ADAOHA UGO-NGADI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA(2018)

ADAOHA UGO-NGADI v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2018) LCN/4717(SC)

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 26th day of January, 2018

SC.516/2016

RATIO

CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABSENCE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ENTERTAIN A MATTER

Jurisdiction is the sole of adjudication and if the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter, an appellate Court cannot assume jurisdiction over its proceedings that have been conducted without jurisdiction. Consequently it is always expedient to resolve any challenge to jurisdiction first before proceeding to resolve any other issue. See Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390; Ezomo vs Oyakhire (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) 195; Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1980) 5 – 7 SC 1; A-G of Anambra State v. A.G. Fed. (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 692. PER PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

WHETHER A STATE HIGH COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AN OFFENCE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ADVANCE FEE FRAUD AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT 1995 AND ANY OTHER LAW OR REGULATION RELATING TO ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES, INCLUDING THE CRIMINAL CODE AND PENAL CODE.

I wish to pause here in order to consider this brilliant academic argument by learned senior counsel which argument does not seem to fall in line with the decisions of this Court regarding the provision of Section 251(3) of the Constitution. Unlike the State High Court which is a Court of unlimited jurisdiction, the Federal High Court is a special Court with limited, but exclusive jurisdiction clearly specified under Section 251(1)(a- s) of the Constitution. There is nowhere in the Constitution or any other enactment where it is stipulated that any suit in which a Federal Government Ministry, agency, functionary or parastatal is sued is justiciable only in the Federal High Court except those cases specified under Section 251 (1) (a – s) of the Constitution. Section 251(1) of the Constitution deals solely with civil matters in which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction. This is what the Section says: – “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition jurisdiction to such other as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters…” The jurisdiction of the State High Court is donated by Section 272(1) of the Constitution, in the following words:- “Subject to the provision of Section 251 and other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.” Section 272 (1) of the Constitution is made subject to Section 251 and other provision of the Constitution with respect to those items where the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is exclusive. The Section is also made subject to other provisions of the Constitution where exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and Election Petition Tribunals. In all other matters where exclusive jurisdiction has not been expressly assigned to any other Courts, the State High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine such matters. Section 251 (3) provides as follows:- “The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise and jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this Section.” The word ‘exclusive’ is clearly absent in Section 251 (3) of the Constitution. The word ‘also’ as used in Subsection (3) of Section 251 of the Constitution is defined by Advanced Learned Dictionary to mean ,’in addition; too, or as well”. If the framers of the Constitution had intended that the Federal High Court should have exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters involving the items listed under Section 251 (1)(a – s), they would have said so in clear terms. It is an established cardinal principle of interpretation that the words of a statute which are unambiguous must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning. It is not the function of the Court to import words into the statute which do violence to the intent and meaning of the statutory provision. See Edozien vs. Edozien & Ors (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt.580) at 152; Egbe v. Alhaji & Ors (1990) 21 NSCC (Pt.1) 306 at 325; (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 546 at 581. In Attorney General of Ondo State v. Attorney General of the Federation & Ors (2002) 6 SC (Pt.1) 1, the full Court of the Supreme Court, laid to rest the question whether States High Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal offences created by National Assembly when it held:- “The Attorney General of the Federation drives his powers under Section 174 of the Constitution as an agency of the Federal Government. The law is well established that the Court cannot control the manner he exercises his powers so conferred — nor can he be prevented from exercising his functions on the grounds that his jurisdiction does not extend to any particular State in Nigeria. Section 174 of the Constitution does not impose any such limitation.” See the State vs Ilori (1983) 1 SC NLR 94.” This Court came to the conclusion that by virtue of Section 174 (1) Section 286 (1)( b) of the 1999 Constitution, the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorised by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), a Federal Government Agency, can lawfully initiate or authorize the initiation of criminal proceedings in any Court other than a Court martial in any State of the Federation in respect of offences created by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. Section 19 (1) of the Economic And Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 provides that the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction to try offenders under this Act. Subsection 3 of Section 19 of the EFCC Act provides as follows:- “The Chief Judge of the Federal High Court or a High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, as the case may be, shall by order under his hand, designate a Court or judge or such number of Courts or judges as he shall deem appropriate to hear and determine all cases under this Act or other related offences arising under this Act.” By Section 7(2)(b) and (f) of the same Act, the Economic And Financial crimes commission shall be the coordinating agency for the enforcement of the provision of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 1995 and any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes, including the Criminal Code and Penal Code. The Appellant was arraigned before the Lagos State High Court for offences under the section of Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related offences and Sections of the criminal code which the EFCC is empowered to coordinate the enforcement of their provisions. By the provision of Section 251(1) of the Constitution, the National Assembly notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution conferred additional jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of criminal matters which jurisdiction is not exclusive. There is nowhere in the Constitution where the jurisdiction of State High courts in respect of the Federal cause as provided by Section 286 (1)(a) has been removed. I am of the firm view that the Lagos State High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges for which the Appellant was arraigned before it. PER PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

WHETHER IT IS ONLY THE FACTS OF THE CASE THAT CAN INFLUENCE AND DETERMINE THE APPLICATION OR INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT OF FAIR HEARING

A breach of the right of fair hearing that will vitiate a trial and ultimately lead to the setting aside of the decision reached, will depend on the facts of the case. This Court in Magit vs. University of Agriculture Makurdi (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt.959) 211 at 243 – 244 held:- “Fair hearing is not a cut and dry principle, which parties can in the abstract, always apply to their comfort and convenience. It is a principle which is based and must be based on the facts of the case before the Court. Only the facts of the case can influence and determine the application or inapplicability of the principle. The principle of fair hearing is helpless or completely dead outside the facts of the case.” See Olowu vs Nigerian Navy (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.1279) 659. PER PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE A WRONGFUL ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OR A WRONGFUL CONSIDERATION OF AN ISSUE WHICH IS ALIEN TO THE CASE, WILL NOT LEAD TO THE REVERSAL OF A DECISION

A wrongful admission of evidence or a wrongful consideration of an issue which is alien to the case under consideration cannot be a ground for reversal of a decision where it appears on appeal that such evidence or wrongful consideration of such issue cannot be reasonably be held to have affected the decision and that the decision would have been the same if such evidence had not been admitted and the consideration of the issue complained of had not been made. See Ezeoke vs Nwagbo (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 616, Umeojiako vs Ezenamuo (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.126) 253: Ayeni vs Sowemimo (1982) 5 SC 60. PER PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE DUTY INCUMBENT ON A COUNSEL WHO CITES A CASE THAT HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED

Where a counsel cites a case that has not been reported, he owes the Court a duty to produce a copy of the judgment if he wants this Court to rely on such authority. Where copies of the judgment are not produced, the Court will have nothing to rely upon. The cases are yet to reach this Court, as such I will refrain from commenting on them. PER PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

JUSTICES

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

ADAOHA UGO-NGADI Appellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):The Appellant herein and four (4) other accused persons were arraigned before the Lagos State High Court by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) charged with obtaining properties by false pretences contrary to Section 1 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 and conspiracy to forge documents, Forgery, and Uttering of false documents contrary to Sections 516, 467 (3)(c) and 468 respectively of the Criminal Code CAP, C 17 Vol 2 Laws of Lagos State of Nigeria, 2003.

Appellant and the co-accused persons pleaded not guilty to the charge. In order to prove its case, the prosecution called twelve (12) witnesses and tendered seventy-one (71) documents which were admitted in evidence. At the close of the prosecution’s case, a no case submission pursuant to Section 239 of the Administration of Criminal justice, Law of Lagos State was made on behalf of the Appellant, 2nd and 5th accused persons. In the no case submission, the Appellant raised the issue of jurisdiction, contending that the evidence led shows that the charge relates to

revenue of the Federal Government, Petroleum and Crude oil products as well as admiralty matters, and that by virtue of the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, the High Court of Lagos State has no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

The Respondent filed a counter affidavit accompanied by a written submission. In a reserved and considered ruling delivered on the 10th October, 2014 the trial Court overruled the no case submission and held that a prima facie case was sufficiently disclosed against the appellant. He was therefore called upon to enter his defence.

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the trial Court, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division. The appeal was heard and in a reserved judgment delivered on the 30th April, 2015 same was dismissed. The Appellant is once again dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal. Being aggrieved she has brought this appeal. Her notice of appeal dated 27th May, 2015 and filed on the 3rd of June, 2015 contains seven grounds of appeal. Parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. The Appellant’s brief of argument, settled by Chief Wole Olanipekun SAN is dated and

filed on the 27th November, 2015, but deemed properly filed on the 28th April, 2016. At page 3 paragraph 3.1 of the said brief of argument, three issues have been formulated for determination of this appeal. I reproduce them hereunder as follows:-
i. Having regard to the Lower Court’s finding that the trial Court breached the principle of fair hearing in striking down Section 19 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA), whether the Lower Court was not in grave error and so acted without jurisdiction when it thereafter failed to set aside the trial Court’s ruling of 10 October, 2014. (Ground 1).
ii. Having regard to the clear provisions of Section 251(1)(a),(g),(n),(s) and (3) of the Constitution, Section 8 (1) of the Federal High Court Act (FHC Act), Sections 1, 2, 19 and 25 of the AJA vis-a-viz the Information preferred against the appellant at the trial Court, as well as the evidence adduced by the prosecution, whether the Lower Court was not in grave error in holding that the trial Court rightly assumed jurisdiction on the Information dated 20 July, 2012. (Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).
iii. Whether the Lower Court was not in error when it failed

to be bound and to follow the decision of the Honourable Court in George vs FRN (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt.1399) 1 and its own decisions in Okey Nwosu vs FRN — Appeal No: CA/L/601/11 delivered on 21 November 2013 and Akingbola vs FRN – Appeal No: CA/L/490/14 delivered on 31 December 2014 (Ground 7).

The Respondent’s brief of argument, settled by Rotimi Jacobs SAN is dated and filed on the 28th June, 2017, but deemed properly filed and served on the 11th October, 2017. Learned senior counsel submitted only one issue for determination of this appeal. It reads thus:-
“Whether the Court of Appeal was not right in upholding the decision of the High Court of Lagos State that it had the Jurisdiction to entertain the information contained in charge No.ID/115C/2012 bordering on the offences of obtaining money by false pretence under the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006, Forgery, Uttering and Conspiracy under Sections 467 and 468 of the Criminal Code Cap C17, Volume 2 Laws of Lagos State, Nigeria 2003.”

The facts that gave rise to this appeal are simple and straight forward and they have been ably set out in the briefs of argument by

learned senior counsel for the parties. I will do no more than to recount them in brief. In order to relieve the public of the high cost of petroleum products, the Federal, State and Local Government came up with a scheme in which they contributed certain funds that was referred to as Petroleum Support Fund which fund was used to subsidise fuel import. Under the scheme, petrol is bought locally in Nigeria in the open market at a government subsidised rate. The oil marketing companies, under licence to import petrol into Nigeria would bring in petrol from abroad, having purchased same at the international rate and then submit their claims to the Government for settlement. The amount paid by the Government is the difference in price between the international market rates which is always higher than the subsidised rate. The claim by the marketer under the Petroleum Support Fund is based on what is actually discharged at the tank farm and as verified by the officers of Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Authority (PPPRA), Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), External auditors, the surveyor to the marketers involved, and the surveyor to the tank farm owner.

The Respondent’s case is that sometimes in 2011, it was observed that the subsidy being paid by the Government went up astronomically and this prompted the Minister of Petroleum Resources to forward a petition to Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), urging it to carry out investigation into the operation of the Petroleum Support Fund otherwise known as fuel subsidy. The EFCC found in the course of its investigation that Ontario Oil & Gas Nigeria Limited, (the 5th accused at the Lower Court) was one of the companies licensed by Government to import petrol into the country. The Appellant herein is a director in Ontario Oil & Gas Nigeria Limited (henceforth to be called company) and also a signatory to the account of the company. In 2010 the company was given allocation in the 3rd quarter to import fuel. It claimed that following the authorisation, it imported 19,327,460 litres of petrol and discharged same into the Integrated & Gas depot on the 7th July, 2010. During the 4th quarter of the same year the company in pursuance of the licence given to it to import petrol, claimed to have imported 19,523,892 litres of petrol which

it discharged into Obat Oil Storage Facilities in Apapa between 14th and 15th November, 2010. Investigation conducted by the EFCC revealed that the company imported 12,470,706 and 10,146,594.73 litres of petrol for the 3rd and 4th quarters of 2010 respectively and the Appellant and 1st accused person presented false documents which led to over payment of N340,178,111.24 (Three Hundred and Forty Million, One Hundred and seventy-Eight Thousand, One Hundred and Eleven Naira Twenty-four Kobo) and N414,757,890.54 (Four Hundred and Fourteen Million, Seven Hundred and Fifty-seven Thousand, Eight Hundred and Ninety Naira Fifty-four) as fuel subsidy by the Federal Government for 6,815,830.73 and 9,377,298 litres of petrol which were not imported. It was this discovery that gave rise to the arraignment of the Appellant and other accused persons before the High Court of Lagos State.

The second issue for determination of this appeal is challenging the jurisdiction of the Lagos State High Court before which the Appellant is standing trial. Jurisdiction is the sole of adjudication and if the trial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter, an appellate Court

cannot assume jurisdiction over its proceedings that have been conducted without jurisdiction. Consequently it is always expedient to resolve any challenge to jurisdiction first before proceeding to resolve any other issue. See Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390; Ezomo vs Oyakhire (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) 195; Sofekun v. Akinyemi (1980) 5 7 SC 1; A-G of Anambra State v. A.G. Fed. (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 692.

Learned senior counsel for the Appellant in his argument on the 2nd issue, submitted that Section 272 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (henceforth to be referred to as “the Constitution”) is made subject to the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution and therefore Section 272 of the Constitution must be read in subordination to Section 251 of the Constitution. In aid learned senior counsel cited Labiyi vs Anretiola (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.258) 139 AT 163 164; Achebe v. Nwosu (2003) FWLR (Pt.136) 891 at 907. Learned senior counsel made reference to Section 8(1) of the Federal High Court Act and submitted that the Section of the Federal High Court Act being a Federal enactment takes priority over any State

legislation that purports to vest jurisdiction in the trial Court. In a further argument, learned senior counsel submitted that the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251 (3) of the Constitution is a by-product of and tied inextricably to the jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 251 (1) of the Constitution. It is learned senior counsel’s contention that if the jurisdiction under Section 251 (3) of the Constitution is derivative of the jurisdiction under Section 251 (1) of the Constitution, which is exclusive jurisdiction, then the jurisdiction under Section 251(3) of the Constitution must necessary be exclusive.

Learned senior counsel went on to cite items 36, 39, 67 and 68 of the Exclusive Legislative list contained in the Second Schedule to the Constitution which he says, when read together with the provisions of Section 251 (1) of the Constitution will show clearly that the framers of the Constitution intended that the matters listed therein must in all cases, be Federal matters. Learned senior counsel went on to refer to Section 19 and 25 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA) and spent considerable amount of time

setting out the list of the exhibits which were tendered at the trial Court and submitted that a consideration of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that the subject matter of the information preferred before the trial Court cannot be extricated from the provisions of Section 251 (1)(a),(g),(n) and (s) and Section 251 (3) of the Constitution, Section 8(1) of the Federal High Court Act, Sections 1, 2, 19 and 25 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA).

specified under Section 251 (1) (a – s) of the Constitution.
Section 251(1) of the Constitution deals solely with civil matters in which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction. This is what the Section says: –
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition jurisdiction to such other as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters
The jurisdiction of the State High Court is donated by Section 272(1) of the Constitution, in the following words:-
“Subject to the provision of Section 251 and other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.

Section 272 (1) of the Constitution is made subject to Section 251 and other provision of the Constitution with respect to those items where the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is exclusive. The Section is also made subject to other provisions of the Constitution where exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and Election Petition Tribunals.
In all other matters where exclusive jurisdiction has not been expressly assigned to any other Courts, the State High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine such matters. Section 251 (3) provides as follows:-
“The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise and jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this Section.
The word ‘exclusive is clearly absent in Section 251 (3) of the Constitution. The word also as used in Subsection (3) of Section 251 of the Constitution is defined by Advanced Learned Dictionary to mean ,’in addition; too, or as well”. If the framers of the Constitution had intended that the Federal High Court should

have exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters involving the items listed under Section 251 (1)(a – s), they would have said so in clear terms. It is an established cardinal principle of interpretation that the words of a statute which are unambiguous must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning. It is not the function of the Court to import words into the statute which do violence to the intent and meaning of the statutory provision. See Edozien vs. Edozien & Ors (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt.580) at 152; Egbe v. Alhaji & Ors (1990) 21 NSCC (Pt.1) 306 at 325; (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 546 at 581.
In Attorney General of Ondo State v. Attorney General of the Federation & Ors (2002) 6 SC (Pt.1) 1, the full Court of the Supreme Court, laid to rest the question whether States High Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal offences created by National Assembly when it held:-
“The Attorney General of the Federation drives his powers under Section 174 of the Constitution as an agency of the Federal Government. The law is well established that the Court cannot control the manner he exercises his powers so conferred — nor can he be prevented

from exercising his functions on the grounds that his jurisdiction does not extend to any particular State in Nigeria. Section 174 of the Constitution does not impose any such limitation.” See the State vs Ilori (1983) 1 SC NLR 94.”
This Court came to the conclusion that by virtue of Section 174 (1) Section 286 (1)( b) of the 1999 Constitution, the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorised by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), a Federal Government Agency, can lawfully initiate or authorize the initiation of criminal proceedings in any Court other than a Court martial in any State of the Federation in respect of offences created by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000.
Section 19 (1) of the Economic And Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 provides that the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory has jurisdiction to try offenders under this Act. Subsection 3 of Section 19 of the EFCC Act provides as follows:-
“The Chief Judge of the Federal High Court or a High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, as the case may

be, shall by order under his hand, designate a Court or judge or such number of Courts or judges as he shall deem appropriate to hear and determine all cases under this Act or other related offences arising under this Act.
By Section 7(2)(b) and (f) of the same Act, the Economic And Financial crimes commission shall be the coordinating agency for the enforcement of the provision of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 1995 and any other law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes, including the Criminal Code and Penal Code. The Appellant was arraigned before the Lagos State High Court for offences under the section of Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related offences and Sections of the criminal code which the EFCC is empowered to coordinate the enforcement of their provisions.
By the provision of Section 251(1) of the Constitution, the National Assembly notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution conferred additional jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of criminal matters which jurisdiction is not exclusive. There is nowhere in the Constitution where the jurisdiction of State

High courts in respect of the Federal cause as provided by Section 286 (1)(a) has been removed. I am of the firm view that the Lagos State High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges for which the Appellant was arraigned before it.

The charges against the Appellant have nothing to do with carriage of goods by sea or petroleum products. Even though the charges mentioned the goods whose proceeds were obtained by false pretences and the documents in relation to the goods which were forged and uttered, there is no evidence that the offences in this case were committed when the goods were on board ship on the high sea. The petroleum product in respect of which the offences were alleged to have been committed had been discharged into various tank farms in Nigeria. This being so, admiralty jurisdiction had ended with the discharge of the petroleum product. See Petro Jessica & Anor vs. Leventis Technical Co. Ltd (1992) NWLR (Pt.244) 675; American International Inc. vs Ceekay Traders Ltd (1981) 5 SC 50. The charges against the appellant do not call for the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The appellant was arraigned

before the trial Court for forging and uttering of documents and by so doing collected money from the Federal Government for goods that were not supplied. These charges have nothing to do with either petroleum products or revenue of the Federal Government of Nigeria. There mere fact that goods at one stage in their movement had a voyage on a ship does not give rise to admiralty jurisdiction. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. Ltd vs. Pedmar Nig Ltd (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) 526.
I agree with the lower Court when it held that the trial Court, that is the Lagos State High Court has jurisdiction to hear the case before it. This issue is resolved against the Appellant.

On issue 1, learned senior counsel made reference to the Lower Courts judgment at page 2166 of the printed record of this appeal, where it held:-
Furthermore, this was done by the Court, suo motu which violates the principle of fair hearing. See Katto vs. CBN (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt.214) 126; Oloriode vs. Oyebi (1984) 5 SC 1 at 32 33; Ezomo vs. Oyakhire (1985) 2 SC 260 AT 282; Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt.84) 508 at 520, counsel were not invited to address the Court

before the striking down was done. It was done from the blues so to speak. Therefore it cannot be allowed to stand. In this regards, I set aside that part of the decision striking down Section 19 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA) 1991, and submitted that such finding ought to have resulted in the setting entire aside of the decision of the trial Court. According to the learned senior counsel, this Court has been consistent in holding that once a breach of fair hearing is found in any proceedings/decision, the entire proceedings/decision becomes automatically vitiated and nullified by such breach, regardless of the actual consequences of the breach. In aid, learned senior counsel cited Danladi v. Dangiri (2014) 11 SC 1 at 71 & 75; Olumesan v. Ogundepo (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.433) 628 at 645; Idakwo v. Ejiga (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.783) 156 at 165 166.

I have held elsewhere in this judgment that the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act does not apply to this case. The issue of striking down its Section 19 is irrelevant as far as this case is concerned.

The right to fair hearing is a constitutional right enshrined in Section 36 of the

Constitution and it is very essential to the propagation of justice. The basic attribute of fair hearing include:-
(a) That the Court shall hear both sides not only in the case but also on all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which prejudiced may be to any party in the case;
(b) That the Court gives equal treatment, opportunity and consideration to all concerned;
(c) That the proceedings be heard in public and all concerned shall be informed of and have access to such place of hearing; and
(d) That having regard to all circumstances in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done.
See Usani vs. Duke (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt.871) 116; Fagbule vs. Rodrigues (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt.765) 188; Adeniran vs. NEPA (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.786) 30; Bamgboye v. University of Ilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt.622) 290.

211 at 243 244 held:-
“Fair hearing is not a cut and dry principle, which parties can in the abstract, always apply to their comfort and convenience. It is a principle which is based and must be based on the facts of the case before the Court. Only the facts of the case can influence and determine the application or inapplicability of the principle. The principle of fair hearing is helpless or completely dead outside the facts of the case.” See Olowu vs Nigerian Navy (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.1279) 659.”

From the facts of this case, as I have alluded to earlier Admiralty Jurisdiction Act is inapplicable and reference to the striking down of its Section 9 by the trial Court suo motu without calling for further address, has no relevance to this case. I am also of the firm view that the decision of the Lower Court has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice. A wrongful admission of evidence or a wrongful consideration of an issue which is alien to the case under consideration cannot be a ground for reversal of a decision where it appears on appeal that such evidence or wrongful consideration of such issue cannot be reasonably be held to have affected

the decision and that the decision would have been the same if such evidence had not been admitted and the consideration of the issue complained of had not been made. See Ezeoke vs Nwagbo (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt.72) 616, Umeojiako vs Ezenamuo (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.126) 253: Ayeni vs Sowemimo (1982) 5 SC 60.

The decision of the Lower Court in which it declared the striking down of Section 9 of the AJA as amounting to a breach of fair hearing has not affected the credibility of its judgment, and so I hold. The first issue for determination of this appeal is therefore resolved against the Appellant.

On the third issue for determination of this appeal, learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted that the decision of the Lower Court, as well as that of the trial Court which the Lower Court affirmed, are in breach of the age-long doctrine of stare decisis.

In a further argument, learned senior counsel submitted that the Court of Appeal is not only bound by the decision of the Supreme Court, it is also bound by its decisions. Learned senior counsel gave four exceptions where the Court of Appeal is not bound by its previous decisions as enunciated in

the English case of Young vs Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd (1994) 1 KB 718; 2 ALL ER 293 and ratified in a host of Nigerian cases and contended that the Lower Court did not distinguish the facts in George vs FRN (Supra) and the facts in Okey Nwosu v. FRN (2014) 1 BFLR 298 which it refused to follow. It is learned senior counsels further contention that the failure to follow the applicable judicial precedent by the High Court and the Court of Appeal renders their decisions invalid. Okey Nwosu vs FRN (supra) and Akingbola vs FRN are decisions of the Court of Appeal. Learned senior counsel cited them in the brief as unreported. Where a counsel cites a case that has not been reported, he owes the Court a duty to produce a copy of the judgment if he wants this Court to rely on such authority. Where copies of the judgment are not produced, the Court will have nothing to rely upon. The cases are yet to reach this Court, as such I will refrain from commenting on them. However the facts in George vs FRN (supra) are not at all fours with the instant case. George was charged for splitting of contracts, an offence not known to criminal law. This is what this Court said:-<br< p=””

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“It is clear from the reproduced portion of Exhibit 3, as above, that it contains guidelines which forbids splitting of contracts by any officer. It stipulates that breach of same shall be met with disciplinary action. This may be in form of administrative action against an officer who breaches the rules. Disobeying Exhibit 3 is not made an offence by any Act of the National Assembly or law of a State House of Assembly or even the contents of Exhibit 3 itself. Even then disobedience of Exhibit 3 is nowhere penalysed in a written law. Any conduct that must be sanctioned must be expressly stated in a written law to wit! An Act by the National Assembly. That is what Section 36 (12) of the 1999 Constitution provides. Such conduct should not be left to conjecture. As well, it cannot be inferred by the Court. It occurs to me that Section 203 of the Criminal Code is not in tune with the dictate of Section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution. That being the position, the charges filed under Section 203 of the said code ostensibly for splitting contract in disobedience of lawful order by constituted authority cannot stand. Acts said to have constituted authority acts resulting in

abuse of office are splitting of contract which were not known to law at the material time.

The appellant Chief Bode along with others were alleged to have exceeded the limit set to their authority to award contracts and they contrived to bring the contract within their limits by splitting them while also inflating their prices. The same thing cannot be said about the instant case where the offences for which the appellant was arraigned before the trial Court are offences created by the National Assembly and States and are properly codified.

The doctrine of stare decisis come to play when the facts of the previous case and the current one are the same. A Court is not bound to follow the decision of the higher Court when the facts are distinguishable. In the instant case, I am of the firm view that the facts in George vs FRN (supra) is not the same as the facts of the present case. The trial Court and the Court of Appeal were right when they refused to be bound by the decision in George vs FRN (supra). This issue is resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

This appeal is in the nature of interlocutory appeal.

Paragraph 4(e) of the Court of Appeal; (Fast Track Practice Directions 2014 provides that interlocutory appeals pertaining to or connected with corruption, Human trafficking, kidnapping and money laundry should be discouraged in the following words:-
“Active case management includes discouraging interlocutory appeals and requiring the parties, except in the most deserving cases, to subsume their interlocutory matters under a final appeal or under the substantive suit at the trial Court.
The High Courts and the Court of Appeal are hereby called upon to observe and enforce the provision of this practice direction in order to cut down the delay experienced in the hearing and disposal of corruption related cases.

Now, having resolved the three issues submitted by the Appellant for determination of this appeal against the appellant, this appeal shall be and it is hereby dismissed.

The appellant shall appear at the trial Court for the conclusion of her trial.

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Paul Adamu Galinje JSC and to register that

support I shall make some comments.

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal Lagos Division or Lower Court or Court below delivered on the 30th day of April, 2015 which affirmed the ruling of the learned trial judge of the High Court dated 10th October, 2014 that overruled the No case submission of the appellant and affirmed the jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos State to try her for the offences for which she is being prosecuted before that Court.

The background facts are well set out in the lead judgment and so there is no need to repeat them here except for when it is necessary to refer to any part of the facts.

At the hearing on 1st November, 2017 learned counsel for the appellant Y.A. Kadiri Esq. adopted the brief of argument settled by Dr. Oladapo Olanipekun SAN, filed on 27th November, 2015 and deemed filed on 28th April, 2016. In the brief were three issues for determination which are as follows:-
i. Having regard to the Lower Court’s findings that trial Court breached the principle of fair hearing in striking down Section 19 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (AJA), whether the Lower Court was not in grave

error and so acted without jurisdiction when it thereafter failed to set aside the trial Court’s ruling of October, 2014. (Ground 1).
ii. Having regard to the clear provisions of Section 251(1)(a),(g),(n),(s) and (3) of the Constitution, Section 8(1) of the Federal High Court Act (FHC ACT), Section 1, 2, 19 and 25 of the AJA viz-a-viz the information preferred against the appellant at the trial Court, as well as the evidence adduced by the prosecution, whether the Lower Court was not in grave error in holding that the trial Court rightly assumed jurisdiction on the information dated 20th July, 2012. (Grounds 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).
iii. Whether the Lower Court was not in error when it failed to be bound and to follow the decision of this honourable Court in George v FRN (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt.1399) land its own decisions in Okey Nwosu v. FRN -Appeal No: CA/L/601/11 delivered on 21st November 2013 and Akingbola v FRN – Appeal No: CA/L/490/14 delivered on 31st December 2014. (Ground 7).

The appellant also filed a reply brief on the 28th October, 2017.

Learned counsel for the respondent, Adebisi Adeniyi Esq. adopted the brief of argument of the

respondent settled by Rotimi Jacobs SAN, filed on 28th June, 2017 and deemed filed on 11th October, 2017 and identified a sole issue as follows:-
Whether the Court of Appeal was not right in upholding the decision of the High Court of Lagos State that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the information contained in charge No: ID/1152C/2012 bordering on the offences of obtaining money by false pretence under the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences ACT 2006, forgery, uttering and conspiracy under Section 467 and 468 of the Criminal Code Cap C17, Volume 2, Laws of Lagos State, Nigeria 2003.

The single issue as crafted by the respondent is sufficient for use in this appeal and I shall utilise it.

TREATMENT OF ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeal was not right in upholding the decision of the High Court of Lagos State that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the information contained in charge No: ID/115C/2012 bordering on the offences of obtaining money by false pretence under the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006, forgery, uttering and conspiracy under Section 467 and 468 of the Criminal Code Cap C17,

Volume 2, Laws of Lagos State, Nigeria 2003.

Advancing the position of the appellant, learned counsel stated that an incident of the breach of fair hearing will invariably create and cast a substantial doubt over the entire proceedings as happened in the case in hand when the Court below struck down Section 19 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act when counsel were not invited to address the Court before the order. That this vitiated the entire proceedings as the jurisdiction of Court was ousted thereby. He cited Section 135 of the Evidence Act 2011; State v Oladotun (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.1256) 542 at 572; PDP V Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt.1316) 85 at 152-153; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 ALL NLR (Pt.4) 581 at 595 e.t.c.

That the effect of Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 has conferred criminal jurisdiction to the Federal High Court exclusively. He referred to Section 19 and 25 of the Administration of Justice Act, AJA for short.

That the information preferred against the appellant at the trial Court falls squarely within the provisions of Section 251(1)(a),(g) and (3) of the CFRN as well as Sections 1, 2, 3

and 19 of the AJA and so the Court below ought to have given effect to those provisions and held that the State Trial High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the charge which should be within the exclusive domain of the Federal High Court.

Learned counsel for the respondent contended that this Court should uphold the concurrent findings of the two Courts below to the effect that the information contained in charge No:ID/115C/2012 bordering on the offences of obtaining money by false pretence under the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Relate Offences Act, 2006 forgery, uttering and conspiracy under Section 467 and 468 of the Criminal Code Cap C17 , Volume 2, Laws of Lagos State, Nigeria 2003 and that they were triable by the Lagos State High court. He cited Mandara v. Attorney General of the Federation (1984) 1 SCNLR 311 at 330; A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222 at 308 etc.

The appellant posits that the case before the Court below as well as the High Court in which the information against the appellant bordered on the revenue of the Federal Government, PMS (a derivative of mines and minerals) and carriage of goods

by sea is caught by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251 (1)(a), (g), (n) of the Constitution and Sections 1, 2, 3 and 19 of the Administration of Justice Act.

The respondent disagreed with that stance stating that the Court of Appeal was right in upholding the decision of the High Court of Lagos State that it had jurisdiction to entertain the information contained in the charge which bordered on the offences of obtaining money by false pretence under the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006, forgery, uttering and conspiracy under Sections 467 and 468 of the Criminal Code Cap C.17, Volume 2, Laws of Lagos State, Nigeria 2003.

At the Court of first instance, the learned trial judge held thus:-
“I am unable to hold the view that the matters herein are within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. It is simply a criminal matter on the offences committed on documents allegedly uttered, forged and false pretence under the State Criminal Code and not Federal.”
He followed the diction of Karibi-Whyte JSC in Eze v FRN (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.51) 506, which considered a similar presentation of

documents allegedly uttered and forged under false pretences for the purposes of illegally collecting payment under Section 419 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences and the State Criminal Code which the Supreme Court held were clearly not under Federal High Court Act.
In a case bearing similar facts as the one under review, this Court per Ogunbiyi JSC in the case of FRN v. Okey Nwosu (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt.1541) 226 at pp 304-305 stated as follows:-
“The offence of stealing being alleged against the 1st respondent was created under the law enacted by the Lagos State House of Assembly, the same house could not have conferred jurisdiction on the Federal High Court but only conferred on the High Court of the State. The offence of stealing does not fall within items (a)-(s) listed in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. The control of capital issue does not also fall within any of the items specifically listed in Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Assuming that the offence of stealing falls within the items listed as (a)-(s) in Section 251, that in itself would not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try

criminal cases arising from such items. This is in view of Section 251(3) and the phrase “The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction.” by Section 251(3) the Federal High Court shall also have jurisdiction along with other Court in criminal causes or matters but not an exclusive jurisdiction as was conferred on the Federal High Court in civil matters listed in Subsection 1 of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution…as rightly submitted by the appellant therefore, the learned justices of the Court of Appeal were in great error in holding that the High Court of Lagos State had no requisite jurisdiction to try the 1st respondent for the offence of stealing by conversion preferred against him under Section 390 (7) of the Criminal Code Law of Lagos State, 2003.”
Also, at page 304, his Lordship Ogunbiyi JSC opined further
“In criminal law and administration of criminal justice, the determination of justice, the determination of jurisdiction will be taken in the light of the enabling law setting out the jurisdiction viz-a-viz the charge preferred against the accused. Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution is also relevant. The charge

before the Court is what determines its jurisdiction. While Section 251(1) of the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction in civil matters in respect of items listed as (a)-(s), Section 251(3) does not however confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in criminal causes and matters listed in Subsection (1). By the use of the phrase, “the Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction” can only mean that other Courts apart from the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction also in respect of criminal matters relating to matters listed in Section 251(1). The phrase “to the exclusion of any other Court is omitted deliberately. It is difficult in the circumstance to appreciate the reasoning of the Court of Appeal that what the respondents did with the proceeds of crime of stealing would divest the (High Court) of its jurisdiction to try the offence of stealing.”
Towing the same line of thought, Dattijo Muhammad JSC stated thus:-
“The jurisdiction of the trial Court as spelt out under Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution operates subject to the restriction placed on it by Section 251(2) and (3) of the same

Constitution. The latter subsection vests criminal jurisdiction in the Federal High Court regarding all the items for which the Courts is conferred exclusive civil jurisdiction under Section 251(1). None of these items pertains simple stealing for which the 1st respondent stands trial at the trial Court. He is not being charged for stealing shares. As learned senior counsel for the appellant further observed, and correctly too, the 1st respondent does not stand trial at the Federal High Court for the same offence of stealing preferred against him at the trial Court. At the Federal High Court, he faces trial only for those offences for which, by virtue of the relevant items in the Exclusive Legislative List, the National Assembly had passed laws on. The Lower Court’s judgment that the trial Court has lost its jurisdiction to the Federal High Court of the basis of the latter’s exclusive jurisdiction under Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution is therefore, preserve. It is a decision that neither draws from the evidence on record nor from a correct construction of Section 251 (3) of the Constitution, the Lower Court held the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal

High Court stems from. The truth is that stealing is a matter which falls within the Legislative competence of the Lagos State House of Assembly and having been legislated upon, the trial Court retains the jurisdiction of trying the 1st respondent, See Daboh & Anor v State (1977) NSCC 309 at 321-322.” See also Ehindero v FRN (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt.1415) 281.
Clearly this Court has stated in definite terms the extent of criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as its not being tampered with by the emergence of the 1999 Constitution and until the National Assembly enacts a penal enactment in future to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court, the State High Court will continue to exercise the jurisdiction entrusted to it in offences covered by state Laws. On the other hand, the Federal High Court will keep to the limits prescribed for it in matters listed in Section 7(1) of the Federal High Court Act or the Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution. In determining the Court with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a criminal matter, the Court would always consider the nature of the charge rather than the transaction forming the

subject matter of the charge or the documents attached as proof of evidence.
It needs to be said that the 1999 Constitution has not conferred exclusive criminal jurisdiction on the Federal High Court on various items listed in Section 251(1) of the CFRN and until such a provision bestowing exclusivity of the jurisdiction to the Federal High Court, the State High Court can equally entertain matters either civil or criminal to which jurisdiction has been conferred by the National Assembly and in this Section 251(1)(s) stipulates thus: “such other jurisdiction, civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an act of National Assembly.”
Section 286 of CFRN provides thus “Jurisdiction of State Court in respect of Federal Causes”. This is because the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria recognizes that the State High Court may be conferred with the power by an Act of the National Assembly to try Federal offences. This situation has been effectively explained in the case of A.G. Ondo State v A.G. Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222 at 308 per Uwais CJN as follows:-
“The next point

is whether the Attorney General of the Federation or any person authorised by the ICPC can lawfully initiate or authorise the initiation of criminal proceedings in any Court in Ondo State in respect of offences created by the Act. The plaintiff’s contention is that the answer is in the negative if the answers to issues No’s .(i) and (ii) have been answered in the negative.
But I have held otherwise and so the opposite is the case, I therefore hold that the criminal proceedings can be initiated in the Court in Ondo State in accordance with the provisions of Section 286 Subsection (1) (b) of the Constitution which provides,., Federal offences is defined in Section (3) thereof to mean “an offence contrary to the provisions of an Act of the National Assembly or any law having effect as if so enacted.” This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in Olafisoye .v. FRN (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt.864) 580.”
The word “any Court in Nigeria” in Section 174(1) (a) of the CFRN 1999 has stated that the Federal Attorney General can approach any Court including the State High Court to initiate criminal proceedings in relation to Federal Offences. It follows that the

appellant is not pushing a right interpretation to the effect that in any Federal Offence, only the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the matter.

Indeed, the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Courts below are anchored on the facts available and sustained by the relevant laws and so there is no basis for any interference by this Court.

From the foregoing and the better reasoning in the lead judgment, I dismiss this appeal which is lacking in merit.
I abide by the consequential orders as made.

KUMAI BAYANG AKAAHS, J.S.C.: I read before now the judgment of my learned brother, Galinje JSC that the appeal is lacking in merit. I entirely agree with him.

The arguments of Learned Senior Counsel on the issue of jurisdiction though brilliantly presented cannot affect the outcome of this appeal. The trial Court held that a prima facie case had been disclosed against the appellant requiring her to enter into her defence. This finding was affirmed by the Court below. There is no reason whatsoever to interfere with this finding.

It is urged on counsel particularly the

learned Senior counsel to fast track hearing and disposal of cases connected with corruption, human trafficking, kidnapping and money laundering by avoiding the temptation of filing interlocutory appeals that have the undesired effect of delaying the quick disposal of such cases. If counsel felt strongly that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to ground a conviction, they have an option to rest their case on that of the prosecution instead of going the whole gamut of contesting the refusal of the trial Court to uphold the no – case submission up to the Supreme Court, the constitutional guarantee of the right of appeal notwithstanding.
The appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.

JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.: I was obliged in advance a copy of the judgment of my learned brother, Paul Adamu Galinie, JSC just delivered. I am in complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion that this appeal is devoid of merit and deserves an order of dismissal. My learned brother has admirably resolved the three issues submitted for the determination of this appeal. I adopt his views expressed in this judgment as

mine.

May I emphasize that once a cargo has been discharged from the vessel, carriage by sea and admiralty jurisdiction ends. The storage facilities in Lagos or any other city in Nigeria where the petroleum products were discharged into is not part of the high sea so as to make any offence arising from it to be an admiralty matter. See Petro Jessica Enterprises Ltd & Anor v Leventis Technical Company Ltd (1992) LPELR – 2915 (SC),Aluminium Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. Nigerian Ports Authority (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.51) 475.
It follows that the appellant who was standing trial before the High Court of Lagos State for forging and uttering documents through which he collected various sums of money from the Federal Government of Nigeria for petroleum products not imported, was properly arraigned before the said High Court. The charges have nothing to do with carriage of goods by sea or admiralty to which only the Federal High Court could have exclusive jurisdiction. I agree that Lagos State High Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter.

Based on the above and the fuller reasons adumbrated in the lead judgment, I hold that this appeal lacks merit.

It is hereby dismissed by me. Appellant shall return to the trial Court for his trial to be concluded.

SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.S.C.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead Judgment of my learned brother Paul Adamu Galinje, JSC, just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion reached. The appeal is without merit and it is hereby dismissed. I abide by all the orders contained in the lead Judgment.

Appearances:

A. Kadiri, Esq. with him, Mr. C. O. Alaje For Appellant(s)

Adebisi Adeniyi, Esq. For Respondent(s)

Appearances

A. Kadiri, Esq. with him, Mr. C. O. Alaje For Appellant

AND

Adebisi Adeniyi, Esq. For Respondent