ABUJA MARKET MGT LTD v. AUGUSTINE & ORS
(2022)LCN/15970(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Wednesday, April 27, 2022
CA/ABJ/CV/510/2020
Before Our Lordships:
Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal
Danlami Zama Senchi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Bature Isah Gafai Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
ABUJA MARKET MANAGEMENT LIMITED APPELANT(S)
And
1. REV. UGWU AUGUSTINE 2. PASTOR WILSON NWACHUKWU 3. PASTOR WILFRED OKOYE 4. ELDER CHARLES EROBUTE 5. PASTOR CHUKWU UDE 6. BROTHER BITRUS I. SENCHI 7. EVANGELIST FAITH ADEOY 8. BROTHER EMEKA ANI 9. BROTHER EMEKA OKOYE 10. EVANGELIST PROSPER NGENE 11. BROTHER CHARLES EROBUTE (SUING FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF CONCERNED MEMBERS OF CHRISTIAN TRADERS MARKET FELLOWSHIP OF GARKI MARKET, ABUJA) 12. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, ABUJA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF ENDORSEMENT OF A PARTY’S NAME AND ADDRESS IN PROCESS FILED IN COURT
The issue of endorsement of a party’s name and the party address is very fundamental. The person who files any process must take the issue of address for service seriously. Under Order 2 Rule 6 of the Court’s Rules 2021, it is provided as follows:
6. Where under these Rules, any notice or other process is required to have an address for service endorsed on it, it shall not be accepted for filing by the Registry of the lower Court or the Registry of the Court, or where accepted, it shall not be deemed to have been properly filed in so far as such address has not been endorsed on it.
This provision of the Rules is very plain and sacrosanct. The provision is aimed at ensuring that the Court is not at any difficulty in effecting service of the processes filed in Court on the relevant parties in furtherance of the Fundamental Right to Fair Hearing under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended). The foundation for the actualization of the right to fair hearing is the address of service of the process on all the parties. The address must be dual. It must be the address of the party filing and the party to be informed of the process filed. Any process filed without an address for service of the process is fundamentally defective. See the cases of Ihedioha & Anor. v. Okorocha (2015) LPELR-40837 (SC) and Chinda v. INEC & Ors (2019) LPELR-47902 (CA). The hallmark of all I have been labouring to say is that service of process of Court is very important to the competence of the Court to adjudicate on the matter hence all processes filed in Court requiring service must have a proven address for service. PER ADAH, J.C.A.
THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT TO A LEGAL COUNSEL OF CHOICE
This move is essential to enable the Court serve processes in the case on the relevant parties through their counsel. Our law is now well settled that a party has a constitutional right under Section 36 of 1999, to a counsel or a legal practitioner of his choice. See the cases of Festus v. A.A.C & Ors. (2020) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1713) 105 and Isiaka & Ors. v. Ogundimu & Ors. (2006) LPELR-1552 (SC). Having regard to the foregoing, it sounds very much in line with the law to allow the endorsement of the address of counsel for the parties on the notice of appeal as was done in the instant appeal. PER ADAH, J.C.A.
STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, delivered on 6th December, 2019, in Suit No: FCT/CV/3180/2019.
The respondents as claimant instituted this action and claimed against the appellant as defendants jointly all the sundry reliefs as per the Originating Motion, thus:
1. A Declaration that the claimants and their members are entitled to build their own fellowship church in the Garki Market Abuja, at a place to be designated by the 2nd defendant, as the 2nd defendant provided for other religious faiths.
2. A Declaration that the 2nd defendant is to pay the claimants and their members the sum 50 Million Naira only as damages for violating the right of the claimants by refusing them their unfettered right for a designated place of worship for a considerable number of years, having consistently demanded for same from the 2nd Defendant.
3. An Order compelling the 2nd Defendant from further violating any legal existing rights of the claimants and their members in the said Garki Market.
4. AND FOR SUCH FURTHER ORDER OR ORDERS this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.
The facts of the case at the trial Court is that the claimants claimed they have a right to build a place of worship at the market just like every other faith. They claimed the land in the market was allocated to them by the 12th respondent for building a place of worship.
After hearing the 16 paragraphs of affidavit in support of the Originating Summon deposed to by Rev. Ugwu Augustine, who is the 1st claimant, the 1st defendant in response, filed a 19 paragraph counter-affidavit deposed to by Ngozika Ruth Owohohaaa staff with the Administration Department of the 1st Defendant.
In proof of their case, the claimants tendered three documentary Exhibits marked as Exhibits A, B and C.
At the close of trial, the trial Court on the 6th of December, 2019, entered judgment in favour of the 1st-11th respondents.
Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellant appealed to this Court. The Notice of Appeal filed on the 12th February, 2020, is upon Seven Grounds of Appeal. The Record of Appeal was transmitted to this Court on the 8th July, 2020.
In line with the extant rules and practice of this Court, parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument, which they adopted and relied on as their arguments at the hearing of the appeal.
The Appellant’s Brief of Argument was filed on the 16th July, 2020. The 1st-11th Respondents’ Brief was filed on 1st July, 2021 but deemed properly filed and served on 3rd February, 2022. The Appellant’s Reply Brief was filed on the 23rd September, 2021 but deemed properly filed and served on the 3rd February, 2022.
In the Appellant’s Brief of Argument, four (4) issues were formulated for the determination of this appeal. They are:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in his judgment to hold that the 1st-11th Respondents are entitled to build a place of worship on a portion of the appellant’s land granted to her by the 12th respondent. (Grounds 1, 2, 4 and 5)
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the appellant is obliged to allocate or designate places of worship inside the appellant’s (property) market and consequently ordered the appellant to approve the building plan as sought by the 1st to 11th respondents for building of their place of worship even when such claim was never made by the 1st to the 11th respondents for building of their place of worship even such claim was never made by the 1st to the 11th respondents. (Grounds 3 and 7)
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that a particular portion of the appellant’s land in the market has been designated for the building of place of worship and same was verbally allocated to the 1st to 11th respondents by the appellant when in fact the identity of such portion of land was never established. (Ground Six)
4. Whether the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence before him in his judgment. (Ground 8)
The respondents adopted the four issues formulated by the appellant. Parties being ad idem on the issues calling for determination, I shall also adopt the issues for the determination of this appeal. The respondents in their Brief of Argument, raised a Preliminary Objection challenging the competence of the appellant’s appeal before this Court. The respondents claiming that the Record of Appeal is incompetent and it affects the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. <br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”></br<>
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF THE 1ST TO 11TH RESPONDENTS:
Learned counsel for the 1st to 11th respondents submitted that the names and addresses of parties directly affected by this appeal are not the same as names and addresses of their counsel. It is the personal names and addresses of the respective parties to the appeal. The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant in this appeal has woefully failed to comply with this mandatory provision. The said Notice of Appeal is to this extent incurably defective and should be struck out. Counsel relied on Order 7 Rule 6 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016; Dr. Stephen Adi Odey v. Chief John Alaga & 2 Ors (2021) Unreported, in Appeal No. SC/CV/9/2021.
In response, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is trite principle of law that endorsement of address of service on a Notice of Appeal as that provided at the trial Court is a valid endorsement especially where a party has continued to maintain such address and has not forwarded a new address for service. This becomes sacrosanct when a party who instituted action at the trial Court endorsed as address for service on him, the process of Court as that of his counsel and such counsel has continued to act and accept processes on behalf of such party even on appeal without any objection and/or notice of withdrawal duly filed and served on the other party. Counsel relied on the cases of Revd. Hyde Onuaguluchi v. Mr. Bencollins Ndu & 2 Ors (2000) 11 NWLR (679) PP. 552-553, Paras. G-A; Afonja Community Bank (Nig) Ltd v Mr. M. F. Akpan (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) Pp. 170- 171, Paras. G-C.
Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the rule did not state that the names and address of the parties directly affected. Suffice to say that the names of the appellant and the respondents are correctly endorsed on the face of the Notice of Appeal, it is therefore, non-sequitur, to state that the actual names and personal addresses of the 1st to the 11th respondents must be stated at paragraph five (5) of the Notice of Appeal as parties directly affected by the appeal. Counsel relied on the cases of Afonja Community Bank (Nig.) Ltd v. Mr. M.F. Akpan (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) Pp. 170-171, Paras. G-C; Eze (Dr.) Emma Umez Eronini & Ors., v. Lady C. Eronini & Ors (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1373) P. 48, Para. C; Nze Jeremiah Osigwelem v. Independent National Electoral Commission & Ors (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 441, Paras. C-E; Hon. Hassan Anthony Saleh V. Christian Adabah Abah & Ors (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1578) Pp. 126-127, Paras. H-D; First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Government of Ondo State & Ors (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) P. 512, Paras. E-F.
The fulcrum of the Preliminary Objection is that the endorsement of address of service on the Notice of Appeal of the names and addresses of parties directly affected by the appeal were not the same as the names and addresses of their counsel. That it must be the personal names and addresses of the respective parties to the appeal. That the Notice of Appeal has failed to comply with the mandatory provision of the Rules. That the Notice should be struck out.
The appellant maintained that the endorsement of address for service as per the address provided at the trial Court is a valid endorsement.
The issue of endorsement of a party’s name and the party address is very fundamental. The person who files any process must take the issue of address for service seriously. Under Order 2 Rule 6 of the Court’s Rules 2021, it is provided as follows:
6. Where under these Rules, any notice or other process is required to have an address for service endorsed on it, it shall not be accepted for filing by the Registry of the lower Court or the Registry of the Court, or where accepted, it shall not be deemed to have been properly filed in so far as such address has not been endorsed on it.
This provision of the Rules is very plain and sacrosanct. The provision is aimed at ensuring that the Court is not at any difficulty in effecting service of the processes filed in Court on the relevant parties in furtherance of the Fundamental Right to Fair Hearing under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended). The foundation for the actualization of the right to fair hearing is the address of service of the process on all the parties. The address must be dual. It must be the address of the party filing and the party to be informed of the process filed. Any process filed without an address for service of the process is fundamentally defective. See the cases of Ihedioha & Anor. v. Okorocha (2015) LPELR-40837 (SC) and Chinda v. INEC & Ors (2019) LPELR-47902 (CA). The hallmark of all I have been labouring to say is that service of process of Court is very important to the competence of the Court to adjudicate on the matter hence all processes filed in Court requiring service must have a proven address for service.
In the instant appeal, the record of appeal clearly shows that the appellant indicated the persons affected directly by the appeal as the appellant, the respondents’ c/o their respective counsel with their addresses. This so far has not posed any challenge in substance and in form to the destiny of this appeal. When under Section 36(6) of the Constitution, a person is allowed to act for himself or by a legal practitioner of his own choice, the listing of legal practitioners and their addresses representing the parties in this appeal no doubt has satisfied the requirement of the rules for the parties directly affected by the appeal to be endorsed. This move is essential to enable the Court serve processes in the case on the relevant parties through their counsel. Our law is now well settled that a party has a constitutional right under Section 36 of 1999, to a counsel or a legal practitioner of his choice. See the cases of Festus v. A.A.C & Ors. (2020) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1713) 105 and Isiaka & Ors. v. Ogundimu & Ors. (2006) LPELR-1552 (SC). Having regard to the foregoing, it sounds very much in line with the law to allow the endorsement of the address of counsel for the parties on the notice of appeal as was done in the instant appeal.
From the foregoing therefore, I am of the opinion that the Preliminary Objection is lacking in merit. It is hereby dismissed.
Having disposed off the Preliminary Objection of the 1st to 11th respondents, I shall look into the merit of the appeal.
MAIN APPEAL:
Counsel for the appellant distilled four issues for the determination of this appeal. These four issues are all the same being issues relating to the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the trial Court.
These issues shall therefore, be taken together. They are:
Issues: One Two Three and Four:
Whether the learned trial Judge was right in his judgment to hold that the 1st-11th respondents are entitled to build a place of worship on a portion of the appellant’s land granted to her by the 12th respondent;
Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the appellant is obliged to allocate or designate places of worship inside the appellant’s (property) market and consequently ordered the appellant to approve the building plan as sought by the 1st to 11th respondents for building of their place of worship even when such claim was never made by the 1st to the 11th respondents for building of their place of worship even such claim was never made by the 1st to the 11th respondents;
Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that a particular portion of the appellant’s land in the market has been designated for the building of place of worship and same was verbally allocated to the 1st to 11th respondents by the appellant when in fact the identity of such portion of land was never established; and
Whether the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence before him in his judgment.
Learned counsel for the appellant while arguing these issues submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong to have held that the 1st to 11th respondents have a right to build a place of worship on the appellant’s land inside the market when there was evidence that the land belongs to the appellant and that the 1st to 11th respondents did not pay any money nor offer any consideration to entitle them to such right over a portion of appellant’s land. Counsel further submitted that the appellant’s counter-affidavit at the lower Court was never controverted by the 1st to 11th respondents in their further affidavit and reply to the appellant’s counter-affidavit which means that the facts deposed to as stated above is admitted by the 1st to 11th respondents and facts admitted need no further proof. Counsel relied on the cases of Waziri v. Ali (2009) NWLR, (Pt. 1130) 178 at 182, Ratio 1; Oseni v. Bajulu (2009) NWLR (Pt. 1172) 164 at 167; BFI Group Corporation v. Bureau of Public Enterprises (2012) LPELR-9339 (SC); Ogboru v. Uduaghan (2012) NWLR (Pt. 1311) 357 SC at Ratio 4; A.G Abia State v. A.G. Federation & Ors (2005) LPELR-3151 (SC); Orupabo & Ors v. Opuambe & Ors (2014) LPELR-22673 (CA); Araka v. Egbue (2003) LPELR-532 (SC); Ademoye & Ors., v. Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) & Ors., (2013) LPELR-20825 (CA).
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that Exhibit A-D (which were mere Letters by the 1st to 11th respondents soliciting that the appellant approve a place of worship for them and the plan attached) gives the 1st to 11th respondent right to construct a place of worship on appellant’s land is a total misapprehension of Section 38 of the 1999 Constitution with due respect. The Letters as observed by the learned trial Judge were merely soliciting for a place of worship from the appellant. There was no evidence that the appellant approved such a request to even translate same into a binding agreement. Counsel relied on the cases of Okobiemen v. UBN (Jalingo Branch, Taraba State) (2017) LPELR-43633 (CA) Odutola v. Papersack (Nig.) Ltd (2006) LPELR-2259 (SC), (2006) NWLR (Pt. 1012) p. 491 para. G-H; Teraku Mills v. Sant Engineering Ltd (2009) NWLR (Pt. 1136) 1 at p. 5 Ratio 6; Ma’aji v. Suleiman (2017) LPELR-43149 (CA); Nwabueze v. The People of Lagos State (2018) LPELR-44113 (SC).
Moreso, that the 12th respondent had already given approval to the appellant to construct market on the land allocated to her and there is no evidence proffered by the 1st to the 11th respondents to show that the purpose of the land has been changed by the 12th respondent to building of place(s) of worship to warrant compelling either the appellant or the 12th respondent who has that prerogative to approve such a plan. Counsel further stated that where a law makes provision for the way and manner of doing a thing or performing a duty or claiming a right, it is only that method or procedure provided by law that must be followed to validly perform the duty or claim such right. Counsel relied on the cases of Adhekegba v. The Honourable Minister of Defence & Ors. (2013) LPELR-20154 (CA).
Learned counsel for the appellant posited that the law is trite that a person claiming right of possession or any interest on a particular piece of land must prove its identity. This is to enable the Court and opponent or adverse party know the exact boundaries of the land in dispute and the judgment of a Court when obtain to be enforceable on the particular piece of land and no other. Counsel relied on the cases of Odumosu & Anor. v. Oluwole & Anor. (2002) LPELR-12307 (CA); Bala v. Liyafa Palace & Ors (2018) LPELR-46662 (CA); Juidi v. Bako & Ors (2017) LPELR-43362 (CA).
On the evaluation of issues before the trial Court, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the instant case on appeal, the matter at the trial Court was heard on affidavits which are themselves evidence. Consequently, the judgment of the lower Court must reflect a proper evaluation of the affidavit evidence and exhibits attached thereto which the learned trial Judge failed to do. Counsel relied on the cases of Etim & Anor v. Obot & Ors., (2009) LPELR-4128 (CA); Awolola v. Governor of Ekiti State & Ors., (2018) LPELR-46346 (SC).
Learned counsel for the appellant further argued that if the learned trial Judge had acted on these uncontroverted facts, he would not have also come to the conclusion that 1st-11th respondents are entitled to build a place of worship in the market and ordered the appellant to give approval to the 1st-11th respondents to build such place of worship inside appellant’s property (market). Counsel relied on the cases of Dalyop v. Madalla (2017) LPELR-43349 (CA); Cement Company of Northern Nigeria Plc v. Giwa & Ors (2017) LPELR-42500 (CA). Counsel urged this Court to set aside the judgment of the lower Court and dismiss the suit of the 1st-11th respondents at the trial Court.
In response to these issues, learned counsel for the 1st to 11th respondents submitted that the land that Garki Model Market is built on is a Government land for exclusive Government use for general public use. It is a misconception of the situation under which the land was granted to the appellant for the appellant to think there should have been contract for sale of land between her and the 1st-11th respondents before they could be permitted to build a place of worship like the other religious faiths were permitted to have done in the same Garki Market. Counsel relied on the cases of Aso Timdoz Investment Co. Ltd v. Abuja Markets Management Ltd & Anor. (2016) LPELR-40367 (CA); Onyeanusi v. Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal (2002) 12 NWLR (Part 781) P. 211 at 233; Odutola v. NITEL (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 335) 73 at 87; Luiz B. Ezekiel v. Chief George (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) P 276 at 279; Obi v. Obi (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 867) 654 at 659.
Learned counsel for the 1st to 11th respondents submitted that it is also pretty worthy to note that the general rules and principles of law is that a judgment cannot be enforced against non-party to the suit; however, to every general rule, there are exceptions to the said rule. It is settled law that a judgment can be enforced against even a non-party to the suit. Counsel relied on the cases of Honeywell Flour Mills Plc v. Eco Bank Nig. Ltd (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1539) 387 at 399 ratio 16 Oguebego v. PDP (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 446 SC. P. 455 Ratio 4.
That the decision of the trial Court in ordering the appellant to approve the plan as sought and allow the construction without delay at the place which they had already designated for such purpose as sought is totally at variance with Section 4 (1) (b) of the Federal Capital Territory Act. Counsel further stated that the 12th respondent sometime in 2011 decided for overriding public interest revoked the statutory rights of occupancy formerly issued to Aso Timdoz Investment Co. Ltd., and re-allocated the said Garki Market Land to the appellant for the sake of overriding public interest. Counsel relied on the cases of Aso Timdoz Investment Co. Ltd v. Abuja Markets Management Ltd & Anor (2016) LPELR-40367 (CA); Wuyah v. Jama’a L.G. Kafanchan (2011) LPELR-9078 (CA).
Learned counsel for the 1st-11th respondents maintained that the suit of the 1st-11th respondents at the trial Court was not about ownership of land or seeking to take possession of the Garki Model Market as being insinuated by the appellant, so the issue of identity of land does not arise at all. Counsel further submitted that it is very clear that the 1st-11th respondents have been congregating in a particular designated place in the Garki Model Market without any challenge or disturbance from the appellant since the place has been allocated and designated to them by the appellant. Counsel relied on the cases of Amore & Ors v. Adegbami (2018) LPELR-45542 (CA); Odutola v. NITEL (Supra).
On the evaluation of the evidence before the Court, learned counsel for the 1st-11th respondents submitted that the primary duty of the Judge at trial stage is perception of evidence, evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value thereto by making the requisite findings of facts which entails both perception and evaluation. Counsel relied on the cases of Guardian Newspaper Ltd v. Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 574 @ 592; Cole & Anor v. Sunmola & Ors (2018) LPELR-45978 (CA). Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the appeal, same being frivolous and lacking in merit.
Learned counsel for the appellant in their Reply Brief submitted that the argument of the 1st-11th respondents is a fresh point on appeal which requires the leave of this Court before same is canvassed. The submission is essentially an introduction of fresh evidentiary issue on appeal which was not made out by the respondents at the trial Court. There is nowhere at the Court below where the 1st to the 11th respondents adduced any evidence to show that the land in question was originally granted to Aso Timdoz Co. Ltd., or that the property was formerly allocated to a private citizen. However, the points being made by the 1st to the 11th respondents is a fresh point, which did not form part of the case of the 1st to the 11th respondent at the Court below. Furthermore, the Court below did not make any pronouncement on the point being made out by the respondents. Counsel relied on the cases of Hawad International School Limited v. Mima Projects Ventures Ltd & Anor., (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 908) Pp. 610-611, Paras. G-B; Dodo Dabo v. Alhaji Ikira Abdullahi (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 923) P. 200, Paras. D-F; United Bank for Africa v. BTL Industries Limited (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 933) P. 371, para. A; Marine Management Associates Inc. & Anor v. National Maritime Authority (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) Pp. 545-546, paras. E-C.
In this appeal, the record clearly shows that the main point of dispute is the claim of the 1st to 11th Respondents that they are entitled to build their own fellowship church in the Garki Market Abuja, at a place to be designated by the appellant who was the 2nd Defendant at the trial Court. The appellants maintained in the case that they are a market and that the land given to them is for market and not for any religious purpose.
The learned trial Judge in his judgment found at pages 141 to 142 of the record as follows:
“The use of the phrase:
“That may be designated by the 2nd Defendant” shows and further confirm that the Claimants are not tussling with the 2nd Defendant over ownership of the Garki Market. They are not equally challenging the ownership by the 2nd Defendant. They are not insinuating that the 2nd Defendant obstructing their freedom under Section 38 1999 Constitution or the African Charter Art 8, 10 (1) and 13(3) and Art 19. The question is whether under the Africa Charter as listed above, the Claimant has right to construct their fellowship centre in any land which the 2nd Defendant may allocate or grant to them?
It is the humble view of this Court that, yes, the claimants can build/construct in any land which the 2nd Defendant may designate to carry out their religious obligatory right as the same 2nd Defendant had done/provided for other religious faith in the same Garki Market managed by 2nd Defendant, through their officer and agents.
It is imperative to point out that the request for a place of worship by the claimants is not strange to the 2nd Defendant. A closer look at the Exhibit attached by claimants, especially the letter Exhibit A-D. Of particular interest is the content of Exhibit C which was attached to the Further Affidavit filed in response to the Counter Affidavit of 1 and 2 Defendants. The said Exhibit is a judgment of this Court, in it are the members of the Garki Market Management Task Force, the Branch Manager of Garki Market Management which is obviously the agent and eye as well as the mouthpiece of the 2nd Defendant, as well as the DPO Garki Police Division and the COP Abuja Command. The said judgment as agreed by the parties stated thus:
“The open space provided by the Management of Garki Modern Market for the Christian Trader’s Markert Fellowship Abuja should be constructed to avoid rain and sun from affecting them. Every Christian activity should be carried out by the Christian Traders Market Fellowship inside the constructed place.”
This was before Hon. Justice S.E. Aladetoyinbo, as he then was. The above puts no one in doubt about the designation of a place of worship for the Garki Christian Traders Fellowship who are the Claimant in this suit.
From the evidence before the trial Court, the parties had their issues addressed as is revealed in Exhibit C annexed to the further affidavit filed by the respondents at the trial Court. Exhibit C is copied into the Record of Appeal at pages 102 to 103. It was the consent judgment delivered by the lower Court (coram: Hon. Justice S.E. Aladetoyibo). It was dated 20th June, 2015. The record indicates that the lower Court in that proceedings which was in Case No: FCT/HC/CV/1506/2016, as follows:
Court – The Court decided to settle this matter amicably among the parties.
Parties were allowed to say their grievances; after that the lawyers to the parties made input. The Court now arrived at the following conclusions which were agreed to by the parties.
(a) The Court hereby orders that preaching in front of shops should discontinue by the Christian Traders Market Fellowship of Abuja in Garki Modern Market.
(b) The open space provided by the management of Garki Modern Market for the Christian Traders Market Fellowship Abuja should be constructed to avoid rain and sun from affecting the worshippers. Every Christian activities should be carried out by Christian Trader’s Market Fellowship inside the constructed place.
The Officer-in-charge of the Police Post Garki Modern Market should release all the musical instruments seized from the Christian Trader’s Market Fellowship, Abuja.
(Sgd.).
Hon. Justice S.E. Aladetoyinbo
(Presiding Judge)
20/6/2016
This decision of Aladetoyinbo, J., was accepted by both the parties and the trial Court in this instant appeal. None of the parties appealed that decision. It has not in any form been lifted or annulled by any other Court. That decision being consent judgment of the parties cannot be sidelined. The appellant under that decision was bound to comply with that decision. The decision of the trial Court in that respect is unassailable.
The market operated by the appellant is patronized by all Nigerians of different beliefs. The burden of keeping peace is on all that operate in that market. The market being a melting point of all commercial activities, the appellant must not engage in any policy that will cause any explosion of unrest and disturb the peace of the market. The consent judgment as in Exhibit “C” earlier reproduced should guide and govern the parties to this case.
From the foregoing consideration therefore, I have confidence that the trial Court’s decision cannot be impeached in this appeal. I have not in any way seen any merit in this appeal. The appeal is hereby dismissed.
The judgment of the trial Court in Suit No: FCT/CV/3180/2019, delivered on the 6th day of December, 2019, is hereby affirmed.
Parties are to bear their respective costs.
DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A.: I was privileged before now to read in draft, the lead judgment in this appeal of my learned brother STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, JCA just delivered.
Prior to the decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja in Suit No. FCT/HC/COJ/3180/2019 delivered on 6th December, 2019 that gave rise to the instant appeal, by virtue of exhibit C annexed to the further affidavit filed by the 1st-11th Respondents, there was a consent judgment of the same Court in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1506/2016 delivered on 20th June, 2016 by S.E ALADETOYINBO, J on the same subject matter where the Court held:-
“(a) The Court hereby orders that preaching in front of shops should discontinue by the Christian Traders Market Fellowship of Abuja in Garki Modern Market.
(b) The open space provided by the Management of Garki Modern Market for Christian Traders Market Fellowship Abuja should be constructed to avoid rain and sun from affecting the worshippers. Every Christian activities should be carried out by Christian Traders Market Fellowship inside the constructed place.
The officer-in-charge of the Police post Garki Modern Market should release all the musical instruments seized from the Christian Traders Market Fellowship Abuja”
The above is the consent judgment entered by the Court for the parties including the appellant in the instant appeal. And from the records in the present appeal, it is not shown that any of the parties to the consent judgment had appealed against that decision. In other words, the judgment is subsisting and valid in all its entire ramifications.
I therefore agree with the finding and conclusion in the lead judgment that this appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed by me as well.
The decision of the lower Court in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/3180/2019 delivered on 6th December, 2019 is hereby affirmed.
I make no order as to cost.
BATURE ISAH GAFAI, J.C.A.: I have before now read in draft, the judgment delivered by my learned brother Stephen Jonah Adah, JCA. I am in full agreement with the reasonings expressed therein and the conclusion expressed in the lead judgment.
I adopt those reasonings as mine; by which I too find this appeal unmeritorious and is dismissed by me too.
Appearances:
Ayodeji Ademola, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Mohammed N. Mohammed, SAN, with him, Michael Eleyinmi, Esq. and Fawziyyah Gogo Muhammad, Esq. – for 1st to 11th Respondents
U.J. Obialor, Esq., with him, M.S. Ugwu, Esq. – for 12th Respondent. For Respondent(s)