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ABUBAKAR & ORS v. NSCDC & ORS (2022)

ABUBAKAR & ORS v. NSCDC & ORS

(2022)LCN/15959(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, May 05, 2022

CA/K/479/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Amina Audi Wambai Justice of the Court of Appeal

Bitrus Gyarazama Sanga Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abubakar Mahmud Talba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. MURTALA ABUBAKAR 2. AUWAL ZAKARI 3. YAHAYA ISAH 4. ADAMU ISAH 5. GANDU BABANGIDA 6. RABI’U SA’IDU 7. ABDULLAHI ADAMU 8. KABIRU MA’AZU 9. MU’AZAMA ISA 10 ABBAS YA’U 11. LABARAN SHUAIBU 12. HASSAN LAWAL IRONBENDER 13. MA’ARUF MUSA 14. HAYATU ABDULLAHI 15. ABDULLAHI ABUBAKAR GADO 16. JAMILU MUSA 17. UMMAR MUSA 18. ABUBAKAR ALHASSAN 19. SULAIMAN ABUBAKAR 20. BODA SIKIRU 21. KABIRU ABDULMALIK 22. RABI USANI 23. SAMAILA ABDULLAHI 24. BUHARI MUSA 25. SALISU HARUNA 26. MUHAMMED JUNAIDU 27. ISMAIL UMAR APPELANT(S)

And

1. NIGERIA SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS 2. THE STATE COMMANDANT, NSCDC 3. NATIONAL EYE CENTER 4. ALHASSAN UNGO (DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL EYE CENTER) 5. SUNDAY MAIGIDA RESPONDENT(S)

 

RATIO

THE POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

Evaluation of evidence entails the trial Judge examining all evidence before him before making his findings. This is done by putting all evidence on an imaginary scale to see which side appears to outweigh the other. See Lafia Local Govt v. Executive Governor of Nasarawa State (2012) LPELR-20602 (SC); Usang & Ors v. Okon & Ors (2016) LPELR-41355; Gilbert Onwuka & Ors v. Michael Ediala & Ors. (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 1282. Being a matter that was commenced pursuant to the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, the trial Court considered the affidavit in support of the application, the counter-affidavit and the further affidavit with all the documents attached thereto. See Ukaobasi v. Ezimora (2016) LPELR-40174 and Fort Royal Homes Ltd & Anor v. EFCC & Anor (2017) LPELR-42807. PER TALBA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE STATUTORY POWERS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

The trial Court will not hastily interfere with the statutory powers of law enforcement agencies like the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) in the exercise of their statutory duty to investigate alleged offences and detain where necessary for the purpose of that investigation. See Danfulani v. EFCC (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1493) 223 and Kalu v. FRN (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1389) 492.  PER TALBA, J.C.A.

ABUBAKAR MAHMUD TALBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the Judgment of Kaduna State High Court delivered on 22th of June, 2018 in suit No. KDH/K/KAD/87/2018.

The appellants instituted an action against the respondents under the Fundamental Human Right Enforcement Procedure Rules, seeking for the enforcement of their Rights to dignity of Human Persons, Personal Liberty and Freedom of Movement as guaranteed by Section 34 and 35 of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN (as amended and African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act. After hearing the learned trial Judge in a considered judgment held thus:
“For the purpose of this application therefore having held that there is basis for suspicion that a crime was committed, I hold that this matter lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed.”

​Aggrieved by the decision the appellants filed their notice of Appeal on the 19th of July, 2018 containing two grounds of appeal. At the hearing of the appeal on 9th February, 2022. M. T. Mohammed of counsel adopted the appellants’ brief of argument filed on 20th September, 2018 and the reply brief filed on 5th of November, 2020. He urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the lower Court. A. U. Okinu of counsel adopted the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ brief of argument filed on 27th of September, 2021. The counsel to the 3rd & 5th respondents was not in Court. The Court registrar informed the Court that the 3rd & 5th respondents’ counsel was served with a hearing notice by phone call on the 1st of February, 2022. And The 4th respondent was served on the 1st February 2022. The appellants’ counsel M. T. Mohammed urged the Court to deem the 3rd–5th respondents’ brief as having been duly argued pursuant to Order 19 Rule 9 (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2021. The 3rd–5th respondents’ brief was filed on the 12th of October 2021, it was accordingly treated as having been duly argued. From the two grounds of appeal the appellants distilled a sole issue for determination thus:
“Whether the learned trial Judge was right when she dismissed the appellants’ application in view of the facts and circumstances of this case and without thorough evaluation of all the materials (including decision in appeal No: CA/K/433/2015) placed before the Court”.

The 1st and 2nd respondents also distilled a sole issue for determination, thus:
“Whether the trial Court was right to have held and entered judgment in favour of the respondents”.

The 3rd–5th respondents equally distilled a sole issue for determination thus:
“Whether the trial Court properly evaluated the evidence placed before it and was right to have dismissed the appellants’ suit”.

I have carefully considered all the issues submitted by the respective counsels and I am of the view that the issue submitted by the 1st & 2nd respondents’ counsel is apt for the determination of this appeal and I adopt same.

​The appellants’ counsel submitted that the trial Judge did not consider the materials placed before the Court by the appellants and that it is the Police and not the 1st respondent that has the power to investigate and if necessary, prosecute an offender. It is constitutionally wrong for a person to be invited or arrested without first of all carrying out a thorough investigation as was done in this case. See the case of Fawehinmi v. IGP & Ors (2002) LPELR–1258 (SC) where the Supreme Court held that:
“I think I can say this that in a proper investigation procedure, it is unlawful to arrest until there is sufficient evidence upon which to charge and caution a suspect. It is completely wrong to arrest, let alone caution a suspect before the Police look for evidence implicating him”.

​The appellant submitted that the 1st & 2nd respondents did not put up appearance at the lower Court, therefore they have not placed before the Court any evidence gathered which implicates the appellants. The 3rd, 4th & 5th respondents did not disclose the steps taken by the 1st & 2nd respondents upon the receipt of their complaint. And the contents of the complaint written by the 3rd respondent was not placed before the trial Court. The learned counsel submitted that the written statement made or volunteered by the appellants upon their arrest as required by Section 17 (1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, which is the same with Section 39 (1) of Kaduna State Administration of Criminal Justice Law No. 6 of 2017, was not placed before the lower Court. Yet the learned trial Judge held that:
“(a) There was clear evidence that raise the suspicion that a crime had been committed.
(b) The 1st & 2nd respondents were right to invite the appellants.
(c) The appellants were adjudged trespassers and the 1st & 2nd respondents have a duty to investigate the allegation of vandalisation of the facilities of the 3rd respondent.
(d) They have a duty to hear from the appellants by inviting them before concluding their investigation.
(e) Judgment in suit No: KDH/KAD/542/2010 is valid and subsisting and the respondents have the power to approach the Court to enforce its judgment.
(f) The 1st & 2nd respondents have the power to ensure that the judgment of the High Court is obeyed.
(g) The matter stated in the counter affidavit is a criminal matter and not a civil matter.

Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge made a case for the respondents against the settled principle that no Judge should make a case for a party – see Itauma v. Akpe–Ime (2000) LPELR–1557 (SC), Addah & Ors v. Ubandawaki (2015) LPELR – 24266 (SC).

The learned counsel submitted that the appellants were arrested as against the finding of the learned trial Judge that the appellants were only invited. And while it is true that the judgment in suit No: KDH/KAD/542/2010 is still subsisting or pending. The learned trial Judge referred to the appellants as adjudged trespassers while the Court of Appeal had settled the dispute in Appeal No. CA/K/433/2015 wherein the Court of Appeal held that the subject matter in both suits is not the same. But the learned trial Judge ignored the decision even though a CTC was placed before the Court as Exhibit B attached to the applicants’ further affidavit. And that prompted the lower Court to hold wrongly that:
“The 1st & 2nd respondent have to investigate whether the area in issue is part of the judgment and ensure that the judgment of the Court is obeyed”

Learned counsel concluded by relying on the case of Salau v. Araba (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 204) @ 118–119 where Sanusi JCA (as he then was) held that: redress instead of wanton misapplication of power or force. It deserves to be condemned in no uncertain terms.

See also Federal Minister of Internal Affairs & 3 Ors v. Shugaba A. Darman (1992) 3 NCLR 915. He submitted that the learned trial Judge did not do a thorough evaluation of the materials placed before the Court. The multiple suits instituted by the appellants is a clear evidence that the respondents were only misusing the law enforcement agents who cannot resolve what is purely a civil issue. The Court of Appeal had in appeal No. CA/K/433/2015 settled the issue of the disputed land and its decision that the lands are not the same cannot be reopened by the 1st & 2nd respondents or the lower Court. Some of the basis for coming to certain conclusions in favour of the respondents are not supported by the materials placed before the lower Court. The learned trial Judge could not see through the smokescreen erected mischievously by the 3rd–5th respondents on allegation of crime without explaining why multiple cases of fundamental human right were instituted by the appellants against the 3rd respondents and the police or Air Force.

The learned counsel urge the Court to allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the lower Court and in its place grant all the prayers of the appellants.

​In response the 1st & 2nd respondents’ counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge was right to have held and entered judgment in favour of the respondents. The fundamental rights Enforcement Procedure Rules being a Special Provision for adjudication on affidavit evidence did not contemplate the evaluation of evidence outside the statutory and judicial authorities. The judgment of the trial Court was in consonance with the provisions of Section 14, 15, 121(a), 122, (1) (2) (a) (b) (m) (4), 128, 131, 134, 143, 167, 168 and 173 of the Evidence Act 2011. Particularly Sections 134, 143 and 173 of same. He submitted further that the trial Court was right in its decision having taken judicial notice of Section 3 (1) (f) (i) (iii) (h) (ii) (iii) of the Nigerian Security & Civil Defence Corps (amendment) Act 2007 which gives the 1st & 2nd respondents the power to invite the appellants for investigation. The judgment of the trial Court in favour of the respondents was rightly decided and it was in consonance with the High Court ruling in suit No. KDH/KAD/542/2010 that adjudged the applicants to be trespassers, as per pages 129–134 of the record. The final judgment of the trial Court was entered in favour of both respondents because of the clear evidence that a crime has been committed. The 3rd respondent is right to invite and report to the 1st & 2nd respondents for legal action. It was on the basis of the trial Court judgment that the 1st & 2nd respondents filed a 4 counts charge in Federal High Court Kaduna in charge No. FHC/KD/18C/2020 dated 27th July, 2020 against 15 defendants in case between FRN v. Awwal Tahir and 14 others and also an F.I.R in Chief Magistrate Court Mando Kaduna State with case No. KMD/167/XB/2020 between NSCDC v. Jamilu Ishiyaku and 10 others which are all pending. The learned counsel submitted that Section 33(2), 34(2), 35 (11) (a)–(f) of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN, as amended provide for exceptional circumstances that is peculiar to the present situation. The arrest, investigation and prosecution of the defendants by the 1st & 2nd respondents sequel to the report/complaint from 3rd–5th respondents relying on the judgment delivered on 22nd June, 2018 in their favour in suit No. KDH/KAD/87/2018 and suit NO.KDH/KAD/542/2010 was constitutional, justified and rightly done. Also, Section 3 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 & Section 3(1) (f) of Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (amendment) Act 2007 are in consonance with the decision of Hassan v. EFCC (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1389) 616 of ration 13 where the Apex Court held thus;
“No Court has the power to stop the investigative powers of the Police or EFCC or any agency established under our laws to investigate crimes where there is reasonable suspicion of commission of a crime or ample evidence of commission of an offence by a suspect” See also Orji Uzor Kalu v. FRN 2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1389) 492.

In his own response the learned counsel for the 3rd–5th respondent submitted that the materials placed before the trial Court being a suit commenced pursuant to the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009, are the affidavit and documents in support of the appellants’ application, the counter-affidavit and documents filed by the 3rd-5th respondents and the further affidavit and reply on points of law filed by the appellants before the trial Court.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”></br<>

Paragraph 12 of the 3rd–5th respondents’ counter-affidavit states below:
“12 That during the pendency of the various suits filed by the present applicants the 1st and 2nd applicants have purport to create a layout of land within the premises of the 3rd respondent, have moved in heavy graders and trucks have in the process destroyed and vandalised facilities including but not limited to tress, roads, light poles etc and has continuously interrupted the smooth operation of the 3rd respondent.”
“13 That the 1st and 2nd respondents are statutorily empowered with the mandate to protect government properties.”

The learned counsel submitted that in paragraph 14(b) it is deposed that the management of the 3rd respondent had reasonable and probable cause to believe that only intervention by the security agencies could bring about peace and ensure that the 3rd respondent carried out its public statutory mandate in a conducive atmosphere. The learned counsel submitted further that from the records, there is no place where the applicants denied creating a layout within the premises of the 3rd–5th respondents and neither did they deny moving in heavy graders and machines which brought about the destruction and vandalization of facilities including trees, roads, light poles etc. he submitted that it is trite law that uncontroverted evidence is deemed not only proved but also admitted. See Harding v. A. G & P. T. Lagos State & Anor (2016) LPELR-40990 Page 18-19 Para F-C. Therefore, the findings of the learned trial Judge that there is clear evidence that there is a basis for suspicion that a crime has been committed cannot be said to be a general and sweeping statement, but was clearly borne out of the uncontroverted facts deemed admitted as deposed in paragraphs 12 and 14(b) of the 3rd–5th respondents’ counter-affidavit. And that forms the basis of the judgment of the trial Court. The contention of the appellants that is only the police and not the 1st respondent that has the power to investigate and if necessary prosecute an offender is wrong in the light of the provisions of Section 3(f) of the NSCDC Act which empowers the 1st respondent to arrest, investigate and prosecute offenders in addition to the general powers/mandate to protect government properties. It is immaterial that the 1st and 2nd respondents did not put up appearance at the trial Court. The burden lies on the applicant to prove by its affidavit in support of the application that he is entitled to the reliefs sought. See Mainstreet Bank & Ors v. Amos & Anor (2014) LPELR-23361 Page 26-27. The burden is not discharged even where the other party does not file a counter-affidavit, the applicant must establish his entitlement to the reliefs sought by his own affidavit. See Ikudayisi & Ors. v. Oyingbo & Ors (2015) LPELR-40525.

The learned counsel submitted that this matter is not all about a distinct piece of land from the judgment in KDH/KAD/542/2010, and Appeal No: CA/K/433/2015. Rather it relates to the issue of destruction and vandalization of the properties of the 3rd–5th respondents and the powers of the 1st and 2nd respondents to investigate and prosecute same.

​I have gone through the reply brief filed by the appellant and I must say that it is not a reply brief in accordance with the rules of this Court. The rules of this Court by Order 19 Rule 5(1), the appellant may if necessary within fourteen (14) days of the service on him of the respondents’ brief file and serve or cause to be served on the respondents, a reply brief which shall deal with all new points and points of preliminary objection or any challenge to the appeal raised and argued in the respondents’ brief. In consequence thereof a reply brief which does not answer or deal with any new point or points raised by the respondents’ brief cannot hold water. In the instant case, the reply brief is merely a reargument or repetition of the appellants’ brief of argument. It does not contain any argument in response to a new issue raised by the respondent. Accordingly, the reply brief is hereby discountenanced.

​The crux of this matter right from the trial Court is that the appellants are residents/owners of the land situate at Mahuta Village in Kaduna. Part of the land was acquired from their parents sometime in 1980 and they were paid compensation. The 3rd respondent, the National Eye Centre was built on part of the land that was acquired. After sometime there was series of litigation over the boundary demarcation between the local community and the management of the 3rd respondent. This present appeal is inclusive. One needs not to be told that the dispute over a land in Nigeria has been the cause of anxieties and communal war and many have gone to the grave as a result of the battle over land matters. In most cases, the crises are uncalled for if properly managed through dialogue and amicable settlement. In this instant case too there was terms of settlement filed by the parties in one of the matters, although the 3rd respondent stated that they were not part of the terms of settlement. The truth of the matter is that all these series of litigation will not solve the problem at stake.

It seems that the boundaries are not well known to the parties, although it has been stated that the 3rd respondent built a fence after the acquisition. In paragraphs 4(v) to (xi) of the counter-affidavit at page 27 of the record its stated thus:
“4(v) That inspite the payment of compensation and compromise to resettle by resettling them on the excised land some of the villagers especially the present applicants did not only refused to vacate the land but persisted in their acts of defiance by among several other acts breaking the fence wall created by the National Eye Centre and proceeded to earmarked plots and layout for sale and have continued to sell to unsuspecting the public.
(vi) The villagers aforementioned included those from Masaba and Mahuta villages the present applicants and other persons who were unknown.
(vii) That the extent and boundary of the land acquired has never been in dispute and the villagers including the present applicants eventually through their representatives requested the National Eye Centre vide a letter dated 1st May 1993 but singed in June, 1993 to borrow them part of the land of the National Eye Centre for their farming activities. A copy of the said letter is hereby annexed hereto and marked as Exhibit A.
(viii) That the National Eye Centre declined the request of the villages and present applicants vide its letter dated 7th May, 1996 addressed to the District Head of Rigasa in whose domain the National Eye Centre is situated and insisted the villagers including the present applicants must vacate its land. a copy of the letter is annexed hereto and marked as Exhibit B.
(ix) That the Kaduna State Government vide a letter dated 7th February, 2002 addressed to the district head of Rigasa gave the villagers and occupants including the present applicants up to the 31st July, 2002 to vacate or quit the land. A copy of the said letter is annexed and marked Exhibit C.
(x) That the district head of Rigasa immediately after receiving Exhibit C hereof summoned all the villagers on the land including the present applicants and urged them to comply with the quit notice of the Kaduna State Government.
(xi) That when the refusal and disruption of the villagers including the present applicants became detrimental to the smooth operations of the National Eye Centre Kaduna, the smooth operations of the National Eye Centre Kaduna, the management of the Eye Centre was constrained to instruct their Solicitors to take all legal steps to eject the villages from the land including the present applicants.”

I have searched the entire record and I cannot lay hands on any further affidavit which has challenged the depositions in the counter-affidavit. After a review of the affidavit in support of the application and the counter-affidavit of the 3rd–5th respondents particularly paragraphs 5-14(a)–(c), the learned trial Judge held as follows:
“From all the above there is clear evidence that raise the suspicion that a crime has been committed. The 3rd respondent is right to invite the 1st and 2nd respondent in the situation highlighted in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit. The 3rd respondent alleges vandalisation of the facilities including roads, poles, trees etc by persons who were adjudged trespassers to the said premised by a Court of law.
In that circumstance, the report to the security agencies is in order. The 1st and 2nd respondents have a duty to investigate the matter, they have a duty to hear from the applicants by inviting them before concluding their investigation and I so hold.”

The learned trial Judge further held that:
“Thus whether it is a report for criminal trespass by destruction to property or criminal trespass by reentry by an adjudged trespasser, I find and hold the 3rd–5th respondents have a right and did not breach the fundamental rights of the applicants by making a report as the matter as stated in the counter affidavit is not civil, it is a criminal matter.”
See pages 132-133 of the record.

The appellants’ grievance is that the learned trial Judge held that there was clear evidence that raise the suspicion that a crime had been committed. The 1st and 2nd respondents were right to invite the appellants. The appellants were adjudged trespassers and the 1st and 2nd respondents have a duty to investigate the allegation of vandalisation of the facilities of the 3rd respondent. They have a duty to hear from the appellants by inviting them before concluding their investigation. The matter stated in the counter-affidavit is a criminal matter and not a civil matter. I had earlier mentioned in this judgment that the fact deposed in paragraphs 4(v)-(xi) of the counter-affidavit was not challenged by the applicants. It is settled law that where facts provable by affidavit evidence are duly deposed to in affidavit by a party to a suit his adversary has a duty to controvert those facts in a counter-affidavit if he disputes them otherwise such facts may be regarded as duly established. In this instant case, the appellants have a duty to controvert those facts in a further affidavit. See Chief Atanda v. Olanrewaju (1958) 10-11 SC: (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 89) 394; Military Administrator FHA v. Aro (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 168) 405: Okere v. Nlem (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 234) 132; Momah v. Vab Petroleum Inc(2000) 2 SC 142. The findings of the learned trial Judge were based on the uncontroverted depositions contained in the counter-affidavit. Every person has a civic duty to report crime to the police or any Security agency like the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence corps. In this instant case the report to NSCDC was made by the 3rd–5th respondents upon being apprehensive that the appellants were creating a layout of land within the premises of the 3rd respondent, having moved in heavy graders, and trucks. And in process, they have destroyed and vandalized facilities including trees, roads, light poles etc thereby interrupting the smooth operations of the 3rd respondent. The report having been made to the 1st and 2nd respondents they have no right to ignore the report which is likely to cause breach of the peace. The 1st and 2nd respondents are statutorily empowered to arrest, detain, investigate and prosecute offenders or persons who are suspected to have committed an offence. See Section 3(1), (f) (I) (iii) (h) (ii) (iii) of the Nigeria Security of Civil Defence Corps (amendment) Act 2007. Where a person or persons are arrested by the NSCDC in the legitimate exercise of their duty and on the grounds of reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, he or they cannot sue the NSCDC in Court for breach of his/their fundamental rights. In the case of Hassan v. EFCC (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1389) Page 616 ratio 13 the Apex Court held thus:
“No Court has the power to stop the investigative powers of the Police or EFCC or any agency established under our laws to investigate crimes where there is reasonable suspicion of commission of a crime or ample evidence of commission of an offence by a suspect.”
The powers of the Police or NSCDC is exercised for the benefit of the citizenry in order to promote order, safety, health morals and general welfare within statutory and constitutional limits which is an essential attribute of government.

In the final analysis, I am on the same page with the trial Court that the 3rd–5th respondents have a right and did not breach the fundamental rights of the appellant by making a report as the matter as stated in the counter-affidavit is not a civil but a criminal matter. Moreso there was no further affidavit which controvert the facts deposed in the counter-affidavit. The appellants’ counsel strenuously argued and submitted that the trial Court did not evaluate the materials placed before the trial Court, which prompted the Court to hold wrongly. Upon a careful perusal of the record of appeal it is evident that the trial Court has evaluated the evidence placed before the Court. Evaluation of evidence entails the trial Judge examining all evidence before him before making his findings. This is done by putting all evidence on an imaginary scale to see which side appears to outweigh the other. See Lafia Local Govt v. Executive Governor of Nasarawa State (2012) LPELR-20602 (SC); Usang & Ors v. Okon & Ors (2016) LPELR-41355; Gilbert Onwuka & Ors v. Michael Ediala & Ors. (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 96) 1282. Being a matter that was commenced pursuant to the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, the trial Court considered the affidavit in support of the application, the counter-affidavit and the further affidavit with all the documents attached thereto. See Ukaobasi v. Ezimora (2016) LPELR-40174 and Fort Royal Homes Ltd & Anor v. EFCC & Anor (2017) LPELR-42807.

The appellants counsel made a heavy weather that the learned trial judge laboured so much to make case for the respondents. I regret to say however that what I saw in the record was quite different from what learned counsel would want the Court to believe. This must be a misconception and no doubt this contention betrays the high level of experience in practice of learned counsel who should always see himself as an officer of the Court. A counsel as an officer of the Court should avoid litigation with exasperation which does not achieve any positive result but certainly leave a very lasting bad memory.

The trial Court will not hastily interfere with the statutory powers of law enforcement agencies like the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) in the exercise of their statutory duty to investigate alleged offences and detain where necessary for the purpose of that investigation. See Danfulani v. EFCC (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1493) 223 and Kalu v. FRN (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1389) 492.

Before I conclude, I wish to observe that the 3rd respondent, the National Eye Centre was established by Government for the overall benefit of the community and Nigerians at large. If the community cannot do things that will assist the National Eye Centre to achieve its mandate and the objectives of establishing the centre. Then they should not be seen to do things that will interfere with or interrupt with the smooth operation of the centre. Other Nigerian Communities will do all what they can do to have such a centre established in their doorsteps. There is no end to dialogue, and dialogue can achieve better results in the present circumstance rather than the litany of cases which this dispute gave rise to.

In conclusion, I hold that the appeal lacks merit and it is dismissed. No order as to cost.

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.: I agree.

BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.: I have read a draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Talba, JCA. I agree with and adopt as mine the finding and conclusion in the said judgment that this appeal lacks merit. I also associate myself with the final comment made by my learned brother in the lead judgment on the need for dialogue between the parties in order to engender peace in the community. Appeal is hereby dismissed.

Appearances:

M. T. Mohammed Esq. For Appellant(s)

A. U. Okino Esq. – For the 1st & 2nd Respondents

Dakun Rindi Joel Esq. – for the 3rd – 5th Respondents. For Respondent(s)