EFFIONG OKON OMON & ORS v. BARR. EKPA B. EKPA
(2019)LCN/13501(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 14th day of June, 2019
CA/C/384/2016
RATIO
JURISDICTION: THE COURT SHOULD HANLDE ISSUES RELATING TO JURISDICTION FIRST
The law mandates the Courts to accord prime attention to issue of jurisdiction first where it germinates from any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig) Ltd. v. seplat Pet. Dev. Co. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (P. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Ngere v. Okuruket xiv (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440. I will pay total obedience to this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
JURISDICTION: DEFINITION
Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Unltd v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Society Bic S.A. v. Charzin Ind. Ltd. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 497; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; A. G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210;Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
WHEN DOES A COURT OF LAW HAVE JURISDICTION?
A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: 1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction?, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 208 1961 NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1059) 164; Okereke v. Yar? Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
DEFAMATION: DEFINITION
The cause of action is founded on the tort of defamation. Defamation has been, judicially, defined to embrace imputations which tend to lower a persons dignity in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society and expose him, the person so disparaged, to hatred approbrium, odium, contempt or ridicule, see Oruwari v Osler (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 535.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
DEFAMATION: THE TWO TYPES OF DEFEAMATION
There are two species of defamation: libel and slander. Libel is any publication in print, writing, pictures or signs that injures the reputation of somebody. Slander, on the other hand, means a defamatory statement made/conveyed by spoken words, sounds, looks, signs and gestures which injure the reputation of somebody, see Society BIC S.A. v. Charzin Ind. Ltd. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 497; Oruwari v. Osler (supra)PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
DEFAMATION: HOW TO SUCCEED IN A CLAIM OF DEFEMATION
To succeed in an action for defamation, which is actionable per se, the defamed person must conjunctively prove. (1) Publication of the offending words. (2) That the offending words refer to him. (3) That the offending words are defamatory of him. (4) That the offending words were published to a third party. (5) That they are false or lack accuracy and (6) That there are no justifiable legal grounds for the publication of the defamatory words, see Dalumo v. Sketch Publication Co. Ltd. (1972) SSC 308; Ezomo v. Oyakhire (1985) 2 SC221; Onu v. Agbese (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 704/(1985) LPELR ? 2698 (SC); Nsirim v. Nsirim (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 255; Dumbo v. Idugboe (1983) NSCC 22; Offoboche v. Ogoja L.G. (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458; Iloabachie v. Iloabachie (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 695; Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Ajagbemokeferi (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 100) 678/(1989) 1 NSCC 346; Amorc v. Awoniyi (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (Pt. 11) 390; Newspapers Corporation v. Oni (1995) 1 SCNJ 218;Emeagwara Star Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd. (2000) 2 SCNQR (Pt. 2) 910; Mamman v. Salaudeen (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 478; Peterside v. Fubara (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 156; Ologe v. New Africa Holdings Ltd. (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 449; Ekong v. Otop (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1419) 549; Mainstreet Bank Ltd. v. Binna (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 316.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: HOW THE COURT SHOULD ASCERTAIN THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
In ascertaining the weight of evidence, the trial Court is enjoined, by law, to consider whether the evidence is admissible, relevant, credible, conclusive or more probable than that given by the other party, see Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC91; Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 2 NSCC, Vol. 17, 799 at 806/(1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 731; Nwokidu v. Okanu (supra) (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362; Akinlagun v. Oshoboja (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60; Gov., Lagos State v. Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 291; Oyewole v. Akande (2009)15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 11; Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 412.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
COURTS: DUTY OF COURTS: DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT AS PROVIDED BY THE LAW
The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies, see Mogaji v. Odofin (supra); Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Oyewole v. Akande (supra); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 LR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWL.R (Pt 1356) 11; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 522.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
COURT: THE PRIMARY DUTY OF THE COURT IN A CASE OF DEFAMATION
To start with, in defamation cases, it is primary duty of the trial Judex to determine whether a publication is defamatory or not of a plaintiff. In doing so, the Judge construes the publication holistically, not in isolation, employing literal interpretation to it: ordinary grammatical means of the words in the publication. It is incumbent on the Judge to adopt the litmus test of foraging what a reasonable men/right thinking men in the society think of the publication, see Onu v. Agbese (supra); Dumbo v. Idugboe (supra); Sketch Publishing v. Ajagbemokeferi (supra); Amorc v. Awoniyi (supra); Ekong v. Otop (supra); Ologe v. New Africa Holdings Ltd. (supra).PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
EVIDENCE: WHEN A PIECE OF EVIDENCE WILL BE CONSIDERED CREDIBLE
A piece of evidence is credible when it is worthy of belief, see Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353; Eta v. Dazie (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 248; A. J. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380; Emeka v. Chuba-Ikpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345. In the same vein, a piece of evidence is conclusive if it leads to a definite result, see Nruamah v. Ebuzoeme (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474.PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
FORGERY: DEFINITION
As a prelude, forgery connotes making a false document or altering a genuine one for usage. It occurs when a document tells a lie about itself; see Babalola v. The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 115) 264 at 277; Nigerian Air Force v. Kamaldeen (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1032) 164; A.P.C. v. PDP (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1481) 1; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1585) 386. A party who alleges forgery of a document must produce two documents: (a) the document (original) from which the forgery was made; and (b) the forged/counterfeit document, see APC v. PDP (supra); Agi v. PDP (supra).PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
FORGERY: IS UNDER THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW
That is not all. Forgery is an amphibious term. It is accommodated in the civil and criminal actions, see Mohammed v. Wammako (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 573. In other words, a party who claims forgery of a document in civil proceedings must prove it beyond reasonable doubt, see Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374; APC v. PDP (supra); Ogboru v. Okowa (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1522) 84; Saleh v. Abah (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1578) 100; Mohammed v. Wammako (supra).PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
AN APPELLATE COURT AS WELL AS THE PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THE CONTENT OF THE RECORDS
The law does not grant this Court the licence to import such time condensation in the order. The reason is not far-fetched. An appellate Court is bound by the contents of the record. It has no vires to read into what is absent from it nor add into it what is outside the record. In other words, it must construe the record in its exact content. The parties are bound by the record too, see Orugbo v. Una (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) 175; Ogidi v. State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 918) 286; O. O. M. F. v. N. A. C. B. Ltd. (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 412; Ekpemupolo v. Edremoda (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1142) 166; International Bank Plc. v. Onwuka (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 462; Sapo v. Sunmonu (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 374; Akanbi v. Oyewale (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt. 456) 1922; Offor v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 421; Adegbuyi v. APC (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442)1; Brittania U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet Dev. Co. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 541; PDP v. Umana (No.2) (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 307. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
1. EFFIONG OKON OMON
2. GEORGE U. ESSIEN
3. GODWIN U. UMOH
4. ISAAC UDO EKONG
5. A. A. ETOK
6. IME AKPAN BASSEY
7. EFFIONG DAN AKPAN
8. OKON DAVID UMOREN
9. FRIDAY E. INYANG Appellant(s)
AND
BARR. EKPA B. EKPA Respondent(s)
OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal probes into the correctness of the decision of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State holden at Uyo (hereinafter addressed as ?the lower Court?), coram judice: Godwin J. Abraham, J., (as he then was), in Suit No. HIT/53/2009, delivered on 8th March, 2016. Before the lower Court, the appellants and the respondent were the defendants and the plaintiff respectively.
The facts of the case, which transformed into the appeal, are amenable to brevity and simplicity. The parties hail from Use Ndon, Ibiono Ibom Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State. During the construction of Itak/Use Ikot Amama Road by Akwa Ibom State, through CCECC, Ikot Usan-Use Abat, the properties of the residents alongside it were damaged. As a result, the Use Ndon Village Council, on 10th March, 2008, appointed the respondent, a lawyer, as a consultant to oversee and collect the compensations for those whose properties were affected. The 745 persons, including the appellants, whose buildings, economic trees/crops were destroyed, donated an irrevocable power of attorney, registered with
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the Lands Registry, Ministry of Lands and Town Planning, Uyo as No. 50 at page 50 in volume 277, to the respondent as authority to collect the compensations for them.
The respondent consulted an estate valuer who prepared evaluation report and wrote to the project manager of CCECC, Ikot usan-Use Abat for the payment of the compensation for the donors of the power of attorney. The respondent briefed the Use Ndon Village Council meetings on the efforts and progress made for the payment of the compensations and he was commended. On 20th May, 2009, the appellants wrote to the project manager of CCECC, Use Abat, Ibiono Ibom Local Government Area, and Site Engineer, Ministry of Works, Uyo, stating that the CCECC should have no dealings with the respondent. On 17th June, 2009, the fifth appellant swore to an affidavit, in the High Court Registry, Uyo, which shares the same effect with the letter. The respondent alleged that the two documents were defamatory of his character. Sequel to that, the respondent beseeched the lower Court, via a writ of summons filed on 8th July, 2009, and tabled against the appellants, jointly and severally, the following reliefs:<br< p=””
</br<
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1. A DECLARATION that the letter written on 20/5/2009 to the Project Manager, CCECC, Use Abat, Ibiono Ibom Local Government Area and the Site Engineer, Ministry of Works, Uyo that ?The Members of the above village council hereby wish to notify you that we have lost confident (sic) in Barr. Ekpa B. Ekpa whom we trusted as an indigene to protect the village interest on this regard and whom, we had trusted with power of attorney.
He has betrayed the trust of the people of Use Ndon village and as such the village has withdrawn the power of attorney granted to him.
Your company should now deal directly with the village council of Use Ndon through the village head elect Obong Pastor Wilson Iwa Udofia.
Please note that any further dealings with Barr. Ekpa B. Ekpa on compensation to the affected persons in Use Ndon is null and void and not acceptable by us?. AND the affidavit sworn to by the 5th defendant at the High Court, Uyo on 17/6/2009 that ?I, Effiong D. Akpan a chairman of village council of Use Ndon in Ibiono Ibom Local Government of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, now residing thereat and citizen of the Federal Republic of
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Nigeria, do hereby make oath and state as follows:
i) That the Power of Attorney made some times ago by the Use Ndon members is hereby withdrawn.
ii) That the essence of withdrawal is that the valuer has betrayed the trust of the people of Use Ndon village and as such the village has withdrawn the power of attorney granted to him.
?iii) That we want the former valuer Barr. Ekpa B. Ekpa to handed (sic) over to the village council of Use Ndon through the village head elect Obong Pastor Wilson Iwa Udofia.
iv) That this affidavit is sworn for record purposes and for information of the authority/ies concerned to believe the fact deposed herein as true and correct.
AND THAT I SWEAR, to this affidavit conscientiously believing same to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and by virtue of the provisions of the Oath acts of 1990.
DECLARANT
Sworn to at the High Court Registry,
Uyo, this 17th day of June, 2009.
BEFORE ME
COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS.
ARE false, malicious and defamatory of the plaintiff.
?2. FOR the
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defendants to retract the said defamatory statements with requisite apology to be published in (2) two National Newspapers and announcing same in the Akwa Ibom State Radio and Television.
3. N20m (Twenty Million Naira) damages for the injury, loss of reputation and character caused the plaintiff by the publication.
4. PERPETUAL injunction restraining the defendants by themselves, privies, servants or agents from further publication of such defamatory statements against the plaintiff pending the hearing and determination of this suit.
In reaction, the appellants joined issue with the respondent and denied liability.
Following the rival claims, the lower Court had a full-scale determination of the case. In proof of the case, the respondent testified as PW1 and tendered three documentary evidence: Exhibits 1-3. In disproof of the case, the appellants fielded a single witness, DW1. At the closure of evidence, the parties, through their respective counsel, addressed the lower Court. In a considered judgment, delivered on 8th March, 2016, found at pages 475-486, the lower Court granted the respondent?s claim.
The appellants were
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dissatisfied with the judgment. Hence, on 20th April, 2016, they lodged a 4-ground notice and grounds of appeal, copied at pages 487-490 of the record, wherein they prayed the Court as follows:
For the Court of Appeal to set aside or reverse the judgment of the lower Court and to enter judgment for the Appellants in terms of their defence i.e. dismiss the Respondent?s claims at the lower Court.
Thereafter, the parties, through their counsel, filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument in line with the procedure regulating the hearing of civil appeals before this Court. The appeal was heard on 10th April, 2019.
During its hearing, learned counsel for the appellants, Chief P. Anselem Eyo, adopted the appellants? brief of argument, filed on 22nd May, 2017 and deemed properly filed on 24th May, 2017, and appellants? reply brief, filed on 27th November, 2017 and deemed properly on 10th April, 2019, as representing his arguments for the appeal. He urged the Court to allow it. Similarly, learned respondent, Ekpa B. Ekpa, Esq., adopted the respondent?s brief of argument, filed on 23rd June, 2017, as forming his
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reactions against the appeal. He urged the Court to dismiss it.
In the appellants? brief of argument, learned counsel distilled four issues for determination to wit:
2.1 Whether the judgment of the Learned Trial Judge was against the weight of evidence.
2.2 Whether the Learned Trial Judge did not err in law by assuming the jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s claim as constituted and or to grant the relief that were sought by the Respondent.
2.3 Whether the Learned Trial Judge did not err in law by lending its stamp of authority to illegality with regards to the impugned power of attorney subject matter of the dispute.
2.4 Whether the Learned Trial Judge did not err in law in terms of his order for the retraction of the alleged defamatory publication and an apology to the Respondent.
Admirably, learned counsel for the respondent adopted the four issues crafted by the learned appellants? counsel.
Arguments on the issues:
Issue one
Learned counsel for the appellants set out the meaning of judgment being against the weight of evidence as noted in Musa Sha (Jnr) v. Da Rap Kwan (2000) 5 SCNJ
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101; Osolu v. Osolu (2003) FWLR (Pt. 172) 1777; A.-G., Akwa Ibom State v. Essien (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 233) 1730. He submitted that he wrongly placed the burden of proof on the appellants and its judgment liable to be upturned. He relied on Usman v. Garke (2003) FWLR (Pt. 177) 815. He observed that if the complaint of the appellants was criminal, then it ought to have been investigated. He explained that since the respondent claimed to be an estate valuer, when he was not and did not consult any, it was a betrayal of trust. He stated that those documents were sent to those who did not testify to show how defamatory they were. He said that the appellants were justified to be disappointed over the respondent?s claim of engaging an estate valuer when there was no proof of it. He cited ACB v. Apugo (2001) 4 SCM 13; Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act; Elias v. Disu (1962) All NLR 215; Citizens International Bank Ltd. v. SCOA (Nig.) Ltd. (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 323) 1680. He explained the meaning of betray as noted in Merriam Webster?s Collegiate Dictionary, page 111.
Learned counsel further submitted that the lower Court failed to consider the
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meaning of the offending words in the contest the appellants made on the statements as they had reason to complain about the respondent?s betrayal of their trust. He referred to Utih v. Onoyivwe (1991) 12 LRCN 163; Dumbo v. Idugboe 1983) All NLR 37; Sketch Publishing Ltd. v. Ajagbemokeferi (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 100) 678; Otop v. Ekong (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 311) 1355.
On behalf of the respondent, learned counsel explained the duty of a Court on issue of judgment being against weight of evidence. He relied on Osolu v. Osolu (2003) 113 LRCN 2641; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2009) 173 LRCN 60. He stated that the publication affected the respondent?s professional business as a lawyer and injured his financial credit. He cited Ologe v. New Africa Holdings Ltd. (2013) 120 (Pt. 1) LRCN 124. He said that the appellants admitted the publication and there was no need to call those that received the documents. He noted that imputation need not be proved and even if imputations were used instead of imputation, there was no miscarriage of justice. He cited Peterside v. Fubara (2013) 218 (Pt. 2) LRCN 216; Akomolafe v. Guardian Press Ltd. (2010) 182 LRCN 63. He observed that
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the lower Court never considered the valuation report in its judgment and the appellants failed to plead or demand for further particulars on the report and the argument on it went to no issue. He cited Apena v. Aileru (2014) 237 LRCN 1; Nwokorobia v. Nwogu (2009) 5 KLR (Pt. 267) 1303. He added that the publication, Exhibit 3, never mentioned power of attorney. He maintained that the absence of the valuation report did not mean hiding evidence under Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011. He relied onFRN v. Umaru (2014) 230 LRCN 1.
Learned counsel postulated that the respondent?s pleading and evidence of the appellants? commendation of his efforts negatived appellants? contention on betrayal of trust by the respondent. He declared the cases, cited by the appellants, as inapplicable.
Issue two
Learned counsel for the appellants contended that since the appellants pleaded and established criminal ingredients of fraud and forgery against the respondent, the lower Court should not have heard the action without appropriate criminal procedure of investigation. He relied on Zimit v. Mahmoud (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 267) 71. He added
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that since it was proved that some of the persons in the power of attorney had died, the lower Court should have directed appropriate investigation of it. He cited Abiodun v. Chief Judge of Kwara State (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 448) 340. He asserted that a Court would not exercise jurisdiction beyond the statutory provision as there could not be inherent jurisdiction. He referred to Agu v. Odofin (1992) 3 SCNJ 161.
For the respondent, learned counsel submitted, per contra, that the lower Court had jurisdiction to hear the action under Sections 6 and 272 of the Constitution, as amended. He cited Egunjobi v. FRN (2013) 218 LRCN 88. He noted that jurisdiction of Court is statutory. He referred to Apugo v. OHMB (2016) 261 LRCN 1.
Issue three
Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the lower Court had a duty not to allow itself to be used as a stamp of authority for illegality with regards to the impugned power of attorney. He relied on RCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. R.P.C. Ltd (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 265) 1020; Inyang v. Ebong (2001) 25 WRN 138.
?On the side of the respondent, learned counsel contended that the appellants did not plead and give evidence
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of illegality or fraud of the power of attorney. He stated that the literate appellants who signed the power of attorney understood what they signed. He relied on Inyang v. Ebong (2001) 25 WRN 138.
Issue four
Learned counsel for the appellants posited that by Section 24(2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Act, the appellants had three months to appeal against the judgment. He reasoned that the lower Court?s order on apology infringed the appellants? right to appeal. He relied on Mumu v. Agor (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 313) 573.
On the part of the respondent, learned counsel argued that by Section 241(1) of the Constitution, as amended, and Section 24 (2)(b) of the Court of Appeal, the appellants exercised their right of appeal when they filed their notice of appeal on 24th April, 2016 within three months of the judgment. He persisted that the lower court?s order did not foreclose their right of appeal especially when the respondent did not execute the judgment within three months. He declared the case of Mumu v. Agor (supra), cited by the appellants, as inapplicable.
Resolution of the issues:
In total loyalty to the dictate
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of the law, I will attend to issue two first. The reason is plain. It evinces a jurisdictional question. The law mandates the Courts to accord prime attention to issue of jurisdiction first where it germinates from any proceedings, see Okwu v. Umeh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig) Ltd. v. seplat Pet. Dev. Co. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (P. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Ngere v. Okuruket ?xiv? (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559) 440. I will pay total obedience to this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.
Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding, see Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. Co. Unltd v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1; Ndaeyo v. Ogunaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Society Bic S.A. v. Charzin Ind. Ltd. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 497; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; A. ? G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210;
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Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175. A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: ?1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction?, see Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (2006) 2 LC 208 1961 NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Dairo v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1059) 164; Okereke v. Yar? Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387. These three ingredients must co-exist in order to vest
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jurisdiction in a Court.
Now, the meat of the issue, though a seemingly stubborn one, is canalised within a narrow compass. It chastises the lower Court?s assumption of jurisdiction over the respondent?s suit. The lower Court erected its decision on the provision of Section 272 of the Constitution, as amended. Due to its kingly position and role on the issue, it is imperative to pluck out the provision, where it is ingrained in the Constitution, ipissima verba, thus:
272 (1) Subject to the provision of Section 251 and other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.
(2) The reference to civil and criminal proceedings in this section includes a reference to the proceedings which originate in the High Court of a State and those which are brought
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before the High Court to be dealt with by the Court in the exercise of its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction.
The provision is comprehension ? friendly and the Courts have accorded literal interpretation to it.
To begin with, the respondent?s action, which parented the appeal, is, deeply, rooted in the tort of defamation. I had outlined the respondent?s reliefs at the cradle of this judgment. In order to conserve the scarce juridical time and space, it is pointless to import and propagate them here. Suffice to say that the action is hedged around the respondent?s perception of violation of his legal right. In A.-G, Lagos State v. A-G., Fed. (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 1 at 126, Tobi, JSC, graphically, captured the import of legal right in these illuminating words:
What is a legal right? A legal right, in my view, is a right cognisable in law. It means a right recognised by law and capable of being enforced by the plaintiff. It is a right of a party recognised and protected by a rule of law, the violation of which would be a legal wrong done to the interest of the plaintiff, even though no action is taken. The
16
determination of the existence of a legal right is not whether the action will succeed at the trial but whether the action donates such a right by reference to the enabling law in respect of the commencement of the action.
It is decipherable from this magisterial pronouncement, in the ex cathedra authority, that the respondent was armed with a legal right capable of ventilation in a Court of law. The success or otherwise of it is a different thing which does not erode the jurisdiction of the court to entertain it.
I have, in due allegiance to the expectation of the law, situated the respondent?s action, as manifest in the reliefs, with the positions of the law displayed above. The raison d? tre for the juxtaposition is simple. It is to discover if the action/claims come with the ambit of the jurisdiction of the lower Court. As already noted, the action is founded on tort of defamation. On this score, the lower Court was equipped with the requisite jurisdiction to hear it. In Society BIC S.A. v. Charzin Ind. Ltd. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 497) at 541. Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, incisively, opined: ?Since the claims are for libel and
17
injunction, the State High Court ? and not the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff/respondent?s claims.? Indeed, once the items meant for adjudication by the Federal High Court and the National Industrial Court, in their first instance jurisdiction as entrenched in Section 251 (1) and 254C(1) of the Constitution, as amended, respectively are excised, ?All other items not included in the list would therefore still be within the jurisdiction of the State High Court,? see Onuorah v. K.R.P.C Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393 at 405, per Akintan, JSC; N.U.E.E. v. B.P.E. (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 538; Egharevba v. Eribo (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 411; Sun Ins. (Nig.) Plc. v. U.E.C.C Ltd. (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1471) 576; Ugo-Ngadi, v. FRN (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1620) 29.
In the light of this brief legal anatomy, the lower Court was clothed with the requisite jurisdiction to hear the actions germinating from the tortious act of defamation. It flows, that the lower Court did not, in the least, fracture the law when it assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate over the respondent?s action which as predicated on defamation.
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This, with due reverence, exposes the poverty of the learned appellants? counsel?s scintillating submission on the issue. It is lame and cannot fly. It will smell of judicial sacrilege to tinker with a finding or judicial act that is not hostile to the law. In the end, I have no choice than to resolve the issue two against the appellants and in favour of the respondents.
Having dispenses with the jurisdictional issue two, I reverse to settle issue one. It is foremost to appreciate the nature of the respondent?s action which mothered the appeal. The cause of action is founded on the tort of defamation. Defamation has been, judicially, defined to embrace imputations which tend to lower a person?s dignity in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society and expose him, the person so disparaged, to hatred approbrium, odium, contempt or ridicule, see Oruwari v Osler (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 535. There are two species of defamation: libel and slander. Libel is any publication in print, writing, pictures or signs that injures the reputation of somebody. Slander, on the other hand, means a defamatory statement made/conveyed by
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spoken words, sounds, looks, signs and gestures which injure the reputation of somebody, see Society BIC S.A. v. Charzin Ind. Ltd. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1398) 497; Oruwari v. Osler (supra). To succeed in an action for defamation, which is actionable per se, the defamed person must conjunctively prove. (1) Publication of the offending words. (2) That the offending words refer to him. (3) That the offending words are defamatory of him. (4) That the offending words were published to a third party. (5) That they are false or lack accuracy and (6) That there are no justifiable legal grounds for the publication of the defamatory words, see Dalumo v. Sketch Publication Co. Ltd. (1972) SSC 308; Ezomo v. Oyakhire (1985) 2 SC221; Onu v. Agbese (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 704/(1985) LPELR ? 2698 (SC); Nsirim v. Nsirim (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 138) 255; Dumbo v. Idugboe (1983) NSCC 22; Offoboche v. Ogoja L.G. (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 739) 458; Iloabachie v. Iloabachie (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 695; Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Ajagbemokeferi (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 100) 678/(1989) 1 NSCC 346; Amorc v. Awoniyi (1994) 7-8 SCNJ (Pt. 11) 390; Newspapers Corporation v. Oni (1995) 1 SCNJ 218;
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Emeagwara Star Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd. (2000) 2 SCNQR (Pt. 2) 910; Mamman v. Salaudeen (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 478; Peterside v. Fubara (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 156; Ologe v. New Africa Holdings Ltd. (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 449; Ekong v. Otop (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1419) 549; Mainstreet Bank Ltd. v. Binna (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 316.
Now the appellant?s chief grievance orbits around the lower Court?s evaluation of the evidence. Put bluntly, the appellants accused the lower court of improper evaluation of evidence because the judgment was against the weight of evidence. A castigation of a decision on the premise that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, invariably couched as an omnibus ground, connotes that the decision of the trial Court cannot be supported by the weight of evidence advanced by the successful party which the Court either wrongly accepted or that the inference it drew or conclusion it reached, based on the accepted evidence, is unjustifiable in law. Also, it implies that there is no evidence, which if accepted, will buttress the finding of the trial Court. Furthermore, it denotes that when the evidence
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adduced by the complaining appellant is weighed against that given by the respondent, the judgment rendered to the respondent is against the totality of the evidence placed before the trial Court. In ascertaining the weight of evidence, the trial Court is enjoined, by law, to consider whether the evidence is admissible, relevant, credible, conclusive or more probable than that given by the other party, see Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC91; Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 2 NSCC, Vol. 17, 799 at 806/(1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 731; Nwokidu v. Okanu (supra) (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362; Akinlagun v. Oshoboja (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60; Gov., Lagos State v. Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 291; Oyewole v. Akande (2009)15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 11; Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 412.
The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and
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final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies, see Mogaji v. Odofin (supra); Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225; Oyewole v. Akande (supra); Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 LR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWL.R (Pt 1356) 11; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 522. I have married the decision of the lower Court with the positions of law displayed above with a view to deciphering their infractions or compliance.
To start with, in defamation cases, it is primary duty of the trial Judex to determine whether a publication is defamatory or not of a plaintiff. In doing so, the Judge construes
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the publication holistically, not in isolation, employing literal interpretation to it: ordinary grammatical means of the words in the publication. It is incumbent on the Judge to adopt the litmus test of foraging what a reasonable men/right thinking men in the society think of the publication, see Onu v. Agbese (supra); Dumbo v. Idugboe (supra); Sketch Publishing v. Ajagbemokeferi (supra); Amorc v. Awoniyi (supra); Ekong v. Otop (supra); Ologe v. New Africa Holdings Ltd. (supra).
I have, in due obeisance and desire of the law, consulted the mountainous record, the bedrock of the appeal, especially at the residence of the judgment of the lower Court which colonises pages 475 ? 486 of it. I have perused the 11-page judgment with the finery of a tooth comb. Admirably, it is submissive to easy comprehension. The lower Court, painstakingly, considered the elements of defamation vis-a-vis libel, on which the action was pegged, catalogued above. It found the publication, in Exhibit 3, as libellous of the respondent?s reputation as a lawyer. Betrayal of trust, which the appellants charged the respondent in Exhibit 3, is, certainly, fraught
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with negative imputations against him as a lawyer. A lawyer pleads for others in the society. His trade is built and rooted in trust which members of the public repose in him. Allegation of the betrayal of trust portrays a lawyer as one who cannot be taken into confidence. It, undoubtedly, is a serious erosion of a lawyer?s reputation in his professional calling and financial credit. Exhibit 3, which labels the respondent, who had held several pivotal positions in the society and gained legion of laurels, as a betrayer of trust constitutes a serious and invincible dents on his integrity and honesty as a barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. It tarnishes his hard-earned dignity, appurtenant to his position as a lawyer, and, ultimately, neutralises the assurances of the members of the public in relation to his business. Indeed: ?When wealth is lost, nothing is lost, when health is lost something is lost but when character is lost everything is lost,? see Mirchandani v. Pinheiro (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 557 at 577 per Galadima, JCA (later JSC). In fact, Exhibit 3, unjustifiably, assassinated the respondent?s character.
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The lower Court, duly, respected the law in its finding on the point. I am in full agreement with it.
Besides, the lower Court, equally, treated the defence of justification/truth of the publication weaved by the appellants. Being a defence invented by the appellants to escape/avoid liability, it is their bounden duty, saddled on them by the adjectival law, to establish it. The lower Court reached a solemn finding that the defence was devoid of proof. Proof, in law, is a process by which the existence of facts is established to the satisfaction of the Court, see Olufosoye v. Fakorede (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 747; Awuse v. Odili (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt. 952) 416. The appellants maintained that they were armed with reasons for the publication in Exhibit 3. The lower Court could not locate any in their evidence. I have given a clinical examination to the appellant?s viva voce evidence, offered by their star and only witness, DW1, on record. The appellants, via DW1, in their infinite wisdom, hoarded and starved the Court of the reason(s) for the publication in Exhibit 3. This was a serious coup de grace in their defence which they contrived as a shield to the
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libellous suit. The absence of the reason(s) castrates the appellants plea of justification and rendered it a pseudo-defence. I endorse, in toto, the lower Court?s finding on the point.
Indubitably, the lower Court, to my mind, carried out a meticulous and thorough analyses of the evidence, oral and documentary, proffered by the warring parties after assigning them to their respective pans in the imaginary scale of justice. It attached deserving probative weight to the respective evidence professed by the parties. It found that the respondent?s pan in the imaginary scale of justice hosted more admissible, credible and conclusive evidence than that of the appellants?. A piece of evidence is credible when it is worthy of belief, see Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353; Eta v. Dazie (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 248; A. J. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380; Emeka v. Chuba-Ikpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345. In the same vein, a piece of evidence is conclusive if it leads to a definite result, see Nruamah v. Ebuzoeme (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474. The lower
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Court found, rightly in my view, that the evidence of the respondent, based on their qualitative nature, preponderated over those of the appellant.
In the light of this juridical survey, the lower Court did not defile the law as to be guilty of the allegation of perfunctory evaluation of evidence levelled against it by the appellants. The charge is spurious and unsustainable in law. On this premise, I dishonour the appellants? enticing invitation to crucify the lower Court?s decision on the undeserved altar of improper evaluation of evidence. In the end, I will not hesitate to resolve issue one against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.
That takes me to the treatment of issue three. The nucleus of issue falls within a very slim scope. It quarrels with the lower Court?s finding that the power of authority, Exhibit 2, was not a forgery.
As a prelude, forgery connotes making a false document or altering a genuine one for usage. It occurs when a document tells a lie about itself; see Babalola v. The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 115) 264 at 277; Nigerian Air Force v. Kamaldeen (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1032) 164; A.P.C. v. PDP
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(2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1481) 1; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1585) 386. A party who alleges forgery of a document must produce two documents: (a) the document (original) from which the forgery was made; and (b) the forged/counterfeit document, see APC v. PDP (supra); Agi v. PDP (supra).
The appellants? coup de main is that Exhibit 2 was a forged document. The Exhibit 2 is an irrevocable power of attorney, made on 9th September, 2008, donated by 745 donors, including the appellants, to the respondent authorising him to recover the compensations accruing to the donors from the Akwa Ibom State Government. It is in its original state. In other words, there was/is no other power of attorney, presented in the bowel of the lower Court, imitating Exhibit 2 as a counterfeit. Put starkly, the two twin ingredients of proof of forgery were not established. The appellants asserted forgery and stigmatised Exhibit 2 as one. In the eyes of the law, the burden resides/rests on them to prove the forgery of Exhibit 2. The appellants? failure to produce/avail the lower Court of another document, showcasing that Exhibit 2 is phantom, punctures their branding it as
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a forgery.
That is not all. Forgery is an amphibious term. It is accommodated in the civil and criminal actions, see Mohammed v. Wammako (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 573. In other words, a party who claims forgery of a document in civil proceedings must prove it beyond reasonable doubt, see Section 135 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374; APC v. PDP (supra); Ogboru v. Okowa (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1522) 84; Saleh v. Abah (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1578) 100; Mohammed v. Wammako (supra). The appellants? neglect to provide the lower Court with another document, to demonstrate that Exhibit 2 was forged, is a concrete evidence that they, woefully, failed to prove the allegation of forgery, preferred against Exhibit 2. Put differently, the appellants failed to discharge the onus probandi, which the law placed on their shoulders, vis–vis the accusation of forgery of Exhibit 2 by the respondent.
At the bottom/foot of page 483 and dawn of page 484 of the elephantine record, the lower Court found:
Having regard to the evidence, there is nothing that is a forgery between the Defendants and the Plaintiff under the
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Power of Attorney.
It stems from the above brief legal dissections, done after due consultation with the law, that the lower Court?s finding on Exhibit 2 was immaculate and unassailable. In effect, all the strictures, which the appellants rained against Exhibit 2 as a false document, are idle and pale into insignificance. I, therefore, resolve issue three against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
It reasons to handle issue four. The focus of the issue is clear. It queries the lower Courts order of retraction of the offensive words in Exhibit 3 within one month of the judgment. In the twilight of the judgment, at pages 485 and 486 of the wordy record, the lower Court ordered:
It is Further Ordered that the Defendants shall within one month from the date of this Judgment write to the Project Manager CCECC in Akwa Ibom State, the Site Engineer Ministry of Works, Uyo retracting that part of Exhibit 3 which alleges that the Plaintiff has betrayed the trust of the people of Use Ndon village, provided that a copy of the letter shall be sent to the Plaintiff.
This order does not, in the least harbour any ambiguity. It is
31
clear, succinct, precise and bereft of woolliness. I am unable to find, even with the prying eagle eye of a Court, where the lower Court, in the order x-rayed above, curtailed the appellants inviolable right to appeal in terms of time frame, as enshrined in Sections 240, 241 and 242 of the Constitution, as amended, and Section 24(2) of the Court of Appeal Act by way of abridgement. The order, to all intents and purposes, never abbreviated the appellants time to appeal against the decision. The law does not grant this Court the licence to import such time condensation in the order. The reason is not far-fetched. An appellate Court is bound by the contents of the record. It has no vires to read into what is absent from it nor add into it what is outside the record. In other words, it must construe the record in its exact content. The parties are bound by the record too, see Orugbo v. Una (2002) 16 NWLR (Pt. 792) 175; Ogidi v. State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 918) 286; O. O. M. F. v. N. A. C. B. Ltd. (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1098) 412; Ekpemupolo v. Edremoda (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1142) 166; International Bank Plc. v. Onwuka (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 462;
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Sapo v. Sunmonu (2010) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1205) 374; Akanbi v. Oyewale (2009) ALL FWLR (Pt. 456) 1922; Offor v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 421; Adegbuyi v. APC (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442)1; Brittania ? U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet Dev. Co. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 541; PDP v. Umana (No.2) (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 307. I must pay due fidelity to this hallowed and inelastic principle of law. It deflates the learned appellants? counsel?s dazzling argument on the issue. In effect, the order, on the footing of its tenor, has not, in any manner howsoever, limited, violated, truncated or caged the appellants? time to appeal against the decision as decreed by the Constitution, as amended, and the statutes. In sum, I resolve issue four against the appellants and in favour of the respondent.
On the whole, having resolved the four issues against the appellants, the destiny of the appeal is obvious. It is meritless and deserves the penalty of dismissal. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal. I affirm the decision of the lower Court delivered on 8th March, 2016. The parties shall bear the respective costs they incurred in the prosecution and defence of
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the doomed appeal.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JCA .
My learned brother has painstakingly dealt with the four issues nominated for determination in this appeal. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the lead judgment. I also consider that the appeal lacks merit and has been rightfully dismissed.
I abide with the consequential orders and the order as to costs.
YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I was afforded the privilege of reading in advance a copy of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at in the judgment. I have nothing to add. I too dismiss the appeal and abide by the order as to cost.
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Appearances:
Chief P. Anselem EyoFor Appellant(s)
Barr. Ekpa B. Ekpa appears in personFor Respondent(s)
Appearances
Chief P. Anselem EyoFor Appellant
AND
Barr. Ekpa B. Ekpa appears in personFor Respondent
