HYACINTH NGWUECHE v. COMMISSIONER FOR POLICE BENUE STATE (2019)

HYACINTH NGWUECHE v. COMMISSIONER FOR POLICE BENUE STATE

(2019)LCN/13659(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Wednesday, the 17th day of July, 2019

CA/MK/194C/2012

RATIO

CRIMINAL LAW: THE PURPOSE OF A CHARGE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The object of a charge in a criminal proceeding includes making an accused person to be fully aware of the case he is confronting in Court, and entails the specification or particularization of the essential ingredients of the offence in question – Mohammed V State (2010) LPELR-9019(CA). PER JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CHARGES: THE EFFECT OF AN ERROR IN A CHARGE
The main purpose of a charge is to give the accused person notice of the case against him. It is the law that no error in stating the offence or particulars required to be stated in the charge and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission. Even a defect in a charge will not vitiate a trial except where such a defect occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Mamman V FRN (2010) LPELR-4470(CA) 32 per Augie, JCA (as he then was); Odeh V FRN (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1103) 1 (SC); Shekete V NAF (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 159; Agbo V State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 977) 545; & FRN V Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 113. PER JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: EFFECT OF NOT REPRODUCING GTHE EXACT WORDING OF THE RELEVANT LAW IN A CHARGE
The offence for which the Appellant was charged was well defined therein, with the penalty therefore clearly stated. Indeed the charge, in my view, was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the law. However, an error or omission in reproducing the exact wordings in the relevant law should not be a reason for declaring the trial bad. In the case of Ogomor V State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 233, 234, the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte, JSC acknowledged that there is a difference between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material. He states:
Thus, the law distinguishes between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material and will not vitiate a trial, and those which are material will vitiate the trial. Where the omission or error is material to the charge, it necessarily misleads and will vitiate the trial. PER JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A.

APPEAL: INSTANCES WHEN THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT

JUSTICES

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

HYACINTH NGWUECHE Appellant(s)

AND

COMMISSIONER FOR POLICE BENUE STATE Respondent(s)

JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This Appeal is against the Judgment of the High Court of Benue State sitting in its appellate jurisdiction in Makurdi. The Court below affirmed the Judgment of the trial Magistrate Grade 1 Court, Aliade in Benue State delivered on 07-06-11, Coram: I. Shaapera Esq., wherein the trial Court convicted the Appellant for the offence of negligent and careless driving punishable under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act Cap 135, Laws of the Federation, 1990. Dissatisfied, the Appellant further appealed to this Court on one ground of appeal.

?The brief facts leading to this Appeal are as follows: Sometime on 22-03-10, the Appellant was arraigned before the Chief Magistrate Court, Aliade in Benue State on a First Information Report alleging driving without due care and attention contrary to Section 22 of the Benue State Road Traffic Law. At the trial, four prosecution witnesses testified and a no-case submission was made on behalf of the Appellant by his Counsel. On 26-01-11, the trial Court overruled the no-case submission and framed a charge of reckless driving against the

Appellant punishable under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act Cap 135, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1990. Thereafter, the trial Magistrate took the plea of the Appellant who pleaded not guilty to the charge. The Appellant, in his defence, testified in person and called one other witness (DW2), after which he closed his case and his Counsel filed a final written address. In its Judgment delivered on the 07-06-11, the trial Magistrate Court found the Appellant guilty as charged under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act (supra) for negligent and careless driving, and therefore convicted and sentenced him to six months imprisonment.
?
Dissatisfied with this decision, the Appellant filed an Appeal to the High Court of Benue State sitting in its appellate jurisdiction vide two Notices of Appeal, to wit: Appeal No. MHC/19CA/2011 filed on 30th June, 2011 containing a sole Ground of Appeal; and Appeal No. MHC/20CA/2011 filed on 27th June, 2011 containing six Grounds of Appeal. At the hearing of the Appeal, the Appellant withdrew the Notice of Appeal No. MHC/20CA/2011 containing six grounds and it was struck out. He therefore argued the Appeal

on the lone Ground of Appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal No. MHC/19CA/2011. On 27th July, 2012, the High Court of Benue State sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, Coram: Kpojime, J. and Asua, J., dismissed the Appeal and affirmed the Judgment of the trial Chief Magistrate Court delivered on 07-06-11. Once again dissatisfied, the Appellant has appealed to this Court vide his Notice of Appeal filed on 28-09-12 contained at unnumbered back pages of the printed Record of Appeal.

At the hearing of the Appeal on 15th May, 2019, both the Appellant and the Respondent were not in Court and were not represented by Counsel, even though they were both duly served notices for the hearing of the Appeal. Having satisfied itself of due service on the parties, the Court proceeded to hear the Appeal as scheduled. Thus, the Appellant?s Brief of argument filed on 10-12-12 and the Respondent?s Brief of argument filed on 10-01-13 were deemed duly argued pursuant to Order 19 Rule 9(4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016.

The Appellant in his Brief of argument distilled one issue from his sole ground of Appeal as follows:
“Whether the Court below

was right in affirming the Judgment of the learned trial Magistrate, I. Shaapera Esq., sitting at the Chief Magistrate Court Aliade, Benue State dated 7/6/2011 in charge no: CMCA1/2010 – Compol Benue State Vs Hyacinth Ngwuche.”

The Respondent also distilled one issue from the lone Ground as follows:
?Whether the Court below was right in affirming the Judgment of the learned trial Magistrate delivered on the 7/6/2011.?

Since the two sets of issues are virtually identical in content, the Appellant?s issue is adopted in the determination of the Appeal. Before then however, the Respondent raised and argued a preliminary objection in paragraphs 4.1 to 4.1.6 at pages 3 to 5 of the Respondent?s Brief of argument. It shall therefore be addressed first.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the competence of some of the particulars in support of the sole Ground of Appeal, as well as the arguments therein contained in the Appellant?s Brief of argument which, he contends, introduced fresh issues without the leave of Court. Counsel submits that at the Court below, the Appellant?s

complaint in his sole ground of appeal was that the trial Chief Magistrate wrongly found him guilty and convicted him of the offence of negligent and careless driving under Section 6(1) of the Federal High Ways Act Cap 135, LFN 1990. However, that none of the particulars in support of the sole Ground of Appeal before the Court below complained that the Aliade/Makurdi Road was not proved to be a Federal highway. Likewise also, that in the Appeal before this Court, the Appellant again in his sole Ground of Appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal filed on 10-12-12 and tagged ?Supplementary Record? introduced a fresh particular as No. 1, to the effect that the Aliade/Gboko Road where the offence was committed, was not proved by the prosecution to be a Federal highway within the meaning Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act to have warranted a conviction.
?
Counsel submits that the Appellant buttressed the contention by arguing that a basic ingredient of an offence under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act (supra) is that the act constituting the offence must have taken place on the Federal highway and that the prosecution failed to prove

that Aliade/Gboko road is a Federal highway. He however contends that the Appellant ought to have sought the leave of Court to file the present sole Ground of Appeal which introduced the fresh particulars complained of. Having not done so, the fresh particulars under the sole Ground of Appeal canvassed before the Court below has been varied by the Appellant suo motu. Consequently, Counsel urged the Court to strike out particular No. 1 in support of the sole Ground of Appeal and a fortiori, the Ground of Appeal itself for having introduced a fresh issue without having sought and obtained the leave of Court. Reliance is placed on Onwuka V Ononuju (2009) 38 NSCQR 97, 60-61; & Our Line Ltd V SCC Nig. Ltd (2009) 39 NSCQR 477, 7.
?
However, in an unexpected turn of events, Counsel proceeded to assemble arguments contending that the Aliade/Gboko Road was indeed a Federal Highway. He eventually urged the Court to strike out or discountenance the Appellant?s contentions and submissions on this issue, especially against the backdrop that his submissions therein substantially centre on the fresh issue, which is that the Aliade/Gboko road was not proved to

be a Federal Highway. Finally, Counsel urged the Court to uphold the preliminary objection, strike out particular No. 1 in support of the sole Ground of Appeal, and consequently dismiss the Appeal.

The Appellant did not respond to the submissions of the Respondent on this preliminary objection as he failed to file a Reply Brief of argument.

Findings on the Preliminary Objection
It must be said from the onset that the Supplementary Record of Appeal referred to by the Respondent which is said to contain a subsequent Notice of Appeal filed on 12-12-12, is not contained in the File before the Court. Therefore, all the submissions of learned Counsel with respect to particular No. 1 under the lone Ground of Appeal which allegedly raises the issue that the Aliade/Gboko Road was not proved to be a Federal Highway go to no issue. For the avoidance of doubt the only Notice of Appeal before this Court is that filed on 28-09-12 wherein the Appellant complained against the decision of the Court below on one lone ground. It is contained at un-numbered pages at the back of the Record of Appeal. The lone ground and its particulars are reproduced here under:<br< p=””

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?3. GROUNDS OF APPEAL, ERROR IN LAW:-
The learned Judges erred in law when they upheld the decision of the trial Magistrate, His Workship (sic), I. Shapeera Esq. Mag. 1 of the Chief Magistrate Court of Benue Holden at Aliade delivered on 7/6/2011 and found the appellant guilty of the offence of negligent and careless driving punishable under S. 6(1) of the Federal High Way Act Lap (sic) 135 LFN 1990.
2. That the appellant had taken the plea on the count of ?Driving without Due Care and Attention? along Aliade/Makurdi Road while his conviction was for ?negligent and careless driving? punishable under S. 6(1) of the Federal High Ways Act Cap 139 LFN 1990.
3. That there is no offence provided in S. 6(1) of the Federal High Way Act 135 LFN 1990 known as ?Negligent and careless driving?, the appellant was thus convicted for an non-existent offence by the trial magistrate.
4. That the appellant?s conviction went against the grain of S. 36(8) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria.?
?
However, I agree with the Respondent that, contrary to the above solitary ground of appeal and its

particulars spelt out thereunder numbered 2, 3 and 4, the issue extensively canvassed in the Appellant?s Brief of argument was that the Court below was wrong in affirming the Judgment of the trial Court when the Respondent (Prosecution) failed to prove that the Aliade/Gboko Road was a Federal Highway, to warrant his conviction under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act, Cap 135, LFN, 1990. It clearly was not a part of the Appeal to this Court. In point of fact, it was also not an issue before the Court below and so there was no finding thereon in its Judgment. Finally, even though the Appellant has extensively argued this fresh issue in his Brief of argument, there is no gainsaying that no leave was sought or granted to warrant its being argued as a fresh issue in the Appeal before this Court. It is no wonder that the Appellant failed and/or neglected to respond to the preliminary objection. He is therefore taken to have conceded to the objection raised. Thus, for all these reasons, the preliminary objection against the submissions contained in paragraphs 1.04, 1.05, 3.10 to 3.13 of the Appellant?s Brief of argument, is sustained. In

consequence, the said submissions are accordingly discountenanced. The Appeal shall therefore be considered and determined based solely on the only issue canvassed in the single Ground of Appeal and its particulars, to wit:
Whether the learned Judges of the Court below erred In law when they upheld the decision of the trial Chief Magistrate Court which found the Appellant guilty of the offence of ?negligent and careless driving?, when the Appellant had pleaded to an allegation of ?driving without due care and attention? upon his arraignment in the FIR, and S. 6(1) of the Federal High Ways Act Cap 139 LFN 1990 of the subsequent charge which only provides for ?reckless or negligent driving?.

ARGUMENTS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE APPEAL
?In respect of the main Appeal. learned Counsel for the Appellant his Brief of argument submits that the Court below erred in affirming the Judgment of the trial Court because the Appellant had pleaded to the offence of ?driving without care and attention, contrary to Section 22 of Road Traffic Law?, presumably of Benue State. After the prosecution witnesses had testified and

the Appellant?s Counsel had made a no-case submission which was overruled, the trial Court framed a charge against the Appellant for reckless diving, an offence punishable under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act, Cap 135 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990. The Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and adduced evidence in his defence through his testimony and that of one other witness. Subsequently, in its Judgment delivered on 07-06-11, the trial Court convicted the Appellant for negligent and careless driving under Section 6 (1) of the Federal Highways Act.
?
Counsel submitted that the Appellant had been charged with the offence of driving recklessly, and not for negligent and careless driving. He also contends that Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act (supra) did not create any offence known as negligent and careless driving. He submits that the law is that a criminal charge must be framed in the manner the offence charged is defined and/or appears in the words of the statute. There is no room for any change in the words of the statute so as to accommodate the personal view of the prosecution or of the Court on the issue.

Reliance is placed on Asuquo V State (1969) ANLR 132, 134; & Ezeze V State (2004)14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 491-492. Counsel submits that it is not for the trial Magistrate to substitute the words of the statute with his own words. Since the statute did not employ the word “careless” in setting out the ingredients that constitute an offence under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act (supra), the trial Court cannot import the word into the provision. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it appears in the statute -Ofuani V Nigerian Navy (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 62.

Counsel also submits that each of the ingredients of the offence charged ought to and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. These include:
(1) that the Appellant drove a motor vehicle on a Federal Highway,
(2) and that he drove same recklessly or negligently, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the state, condition and use of that highway, and to the amount of traffic which at that time is or might reasonably be expected to be on that highway.
?
Counsel submits that by Section 138 of the Evidence Act, LFN 1990

(then applicable when the trial was conducted), the prosecution had the responsibility to prove each of these ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that the trial Court convicted the Appellant for the offence of “negligent and careless” driving which does not exist in the statute. Counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the Respondent failed to prove that the Appellant committed an offence under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act (supra). Therefore, the learned Judges of the Court below erred in law when they dismissed his Appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial Magistrate Court. The Court is therefore urged to allow the Appeal, set aside the Judgment of the Court below, and discharge and acquit the Appellant.
?
In response, learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that a First Information Report is not a charge. It is merely a suggestion, even though a conviction can be entered thereon upon a plea of guilty by an accused person. Reference is made to Sections 156 and 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code Cap 51, Laws of Benue State (2004). Therefore, the procedure allowed under

Sections 160 and 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code was proper, as found by the Court below.

With regard to the words used by the trial Chief Magistrate in describing the offence in the charge, Counsel submits that the trial Magistrate might not have used the exact words of the Act in describing the offence, however he was certainly referring to the same offence. He submits that even though the trial Court used the word ?reckless? in the charge as used in Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act (supra), and in its findings it used the words ?negligent and careless?, the words carry the same or similar meaning. Reference is made to The Oxford Advanced Learners? Dictionary which defines these words as follows, id est ? ?reckless? – showing a lack of care about danger and the possible results of your action; ?careless” – not giving enough attention and thought to what you are doing so that you make mistake; and ?negligent” – failing to give enough care and attention.? Counsel submits that any of these words used by the trial Court convey the same meaning, as was rightly held by the Court

below.

Counsel further submits that the Court below was right when it affirmed the finding of the trial Magistrate Court that the Appellant was not misled thereby and that there was no miscarriage of justice as a result of the interchange of words. Reliance is placed on Oludamilola V State (2011) Vol. 9 LRCNCC 27, P-Z; & Omoregie V State (2011) Vol. 9 LRCNCC 275, Z on the attitude of appellate Courts to concurrent findings of fact made by two Courts, such as the trial Court and the Court below in this case. Counsel therefore urged the Court to uphold the findings of the Court below having established that no miscarriage of justice has been occasioned, and to dismiss the Appeal.

Findings –
At the onset of the case before the trial Chief Magistrate Court Aliade, the Appellant was arraigned on a First Information Report, (also referred to as an ?FIR?), on 19-07-10 for an offence which alleged ?driving without due care and attention? contrary to Section 22 of the Road Traffic Law. When the allegation in the FIR was read to him, the Appellant stated that he understood the allegation but that it was false. Trial thereafter

commenced with the Respondent adducing evidence through four witnesses and tendering several exhibits. When the Respondent closed its case, the Appellant?s Counsel made a no-case submission, which was however overruled by the trial Court on the ground that a prima facie case had been made out against the Appellant. The trial Magistrate therefore proceeded to frame a charge against the Appellant in the following terms (at page 17 of the Record):
“That you on or about the 9th day of February, 2010 drove your vehicle number FG638 B45 along Aliade-Gboko road, being a Federal High way, recklessly and hit the vehicle number Benue AJ494 GBK by its side, damaged it and caused multiple fractures to the driver of the said vehicle, Mr. Aondofa Nombor and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 6(1) of the Federal High ways Act, Cap 135, laws of the Federation, 1990.” (Emphasis supplied)
?This procedure is adequately provided in Sections 156 and 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) Cap 51, Laws of Benue State (2004). It is settled law that the allegation contained in the FIR is, at that stage, a mere allegation and not a formal charge. By

Sections 160 and 161 of the CPC Law, the Magistrate only drafts a formal charge after evidence has been adduced by the prosecution in substantiation of the allegation contained in the FIR. As was rightly found by the Court below, before such a charge is framed, the contents of the FIR are a mere allegation which the accused person can admit or deny. It is only where he admits the allegation that a magistrate can proceed to convict him summarily thereon. If he however, denies it, then the prosecution is obliged to present evidence to substantiate the allegation in the FIR. Thus, by the time the charge is framed, the accused person is fully appraised of the nature and details of the offence alleged against him via all the evidence already adduced by the prosecution before the trial Court.
In the instant case, the charge framed by the trial Court was punishable under Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act Cap 135, LFN, 1990. The provision reads as follows:
?Any person who drives a motor vehicle on a Federal Highway recklessly or negligently, or at a speed or manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the

case including the state, condition, and use of that highway, and to the amount of traffic which at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be on that highway shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine of four hundred naira or to imprisonment for two years or to both such fine and imprisonment.? (Emphasis supplied)
The charge (already reproduced earlier in this Judgment) was read and explained to the Appellant and he pleaded not guilty to it (page 17 of the Record). Thereafter, the Appellant/accused person entered his defence by testifying and calling one witness, DW2; and the Appellant?s Counsel addressed the trial Court on the evidence adduced and the law via a written address. At the close of trial, the learned trial Magistrate assessed and evaluated the totality of the evidence adduced before him and found that the prosecution had proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt. He therefore pronounced inter alia as follows (at page 26 of the Record):
“I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved their case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and I find him guilty of negligent and careless driving. The

accused person is hereby found guilty and convicted under Section 6(1) of the Federal High Ways Act Cap 135 LFN 1990.” (Emphasis supplied)
?The Appellant?s contention before the Court below (as before this Court) that there is no offence provided for in Section 6(1) of the Federal Highways Act (supra) known as “negligent and careless driving”, was peremptorily dismissed. I must say that I agree with the Court below. The extensive submissions of the Appellant in this regard in his Brief of argument before this Court are both shallow and without basis. While it is true that the charge must, as much as possible, reflect the offence as described in the statute, the failure to use the exact words as those used in the statute creating the offence, is not fatal to the charge. The trial Court may use words which convey the same or similar meaning with those used in the statute. This is more so in a case such as this one, where ample evidence was adduced through four witnesses and documents, and the ingredients of the offence charged were brought to the notice of the Appellant. He was therefore not misled by the interchange of the words: reckless, negligent

and careless.
The object of a charge in a criminal proceeding includes making an accused person to be fully aware of the case he is confronting in Court, and entails the specification or particularization of the essential ingredients of the offence in question – Mohammed V State (2010) LPELR-9019(CA). In the instant case, the words used in the charge, to wit: ?drove a motor vehicle on a Federal Highway recklessly?, instead of the exact words used in the statute, which is: driving ?recklessly or negligently?, is of no moment. Indeed, from the wordings of the provision in Section 6(1) under which the Appellant was charged, it would be sufficient if the charge stated that the accused person drove either recklessly or negligently, as the words are used disjunctively. In this case, he was charged of driving recklessly. It is therefore difficult to see the substance in the Appellant?s complaint.
?The final complaint of the Appellant is that the trial Court, after charging him with driving ?recklessly?, convicted him of ?negligent and careless driving?. Again, I am at a loss to see the substance in this

complaint, much less how this has prejudiced the Appellant in any way. Instead, I totally agree with the Court below that all the arguments proffered on this issue by the Appellant are in the realm of mere semantics. In fact, I consider the Appellant?s antics even less than raising semantics; instead it borders on mischief and an attempt to escape responsibility for his actions or to bear the consequences of his acts. The mere fact that that the trial Court included the adjective ?careless? to the word ?negligent? driving, in convicting him of the offence charged, does not in any way detract from sound Judgment issued by the trial Court, which is completely borne out by the evidence adduced before it.
? The main purpose of a charge is to give the accused person notice of the case against him. It is the law that no error in stating the offence or particulars required to be stated in the charge and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission. Even a defect in a charge will not vitiate a trial except

where such a defect occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Mamman V FRN (2010) LPELR-4470(CA) 32 per Augie, JCA (as he then was); Odeh V FRN (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1103) 1 (SC); Shekete V NAF (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) 159; Agbo V State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 977) 545; & FRN V Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 113.
The offence for which the Appellant was charged was well defined therein, with the penalty therefore clearly stated. Indeed the charge, in my view, was in substantial compliance with the provisions of the law. However, an error or omission in reproducing the exact wordings in the relevant law should not be a reason for declaring the trial bad. In the case of Ogomor V State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 233, 234, the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte, JSC acknowledged that there is a difference between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material. He states:
?Thus, the law distinguishes between omissions and errors which are trivial and not material and will not vitiate a trial, and those which are material will vitiate the trial. Where the omission or error is material to the charge, it necessarily misleads and will vitiate the trial.

For instance, where the information refers to a repealed enactment, and there is no similar offence known to law, the error would be regarded to as material and fundamental and will undoubtedly mislead the accused.?
See also Akala V FRN (2014) LPELR-22930(CA) 38; Essien V COP (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 489. Therefore, a charge which does not contain the exact words of the statute is not necessarily bad if the accused person is not misled thereby.

Finally, the law is settled that where a Court of trial unmistakably evaluates the evidence and duly appraises the facts adduced before it, as in this case, it is not the business of an appellate Court to substitute its own views for the views of the trial Court unless such views are perverse. Thus, without further ado, and in light of all the above, I resolve the sole issue for determination against the Appellant and in favour of the Respondent.
?
Therefore, for all the above reasons. I find the Appeal bereft of merit. It fails and is dismissed. Accordingly, I affirm the Judgment of the Court below, as well as its Order, that the Appellant be promptly returned to Prison to serve out his term of

imprisonment.

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: My Learned Brother Jummai Hannatu Sankey, J.C.A, made available to me, in draft form, a copy of the lead Judgment in which this appeal was dismissed.
I agree and adopt as mine the resolution of the sole issue formulated for determination. It is the law that in stating the particulars of an offence, the words used in the Section of the Statute creating the offence ought to be used, but a charge is not bad for non-compliance if the accused person is not misled; Abidoye v. FRN (2013) LPELR 21899 (SC),. The main purpose of a charge is to give the accused person sufficient notice of the case against him, and once the charge discloses an offence with the necessary particulars that should be brought to his attention, in order to avoid his being prejudiced or embarrassed, such a charge will b good in law,Ifeanyi v. FRN (2018) LPELR-43941(SC). The Appellant was by no means misled by the inclusion of the adjective ‘careless’ to the word ?negligent? driving, in convicting him for offence charged.
?Indeed, I see no merit in the appeal. In my view, the Appellant was

merely flying a kite. The appeal is also dismissed by me. I abide by orders made in the lead Judgment.

JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, J.C.A.: I read before now lead judgment of my learned brother, Sankey, J.C.A, which has just been delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion therein that the appeal lacks merit.
I therefore dismiss the same.

Appearances:

For Appellant(s)

For Respondent(s)

Appearances

For Appellant

AND

For Respondent