AGBAGUNDU v. SHIWONGUR & ORS
(2022)LCN/16078(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(MAKURDI JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Saturday, January 22, 2022
CA/J/67/2008
Before Our Lordships:
Ignatius Igwe Agube Justice of the Court of Appeal
Cordelia Ifeoma Jombo-Ofo Justice of the Court of Appeal
Yargata Byenchit Nimpar Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
PRINCESS IVEREN AGBAGUNDU APPELANT(S)
And
1. MADAM ALICE SHIWONGUR 2. DAVID IORLAHA CHIA 3. VIASHIMA KPAMBER RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDES
Now by lis pendens is meant a pending law suit or action or a controversy in Court particularly in relation to the subject matter of a property. The doctrine is designed to prevent the vendor from transferring any effective title to the purchaser by depriving the vendor of any rights over the property during the currency of the suit. See Enyibros Foods Processing vs. N.D.I.C. (2007) 3 SC. (Pt. II) 175 at 207, 209; Enekwe vs. International Mech. Bank Ltd. (2006)11-12 SC, 3 at 12; and Osidele vs. Sokunbi (2012) 7 SC. (Pt. II) 30 at 76.
For this doctrine to apply it must be shown:
a. That at the time of the sale, the action was already pending.
b. That the action was in respect of real property, as it never applies to personal property.
c. That the object of the action was to recover or assert title to a specific real property; that is to say, an action in a subject matter adverse to the owner in respect of some substantive right which is proprietary in nature;
d. That the other party had been served with the originating process in the pending action. JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDENS PREVENTS THE EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF RIGHT IN ANY PROPERTY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF A DISPUTE
Generally, the doctrine of lis pendens prevents the effective transfer of right in any property which is the subject matter of an action pending in Court during the pendency of the action. Where, therefore, there is a conveyance, sale or transfer of land, even though the alienation is for the best consideration, yet if made pendente lite, the alienation will be caught by the doctrine of lis pendens and is null and void. EBUEKU V. AMOLA (SUPRA) WIGRAM V. BUCKLEY (1894) 3 CH. 483, BFI GROUP CORPORATION V. B.P.E (2012) LPELR-9339(SC), OLORI MOTOR CO. LTD & ORS V. UBN PLC (2006) LPELR-2589(SC) and FIRST BANK & ANOR V. HAMIDAWA LTD & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44260(CA). PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE OF LIS PENDES APPLIES TO EVERY SUIT
It is trite law that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to every suit, as held in BARCLAYS BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. V. ALHAJI ASHIRU (1978) 6-7 SC. 99 AND ENEKWE V. INT’L MERCHANT BANK OF NIG LTD & ORS (2006) LPELR-1140 (SC), wherefore, evidence shows that the property was actually sold after the determination of the case, the doctrine of lis pendens will become inapplicable. PER NIMPAR, J.C.A.
CORDELIA IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal emanated from the judgment of the High Court of Benue State sitting in Makurdi (hereinafter the lower/trial Court), in suit No. MHC/130/90, presided over by Hon. Justice E. Eko, J. (as he then was) and delivered 3rd August, 2007.
BRIEF FACTS LEADING TO THE APPEAL
The Plaintiff at the lower Court who herein is the Appellant, had in her Further And Better Amended Statement of Claim dated 4th June, 2007 sought the following reliefs against the defendants who herein are the Respondents:
a) A declaration that the Plaintiff is the rightful customary holder of Plot No. BN 1312 lying and situate at KM. 2, Gboko Road, Makurdi.
b) An order directing the 1st Defendant herein to account for all the rents she has been collecting since 1982.
c) N30,000.00 general damages against the Defendants jointly and severally for acts of trespass.
d) N30,000.00 general damages against the 2nd Defendant for tort of malicious persecution.
e) An order directing the Defendants herein to give up possession of the land of the Plaintiff aforesaid immediately.
f) An order for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their agents or servants, however named from further trespassing unto the land of the Plaintiff aforesaid.
g) A declaration that the purported sale of the Plaintiff’s land to the 3rd Defendant during the pendency of this suit is null and void and the sale be set aside, having been caught by the Doctrine of lis pendis. (See pages 84 –89 of the record of appeal).
The 1st defendant filed a 1st Defendant’s Statement of Defence dated 16th July, 2006. Therein she prayed the Court as follows against the Plaintiff:
The 1st Defendant denies the Plaintiff’s claim in its entirety and avers that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the reliefs contained in paragraph 25 of the claim and shall at the trial, urge the Honourable Court to dismiss the entire claim with substantial cost, as it is frivolous, unmeritorious and most vexatious. (See page 65 of the record of appeal).
Contained at pages 77 – 78 of the record of appeal, is the 2nd Defendant’s Further Amended Statement of Defence of 9 (nine) paragraphs, filed 30th May, 2007.
Along with her Statement of Defence is the 3rd defendant’s Counter-Claim against the plaintiff filed 18th August, 2006 and which reads as follows:
a) A declaration of title to plot No. BNC 5953 in favour of the Counter-claimant.
b) N500,000.00 being legal fees paid by Counter-Claimant for counsel representation in this suit.
c) 5,000,000.00 general damages. (See pages 67 – 70of the record of appeal).
Having filed and exchanged pleadings as well as the adoption of the parties’ respective written addresses, the lower Court in its considered judgment delivered 3rd August, 2007 dismissed in its entirety the claims of the plaintiff. (See pages 191 to 195 of the record of appeal).
Irked by the said judgment, the Plaintiff as Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal at the lower Court, on 22nd October, 2007 challenging the decision. (See pages 196 – 201 of the record of appeal).
The record of appeal was compiled and transmitted to the Court on 10th March, 2008.
The Appellant in compliance with the rules and practice of the Court filed an amended brief of argument on 15th November, 2018. The Respondents failed and or neglected to file any brief of argument either within or outside the time provided for that. Consequently, the learned counsel for the Appellant applied for and was granted leave of Court for the appeal to be heard and determined on the Appellant’s brief alone. The Appellant’s amended brief of argument was settled by Amuwa Olasoji Olatunde, Esq.
Notwithstanding the absence or non-filing of respondents’ briefs, the appeal will still be determined on the strength of the appellant’s case.
From the 7 (seven) grounds of appeal, the Appellant crafted the following 4 (four) issues for determination:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have relied on the submission of counsel in the face of the unchallenged evidence of the Plaintiff to dismiss the suit? (Distilled from grounds 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether Exhibit “E” which is a registrable document and unregistered as required by law can be admitted as proof of title to land when the consent of the Executive Governor of Benue State was not sought and obtained? (Distilled from Grounds 2 and 4).
3. Whether the identity of the land in dispute was in issue? (Distilled from Ground 5).
4. Whether the judgment of the learned trial Judge is not against the weight of evidence? (Distilled from Grounds 6 and 7).
I think that issues 1 (one) and 2 (two) can be conveniently merged and determined as issue 1 (one), while 3 (three) and 4 (four) are determined as issues 2 (two) and 3 (three) respectively.
ISSUES 1 (ONE) AND 2 (TWO) DETERMINED TOGETHER
Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have relied on the submission of counsel in the face of the unchallenged evidence of the plaintiff to dismiss the suit?
AND
Whether Exhibit “E” which is a registrable document and unregistered as required by law can be admitted as proof of title to land when the consent of the Executive Governor of Benue State was not sought and obtained?
Appellant through her counsel submitted that her pleadings in paragraphs 7, 10 and 26 of her further amended statement of claim were not traversed by any of the respondents. Counsel canvassed that the appellant had copiously pleaded in the said paragraphs and led evidence on the fact that she was out of the country by 7/7/1982 and only came back on 22/12/87.
Contrary to the Appellant’s contention, the Respondents in their respective pleadings, aside from denying the averment, put the Appellant to the strictest proof thereof. See for instance paragraphs 5 and 6(a) of the 1st Defendant’s Statement of Defence; paragraph 4 of the 2nd Defendant’s Further Amended Statement of Defence; and paragraph 2 of the 3rd Defendant’s Statement of Defence.
It seems to me that it is not so much as to whether the Appellant travelled to the United Kingdom that is in issue, rather it is the date of her departure from Nigeria vis-à-vis the making of Exhibit ‘E’. In this instance, the Appellant had averred and led evidence that she travelled to the United Kingdom sometime in July, 1982 and came back in 1987. See her evidence wherein she stated as follows:
On 7.7.1982 I left Makurdi to London. I came back on 22.12.1987. Since I left Nigeria on 7.7.82 I never came back to Nigeria until 22.12.87. I did not sell that property to 1st defendant on 25.9.82. On that date, I was in Edinburgh. I was not even in London. I was also not in Nigeria on 25.9.82. (See page 119, lines 23 – 28 of the record of appeal).
Exhibit ‘E’ which is titled a Land Purchase Agreement, on the face of it was executed between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent on or about the 25th September, 1982. Contrary to the contention of the Appellant, the document was tendered by showing same to Mr. A. O. Olatunde, counsel for the plaintiff (appellant herein). Though he objected to its admittance in evidence, the lower Court however and in its wisdom, admitted and marked same as Exhibit ‘E’. The ruling of the lower Court thereon is reproduced hereunder for effect:
Court: The document is pleaded. The document merely certifies that plaintiff has (allegedly) sold her plot to the defendant in consideration for N700.00. At best the document is a receipt in evidence of the transaction. The objection is hereby overruled. The document dated 25.9.1982 is hereby admitted in evidence as Exhibit E. (See pages 125 – 126 lines 31 – 4 thereof of the record of appeal).
It is an established fact from both oral and documentary evidence adduced in the instant case, that the Appellant sold the land in dispute to the 1st Respondent in consideration of the amount stated in Exhibit ‘E’. Exhibit ‘E’ shows that the 1st respondent paid money to the appellant for the purchase of the land in dispute. Though not registered, that does not render the document inadmissible in evidence. As an unregistered agreement, Exhibit ‘E’ herein confers equitable interest on the land and not legal title. See Ayorinde vs. Fayoyin (2001) FWLR Pt.75, pg. 483, where the Court of appeal held that:
An unregistered document can be admitted in evidence as a receipt or evidence of money transaction. Such document cannot be used to prove title. However, where it is coupled with possession in appropriate cases, it may give rise to equitable interest.
It is clear from the foregoing that Exhibit ‘E’ qualifies as evidence that there was an agreement for sale of the land in dispute consequent upon which money or price was paid by the purchaser. A purchase receipt such as Exhibit ‘E’ is not a registrable instrument. It is however, admissible as a receipt or an acknowledgment of the payment of money in respect of the land herein in dispute. In aid are the cases of Adesanya vs. Aderonmu (2000) 6 SCNJ 242 at 254; Coker vs. Ogunye (1939) 15 W.A.C.A. 57; Yaya vs. Mogoga (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 132; and Kachalla vs. Banki (2006) 8 NWLR Pt. 982, pg. 364. This is to say that where a person pays for land and obtains a receipt, followed by going into possession and remaining in possession, as has played out in the instant appeal, equitable interest is created for him in the land.
Exhibit ‘E’ as rightly held by the learned trial Judge was duly pleaded and it certifies that the land was sold to the 1st Respondent in consideration of N700.00. Before its admittance in evidence, Exhibit ‘E’ was shown to learned counsel for the Appellant who never raised objection to the Appellant’s signature as it appeared thereon. The learned counsel’s only grouse at the time was that it was not registered contrary to the Land Instrument Registration Law. That the 2nd Respondent was not called as a witness to testify that he signed Exhibit ‘E’ is neither here nor there. Substantial evidence had been led to ground or justify the admissibility of Exhibit ‘E’ in evidence and same was duly admitted in evidence by the trial Court.
It is indeed trite that counsel’s address no matter how elegantly couched or presented can never take the place of evidence. Much as the 1st and 2nd Respondents failed to amend their respective statement of defence following the further amendment of the Appellant’s statement of claim, that did not take away from the fact that they both joined issues with the Appellant as shown in their original statement of defence.
Appellant sold the land in dispute to the 1st Respondent prior to her departure to overseas, thereby extinguishing whatever interest she may have acquired over same. The issue of whether the 1st Respondent sought and obtained the consent of the Governor of Benue State before transferring her interest in the land to the 3rd Respondent does not form part of the cause of action herein. It is a matter solely between the 1st and 3rd Respondents and not for this action. In the event, the merged issues that gave rise to issue 1 (one) are resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondents.
ISSUE 2 (TWO)
Whether the identity of the land in dispute was in issue.
This issue to my mind is uncalled for. This is because, the same appellant who raised it, went on in their submission to state that the identity of the land was never in issue. Learned counsel on her behalf further submitted that while the Appellant referred to the land in dispute as Plot No. BN 1312, the 3rd Respondent referred to it as Plot No. BNC 5953 and that his title is traced through one Terver Ikyambe to the 1st Respondent. Counsel was emphatic that throughout the length and breadth of their pleadings and evidence, the Respondents did not dispute the identity of the land in dispute. See the case of Mohammed vs. Mohammed (2012) All FWLR Pt. 655, pg. 363, 382 – 383, paras. G-A, where our respected Ogunwumiju, JSC., (JCA. as she then was) held thus:
It is the duty of a claimant to prove clearly and unequivocally the precise area to which his claim relates. This duty does not arise if the defendant does not dispute the identity of the property or location of the property in his statement of defence. The defendant must specifically make it an issue in his pleadings by disputing the area or location or features described by the claimant. Dada vs. Dosunmu (2006) All FWLR Pt. 34 1605; (2006) 9 SCNJ 31; Akinterinwa vs. Oladunjoye (2000) FWLR Pt. 10, pg. 1690, (2000) 4 SCNJ 149; and Nwokidu vs. Okanu (2010) All FWLR Pt. 522, pg. 1633 at 1656, para. F.
Learned counsel capped his submission and which submission I completely align myself with, that the fact that the Appellant refers to the land in dispute as Plot No. BN 1312, while the 3rd Respondent refers to it as Plot No. BNC 5953 does not change, derogate or alter the identity of the land. See the authority of Abdullahi vs. Hedima (2011) All FWLR Pt. 564, pg. 125 at 137, paras. B-C.
It is in the face of its being a non-contentious issue, that I unhesitatingly answer the question whether the identity of the land in dispute was in issue, in the negative. The identity of the land in dispute was never in issue between the parties, more so as they had gone on a visit to the locus in quo with the learned trial Judge. This is an issue that has added no value to this appeal at all as same is a mere academic exercise. Issue 2 (two) is in this light discountenanced.
ISSUE 3 (THREE)
Whether the judgment of the learned trial Judge is not against the weight of evidence.
The contention of the Appellant herein is that the learned trial Judge ought to have invoked the doctrine of lis pendens against the 1st and 3rd Respondents and declare the purported transfer or assignment of interest in the land in dispute as null and void having done so during the pendency of this suit.
Now by lis pendens is meant a pending law suit or action or a controversy in Court particularly in relation to the subject matter of a property. The doctrine is designed to prevent the vendor from transferring any effective title to the purchaser by depriving the vendor of any rights over the property during the currency of the suit. See Enyibros Foods Processing vs. N.D.I.C. (2007) 3 SC. (Pt. II) 175 at 207, 209; Enekwe vs. International Mech. Bank Ltd. (2006)11-12 SC, 3 at 12; and Osidele vs. Sokunbi (2012) 7 SC. (Pt. II) 30 at 76.
For this doctrine to apply it must be shown:
a. That at the time of the sale, the action was already pending.
b. That the action was in respect of real property, as it never applies to personal property.
c. That the object of the action was to recover or assert title to a specific real property; that is to say, an action in a subject matter adverse to the owner in respect of some substantive right which is proprietary in nature;
d. That the other party had been served with the originating process in the pending action.
From the evidence before the Court and as has played out under issue 1 (one) earlier determined, the Appellant sold the land in dispute to the 1st Respondent on or about the 25th of September, 1982. Suit No. MHC/130/1990 which gave rise to this appeal was instituted 13th November, 1990 when the Writ of Summons originating the action was issued. (See pages 1 – 2 of the record of appeal). The action was pending in Court up until 3rd August, 2007 when same was determined. The question arising here is whether there was any sale of the land between November, 1990 to August, 2007. The Appellant had averred at paragraph 24 of her Further and Better Amended Statement of Claim that:
The defendants notwithstanding all efforts by the plaintiff have vowed to remain on plaintiff’s plot aforesaid, and purportedly sold the plot in dispute since year 2000 to the 3rd Defendant and while the matter was on appeal at their instant. [Underlining mine for emphasis. (See pages 87 – 88 of the record of appeal)].
The Respondents in their respective pleadings reacted as set out hereunder to the Appellant’s allegation of sale of the disputed land:
The 1st Defendant/Respondent at paragraphs 14 and 15 of her Statement of Defence pleaded thus:
14. The 1st defendant emphatically denies paragraph 24 of the claim and avers further that the plaintiff no longer has any plot at km2 Gboko Road hence plaintiff shall be required to prove the averment therein contained strictly.
15. In further answer to the said paragraph 24 of the claim, the 1st defendant avers that she sold her plot No. 129 to Terver Aaun Ikyambe and not Lt. General Kpamber and this was shortly after the decision in MCN/7C/88. (See page 65 of the record of appeal).
The 2nd defendant/respondent on his part averred thus at paragraph 8 of his Further Amended Statement of Defence.
8. The 2nd defendant has contrary to the averment in paragraph 24 denies selling the disputed plot or any other plot to the 3rd defendant or to any other person as falsely alleged. (See page 77 of the record of appeal).
The 3rd Defendant/Respondent on his part at paragraph 5 averred as follows:
The 3rd Defendant denies paragraphs 24 of the claim and avers that he did not buy any plot from the 1st and/or 2nd Defendant in 1990 or at any other time. (See page 67 of the record of appeal).
In the course of her being cross-examined, the Appellant as Plaintiff at the lower Court had testified that she was not aware that the property was sold in 1988 or anytime. (See page 120, lines 31 – 32 of the record of appeal). Furthermore, at page 122, lines 1 – 2 of the record she changed tone by testifying that “3rd Defendant bought the disputed plot in 2002 while this case was pending”. Again at page 124, line 4 of the record, the Appellant in contradiction of herself said, 3rd Defendant bought the land in 2000 and he started building on it immediately. By 2001 he had finished and students moved in.
1st respondent on her part testified that she sold the land in dispute to Mr. Ikyaambe and this was after the case (Exhibit “F”) was concluded. (See page 127, lines 31 – 32 and page 130, lines 1 – 2 of the record of appeal).
From the record, it does appear to me that the land in dispute was re-sold by the 1st Respondent in 1989. The 1st Respondent in her evidence stated that she sold the land immediately after the case in Exhibit ‘F’ and Exhibit ‘F’ was determined 29th March, 1989. The sale was therefore before 1990 when the Appellant instituted the action that gave rise to this appeal. This is more so in the face of the contradiction in the Appellant’s evidence wherein she had denied knowledge of sale of the land either in 1988 or anytime at all. Since there was a sale of the disputed land, it is more probable that the said sale was after 3rd March, 1989 but before November, 1990 when suit No. MHC/130/ 1990 was instituted. The disputed land in effect was not sold by the 1st Respondent during the pendency of suit No.
MHC/130/90. Contrary to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned trial Judge was not wrong not to have invoked the doctrine of lis pendens and thereby nullified the sale by the said 1st respondent, as is being advocated by the learned counsel for the Appellant.
The learned counsel for the Appellant further canvassed that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have placed reliance on Exhibits K1 and K2 which according to him were documents made during the pendency of the suit and so dismiss the suit.
Exhibit K1 is the Right of Occupancy over Plot No. BNC 5953 dated 4th October, 2002, while Exhibit K2 is the Certificate of Occupancy issued 10th March, 2007 in respect of same Plot. Both Exhibits are made out in respect of Gabriel Kpamber who was at some point in the course of trial, joined as a party. Admittedly both exhibits were made by the 3rd Respondent (DW3) while the suit was pending. Be that as it may, there is nothing on record to show me that the learned trial Judge placed reliance on them to the extent that they placed weight or value on the judgment. His only finding regarding Exhibits K1 and K2 reads as follows:
I hold therefore that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that her plot is part of the 3rd Defendant’s plot to which Exhibits I, K1 and K2 relate. … Exhibits K1 and K2 are respectively the Right of Occupancy and the Certificate of Occupancy issued to the 3rd Defendant in evidence of his lawful title to plot No. BNC 5953. (See page 194, lines 19 – 24 of the record of appeal).
The foregoing findings of the learned trial Judge has no bearing or effect on the dismissal of the cause of action in the suit given the other available pieces of evidence. Therefore, the submission of the learned Appellant’s counsel thereon is overruled. The doctrine of lis pendens raised by the learned counsel for the Appellant has likewise failed.
The learned trial Judge in the circumstances of this case, rightly appraised and weighed the evidence both documentary and oral on the imaginary scale, before arriving at the unassailable conclusion that:
The plaintiff (appellant herein) has not proved her case against the defendants (respondents) jointly and/or severally. The plaintiff appears to me to be a vexatious litigant. This suit is mischievous, frivolous and unwarranted. ….(See page 195 of the record of appeal). The question whether the judgment of the learned trial Judge is not against the weight of evidence, is hereby determined in the negative.
The judgment was not given against the weight of evidence. Issue 3 (three) is therefore resolved in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
Having resolved issues I (one) and 3 (three) in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellant, while issue 2 (two) is discountenanced for being an academic exercise, it is obvious that the appeal has nosedived. The appeal is thus dismissed with costs assessed and fixed at N80,000 against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondents jointly and severally.
Appeal dismissed.
IGNATIUS IGWE AGUBE, J.C.A.: I had the opportunity of reading the draft Judgment of my Learned brother C.I. Jombo-Ofo, JCA and I am in total agreement with his reasoning and conclusion on all the issues distilled for determination that the Appellant’s Appeal is unmeritorious and same is accordingly dismissed. I have nothing to add to the well-researched Judgment which I adopt as mine, in so holding that my Lord was right in resolving all the Issues distilled for determination against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondents.
I also affirm the judgment of the trial Court and abide by the order as to costs.
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: My learned brother, C. IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO, JCA, obliged me in advance the lead judgment he has just delivered which I am in total agreement that there is no merit in the appeal and deserves to be dismissed. My learned brother has meticulously and quite efficiently dealt with all the salient issues nominated by the Appellant for the determination of this appeal and there seems to be nothing new to say. Be that as it may, apart from adopting both the reasoning and conclusion in the lead judgment as mine, I shall chip in a few words of mine in support of the judgment only. The contention of the Appellant herein is that the learned trial Judge ought to have invoked the doctrine of lis pendens against the 1st and 3rd Respondents and to have declared the purported transfer or assignment of interest in the land in dispute as null and void, having done so during the pendency of this suit.
Generally, the doctrine of lis pendens prevents the effective transfer of right in any property which is the subject matter of an action pending in Court during the pendency of the action. Where, therefore, there is a conveyance, sale or transfer of land, even though the alienation is for the best consideration, yet if made pendente lite, the alienation will be caught by the doctrine of lis pendens and is null and void. EBUEKU V. AMOLA (SUPRA) WIGRAM V. BUCKLEY (1894) 3 CH. 483, BFI GROUP CORPORATION V. B.P.E (2012) LPELR-9339(SC), OLORI MOTOR CO. LTD & ORS V. UBN PLC (2006) LPELR-2589(SC) and FIRST BANK & ANOR V. HAMIDAWA LTD & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44260(CA).
In the instant case and evidence before the Court shows that the Appellant sold the land in dispute to the 1st Respondent on or about the 25th of September, 1982, however, the Appellant denied ever selling the land to the 1st Respondent. The Appellant also claimed that the 1st Respondent resold the land during the pendency of Suit No.: MHC/130/90. The 1st Respondent argued that she sold the land in 1989 and not 1988 during the pendency of the suit (see Exhibit “F”).
It is trite law that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply to every suit, as held in BARCLAYS BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. V. ALHAJI ASHIRU (1978) 6-7 SC. 99 AND ENEKWE V. INT’L MERCHANT BANK OF NIG LTD & ORS (2006) LPELR-1140 (SC), wherefore, evidence shows that the property was actually sold after the determination of the case, the doctrine of lis pendens will become inapplicable.
In view of the above additional discussions, I am in full agreement with the lead judgment of learned brother C. IFEOMA JOMBO-OFO which I have had the advantage of reading in advance. I also hold that the appeal is unmeritorious and therefore is dismissed. I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
Appearances:
I. T. Nongu, Esq. For Appellant(s)
…For Respondent(s)