ABBAS ABDULLAHI MACHIKA v. SHEHU INUWA IMAM & ORS
(2010)LCN/3901(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Tuesday, the 29th day of June, 2010
CA/K/EP/NA/31/08
RATIO
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE FAILURE , OMISSION OR CHOICE OF THE OPTION AN APPELLANT TO ANSWER, RESPOND OR REACT TO THE SUBMISSIONS ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION CONTAINED IN THE RESPONDENT’S BRIEF OF ARGUMENT
There is no record that the learned Appellants’ Counsel had filed an Appellants’ Reply brief to answer, respond or react to the submissions on the preliminary objection contained in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument. The legal consequence of such failure, omission or choice of the option not to react or respond to the preliminary objection by the Appellant is now very well known in judicial practice, particularly in the Appellate Courts where briefs of argument are used as the avenue by or though which submissions are made on points or issues raised in an appeal by parties thereto. Where and when necessary for an Appellant to react, respond or answer to issues raised by a Respondent to an appeal, he fails, omits or chooses not do so, the law would presume that he concedes or accepts the points or issues so raised by the Respondent. In particular, the Appellant here is deemed in law to have conceded to the points raised by the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent on the preliminary objection. See KHAKIL .V. YAR’ADUA (Supra), NNAMANI .V. NNAJI (1999) 7 NWLR (610) 313, AKANBI .V. ALATEDE (2000) FWLR (i) 928, IRO .V. ECHEWENDU (1996) 8 NWLR (468) 629 @ 636. However, the law in its wide wisdom says that inspite of or despite the absence of an answer to such points raised in the preliminary objection and therefore conceding to them by the Appellant, the preliminary objection is not to be automatically upheld by the Court. In other words, the absence of a Reply brief from the Appellant and his deemed concession to the preliminary objection, success thereof is not automatic and the Court still has the duty to consider if it is sustantiable in law. See AGBABLAKA .V. OKOJIE (2004) 15 NWLR (897) 503 @ 522 on the authority of which I would consider whether the preliminary objection on the competence of the appeal is sustainable in law. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA J.C.A.
NOTICE OF APPEAL: CONSEQUENCE OF LIFTING AND COPYING PASSAGES, PORTIONS OR PARTS OF A JUDGMENT ON A NOTICE OF APPEAL
The style of simply lifting and copying passages, portions or parts of a judgment on a Notice of Appeal is not concise nor precise but rather narrative and verbose. Such passages or portions would not clearly state the nature of any alleged misdirection or error of law required by Order 6 Rule 2 (2) and would therefore be in general in terms. A ground of appeal is and should be a specified complaint or attack on the finding/s with which an Appellant is dissatisfied and should be precise on the grievance against the decision. Passages or portions of a decision cannot bring out concisely and precisely the complaint against it but merely show the decision being complained about. Consequently to merely quote portions or passages of a decision appealed against as a ground of appeal does not meet or satisfy the requirements of Order 6, Rule 2 (2) and (3) and so does not qualify as a competent ground of appeal. See ANYAOKE .V. ADI (1986) 3 NWLR (31) 731, AMADIJEOGU .V. ONONAKU (1988) 2 NWLR (78) 614, ALADE .V. OGUNDOKUN (1992) 5 NWLR (239) 42 @ 52, EZOMO .V. N.N.B. PLC (2006) 14 NWLR 1000) 624. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA J.C.A.
EFFECT OF A PROCEEDING CONDUCTED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING OF A PARTY TO SUCH PROCEEDING
The right to fair hearing in all proceedings of court or other tribunals established by law in Nigeria is sacrosanct and the superior courts in particular have been consistent and quick in ensuring always that parties in all civil or criminal matters or causes are accorded a fair hearing in the determination thereof. Where there is a complaint and it is established that the right to fair hearing of any party was denied in any such proceedings, the proceedings and any out come thereof would be null, void and of no legal effect, ab initio. FRANCIS .V. OSUNKWO (2000) 7 NWLR (666) 564 MILL. GOV. OF IMO STATE V. NWAUWU (1997) 2 NWLR (490) 675, USANI .V. DUKE (2004) 7 NWLR (871) 2 NWLR (1071) 347, YUSUF .V. ILORI (2008) 6 NWLR (1083) 330. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA J.C.A.
WHETHER A COURT REFORMULATE AN ISSUE OR ISSUES FORMULATED BY A PARTY OR COUNSEL FOR DETERMINATION IN AN APPEAL
Depending on the peculiar facts and circumstances of a ease, the Court or tribunal has the discretion to reframe or abridge some of the issues raised by the parties in order to decide the crucial issues of dispute between the parties and so is not bound to consider all the issues in the form or manner presented by the parties if doing so would not lead to the resolution of the real points of dispute in the case. In the case of FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH .V. COMET SHIP AGENCIES LTD. (10) 13 WRN, 1 @ 15, the Supreme Court had put the position beyond argument when it held this:- “A court, can and is entitled to reformulate an issue or issues formulated by a party or Counsel in order to give it or them, precision and clarity.” See also NEKA .V. ACB LTD. (2004) 1 SC (1) 32, (2004) 1 SCNJ 193 @ 202-3, AGBAREH .V. MIMRA (2008) 2 NWLR (1071) 378 @ 410. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA J.C.A.
FAIR HEARING: WHETHER IT IS EVERY FAILURE OR OMISSION TO CONSIDER ALL THE ISSUES SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES THAT WOULD EFFECT OR AMOUNT TO DENIAL OF FAIR HEARING
In the above circumstances it is not every failure or omission to consider all the issues submitted by the parties that would effect or amount to denial of fair hearing. LAWAL V. QUADRY (2004) 6 NWLR (868) 1, NKWOCHA .V. MTN LTD (2008) 11 NWLR (1099) 439 @ 460. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA J.C.A.
RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING: BURDEN PLACED ON THE PARTY WHO ALLEGES THE BREACH OF HIS RIGHT TO FAIR HEARING IN ANY PROCEEDINGS
In any case, the duty lies on the party who alleges the breach of his right to fair hearing in any proceedings to demonstrate by evidence, the manner or way in which the right was breached. It is not sufficient for a party to make assertions of denial of fair hearing by a Court or tribunal without showing on the record of the proceedings to which he was a party how, he was denied the right in the conduct of the proceedings, See OKIKE .V. LPDC (2006) 1 NWLR 67 @ 92 -3. PER MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA J.C.A.
JUSTICES
BABA ALKALI BAABA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
JOHN INYANG OKORO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ABBAS ABDULLAHI MACHIKA Appellant(s)
AND
1. SHEHU INUWA IMAM
2. PEOPLES DEMOCRACTIC PARTY (PDP) AND 516 ORS. Respondent(s)
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant and the 1st Respondent among others, were candidates who contested the election held on the 21/4/2007 at the Faskari/Kankara/Sabuwa Federal Constituency of Katsina State for a seat in the House of Representatives.
The Appellant was sponsored by the All Nigerian Peoples’ Party (ANPP) while the 1st Respondent contested the election, conducted by the 3rd Respondent on the platform of the 2nd Respondent. At the end of the election, the 3rd Respondent declared and returned the 1st Respondent as the winner and being dissatisfied with the said return, the Appellant presented an election petition before the Katsina State National Assembly Election Tribunal, sitting at Katsina questioning it (Henceforth to be call the tribunal).
The main ground relied on by the Appellant in support of his petition is contained in paragraph 5 (A) thereof which is as follows:-
“5. (A) The 1st Respondent was, at the time of the election, not qualified to contest the said election.
However in the alternative to the above ground, the Appellant had averred in paragraph 5 (B) of the petition thus:-
“5. (B) The election was invalid by reason of non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2006 or by reason of Corrupt Practice.”
The two (2) grounds are provided for in section 145 (1) (a) and (b) respectively of the Electoral Act, 2006 to be hereafter called the Act.
After a trial of the petition, the tribunal delivered a judgment on the 16/4/2008 dismissing it and this appeal notice of which was filed on the 15/5/2008, is the result of the grievance by the Appellant against that decision.
The Notice of Appeal contained twenty-six (26) grounds of dissatisfaction with the dismissal of the petition from which ten (10) issues were formulated in the Appellants’ brief of argument dated the 18th and filed on the 19/9/2008.
Though the issues appear prolix, because there is a notice of preliminary objection on the competence some of them along with grounds from which they were raised, it is expedient to set them as they appear in the Appellant’s brief.
They are as follows:-
2.1 Whether considering the conduct of the Tribunal in the handing of this petition, the Petitioner has not been denied fair hearing?
Grounds 1 and 26.
2.2 Whether the refusal by the Tribunal to fully consider the case as presented by the Appellant as well as its exclusion of the evidence of some of the Appellant’s vital witnesses in the consideration of its judging has not resulted in a denial of justice to the Appellant? Grounds 2 and 3.
2.3 Whether the misrepresentation of the person and testimony of the PW 7 by the Tribunal in its judgment and which adversely affected the case of the Appellant has not resulted in a miscarriage of justice to the Appellant?
Grounds 4
2.4 Whether considering the nature of the 1st Respondent’s employment at the time of the election, and the evidence before the Tribunal, the 1st Respondent was qualified to contest the election? Grounds 6, 7 and 8.
2.5 Whether the Appellant has any burden to prove any material fact on which no issue was joined? Grounds 18 and 23.
2.6 Whether the Tribunal had the competence to formulate a case and decide the petition on the case which is different from that presented by the parties?
Grounds 19, 20 and 21.
2.7 Whether the Tribunal was right in rejecting the Statement on Oath of one Nuhu Audu, the 5th Respondent in petition No. NA/HR/EPT/KTS/37/07: Gambo Mainasara V. Shehu Inuwa Imam & Ors because it was not specifically pleaded in this petition? Ground 24.
2.8 Whether taking into consideration the totality of the parties pleadings and the evidence led by them including the various Electoral Forms tendered by the 1st Respondent which contain material irregularities, the Tribunal was right in dismissing the petition?
Grounds 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22.
2.9 Whether considering the facts of the petition including pleadings and evidence, the Tribunal could correctly invoke the presumption of regularity of the election in favour of the Respondents and whether the presumption has not been rebutted? Grounds 10, 16 and 25.
2.10 Whether the tribunal could properly allow the 3rd to 517th Respondents benefit from their disobedience of its order to produce and download Exhibit P1 to 3 and whether the Tribunal could demand that the Appellant should do the impossible in this respect? Ground 17.
In reaction to the Appellants’ brief, a notice of preliminary objection and the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument in which it was argued were filed on the 22/1/09. The 3rd – 517th Respondent’s brief filed on the 15/5/2009 was deemed properly filed on 12/4/2010 at the oral hearing of the appeal when an application for enlargement of the time to file same was granted by the Court.
The Appellant who is a legal practitioner and his learned Counsel in the appeal who settled the Appellants’ brief of argument were both absent from the court at the hearing of the appeal. The Appellant was in court on the 3/3/2010 when the appeal was called for hearing and he requested for another date because his Counsel was not in Court. The appeal was eventually adjourned to the 12/4/2010 for hearing to the hearing of the Appellant. In the absence of any communication to excuse the absence from both the Appellant and his Counsel, the Court, pursuant to Order 17, Rule 9 (4) of the Court Of Appeal Rule, 2007, deemed the appeal to have been duly argued by the Appellant on the Appellants’ brief aforementioned.
Mr. M. I. Abubakar, learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent then moved the preliminary objection he filed and argued in the 1st Respondents’ brief, urging us to uphold same. He also adopted the 1st Respondent’s brief and urged us to dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated therein. Rahima Aminu, learned Counsel who appeared for the 3rd – 517th Respondents also adopted and relied on the 3rd – 517th Respondent’s brief as the submissions on which she urged us to dismiss the appeal.
Before a close look and consideration of the issues which call for decision in the appeal, I would in line with the requirement of the law and prudence, deal with the preliminary objection on the competence of the appeal and most of them.
The challenge to the competence of the appeal itself takes precedence since its primary objective is to abort and terminate the proceedings in the appeal at the stage it was raised and before delving into a consideration of the issues therein.
In paragraph 1 of the notice of the preliminary objection the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent had stated that the appeal is incompetent or improperly constituted and ought to be struck out for non-joinder of necessary Respondents or joinder of non-juristic person as the Respondent. The ground upon which this arm of the objection was premised was given thus:-
a) The Appeal is improperly Constituted and incompetent and ought to be struck out in that the Respondents to the petition at the lower Tribunal and who are directly affected by the Appeal have not been properly joined or named in the Notice of Appeal, and the Respondents as described in the Notice of Appeal is not a legal juristic person that can sue or be sued;”
It was submitted for the above ground that because the 2 -517 Respondents to the petition at the tribunal who would be directly affected by the out come of the appeal have not been joined or named in the Notice of Appeal, it is incompetent. Reference was made to section 144 (2) of the Act (which was set out in the brief) and it was argued that it is not sufficient for the Appellant to name the 1st Respondent and then number of the other Respondents as was done on the Notice of Appeal.
Further that the name of each of the Respondents to the appeal has to be set out on the Notice of Appeal as they appeared on the petition before the tribunal since by virtue of Order 6, Rule 2 (1) of the Court Of Appeal Rules 2007, all appeals shall be by way of rehearing (not hearing as was misquoted in the brief).
According to learned Counsel, for the Court to have the competence to hear an appeal, an appellant must join in the appeal all the Respondents in the petition at the tribunal since under section 36 of the 1999 Constitution no Court can lawfully give a decision against a person who was never a party to the action nor had the opportunity to defend it. The cases of MOGHALU .V. NGIGE (2005) NWLR (914) 1 @ 29 – 30 AND OBASANJO V. BUHARI (2003) 17 NWLR (850) 510 were cited on the submissions and it was insisted by learned Counsel that since the 3rd – 517 Respondents were not each named on the Notice of Appeal as necessary and statutory Respondents to the Petition, the appeal is incompetent.
It was also contended that the names of the Respondents as set out on the Notice of Appeal constitutes an amalgamation of Respondents without leave of Court and that as such, the name does not constitute a legal or juristic person that can sue or be sued. Among others, the cases of EMECHETA .V. AGUERI (1996) 5 NWLR (447) 227 @ 240 AND AKAS .V. THE MANAGER (2001) 8 NWLR (715) 436 @ 444 were referred to on who a juristic person is and it was further submitted that where the names of two (2) or more juristic persons are combined or jumped together to form one entity, the resultant entity or name is not a juristic person, relying on KHALIL .V. YAR’ADUA (2003) 16 NWLR (847) 446 @ 484 AND KALU .V. UZOR (2004) NWLR (886) 1 @ 28 as authorities for the position. Furthermore, it was submitted that though the names of all the Respondents were given in the Appellants’ brief, that does not cure the defect in the Notice of Appeal which is the originating process for the appeal and upon which all other processes are based. That because the Notice of Appeal is defective, it cannot be amended and it robs the Court of the competence to entertain the appeal and the absence of which renders all proceedings a nullity. EQUITY BANK .V. HALILLCO NIG. LTD. (2006) ALL FWLR (337) 438 @ 452 -3 and MACFOR .V. U.A.C. (1961) 3 ALL NLR 1169 were referred to by learned Counsel who finally urge us to uphold the objection and strike out the appeal.
There is no record that the learned Appellants’ Counsel had filed an Appellants’ Reply brief to answer, respond or react to the submissions on the preliminary objection contained in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument. The legal consequence of such failure, omission or choice of the option not to react or respond to the preliminary objection by the Appellant is now very well known in judicial practice, particularly in the Appellate Courts where briefs of argument are used as the avenue by or though which submissions are made on points or issues raised in an appeal by parties thereto. Where and when necessary for an Appellant to react, respond or answer to issues raised by a Respondent to an appeal, he fails, omits or chooses not do so, the law would presume that he concedes or accepts the points or issues so raised by the Respondent. In particular, the Appellant here is deemed in law to have conceded to the points raised by the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent on the preliminary objection. See KHAKIL .V. YAR’ADUA (Supra), NNAMANI .V. NNAJI (1999) 7 NWLR (610) 313, AKANBI .V. ALATEDE (2000) FWLR (i) 928, IRO .V. ECHEWENDU (1996) 8 NWLR (468) 629 @ 636.
However, the law in its wide wisdom says that inspite of or despite the absence of an answer to such points raised in the preliminary objection and therefore conceding to them by the Appellant, the preliminary objection is not to be automatically upheld by the Court. In other words, the absence of a Reply brief from the Appellant and his deemed concession to the preliminary objection, success thereof is not automatic and the Court still has the duty to consider if it is sustantiable in law. See AGBABLAKA .V. OKOJIE (2004) 15 NWLR (897) 503 @ 522 on the authority of which I would consider whether the preliminary objection on the competence of the appeal is sustainable in law.
.
The hard bone of the objection is that failure to name each of the Respondents to the petition at the tribunal on the Notice of Appeal as persons directly to be affected by the out come of the appeal renders the Notice of Appeal incompetent. I must say at the onset that the ground of the objection is quite novel in election matters or appeals in this Court for I have searched widely for decision by the Court or the Supreme Court in which such a ground was canvassed and decided, without success.
I have observed also that the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent did not cite or refer to any provision of the law or Rule/s of the Court dealing with the contents of the Notice of Appeal which requires that the names of Respondent must be set out on the face of a Notice of Appeal for it to be competent. No decided authority binding or persuasive of the Courts on such requirement was cited by the learned Counsel.
I am however aware of the provisions of Order 6, Rule 2 (1) of the Court’s Rules, mentioned by the learned Counsel in the brief, in which it is required that an Appellant shall state the names and addresses of the parties to be directly affected by the appeal on a Notice of Appeal. A Proforma of what is to be contained in a Notice of Appeal was provided for in the First Schedule to the Rules as FORM 3 as guidance for the preparation of a Notice of Appeal under Order 6, Rule 2. In paragraph 5 of the said form, provision was specifically made for the name/s and addresses of the persons directly affected by the appeal to be set out serially.
As provided for in Order 6, Rule 2 (1) and FORM 3 of the First Schedule to the Rules, a Notice of Appeal shall
(a) set forth the grounds of appeal.
(b) State whether the whole or part only of the decision of the Court below is complained of
(c) State the exact nature of the relief sought
(d) state the names and addresses of all parties or persons directly affected by the appeal.
Of relevance to us here is the requirement that the names of the persons to be directly affected by the appeal shall be stated on the Notice of Appeal. Of particular interest on the face of FORM 3 is the statement of the parties therein who are named as “plaintiff and “Defendant” in reference to the judgment appealed against.
It is well known that there is no “Plaintiff or/ and “Defendant” in this Court. Rather there is an “Appellant” “Appellants and “Respondent” or “Respondents” in this Court being an appellate Court.
The Notice of Appeal filed by the Appellant in this appeal which is at pages 275 to 485 would appear to have substantially complied or conformed with the requirements of Order 6, Rules (2) (1) and FORM 3 as to the contents of a valid Notice of Appeal. In particular, the names of parties and their addresses for service of the Notice of Appeal were provided and set out at paragraph, 7/1 7-4 thereof. Except that the names of the 4th – 517th Respondents were not specifically and serially given. However the said Respondents being Officials of the 3rd Respondent against whom complaints were made by the Appellant in his petition were statutory parties who are deem to be Respondents pursuant to section 144 (2) of the Electoral Act, 2006. In other words, because the said Responds were Electoral officers, Returning officers, presiding Officers or other persons who took part in the conduct of the election and against whose conducts the Appellant had complained in his petition, they became parties as Respondents to the petition by the operation of the law. So being statutory Respondents in the petition and eventually in the judgment appealed against, they remain and maintain their statutory positions as Respondents for the purposes of the appeal and the Notice of Appeal filed at the tribunal. None of the parties to the appeal but particularly the 1st Respondent is in any doubt about the names and addresses of the said Respondents. The Appellant had provided the address at which the statutory Respondents were to be served with the Notice of Appeal and other subsequent processes in the appeal on the Notice of Appeal as required by Order 6, Rule 2(1). The said Respondents have been duly served with the Notice of Appeal, they have reacted to it as required by the Rules of Court by filing their brief of argument and participated at the hearing of the appeal through their learned Counsel as in dictated at the beginning of this judgment. On the above peculiar facts, the omission to set out the full names of the 4th – 517th Respondents serially on the Notice of Appeal is only as to the form and not substance of the information that is required by Order 6, Rule 2 (1) to be contained on the Notice of Appeal. It is in the circumstance only a mere irregularity which does not affect the competence or validity of the Notice of Appeal.
I should perhaps in addition point out that since the names and addresses of the 1st – 3rd Respondents were stated and fully set out on the Notice of Appeal as required by Order 6, Rule 2(1) the competence or validity of the Notice of Appeal can not seriously be questioned because even a single Respondent whose full name and address for service was set out on a Notice of Appeal as the person directly affected by an appeal can sustain such a Notice of Appeal and make it valid and therefore competent for the purposes of Order 6, Rule, 2(1). So even with the omission to set out the full names of the 4th – 517th Respondents on the Notice of Appeal, it remains a valid and competent Notice of Appeal under the said Rule of Court in respect of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents whose officials they were and through whom they were to be and in fact and deed, served with the Notice of Appeal as mentioned elsewhere in this judgment. Under the provisions of section 150 (1) of the Act, the 3rd — 517th Respondents being statutory Respondents to the petition and this appeal shall be represented by a Legal officer of the 3rd Respondent or a Legal practitioner engaged by it. So for all meaningful and practical purposes of the Act, the 3rd-517th Respondents are inseparable for the service of all processes of a petition or an appeal as the case may be including the Notice of Appeal. My firm view is that while it is necessary and in law mandatory for all statutory Respondents statutory Respondents against whom there is a complaint to be specifically named in an election petition, once INEC, whose officials they are for the purposes of an election, was fully named on a Notice of Appeal, setting out the names of such Respondents in full on the Notice of Appeal may be desirable but not mandatory under Order 6 Rule 2(1) since it is only a mere formality which has no factual or real effect on the service of the Notice of Appeal.
I would agree that in ordinary civil appeals, it is necessary for the Notice of Appeal to contain the full names and addresses of the parties to the appeal, clearly set out on the face thereof, as the originating process in the Court. That is desirable for the purposes of knowing precisely who are the parties to be directly affected by the out come of the appeal for the purpose of the required service of the Notice of Appeal and other processes of the appeal. That is the situation to which all the cases cited by the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent set out above may apply. They are not apposite to our present situation and so would not apply.
In the result, for reasons set out above, to uphold the 1st Respondent’s objection in this appeal would in the circumstances demonstrated earlier, be to casually drive away the Appellant from the seat of justice by throwing away his appeal on purely technical ground. I am not prepared to be swayed by what may be dazzling technical intricacies and so find no merit in the objection. I hereby dismiss the objection accordingly.
Next is the objection that grounds of appeal No. 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23 and 25 are incompetent on the ground that they are complaints against mere remarks or comments and not findings of the tribunal. In addition, that grounds No. 9, 14, 15 and 25 are vague and in intelligible and that all the issues formulated from the said grounds, are also incompetent.
To avoid making this judgment prolix I do not intend to set out the ten (10) grounds of appeal against which the objection was raised. Suffice it to say that I have read the grounds as set out in the Appellants’ Notice of Appeal and would say that though they are not all remarks or comments by the tribunal, grounds No. 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18, are mere quotations of passages of the judgment of the tribunal. The requirement of Order 6, Rule 2 (2) of the Court Of Appeal Rules, 2007 is that the Notice of Appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the grounds upon which the Appellant intends to rely at the hearing of the appeal without any argument or narrative. The style of simply lifting and copying passages, portions or parts of a judgment on a Notice of Appeal is not concise nor precise but rather narrative and verbose. Such passages or portions would not clearly state the nature of any alleged misdirection or error of law required by Order 6 Rule 2 (2) and would therefore be in general in terms. A ground of appeal is and should be a specified complaint or attack on the finding/s with which an Appellant is dissatisfied and should be precise on the grievance against the decision.
Passages or portions of a decision cannot bring out concisely and precisely the complaint against it but merely show the decision being complained about. Consequently to merely quote portions or passages of a decision appealed against as a ground of appeal does not meet or satisfy the requirements of Order 6, Rule 2 (2) and (3) and so does not qualify as a competent ground of appeal. See ANYAOKE .V. ADI (1986) 3 NWLR (31) 731, AMADIJEOGU .V. ONONAKU (1988) 2 NWLR (78) 614, ALADE .V. OGUNDOKUN (1992) 5 NWLR (239) 42 @ 52, EZOMO .V. N.N.B. PLC (2006) 14 NWLR 1000) 624.
In the above premises, grounds 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18 contained on the Appellants’ Notice of Appeal for non-compliance with the requirements of Order 6, Rule 2 (2) and (3) are not competent grounds of appeal.
In addition to the above grounds challenged by the 1st Respondent, I have observed that grounds No, 7, 8, 11, 12, 17, 20, 21, and 22 also suffer the same fundamental and therefore fatal defects of being mere quotations of passages or portions of the judgment of the tribunal.
They are no concise and precise complaints or attacks on the findings contained in the judgment and are liable to suffer the same legal consequence with grounds 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18. The grounds do not comply with the provisions of Order 6, Rule 2 (2) and (3) and so are incompetent grounds of appeal, liable to be struck out by the Court. BOSIEC .V. KACHALLA (2006) 1 NWLR (962) 587, NWANKWO .V. E.D.C.S.U.A. (2007) 5 NWLR (1027) 377.
Because all the above mentioned grounds are incompetent grounds of appeal, all the issues formulated from them would as a matter of course, be inturn incompetent since nothing can derive from nothing. EGBE .V. ALHAJI (1996) 1 NWLR (128) 546, SADIKU .V. A.G. LAGOS STATE (1994) 7 NWLR (135) 235, OGUNDIPE .V. ADENUGA (2006) ALL FWLR (336) 266.
The appellant’s issues raised from the incompetent grounds of appeal are issues No. 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10, which along with the grounds from which they were formulated, i.e grounds No. 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 18 on the one hand as well as grounds No. 7, 8, 11, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 22 on the other, are hereby struck out for being incompetent.
The learned counsel for the 1st Respondent had also challenged ground No. 25 as being vague and unintelligible along with other grounds which I have found to be incompetent earlier. Without much ado, ground No. 25 is not vague and/or unintelligible, but quite apparently clear, concise and precise on the complaint or dissatisfaction by the Appellant on the finding by the tribunal on the genuiness of the electoral forms in question. The 1st Respondent and the other Respondents are left in no doubt about what the complaint or grievance is in the ground and so it is valid and competent ground of appeal. The objection on the ground is consequently lacking in merit and is dismissed.
With the above done, I would go to the balance of the Appellants’ grounds of appeal and issues formulated there from for consideration in the appeal. The grounds left are grounds No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 23, 24 and 26 while the issues left are No. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.7.
The Respondents have in their respective briefs of argument submitted some issues which they say arise for determination in the appeal. While the 1st Respondent’s raised six (6) issues, the 3rd -517th Respondents formulated four (4) issues which in my view, involve substantially the same points with the Appellants’ issues. For that reason, I intend to consider and determine the appeal on the issues raised by the Appellant since all the parties have adequately made submissions in their respective briefs on the points made therein.
The Appellants’ issues 1 and 3 were argued together and relying on section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, it was submitted that the tribunal was bound to uphold and enforce the principle of fair hearing guaranteed there under in the determination of the Appellants’ petition. That the tribunal did not do so as it misrepresented PW7 and his evidence; Exhibit P7, recording what he did not say and generally taking a stand against the Appellant even before the case put forward by the parties was considered in its judgment. Page 457 of the record of appeal was cited and it was contended that contrary to the statement of the tribunal, the 1st Respondent did not deny the correctness of the wards, code numbers, total registered voters or the polling stations, their code numbers and total registered voters as clearly set out in paragraph 6 of the petition. Further that in fact the 1st Respondent had admitted all the facts in paragraph 12 of his Reply to the petition while the 3rd – 517th Responds did not controvert them and the learned Appellants’ Counsel had pointed this out in his final address to the tribunal. According to the learned Counsel, the tribunal ignored the facts in its judgments but had made findings from documents dumped on it by the 1st Respondent after it had held that it lacked the competence to look at the Appellants’ documents on which no evidence was led on the 1st Respondent’s non qualification. Page 459 of the record of appeal was cited in support of the submission.
It was the further submission of learned counsel that the tribunal did not give any reason why it preferred the testimonies of the 1st Respondents’ witnesses to those of the Appellant in its judgment but conveniently shut its eyes to the intrinsic contradictions contained in the electoral forms tendered by the 1st Respondent which support the case of the Appellant that there was no election. Reference was made to the cases of DURU V. NWOSU (1989) 4 NWLR (113) @ 29 and IBINYE V. AGWU (1989) 9 SCNJ 1 @ 30, on the points made in the above submissions.
Again the tribunal was said to have made a case for the Respondents different from the one they presented by raising suo motu, the issue of ANPP agents signing form which was not pleaded by any of the Respondents. That the tribunal raised the issue of non payment for a copy of the voters register by the Appellant which it used to discredit the admitted figures of voters as stated in the petition without affording the parties an opportunity to address on the issues thereby denying them of fair hearing.
The cases of A.G. LEVENTIS .V. AKPU (2007) 30 NSCQR 631 @ 660 AND DADA .V. BANKOLE (2008) 33 NSCQR 191 @ 209 – 210 were relied on and we were urged to answer the questions in the positive. Since the Appellants’ issue 2 is also related to the denial of fair hearing as in issues 1 and 3, I would review the Appellants submissions there on before going to the respondent’s responses on them.
The Appellants’ submissions on his issue 2 are that the tribunal excluded the testimonies of PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW16 on the ground that they were members of another political party who had testified in another petition in respect of the election in the same constituency. It was argued that the witnesses are competent witnesses under section 155 of the Evidence Act whose evidence was admissible and relevant in the determination of the Appellant’s petition. The Appellant also said that the tribunal merely glossed over the final address by the Appellant’s counsel and refused to consider issues canvassed therein which are germane for a proper determination of the Appellants’ petition. Learned counsel concluded that by failure or refusal to consider the evidence of the named witnesses and the final address from the Appellant, considerable damage was done to the case and substantially denied the Appellant the right fair trial and justice. He urged us to answer the question in the positive and set aside the tribunal judgment.
For the 1st Respondent it was submitted on the above issues that the tribunal had adhered fully to the principles of natural justice and accorded fair hearing to the Appellant as enshrined in section 36 of the 1999 Constitution. The cases of KOTOYE .V. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (1998) 419, ADIGUN .V. A.G. OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (53) 678 and DEDUWA .V. OKORODUDU (1976) 10 SC 329 on the basic criteria and attributes of fair hearing which were listed in the brief.
Further, it was said that the test of fair hearing is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial whether from his observation, justice has been done in the case. That fair hearing means giving the parties to a case equal opportunity to be heard which once given, they cannot complain of breach of the right. The case of NJIOKWUEMENI .V. OCHEI (2004) 15 NWLR (815) 196 @ 223 and BALAMT .V. BWALA (1993) 1 NWLR (227) 61 @ 62 were referred on the position and it was maintained by learned Counsel that the tribunal had complied with the requirements of fair hearing in the trial of the Appellants’ petition. Pages of the record of appeal were referred to on the point and it was further argued that the fact that the tribunal misapprehended the evidence of PW7 does not suggest in any way that Court was biased but it was inadvertent since it was not infallible. According to learned Counsel, the mistake did not occasion miscarriage of justice as the judgment would have been the same without the mistake because the witness was thoroughly discredited under cross-examination. He then referred to paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the 1st Respondent’s Reply to the petition and said the tribunal did not take a stand against the Appellant as they show denial by the 1st Respondent of the averments in paragraph 5(b) of the Appellant’s petition, thereby joining issues. We were urged by him to discountenance the Appellant’s submission that the tribunal was against him and the case of DURU .V. NWOSU (supra).
Furthermore, it was contended that the tribunal was justified in using the documents tendered by the 1st Respondent because there was evidence linking them to his case unlike the ones tendered by the Appellant in respect of which no oral evidence was adduced to support them. That in any case, the tribunal was entitled to rely on the election result forms to presume that the results were genuine pursuant to section 150 (1) of the Evidence Act as all that was required to activate the presumption was the evidential burden of tendering them in evidence. Also that the tribunal did not raise suo motu, the issue of non payment for certified copy of the voters register by the Appellant as there was a clear basis for the finding because the Appellant failed to download the PDF discs tendered by him in evidence as Exhibit P1-3, have them certified and brought to the tribunal as directed by it. It was pointed out that learned Counsel for the 3rd – 517th Respondents informed the tribunal that Appellant could not obtain a certified copy of the PDF discs because he failed to pay for it and that the issue was fully addressed by all counsel in their final addresses which were considered by the tribunal before coming to its conclusion thereon. Page 470 of the record of appeal was relied on and the relevant portion set out in the brief. It was the further argument of learned Counsel that the tribunal duly considered all the material issues raised in the Appellant’ address, though not in the order raised by him as the tribunal was entitled to reframe issues formulated by Counsel and it was not expected to pronouce on every submission made in an address. The case of N.D.B .V. FEMBO NIG. LTD. (1997) 2 NWLR (489) 543 @ 558 as authority for the position and the case of OSASONA .V. AJAYI (2004) 14 NWLR (812) 527 @ 549 on the law that it is not every failure by a Court to consider all issues brought before it that would result in miscarriage of justice or denial of fair hearing which an Appellant has a duty to prove.
Learned Counsel then submitted that the tribunal did not exclude the testimony of PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW16 but did not attach much importance to them for reasons stated in the judgment. In the alternative, it was contended that the Appellant did not show that the exclusion of the evidence of the said witnesses occasioned a miscarriage of justice as such exclusion will not result in the reversal of a decision if it would have been the same if the exclusion did not occur. Reliance was placed on OMOMEJI .V. KOLAWOLE (2008) 14 NWLR (1106) 180 @ 202, and OJENGBEDE .V. ESAN (2001) 18 NWLR (746) 771 and we were finally urged to hold that the tribunal did not deny the Appellant a fair hearing, to resolve the issues in favour of the 1st Respondent.
The submissions by the learned Counsel for the 3rd – 517th Respondents on the issue of fair hearing are similar to those made by the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent. The cases of PAM .V. MOHAMMED (2008) 16 NWLR (1112) 1 @ 48, IDRIS .V. ANPP (2008) 8 NWLR 1088) 1 @ 117 -8 were cited on the criteria for fair hearing and it was submitted that the judgment of the tribunal showed a dispassionate consideration by the issues before it. In addition, that it is the law that presumes that election results are genuine until the contrary is proved and they are not the same with documents that must be proved which cannot be dumped without oral evidence.
Reliance was placed on section 150(1) of the Evidence Act. NWOBODO .V. ONOH (1984) 15 NSCC 1 @ 20 and ONIBUDU V. AKIBU (1982) 13 NSCC 199 @ 202 among other cases for the submissions. We were therefore urged to hold that Appellant was not denied fair hearing.
There is no doubt that provisions of section 36(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999, cited by all learned Counsel here, guarantee and protect the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time for all citizens of Nigeria in the determination of their civil rights and obligations by a court or other tribunal established by law. The right to fair hearing in all proceedings of court or other tribunals established by law in Nigeria is sacrosanct and the superior courts in particular have been consistent and quick in ensuring always that parties in all civil or criminal matters or causes are accorded a fair hearing in the determination thereof. Where there is a complaint and it is established that the right to fair hearing of any party was denied in any such proceedings, the proceedings and any out come thereof would be null, void and of no legal effect, ab initio. FRANCIS .V. OSUNKWO (2000) 7 NWLR (666) 564 MILL. GOV. OF IMO STATE V. NWAUWU (1997) 2 NWLR (490) 675, USANI .V. DUKE (2004) 7 NWLR (871) 2 NWLR (1071) 347, YUSUF .V. ILORI (2008) 6 NWLR (1083) 330. Learned Counsel are right in their restatement of the law on the test or requirements of a fair hearing as established in the cases cited by them on the issue which is that a Court or tribunal is required to afford the parties equal and adequate opportunity to present the respective sides of their case and dispassionately consider and decide the issues canvassed by them therein. Depending on the peculiar facts and circumstances of a ease, the Court or tribunal has the discretion to reframe or abridge some of the issues raised by the parties in order to decide the crucial issues of dispute between the parties and so is not bound to consider all the issues in the form or manner presented by the parties if doing so would not lead to the resolution of the real points of dispute in the case.
In the case of FEDERAL MINISTRY OF HEALTH .V. COMET SHIP AGENCIES LTD. (10) 13 WRN, 1 @ 15, the Supreme Court had put the position beyond argument when it held this:-
“A court, can and is entitled to reformulate an issue or issues formulated by a party or Counsel in order to give it or them, precision and clarity.” See also NEKA .V. ACB LTD. (2004) 1 SC (1) 32, (2004) 1 SCNJ 193 @ 202-3, AGBAREH .V. MIMRA (2008) 2 NWLR (1071) 378 @ 410. In the above circumstances it is not every failure or omission to consider all the issues submitted by the parties that would effect or amount to denial of fair hearing. LAWAL V. QUADRY (2004) 6 NWLR (868) 1, NKWOCHA .V. MTN LTD (2008) 11 NWLR (1099) 439 @ 460.
In any case, the duty lies on the party who alleges the breach of his right to fair hearing in any proceedings to demonstrate by evidence, the manner or way in which the right was breached. It is not sufficient for a party to make assertions of denial of fair hearing by a Court or tribunal without showing on the record of the proceedings to which he was a party how, he was denied the right in the conduct of the proceedings, See OKIKE .V. LPDC (2006) 1 NWLR 67 @ 92 -3.
The first point raised by the learned counsel for the Appellant in respect of the alleged denial of fair hearing was that the tribunal misrepresented the evidence of PW7 and acted on it as the basis of its judgment PW7’s evidence is at page 312 of the record of appeal wherein his statement on oath, which is at page 68 of the record of appeal, was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P7.
The name of PW7 given at both page 312 and on Exhibit P7 is Hamza Yusuf Magayaki, the presiding officer assigned to Hurya/Ketare ward by the Petitioner and the ANPP. Exhibit P7 is to the effect the election materials meant for Hurya/Katare ward were carted way by “thugs”, military and police personnel led by one Yakubu Lado, a PDP senatorial candidate from election officials in the presence of PW7, who was beaten in the process. Under cross-examination, PW7 said he escorted the election materials from Katsina to Kankara, he went to Huray/Ketare ward and that the incident happened at Kankara INEC office. That Yakubu Lado was his classmate and a candidate for the House of Representatives at the election. This is a resume of the evidence of PW7.
In its judgment, the tribunal at page 436 of the record of appeal, had stated this in review of the evidence of PW7:-
“Mallam Maishago Yarmalamai PW7, was the Returning Officer for Yarmalamai ward representing the Petitioner. In Exhibit P7, he said election was held in the ward but there was no collation of result as the supervisory Presiding Officer disappeared without filling the forms as he had not supplied the ward with forms”.
The tribunal at page 462 of the record of appeal repeated the above evidence though in brief and then at page 464 observed initer alia as follows in respect of the evidence of PW17:-
“Even PW7, during cross-examination said he did not see Yakubu Lado on the election day which is contrary to his evidence in chief where he alleged that Yakubu Lado is a senatorial candidate for PDP but not for that constituency mounted a road block in Danmarke village. We therefore believe the evidence of the 1st Respondent’s witnesses as they are credible and uncontroverted and in line with the pleading.”
The above was the entire consideration given by the tribunal to the evidence PW7 in its judgment, It is apparent from the correct account and state of the record of appeal that the tribunal had misrepresented the evidence of PW7 who testified at the trial of the Appellant’ petition. This much has been conceded by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents in their respective briefs.
The learned Counsel for the Appellant had argued that the tribunal based its judgment on the said misrepresented evidence of PW7. On their part, the learned Counsel for the respondents as seen earlier, have contended that the misrepresentation did not affect the decision of the tribunal which would have been the same even if it had not occurred. What I have observed on the point is that the learned Counsel for the Appellant did not make any attempt in his brief of argument to demonstrate or show that the tribunal based its judgment on the mispresentation of the evidence of PW7 which in summary, is to the effect that election did not hold at the ward he was assigned for the disputed election.
The observation by the tribunal at page 4.4 of the record of appeal set out above, cannot by any stretch of reasonable imagination be said to be the basis of the tribunals’ judgment or even decision to believe the evidence of the 1st Respondent’s witnesses mentioned therein. The tribunal did not base its judgment on that observation as it related to only one (1) ward out of eleven (11) wards of Kankara Local Government which was one (1) of the three (3) Local governments in the Constituency where the election in dispute was conducted. The misrepresented evidence was not used or considered in the tribunal’s decision in respect of the other two (2) Local Governments of Faskari and Sabuwa as was clearly shown in the record of appeal. Learned Counsel’s submission that the tribunal based its judgment on the mispresented evidence of PW7 is therefore not supported by the record of appeal, so has no basis and is untenable.
The next point of complaint by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is on the statement by the tribunal that the 1st Respondent had vehemently, denied all the pleadings in paragraph 5B of the petition in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of his Reply. He said by the statement, the tribunal had taken a stand against the Appellant even before considering the case put forward by the parties.
However even a cursory look at the mentioned pleadings of both Appellant and the 1st Respondent would reveal that there were specific and clear denials of the averments by the Appellant on non conduct of election at the places named in the relevant paragraphs. The denials were consistent and maintained through out the Reply of the 1st Respondent. What then is wrong with the tribunal stating in its introduction to the judgment that the 1st Respondent vehemently denied the Appellant’s averments in paragraph 5(B) of the petition? It should be noted that the manner or mode of writing judgment by a Court or tribunal; including the choice and use of the English words in the process is a matter of style left to the peculiarities of each Court or tribunal. N.B.C. PLC .V. BORGUNDU (1999) 2 NWLR (591) 408, OGOLO .V. OGOLO (1997) 77 NWLR (512) 510, MBANI .V. BOSI (2006)11 NWLR (991) 400.
As long as a judgment reflected a correct evaluation of the evidence adduced in support of the issues canvassed by the parties before the Court or tribunal, its choice of words and style in the process of witting it would take the back seat in the determination of its validity. Any style adopted would ordinarily not have any bearing on the principle of fair hearing. In the present appeal, the record of appeal shows that dispite of the choice of word or style complained of by the learned counsel for the Appellant, the tribunal went ahead thereafter to consider the pleadings and evidence adduced by all the parties to the petition before reaching its final decisions on the issues canvassed therein. In the circumstances there is no basis on the record and so no justification to warrant the allegation by the learned Appellant’s Counsel that “that tribunal took a stand against the Appellant even before considering the case put forward by the parties” merely because a particular style and not another was used in writing the judgment appealed against.
Another point of complaint was that the tribunal had looked into documents or various electoral forms “dumped” on it by the 1st Respondent and misapprehended the case of the Appellant that no such forms were used at the officially designated points on the day of the election. That the contents of such forms were not known to the Appellant and his witnesses and so he could not controvert them especially when the 3rd Respondent reused to give the forms to him. The Appellants’ learned Counsel also made various other kinds of allegations against the tribunal all meant or intended to show that it was biased against the Appellant including that the tribunal raised suo motu, issues of ANPP’s agents signing form and non payment for a copy of the voters register. Cases of IBENYE .V. AGWU (1998) 9 SCNJ 1 @ 30, AYUA .V. ADASU (1992) 3 NWLR (231) 598, among others were cited on the submission on these points.
I have read page 459 of the record referred to by learned Counsel for the Appellant on the complaint that the tribunal had stated that the documents tendered by the 1st Respondent were not controverted by any of the Appellant’s witnesses. The documents in question were Exhibits RC 1-3; Forms EC8 C(II), RD 1 – 10; Form EC8B(II) and RE1-176; Forms EC 8 A (II) in respect of which 1st Respondents witnesses RW1-9 gave oral evidence in their respective statements on oath which were admitted in evidence at the trial. There was therefore the necessary oral evidence to link the documents with the 1st Respondent’s case that election was held at the places to which they related and it would be clearly wrong to say that such documents were “dumped” on the tribunal. They were not and the tribunal was right in law to have considered them in deciding whether or not the Appellant has proved his case that election did not hold in the areas named therein. Whether or not copies of such result forms were signed by the agents of any party that participated in the election did affect and had nothing to do with the validity or statutory presumption of genuiness of the results. See AJADI .V. AJIBOLA (2004) 16 NWLR (898) 9.1 @
I cannot find any portion of the tribunals judgments where the failure to pay for a copy of the voters register said to have been raised suo motu by the tribunal was used to reject the said registers. What the tribunal said and held about the voters register admitted as Exhibit P. 1- 3; PDF Discs was to the effect that the Appellant had failed to down load them and lead oral evidence to link them with his case. The tribunal then concluded that it was not in a position to know the contents of the said Exhibits. The tribunal’s position cannot seriously be faulted because the duty was on the Appellant to adduce evidence to connect the said Exhibits directly to his case, which as borne out by the record of appeal, he failed to do.
The position of the tribunal in the above situation did not infringe on the Appellants’ right to fair hearing and so the cases cited on the effects of a denial of that right are inapplicable. As stated earlier the Appellant owes the duty to establish a real and not imagined infraction or denial of the right before a consideration of the effect would arise. The Appellant has not satisfactorily discharged that duty in the present appeal. In the result, for the reasons set out before I resolve the issues 1 and 3 against the Appellant.
Next is the Appellants’ issue 2 on which it was submitted that the tribunal merely glossed over the Appellants’ final address in its judgment and refused to consider issues raised and argued which are germane for a proper determination of the petition raised therein. According to learned counsel, the tribunal closed its eyes to the glaring irregularities in the contents of the electoral forms tendered by the 1st Respondent. He said the inconsistent number of political parties entered on the forms for Polling Stations, wards and Local Governments were ignored or overlooked by the tribunal. In addition, the tribunal excluded the testimonies of four (4) vital witnesses for the Appellant i.e., PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW16 in its judgment on the ground that they were members of another political party and had testified in another petition from the same constituency. It was submitted that by virtue of section 155 of the Evidence Act, Cap E 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the witnesses are competent in witnesses and the Appellant had the right to call them in proof of his case.
That they suffered no disability and their evidence is relevant and admissible. The sworn statements of the said witnesses admitted as Exhibits PI, P2, P10 and P16 as well as the oral testimonies of the witnesses at different pages of the record of appeal were referred to by learned Counsel who argued that non consideration of the evidence of the witnesses caused considerable damage to the Appellant’s case and denied him justice. We were urged by him to answer the issue in the positive and set aside the tribunal’s judgment.
For the 1st Respondent, it was submitted that the tribunal had considered every material issue in the petition and exhaustively reviewed the relevant pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties before arriving at its decision. Furthermore, that the tribunal had the right to reframed issues formulated by learned Counsel and it was not bound to comment or pronounce on every submission made by Counsel in their final addresses, relying on the case of N.T.D.B. V. FOMBO NIG. LTD. (1997) 2 NWLR (489) 543 @ 558. It was contended that all the issues formulated by the Appellants’ Counsel in his final address before the tribunal were subsumed in the two issues reframed by the tribunal. In the alternative, it was said that failure by a Court to consider all issues brought before it does not necessarily lead to a miscarriage of justice or denial of fair hearing the case of OSASONA AJAYI (2004)14 NWLR (892) 527 @ 549 was cited as authority on the point and it was submitted that the Appellant did not show how the alleged failure to consider his issues occasioned denial of fair hearing or miscarriage of justice to him. It was also the argument of learned counsel for 1st Respondents that the tribunal did not exclude the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW16 in its judgment but merely did not attach much importance to it for the reasons stated by it in any case he said. The Appellant did not show how the exclusion of their evidence occasioned miscarriage of justice or affected the occasion of the tribunal since it settled law that such exclusion will not result in the reversal of a decision if it did not affect the decision such that it would have been different in the absence of the exclusion. Reliance was placed on OMOMEHI .V. KOLAWOLE (2008) 14 NWLR (1106) 180 @ 202 and OJENGBEDE .V. ESAN (2001) 18 NWLR (746) 771 for the submission.
In the premises, we were urged to resolve issue in favour of the 1st respondent.
For the 3rd – 5th Respondents the relevant submissions on the issue are that the tribunal had found as a fact that the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW16 was not relevant to the Appellants’ petition but was in relation to another petition.
The first point of complaint in the issue is the alleged failure to consider the issues and arguments contained in the final address by the learned Appellants’ Counsel.
Speaking in general terms, a court of law or tribunal has a duty to consider and decide all issues properly raised and submitted to it by the parties for determination of their dispute. In deed, the law requires that a Court or tribunal should confine itself to the issues raised by the parties in its determination of cases or matters brought before it. See EBAMAWU .V. FODIYO (1973) 1 ALL NLR, 130, ATANDA .V. AJANI (1988) 3 NWLR (111) 511, OKONJI .V. NJOKANMA (1991) 7 NWLR (202)131, EDEM .V. CANON BALLS LTD (2005) ALL FWLR (276) 693 @ 706. However the law has made exceptions to the above position by granting the Court or tribunal the directionary power to disregard and ignore irrelevant issues raised in the parties’ briefs of argument, so as not obscure the main or real issues that require determination in a case. See NWOKORO .V. ONUMA (1990) 3 NWLR (136) 22, YAKUBU .V. GOVERNOR OF KOGI STATE (1997) 7 NWLR (571) 66 @ 92, EDEM .V. CANON BALLS ((supra) @ the same page 706.
In practice, the law recognizes the right and discretionary power of a Court or tribunal to reframe, reformulate or recast issues formulated or raised by the parties in order for the crucial or germane points or issues of dispute in the case to be determined clearly and completely. See ADUKU .V. ADEJO (1994) 5 NWLR (346) 582, AKEGWUOHA V. OHAWUCHI (1996) 3 NWLR (435) 146, NWANA .V. F.E.D.A. (2004) 13 NWLR (898)128 @ 142, FRN .V. ANACHI IN RE: CHIEF OLAFISOYE (2004) NWLR (602) 532 @ 546. By these authorities, a Court or tribunal has the power to even formulate issues from the grounds of appeal which may be different from those raised by the parties if doing so would lead to the determination of the real and vital issues of contention in the case. The only caveat is that where the issues are different from the ones raised by the parties, the parties are to be afforded adequate opportunity to address on them before decision by the Court or tribunal. See EDEM .V. CANON BALLS (supra) @ 714, BANKOLE .V. FELU (1991) 8 NWLR (211) 523, UDO .V. C.R.S.N.C. (2001) 14 NWLR (732) 116, FED MIN. OF HEALTH .V. C.S.A.LTD. (20099 NWLR (1145) 193 @ 222 -4.
On the authority of the above cases, failure or refusal by a Court or tribunal to consider the issues as formulated, frame or raised in the briefs or final addresses of the parties would not ipso facto amount to or culminate into denial of fair hearing or miscarriage of justice where the parties have had the opportunity to address on the issues or had in fact addressed in their final addresses the issues considered and determined by the court or tribunal in its decision of the matter or case. The duty is on the party making the allegation or assertion that such failure had in fact of occasioned denial of fair hearing or miscarriage of justice to him to demonstrate from the record of proceedings such an effect. It is not sufficient to merely make the allegation without reference to the specific partions of the records of the Court or tribunal which support or warrant such allegation.
I would now look at the issues raised by the Appellant in the final address which, it was alleged, the tribunal refused to consider in its judgment or “merely glossed over.”
The four (4) issues raised and submitted by the learned Appellants’ Counsel for determination by the tribunal in his final address are at page 400 of the record of appeal. They are thus:-
5.0 ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
5.1. Whether considering the state of the parties pleadings and the evidence adduced by them the figures returned as the purported scores for the 1st Respondent the total votes ascribed to all the candidates as well as the total votes purportedly cast at the said election, each of which is higher than the total number of the registered voters in the Constituency have not rendered the Election void.
5.2. Whether on a dispassionate consideration of the totality of the party’s pleadings and the evidence adduced by them, the Petitioner has made out a case of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2006, and whether such non-compliance substantially affected the result of the election.
5.3 Whether considering the circumstances of this case and the evidence led by the parties the petitioner has established any case of corrupt practices against the Respondents as to vitiate the return of the 1st Respondent.
5.4. Whether the 1st Respondent was qualified to contest the said election being a public officer who did not resign his office at least 30 days before the date of the election.
The tribunal in its judgment, particularly page 450 of the record of appeal had said:-
“After a careful analysis of the evidence led by the parties and the state of the pleading and Counsel submission, the issues as formulated by this Tribunal are as follows:-
(1) whether the 1st Respondent was at the time of the election not qualified to contest the said election and
(2) Whether from the evidence adduced by the Petitioner the election held on 21st April, 2007 into the House of Representative in Faskari/Kankara/Sabuwa Federal Constituency was invalid by reason of non-compliance with the electoral Act, 2006 or by reason of corrupt practices.”
The above two (2) issues raised or framed by the tribunal were the ones used, considered and determined by it in the judgment appealed against.
One can easily see that the issue (1) formulated by the tribunal is essentially and substantially the same with the Appellant’s issue No. 5.4.
The only difference between the two (2) issues is the form, manner, or style of the formulation. The style of the tribunal is more concise and precise than that of the Appellants’ learned Counsel. All the submissions by the learned Counsel for the Appellant on this issue as well as by the learned Counsel for the Respondents to the petition were reviewed and adequately considered by the tribunal in its judgment. It should be noted that the fact that the tribunal preferred the submissions made by a party for reasons which are clearly stated in the judgment is not the same thing and so cannot be equated with failure or refusal to consider the submissions by the other parties. I have read the judgment of the tribunal and found that the No (1) formulated by it which is Appellant’s issue No. 5.4 was fully considered and determined in line with all the submissions made therein by the parties in respect of the pleadings and evidence adduced by them. In particular pages 451 -456 of the record of appeal, show that all submissions by the Appellants’ Counsel on the issue, were adequately considered along with those of Learned Counsel for the Respondent before the tribunal arrived at its decision on the issue. It is therefore not and cannot be right to say that the tribunal refused to consider or merely glossed over the Appellant’s submissions on the issue. The records of the judgment undoubtedly show a detailed and sufficient consideration of the said submissions by the tribunal.
The issues 5.1. and 5.2 raised by the Appellant’s Counsel are in their substance questioning the return of the 1st Respondent on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act. Issue 5.3 is one which challenges the election on the ground of corrupt practices alleged against the Respondents.
These issues, on a calm reading of the issue No (2) formulated by the tribunal, are exactly what are contained and subsumed therein. In other words it is the tribunal’s issue (2) that was split into issues No. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 by the style or mode of the formulation by the learned Counsel for Appellant. The only difference between the two is as to the style in formulation, one of saying “seven days” instead of simply “a week.” The questions or points that arise in the issues raised by the Appellant and the one raised by the tribunal are the same and a consideration of either would cover and completely take care of the other.
In fact a close look at the judgment of the tribunal, particularly at pages 456 – 473 of the record of appeal would reveal that in considering the issue (2), it formulated, the tribunal had in some great details, considered and decided the issues of non-compliance raised in the Appellants’ issues 5.1 and 5.2. Every relevant and material point canvassed in the final address by the learned Counsel for the Appellant on the issues was considered by the tribunal along with the pleadings and evidence placed before it by the parties.
The records of the appeal do not support the assertion by the learned Counsel for Appellant that the tribunal did not consider the issues raised by him. As seen earlier, the tribunal was at liberty and had the discretionary power in law to reframe, re-formulate or even as the justice of a case may warrant, formulate issues which may be different from the ones raised by the parties. What the tribunal did as learned Counsel for the Appellant by reducing them in numbers and incorporating some of them into a single issue. Because the learned Counsel had fully addressed the issues subsumed in the issue raised by the tribunal in his final address, there was no need to have invited another or further address on them from him as that would have amounted to waste of precious time on mere repetition of the arguments on the issues. The assertion of the denial of fair hearing or miscarriage of justice made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant on the point is not borne out by the record of the appeal and therefore is untenable.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant had also said that the exclusion of the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW11 denied him fair hearing.
The question that arises here is whether the tribunal excluded the evidence of the said witnesses in its judgment. The judgment at pages 455, 456 and 458, shows that after briefly reviewing the evidence of the witnesses concluded that it was not relevant in the determination of the Appellants’ petition. Apparently therefore, from then on, the tribunal did not consider the said evidence in its determination of the issue on non-compliance on which the witnesses testified. The fact that a witness had testified in another case or here, petition would not disqualify such a witness and render him an incompetent witness in a later case or petition. Once the evidence of such a witness is relevant in later proceedings, it is admissible under the provisions of section 6 of the Evidence Act. The tribunal having rightly admitted the evidence of the PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW16 in the trial of the Appellant’s petition, had a duty to evaluate or assess such evidence and consider it along with the other evidence adduced, in determining the issues raised in the petition.
The recognized factors taken into account in assessing or evaluating the probative value of a piece of evidence include:-
(a) admissibly
(b) relevance
(c) credibility
(d) probability
(e) conclusiveness, etc
See MOGAJI .V. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC, 91, ONWUKA .V. EDLALA (1989) 1 NWLR (1996) 182, OSIGWE .V. UNIPETROL (2005) ALL FWLR (267) 1525 @ 1543. It is not the law that because a witness had testified in another case or petition his testimony or evidence in another or later case or petition would be rejected on that ground or that the evidence would not be evaluated or assessed for the purpose of ascription of probative value or worth.
However what the tribunal in its assessment of the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW16 said was that it was not relevant to the Appellants’ petition and so did not consider it in the determination of the Appellants’ petition. From the record of appeal, the tribunal did not consider at all the evidence of PW10, Madada Mohammed, who was the Sabuwa Local Government Chairman of the DPP in the determination of the issue of non-compliance in respect of Sabuwa Local Government.
The case put forward by the Appellant on the issue is primarily that election did not hold in the whole constituency in general and in Sabuwa Local Government to which the evidence of PW10 relates in particular.
The evidence of PW10 is to the effect that election did not hold in Sabuwa Local Government and under cross examination by the 1st Respondents Counsel, said the result declared by INEC was false. This piece of evidence is directly relevant to the case of the Appellant and ought to have been assessed and considered in determination of the issue of non-compliance in Sabuwa Local Government. The same thing applies to the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW16 to the effect that election did not hold in their respective Local governments. Their evidence is directly relevant to the case of the Appellant and the issue of non-compliance and ought to have been assessed and considered by the tribunal in its judgment. See ASIKA .V. AWANYA (2008) 17 NWLR (1117) 484. It was in clear error of law not to have done to for it had failed to carry out its primary duty of so doing. In the circumstances, this court has a duty to do so pursuant to Order section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2004. See AJADI .V. AJIBOLA (supra), HARUNA .V. MODIBBI (2004) 16 NWLR (900) 487.
The evidence of PW1 and PW2 is to the effect that no election materials were distributed on election day, there were no election official and no election was held in Kankara Local government. The evidence of PW10 and PW16 is to the same effect in Sabuwa Local Government and that result declared were false.
However, there were the 1st Respondents witnesses whose evidence on the holding of the election in all the three (3) Local governments in the constituency was not discredited by the Appellant. In support of the fact that election held, were the results declared by INEC which as rightly found by the tribunal, enjoy the rebuttable presumption of genuuiness. Though the witnesses of the Appellants said the results were false there was no sufficient evidence to prove such falsification as required by law. In other words, there was no cogent evidence to rebut the presumption that the results declared by INEC were in fact, false.
The evidence adduced by the 1st Respondent, oral and documentary on the issue whether or not election held at the places in respect of which PW1, PW2, PW10 and PW16 gave evidence, is more credible, probable, cogent and conclusive on the issue. It therefore carries more probative value, weight or worth in the determination of the issue.
In the above circumstances when the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW19 and PW16 was considered along side the evidence of the Respondents by the tribunal in its judgment, its decision on the issue would have been the same. Put another way, the exclusion or non consideration of the evidence of the said witnesses did not affect the decision of the tribunal in that even if considered; the decision would have been the same.
In the result, no miscarriage of justice or denial of fair hearing was occasioned by the said exclusion to the Appellant. I resolve issue 2 against the Appellant.
The last live issue left for determination in the appeal is Appellant’s issue No. 2.7 which was distilled from ground of appeal No 24.
For ease of reference, it is whether the tribunal was right in rejecting the sworn statement of 5t Respondents on the ground that it was not specifically pleaded.
The learned counsel for the Appellant had argued that since the 5th respondent was the Returning Officer for the disputed election in the constituency his statement of oath made in respect of another petition No. NA/HR/EPT/KTS/37/07 before the same tribunal in respect of the election was admissible because it was relevant to establish a fact pleaded by the Appellant. The cases of ABUBAKAR .V. CHUKS (2007) 32 NSCQR (351 @ 370 and BCC LTD .V. ADO IBRAHIM and CO. LTD (2002) 2 NWLR (805) 462 @ 483 – 4 were cited on the submission that the tribunal was wrong to have rejected the said document in evidence. It was submitted that the exclusion of the “vital documentary evidence” has led to a miscarriage of justice since if admitted would have had a substantial effect on the out come of the petition. We were urged to resole the issue in favour of the Appellant.
The submissions by the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent on the issue are that the tribunal was right in rejecting the statement on oath of the 5th Respondent made in respect of another petition for the following reasons:-
(1) The statement was not pleaded.
(2) The statement was not attached to the petition or listed as one of the documents to be relied on by the Petitioner.
(3) The statement was not adopted or proved in evidence in the said petition No. NA/HR/KST/37/07 or
(4) The statement could not have been used for the purpose of cross examination PW6 through which the Appellant attempted to tender the document.
He said the Appellant has not shown how the statement was relevant to the pleaded facts to render same admissible and admitting it in evidence would have been contrary to the mandatory provision of paragraphs 1 (1) (c) and 4 (8) of the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions, 2007.
Relying on the case of IDRIS .V. ANPP (2008) 8 NWLR (1088) 1 @ 93, Learned Counsel said that the statement which was not adopted in the petition in respect of which it was made did not constitute evidence before the Court upon which the deponent could be cross examined. Further that the statement could not be tendered as proof of its contents for under sections 199 and 209 of the Evidence Act; evidence of witness taken in earlier proceeding is not relevant or admissible in subsequent proceedings except for the purpose of discrediting the witness in cross examination. The case of DUROSARO .V. AYORINDE (2005) 8 NWLR (927) 407 @ 426 was cited on the submission and it was argued that the PW6 who was subpoenaed to produce documents which did not include the statement in question was not a witness before the tribunal and could have been cross-examined on the statement pursuant to section 193 of the Evidence Act. According to learned Counsel, if the tribunal was wrong for the reason given for rejecting the statement, the rejection was still right for the other reason given by him above and so the Court should not interfere with the decision. As authority for the position, the cases of NDAYAKO .V. DANTORO (2004) 13 NWLR (889) 187 (2007) 220 and DUKE-OGU .V. AMADI (2008) 12 NWLR (1102) 650 @ 680 were relied on. In addition that Appellant did not show that the rejection of the evidence had led to any miscarriage of justice and we were urged to hold that the tribunal was right in rejecting the statement or even if wrong, no miscarriage of justice was occasioned. We were also urged finally, to resolve the issue in the 1st Respondent’s favour.
The issue was argued as issue iv in the 3rd – 517th Respondent’s brief wherein it was submitted the tribunal was right in rejecting the statement for similar reasons given above by the Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent. The cases of SANYAOLU .V. COKER (1985) 3 SC. 124, IKENYA .V. OFUME (1985) 2 NWLR (5), 1, OKONKWO V. ADIGWU (1985) 1 NWLR (4) 694 were referred to on the submission that the statement can only be used in later proceedings for the purpose of cross examination but not to prove the truth of its contents.
We were finally urged by learned Counsel to hold that the rejection of the statement was proper.
By the general principle of the law of evidence, relevance of a place of evidence determines its admissibility in judicial proceedings.
The Supreme Court in the case of FAWEHINMI .V. N.B.A. (NO2), (1992) 2 NWLR (105) 558 @ 583 had stated the position thus:-
“Ordinarily admissibility of evidence is governed by section 6 of the Evidence Act. Once a piece of evidence is relevant, it is admissible in evidence irrespective of how it was obtained. See also AGBHIMOVO .V. EDUYEGBE (1999) 3 NWLR 594) 170 @ 183, OYEDIRAN .V. ALEBIOSU II (1992) 6 NWLR (249) 550, TORI .V. UKPABI (1984) 1 SC, 370 NWABUOKU .V. ONWORDI, (2000) ALL FWLR (331) 1236 @ 125.”
It is also an established principle of the law of evidence that documentary evidence in order to be admissible in evidence needs not be specifically pleaded so long as the relevant facts and not the evidence by which such document is convered, are pleaded. In other words, documents tendered in support of pleaded facts need not be pleaded.
See MONIER CONSTRUCTION .V. AZUBUIKE (1990) 3 NWLR (136) 74, AMADI .V. OLUMATI (1995) 7 NWLR (410) 73A @ 752, ALLIED BANK .V. AKUBUEZE (1997) 6 NWLR (509) 374 @ 403.
These general principles of evidence are applicable in all ordinary civil and criminal proceedings or trials before the Courts or tribunals established by law. However because election petitions are not ordinary civil proceedings because there are laws and rules of procedure and practice specifically enacted for application therein, the above principles are not normally applied where such specific provisions are made to apply. In this regard, Paragraph 1 (1) ‘A9 of the Election Tribunal and Court Practice Directions, 2007 issued pursuant to the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2006 to regulate the practice and procedure for election petitions, has the following provisions:-
“1. Mode of Filing a Petition
(1) All petitions to be presented before the The Tribunal or Court shall be accompanied by.
(c) Copies or list of every document to be relied on at the hearing of the petition.”
These provisions are plain and clearly commanding in their language such that a discretion or option other than compliance therewith is not contemplated. The requirements in the paragraphs do not admit of a liberty on the part of the Petitioner whether or not to comply with them. They demand that in the first instance, a petition must be accompanied by copies or list of every document to be relied on at the hearing of the petition. In the second instance except the tribunal grants leave, no document etc shall be received in evidence at the hearing of a petition unless it had been filed along with the petition or reply in accordance with the Directions. In the case of OKEREKE .V YAR’ADUA (2008) 12 NWLR (1100) 95 @ 140 -1, the Supreme Court had held that the Practice Directions, 2007 are ancillary to the Electoral Act, 2006 and complimentary to the provisions of the 1st Schedule to the Act which are mandatory in election petition.
For our purposes here, a petitioner was required to file the copies or list of all or every document he intended to rely on at the hearing of his petition, along with the petition. Of course before filling the said document or list, the Petitioner must plead facts in the petition to which the document/s in question related and since the averments in the petitions are the pleadings, such documents must be mentioned therein. Where therefore a Petitioner in his pleadings specifically named or stated the documents he intended to rely on at the hearing of his petition and filed same along with this petition as required by the provisions of Paragraph 1(1) (c) above, he cannot and would not be permitted to tender any other document not listed or accompanied in the petition as it would be out side his pleadings. In law where a party specifically pleads certain documents to establish his case, he cannot during the trial rely on documents other than those specifically pleaded. See HASHIDU .V. GOJE (2006) 2 EPR 789 @ 816.
In the present appeal the learned Appellant’s Counsel did not dispute that the Statement of sought to be tendered at the tribunal was not one of the documents listed and filed along with his petition as one of the document he intended to rely on at the hearing. It was therefore not one of the documents specifically pleaded by the Appellant to be used and relied on at the trial of his petition. It was in the circumstances not a document which can properly be admitted in evidence since there were no facts which were specifically pleaded in relation to it. Paragraph 1 (1) (c) set out above which is mandatory requires that before such a document can be received in evidence, the leave of the tribunal had to be sought and obtained by the Appellant and there is no record of such leave of the tribunal.
For the above reasons the tribunal was right in rejecting the said statement in evidence in compliance with the provisions of Paragraph 1 (1) (c). I would confine my resolution of the issue on the one and only reason given by the tribunal for rejecting the statement in evidence as demonstrated above though learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent had gone ahead to argue the issue on other grounds or reasons which support the rejection of the statement. By the provisions of Order 9, Rule 2 of the CAR, 2007, a Respondent who desires to contend on the appeal that the decision of the court below should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by that court, must give notice to that effect specifying the grounds of that contention. Rule 3 of Order 9 provides thus:-
“3 Except with the leave of the Court, a respondent shall not be entitled on the hearing of the appeal to contend that the decision of the court below should be varied upon grounds not specified in a notice given under this rule, to apply for any relief not so specified or to support the decision of the court below upon any grounds not relied upon by that court or specified in such a notice,”
(Underline provided)
The Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent did not give the mandatory notice of his arguments that the decision of the tribunal on the rejection of the statement in question be affirmed on the other grounds than the one relied on by the tribunal. He did not also seek and obtain the leave of the Court to argue such other grounds and so the grounds can not properly be considered in the determination of the issue whether the rejection of the statement on evidence by the tribunal was right or not.
Be that as it may, since the 1st Respondent’s brief was duly served on the Appellant long before the hearing of the appeal and the other grounds in support of the decision by the tribunal were raised and argued therein, the Appellant has had sufficient notice of the grounds. Because the grounds are new points raised in the 1st Respondent’s brief, they called for a response or reaction from the Appellant by way of a Reply brief if he intended to challenge them, There is no record that the Appellant had filed an Appellants’ reply brief to answer to the grounds and so he is deemed to have conceded to the grounds.
The first of the other grounds or reasons in support of the rejection of the statement was that the statement was not evidence in the earlier or other petition since the maker did not testify in order to adopt it for admission in evidence in the proceedings. This position is correct because there is no record in the appeal to show that the statement was part of the evidence admitted by the tribunal in petition No NA/HR/EPT/KTS/37/07, though it was made for and filed along with that petition as statement on oath to be relied or at the hearing. Because it was not adopted and admitted as evidence at the trial of that petition, the statement did not constitute and was not evidence in previous proceeding as envisaged in section 34 (1) of the Evidence.
Furthermore, the statement on was not one of documents produced before the tribunal by any one person subpoenaed to produce documents in respect of the Appellants’ petition. The statement just flew out from nowhere in the facts pleaded by the Appellant in his petition and attempted to find a way into the trial of the petition. The law as stated earlier does not permit the admission of such strange to the facts pleaded piece of document, in evidence,
In the result, in addition to the reason given by the tribunal for the rejection of the statement in question the other reasons given by the learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent support the rejection. I accordingly resolve the issue against the Appellant.
In the final result with the resolution of all the live issues left in the appeal against the Appellant, the appeal must fail for lacking a merit. For that reason, the appeal is hereby dismissed and consequently the decision of the tribunal contained in the judgment delivered on the 16th of April, 2008 is hereby affirmed.
Parties are to bear their respective costs of prosecuting the appeal.
BABA ALKALI BA’ABA. J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading in advance the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Garba, JCA.
I am in full agreement that the appeal lacks substance and merit and should be dismissed. I also dismiss the appeal and abide by the order in the lead judgment.
JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.C.A.: My learned brother, Garba, JCA obliged me a copy of the lead judgment just delivered by him. I am to say that I agree completely with both the reasons and conclusion on the live issues submitted for the determination of this appeal. I hereby adopt his views as mine and also hold that this appeal is devoid of merit and is also dismissed by me. I abide by the order as to costs.
Appearances
Appellant And Counsel absent.For Appellant
AND
Mr. M. I. Abubakar for the 1st Respondent.
2nd Respondent absent and not represented.
RAHIMA AMINU – for the 3rd – 517th Respondents.For Respondent
