ABRAHAM v. STATE (2020)

ABRAHAM v. STATE

(2020)LCN/14117(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(AKURE JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, March 20, 2020

CA/AK/129C/2017

Before Our Lordships:

Mohammed Ambi-Usi Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ridwan Maiwada Abdullahi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

DANIEL ABRAHAM APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

CONDITIONS FOR A VALID ARRAIGNMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON

For there to be a valid trial, there must be a proper arraignment in terms of the laid down procedure provided by the law. The conditions for a valid arraignment of a person charged with criminal offences are as follows:
a. The accused person shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order;
b. The charge or information shall be read over and explained to the Accused to the satisfaction of the Court by the Registrar or other officer of the Court.
c. The Accused person must be called upon to plea instantly to the charge, unless there is a valid reason not to do so.
SEE EFFIOM V. STATE (1995) LPELR 1026 (SC); MOHAMMED V. FRN (2018) LPELR 43908 (SC); DAUDA V. FRN (2017) LPELR 41910 (SC) and OKO V. STATE (2017) LPELR 42267 (SC).
It is therefore, the purpose or aim of arraignment to ensure fair hearing to the Accused person. The Court should ensure and satisfy that the Accused person(s) understands the charge against him to enable him make his defence after plea has been properly taken. PER ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT CAN CONVICT ONLY ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON

A Court can convict on only the extrajudicial statement of an Accused person even if retracted at the trial where the confession is direct, positive and unequivocal and is properly proved, as in the instant case, the Court may convict an Accused person solely on such a confession regardless of whether the maker resiled from it. See GALADIMA V. STATE (2012) LPELR 15530 (SC); SIMON V. STATE (2017) LPELR 41988 (SC) and MOHAMMED V. STATE (2019) LPELR 46420 (SC).
Retraction or denial of a confessional statement does not affect its admissibility. Where an Accused person retracts or resiles from his confessional statement, the Court would be right to admit it and determine the weight to be attached to it in its judgment. See FRN V. IWEKA (2013) 3 NWLR (PT. 1341) 285; MBANG V. STATE (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1352) 48 and ESSIEN V. STATE (2018) 6 NWLR (PT. 1614) 162. PER ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF AN INVESTIGATING POLICE OFFICER OF FACTS HE SAW IN THE COURSE OF INVESTIGATION IS A HEARSAY EVIDENCE

It is trite that evidence of investigating police officer of facts he saw or discovered in the course of investigation as in the instant case, is not a hearsay evidence to render such facts inadmissible.
His testimony on what the Appellant and other witnesses in the course of his investigation told him was positive and direct. See ANYASODO V. STATE (2018) LPELR 43720 (SC); OLAOYE V. STATE (2018) LPELR 43601 (SC).
In the case of OLAOYE V. STATE (supra) the Supreme Court had this to say:
“…Here, I do not share the Appellant’s counsel view that the evidence of I.P.O amount to hearsay because an I.P.O narrates to the Court the outcome of his investigation or enquiries or what he recovered and in the course of his duty, he must have discovered or recovered some pieces of evidence vital to the commission of the crime which trial Courts normally considered in arriving at just decision one way or the other…” PER ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.

THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF ROBBERY

Robbery means the illegal taking of property from the person to another or in the person’s presence by violence or intimidation, where the robbery is accompanied by the use of firearms or offensive weapons what causes or attempts to cause any person’s death or hurt or unlawful restraint or fear, it metamorphoses into an armed robbery. See BASSEY V. STATE (2012) LPELR 7813 (SC); PIUS V. STATE (2015) LPELR 24446 (SC) and KEKONG V. STATE (2017) LPELR 42343 (SC). To secure a conviction for the offence of armed robbery, the Prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a robbery or series of robberies; each robbery was an armed robbery and the Accused person was one of those who took part in the armed robbery. See ATTAH V. STATE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1201) 190; KAYODE VS STATE (2016) 7 NWLR (PT. 1511) 179 and THOMAS V. STATE (2017) 9 NWLR (PT. 1570) 230.
The case law has provided three ways of proving commission of a crime to wit; (a) Eye witness evidence, (b) Circumstantial evidence (c) Confessional evidence. See MBANG V. STATE (2010) 7 NWLR (PT. 1194) 431; OKIEMUTE V. STATE (2016) 15 NWLR (PT. 1535) 297 and EZE V. FRN (2017) 15 NWLR (PT. 1589) 433.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not evince proof beyond all iota/shadow of doubt. PER ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.

RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the Osun State High Court of Justice sitting at Osogbo Judicial Division presided over by Hon. Justice A. O. Ayoola delivered on the 25th day of April, 2017, whereat the Appellant/Accused was found guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Armed Robbery and Armed Robbery and sentenced him and three of his co-accused accordingly.

The Appellant was arraigned on a two count charge of conspiracy to commit Armed robbery and Armed Robbery contrary to Section 6(B) and Section 1(1) and (2a) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act Respectively.

The brief background facts of the case leading to this appeal as garnered from the processes filed is that on the 14th day of October, 2013, at about 20:00 hours, one Abubakar Rauf a motorcycle rider carried one Joseph Moses and Godwin Ode of Araromi Kajola Osogbo as passengers. Joseph Moses brought out a knife and ordered Abubakar (Okadaman) to surrender his motorcycle to them or else he would stab him. For the fear of death Abubakar surrendered his motorcycle to them and reported the incident to the

police. The motorcycle was later recovered at the house of one of the Accused persons Daniel Abraham. The Appellant, Joseph Moses, Godwin Ode and Samuel Job were arrested in connection to the crime and subsequently charged before the lower Court on a two count charge.

In proof of its case, the Prosecution called two witnesses and tendered documents. In defence of the case, the Appellant testified in person as DW2 and called no other witness. At the closure of evidence, the parties, qua counsel addressed the Court. In a considered judgment delivered on 25th day of October, 2016, found at pages 241-251 of the printed record, the learned trial judge convicted the Appellant along with other Accused persons for the offences of criminal conspiracy and armed robbery and sentenced him to death.
The Appellant was dissatisfied with the judgment. Hence on 11th day of May, 2017 lodged a two (2) grounds Notice of Appeal found at pages 252-253 of the record. The Appellant with the leave of this Court, filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on 16th day of November, 2018 containing 11 grounds of Appeal.

Thereafter, the parties filed and exchanged their briefs of

argument in line with the rules governing the hearing of criminal appeals in this Court. The appeal was heard on the 21st day of January, 2020. During the hearing of the appeal, learned counsel for the Appellant, B. J. Akinsete, Esq. adopted the Appellant’s brief of argument filed on 26th November, 2018 and Appellant’s reply brief of argument filed on 5th day of April, 2019 but deemed properly filed on 17th day of April, 2019 as representing his arguments for the appeal. Learned counsel for the Respondent, I. T. Alarape Abdulrahamon, Esq. adopted the Respondent’s brief of argument, filed on 25th February, 2019 and deemed properly filed on 17th April, 2019 as forming his reaction against the appeal.

In the Appellant’s brief of argument, he nominated three issues for consideration to wit:
1. Whether the learned trial judge was right in convicting and sentencing the Appellant to death by hanging without first satisfying the condition precedent to the plea taking of the Appellant.
2. Whether the Court below did not err in law when it unduly attached weight to the Appellant’s purported confessional statement and relied

on it in convicting the Appellant for conspiracy to commit armed robbery and sentencing him to death.
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he convicted the Appellant for conspiracy to commit armed robbery and sentenced him to death under Section 1(2)(b) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Offences) Act.

Learned counsel for the Respondent in its brief of argument formulated three issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether there was a valid plea by the Appellant before the trial Court.
2. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant as required by the Law and convicting him accordingly.
3. Whether the learned trial judge can rely on the confessional statement of the Appellant, amongst other evidence to convict him for the offence of conspiracy and armed robbery.
A close look at the two sets of issues reveals that they are identical in substance. I believe the Respondent’s issues can conveniently be married under the Appellant’s issues. For this reason of oneness, I will decide the appeal on the issues tabled by the Appellant.

ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUES
ISSUE ONE
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Court must satisfy the condition specified under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap C.41 Laws of the Federation, 2004 for the arraignment of a person to be valid. That failure to strictly observe this provision will render the whole trial a nullity. He cited the case of AFOLALU V. THE STATE (2009) 3 NWLR (PT. 1127).
Counsel submitted that it is clear from the face of the record of the lower Court that the charges upon which the Appellant was arraigned, was only read over to him but was not explained to him and the person or designation of the person who read the charge to the Appellant was not ascertained before his plea was taken.
Counsel reproduced the proceedings of the lower Court of 24th May, 2016 and submitted that nowhere on the record shows who read the charge and explained to the Appellant before his plea was taken. That it is not stated whether it was the Registrar or any officer of the lower Court that read and explained the charge to the Appellant.
Learned counsel argued that what is stated on the record was

only to the effect that, “the counts were read and interpreted in the Yoruba language understood by the Accused persons” and nothing more. That the failure of the lower Court to ensure that the charge was read over and explained to the Appellant by the registrar or Court official before his plea was taken in compliance with the provision of Section 215, is a fundamental breach of the Appellant’s right of fair hearing. He cited Afolalu (Supra) for the view.
He argued that where a law or statute prescribed a method or procedure of doing things, compliance with that method is a condition precedent to the validity of the action taken. He cited NWANKWO V. YAR’ADUA (2010) 12 NWLR (PT. 1209) 518; IBRAHIM V. INEC (1999) 8 NWLR (PT. 614) 334 and KAYODE V. THE STATE (2008) 1 NWLR (PT. 1068) 281 for the view.
Counsel reasoned that the failure of the lower Court to satisfy the condition precedent to the plea taking renders the entire proceedings a nullity and urged the Court to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that by the record of the trial Court, the Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law

was fully complied with. That the Appellant and the other Accused persons were before the Court and represented by counsel L. P. Jones, Esq. when the charge was read and interpreted in the Yoruba Language understood by them and that they all pleaded not guilty to the two counts charges. Counsel submitted that the crucial requirement is for the trial Court to make record to the effect of the procedure laid down by law and the omission to use the exact language of the law does not vitiate a conviction based on such plea. He cited CHIBUZOR V. FRN (2017) LPELR-41852 (CA); EYISI & ORS V. THE STATE (2000) LPELR 1186 (SC) for the point.
On whether the charge was read and explained to the Appellant, learned counsel referred to the holding of the lower Court at page 234 of record where the Court held thus “All counts were read and interpreted in Yoruba Language understood by the Accused persons” and submitted that by this sentence, the charge was duly explained to the Appellant and his co-accused before they entered their plea. He cited the case of ADEWUNMI V. THE STATE (2016) 9 SCM 1 AT 8 for the view and urged the

Court to hold that the Appellant’s plea was validly taken and resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent.
In his reply brief, learned counsel for the Appellant reiterated his earlier submission that the charge was not interpreted to the Appellant and that the failure of the trial Court to satisfy the condition precedent for the plea taken, renders the proceedings a nullity.

RESOLUTION
For there to be a valid trial, there must be a proper arraignment in terms of the laid down procedure provided by the law. The conditions for a valid arraignment of a person charged with criminal offences are as follows:
a. The accused person shall be placed before the Court unfettered unless the Court shall see cause otherwise to order;
b. The charge or information shall be read over and explained to the Accused to the satisfaction of the Court by the Registrar or other officer of the Court.
c. The Accused person must be called upon to plea instantly to the charge, unless there is a valid reason not to do so.
SEE EFFIOM V. STATE (1995) LPELR 1026 (SC); MOHAMMED V. FRN (2018) LPELR 43908 (SC); DAUDA V. FRN (2017) LPELR 41910 (SC) and

OKO V. STATE (2017) LPELR 42267 (SC).
It is therefore, the purpose or aim of arraignment to ensure fair hearing to the Accused person. The Court should ensure and satisfy that the Accused person(s) understands the charge against him to enable him make his defence after plea has been properly taken.
In the instant case, I have gone through the entire Record of Appeal , its revealed that at the initial trial on 24th May, 2016, the Appellant pleaded not guilty to the two counts when the charge was read over and interpreted in Yoruba Language to him, he understood the two counts before he pleaded not guilty to each count as can be seen at pages 234-239 of the record.
Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law, requires that the charge must be read over and explain to the Accused person in the language he understands to the satisfaction of the Court before he is called upon to plead to the charge. In the case at hand, it is on record that the Accused person, Appellant understood Yoruba Language and the charge was read over and explained to him to the satisfaction of the Court before his plea was taken. The Appellant made his plea, he speaks

Yoruba and gave evidence before the trial Court in his defence. How can he make his plea and give evidence if the charge was not read over, interpreted and understood to him. If I may ask?
It is evident on record that the Appellant was represented by counsel during his arraignment and there was no any objection raised to the procedure of his arraignment. The omission of the learned trial Judge to reflect in his record the word “Registrar” or the “Court official” as the person who read over and explain the charge to the Appellant, without more, would not constitute non compliance with the provision of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law. I don’t think that absence of the word Registrar simplicita will render the trial nullity. See OKO VS. STATE (supra). In the case of ADEWUNMI V. STATE (2016) LPELR 40106 (SC) the Supreme Court had this to say:
“…the Record of Appeal reveals on page 10 that the charge was read over to the Appellant in the language he understands i.e Yoruba. There is an irrebutable presumption that the charge was explained to the Appellant to the satisfaction of the Court since neither

he nor his counsel complained during the trial of his arraignment. The fact that proceedings continued unhindered after arraignment is indicative that the Appellant understood the charge before pleading not guilty to the one count charge of Armed Robbery…”
In light of the above, I find it difficult to fault the arraignment of the Appellant. I agree with the Respondent’s counsel that there was a substantial compliance with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
This issue is resolved against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.

ISSUE TWO
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant retracted his confessional statement, therefore the Court is bound to scrutinize the said statement by looking for an independent evidence outside the confessional statement. He cited OGUDO V. STATE (2011) 14 NWLR (PT. 1278)1 and SABI V. STATE (2011) 14 NWLR (PT. 1268) 421 for the view.

Learned counsel contended that the pieced of evidence adduced by PW1 and PW2 which the learned trial Judge resorted to in a bit to corroborate the Appellant’s confessional statement are inadmissible hearsay, so also

exhibit P4 the purported statement of Abubakar Rauf.

Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial judge having failed to test the veracity of the Appellant’s purported confessional statement outside the confession, he cannot attach any weight to same and rely on it to convict the Appellant. He urged the Court to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.
In his response to this issue, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant’s confessional statement was tendered in evidence without any objection neither was it retracted. The retraction of the statement in his defence is an after-thought. He referred to pages 236-239 of the record. That where a statement is direct, positive and unequivocal, amounts to admission of guilt and can stand to ground a conviction without corroboration. That where a case is based on confessional statement of the Appellant and circumstantial evidence as in the instant case, the Court has the power to go ahead to convict.
He cited the cases of OGUNO V. STATE (2013) 6 SCM and ADAMU SALIU V. STATE (2014) LEGAL PEDIA SC 29 CC (SC).
Counsel argued that the learned trial

judge was right in admitting and relying on the confessional statement of the Appellant, Exhibit P8 and other evidence before the Court to convict him. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent. He submitted further that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 is not a hearsay and thus admissible.
Learned counsel for the Appellant in his reply brief merely repeated his earlier submission and furthered that the content of Exhibit P8, the Appellant’s purported confessional statement and his testimony in Court shows that he retracted the confessional statement. That the Appellant’s confessional statement and that of his co-accused Exhibits P5, P6 and P7 are incapable of corroborating each other and urged the Court to so hold.

RESOLUTION
Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the lower Court cannot rely on the Appellant’s purported confessional statement Exhibit P8 to convict him without corroborative evidence to test it veracity having been retracted by the Appellant, that the learned trial judge was wrong to have attached weight to the retracted confessional statement Exhibit P8 and relied solely on it in

convicting the Appellant.
I don’t think the learned counsel for the Appellant is on the right footing. A Court can convict on only the extrajudicial statement of an Accused person even if retracted at the trial where the confession is direct, positive and unequivocal and is properly proved, as in the instant case, the Court may convict an Accused person solely on such a confession regardless of whether the maker resiled from it. See GALADIMA V. STATE (2012) LPELR 15530 (SC); SIMON V. STATE (2017) LPELR 41988 (SC) and MOHAMMED V. STATE (2019) LPELR 46420 (SC).
Retraction or denial of a confessional statement does not affect its admissibility. Where an Accused person retracts or resiles from his confessional statement, the Court would be right to admit it and determine the weight to be attached to it in its judgment. See FRN V. IWEKA (2013) 3 NWLR (PT. 1341) 285; MBANG V. STATE (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1352) 48 and ESSIEN V. STATE (2018) 6 NWLR (PT. 1614) 162.
The learned trial judge was right in attaching weight to Exhibit P8, the Appellant’s confessional statement. There is no evidence stronger than a person’s admission of the state

of affairs.
I have perused the record of Appeal, the spinal cord of the Appeal, it is not in doubt that the Appellant did not contest the admissibility of his confessional statement Exhibit P8, neither his counsel, the Exhibit was admitted without objection and in the absence of objection, the Court can conclude that the statement was made voluntarily by the Appellant.
The Appellant’s confessional statement was tendered through PW2 and admitted in evidence as can be seen at pages 234-236. On 24th May, 2016, the proceedings went thus:
“Evidence of PW2 …
I also obtained the statement of all Accused persons, I can identify the statement.
AbdulRahman: I seek to tender the statement.
Jones Esq. No objection.
COURT: the statement of the 1st Accused person admitted and marked as Exhibit P5. Statement of 2nd Accused person marked as Exhibit P6. Statement of 3rd Accused person is marked as Exhibit P7 and statement of 4th Accused person is admitted and marked as Exhibit P8…”
It is clear from the proceedings of the lower Court, nowhere where the Appellant retracted his confessional statement, even if the Appellant

retracted his voluntary confessional statement, it does not render such statement inadmissible or worthless. See FRN V. IWEKA (2011) LPELR 9350 (SC); OSENI V. STATE (2012) LPELR 7833 (SC) and MATHEW V. STATE (2018) LPELR 43716 (SC).
It is my firm view that, the learned trial Judge was right in admitting and attaching weight to the Appellant’s direct positive and unequivocal confessional statement.

On the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the evidence of PW2, the investigation police officer amounts to hearsay. It is trite that evidence of investigating police officer of facts he saw or discovered in the course of investigation as in the instant case, is not a hearsay evidence to render such facts inadmissible.
His testimony on what the Appellant and other witnesses in the course of his investigation told him was positive and direct. See ANYASODO V. STATE (2018) LPELR 43720 (SC); OLAOYE V. STATE (2018) LPELR 43601 (SC).
In the case of OLAOYE V. STATE (supra) the Supreme Court had this to say:
“…Here, I do not share the Appellant’s counsel view that the evidence of I.P.O amount to hearsay

because an I.P.O narrates to the Court the outcome of his investigation or enquiries or what he recovered and in the course of his duty, he must have discovered or recovered some pieces of evidence vital to the commission of the crime which trial Courts normally considered in arriving at just decision one way or the other…”
In the result, I am not heisted to resolved this issue in favour of the Respondent. I therefore resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.

ISSUE THREE
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the standard of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. That to establish the offence of conspiracy, the Prosecution is required to prove that (a) there is an agreement by two or more persons to execute an agreed act, (b) the agreed act is unlawful and that each of the Accused individually participated in the conspiracy. He cited KAZE V. STATE (2008) 5 SCM 70; AITUMA V. THE STATE (2006) 10 NWLR (PT. 989) 432 for the view.
Learned counsel submitted that the Respondent failed to prove the ingredients of the offence of conspiracy. That there is no cogent and

positive evidence before the trial Court to justify the conviction of the Appellant for the offences for which he was charged.

Learned counsel argued that where the agreement on the part of the alleged conspirators is absent, the charge of conspiracy is not made out. He submitted that apart from the purported Appellant’s confessional statement, there is no direct or circumstantial evidence suggesting that the Appellant conspired with other persons to commit the offence of armed robbery. That the Respondent having failed to prove the charge against the Appellant, the trial Court ought to have discharged the Appellant. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant and allow the appeal.
Responding to this issue, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the burden of proof on the Respondent in a case of this nature, is not proof beyond every shadow of doubt. He cited OKOH V. THE STATE (2014) 6 SCM 165. That to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt, the Respondent may rely on confessional statement of the Appellant, evidence of an eye witness or circumstantial evidence.
That where a case is based on the

Appellant’s confessional statement and circumstantial evidence as in the instant case, the Court has the power to go ahead to convict the Appellant. He cited OGUNO & ORS V. STATE (2013) 6 SCM 145 162 and ABACHA V. THE STATE (2003) 3 ACLR 333 for the point.
Learned counsel submitted that the offence of armed robbery can be established by the presence of the following ingredients (1) That there was a robbery, that the robber(s) were armed with firearms or offensive weapons and that the accused is the robber or among the robbers. Counsel argued that the Appellant and other Accused persons in Exhibits P5 to P8 voluntarily confessed the commission of the crime. He referred to Exhibits P5-P8. He submitted that the Appellant under cross examination also admitted keeping the motorcycle in his house after the robbery of the victim with offensive weapons. He submitted that the extrajudicial statements of the Appellant, Exhibit P8 was tendered and admitted in evidence without any objection. That the Appellant has clearly stated the role he played in the commission of the crime. That the evidence before the trial Court is consistent with the

Appellant’s confessional statement.
He urged the Court to hold the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant and resolve this issue in favour of the Respondent and dismiss the appeal.
In his reply brief, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant’s purported confessional statement Exhibit P8 is inadmissible in law for being an extra judicial statement and ought not to be relied upon by the lower Court in convicting the Appellant. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant and allow the appeal.

RESOLUTION
Robbery means the illegal taking of property from the person to another or in the person’s presence by violence or intimidation, where the robbery is accompanied by the use of firearms or offensive weapons what causes or attempts to cause any person’s death or hurt or unlawful restraint or fear, it metamorphoses into an armed robbery. See BASSEY V. STATE (2012) LPELR 7813 (SC); PIUS V. STATE (2015) LPELR 24446 (SC) and KEKONG V. STATE (2017) LPELR 42343 (SC).

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To secure a conviction for the offence of armed robbery, the Prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a robbery or series of robberies; each robbery was an armed robbery and the Accused person was one of those who took part in the armed robbery. See ATTAH V. STATE (2010) 10 NWLR (PT. 1201) 190; KAYODE VS STATE (2016) 7 NWLR (PT. 1511) 179 and THOMAS V. STATE (2017) 9 NWLR (PT. 1570) 230.
The case law has provided three ways of proving commission of a crime to wit; (a) Eye witness evidence, (b) Circumstantial evidence (c) Confessional evidence. See MBANG V. STATE (2010) 7 NWLR (PT. 1194) 431; OKIEMUTE V. STATE (2016) 15 NWLR (PT. 1535) 297 and EZE V. FRN (2017) 15 NWLR (PT. 1589) 433.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not evince proof beyond all iota/shadow of doubt.

In proving the offence against the Appellant, the Prosecution relied on the Appellant’s confessional statement, Exhibit P8 and circumstantial evidence.
The summary of the confessional statement goes thus:
“…on the 14th day of October, 2013 at about 6:30pm I and Godwin Ode, Samuel Job and Moses Joseph went to Osogbo with aim of snatching motorcycle from the

rider… on getting to Osogbo, we divided ourselves into two, while Samuel and I at one side and Godwin Ode at the other side looking also for okada to snatch it was Godwin Ode and Moses Joseph that first see okada to snatch and chartered the Bajaj Boxer motorcycle to owode village along Ilesa Road and also show as sign that they have see motorcycle and also that we should be going ahead of them to Kajola. After they have successfully snatched it and pushing it to the direction of my house by Godwin Odeh. I collected it from him and push it to kept at my landlord room.
…it was after we snatched it we started regretting what we did …”

On 15th day of June, 2016, the Appellant as DW2 testified as follows: “… on 14th day of March, 2013, I and the 1st Accused person went to Osogbo to buy clothes and shoes… I and Samuel Job (2nd Accused person) boarded a vehicle home with the clothes and I suggested the 4th accused and the 1st Accused should ride motorcycle home. When I got home and after some time that those who ride motorcycle did not come on time we were wondering what happened and after a while we heard noise

from outside the house… later the motorcycle rider left his motorcycle and his key and went away. The following morning we were arrested by the vigilante and taken to the police station at Kajola… and eventually to State C.I.D Osogbo we were later asked to write a statement. We were threatened and asked to confess…”
Under cross examination, the Appellant stated that “I kept the motorcycle in my house when the motorcycle rider left it”.
It is not enough for an Accused Defendant to merely give oral evidence inconsistent with the contents of his confessional statement, he must directly impeach the confessional statement. The Appellant did not object to the admissibility of his confessional statement when it was sought to be tendered on any ground. It is trite that a Court is entitled to convict an Accused person solely on the basis of his direct, positive and unequivocal confession, so long as it is satisfied of its truth, even without corroboration. See OSENI V. STATE (2012) 5 NWLR (PT. 1293) 351; ABDULLAHI V. STATE (2013) 11 NWLR (PT. 1366) 435 and OLADIPUPO V. STATE (2013) 1 NWLR (PT. 1334) 68.

It was not in doubt in this case that the motorcycle rider was attacked and robbed of his motorcycle by the Appellant and co-accused armed with offensive weapons. Section 1(2) of the Robbery and Firearms (supra) states that armed robbery occurs where at the time of a robbery the offender is armed with any firearm or any offensive weapon or is in company with any person so armed or at or immediately before or immediately after the robbery, the said offender would or uses any personal violence to any person.
The evidence of the Prosecution witnesses couple with the Appellant’s confessional statement amply revealed that the Appellant and other Accused persons committed the offence charged. There are convincing evidence on record that the Appellant was one of the armed robbers and was culpable of the offence of armed robbery.
Clearly therefore, given the facts and evidence upon which the trial Court convicted the Appellant, the Prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The lower Court findings that the Respondent has proved the crime against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt is unassailable.
Issue three is resolved against the

Appellant.

Having resolved the three issues in this Appeal against the Appellant, the Appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
The judgment, conviction and sentence of the Appellant by A. O. Ayoola, J, of Osun State High Court of Justice in Suit No. HOS/16C/2014 delivered on 25th day of April, 2017 is hereby affirmed.

MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I have read in draft before now the lead Judgment just delivered by my learned brother R. M. Abdullahi, JCA and agree that the appeal be dismissed.
The Prosecution had proved its case at the trial Court as relating the offences of conspiracy to commit Robbery and Armed Robbery.
The Appeal raising the three (3) Issues for determination fails as the 3 issues are all resolved against the Appellant as done rightly in the trial Judgment and approved in the lead Judgment, with which I concur.

PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A.: I had the advantage reading the draft of the lead Judgment which my learned brother, Ridwan M. Abdullahi, JCA just delivered. I endorse the conclusion that this appeal is unmeritorious and should be dismissed.
In criminal law one of the ways of proving

an offence is through confessional statement. A free and voluntary confession which is direct, positive and properly proved is sufficient to sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence so long as the Court is satisfied with its truth. The only duty on the Court to test the truth of such confession by examining it in the light of the other credible evidence before the Court. See AROGUNDADE V THE STATE (2009) 6 NWLR, PT 1136. 165; ANKPEGHER V STATE (2018) 11 NWLR PT 1631, 484; IGRI V STATE (2012) 16 NWLR, PT. 1327, 522 AT 542 and FAMUYIWA V THE STATE (2018) 5 NWLR PT 1613, 512.
Against this background, the learned trial Judge can be said to be on firm footing when he relied on Exhibit P8, the confessional statement of the Appellant to convict him. The confession was direct, positive and unequivocal to the effect that the Appellant and three other co-conspirators did indeed rob the victim of his motor cycle after threatening him with a knife and the motor cycle was taken to the house of one of them and hidden in a room there. The learned trial judge in addition relied on the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 as establishing the offences of conspiracy and

armed robbery against the Appellant.
It is for these and the more detailed reasons in the lead judgment that I shall dismiss this appeal as being wholly unmeritorious. I abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

BABAFEMI AKINSETE ESQ. For Appellant(s)

T. ALARAPE ABDULRAHAMON, ESQ. For Respondent(s)