ABUJA INVESTMENT & PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED v. ISA ENEJOH PAUL & ORS
(2018)LCN/11835(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 5th day of July, 2018
CA/A/757/2014
RATIO
COURT AND PROCEDURE: FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
“The law is settled that this Court will not lightly interfere with the findings of a Lower Court especially where it has to do with evidence of witnesses before the trial Court because it is the trial Court that has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. Where it is shown however that the learned trial Judge’s evaluation of oral and documentary evidence before him is perverse or not properly carried out this Court can intervene to re-examine and re-evaluate the pieces of evidence led at the trial Court both oral and documentary in order to correct any miscarriage of justice.” PER PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.
JUSTICES:
ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
PETER OLABISI IGE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
TANI YUSUF HASSAN Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ABUJA INVESTMENT & PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT CO. LTD – Appellant(s)
AND
1. ISA ENEJOH PAUL
2. THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT
3. THE HONOURABLE MINISTER, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT
4. THE HON. MINISTRY FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
5. THE FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY – Respondent(s)
PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment):
The 1st Respondent had as the Plaintiff and vide his Amended Writ of Summons issued out of the Federal High Court, Abuja, on 15th June, 2010 claimed against the Appellant and 2nd – 5th Respondents the following reliefs:-
1. A DECLARATION that the Plaintiff is the lawful owner, occupier and user of the property known as Huts Nos. 2228,29,30,31,32.39 and Barbeque center (Barbeque 02) all lying and situate at plot 1763 Cadastral Zone BII, Kaura District, Abuja – FCT.
2. A DECLARATION that the Plaintiff is entitled to an exclusive use and occupation of the property lying, situate and known as Plot 1763 with puts No. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and Barbeque Centre (Barbeque 02) covered by eight (8) letters of allocation with Reference Nos. GVA/LH/01/06/027-33 and Reference No. GVA/BC/01/06/002.
3. A DECLARATION that the purported re-allocation of the Plaintiff’s property lying, situate and known as Plot 1763 with Huts No.27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and Barbeque Centre (Barbeque 02) covered by eight (8) letters of allocation with Reference Nos.GVA/LH/01/06/027-33 and Reference No.GVA/BC/01/06/002 by the 4th and 5th Defendants to the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void.
4. AN ORDER setting aside the purported re-allocation of the Plaintiffs property lying, situate and known as Plot 1763 with Huts No.27, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and Barbeque Centre (Barbeque 02) covered by eight (8) letters of allocation with Reference Nos.GVA/LH/01/06/027-33 and Reference No.GVA/BC/01/06/002 by the 4th and 5th Defendants to the 1st Defendant.
5. AN ORDER directing the 4th and 5th Defendants to immediately issue a Certificate of Occupancy and/or other title documents to the, Plaintiff in respect of the property lying situate and known as Plot 1763 with Huts No. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and Barbeque Centre (Barbeque 02) GVA/LH/01/06/027-33 and Reference No.GVA/BC/01/06/002.
6. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants either by themselves, servants, agents or privies from interfering with or in any way disturbing the Plaintiff’s exercise of his lawful right to the exclusive use and occupation of the said property.
7. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants particularly the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants either by themselves servants agents or privies from re-allocating and/or further reallocating alienating transferring or selling the Plaintiffs property lying, situate and known as Plot 1763 with Huts No. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and Barbeque Centre (Barbeque 02) covered by eight (8) letters of allocation with Reference Nos.GVA/LH/01/06/027-33 and Reference No.GVA/BC/01/06/002 to any person or/and organization.
8. The sum of N50M (Fifty Million Naira) only as general damages against the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants for trespass –
9. The cost of this action.”
The 1st Defendant now Appellant set up Counter-Claim against the 1st Respondent (Plaintiff) as follows:-
“COUNTER CLAIM
WHEREOF the 1st Defendant Counter Claims against the Plaintiff as follows:
1. A DECLARATION that the 1st Defendant is the holder of a valid statutory right of occupancy to all that parcel of land known as Plot No: 1763, having an area of 8791-33 SQ.M demarcated and delineated by survey/beacon numbers PB6011, PB6445, PB6263 and PB6012 in Cadastral Zone B11 of Kaura District specifically situate in the Games Village, Abuja FCT.
2. A DECLARATION that the 1st Defendant is the lawful owner of the property known as Plot No: 1763, having an area of 8791.33 SQ.M demarcated and delineated by survey/beacon numbers PB6011, P86445; P86263 and PB 6012 in Cadastral Zone BII of Kaura District specifically situate in the Games Village. Abuja-FCT.
3. A DECLARATION that the Plaintiff is a trespasser and the 1st Defendant is entitled to exclusive possession of the Property known as Plot No: 1763, having an area of 8791.33 SQ.M demarcated and delineated by survey/beacon numbers PB6011, PB6445, P86263 and PB 6012 in Cadastral Zone B11 of Kaura District specifically situate in the Games Village, Abuja-FCT with all the appurtenances and attachments affixed thereon.
4. A DECLARATION that the Plaintiff’s claim as to title of the property known as Plot No: 1763, having an area of 8791.33 SQ.M demarcated and delineated by survey/beacon numbers PB6011, PB6445, PB6263 and PB 6012 in Cadastral Zone BII of Kaura District specifically situate in the Games Village, Abuja-FCT with all appurtenances and attachments affixed thereon is unlawful, null and void.
5. AN ORDER of possession in favour of the 1st Defendant over the properly known as Plot No: 1763, having an area of 8791.33 SQ.M demarcated and delineated by survey/beacon numbers PB6011, P86445, P86263 and PB 6012 in Cadastral Zone B11 of Kaura District specifically situate in the Games Village, Abuja-FCT with all appurtenances and attachments affixed thereon.
6. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Plaintiff either by himself, servants, agents or privies from committing further acts of trespass on the property known as Plot No: 1763, having an area of 8791.335Q.M demarcated and delineated by survey/beacon numbers PB6011, P86445, PB6263 and PB6012 in Cadastral Zone 811 of Kaura District specifically situate in the 6ames Village. Abuja – FCT with all appurtenances and attachments affixed thereon.
7. AN ORDER dismissing the Plaintiff’s suit as misconceived, frivolous and vexatious with substantial costs awarded to the 1st Defendant against the plaintiff.
8.The sum of One Hundred Million Naira (N100,000,000) as mesne profit and damages against the plaintiff for trespass committed by him in respect of the 1st Defendant’s property known own as Plot No:1763, having an area of 8791.33 SQ.M demarcated and delineated by survey/beacon numbers PB6011, PB6445, PB6263 and PB 6012 in Cadastral Zone BII of Kaura District specifically situate in the Games Village, Abuja-FCT sometime in 2007, which trespass is still continuing.”
After pleadings have been duly exchanged between the parties the matter proceeded to trial and at the end of adoption of final addresses by learned Counsel to the parties, the learned trial Chief Judge who heard the matter gave a considered judgment wherein he held thus:-
“The Federal Government then set up a Committee which included the then Minister for F.C.T and the Minister of Housing and Urban Development. The Committee placed advert in the newspapers, which prompted the plaintiff to write an application which is Exhibit B23. The application was granted and he bought the properties as evidenced by allocation letters. The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff is the legal owner of the seven Huts and Barbeques Centre. The interest of the Plaintiff must be protected, the 4th and 5th Defendants being part of the Committee that sold the properties are estopped from issuing another title to another person. The Court having visited the place believes that the Huts were constructed for the purpose of creating a recreational venue and not meant for a residential purpose it is trite in property law that the fundamental rule is that competing interests will generally rank according to the order of their creation see: Barclays Bank Limited vs Bird (1954) ch.274.
In this case the Plaintiff’s title to the properties is genuine as it was gotten legally and he was in possession before the Certificate of Occupancy of the 1st Defendant was issued.
The role of the 4th and 5th Defendants was to be to get the list of the buyers and process proper title documents for the beneficiaries. They actually tried to do that, according to their witness; they tried to reach the plaintiff to carry out this function. They returned the files to the 5th Defendant when they could not reach him as evidenced by Exhibit E1. But the question is, can the failure or inability of the 5th Defendant to reach the Plaintiff amount to him losing his interest in the properties.
It is trite that a Plaintiff will succeed on the strength of his case.
Based on the evidence before the Court, it is clear that the Plaintiff has established that he acquired and owns all the seven lockable Huts and Barbeque Centre on the Plot in dispute. The Defendants did not dispute this fact and it was established by evidence.
It is to be noted that the pieces of land allocated to the Plaintiff and visited by the Court, was meant originally for recreational purposes and not residential. The plot is outside the residential areas built by the government.
It is government practice everywhere in the world to provide a space for recreational purposes. From the evidence before this Court, the Plaintiff has established his case beyond all reasonable doubt. A private citizen has the right to own properties and not only government.
The Court hereby grant all the reliefs sought as per the statement of claim.
Plaintiff present represented by L.M. Anenga Anuda (Mrs) Abiola Giwa for the 1st Defendant Vivian Ojokojo for the 2nd and 3rd defendants Bunmi Fasan for the 4h and Ch Defendants.
Plaintiff – we are very grateful. We ask for cost of N100,000.
1st Defendant – we are grateful. I do not know the cost she is asking us to pay.
2nd and 3rd Defendants – we are grateful for the judgment.
1st Defendant – we are grateful. I do not know the cost she is asking us to pay.
2nd and 3rd Defendants – we are grateful for the judgment.
4th and 5th Defendants – we are grateful for the well considered judgment.
Court – no order as to cost.
The Appellant was dissatisfied and has by her Notice of Appeal dated and filed on 17th day of November, 2014 appealed to this Court on six (6) grounds which without their particulars are as follows:-
GROUND 1
1. The learned trial judge erred in law when he assumed jurisdiction to hear the matter and gave judgment in same.
GROUND 2
2. The learned Judge erred in law and fact in holding that the Plaintiff/1st Respondent title or interest in Plot 1763 at Games village was legal, holding at page 42 of the judgment as follows: But it is seven more important to note that the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants have not been able to explain how he suddenly lost that title or interest. Is it by his action or inaction, was it revoked or sold? … The Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is the legal owner of the Seven Huts and Barbeque Centre. The Court having visited the place believes that the Huts were constructed for the purpose of creating a recreational venue and not meant for a residential purpose, it is trite in property law that the fundamental rule is that competing interests will generally rank according to the order of their creation… In this case, the plaintiffs title to the properties is genuine as it was gotten legally and he was in possession before the Certificate of Occupancy of the 1st Defendant was issued.”
GROUND 3
3. The learned Judge erred in law in failing to resolve all issues formulated by the parties pertaining to the subject matter of the suit.
GROUND 4
4. The learned Judge erred in law and misdirected himself when he awarded a N50,000,000 general damages in trespass against the 1st Defendant/Appellant as follows:
That the sum N50M (Fifty Million Naira) only as general damages against the 1st, 4th and 5th Defendants for trespass.
GROUND 5
5. The learned trial judge erred in law and misdirected himself in failing to observe that even if the Plaintiff/1st Respondent is entitled to general damages in tort (which is strongly denied) the quantum of damages is excessive.
GROUND 6
6. The entire judgment of the trial Court appealed, is against the weight of evidence.”
The Appellant filed her Brief of Argument dated 5th February, 2015 on the same date while the 1st Respondent filed his Brief of Argument though undated on 14th April, 2015. The Appellant filed Reply to the 1st Respondent’s Brief on 28th day of October, 2015. It was dated same date and deemed filed on 9-4-18.
The appeal was heard on the 9th April, 2018 when the learned Counsel to the Appellant and 1st Respondent adopted their respective Brief of Arguments. It must be placed on record here that the 1st Respondent’s Notice of Preliminary objection and arguments thereon were struck out for failure of learned counsel to move the said objection. It is equally relevant to state that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents did not file Briefs of Arguments in this appeal.
The learned Counsel to the Appellant IJEAMAKA-NWUIZU, ESQ who settled its Brief distilled four issues for determination of the appeal namely:-
(1) Whether the learned Honourable trial Judge was right when he assumed jurisdiction to hear the matter and give judgment in same. (Ground 1)
(2) Whether the learned Chief-Judge with respect was right in ignoring the defective roof of title of the Plaintiff/1st respondent and in failing to address same in his Judgment despite having been vehemently canvassed by Defendant. (Ground 2 and 3)
(3) Whether from the evidence before the Lower Court, the learned Chief-Judge was right when he wrongly applied established legal principles and awarded N50,000,000 general damages in trespass against the Appellants and 4th and 5th Respondents? (Grounds 4)
(4) Whether assuming but not conceding that the general damages awarded by the Court were rightly awarded, quantum was excessive. (Ground 5)
The issues formulated by the 1st Respondent are as follows:-
2.1. Whether the trial Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the 1st Respondent’s Suit. (Distilled from ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal).
2.2 Whether on the preponderance of evidence as required in civil proceedings, the 1st respondent has proved his case to be entitled to judgment. (Distilled from ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal)
2.3. Whether the trial Court was right when it awarded N50,00,000 general damages against the Appellant, 4th and 5th Respondents for trespass and whether the amount awarded by the lower Court was excessive. (Distilled from ground 4 & 5 of the Notice of Appeal).”
The issues formulated by the Appellant are adequate for consideration of the appeal. They will be treated seriatim.
The learned Counsel to the Appellant, IJEAMAKA UWIZU, ESQ., submitted that the Lower Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit as according to him the subject matter of the case is not within the jurisdiction of the Federal High court. He relied on the case of N.M.R. V. N.U.R.T.W. (2010) 12 NWLR 328 and OBIUWEUBI V CBN (2011) VOL. 193 LRCN (sic). That the learned trial chief Judge erroneously adjudicated on a matter concerning land which was well out of the purview of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, as contained in Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. That the Land Use Act and the Constitution vest exclusive jurisdiction in land matters to the Federal Capital Territory High Court.
He relied on Section 39(1)(a)(b) and 41 of the Land Use Act Cap 202 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. He relied on the following authorities viz:-
1. ADISA V. OYINWOLA (2000) 10 NWLR (PT. 674) 116:
2. ADETAYO V. ADEMOLA (2010) 15 NWLR (PT. 1215) 259 and
3. TONY ANTHONY (NIG) LTD V NDIC (2011) 15 NWLR (sic).
That the instant appeal arose from a land matter instituted by the 1st Respondent in the Federal High Court and as such the learned Chief Judge wrongly assumed jurisdiction in the case. He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of Appellant.
In his own argument on issue of jurisdiction, the learned Counsel to the 1st Respondent contended that the submissions of the Appellant are misconceived in that the conditions for assumption of jurisdiction was complied with. That the Federal High Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Section 251(1)(r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended which he stated confers jurisdiction on the Lower Court to entertain any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its Agencies.” That in determining whether a Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter before it, the Court has to consider two major issues to wit:-
(i) The Court must examine the nature of the claim before it and
(ii) The persons who make up the parties before it.
That in this case, the 1st Respondent’s claim were declaratory and injunctive in nature, affecting the validity of the actions or inaction of the Federal Government Agencies and not a land dispute simpliciter as contended by the Appellant. He relied on the cases of:-
1. ABSIEC Vs KANU (2013) 13 NWLR (PART 1370) 69 AT 78, 79 and 87;
2. AGBULE V W.R. & P CO. LTD (2013) 6 NWLR (PT.1350) 318 AT 348, 351 – 352.
The learned 1st Respondent’s Counsel submitted that even if it is held that the dispute here has to do with land he relied on the case of ABSIEC V KANU supra to contend that irrespective of the nature of claim once any of the parties happens to be the Federal Government or any of its agencies the State High Court loses jurisdiction, the jurisdiction belongs to Federal High Court under Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. That the case of ADETAYO V ADEMOLA (2010) 15 NWLR (PT. 1215) 259 relied upon heavily by Appellant has been overtaken by the decision in the cases of AGBULE V W.R. CO. LTD (supra), and ABSIEC v KANU which learned Counsel said were delivered on 14/12/2012 and 10/5/2013 respectively. He urged this Court to hold that Federal High Court and not Federal Capital Territory High Court has the jurisdiction to deal with this matter.
Now the importance of jurisdiction of a Court cannot be overemphasized. A Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon matters or subject matter of an action or suit not committed or donated to it by the Constitution or the statute creating the Court or Tribunal. In other words, a Court or Tribunal must possess the necessary vires or jurisdiction to adjudicate on any cause on matter.
1. ALHAJI JIBRIN ISAH VS INEC & ORS (2016) 18 NWLR (PART 1544) 175 AT 222H per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC who said
“Jurisdiction is the legal power that a Judge has to hear and determine a case. It is usually conferred on the Court by the Constitution or Statute. It is a threshold issue, the heart-beat of a case. Once a Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a matter and it proceeds to hear the matter, no matter how well handled, the entire proceedings are a nullity no matter how well handled. That explains why the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at anytime, in the trial Court, the Court of Appeal or in the Supreme Court for the first time. See A.G. Anambra State v. A.G. Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) p.692: Barclays Bank of (Nig. v. Central Bank of (Nig.) (1976) 6 SC 175: Dangana & Anor. V. Usman & Ors. (2012) 2 SC (Pt.iii) p.403, (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt.1349) 50: Usman Dan Fodio University v. Kraus Thompson Organisation Ltd. (2001) 15 NWLP (Pt.736).
2. SKYE BANK PLC VS VICTOR ANAEMEM IWU (2017) 6 NWLR (PART 1590) 24 AT 111 H TO 112 A – E per PETER ODILI; JSC who said:-
“The situation on ground throws up the matter of jurisdiction of Court and it is trite that jurisdiction is the bedrock of any adjudication to the extent that if affects the very foundation of every cause of action before a Court of law. The reason is simple since without jurisdiction the decision of a Court or Tribunal without the requisite jurisdiction is a nullity, dead on arrival and of no effect whatsoever. The principle applies to Courts whether of trial or appellate. The description is very aptly made in the case of Utih v. Onoyivwe (1991) 1 SC (Pt. 1) 65 at 96-97 (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt.166) 166 at 206 paras. A per Bello CJN thus: jurisdiction is blood that gives life to the survival of an action in Court of law and without jurisdiction, the action will be like all animal that has been drained of its at blood. It will cease to have life and any attempt to resuscitate it without infusing blood into it would be an abortive exercise. See also decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the old case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.”
In civil matter, it is the claims or reliefs as endorsed on the writ of summons and statement of claim that determine the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal seised of the matter. As a corollary to this, it is also the reliefs of the Plaintiff as claimed in an Originating Summons and Affidavit(s) in Support thereof that determine the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate on the Originating Summons. I call in aid the cases of:
1. GOYANG KAYILI V SESLY YILBUK & ORS (2015) 7 NWLR (PART 1457) 26 53B per OGUNBIYI, JSC who said:
“It is the Plaintiff’s claim in a matter that determines the jurisdiction of the Court. See Rt. Hon. Chibuike Rotimi Amaechi v. INEC (No.1) 18 NWLR (Pt.1065) 42 at 48. See also Akinfolarin v. Akinnola (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.335) 659 and Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9 – 10 SC 31 at 51.”
2. ALHAJI JIBRIN ISAH VS INEC & ORS (2016) 18 NWLR (PART 1544) 175 AT 223D where my Lord, RHODES VIVOUR, JSC had this to say:
“It is a fundamental principle that jurisdiction is determined by the claimant/plaintiff’s claim and not by the defence, and so the writ of summons and statement of claim which contains the claim before the Court are the documents that must be examined in detail to ascertain whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court. Where the originating process is an originating summons jurisdiction is determined by considering the questions, reliefs and affidavit filed in support.”
I have reproduced the claims of the 1st Respondent as indorsed on the Writ of Summons and the Amended Statement of Claim paragraph 26 thereof. See pages 342 – 410 of the record.
The strong contention of the Appellant is that since the claims before the Lower Court bordered on title to land or right of occupancy the Lower Court has no jurisdiction in the matter while the 1st Respondent’s contention is that irrespective of the claims before the Lower Court the 2nd – 5th Respondents gave jurisdiction to the Lower Court because they are agencies and agents of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
The vex issue of the extent of jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under Section 251(1) (a)-(s) has re-surged in this case. It used to be thought that once an agency or agent of the Federal Government is a party to an action the jurisdiction to adjudicate over the matter irrespective of the subject matter lies with Federal High Court thereby relegating the subject matter to the background. And this is the position taken by the 1st Respondent in this appeal. Yes it is true that some decisions of the apex Court decided in the past that once an agency of the Federal Government is a party in a matter jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter resides with the Federal High Court. See:
1. CHIEF M.A. INEGBEDION V DR. SELO-OJEMEN (2013) 8 NWLR (PART 1356) 211 AT 226 F – A per ALAGOA, JSC who said:-
“The question having now been settled that the 2nd Respondent Otibhor Okhae Teaching Hospital Irrua is an agency of the Federal Government, the next relevant question is whether the Appellant’s claim relates to the administration or management and control of the 2nd Respondent. Paragraph 25 of the Statement of Claim is a claim in aggravated and/or damages for defamafion, negligence and breach of Doctor/Patient Confidence which undoubtedly relates to the administration or management of the Oribhor Okhae Teaching Hospital, Irrua sued as the 2nd defendant in the trial Court and is 2nd Respondent in this appeal and in the Lower Court. The effect of Paragraphs (p), (q) and (r) of Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution is to vest exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over all civil causes and matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. See NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 103 LRCN 2280 AT 2281 – 2282. The Proviso to Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution does not in any way detract from the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 251 (1) (p) and (r) consequently the Proviso cannot apply.
From the foregoing, the sole issue for determination must be resolved in favour of the Respondents against the Appellant and it is hereby so resolved. The Appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. The Judgment of the Court of Appeal Benin Division delivered on the 27th February, 2004 upholding the ruling of Amaize J., of the Ekpoma High Court, Edo State delivered on the 13th May, 2002 is hereby affirmed. Parties are however to bear their own costs.” (underlined nine).
In his own Judgment in the said case, my Noble Lord who presided over the matter, I. T. Muhammad, JSC held on page 227 C – E and put it in the following pungent manner viz:
“I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Alagoa, JSC. I am in agreement with him that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter as one of the parties that is, the 2nd Respondent is an Agency of the Federal Government. The law is unequivocally stated by the 1999 Constitution (as amended in Section 251(1) (p), (q), (r) and by this Court that where in matter, one of the parties is the Federal Government or any of its Agencies, it is only the Federal High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction. A State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such a matter. See National Electric Power Authority v. Edegbero 1 (2002) 118 NWLR (PT.789) 79. (Underlined mine).
2. BENSON AGBULE VS. WARRI REFINERY & PETROCHEMICAL CO. LTD. (2013) 6 NWLR (PART 1350) 318 delivered on 14th December, 2012 where at page 348 F – H Per OGUNBIYI JSC who said:
On a gruesome and careful determination of the case NPA v. Edegbero (2003) 1 MJSC 69; (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 98, this Court per Ogundare, JSC while interpreting the Constitutional enactment as provided in paragraphs(q),(r)and(s) of Section 230 (1), held the following pronouncement at pages 80 -81 of the report and said:-
From what I have said earlier in this judgment the aim of paragraphs(q),(r)and(s) of Sub-section 230 was to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies was a party. A State High Court would not long have jurisdiction in such matters notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action.
However the settled position now is that the apex Court in the land has, to the pleasant surprise of stakeholders in administration of justice come out with a significant interpretation of the said Section 251(1)(a) (s) and came to firm conclusion that in determining whether Federal High Court has jurisdiction in a matter, the presence of Agencies of Federal Government as parties to the action will not be the yardstick to give jurisdiction to Federal High Court. The subject matter of the litigation must not be put under searching light in order to discern whether it (subject matter of litigation) falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. See:-
1. TERVER KAKIH VS. PDP & ORS (2014) 15 NWLR (Part 1430) 374 AT 414 F – H per GALADIMA, JSC.
2. MRS UJU B. OSUDE VS MRS EUCHARTA AZODO & ORS (2017) 15 NWLR (PART 1588) 293 AT 322D-H TO 323A-G per GALINJE, JSC.
3. PETER ESSI Vs NIGERIA PORT PLC (2018) 2 NWLR (PART 1604) 361 AT 385 – 386 and 390 E – H per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said:-
In determining whether or not a Court had jurisdiction to entertain a cause or matter, it is the plaintiff’s claim as disclosed in his writ of summons and statement of claim that would be considered. Where the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is in issue, the mere fact that an agency of the Federal Government is a party is not sufficient, without more to confer jurisdiction on the Court. The Court deciding the issue will also take into consideration the nature and subject matter of claim. It has been held severally by this Court that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court provided for in Section 230(1)(s) of the 1979 Constitution, as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 (now Section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution) does not extend to dispute arising from simple contracts. See: Adelekan v. Ecu-Line NV (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt.993) 33; Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393 @ 405 A-D & 409 A-D; Sun Insurance Nig. Plc. v. Umez Eng. Const. Cont. Co. Ltd. (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt.1471) 576; (2015) LPELR-24737 (SC).
The dispute between the parties in this suit se from a simple breach of a landlord/tenant contract. It does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.”
4. CHIEF RITA LORI OGBEBOR & ORS VS. INEC & ORS (2018) 6 NWLR (PART 1614) 1 AT 22 G H TO 23A per EKO, JSC who said:-
“Now, I come back to the contention of the appellants that what determines the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court is the parties, and not the nature of the claim. To be specific, the appellants contend that where the action is in relation to the matters covered by Section 251(I) (p), (q) & (r) of the Constitution, the determinant is whether the party, either as the plaintiff or defendant, is the Federal Government or any of its agencies. To some extent this statement of law is correct, but in a limited sense. In the instant case, the appellants as the plaintiffs, have not been able to convince the judex that their suit has anything to do with the administration, management or control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies of the validity of any executive/administrative action or decision of the Federal Government or any of its agencies to warrant the Federal High Court interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution in that regard.
This Court has shifted position from the blanket statement that in any Suit, where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party, only the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain such an action. In Onuorah v. Kaduna Refinery & Petrochemical Company(2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.921) 391 at 405, it has stated clearly that the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court by the 1999 Constitution does not extend to claims founded on simple contract between the Federal Government or any of its agencies, and a third party. See alsoAdelekan v. Ecu-Line NV (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt.993) 33; (2006) 5 SC (Pt.2) 32 where Onnoghen. JSC (as he then was) stated that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court does not Include dealing with any case of simple contract.
5. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, LAGOS STATE VS. EKO HOTELS LTD (2018) 7 NWLR (PT.1619) 518 AT 552H TO 553A- C where my Lord KERERE-EKUN, JSC said:-
In determining whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to entertain a cause or matter, it is the originating processes filed by the plaintiff that would be considered. See: A.G. Federation v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt.618) 187; Uwaifo v. A.G. Bendel State (1982) 7 SC 124: (1983) 4 NCLR 1; Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 6 – 10 SC 31: Amaechi v. INEC (No.2) (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt.1065) 98. In the course of this judgment, several references have been made to the cause of action that gave rise to this appeal. I need not repeat it again. Suffice it to say that both Lower Courts were of the opinion that the trial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit on two grounds: (a) by virtue of Section 251(1) (b) of the Constitution and (b) having regard to the fact that an agency of the Federal Government is a party Section 251(1) (r). It is not correct as argued by learned counsel for the appellant, that the Courts simply relied on the fact that an agency of the Federal Government is a party. They also considered the subject matter of the action. This is in keeping with decisions of this Court in cases such as: Ohakim v. Agbaso (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt.1226) 172 @ 236, 27 G-D; Salim v. CPC (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt.1351) 501; Ucha v. Onwe (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt.1237) 386, to the effect that in determining the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, notwithstanding the fact that one of the parties is an agency of the Federal Government, the subject matter of the dispute is also relevant.
6. ADAOHA UGO-NGADI VS FRN (2018) 8 NWLR (PART 1620) 29 AT 49D per GALINJE, JSC who said:
I wish to pause here in order to consider this brilliant academic argument by learned senior counsel which argument does not seem to fall in line with the decisions of this Court regarding the provision of Section 251(3) of the Constitution. Unlike the State High Court which is a Court of unlimited jurisdiction, the Federal High Court is a special Court with limited, but exclusive jurisdiction clearly specified under Section 251(1)(a)-(s) of the Constitution. There is nowhere in the Constitution or any other enactment where it is stipulated that any suit in which a Federal Government Ministry agency functionary or parastatal is sued is justiceable only in the Federal High Court except those cases specified under Section 251(1)(a-s) of the Constitution.
I am of the firm view that where there is a dispute touching and concerning right of occupancy over land or acquisition or ownership of land in the Federal Capital Territory, it is the Federal Capital Territory High Court that is endowed with the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter.
This is made eminently clear in Section 39(1) of the LAND USE ACT which provides:-
“39(1) The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings-
(a) Proceedings in respect of any Land the subject of a Statutory Right of Occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act and for the purposes of this proceedings includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a Statutory Right of Occupancy.
(b) Proceedings to determine any question as to the persons entitled to compensation payable for improvements of Land under this Act.
2. All Laws, including rules of Court, regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court shall apply in respect of proceedings to which this section relates and the Laws shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to the provisions of this section.”
Section 51(2) of the said Land Use Act provides in respect of lands in Federal Capital Territory, Abuja thus:-
“The power of a Governor under this Act shall in respect of land in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, or any land held or vested in the Federal Government in any State, be exercisable by the President or any Minister designated by him in that behalf and references in this Act to Governor shall be construed accordingly.
Thus the powers to grant right of occupancy over land in Federal Capital Territory is vested in the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria who may exercise his powers through any Minister of Government designated by him.
There is evidence in this case that if was the Presidential Committee on Disposal of Federal Government Landed Properties in Abuja which Committee comprised of 2nd – 5th Respondents including the Hon. Minister of Federal Capital Territory that sold the land in dispute to the 1st Respondent following advertisement in National Dailies calling on interested buyers to purchase the land in dispute.
The 1st Respondent as Plaintiff pleaded in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of his statement of claim (page 819) of the record as follows:-
12. The Plaintiff avers that after complying with the terms of offer by doing all that was required of him under the said terms, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants via the Presidential Committee on the Disposal of the Federal Government properties in Abuja (Games Village) proceeded and consequently delivered to him letters of allocation of Hut Nos. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and the Barbeque Centre (2) with Reference Nos. GVA/LH/01/06/027 – 033 and Reference No. GVA/BC/01/06/002 all dated the 3rd day of April, 2006. The Plaintiff shall found and rely on the said letters of allocation at the hearing of this suit.
13. The Plaintiff avers that consequent upon clause 4 of the letters of allocation, he proceeded to the secretary of the Presidential Committee on the Disposal of the Federal Government properties in Abuja (Games Village) where he promptly complied with the checking in procedure and thereafter took proper of the said properties.
14. The Plaintiff avers that the said huts and Barbeque center were fully developed at the time they were sold and handed over to him by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and he has been in occupation of same since then.”
The Appellant as 1st Defendant pleaded in paragraphs 7 and 8 of its Amended Statement of Defence and Counter-Claim as follows:-
“7. The Federal Government built the games village between September 2000 and August 2003 in preparation for the All African Games. The Presidential Committee on the Disposal of Federal Government Properties in Abuja (Games Village) conducted the first phase of the Sale of Games Village Houses in 2004 after which the Approved Guidelines For the Sale of Federal Government Houses in the FCT to the General Public and Political Office was published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 82 Volume 92 as Government Notice No. 155 dated August 15, 2005.
7. The gazette Guidelines, in paragraph 2, authorize the sale of ALL RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES (houses, flats, etc) That Gazette is hereby pleaded and shall be founded and relied upon at the trial.”
To my mind, Section 257(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended which provides as follows:-
257. – (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 251 and any other provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as nay be conferred upon it by law, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall have unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.
(2) The reference to civil or criminal proceedings in this section includes a reference to the proceedings which originate in the High Court of the Federal, Capital Territory, Abuja and those which are brought before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja to be dealt with by the Court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction.”
Vest jurisdiction in the Federal Capital Territory High Court to entertain the subject matter of this action and not the Federal High Court. This has been emphatically resolved and laid to rest by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of JOSIAH AYODELE ADETAYO & ORS. Vs. KUNLE ADEMOLA & ORS (2010) 6 SCM 1 at 169 -18A-B where MAHMUD MOHAMMED JSC who read the leading judgment firmly held thus:
“Close examination of the entire provision of the 1999 Constitution prescribing the jurisdiction of Federal High Court to the exclusion of all other Courts, there is nothing therein specifically conferring jurisdiction in that Court in causes of matters land disputes. Although the section also indicated that the National Assembly may confer additional jurisdiction to the Court to entertain causes and matters on land disputes. If any such additional jurisdiction had been given, the most relevant statute to examine in search for it in my view, is the Land Use Act because jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain land matters cannot be inferred by implication in the construction of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution the meaning of which is quite clear and plain as no causes or matters in land dispute are mentioned therein.
Since the provisions of Section 251 (1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution are not helpful in tracing any jurisdiction in land matters to the Federal High Court as jurisdiction of Court is derived from statutes conferring the jurisdiction, I decide to examine the provisions of the Land Use Act 1978 which was promulgated specially and specifically to deal with the control and management of land in Nigeria. The Court conferred with jurisdiction to entertain disputes between Nigerians in exercising their rights to acquire and use land under the Act are clearly specified therein. The relevant Sections in this respect are sections in this respect are Sections 39, 41 and 42 respectively which states –
JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURTS AND OTHER COURTS
Jurisdiction of High Courts;
The High Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings:
(a) Proceedings in respect of any land the subject of the Statutory Right of Occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act, and for the purpose of this paragraph, includes proceedings for a declaration of title to a Statutory Right of Occupancy.
(b) Proceedings to determine any question as to those entitled to compensation payable for improvements on land under the Act.
(2) All Laws, including rules of Court, regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court shall apply in respect of proceedings to which this Section relates and the laws shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect to be given to the provisions of this section. Jurisdiction of Area Courts or Customary Courts etc.
An Area Court or Customary Court or other Court of Equivalent jurisdiction in a state shall have jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in respect of a Customary Right of Occupancy granted by a Local Government under this Act; and for the purpose of this paragraph proceedings includes;
Proceedings for a declaration of title to a Customary Right of Occupancy and all laws including rules of Court regulating practice and procedure of such Court shall have effect with such modifications as would enable effect be given to this section.
(1) Proceedings for the recovery of rent payable in respect of any Certificate of Occupancy may be taken before a Magistrate’s Court of competent Jurisdiction by and in the name of the Chief Land Officer or by and in the name of any other officer appointed by the Governor in that behalf.
(2) Proceedings for the recovery of rent payable in respect of any Customary Right of Occupancy may be taken by and in the name of the Local Government concerned in the Area Court or Customary Court of equivalent jurisdiction.
It is quite clear for the provisions of the above sections of the Land Use Act with specific powers and jurisdiction in respect of land matters specified therein conferred on State High Court is not one of the Courts conferred with jurisdiction to entertain any dispute in the land matters. Infact the purpose of which Section 39, 41 and 42 of the Land Use Act are designed to serve are very clear. While Section 39 excludes Area Courts and Customary Court from exercising jurisdiction in respect of land the subject of Statutory Right of Occupancy.
Section 41 redefines the jurisdiction of the Courts referred to therein so as to ensure that Courts, such as the Customary Courts in Southern State of this had previously been exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court without distinction by classification of land, have their jurisdiction limited as stated therein. In other words while the State High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over lands in Urban Areas by virtue of Section 39(1) of the Land Use Act, that Courts shares jurisdiction with only the Area Courts and Customary Courts or other Courts of equivalent jurisdiction by virtue of both the Jurisdiction of the State High Court under Section 272 of the 1999 Constitution and the jurisdiction conferred on the Area Courts and Customary Courts by virtue of Section 41 of the Act. As there is nothing in these Section 39, 41 and 42 of the Land Use Act that conferred jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to entertain land causes or matters, I entirely agree with the Court below that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to hear and entertain any dispute declaration of the title to land.”
Furthermore, the Land Use Act has by Section 315(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended been entrenched into the said Constitution and made part of the Constitution. It thus means that all sections of Land Use Act are deemed to be part and parcel of our Constitution. That being the case Section 39 of the said Land Use Act remains inviolate and vests jurisdiction in land matter in Federal Capital Territory Abuja in the High Court of Federal Capital Territory. The said Section 315(5) of the 1999 Constitution as amended provides:-
“315(5) Nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate the following enactments, that is to say-
(a) the National Youth Service Corps Decree1993;
(b) the Public Complaints Commission Act;
(c) the National Security Agencies Act;
(d) the Land Use Act,
and the provisions of those enactments shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with their tenor and to the like extent as any other provisions forming part of this Constitution and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(2) of this Constitution.”
See also the case of THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA V THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ANAMBRA STATE (2018) 6 NWLR (PART 1615) 314 AT 349 E – G per PETER-ODILI, JSC who said:-
Also important to note is that the subject matter of the dispute is the right of control of Amansea land in Anambra State, which the plaintiff claimed it acquired through the instrumentality of the Anambra State Government clearly within the ambit of the Land Use Act. I shall quote the relevant section thereby being Section “39(1) The High Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in respect of the following proceedings-
(a) Proceedings in respect of any land the subject matter of a statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor or deemed to be granted by him under this Act, and for the purpose of this proceedings include proceedings for a declaration of title to a statutory right of occupancy:
(2) All laws, including rules of Court, regulating the practice and procedure, the High Court shall apply in respect of proceedings to which this section relates and the laws shall have effect with such modifications and would enable effect to be given to the provisions of this section.”
I fully agree with the submissions of learned counsel to the Appellant to the effect that the Lower Court, the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on that subject matter of the Plaintiff’s action (1st Respondent in this Appeal) and the decision of the Federal High Court in this matter is null and void. The Lower Court ought to have declined jurisdiction and utilize its power of transfer of the suit to the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory.
The above findings would have sufficed to dispose of this appeal, but the Supreme Court had enjoined the Courts below it to always determine the merits of a case notwithstanding that it has found that there is no jurisdiction to deal with the merit of the case. This is to obviate delay in administration of justice in that where the merit is considered by Lower Court the Supreme Court will not have to send the case back for rehearing or trial de novo if it is found that the Lower Court has jurisdiction in the matter. See:-
ALHAJI JIBRIN ISAH V INEC & ORS (2016) 18 NWLR (PART 1544) 175 AT 230 H TO 231 A – D per RHODES-VIVOUR JSC who said:-
“It is safe to say that there are two schools of thought on this issue. The first is that if the penultimate Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over an appeal or that the trial Court was right to decline jurisdiction it should say so and proceed to give a decision on the merits. See Brawal Shipping (Nig) Ltd. v. F. I. Onwadike Co. Ltd. (2000) 6 SCNJ 508, (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt.678) 357: Okonji v. Njokanma (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 202) p.131.
The second is that if the Court of Appeal is of the view that a sole issue, e.g. jurisdiction disposes of the appeal there would be no need for the Court to consider other issues.
See 7Up Bottling Co. v. Abiola & Sons (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) p. 469: Okonji v. Njokanma(1991) 1 SCNJ p. 372. (1991) 7 NWLP (Pt. 202) 131: Kotoye v. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.98) p. 419.
There is no sanction known to law for which ever school of thought a penultimate Court decides to follow, but following the first school of thought is to be desired but there are exceptions. In the first place, if the Court of Appeal does not avail the Supreme Court with a judgment on the merits it may unwittingly amount to a denial of fair hearing and may occasion a miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court would have to send the case back to the Court of Appeal for a hearing on the merits if that Court was wrong on jurisdiction, and this would be at great cost and waste of judicial time.”
I shall now proceed to determine the merit of the appeal based on issues 2, 3, and 4 distilled by the Appellant and they will be taken together;
(2) Whether the learned Chief-Judge with respect was right in ignoring the defective root of title of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent and in failing to address same in his Judgment despite having been vehemently canvassed Defendant. (Ground 2 and 3)
(3) Whether from the evidence before the Lower Court, the learned Chief Judge was right when he wrongly applied established legal principles and awarded N50,000,000 general damages in trespass against the Appellants and 4th and 5th Respondents? (Grounds 4)
(4) Whether assuming but not conceding that the general damages awarded by the Court were rightly awarded, quantum was excessive. (Ground 5)
Under Issue 2, the Learned counsel to the Appellant contended that the sale and handover of the 7 huts out of 10 huts on the said land by the Presidential Committee to the 1st Respondent/Plaintiff did not convey a valid title to land in dispute to 1st Respondent. According to him the only legal way to acquire land in the Federal Capital Territory is through allocation or grant by the Minister for the Federal Capital Territory. He relied on Section 18 of Federal Capital Territory Act Cap 503 LFN 1990 and Section 1 of LAND USE ACT. He also relied on the case of MADU V. MADU (2008) 6 NWLR (PART 1083) 304.
That the land in dispute is Plot 1763 in Games Village and no ownership of some huts. That 1st Respondent has strangely exhibited bank tellers and letters Exhibits B – B 38 as his title to the land. That at best they could only serve as interest in the land. That the 1st Respondent admitted that he has no title documents to Plot 1763 on page 792 of the record.
He relied on evidence of DW2 to contend that even if the huts belong to the 1st respondent, it will not cover the entire Plot 1767 in view of Exhibit B. That the Appellant was able to establish his title and right to the land in dispute as it has established they own the land with certainty. He relied on Exhibit D4. He relied on the following cases to contend that she has pleaded facts and proved its right to the land in dispute viz:-
1. MICHAEL UDENZE & ORS Vs NWOSU & ORS (2008) LRCN VOL. 154 P.17;
2. M. S. YUSUF V. MADAM ADIAW ADEGOKE (2008) LRCN VOL 157 P.177;
3. IROLO & ORS V UKA & ANOR (2002) LPELR 3335 SC.
4. KUPOLUYI v PHILIPS (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt.427) 671.
The Appellant argued alternatively to the effect that if it is conceded that Plaintiffs ownership of the land is traced to the sale to him by the Ad-hoc Committee on Sale of Federal Government Houses in Abuja to whom Plaintiff paid, he submitted that the Ad-Hoc Committee has no power to sell the property in dispute and went to extensive exploration of the meaning of “residential houses” the Ad Hoc Committee could or could not sell. That the sale and hand over of 7 huts on Plot 1763 to the 1st Respondent pursuant to the Approved Guidelines published by Federal Government is ultra vires, null and void and of no effect. He relied on the case of OLANIYAN & ORS V UNILAG & ANOR (1985) NWLR (PT. 9). That the Presidential Committee lacked the power to sell the land and has no title to pass to the 1st Respondent.
That Exhibits B – B38 tendered by 1st Respondent do not accord him a better title but defective title. He relied on the case of DABO V ABDULLAHI (2005) 7 NWLR (PT. 923) 181 AT 212, 213. That the allocation to the Appellant is valid but that ad hoc Committee acted without Powers to sell to 1st Respondent.
On whether the 1st Respondent was first in time to acquire the land, the Appellant disagreed. Appellant submitted that a defective title cannot be first in time. That evidence of DW3 and DW4 showed the land was allocated to the Appellant.
That the learned trial Judge failed to consider all material issues submitted to it for consideration of the case. That Appellant was thereby denied fair hearing. He relied on the case of OVUNWO V WOKO (2011) 17 NWLR 531. That the breach vitiate the entire proceedings.
Under Issue 3 as to whether the learned trial Judge wrongly awarded N50,000,000 = general damages in trespass against Appellant and 4th and 5th Respondents, the learned Counsel to the Appellant stated that the only time it entered the land in dispute which it claimed was properly allocated to it by Minister of FCT, was after the said allocation and it was to help the surveyor identify the land. That it was also when Appellant went and served trespass notices to every hut occupant on the land. He relied on page 104 Vol. 1 of the record. That damages are pecuniary recompense given by process of law to a person for actionable wrong that another has done to him. That there is none to specifically claim and plead damages before it is worded. That 1st Respondent did not plead particulars of the tort of trespass nor damages whether general or specific in his amended statement of claim or any of the processes filed and that 1st Respondent did not lead any evidence in that regard. That though item of general damages need not be specifically pleaded but some evidence of such damage is required. He relied on YAKUBU VS IMPRESIT BAKOLORI PLC (2011) 6 NWLR 575 and urged this Court to hold that the learned trial Chief Judge was wrong in awarding N50,000,000.
In reference to issue 4 as to whether the quantum of damages awarded is not excessive assuming that general damages is awardable in 1st Respondent’s favour, learned Counsel opined that the trial Judge failed to exercise moderation in the award as he failed to observe that 1st Respondent/Plaintiff was in possession of the disputed land before the suit was initiated and remained in possession till date. He relied on YAKUBU V IMPRESIT BAKOLORI PLC supra. That the 1st Respondent was still in the same position as he was before the suit was commenced. That this Court can interfere to correct the award where it is shown to be manifestly high or low. That the evidence led was not supportive of the award made. That a visit to the locus in quo influenced the learned trial Judge’s finding on page 858 Vol.II of the record.
That the finding bordered on sentiment. He urged this Court to set the trial Judge’s findings aside.
In his response under Issue 2, the 1st Respondent contended that he placed uncontradicted facts before the Court sufficient enough to show he is the lawful owner, occupier and user of the property in issue and the Lower Court was right in declaring the action of 4th and 5th Respondents null and void. He stated that he (1st Respondent) acquired interest on the property from the 2nd and 3rd Respondents through the Presidential Committee on the disposal of the Federal Government Properties in Abuja (Games Village) which was mandated by the PRESIDENCY TO CARRY OUT THE SALE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT properties in Abuja. That the DW1 – Edward Amupitan admitted the title of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents over the properties known as Games Village Kaura District of Abuja in paragraph 4 of Exhibit C.
That 2nd and 3rd Respondents mandated 4th and 5th Respondents to process their title and that 4th and 5th Respondents did not query the legality or otherwise of the committees action. He also relied on Exhibit D and case of GBADAMOSI V AKINLOYE (2013) 15 NWLR (PT. 1378) 455 AT 478 E-H.
He relied on evidence of PW1 and Exhibit A which show that in January, 2006 the 3rd Respondent advertised the property in dispute among others for sale as a result of which 1st Respondent was offered to buy lockable huts which were seven in number and that he paid for them. That letters of Offer allocating the seven lockable huts and Barbeque Centre to 1st Respondent were sent to 1st Respondent. That oral and documentary evidence were given at Lower Court showing the property in dispute belongs to him.
That the law is that once a party has satisfied the Court of how he got his title to land in dispute, the Court need not inquire into the title of his predecessors-in-title. He relied on MATANMI V DADA (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1353) 319 AT 336 and AJIBULU V AJAYI (2014) 11 NWLR (PT. 885) 458 AT 474 F – G.
On how to acquire title to property the learned Counsel to 1st Respondent relied onIDUNDUN V OKUMAGBA (1976) 9 – 10 5C 227 and stated that the 1st Respondent acquired his title from 2nd and 3rd Respondents by document but that all efforts made to see that 4th and 5th Respondents perfect 1st Respondent was not fruitful.
That he has placed all necessary materials evidence before the Court to show that 1st Respondent is the owner of the property.
On the identity of the land in dispute 1st Respondent argued that the identity of land is not in dispute and the property is known to the parties in this action. He relied on the case of SONGO V AKURE (2015) 1 NWLR (PT. 1441) 535. That giving different names to describe the land in dispute will not affect the identity of the land. He relied on the case of OJO V REGISTRED TRUSTEES, CHURCH OF THE LORD (2003) FWLR 303 (PT. 153) AT 317 A – C. That both parties referred to the land as lying and situate at PLOT 1763 CADASTRAL ZONE BII, KAURA DISTRICT, FCT, ABUJA.
On the issue, Bank TELLERS TENDERED by 1st Respondent, the learned Counsel to him submitted that those letters show evidence of land transaction between 1st Respondent and 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Respondents. That it shows 1st Respondent has duly paid for the land in dispute. He submitted that where a purchase of land has paid purchase price of the land to vendor as in this case and puts in possession he immediately acquires on equitable interest in the land and is as good as legal estate. He relied on the cases of:-
1. GBADAMOSI V AKINLOYE (2013) 15 NWLR (PT. 1378) 455 AT 480 C-F:
2. MOSES v ONU (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 674) 153 AT 178 to further argue that the 2nd – 5th Respondents had nothing to sell to Appellant on doctrine of NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.
That it unconscionable for 4th and 5th Respondent in equity and good conscience to have purportedly transferred the land to Appellant after the 1st Respondent had acquired interest in the land. That the 4th and 5th Respondents cannot eat their cake and have it. That the certificate of occupancy being brandished or paraded by the Appellant is a worthless piece of paper. He cited a number of cases including AYORINDE v KUFORIJI (2007) 4 NWLR (PART 1024) 341. That the 1st Respondent has better title to the land in dispute. He relied on the cases of DADA WILLIAMS (2013) 2 NWLR (PART 1338) 260 AT 276 – 277 and OGUNLEYE V ONI (1990) 2 NWLR (PT. 135) 745.
That the Lower Courts judgment is supported by weight of evidence.
On Issues 3 and 4 as to whether the award of N50,000.000= was justified. The 1st Respondent submitted that the entire argument of Appellant is misconceived.
He submitted that general damages are damages which the law implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong complained of or as the immediate direct and proximate result of or necessary result of wrong complained of. He relied on the cases of TAYLOR V OGHENEOVO (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 610) 358 AT 1376 (sic) and UNION BANK OF NIGERIA Vs AJABULE (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 611) 1413 at 1432 A – C.
That the trial Court has discretion to award general damages. That it is not the duty of this Court to reassess the award of general damages by a trial Court on the basis that it would have awarded a different figure if it had determined the matter at first instance. He relied on AGBU VS C.S.C. NASARAWA STATE (2013) ALL FWLR (PART 675) 318.
That the learned trial Judge visited the locus and assessed the level of damages inflicted on the 1st Respondent by the Appellant, 4th and 5th Respondents before the award of N50,000,000 in favour of 1st Respondent. That 1st Respondent received notices of trespass for land in dispute and threat of ejection well after 2nd and 3rd Respondents have collected money from 1st Respondent. He urged this Court to resolve the issues in 1st Respondent’s favour.
As stated earlier on this judgment the Appellant filed Reply Brief to 1st Respondent’s Brief of Argument.
I am of the firm view that the Reply Brief was a mere rehash of the main brief with nothing new or Points of law raised therein. It is therefore (Reply Brief) discountenanced.
The law is settled that this Court will not lightly interfere with the findings of a Lower Court especially where it has to do with evidence of witnesses before the trial Court because it is the trial Court that has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses. Where it is shown however that the learned trial Judge’s evaluation of oral and documentary evidence before him is perverse or not properly carried out this Court can intervene to re-examine and re-evaluate the pieces of evidence led at the trial Court both oral and documentary in order to correct any miscarriage of justice.
ADIELE IHUNWO V JOHNSON IHUNWO & ORS. (2013) 8 NWLR (PART 1357) 550 at 571 D where ARIWOOLA JSC said:
It has been held that it is trite law that appeals to the Appellate Courts are by way of rehearing. In hearing an appeal, the appellate Court should reconsider the materials before the trial Court and should not hesitate to evaluate its decision even on facts where, after giving due regard to the advantage which the trial Court has of seeing the witnesses, it is clear the decision is wrong. See Okhuarobo & Ors v Aigbe (supra).”
In the case of (1) MOSES OKHUAROBO & ORS V. CHIEF AIGBE (2002) 9 NWLR (PART 771) 29 AT 85 D F the Supreme Court per AYOOLA, JSC said:-
“It is not only when there is no evidence to support a decision that the decision can be held perverse. Absence of proper evaluation of evidence and failure to draw appropriate inference from them can also amount to perversity where the inference is so clear that no reasonable Tribunal would fail to draw them, or where inference drawn by the trial Judge from the does not follow evidence or the conclusion that should reasonably follow from the findings of fact made.
3. CHIEF JAMES O. OLONADE & ANOR VS H – B SOWEIMO (2014) 14 NWLR (PART 1428) 472 AT 495 G-H To 496 per M. D. MOHAMMED who said:-
“Firstly, evaluation of relevant and material evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence are the primary functions of the trial Court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses as they testified. Where the trial Court unquestionably evaluate the evidence and justifiably appraises the facts, as it has been manifestly shown to have been done in the instant case, it is not the business of the Lower Court, an appellate Court, to substitute its own views for the views of the trial Court. The application of this trite principle by the Lower Court cannot, certainly, be a basis for the reversal of the Court’s decision. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 97: Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 565) 226 and Sha v. Kwan (2000) 5 SC 178, (2000) 8 NWLR (PT. 670) 685.
Secondly, in a civil matter such as this, the Court decides the case on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence. The trial Court does this by first deciding which evidence it accepts from each of the parties, putting the accepted evidence adduced by the plaintiff on one side of the imaginary scale and that of the defendant on the other side of the scale weighing them together. The Court then decides which side’s evidence is Heavier, not by the number of witnesses called by either party or on the basis of the one being oral and the other being documentary, but by the quality or probative value of the evidence be it oral and/or documentary. See Fagbenro v. Arobadi (2006) 7 NWLR (Pt. 978) 172.
3. MRS ELIZABETH IRABOR ZACCALA VS MR KINSLEY EDOSA & ANOR (2018) 6 NWLR (PART 1616) 528 AT 545 B – D per M. D. MUHAMMAD, JSC who said:-
It is trite that the trial Court is vested with the primary duty of evaluating evidence and ascribing probative value to same. This primacy in the Court’s responsibility arises out of the fact of the advantage it has of seeing and, from observation of the witnesses, making impressions as they testified. Thus where the trial Court fails to bring the advantage to play in evaluating the evidence of the witnesses or where being documents, as in the instant case, the issue of credibility is not at play, the appellate Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to re-appraise the evidence and make correct inferences. See Atoyebi & Anor v. The Governor of Oyo State & Ors (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 290, Dakat v. Dashe (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt.531) 46 and Ajibulu v. Ajayi (2013) LPELR-21860 (SC); (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt.1392) 483.
In Nkebisi v. State (2010) 5 NCC 84 at 104; (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt.1185) 471 this Court held that an appellant who appeals on the basis of the Lower Court’s improper evaluation of evidence has the duty of identifying the evidence not evaluated or improperly evaluated and showing convincingly that if the error complained of is corrected, the conclusion reached would have been different and in his favour. The 1st respondent’s appeal to the Lower Court was on the basis of proper/non-evaluation of documentary evidence, Exhibit A and P.”
4. ASANI SOGUNRO & ORS V AREMU YEKU & ORS (2017) 9 NWLR (PART 1570) 290 AT 322 F – H per NWEZE, JSC.
The assertion of the 1st Respondent through oral and documentary evidence that he purchased the property in dispute from the Federal Government through the Presidential Committee on Disposal of Federal Government Properties in Abuja in 2006 and that letters offering the Lockable huts/and Barbeque Centre on it to him were forwarded to him, have not been controverted or debunked by the Appellant and 2nd – 5th Respondents. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not deny paragraphs 3 – 12, 19 – 26 of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 6th November, 2012 contained in the judgment of Lower Court on pages 817 – 822 of the record. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents Statement of Defence is on pages 835 – 837 of the record also quoted in the judgment.
The 1st Respondent showed and tendered evidence of payments for the lockable Huts and the Barbeque Centre. Exhibits B – B38 evidenced payments for the properties sold to the 1st Respondent in 2006 which are all in plot 1763 none of the Defendants denied the stated case of 1st Respondent, all the Appellant had to say is that the Presidential committee on Disposal of Federal Government Properties in Abuja Games village lacked the power to sell the landed properties in Abuja. That the power resided in the Hon. Minister of Federal Capitol Territory. No one denies that 1st Respondent paid for the properties as directed by the Committee. As a matter of fact the 2nd and 3rd Respondent stated in paragraph 5 of their Statement of Defence that the said Committee was chaired by Minister of the Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development as Chairman. That the list of those who purchased the properties were handed over to Hon. Minister of Federal Capital Territory for proper documentation and issuance of relevant documents of title to the beneficiaries. The 4th and 5th Respondents admitted that no revocation Notice was served upon the 1st Respondent before issuance of certificate of occupancy to the Appellant in May, 2007 on the same land already sold to 1st Respondent.
The sheet anchor of the Appellant is that the 1st Respondent has only defective title vide payments the Federal made to the Federal Government and not a legal title. The Appellant is wrong. The 1st Respondent has a prior interest in the land in dispute. The 4th and 5th Respondents’ cannot feign any ignorance about it. The 1st Respondent fully paid for the properties to the Federal Government which set up the Presidential Committee to sell the properties. The 1st Respondent complied with all necessary conditions. He was lawfully put in possession of the land in dispute and no legal right in form of Certificate of Occupancy issued in favour of Appellant by the 4th Respondent can oust the equitable interest of the 1st Respondent in the property.
Failure on the part of the Honourable Minister, Federal Capital Territory who was fully aware of the sale to the 1st Respondent to perfect and process all documents of title including issuance of Certificate of Occupancy to 1st Respondent cannot render the sale made to 1st Respondent by the Federal Government through its agencies/agents the 2nd – 5th Respondents, ineffectual. The sale remains valid and legal.
The subsequent and purported sale and issuance of Certificate of Occupancy to the Appellant is absolutely null and void and of no effect as the 2nd – 5th Respondents no longer have any interest in the land to sell to the Appellant NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET. See:
1. ALHAJI A. DANTSOHO VS ALHAJI A MOHAMMED (2003) 6 NWLR (PART 877) 457 AT 487:
2. MAJOR MURTALA GBADAMOSI RTD & ORS V HRM OBA T. A. AKINLOYE & ORS (2013) 15 NWLR (PART 1378) 455 AT 47A F – H TO 479 A – E Per ONNOGHEN, JSC now CJN who said:-
“It is settled law that you cannot give what you do not have, otherwise known as the doctrine of “Nemo dat quod non habet”. The question is simply whether the respondents who had sold their title to the portion of land in dispute to the appellants which title was acquired by the Lagos State Government from the appellants, and which acquisition has been declared by a Court of law to be null and void legally speaking be entitled to a repossession of the title already sold to appellants from the third party; Lagos State Government, without the authority and/or consent of the new owner of that title? The Lower Courts held that the respondents are entitled to the title. However, common sense says that you cannot eat your cake “and still have it back.” That is the simple answer to a very simple case as revealed by the record of appeal. Without making magic or abracadabra, can you eat your cake and still have it back? Fortunately, this is a Court of law which has absolutely nothing to do with magic or abracadabra neither does the Court allow itself to be used as an engine for the perpetration of fraud, in whatever guise.
In the case of Ilona v. Idakwo (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.830) 53 at 83 para. Hand 91 – 92 paras. H-A, this Court held, inter alia, as follows:-
“Where there is a subsisting right of occupancy, it is good against any other right. The grant of another right of occupancy over the same piece of land will therefore be merely illusory and invalid… Where a party has fully divested himself of all interest in land, no right vests in him to deal with the same property by way of further alienation anymore, It is a matter of nemo dat quod non habet. i.e. he cannot give that which he no longer has.”
It is very unfortunate that the respondents claimed title to the whole of their family land compulsorily acquired by the Lagos State Government including the portion earlier sold to the father of the appellants and in which they were in effective possession. The claim so made without disclosing the truth and excluding the said portion so sold is clearly made in bad faith and smacks of insincerity, To put it mildly, it is very unconscionable and consequently against the principles of equity and good conscience. It is worst when the respondents, after obtaining judgment and entering into a settlement agreement which expressly excludes the land of appellants to still insist and hold unto that land when they know that they had much earlier divested themselves of the title to the said portion.
3. TORONTO HOSPITAL NIG LTD VS SIR ERIC UKPAKA & ORS 2018 5 NWLR (PART 1613) 426 AT 445 G – H per EKO, JSC.
4. MRS ELIZABETH IRABOR ZACCALA VS MR KINSLEY EDOSA & ANOR (2018) 6 NWLR (PART 1616) 528 AT 580.
The 2nd – 5th Respondents have earlier in 2006 divested themselves of all rights and interest in the property in dispute when they sold the land and put the 1st Respondent in possession. The Appellant admitted that even in their Brief the 1st Respondent was all the time in possession of the land. See paragraph 4.42 of the Appellants Brief page 20 thereof. What is more the settled position of the law is that where two disputants over land trace their title to common vendor the first in time is stronger in law. The 1st Respondent was the first to purchase and thus has a prior equitable right over the land which entitled him to legal estate in the said land.
1. NAPOLEON S. ORIANZI VS. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, RIVERS STATE & ORS (2017) 6 NWLR (PART 1561) 224 AT 272 C-H per GALINJE, JSC who said:-
In Olukoya v. Ashiru (2006) All FWLR (Pt.322) 1479 at 1514 paras. E -H; (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt.990) 1, this Court held that an equitable owner in possession cannot be overridden by a subsequent grantee of a legal estate. This is what my brother, Ogbuagu, JSC, 38, paras. F – H who read the lead judgment said:
As rightly submitted in the respondents brief at page 8, the Jalingo Local Government having lawfully granted the land in dispute to the respondent in 1981, it was left with nothing to grant to the appellant subsequently in 1983 during the subsistence of the grant to the respondent..so that, if there is proof that money was paid for the land coupled with an entry into possession it is sufficient, to defeat the title of a subsequent purchaser of the legal estate, if an provided that the possession, is continuously maintained
Thus, if even it is coupled with possession, it cannot be overridden by a legal estate.”
See Ogbu & 4 Ors v. Ani & 4 Ors (1994) 78 SCNJ (Pt.II) 363; (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt.335) 128, Soremekun v. Shodipo (1959) LLR 30; Orasanmi v. Idowu (1959) 4 FSC 40; (1959) SCNLR 97; Oshodi v. Balogun & Ors. (1934) 4 WACA 1.
Clearly the right of occupancy available to the appellant over the disputed property was not automatically extinguished by Section 5(2) of the Land Use Act by the purported sale and subsequent grant of a statutory right of occupancy over the same property to the 3rd and 4th respondents. To allow such an injustice, is to allow those in authority to benefit from their wrong actions. Rivers State Government cannot determine a contract in which it is a party and then take certain benefit arising therefrom leaving the party aggrieved without any remedy.
At page 284 C- G AUGIE, JSC said as follows:-
In Tewogbade v. Obadina (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt.338) 326 at pp.347 -348 paras. H – A this Court per Iguh, JSC, hit the nail right on the head, as follows-
Where two contesting parties trace their title in respect of the same piece of land to the same grantor, the applicable principle of law has always been that the latter in time of the two parties to obtain the grant cannot maintain an action against the party who first obtained a valid grant of the land from such a common grantor. The reason is obvious as a grantor having successfully divested himself of his title in respect of the disputed piece or parcel of land by the first grant would have nothing left to convey to a subsequent purchaser under the elementary principle of nemo dat quod non habet as no one may convey what no longer belongs to him.
2. MRS ELIZABETH IRABOR ZACCALA VS MR KINSLEY EDOSA & ANOR (2018) 6 NWLR (PART 1616) 528 AT 550 B – F per EKO, JSC who said:-
Let me add just a few words. The dispute between the appellant and the 1st respondent raises the equity of priority as well as the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. Both the appellant and 1st respondent claim title to the disputed land through the transactions each of them had with the 2nd respondent. In other words, they all claim that the 2nd respondent is their common grantor. The 2nd respondent was signatory to exhibits A and P. There was evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price by the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent before the transactions in Exhibit A, between the appellant and the 2nd respondent. At the time the 2nd respondent was purporting to have sold the same piece of land to the appellant, vide.
Exhibit A, he had a no further title to pass to the appellant, having in Exhibit P earlier passed his title and interest in the disputed land to the 1st respondent. Equity follows the law. Even if one should agree with the appellants slant towards solomonic justice by which both of herself and the 1st respondent would lose the disputed land on one ground of non-compliance with Section 26 of the Land Use Act, the fact remains that the 2nd respondent, from the transactions, had created equitable interest in the two buyers, namely the appellant and the 1st appellant. Where equities are equal, the first in time prevails. On the basis this equitable principle of priority, the 1st respondent has a better title.
The learned trial Judge was right in his conclusion that the land belongs to the 1st Respondent. The learned trial Chief Judge properly and correctly evaluated the oral and documentary evidence before him having regard to all issues in contention between the parties. There is no breach or denial of fair hearing to the Appellant.
Issue 2 is thus resolved against the Appellant.
On issue 3 as to whether there was any pleading or proof to entitle the 1st Respondent to an award of N50,000,000 by the Lower Court.
The law is settled that general damages arises from the inference of law and need not proved by evidence.
It is not necessary that it should be specifically pleaded and proved strictly as in claims for special damages. Once it is claimed the Court is to exercise its discretion in measuring the loss or injury that flows from the wrongful act of the Defendant. See ELF PETROLEUM NIGERIA LIMITED VS DANIEL C. UMAH & ORS (2018) LPELR – 43600 (SC) 1 AT 25 where OGUNBIYI, JSC said:-
It is an established principle of law that in cases where a party is demanding for or claimed general damages the Court awards same at its discretion. See Akinterinnwa v Oladunyoye (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 659) 93 at 115, UBN PLC vs Ikwem (2000) 3 NWLR (Pt.646) 223 at 237; Yalaju Amaye v AREC Ltd (Pt.145) 4 22 at 451 and Osuji v Isiocha (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) 623 at 640.
His Lordship continues on page 26 D – G thus:-
“It is pertinent to reiterate herein that in the award of general damages, a wide spread power is given to the Court comparable to the exercise of discretion of the Court. It is enormous and therefore far-reaching and contrary to the contention held by Appellant herein. The measure of general damages is awarded to assuage such a loss, which flows naturally from the defendant’s act. It needs not be specifically. It suffices if it is generally averred. They are presumed to be the direct and probable consequence of that complained of. Unlike special damages, it is generally incapable of exact calculation. See the following authorities of Federal Mortgage Finance Ltd. v Hope Effiong Ekpo (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt.865) 100 at 132, Dumez v. Ogboli (1972) 2 SC 196 andWASA v Kalla (1978) 3 SC 21.”
Land Use Act was enacted to prevent unconscionable and illicit sale and acquisition of land and thus enthrones orderliness into sale and purchase of landed properties. It is also designed to curb greedy and gullible land owners from selling some lands to various persons or individuals after such owner of land has divested themselves of all interest and title in the land.
It is therefore painful and nauseating to see agencies/agents of Government establishment who have duties to ensure the observance and compliance with Land Use Act deliberately flouting the provisions and intendment if the Land Use Act on the altar of unconscionable bargain. The Lower Court is therefore justified in awarding damages in favour of the 1st Respondent. Issue 3 is resolved against the Appellant.
On Issue 4 as to whether the award of N50,000,000= to 1st Respondent is not excessive. This Court will interfere with an award of general damages where it is found to be unjustified or found to be excessive or too small to compensate for injury or damages caused to the Claimant. See UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC Vs MR. N.M. OKPARA CHIMAEZE (2014) 9 NWLR (PART 1411) 166 at 196 G – H TO 197 A per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC who said:-
“With regard to the second issue, the circumstances that would warrant interference with an award of general damages made by a trial Court are:-
1. If the Court is satisfied that the trial Judge acted in the award of such damages, upon some wrong principle; or
2. That the amount awarded was so large or so small as to make it a completely erroneous assessment on the damages; or
3. Where a finding of the trial Court is found to be perverse. See UBA Ltd v. Mudashiru O. Ademuyiwa (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt.628) 570 at 591, A.C.: NBCI vs. Integrated Gas (Nig) Ltd & Anor (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt.613) 119 at 131 paras D – E.”
I am of the solemn view that in the circumstance of all the facts in this case the award of N50,000,000= to the 1st Respondent is too large and ought to be slashed or reduced.
I hereby set aside the award of N50,000,000= damages made in favour of 1st Respondent by the lower Court. In its stead I hereby award N15,000,000.00= (Fifteen Million Naira) general damages in favour of the 1st Respondent. Subject to this, the judgment of the Lower Court delivered by the Chief Judge on 22nd day of October, 2014 is hereby affirmed.
However having found that the Lower Court lacked the jurisdiction to deal with subject matter of this action being claims for title to land and ancillary reliefs therefrom, the Suit/Action of the 1st Respondent FHC/ABJ/CS/418/2010 shall be and it is hereby transferred to the High Court of the Federation Capital Territory, Abuja which has jurisdiction in land matters for trial de novo and the trial de novo shall be given expeditious hearing. See Section 22 and 44 of the Federal High Court Act 2004.
There will be no order as to costs.
ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.: I have read in advance, the leading judgment of my learned brother Ige JCA just delivered and I agree.
TANI YUSUF HASSAN, J.C.A.: I agree
Appearances:
Chinelo Njemanze with him,
Abiola Giwa, Esq. For Appellant(s)
J. S. Agada with him, O. B. Ogunji, Esq.- for 1st Respondent
2nd 3rd Respondents served 5/5/18.
4th and 5th Served 5/4/18 through their counsel.
For Respondent(s)
