AFRAB CHEM LIMITED v. PHARMACIST OWODUENYI
(2014)LCN/7274(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 13th day of June, 2014
CA/K/58/2011
RATIO
WHETHER AN ERROR COMMITTED BY A COURT IN EXPRESSING ITS MANIFEST INTENTIONS CAN BE CORRECTED.
By the slip rule principle, this Court and indeed the court of trial has the power to correct technical or accidental errors which occur in the judgment or order of the court in expressing its manifest intentions. The purpose and the effect of the amendment is to give effect to the manifest intention of the Court or to give proper meaning to the judgment. Stirling Civil Engineer (Nig) Ltd. V. Yahaya (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 263) 628, 642 paras F – G.
It is therefore settled that where an error is committed by a Court in expressing its manifest intention or in pronouncing what it meant to pronounce, such an error can be corrected to give effect to what is manifestly intended and or to bring the record into harmony with what is obviously meant to be pronounced. See also Anatogun v. Iweka 11 (1995) NWLR (Pt. 415) 547, Stirling Civil Engineering (Nig) Ltd v. Yahaya (supra). per AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A
WHETHER AN EMPLOYEE’S MERE KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT HE OR SHE CONSENTED TO INCUR THE RISK TO BE ENCOUNTERED IN THE COURSE OF THE WORK
It is now settled that where injury occurs from the breach of a statutory duty or in any other situation where the law allows a term to be implied into the contract, it is not enough for the employer to merely prove that the employee accepted the work or continued to do the work with full knowledge of the risk involved, he must go further to prove that the employee undertook with full appreciation that the risk would be on him. The mere knowledge of the danger is not sufficient. See Bowater v. Borough of Rowley Regis (1944) 1 KB 465. See also the case of Smith v. Baker (supra) where the House of Lords came up with a definite position that an employee engaged to hold a drill in the process of which one of the stones slipped from the crane and injured the plaintiff causing injury was entitled to compensation and that volenti non fit injuria did not apply.
Furthermore, the fact that the employee continues in his work as contended by the appellant, does not mean that he consented to incur the risk which he may encounter in the course of the work, the employee might have continued in the work only because he does not want to lose his only means of livelihood. In such a case it is the employee’s ‘poverty’ and not his ‘will’ “which consented to incur the danger. See Thrussel vs. Handside (1888) 20 QBD 359, 364. per AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A
JUSTICES:
ABDU ABOKI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
OLUDOTUN A. ADEFOPE-OKOJIE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
AMINA AUDI WAMBAI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
AFRAB CHEM LIMITED – Appellant(s)
AND
PHARMACIST OWODUENYI – Respondent(s)
AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of Kaduna State High Court in suit No. KDH/KAD/856/2006 delivered by Hon. Justice Bashir Sukola on 3rd November, 2010.
The respondent was the plaintiff before the lower Court and claimed against the defendant, now the appellant, in paragraphs 21 and 28 of the statement of claim as follows:-
“21. Wherefore the plaintiff claims special damages from the defendants in the following terms;
(1) December salary in lieu of notice – N43,810.00
(2) Pay in lieu of leave (10) week – N15,158.42
(3) 2006 leave allowance – N78,823.80
(4) HHF/Pension Fund – N244,850,00
(5) Gratuity (for 5 years) – N219,050.00
(6) 2006 end of year bonus – N87,300.00
(7) Medical Bills as at Nov. 2006 – N42,200.00
(8) November, 2006 Salary for his Driver – N10,500.00
(9) November, 2006 Expenses – N64,150.00
(10) June/July 2005 Fuel Claim -N99,680.00
(11) Car Refurbishing Allowance -N100,000.00
(12) Areas of 2006 Compensation -N219,000.00
28. Whereof the plaintiff claims from the defendant the sum of N6,259,832.20 made up as follows:-
(a) The sum of N1,259,832.20 as his accumulated emolument and expenses.
(b) The sum of N5 Million being compensation as a result of his incapacity caused in the end as a result of the defendant’s work.”
In denying the respondent’s claim, the appellant as defendant before the lower court filed a statement of defence and a counter-claim which was by leave of Court amended wherein the appellant counter-claimed against the respondent in paragraph 5 as follows:-
“5. Whereof the defendant claims from the plaintiff the sum of N1,100,600.00 (one million one hundred thousand six hundred naira) itemized as follows-
(a) The sum of N700,000; being value of car wrongfully held by plaintiff.
(b) The sum of N300,000; being damages for loss of use of bus.
(c) The sum of N100,000; being float unaccounted for.
(d) The sum of N600; being cost of Glo lines wrongfully withheld by plaintiff.”
To the statement of defence and the counter-claim the respondent as plaintiff (at the lower court) filed a reply and defence respectively.
The brief facts of the case are that the Respondent, a Pharmacist was on 16th November, 2001 employed by the Appellant a Pharmaceutical Limited Liability Company as the Area Sales Manager (North) to coordinate the sales activities of the appellant’s products in the North. The respondent was the head of the Northern Regional Office and worked in that capacity for about 5 years until 28/11/2006 when his appointment was terminated by the appellant.
Meanwhile, as a result of pressure and magnitude of the work and the respondent’s desire to meet up with the monetary target set by the appellant so as to avoid been reprimanded for shortfall in sales, the respondent sometimes in February 2006 in the course of his work for the appellant suffered stress related stroke affecting his left arm and leg. Inspite of his condition the respondent still coordinated the affairs of the appellant to attain the goal of N98.96M for September, 2006. That notwithstanding, the appellant stopped treating the respondent the same way his colleagues were treated and refused to include the respondent in its Salary Review Package. Subsequently by a letter dated 28/11/2006, the appellant terminated the respondent’s appointment and refused to pay him his entitlements.
At the trial, the respondent as the sole witness for the plaintiff, testified by adopting his 3 witness depositions on oath filed on 29/10/2008, 25/3/2009 and 12/5/2009 and tendered several exhibits. (15 in number).
The appellant also called one witness, Mr. Ezediunor Anthony Chukwu Emeka, the Assistant General Manager, Human Resources of the defendant/appellant but tendered no exhibit. At the close of evidence and submission of all final written addresses by all counsel, the learned trial Judge in a considered judgment, delivered on 3/11/2010 entered judgment in favour of the respondent in the sum of N6,172,532.20 representing N5m as general damages and N1,172,532.20 as special damages. The Court dismissed the appellant’s counter-claim.
In its judgment the lower Court held inter-alia at pp.235 – 236 of the record, thus:-
“…..Since the plaintiff’s injury was sustained in the course of the plaintiff’s official duties as an employee of the defendant, I hold without any hesitation that the plaintiff has prove (sic) his claims justifying compensation for injury sustained by way of stroke associated with stress pressured by the defendant’s desire and plaintiffs efforts to meet up the monetary targets set by the defendant so as to escape the defendant’s reprimand in the event of any failure or shortfalls….”
Dissatisfied with the said judgment of the lower Court, the appellant through his counsel, Olalekan Oyerinde Esq, filed a notice of appeal on the 8/11/10 on 5 grounds challenging the entirety of the judgment.
At the hearing of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant and for the respondent in compliance with the Rules of this Court, filed and exchanged their briefs of argument which they all adopted and relied upon.
The appellant’s brief of argument filed on 22/04/2013 and the reply brief filed on 23/5/13 were settled by Olalekan Oyerinde Esq, while that of the respondent was settled by D.N. Shiklam Esq.
In his brief of argument, the learned counsel for the appellant formulated 4 issues for determination thus:-
“(a) Whether respondent is entitled to general damages in sum of N5m (five million Naira) as awarded by the lower court.
(b) Whether learned trial Judge an re-award in final judgment the sum of N575,568.42 earlier awarded interlocutory and which is still subject of appeal.
(c) Whether respondent proved special damages apart from entitlements conceded by appellant.
(d) Whether appellant proved its counter claim before the court.”
The learned respondents counsel distilled 3 issues virtually of the same effect with the appellant’s issues Nos 1, 2 & 3 but differently couched in the following manner viz:
“(a) Whether the respondent as a result of the stress pressured in order to meet the monetary targets set by the appellant is entitled to the award of compensation in the sum of N5,000,000 (five million naira) only. (Distilled from ground i).
(b) Whether the appellant suffered any miscarriage of justice with the re-award in the final judgment the sum of N575, 568.42 earlier awarded in an interlocutory application by the learned trial Judge. (Distilled from ground iii).
(c) Whether the respondent has proved his special claim to entitle him to the special damages so awarded. (Distilled from iv).”
The learned appellant’s counsel did not canvass any argument in support of the 4th issue formulated. The said issue,must be deemed by the operation of the law to have been abandoned and same is entitled to be and is hereby struck out.
Having struck out issue No.4. I shall adopt with slight modification, the remaining 3 issues distilled by the appellant as the issues calling for determination but in the following order:
“(1) Whether the learned trial Judge can, in his final judgment re-award the sum of N575,568.42 earlier awarded by an interlocutory application and which award is still subject of appeal.
(2) Whether the respondent is entitled to general damages in the sum of N5M as awarded by the trial Judge.
(3) Whether the respondent is entitled to special damages other than those admitted by the respondent.”
ISSUE NO.1
WHETHER THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE CAN, IN HIS FINAL JUDGMENT RE-AWARD THE SUM OF N575, 568.42 EARLIER AWARDED SUMMARILY BY AN INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION, WHICH AWARD IS STILL SUBJECT OF APPEAL.
The learned appellant counsel’s submission on this issue is that the learned trial Judge having on 25/06/2007 entered summary judgment in the said sum in favour of the respondent as part of the terminal benefit of N1,224,522.20 a fact which the trial Judge acknowledged in the preamble to his final judgment, the Judge had no power to re-award same in his final judgment. That the trial Judge ought to have deducted that sum from the total calculation of the specific damages he awarded and that the trial Judge did not only erroneously miscalculate and inflate the respondent’s claim by N35,309.90, but he also became functus officio in respect of the said sum of N575,568.42. He argued further that the said interlocutory award made by the trial Judge is still subject of an appeal in CA/K/339/07 pending before this Court.
In his response, while the learned respondent’s counsel conceded that the inclusion of the said sum of N575, 568.42 in the computation of the damages awarded to the respondent in the final judgment of the lower court is erroneous, he contended that the inclusion of the already awarded sum in his final judgment by the trial Judge, was an accidental slip which this court can and should correct as a clerical error, appellant not having shown how a miscarriage of justice was occasioned. He relied on Stirling Civil Engineer (Nig) Ltd v. Yahaya (2005) All FWLR (pt. 263) 628 at 642 para F – G, p. 643 para A-B and Osigwe v. P.S. Management Consortium Ltd (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 470) 607 at 635 para B – D.
There is no disputing the clear fact as shown in the records, that the said sum of N575, 568.42 which was deemed admitted by the Respondent’s paragraph 9 (a) of the amended statement of defence,was upon application of the Respondent’s counsel vide a motion to that effect dated 5/3/2007, awarded by the learned trial Judge to the respondent. This was part of the sum of N1,259,832.00 total sum claimed as special damages.
This fact, the learned trial Judge acknowledged in his judgment at page 226 of the record.
Obviously, the manifest intention of the trial Judge was to exclude from the computation of the special damages to which the respondent might be entitled to at final judgment, the said sum of N575,568.42 already summarily entered for the respondent. The addition of the said sum to the judgment sum as special damages in his final judgment of the court without doubt, is an error in expressing the intention of the Court.
By the slip rule principle, this Court and indeed the court of trial has the power to correct technical or accidental errors which occur in the judgment or order of the court in expressing its manifest intentions. The purpose and the effect of the amendment is to give effect to the manifest intention of the Court or to give proper meaning to the judgment. Stirling Civil Engineer (Nig) Ltd. V. Yahaya (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 263) 628, 642 paras F – G.
It is therefore settled that where an error is committed by a Court in expressing its manifest intention or in pronouncing what it meant to pronounce, such an error can be corrected to give effect to what is manifestly intended and or to bring the record into harmony with what is obviously meant to be pronounced. See also Anatogun v. Iweka 11 (1995) NWLR (Pt. 415) 547, Stirling Civil Engineering (Nig) Ltd v. Yahaya (supra).
In the instant case, the addition of the sum of N575,568.42 already summarily adjudged in favour of the respondent to the total sum of the special damages awarded to the respondent was an accidental or clerical error in expressing the intention of the trial Judge manifestly expressed in the judgment itself.
Furthermore, the total sum of special damages claimed as stated by the learned trial Judge is N1,259,832.00k as predicated on paragraph 28(a) of the statement of claim. However,by proper computation of the various sums claimed the actual figure should be N1,224,522.20 and not the amount quoted at paragraph 28(a) of the statement of claim, which the trial Judge used to compute the difference between the total amount claimed as special damages and what was deemed admitted at pleadings and awarded to the respondent summarily by which he arrived at N684,263.58 instead of N561,653.78. I therefore correct the figure “N684,253.58” to read “N561,653.78” which respondent was to prove as special damages and not N684,263,58 as erroneously awarded to the respondent by the learned trial Judge.
As to issue of the pendency of an appeal with respect to the said sum of N575, 568.42, there was no proof offered by the appellant to support the contention. It is not enough for the learned appellant’s counsel to submit in his brief of argument and citing the appeal number without going further to show that the said appeal is still alive and pending.
Being an error which is correctable and which we have corrected, we hold that the said error is not sufficient as to reverse the judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, this issue No.1 is resolved in favour of the respondent.
ISSUE NO. 2
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO GENERAL DAMAGES IN THE SUM OF N5, 000,000.00 (N5M).
The submission of the learned appellant’s counsel on the award of the N5M general damages to the respondent is that the said award made by the trial Judge was predicated on the respondent’s contention that he was in good health while working for the appellant until February, 2006 when he suffered stress related stroke pressured by workload which he had asked the appellant to reduce by employing more hands. The appellant’s contention on the other hand is that the respondent a trained qualified pharmacist with full knowledge of the job description, ability and medical condition voluntarily applied for and accepted the offer of employment as the Area Sales Manager (Northern Region of Nigeria). He voluntarily consented to the terms of the employment and worked in that capacity for 5 years before he suffered the stroke. He contended that the respondent can not be heard to complain or ask for general damages. That the maxim “volenti non fit injuria” applies to prevent the respondent from complaining and or claiming any damages in respect of the work he voluntarily consented to do.
Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent neither adduced any medical evidence to create a nexus or link between this affliction and his work to show that his hypertension leading to his stroke was stress related and caused by his work for the appellant, nor did the respondent who relied on negligence for his claim plead or prove any duty of care or the breach of that duty by the appellant which even if proved, would have been negated by the maxim “volenti non fit injuria” just as a boxer cannot claim for assault against his opponent or a soldier against his employer for battle field injuries. The cases of Hall v. Brook lands Auto Racing Club (1933) 1 K.B 205 and Dare v. Fagbamila (2009) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1160) 177 at 199 were relied upon. The case of U.A.C. (Nig) Ltd v. Joseph Orekyen (1961) 1 All NLR 719 learned counsel submitted is distinguishable from the respondent’s condition leading to the stroke, which distinction the learned trial Judge failed to draw.
Before responding to the argument of the appellant’s counsel, the learned respondent’s counsel submitted that the appellant having not in ground I of the notice of appeal challenged the finding of fact upon which the award of the N5M compensation was based, the finding of the lower Court should not be disturbed.
In reply, appellant’s counsel referred to ground I and particular 1(b) thereto and submitted that a communal reading shows that the finding of the lower court was challenged.
Now, a glance at the ground I and particular 1(b) thereto reveal that the appellant has therein challenged the findings of the lower court upon which the compensation was based. The appellant in ground I avers inter alia that:-
“The learned trial Judge erred when he awarded the sum of N5,000,000 as compensation to the respondent based on his finding that…..”
Particular 1(b):-
“In so holding as above the learned trial Judge based his award of N5,000,000 on finding that appellant’s nature of work caused respondent’s ailment without considering the following…….”
(Underlining for emphasis)
I therefore, hold that the appellant has in ground I challenged not only the award of N5M but also the finding of the lower Court upon which the compensation was awarded.
Learned respondent’s counsel also submitted at paragraph 4.1.19 and has urged the Court to strike out ground ii(2) of the appellant’s grounds of appeal as well as all arguments canvassed relating to same at paragraph 3.13 – 3.29 of the appellant’s brief of argument as no issue has been formulated therefrom. He relied on Odeh v. F.RN. (2008) 13 NWLR (PT 1103) 1 at 19. In reply the learned Appellant’s counsel submitted at paragraph 3.4.1 – 3.4.8 of his reply brief that his issue No. I to wit:-
“Whether Respondent is entitled to general damages in sum of N5 Million as awarded in the lower Court ….”
Properly and procedurally flowed from and is based on the appellant’s complaint in ground 2 that:
“Learned trial Judge erred when he misconceived the appellant’s defence of respondent being a volunteer as in maxim volenti non fit injuria.”
Learned appellant’s counsel contends that grounds 1 and 2 are so related that one of the particulars of ground I of the appellant’s notice (particular b(i)) raises the issue of the application of the maxim volenti non fit injuria. An issue for determination learned counsel submitted, could emanate from one or more grounds of appeal. He relied on Ogunokwe v. Ofomata (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt 404) pp 40 E – G, He submitted further that as it is trite that an issue can be argued on multiple grounds if same relate to or can be distilled from the ground(s), any issue argued on a ground or grounds of appeal which arise or can be distilled from the ground(s) of appeal are deemed valid without the need to proliferate issues which the Appellate Court abhor and which this Court would have censored had the appellant formulated an issue as:
“Whether the Lower Court misconceived Appellant’s defence of volenti non fit injuria as the respondent seems to be suggesting. He relied on Okonobor v. D.E. and S. Trans Co. Ltd (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1221) 181 at 189 E-F.”
As the appellant’s issue No. 1 (as formulated by the appellant) covers grounds one and two of the grounds of Appeal,the learned counsel for the appellant has urged upon the Court not to allow the respondent’s counsel put up technical strictures in the way of discerning the issue as related to ground 2 as the Court has been admonished to bend backwards to glean through the grounds of appeal and to marry them with the issues for determination raised in the briefs. The case of JFS Inu Ltd v. Brawal Line Ltd (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1228) 495 at 520 C-G was relied upon.
To determine whether ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal has been abandoned in that issue No. I was not distilled from or have any bearing on the ground 2, it is important to compare the issue No.I as well as ground 2 already set out. Also important to bring to bear, is particular 1(b) which reads:
Part of particular (b) reads:
“…The learned trial Judge respectfully failed to evaluate all these evidence to dismiss respondent’s claim of N5M (Five Million) for stroke suffered on time worn maxim in law that to which a man consents cannot be considered an injury… no one can enforce a right which he has voluntarily waived or abandoned (volenti non fit injuria).”
The ground 2 of the grounds of appeal and the particular (b) thereto, connotes complaint by the appellant that the trial Judge erred when he misconceived the appellant’s defence of volenti non fit injuria and failed to evaluate the evidence which if done, he would have dismissed the respondent’s claim of N5M for the stroke suffered on the principle (or maxim) of volenti non fit injuria.
Juxtaposing this connotation of the appellant’s complaint in ground 2 and its particular (b) with the issue No. 3 as formulated by the appellant to wit: whether the respondent is entitled to general damages in the sum of N5M as awarded by the lower Court, it is discernable that there is a correlation between the ground 2 and issue No.1 as formulated by the learned appellant’s counsel. While the distilled issue questions the entitlement of the respondent to the N5M general damages awarded by the trial Judge, ground 2 attacks the trial Judge’s failure to apply the maxim “volenti non fit injuria” which would have disentitled the respondent to the award.
In effect the complaint in ground 2(b) is that had the trial Judge not failed to evaluate the evidence and had he not misconstrued the appellant’s defence that the respondent was a volunteer within the meaning of the maxim “volenti non fit injuria, he would have dismissed the respondent’s claim of N5M general damages. There is therefore a correlation between issue No.1 formulated by the appellant and ground 2 (especially with the particular) of the grounds of appeal. I am thus at one with the learned appellant’s counsel that the said issue flows from ground 2 and also that ground 1 is closely related to ground 2.
It has since become the law that while parties are not permitted to formulate more issues than the grounds of appeal they are not only allowed but are enjoined to formulate less issues than the grounds of appeal. This is because issues are not meant to be formulated on each ground but are raised or distilled out of a combination of the essential complaints of the appellant in the grounds of appeal. See African International Bank Ltd v. Integrated Dimensional System Ltd & ors, (2012) LPELR – 9710 (SC).
In the instant case, the appellant’s issue No.1 covers or arises from grounds 1 and 2 of the appellant’s grounds of appeal. I therefore hold that ground 2 of the appellant’s grounds of appeal has not been abandoned but has been encapsulated in the appellant’s issue No.1 as distilled. In the circumstance, there is no basis to accede to the respondent’s urge to strike out the ground 2 and to discountenance all arguments canvassed thereon.
Learned respondent’s counsel also submitted that the contract of employment and the setting of monetary targets are 2 different things and that the appellant introduced and demanded of the respondent that which was not part of the terms of contract of employment by arbitrarily setting monetary targets for the respondent to meet, outside the contract of employment which makes the appellant liable on negligence for breach of duty of care to the respondent and the attendant consequence.
Reacting to this submission the learned appellant’s counsel at paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of his reply brief submitted that the respondent did not raise this issue at his pleadings and can not raise same before this court just as the respondent can not be heard to complain that the appellant acted unlawfully by setting reasonable and usual performance targets for the respondent who was voluntarily employed as its Northern Regional Manager.
I have gone through the pleadings of the respondent as plaintiff before the lower Court and cannot agree more with the learned appellant’s counsel that the contention that the contract of employment is separate from the monetary targets set by the appellant is not pleaded by the respondent. There is no averment in the statement of claim or the reply to the statement of defence to the effect that the setting of monetary targets by the appellant was outside the contract of employment.
Furthermore this contention cannot be supported by the letter of offer of appointment dated 16/11/2001 tendered and admitted as exhibit 1. One of the terms of the contract as contained at paragraph 3(b) is:
“You will be given an agreed annual target, which will however be translated to monthly sales. Upon achieving this monthly target, you will earn commission which will be determined by the Management from time to time.”
It cannot therefore be successfully contended in the face of this paragraph 3(b) of the contract that the issue of setting annual targets is outside the terms of employment.
It is however observed that by the said term of contract, the annual target to be set was to be agreed upon by both parties.
On the question as to whether negligence was pleaded by the respondent, the respondent’s pleadings, answer the question in the negative as there is no such averment in the statement of claim or the reply to the statement of defence or counter claim to that effect. The respondent did not plead negligence before the lower Court.
The respondent’s case and claim for general and special damages against the respondent at the lower Court was predicated on the respondent’s contention that he had always been in good health while he worked for the appellant until he suffered stress related stroke in February 2006 in the course of his employment for the appellant while on his way from Gusau to Abuja on his official duty for the appellant.
That the stress related stroke he suffered was as a result of the volume, magnitude and pressure of work, and that he had pleaded with the defendant to reduce the workload or employ more hands as the work was too much for him alone, for the area of coverage, the whole of Northern Nigeria, but the plea fell on deaf ears.
Respondent’s position is that the injury by way of stress related stroke suffered by him was in the course of his employment for the appellant.
Predicated upon these facts it is contended for the respondent that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent being that of master – servant relationship, the respondent who has suffered injury in the course of his work for the appellant, is entitled to compensation from the appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the English case of Smith v. Baker & Sons (1891) AC 325 on the responsibility of the employee when an employer places an employee in a situation that puts the employee at risk and prevents him from looking out for himself.
Now, it is apt to consider whether the prove of these facts would entitle the respondent to claim compensation from the appellant, the respondent having voluntarily applied for and accepted the offer and terms of the employment to work as the Area Sales Manager for the North.
Admittedly, the respondent did not plead the word negligence in his pleadings at the lower Court. However, at common law as it is, in our law, an employee may sue his employer for compensation either in torts or in contract, and may choose to do so in contract where there are other advantages. One of such instances could be where an injury is suffered by an employee at work. Such an employee may bring an action against the employer either in tort or in contract. See Mathew v. Kuwait Buch Tel. Corp (1959) 2 QB 57.
The learned counsel for the appellant at paragraph 3.31 of his reply brief submitted that the respondent could not lawfully claim general damages on claim appertaining to contract of employment. He cited in his support the case of Achor v. Adejoh (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt 1191) 537. However, the said case which is a decision of this court decided by my learned brother Abdu Aboki JCA, involved a dispute over family or clan land between two families/clans. None of the 4 issues adopted for determination by the Court and upon which the appeal was fought and determined, touched directly, indirectly or even remotely on the issue of impropriety or otherwise of a claim for general damages predicated on a contract of employment. There is no where in length and breath of that case where the issue was put forward for determination as the facts of the case were totally unrelated to that issue. The said case obviously does not support the appellant’s contention, and cannot be relied upon to support that preposition canvassed by the learned counsel.
I thus discountenance that submission.
It therefore follows that the failure of the respondent to base his claim on negligence does not defeat the claim if same can otherwise be sustained in contract. It is common ground that there was a contract of employment between the appellant and the respondent which created an employer-employee relationship between the two and which was akin to a master – servant relationship. In an employer-employee or master-servant relationship, in addition to or to the exclusion of the express terms of the contract, the law imposes certain implied terms into the contract. These implied terms may either be founded on statute, by custom, by practice, public policy or such terms as to ensure that the master does not subjudge the servant to a condition of servitude or slavery or like terms. While the court should not concern itself with the reasonableness or otherwise of the contractual terms between the contracting parties, the law would not allow the imposition of servile conditions on an employee. Any such contract which tends to impose servile obligations upon any person would not be enforceable, see Davies v. Davies (1887) 36 Q – D 359. Where a term is permitted to be implied into a contract, the implied term has the same binding effect on the parties.
In Johnstone v. Blooms-Bury Health Authority (1991) 2 All ER 292 by the contract of employment, the employer had the power to require his employee, a medical doctor, to work for additional hours per week. The medical doctor claimed that by requiring him to work intolerable hours deprived him of sleep and damaged his health as well as put at risk the safety of his patients, and that the employers were in breach of their implied duty to take reasonable care for his safety. The contention by the employers that the express contractual term prevailed over the implied duty of care was rejected by Smart Smith L.J who held that an implied term was not inferior to the express term of the contract.
As expressly declared by Smart Smith L.J, in the Johnstone’s case, there is an inherent and implied duty imposed on the employer to take reasonable care to ensure the safety of employee in a master – servant relationship notwithstanding any term in the contract to the contrary. The position is the same under our law.
The Supreme Court in Iyere v. Bendel Feed & Floor Mill Ltd (2009) All FWLR (Pt 453) 1217 defined a contract of employment and its implication thus:
“A contract of employment connotes a contract of service or apprenticeship whether express or implied …The general requirement of law where there exists a service relationship between employer and employee is that the former is under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the latter in all circumstances of the case so as not to expose him to an unnecessary risk. See Latimer v. AEC Ltd (1953) AC 643. The level of his duty is the same as that of the employer’s common Law duty of care in the law of negligence.”
Paris v. Stepney Borough Council (1951) AC 367 at 384 Lord Oakley had this to say:
“The duty of an employer towards his servant is to take reasonable care for his servant’s safety in all the circumstances of the case.”
The appellant’s counsel in this appeal has argued that the affliction of stroke suffered by the respondent is not the injury contemplated in the case of U.A.C (Nig) Ltd v. Joseph Orekyen (1961) 1 All NLR 719. In the said case what happened was that the respondent Joseph M. Orekyen was employed by the appellant (UAC) to be in charge of a Petrol Station. On the fateful day, while the respondent was checking the overnight sales, a stranger entered the salesroom where the respondent was, and asked for change of ‘801 note. One of the attendants under the respondent told him that there was no change. A fight ensued between the attendant and the stranger. The respondent intervened and took a position between them in the process of which the stranger hit him in the eye resulting in his loss of the eye. It was held that there was a relationship between the attendant and the work and that the injury occurred in the course of his employment and the employer was liable to pay compensation to the respondent.
This decision has been upheld. The main issue before that court for determination was whether the injury arose out of the respondent’s employment. The answer was in the affirmative.
In the instant case, the learned appellant’s counsel contends that the ailment (not injury) of stroke which afflicted the respondent was not suffered by the respondent in the course of his activities or linked to his work for the appellant and that assuming but not conceding that the ailment arose from the respondent’s work for the appellant, the respondent having volunteered to work for the appellant under the terms of employment, cannot, under the time worn maxim of volenti non fit injuria, complain.
It is settled law that it is not every injury suffered by an employee during the period of his work for the employer that entitles the employee to damages or compensation. It is only the injury suffered out of and in the course of his employment that the employer will be liable for. The phrases “out of and “in the course of employment” are used conjunctively in the sense that the accident or injury must have occurred not only during the employment but must have occurred ‘out of’ and in ‘the course of’ the employment. In effect the employment must be the cause of the injury and the injury must have occurred in relation to that employment or incidental to the employment. See St. Helens Colliary Co, Ltd v. Hawitson (1924) AC 59. There must be some Causal relationship between the injury sustained and the employment, thus an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. Any injury sustained by an employee which occurs by a mere-co-incidence to the currency of the employment cannot be an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
An injury suffered by an employee for which the employer would be liable may include any harm to the health of an employee either by accident or by disease which arises in the course of and out of employment and incapacities in whole or in part. The occurrence of disability or impairment includes aggravation of a pre-existing injury. See Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition page 786.
This definition of injury as provided by the Blacks Law Dictionary answers the contention of the learned appellant’s counsel that the ailment of stroke suffered by the respondent is different from the injury contemplated in the case of UAC (Nig) Ltd v. Joseph Orekyen (supra) relied upon by the respondent’s counsel.
The germane question then is whether the stroke suffered by the respondent arose out of and in the course of his work for the appellant for which the appellant would be responsible and liable to pay compensation or whether by the operation of the latin maxim volenti non fit injuria, the appellant cannot be held liable for an act consented to by the respondent.
The respondent’s averment in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim and as contained in his depositions on oath that he was in good health when he worked for the appellant though feebly denied in the statement of defence was not challenged in cross-examination. Most importantly, the appellant in a letter written to the respondent on the 15th May, 2006, acknowledged the fact that the respondent had always been known to be in good health. It states inter alia;
“It is unfortunate that you suffered such debilitating health blow which is contrary to the sound health life we use to identify you with…..” (See page 145 of the record).
Thus, it is beyond argument that the appellant recognized the sound health status of the respondent when he was working for the appellant. However, as the workload was too much for the respondent, the respondent pleaded with the appellant to employ more hands or reduce the load work on him. (Paragraph 6 of the statement of claim and paragraph 7 of respondent’s deposition on oath at page 084 of the record). The appellant did not emphatically deny the respondent’s averment nor was the respondent cross-examined on this fact. It is therefore safe to hold that the appellant having not cross-examined the respondent on that material fact must be deemed to have admitted the fact that the respondent pleaded for more hands or reduction of the workload which request fell on deaf ears. See Daggash v. Bulama (2004) All FWLR (pt. 212) 1666 at 1745 para F – G, Digai v. Nanchang (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 240) 4 at 7 para A.
Furthermore, the fact that the respondent had to meet monetary targets to avoid been reprimanded is supported by the evidence of DW1, the sole witness for the appellant as well as exhibit 5. DW1 confirmed that when the salesman failed to meet the targets they would be reprimanded as exhibit 5 threatened to do.
Respondent also adduced credible and unchallenged evidence that he suffered the stroke in the course of his work while he was on his way from Gusau en route Abuja when he could no longer proceed but found himself in the hospital.
The cumulative effect of these proved or admitted evidence is that the respondent who was known to be in sound health while working for the appellant pleaded with the appellant to reduce the workload or employ more hands but the appellant refused. Appellant who had to meet up with the monetary targets set by the appellant for fear of reprimand, was on his way from Gusau en route Abuja in February, 2006 when as a result of the stress of work, he suffered a stroke which affected his left arm and leg.
Although the court would generally not concern itself with the reasonableness or otherwise of contractual terms as agreed by the contracting parties by the nature of contract of employment, there has to be attached to the contract certain inherent terms which must be implied into the contract not only to give effect or efficacy to the express terms of the contract but also to safeguard the basic or fundamental rights of the parties which though not incorporated into the contracts, are presumed to have been borne in mind by the parties at the time of the contract.
For instance, while a servant places his service to his master, the law would not allow him to attach to his contract of service, any servile incidents. See Davies v. Davies (1887) 36 CHID 359 at 393.
Similarly, while an employee (a Medical Doctor) (servant) contracts his labour and places his service to his master the (Health Authority) to carry out additional work or donate additional hours for the service of his master, the law would not attach to that contract any term that the Medical Doctor has agreed to be deprived of his sleep and to damage his health and also to put to risk the safety of his patients. The employers must be held in breach of implied duty to take reasonable care for his safety notwithstanding that the medical doctor agreed to work additional hours per week. See Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Health Authority (supra).
The maxim “volenti non fit injuria” relied upon by the learned appellant’s counsel at the lower Court and in his brief of argument before us, as a defence to negate any wrong or blame on the part of the respondent and to prevent the respondent from complaining or claiming damages is predicated on the principle that to what a man consents, he cannot complain, as he is deemed to have waived his right. “Volenti non fit injuria” is usually a defence to defeat a plaintiff’s case who has consented to the act complained against.
However, for a defendant to succeed in relying on the principle, he must obtain a finding of fact that the plaintiff voluntarily and freely with full knowledge of the risk he ran, impliedly agree to incur it. Both knowledge and consent are necessary and there cannot be consent before knowledge. See Dare v. Fagbamila (supra) which was heavily relied upon by the learned appellant’s counsel both at the lower Court and in his brief of argument before this Court.
The appellant’s counsel contends that the two elements or requirements exist in this case as the respondent knew all the terms and conditions of the employment and voluntarily applied for same. Not only that, the respondent never wanted to leave the work even when he suffered the stroke.
This may very well be so by the fact that the respondent applied for the work, signed the contract agreement and remained in the employment of the appellant even after he suffered the stroke. Respondent did not resign and even when told to do so by the Personnel Manager of the appellant, he did not until his employment was terminated.
But to what extent can an employee be said to have known of the risk involved in his employment and continued to do the work as to make, applicable the defence of volenti non fit injuria? There is no doubt that the twin ingredients of “knowledge” and “consent” are vital for a successful plea of “volenti non fit injuria”.
However, the matter goes beyond that. It is now settled that where injury occurs from the breach of a statutory duty or in any other situation where the law allows a term to be implied into the contract, it is not enough for the employer to merely prove that the employee accepted the work or continued to do the work with full knowledge of the risk involved, he must go further to prove that the employee undertook with full appreciation that the risk would be on him. The mere knowledge of the danger is not sufficient. See Bowater v. Borough of Rowley Regis (1944) 1 KB 465. See also the case of Smith v. Baker (supra) where the House of Lords came up with a definite position that an employee engaged to hold a drill in the process of which one of the stones slipped from the crane and injured the plaintiff causing injury was entitled to compensation and that volenti non fit injuria did not apply.
Furthermore, the fact that the employee continues in his work as contended by the appellant, does not mean that he consented to incur the risk which he may encounter in the course of the work, the employee might have continued in the work only because he does not want to lose his only means of livelihood. In such a case it is the employee’s ‘poverty’ and not his ‘will’ “which consented to incur the danger. See Thrussel vs. Handside (1888) 20 QBD 359, 364.
In the instant appeal the appellant’s contention that the respondent knew of the job description accepted same and did not want or was unhappy, to leave the work is also immaterial. Exhibit 13 referred by the appellant clearly supports the respondent’s case that the respondent hung unto the work even after the stroke because as he put it “it is not easy for anyone to lose his job.”
The respondent also deposed at paragraph 2 of the reply to the statement of defence and counter-claim, the position which he maintained that there is no agreement no matter how strong that can take away his right of compensation contrary to the appellant’s averments in paragraph 4 of the statement of defence and counterclaim.
As an important indicator that the appellant acknowledged that the workload was too much for one person to handle, after the respondent became afflicted with the stroke, the appellant put up advertisement for the work of the respondent in Guardian Newspaper, of 18th May, 2006 and 17th October, 2006 for two additional Area Sales Managers for the North. This fact is not denied by the appellant, and it goes strongly to support the case of the respondent that the appellant accepted the fact that the work was too much for one person.
The respondent was in good health when he applied for employment with the appellant and when he worked for the appellant until he suffered the stroke. He complained to the appellant that the work was too much for one person, though he had entered into the contract to do the work alone.
The respondent neither reduced the workload nor employ more hands as requested by the respondent. However when the respondent suffered the stroke, the appellant then realized the need to employ two persons for the work hitherto done by the respondent alone with the demand of achieving the monthly monetary targets which the respondent had to meet or be met with a reprimand.
It is my view that in the circumstance as stated in this judgment, the respondent suffered the injury in the course of his work for the appellant which perhaps might have been averted had the appellant heeded the request for more hands when the respondent requested for same and the appellant refused but which the appellant later realized the need for, after the respondent had been exposed to unreasonable risk by the appellant leading to his affliction with stress related stroke.
The respondent in his appeal, as the respondent in the case of Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Health Authority (supra) and Smith v. Baker (supra) who was in good health cannot be said to have undertaken with full appreciation that the risk of suffering stroke while working for the appellant would be on him. The maxim volenti non fit injuria, which the learned trial Judge also considered and discountenanced, in my humble view too, would not apply to prevent the respondent from complaining or claiming damages from the appellant, his employer, as the respondent cannot be truly said to have voluntarily undertaken to risk the danger of the stress related stroke having complained to the appellant of the workload to which the appellant developed deaf ears only to later realize after the respondent had suffered the stroke, that it eventually needed two persons, not one, to be able to do the work.
The court then held further, thus:-
“The master/servant relationship in the nature of employer/employee contract is not one which either seeks to destroy, injure or incapacitates or kill the other. Rather it is a relationship which both parties seek to mutually benefit and advance the interest of the other and includes the protection of interests and the general survival of the other.
I accordingly hereby hold that the plaintiff cannot be said to have engaged the defendant through his employment with a view to suffer injury in the nature of stroke associated with stress relating to the volume, magnitude and scale of schedule of his duties as Sales Manager for the whole of Northern Nigeria and so also the defendant has not engaged the plaintiff as its Sales Manager Northern Nigeria with a view to exerting such pressure as would be injurious to its staff.
However, since the plaintiff’s injury was sustained in the course of the plaintiff’s official duties as an employee of the defendant, I hold without any hesitation that the plaintiff has prove (sic) his claims justifying compensation for injury sustained by ways of stroke associated with stress pressured by the defendant’s desire and plaintiff efforts to meet up the monetary targets set by the defendant so as to escape the defendant’s reprimand in the event of any failure or shortfalls.”
I have no reason to fault this finding and decision of the lower court. I entirely agree with this finding of the lower Court. I also hold that the Respondent injury (stroke) in the course and out of his employment for the Respondent.
As regards the damages sustained, the respondent pleaded at paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27 and deposed to the same effect at paragraphs 17, 18, 18, 20, 21 of his written statement on oath which evidence stand unchallenged to the effect that he has been put in a situation that he requires the assistance of a nurse to even clean himself, a driver to move around with, completely dependent, and cannot be employed by any organization as a result of the stroke as he cannot in the next 5 years do any strenuous jobs and with little children of less than age 14 and other dependants. This evidence remains unchallenged.
Respondent therefore in paragraph 28(b) of the statement of claim and paragraph 26 of his witness deposition, claimed N5,000,000 (N5M) as compensation. To this claim the learned trial Judge held;
“In consequence, therefore, I grant the plaintiff claims of N5 Million Naira) (Five Million Naira) compensation for injury sustained by way of stroke associated with stress…..”
I have no cause to hold otherwise. I therefore uphold the sum of N5M general damages awarded by the learned trial Judge in favour of the respondent in view of the injury and damages suffered by the respondent.
Consequently, this issue is resolved in favour of the respondent.
This leads to the 3rd and final issue, thus:
ISSUE NO. 3
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO SPECIAL DAMAGES OTHER THAN THOSE ADMITTED BY THE APPELLANT.
At paragraph 21 of the respondent’s statement of claim, the respondent claimed 12 heads of special damages 6 of which were admitted by the appellant at paragraph 9 of the amended statement of defence upon which the lower court entered summary judgment in favour of the respondent on 25/6/2007 in the sum of N575,568.
The unadmitted heads of claim which the respondent was required to prove at trial as set out at page 227 of the record by the learned trial Judge are:-
(1) Paragraph 21(3) 2006 leave allowance N73,823.80
(2) Paragraph 21(b) 2006 end of year bonus N87,300.00
(3) Paragraph 21(9) Nov. 2006 expenses N64,150.00
(4) June/July 2005 fuel claim N99,680.00
(5) Car Refurbishing allowances N100,000.00
(6) Arrears of 2006 compensation N219,000.00
The learned trial Judge granted all these special claim except the claim in paragraph 21(b) of the statement of claim for 2006 end of year bonus, which he held was not proved by the respondent, bonuses being discretionary gifts by employers to productive employees and the respondent having suffered stroke his performance, had not been optimal.
On the award of the sum of N78,823.00 in respect of the 2006 leave allowance, the appellant’s counsel seems not to have much problem with that as he canvassed no argument respecting same.
The learned appellant’s counsel in his brief of argument centred his submission only on two of the remaining 5 heads of claim viz – the car refurbishing claim of N100,000 and the arrears of 2006 compensation of N219,000.
On the award of N100,000 damages on car refurbishing allowance it is contended for the appellant that the car in respect of which the refurbishing allowance is claimed is the property of the appellant in custody of the respondent which he had to surrender as a pre-condition for the allowance. That there was neither any pleading or evidence as to the time that the respondent got the car to evince the relevance of any of part of the policy. That the car policy are only administrative measures to maintain the appellant’s vehicles and are not meant that the vehicles would be disbursed as a matter of right. That the claim for the refurbishment was made after the respondent had left the employment of the appellant.
For the respondent, it was contended that referring to paragraphs 21(ii), 22, 23 of the statement of claim and paragraphs 22 – 23 of the respondent’s deposition on oath as well as exhibit 9 at page 098 of the record, which all speak for themselves that the respondent is not under any obligation to disburse the sum of N100,000 as erroneously contended by the appellant’s counsel, but it is the obligation of the appellant to disburse the said sum of N100,000 on cars allocated after 18 months to its employees. That the respondent pleaded and adduced evidence vide his reply to the amended statement of defence and the statement on oath of the respondent at pages 166, 168 – 171 of the record that the ownership of the official car in his possession had been transferred to him by the appellant through the Personnel Manager, a fact which the appellant did not challenge in cross-examination. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent having pleaded and led credible evidence to this effect, has met the requirement of prove of special damages which is not an extra-ordinary measure of evidence, the burden was then shifted to the appellant to prove the contrary. Reliance was placed on the cases of Anazodo v. Pazmeck Inter Trade (2008) All FWLR (Pt 432) 1201 at 1217 F – G and M.W.T (Nig) Ltd. vs. PSTF (2008) All FWLR (pt. 439) 499, 544 E – G.
The Court was urged to hold that the respondent had proved his special claim.
The answer as to whether the car refurbishing allowance of N100,000 was pleaded and proved by the respondent at the lower court, lies in
(i) Paragraph 21(ii) of the statement of claim page 069 of the record, paragraph I of the Reply to the amended statement of defence and counter claim at page 166 of the record.
(ii) Paragraph 5 of the respondent’s written statement on oath filed on 2/5/2007 (page 168 – 169) of the record.
(iii) Exhibit 9, the car policy (page 098 of the record and the appellant memo 14th April 2005 (page 097 of the record).
The respondent pleaded at paragraph I of the reply to the amended statement of defence and counter claim that by the car policy dated 14/4/2005, the Mercedez car having been in his possession since 30th January, 2002, ownership of same is transferred to him, which fact was further reiterated by the Personnel Manager on 11th August 2006 to the plaintiff.
By a memo written on 14/4/2005 by the Personnel Manager at page 097 of the record, the car policy would take full effect in accordance with the guidelines as from May, 2005. By that memo, the car policy was no longer an administrative measure but an effective policy applying to both parties.
Respondent at paragraph 5 of his deposition of 2/5/2009 testified that the vehicle has been confirmed given to him.
The car policy guidelines Exhibit 9 at page 098 of the record, contain inter alia the following guidelines:
“1. Any staff previously allocated a vehicle in the past one (1) year shall be paid the sum of N50,000.00 for refurbishing to keep the vehicle in serviceable form.
2. Any staff whose vehicle is two years old with him as at the date of the policy shall have the option of selling the car at a value of N150,000 for replacement with another on OR receive the sum of N100,000 for refurbishment to keep it in serviceable form.
3. After eighteen months of allocation of a vehicle, a refurbishment sum of N100,000.00 shall be disbursed for replacement of engine, tyres and other disposable. The refurbishment will be monitored and status of vehicle confirmed by the regional sales manager to the admin department.”
The respondent was not taken up or challenged in cross-examination regarding this evidence that the car has been in his possession since January, 2002, that it was confirmed given to him by the policy. Generally, the failure of a party to cross-examine the evidence of the adverse party on a material fact in contention, is deemed as an admission except where such evidence is in itself incredible. The documentary and viva voce evidence of the respondent in this case cannot fall within the exception of the general rule. The appellant must be deemed to have accepted the very clear documentary and oral evidence offered by the respondent that the vehicle had, by the car policy of the appellant become his, which was confirmed to him by the appellant’s Personnel Manager.
The evidence as offered by the respondent before the court sufficiently proved the special damage of the N100,000 claimed for the car refurbishing allowance as strict prove required to establish special damage does not mean extra ordinary measure of evidence but only means cogent and credible evidence that establishes the claimant’s entitlement to special damage claimed.
As for the sum of N219,000 claimed for arrears of 2006 compensation, the appellant’s grouse with the award of the said sum is that the respondent did not plead and itemize or particularise what is meant by arrears of 2006 as there is no such arrears known to the appellant. That the respondent who had the duty to prove the claim did not show his authority for entitlement to or the basis for the claim and that all the receipts tendered and admitted as exhibit 10(a) which are all unsanctioned and unagreed expenses should go to no issue. He relied on Anyanwu v. Uzowuaka (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1159) 445 to submit that the special damages given by the lower court were not specially pleaded or strictly proved.
For the respondent it was submitted that the respondent having pleaded and proved his special damages by credible evidence, the burden had shifted to the appellant. Reliance was placed on the case of M.W.T. (Nig) Ltd v. PSTF (2008) All FWLR (Pt 439) 499 at 544 E – G. The Court has been urged to hold that the respondent proved his special damages.
This special damage of arrears of 2006 compensation as claimed by the respondent vide paragraph 22(12) of the statement of claim and paragraph 22(6) statement on oath the appellant in paragraph 9(b)(iv) pleaded that there is nothing like arrears of 2006 compensation in the agreed salaries or allowances between defendant and plaintiff.
In the list of documents filed by the respondent on 29th October 2008, the item listed as serial No.10 (a), is the plaintiff’s medical bills for November 2006. The amount claimed at paragraph 21(7) of the statement of claim as medical bills for November 2006 is N42,200. While the sum of N64, 150.00 is the claim for November 2006 expenses as pleaded.
I agree with the appellant’s counsel that the respondent did not prove the basis for and his entitlement to the arrears of compensation in addition to the claim for medical bills and the November, 2006 expenses. This amount of N219,000 for arears of 2006 compensation not proved, must be deducted from the sum of N561,653.21 claimed and the unadmitted special damages which respondent had to prove. This would translate into N342,653.78 as the amount proved for special damages, other than those admitted by the appellant and summarily awarded to the respondent.
I therefore enter the said sum of N342,653.78 as special damages in favour of the respondent.
I also affirm the N5M general damages awarded by the lower Court in favour of the respondent.
On the whole this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.
No cost is awarded in favour of the respondent.
ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A.: I agree.
OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.: I am in agreement with the judgment of my learned brother Amina Audi Wambai, JCA.
My Lord has meticulously and quite efficiently dealt with all the salient issues submitted for the determination of this appeal and I adopt as mine all the reasons and the conclusion in the judgment.
I also dismiss the appeal and endorse all the consequential, orders made therein.
Appearances
O. OYERINDE ESQ. WITH Y. AJIBOLA For Appellant
AND
S. A. AKANNI ESQ. WITH D. N. SHIKLAM (MRS), R. O. IPINYOMI AND A. G. BELLO ESQ. For Respondent
