated 19th June, 2000 is pleaded and notice is given that the claimant should produce his original letter of appointment dated 19th June, 2000)….
3. The defendant admits paragraph 6 of the statement of facts and states further that the employment of the claimant was also subject to the JAMB’s Regulation and Conditions of Service Rules, 2009. (The JAMB’s Conditions of Service Rules is hereby pleaded)

The respondent admitted the fact that the employment of the appellant was also governed by the letter of appointment, notice to produce it was also placed by the respondent. In a plethora of cases, this Court and the Supreme Court have held that parties are bound by their pleading. In Bakari v. Ogundipe & Ors (2020) LPELR-49571 (SC), it was held that it is well settled that if pleadings are to be of any use, the parties must be held to be bound by them. Muhammad, JSC, in Mr. Ibibiama F.G. Odom & Ors v. The PDP & Ors (2015) LPELR – 24351 (SC), held that:
“It is elementary yet a fundamental principle of pleading that both the Court and parties to a case are tied and bound by the pleading filed in the suit. They cannot go outside the pleadings either to introduce evidence or decide the issues in controversy. The lower Court’s finding that cross-appellant’s pleading does not contain facts on the presence of INEC, Police and SSS officials at the venue of the election to justify the reception of the testimonies of DW3, DW5 and DW6, is therefore impeccable. See Congress for Progressive Change & Anor v. INEC & 4 Ors (2012) 2 – 3 SC 1, Mrs. Vida C. Ohochukwu v. Attorney General Rivers State & 2 Ors., (2012) 2 SC (Pt. 11) 103 and Mr. David I. Karinga Stowe and Anor. v. Godswill T. Benstowe & Anor. (2012) 1 SC (Pt. 11) 86.”
See also Dada v. Dosunmu (2006) LPELR – 909 (SC), Osoh & Ors v. Unity Bank Plc (2013) LPELR – 19968 (SC), Akpapuna & Ors v. Obi Nzeka & Ors (1983) LPELR 384, (SC).

In the instant case, the averment of the appellant that his Letter of Employment governs the terms and conditions of his service binds him and he cannot abandon it by not placing before the Court the said Letter of Employment. Furthermore, the respondent is relying on the said letter which they asked him to produce to aver that the said letter contains conditions of service of the respondent. Part of the argument in this case is that the Board of the respondent is meant to be responsible for the determination of the appellant’s employment and that there was no Board when he was dismissed. In the face of this serious contention of the appellant, the Letter of Employment is of prime necessity in considering whether the appellant was unlawfully dismissed or not. Failure to tender or produce the said letter to the trial Court in the circumstance is fatal. The trial Court in that wise cannot be blamed for holding that the claim be dismissed for failure to tender his conditions of service in his Letter of Employment. 

Further still, the appellant in his brief reproduced paragraph 160501 of the Public Service Rules which provides:
“The power to exercise disciplinary control over officers in parastatals is vested in their Supervisory Board/Council in accordance with their respective conditions of service.”

This means the parastatals have their own conditions of service which are allowed by the Public Service Rules to be used in exercising discipline over their employees. The conditions of service of the Board which also govern the employment of the appellant were not laid before the trial Court by the appellant.

From the foregoing therefore, issues one and two are resolved against the appellant. Having resolved these issues against the appellant, it is certain that there is no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Parties are to bear their respective costs.

ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have read in advance the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Stephen Jonah Adah, JCA.

I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusion to the effect that the appeal is lacking in merit and is hereby dismissed.
I make no order as to costs.

BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.: I have been privileged to read in advance the draft copy of the leading judgment just delivered by noble Lord, Stephen Jonah Adah JCA. I have gone through the lucid reasoning and the impeccable conclusions reached therein to the effect that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. I agree!

I shall by way of contributing to the reach analysis in the leading judgment just say a word or two. On 19/6/2000, the Appellant was employed by the Respondent. JAMB, vide an employment letter dated same date as an Administrative Officer II and was placed on probation. However, subsequently, his employment was confirmed and he rose up to the rank of Assistant Director on Salary Scale CONRA1SS 13 before he was dismissed on 11/7/2016, on grounds of allegation of serious misconduct after about 16 years in the services of the Respondent.

At the trial before the lower Court, the Appellant, as Claimant in an action bordering on claim for wrongful dismissal and seeking amongst others the relief of reinstatement, did not tender, the most crucial and mother of all of evidence in an employment matter, his letter of employment from which firstly the terms and conditions of his employment can be ascertained and secondly from which it can be determined whether or not his dismissal by the Respondent was wrongful or proper.
In the absence of the Appellant’s letter of employment therefore, he having failed to tender before the lower Court his letter of employment stating and or incorporating by reference to the Public Service Rules the terms and conditions of his employment with the Respondent JAMB, his claims were clearly ’dead’ on arrival. There was indeed no duty on the Respondent to even prove anything in its defense in the absence of any prima facie case of the Appellant. In law. in a claim for wrongful dismissal from employment, there can be no prima facie where the very letter of employment stating and or incorporating by reference the terms and conditions of the employment of the Claimant. Indeed, in law, the term of the contract of service is the bedrock of a claim for wrongful dismissal or termination of employment. See Amodu V. Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356 at P. 373 per Wali JSC.

In Okomu Oil Palm Co. Ltd V. Iserhienrhien (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt.710) 660 at P. 673, where the Supreme Court per Uwaifo JSC, had opined inter alia thus:
“The question must be, in what manner or by what method would the respondent in an action like this be expected to demonstrate that his employment was wrongfully terminated? It has been firmly established that when an employee complain that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, he has the onus (a) to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and (b) to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. It is not the duty of the employer as a defendant in action brought in the employee to prove any of these facts.”
See also Amodu V. Amode (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356 @ P. 370, where the Supreme Court per Abaje JSC, had succinctly observed inter alia thus:
“It appears clear to me that since it is the Plaintiff’s case that his dismissal by the defendant is not in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of service between them it is for the Plaintiff to plead and prove the conditions of service regulating the contract of service in question.”
It seems clear to me therefore, and I so firmly hold, that it is when it has been satisfactorily established before the lower Court that the terms of contract of employment that a Claimant, as an employee, was appointed under had been breached, and in what manner the said terms were breached by a Defendant, as the employer, that the question of his removal being whether or not in compliance with the applicable terms, rules or laws can arise. The Appellant, as Clamant before the lower Court, failed woefully to place before the lower Court the terms of his contract of employment with the Respondent and to prove in what manner the said terms were breached. The lower Court was therefore right, in dismissing his claims than venturing into the realms of speculation as to what those terms and conditions of the Appellant service with the Respondent were or would have been had the letter of employment been duly tendered in evidence. 

It follows therefore, even if the lower Court were to take judicial notice of the Public Service Rules 2009, it could not have done so in the absence of the employment letter of the Appellant with the Respondent stating and or incorporating the Public Service Rules 2009 into his contract of employment with the Respondent.

It is for the above few comments of mine and for the fuller reasons adroitly marshalled out in the leading judgment that, I too hold that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed. I therefore join my learned brother in the leading judgment to dismiss this appeal. I shall abide by the consequential orders made therein, including the order as to no cost.

Appearances:

M.I. Hanafi, Esq, with him E.U. Umah Kalu, Esq, For Appellant(s)

Sunday Adeagbo, Esq, with him, F.M. Akinyeye, Esq, For Respondent(s)