FATI KAKENNA ALKALI MONGUNO v. ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS & ORS (2019)

FATI KAKENNA ALKALI MONGUNO v. ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS & ORS

(2019)LCN/13432(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Friday, the 7th day of June, 2019

CA/J/153/2019

RATIO

PRE-ELECTION MATTERS: PERIOD WITHIN WHICH SUCH MATTERS SHOULD BE FILED
Section 285 (9) of the Constitution (supra) provides:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.PER UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

HOW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PRE-ELECTION MATTER WAS FILED WITHIN THE 14 DAY PERIOD IN LINE WITH SECTION 285(9) OF THE ELECTORAL ACT 2010

Accordingly, to determine whether a pre-election suit was filed within 14 days as stipulated by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Court ought to examine the processes originating from the claimant?s suit to determine either of the following:
(a) The date of the event complained of in the suit or
(b) The date of the decision complained of in the suit or
(c) The date of the action complained of in the suit.PER V

WHERE STATUTE DICTATES THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AN ACTION IS TO TAKE PLACE,IT MUST BE FOLLOWED STRICTLY

It is a principle of law, that where a statute dictates a period of time for the institution of an action, the action shall not be commenced outside the time dictated by the statute. Where any action is brought outside the time prescribed by the statute such suit is said to be statute-barred. SOSAN V. ADEMUYIWA (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 27) 241; ODUBEKO V. FOWLER (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 308) 637; NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY PLC. V. LOTUS PLASTICS LIMITED & ANOR. (2005) 19 NWLR (PT. 959) 158; NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION & FISCAL COMMISSION & ORS.V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON & ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PT. 1656) 247.PER UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

CAUSE OF ACTION: DEFINITION
Cause of action simply denotes the factual base or some factual situations, a combination of which makes the matter in litigation an actionable wrong or an enforceable right. THOMAS V. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 18) 669; IBRAHIM V. OSIM (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 82) 257; ALHAJI AMARU ABBA TUKUR V. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517. The Supreme Court, Per Augie, JSC, gave an elaborate meaning of cause of action as:
i. A cause of complaint;
ii. A civil right or obligation for determination by a Court of law;
iii. A dispute in respect of which a Court of law is entitled to invoke its judicial powers to determine;
iv. A consequent damage;
v. Every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence that is necessary to be proved;
vi. All those things necessary to give a right of action whether they are to be done by the Plaintiff or another person; and
vii. It is factual situation, which enables one person to obtain a remedy from another in Court in respect of injury.”
See: MATHEW IYEKE & 25 ORS. V. PETROLEUM TRAINING INSTITUTE & ANOR. (2019) 2 NWLR (PT. 1656) 217 AT 238. PER UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

CAUSE OF ACTION: HOW TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS A CAUSE OF ACTION
To determine whether or not there is a cause of action or when a cause of action arose, it is only the plaintiffs originating processes, such as the writ of summons, the statement of claim, the originating summons and the affidavit in support thereof, as the case may be, that would be considered. ADIMORA V. AJUFO (1988) 1 NSCC 1005; COMBINED TRADE LIMITED V. ALL STATES TRUST BANK LIMITED (1998) 12 NWLR (PT. 576) 56; WILLIAMS V. WILLIAMS (2008) 10 NWLR (PT. 1095) 364.PER UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

WHETHER AN ACTION WAS BROUGHT OUT OF TIME

THE APEX COURT IN: MRS. M.B. AMUSAN V. MR. DANIEL OBIDEYI (2005) 14 NWLR (PT. 945) 322 AT 328; per Kutigi, JSC (as he then was, later CJN); stated how to determine whether or not an action was instituted outside the time prescribed by a statute as follows:
It has been decided that the period of limitation is only determinable by looking at the writ of summons and statement of claim alone to ascertain the alleged date of the wrong in question which gave rise to the 1st Respondents cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ was filed. If the time pleaded in the Writ of summons or the statement of claim is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute barred. PER UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.

JUSTICES

UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

FATI KAKENNA ALKALI MONGUNO Appellant(s)

AND

1. ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS
2. SENATOR ABUBAKAR KYARI
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION Respondent(s)

UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the Federal High Court presided by Jude K. Dakat J., delivered on the 2nd April 2019 in Suit No. FHC/MG/CS/60/2018, wherein the trial Court entered judgement in favour of the Respondents and against the Appellant by upholding the 1st and 2nd Respondents notice of preliminary objection which challenged the competence of Appellant?s Originating Summons on the main that Appellant?s action was statute barred.

?At the trial Court, the Appellant?s Originating Summons was filed on 30th October, 2018. The Originating Summons is at page 1 of the records. The Appellant?s case is that the Originating Summons is a challenge of the decision of the Appeal Committee of the 1st Respondent in the return of the 2nd Respondent as the candidate of the 1st Respondent owing to several infractions. The 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 21st November, 2018. See: Pages 139- 154 of the records.

?The learned trial Judge after considering the objection of the 1st & 2nd Respondents held that the

suit was statute barred thereby robbing the trial Court of its jurisdiction to determine the matter. The learned trial judge after upholding the objection dismissed the Appellant?s Claim, without making pronouncement on the substantive suit. Displeased with the decision, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal filed on 15th April, 2019 is at pages 554-562 of the Records.

On appeal the Appellant and the 1st and 2nd Respondents exchanged their briefs. The 1st and 2nd Respondents also filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection. The 3rd Respondent did not file any brief. On 28th May, 2019 when the appeal was heard, IBRAHIM K. BAWA, SAN with ABDUL MOHAMMED, CHIEMELIE N. ONYIA, RABIU ALHASSAN BAWA, MUKAILA YAHAYA MAVO; appeared for the Appellant. For the 1stand 2nd Respondents YUSUF ALI, SAN; K.K. ELEJA, SAN with K.S. LAWAN, I.O ATOFARATI, R.T. BAMIGBOYE; appeared. The 3rd Respondent though served with hearing notice, was not in Court and was not represented.

?After I. K. Bawa, SAN introduced the appeal; Yusuf Ali, SAN argued the 1st and 2nd Respondents Preliminary Objection. He abandoned their objection in relation to non-service

and compilation of records and maintained their objection on the grounds of appeal as argued at paragraphs 4.10 ? 4.13 at pages 6 ? 8 of the 1st and 2nd Respondents? brief. He adopted their arguments on the Preliminary Objection in urging the Court to uphold the objection. BAWA, SAN, responded adversely to the Preliminary Objection in the Appellant?s reply brief. In view of the fact that Ali, SAN restricted his objection to the competence of the grounds of appeal; the learned Silk withdrew arguments at pages 3 ? 8, and relied on their arguments at pages 8 ? 10 of the Appellant?s reply brief. He adopted their arguments therein in urging that the objection be dismissed.

As is required by the Rules of this Court, I shall first consider the Preliminary Objection before the substantive appeal.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
The second arm of the Preliminary Objection was hinged on the provisions of Order 7 Rules 2 (2), 3 & 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016. The learned senior counsel Yusuf Ali submitted that a Ground of Appeal that alleges misdirection or error in law must state clearly the particulars of the

misdirection or error in law. He noted that Rule 3 forbids a vague or general ground of appeal and prescribes that a ground of appeal that is filed in contravention of the rules may be struck out by the Court. He argued that judicial opinions abound in support of the proposition that any ground of appeal that is in the nature of grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 in the present appeal which are vague, unwieldy, imprecise, argumentative, prolix and verbose are liable to be struck out. He relied on: OSASONA V. AJAYI & ORS (2004) LPELR- 2790 (SC); JAGAL PHARMA LTD V. HUSSAINI & ANOR (2013) LPELR – 21871 (CA).

He therefore prayed the Court to uphold the objection by striking out all the Grounds of Appeal filed in this case and strike out the issues for determination distilled there from and to dismiss the appeal as there would be no valid grounds of appeal worthy of any consideration in the case to sustain the appeal. He accordingly prayed that the appeal be dismissed on this score.

?I.K. Bawa, SAN learned counsel for the Appellant with interest observed that the 1st and 2nd Respondents had raised issues for determination from the grounds of appeal they

alleged to be incompetent. For the mood of the Court on grievances against grounds of appeal?s competence and its effect on the Notice of Appeal, the learned Silk cited: OMISORE & ANOR. V. AREGBESOLA & ORS. (2015) LPELR ? 24803 (SC); (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 205; ALH.ADAMU MAINA & ANOR. V. ALH. IBRAHIM GEIDAM & ORS. (2016) LPELR ? 40660 (SC). He urged the Court to strike out the Notice of Preliminary Objection.

In respect to this second ground of the objection which has to do with grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 of the grounds of appeal as vague, unwieldy, imprecise, argumentative, prolix and verbose and as such liable to be struck out. It is now trite in law that the aim or purpose of a ground of appeal is to give the opposing party notice of the case it has to meet at the appellate Court and the grounds and particulars of error or misdirection alleged, are intended to showcase the complaint against the decision appealed against. JULIUS BERGER & ANOR V. TOKI RAINBOW COMMUNITY BANK LTD (2019) LPELR ? 46408 (SC). With the trend of substantial justice, what the Court looks for in a ground of appeal and its

particulars is that, on reading a ground of appeal and its particulars, the adverse party must be left in no doubt as to what the complaint of the appellant is. A ground of appeal and its particulars must therefore go together. Where the particulars in support of a ground are not related to the ground, the ground is incompetent. HAMBE V HUEZE (2001) 2 SC 26; ACCESS BANK PLC V SIJUWADE (2016) LPELR 40188 (CA). WAZIRI V. GEIDAM(2016) 11 NWLR (PT. 1523) 230 AT 256. Accordingly, it is not every failure to attend to Grounds of Appeal with the pernickety details prescribed by the rules of this Court that would render such a ground incompetent. Whenever sufficient particulars can be gathered from the grounds of appeal and the adversary and the Court are left in no doubt as to the particulars on which the grounds are founded, the grounds of appeal are adjudged competent. UKPONG AND ANOR V. COMMISSIONER FOR FINANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ANOR (2006) LPELR-3349 (SC); HAMBE V. HUEZE (2001) 4 NWLR (PT. 703) 372; (2001) 5 NSCQR 343, 352. The Apex Court has greatly encouraged the Courts to make the very best they can out of a bad or inelegant ground of appeal in the

interest of justice.DAKOLO AND ORS V. DAKOLO AND ORS (2011) LPELR-915. Therefore, bad or defective particulars in a ground of appeal would not, necessarily, render the ground itself incompetent. PRINCE DR. B. A. ONAFOWOKAN V. WEMA BANK (2011) 45 NSCQR 1; BEST (NIG) LTD. V. BLACK WOOD HODGE (2011) 45 NSCQR; ABE V. UNILORIN (2013) LPELR. The reason for this apparent shift is the fact that, the essence of Particulars is to project the reason for the grounds complained of, the inelegance of the said particulars therefore would not invalidate the Grounds from which they flow. NNB PLC. V. IMONIKHE (2002) 5 NWLR (PT. 760) 241, 310; D. STEPHENS IND. LTD. AND ANOR V. BCCI INTER (NIG.) LTD. (1999) 11 NWLR (PT. 625) 29, 3101. Also; is because of the shift from technicalities to substantial justice. ADEROUNMU V. OLOWU (2000) 4 NWLR (PT. 652) 253; HAMBE V. HUEZE (SUPRA); ABE V. UNILORIN (2013) LPELR-20643.
?In the instant appeal, I would want to say that although the presentation of the particulars are a bit clumsy and not strictly speaking elegant, that would not be used to punish a litigant to get the grounds of appeal struck out for incompetence in a situation

where the grounds of appeal and their particulars have not put the Respondents and the court in doubt as to what the grouse of the Appellant is.JULIUS BERGER & ANOR V. TOKI RAINBOW COMMUNITY BANK LTD (SUPRA); OGBORU V. OKOWA (2016) 11 NWLR (PT.1522) 84, 146; OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 205; DAKOLO V. DAKOLO (2011) 16 NWLR (PT. 1272) 22. Interestingly, the 1st and 2nd Respondents distilled 2 grounds of appeal from the present grounds under attack and prepared their brief based on it. Striking out the grounds of appeal in the circumstance that it is glaring that the Appellant has in no way through the inelegant grounds of appeal laid ambush for the adversary herein who were able to gather sufficient particulars from the grounds of appeal to distill necessary issues and prepare their brief will be diving back to the era of technicality which the Apex Court has stamped its foot against. ABE V. UNILORIN (2013) LPELR-20643; PRINCE (DR.) B. A. ONAFOWOKAN AND OTHERS V. WEMA BANK PLC AND ORS (2011) 45 NSCQLR 181 SC; BEST (NIGERIA) LTD V. BLACK WOOD HODGE (NIGERIA) LTD AND ORS (2011) 45 NSCQLR 849. From the forgoing it is my view that this

Preliminary Objection ought to be discountenanced so the Court can see its way in the main content of the appeal without being distracted by minor issues. I therefore overrule the Preliminary Objection.

Having dispensed with the Preliminary Objection, I will now consider the substantive appeal. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant adopted the Appellant?s brief filed 6th May, 2019 and his reply brief filed on 27th May, 2019; in urging the Court to allow the appeal. In the Appellant?s brief, 3 issues were distilled for determination. The issues are:
1. ?Whether the learned lower trial judge was correct in holding that the Appellant/Plaintiff?s suit was statute barred.
2. Whether the Honourable Trial Court rightly evaluated the evidence before him, when it held that the Appellant/Plaintiff failed to indicate the date the Appeal Committee report was made.
3. Whether the failure of the learned trial judge to proceed to determine the case on the merit did not occasion miscarriage of justice against the Appellant/Plaintiff in the light of the admonition of the Supreme Court in the case of LAU V. PDP & ORS (2017) LPELR-42800 (SC). ?

Yusuf Ali, SAN for the 1st and 2nd Respondents adopted their brief filed on 22nd May, 2019 in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal. He also referred to the case of A.N.P.P. V. GONI (2012) 7 NWLR (PT. 1298) 147; while making his oral adumbration. In their brief, the 1st and 2nd Respondents raised the following 2 issues for determination, to wit:
1. ?Whether the Honourable trial Court was not right in its decision that the Appellant?s case was statute barred and in dismissing same and whether it did not consider the materials placed before it in reaching its decision?
2. Whether the Honourable trial Court was correct in not considering the case on the merit after having found that the case was statute barred and whether this is a proper case for the invocation of Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act to grant any relief in the Appellant?s favour

?The issues raised by both parties are the same except that the 1st and 2nd Respondents merged the Appellant?s issues 1 and 2 together as their issue 1. I will adopt the issues as raised by the Appellant for the determination of the appeal but

will rephrase his issues 1 and 2 as a single issue. I shall therefore determine the appeal on the following 2 issues:
1. Whether the trial Court was right in his evaluation of the evidence before it to reach the conclusions that the Appellant failed to indicate the date the Appeal Committee report was made, and that the suit was statute barred.
2. Whether the failure of the learned trial judge to proceed to determine the case on the merit did not occasion miscarriage of justice against the Appellant/Plaintiff in the light of the admonition of the Supreme Court in the case of LAU V. PDP &ORS (2Q17) LPELR-42800(SC).

SUBMISSIONS ON ISSUE 1
Whether the trial Court was right in his evaluation of the evidence before it to reach the conclusions that the Appellant failed to indicate the date the Appeal Committee report was made, and that the suit was statute barred.

I.K. Bawa, SAN noted that the concept of limitation period for the purpose of any statute of limitation must be construed within the peculiar facts and circumstance of each case. He maintained that it is the fact of the Plaintiffs case that determines Jurisdiction. On how the

court determines whether a right of action has become stale, he cited: EGBE V. ADEFARASIN[1987] NWLR (PT.47) 1; WOHEREM V. EMEREUWA (2004) 13 NWLR (PT 890) 398; AGBAKOBAV. I.N.E.C. [2008] 18 NWLR (PART 1119) 489. He submitted that from the questions for determination before the learned trial Judge, the issues which the Appellant presented to the Court was a complaint on the decision of the 1st Respondent?s Appeal Committee.

The learned Silk submitted on the process of primary election. He observed that the Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2019 was attached as Exhibit 3. He contended that the Guidelines was made pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of the 1st Respondent Exhibit 2; and that Exhibit 2 was made pursuant to the provisions of Section 222(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He invited the court to Supreme Court decision in, MATO V. HEMBER (2018) 5 NWLR (PT. 1616) 258, (2018) ALL FWLR (PT. 925) 146, (2017) LPELR – 42675 (SC); followed by this court?s decision in BARAU V. WOKDUNG & ORS (2018) LPELR ? 46168 (CA); to submit that the Courts enjoin party members to obey their

party?s constitution and guidelines. Accordingly, the Appellant who followed the party?s guideline and appealed the declaration of the 2nd Respondent as the Borno North senatorial candidate for election had her cause of action begin to run when the Appeal Committee delivered its appeal report.

Mr. Bawa, SAN argued that since the Appeal Committee report forms an integral part of the complaint of the Appellant, her cause of action accrued on the 15th October 2018 when the 1st Respondent?s Appeal Committee on the Borno North Senatorial Election delivered its report. He referred to: Exhibit 12 attached to the Appellant?s affidavit at page 208 of the Record. He argued that the Appellant?s Originating summons filed on 30th October, 2018 challenging the submission of the name of the 2nd Respondent which was done on 18th October, 2018 vide Exhibit 11 at 124 of the records; was within time.

?Furthermore the learned senior counsel submitted on the meaning and import of Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He argued that the learned trial Judge had failed to give a broad interpretation to

Section 285 (9) of the C onstitution (4th Alteration) and thereby held that the principal ?event, decision or action? complained of is the APC Governorship primary election of Borno state, thereby failing to take into cognizance the decision of the Appeal Committee on the primary election? which formed an integral part of the complaint of the Appellant.

He urged the Court to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellant for the reasons proffered in the Appellant?s Brief of Arguments.

Yusuf Ali, SAN for the 1st and 2nd Respondents in their response noted the trial Court?s findings at pages 543 to 546 and his holding at page 546 that the event that triggered the Appellant?s suit is the APC primary election of 3rd October, 2018 which is the date the cause of action arose upon the announcement of the 2nd Respondent as the winner of the election. The learned senior counsel invited the Court to examine the reliefs sought by the Appellant at pages 2 ? 3 of the records; and to submit that there is no iota of relief touching on any act or omission of the Appeal Committee and indeed in the entire gamut of the case.

The 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted that the Appellant?s case is against the primary election conducted on 3rd October, 2018 and the announcement of the 2nd Respondent as its winner and for purposes of statute of limitation 3rd October, 2018 becomes the starting point and the relevant period. They added that the decision of the trial Court in this wise can also not be faulted in view of Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (4th alteration, No. 21) Act, 2017. It was further submitted that the Appellant failed to provide evidence of any date other than 3rd of October, 2018 as the date her cause of action accrued, which failure is fatal to her case.OJO V. GHARORO (2006) All FWLR (PT. 316) 197; was referred to.

The learned Silk finally submitted that, since the Appellant?s suit was filed outside of the statutorily prescribed period by the Constitution the trial Court had no alternative than to dismiss it. He relied on: EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1NWLR (PT 47) 1; IBRAHIM V. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMM. KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT 584) 1; CHIGBU V. TONIMAS NIGERIA LIMITED (2006)LPELR 846 (SC); VERSTOEP & COMPANY NIGERIA LIMITED V. FOUR STAR INDUSTRIES LIMITED

(2016) LPELR 41258 (CA); NIGERIA PORTS AUTHORITY PLC VS LOTUS PLASTICS LTD.(2005) 19 NWLR (PT. 959) 158.

He prayed the Court to resolve this issue against the Appellant, dismiss all the Grounds of Appeal on which the issue is predicated and to uphold the dismissal of the Appellant?s case for being statute barred.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 1
The resolution of this issue will greatly abide in the consideration of Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (4th Alteration, No. 21) Act, 2017; Section 87 particularly sub-sections 1, 4 (b), and 9 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended); Article 20 (111) Constitution of the All Progressives Congress; The APC Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2019 General Elections; vis a vis the legal issues arising from the questions raised by the Originating Summons for determination of the trial Court.
Section 285 (9) of the Constitution (supra) provides:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.

The provision of Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is unambiguous and as such the words used therein ought to be accorded their ordinary grammatical meanings. By Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), every pre-election action, case, cause or matter must be filed within 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the action, decision or event complained of in the suit. Accordingly, to determine whether a pre-election suit was filed within 14 days as stipulated by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Court ought to examine the processes originating from the claimant?s suit to determine either of the following:
(a) The date of the event complained of in the suit or
(b) The date of the decision complained of in the suit or
(c) The date of the action complained of in the suit.

SOSAN V. ADEMUYIWA (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 27) 241; ODUBEKO V. FOWLER (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 308) 637; NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY PLC. V. LOTUS PLASTICS LIMITED & ANOR. (2005) 19 NWLR (PT. 959) 158; NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION & FISCAL COMMISSION & ORS.V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON & ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PT. 1656) 247.

The Appellant?s grouse is that the learned trial Judge was wrong in his decision in view of the questions submitted to it for consideration and the depositions in the Appellant?s affidavit on the one hand; vis a vis Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (4th Alteration, No. 21) Act, 2017; Section 87 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended); Article 20(111) Constitution of the All Progressives Congress; The APC Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2019 General Elections on the other hand. It was contended that by the 1st Respondent?s guidelines the Appellant is required to exhaust the Party?s internal remedies before seeking redress in Court. The learned Silk relied on the Constitution and Guidelines of the 1st Respondent which the Appellant complied with and the Appeal Committee report released on 15th

October, 2018 wherein her appeal was upheld as the candidate that won the primaries. He submitted that since the committee?s report is the main complaint of the Appellant, that 15th October, 2018; the date the report was delivered was the date her cause of action accrued. He submitted from the foregoing that his suit filed on 30th October, 2018 did not contravene Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (supra) and so not statute barred.

?The issue in this case is when the 14 days limitation time prescribed by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) began to run for the Appellant who was aggrieved by the decision of the 1st Respondent in declaring the 2nd Respondent the winner of the party primary held on 3rd October, 2018 for Borno North Senatorial District when she the Appellant ought to have been declared; and who had appealed to the National Appeal Committee and had her appeal upheld by the report delivered on 15th October, 2018. The argument of the parties are simple and straight forward, the Appellant contends that since she had appealed to the APC National Appeal Committee as provided for by the Constitution and Guidelines of the

party, her cause of action began to run from 15th October, 2018 when the 1st Respondent the Appeal Committee delivered its report. Bawa, SAN submitted vigorously that the provisions of Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) relate to event, decision and action subject of complaint of an aggrieved aspirant. That since the Appellant?s complaint is against the decision of the 1st Respondent?s Appeal Committee; her action filed on 30th October, 2018 was wrongly held as statute barred by the learned trial Judge. The contention of the 1st and 2nd Respondents on the other hand is that the 14 days granted the Appellant by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended); began to run on 3rd October, 2018 the date of the Borno State APC Senatorial primary election and result, being the date the cause of action accrued. A cause of action accrues from the time when a breach of any duty or act occurs which warrants the person who is adversely affected by such breach to take a Court action in assertion or protection of his legal right that has been breached. The period of the cause of action which is conferred on the affected person is

statutorily limited and cannot be extended. It lapses after the date the statute of limitation proclaims that no such legal action or proceedings may lawfully be commenced by an aggrieved person. It is therefore necessary when dealing with statutes of limitation to determine firstly the precise date the cause of action accrued because time will start to run from the moment the cause of action arose.WOHEREM V. EMEREUWA & ORS.(2004) LPELR ? 3500 (SC); EBOIGBE V. N.N.P.C (1994) 5 NWLR (PT. 347) 649; OKAFOR V. A.G. ANAMBRA STATE (2005) 14 NWLR (PT. 945) 210.
Cause of action simply denotes the factual base or some factual situations, a combination of which makes the matter in litigation an actionable wrong or an enforceable right. THOMAS V. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 3 NWLR (PT. 18) 669; IBRAHIM V. OSIM (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 82) 257; ALHAJI AMARU ABBA TUKUR V. GOVERNMENT OF GONGOLA STATE (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 117) 517. The Supreme Court, Per Augie, JSC, gave an elaborate meaning of cause of action as:
i. ?A cause of complaint;
ii. A civil right or obligation for determination by a Court of law;
iii. A dispute in respect of which a Court of

law is entitled to invoke its judicial powers to determine;
iv. A consequent damage;
v. Every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence that is necessary to be proved;
vi. All those things necessary to give a right of action whether they are to be done by the Plaintiff or another person; and
vii. It is factual situation, which enables one person to obtain a remedy from another in Court in respect of injury.”
See: MATHEW IYEKE & 25 ORS. V. PETROLEUM TRAINING INSTITUTE & ANOR. (2019) 2 NWLR (PT. 1656) 217 AT 238
To determine whether or not there is a cause of action or when a cause of action arose, it is only the plaintiffs originating processes, such as the writ of summons, the statement of claim, the originating summons and the affidavit in support thereof, as the case may be, that would be considered. ADIMORA V. AJUFO (1988) 1 NSCC 1005; COMBINED TRADE LIMITED V. ALL STATES TRUST BANK LIMITED (1998) 12 NWLR (PT. 576) 56; WILLIAMS V. WILLIAMS (2008) 10 NWLR (PT. 1095) 364. THE APEX

COURT IN: MRS. M.B. AMUSAN V. MR. DANIEL OBIDEYI (2005) 14 NWLR (PT. 945) 322 AT 328; per Kutigi, JSC (as he then was, later CJN); stated how to determine whether or not an action was instituted outside the time prescribed by a statute as follows:
?It has been decided that the period of limitation is only determinable by looking at the writ of summons and statement of claim alone to ascertain the alleged date of the wrong in question which gave rise to the 1st Respondents cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the Writ was filed. If the time pleaded in the Writ of summons or the statement of claim is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, the action is statute barred. ?
In the instant case, the Appellant?s Originating Summons reads:
.to this Summons which is issued upon the application of Fati Kakenna Alkali Monguno who emerged unopposed at the primary elections of 1st Defendant for Borno North Senatorial District held on 3rd October 2018 who claim that having emerged as candidate of the 1st Defendant in accordance with the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended),

the Constitution of the 1st Defendant and APC Guidelines for nomination of candidates for the 2019 General Elections 2019 is entitled to have her name sent to the Defendant…?

The Appellant sought for the trial Court to determine 2 questions as at page 2 of the record and grant 7 reliefs as at pages 2 -3 of the records. By the Originating Summons, questions to be determined and reliefs sought particularly reliefs 1 ? 3; I hold that the primary complaint of the Appellant was the declaration of the 2nd Respondent as the winner of the Borno North Senatorial District primary election and forwarding of his name by the 1st Respondent to the 3rd Respondent as the winner and candidate of the 1st Respondent for the 2019 general elections as against her name when she ought to have been declared unopposed. So her action stems on the 3rd October, 2018 Borno North Senatorial District Primary election of the APC in Borno State; I do not see any part of the Originating Summons or the reliefs in particular touching on any act or omission of the Appeal Committee.

?However, the Appellant?s argument is that since in compliance with the

Constitution and Guidelines of the 1st Respondent, she appealed to the 1st Respondent?s Appeal Committee; her cause of action began to run on the day the Committee released its report. She relied on: MATO V. HEMBER (2018) 5 NWLR (PT 1616) 258, (2018) ALL FWLR (PT. 925) 146, (2017) LPELR – 42675 (SC); BARAU V. WOKDUNG & ORS(2018) LPELR – 46168(CA).

This position of the Appellant cannot be glossed over in view of the authorities cited. On the 1st Respondent?s Constitution and Guidelines, The Supreme Court per Onnoghen CJN said:
?This Court has decided in quite a number of cases that political parties must obey their own constitutions as the Court will not allow them to act arbitrarily or as they like. See: UZODINMA V IZUNASO (NO 2) (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1275) 30 AT 60, UGWU V ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR (PT 1048) 326 AT 914 PARAS. D – E; CPC V LADO (2011) 14 NWLR [PT 1266) 40 AT 91 – 92 PARAS, D G.? See: MATO V. HEMBER & ORS. (2018) 5NWLR (PT. 1616) 258; (2018) ALL FWLR (PT. 925) 146; (2017) LPELR ? 42675 (SC).
?Commenting on Section 87 (9) in relation to the Constitution and Guidelines of political parties still in

Mato V. Hember (supra); Kekere ? Ekun, JSC stated:
?As stated by my learned brother in the lead judgment, this Court in a plethora of cases has asserted the fact that political parties must obey their own constitutions and guidelines and where necessary (as provided by law) the Courts will intervene and wield the big stick to prevent arbitrariness. The only way our democratic dispensation can work effectively is where every aspirant for political office, who is qualified to contest an election, is given an even playing field. The failure of internal democracy within our political parties, right from the grassroots level eventually leads to instability in the entire political system. The failure of internal democracy is one of the reasons why the Courts’ dockets are congested with pre-election disputes. In UGWU V. ARARUME (2007) 12 NWLR (PT. 1048) 376 @ 514 D-E, this Court per Mahmud Mohammed, JSC (as he then was) admonished:
“My lords, if we want to instill sanity into our human affairs, if we want to entrench unpolluted democracy in our body polity, the naked truth must permeate through the blood, nerve and brain of each and everyone of

us. Although credit may not always have its rightful place in politics, we should try to blend the two so as to attain a fair, just and egalitarian society where no one is oppressed. Let us call a spade a spade”
See also: UZODINMA VS IZUNASO (NO.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1275) 30 @ 60 C-E: C.P.C. V. LADO (2011) 14 NWLR (PT. 1266) 40 @ 91-92 D-G.
The Apex Court has therefore firmed the position that political party members must adhere to the Constitution and guidelines of the party.

The Appellant herein posture is that, by the 1st Respondent?s Constitution and Guidelines which she had complied with; Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act which gave her the right to apply to the Court as an aspirant against violation of the Electoral Act and Guidelines of the 1st Respondent; and Section 285 (9) of the Constitution which granted her 14 days from the date of her complaint to file her action, the decision of the trial Court that the action she filed on 30th October, 2018 was statute barred when the Appeal Committee delivered its report on 15th October, 2018; is wrong. This posture will lead us to the examination of Section 87 of the Electoral Act.

I will reproduce the relevant sub Sections of Section 87 of the Electoral Act thus:

87 (1) A Political party seeking to nominate candidates for elections under this Act shall hold primaries for aspirants to all elective positions

87 (4) (b) in the case of nomination to the positions of Governorship candidate, a political party shall, where it intends to sponsor candidates:-

(i) Hold a special congress in the State capital with the delegates voting for each of the aspirants at the congress to be held on a specific date appointed by the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party; and

(ii) The aspirant with the highest number of votes at the end of the voting shall be declared the winner of the primaries of the party and the aspirant?s name shall be forwarded to the Commission as the candidate of the party, for the particular State.

(87)(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or rules of political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may

apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.

Section 87 (supra) is the statute that gave jurisdiction to the trial Federal High Court to hear and determine pre ? election matters. The extent of the trial Court?s jurisdiction on pre-election matters is equally provided for by the same section of the law. By Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, where a political party chooses to conduct indirect primary election to choose its flag bearer, any dissatisfied aspirant at the primary election has the right by Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) to vent his complaint before the Federal High Court or High Court of a state or of the Federal Capital Territory. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY V. TIMIPRE SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR (PT. 1316) 85. With the insertion of this provision in the Electoral Act, the legislature has made its intention known that a member of a political party who contested the party primary election is entitled to challenge a breach of the party Guidelines and the Electoral Act in the election, by filing an action at any of the stated Courts. Section 87 (9) (supra) accordingly gives an

aggrieved aspirant the flexibility of venting his grievance in any of the Courts listed therein. JEV & ANOR V. IYORTYOM & ORS (2014) LPELR -23000 (SC).

Both the provisions of Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended); and Section 87 of the Electoral Act are plain but the complexity in determining what date the cause of action accrued in this case and so the date the 14 days prescribed by Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended); began to run lies with the fact that the Constitution and Guidelines of the 1st Respondent provided for an appeal to its National Appeal Committee in the event a party?s Senatorial primary election contestant is aggrieved with the conduct and result of the election. The Appellant at paragraphs 21 ? 25 of his affidavit in support of her Originating Summons deposed to the fact that in compliance with the provisions of the 1st Respondent?s Constitution and Guidelines and for the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in MATO V. HEMBER (2018) 5 NWLR (PT. 1616)258; which decision was followed by this court in BARAU V. WOKDUNG & ORS. (2018) LPELR ? 46168 (CA); she complied by

first taking her complaint of the result of the Borno North Senatorial primary election to the 1st Respondent?s Appeal Committee. Let me quickly note that, while the cases of MATO V. HEMBER (supra) and BARAU V.WOKDUNG (supra) are distinguishable from the instant case in that the 14 days time limit imposed by Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) was not in issue as in the instant case. However, the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court therein applies to the instant case. The Supreme Court in the referred case adjured party members to adhere to their party Constitution and Guidelines.

What will need to be ascertained at this point is the scope and nature of the right granted a political aspirant by Section 87 (9) (supra). By Section 87 (9), it is an aspirant?s complaint that is against failure to comply with any of the provisions of the Electoral Act and the Guidelines of a Political Party in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a Political Party for election that can be entertained by the designated Courts. This section which ensures that in making their choice of candidate for elective office political parties

do not stray beyond the confines of the Electoral Act or their own electoral guidelines, is at the same time restrictive on the nature of actions that can be filed under its auspice. So while the section seeks to curb the impunity with which political parties hitherto acted without regard to the democratic norms they profess to practice, it confines an aspirant who wants to apply to any of the Courts designated therein, to file suits only on complaints that arose as a result of failure to comply to the provisions of the Electoral Act and the guidelines of a political party when such non compliance relates to the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election. Put differently, Section 87 (9) (supra) grants right to an aspirant to seek redress in any of the stated courts only on complaints for failure to comply with the provisions of the Electoral Act and the guidelines of a political party in the selection or nomination of a political party?s candidate for election. This is the nature of the action Section 285 (9) of the Constitution (supra) said must be filed within 14 days of the event, decision or action complained in the suit.

The question that need be answered now is in view of the provisions of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, what is the Appellant?s cause of action so as to ascertain when the cause of action began to run. Is her cause of action the conduct of the Borno North Senatorial primary election or the decision of the Appeal Committee as emphasized at paragraphs 13, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the Appellant?s brief? Whereas by the Appellant?s Originating Summons; paragraphs 10 ? 20 of the affidavit in support of it, on the one side, her complaint is that the APC Borno North Senatorial primary election of 3rd October, 2018; did not comply with the Electoral Act and the 1st Respondent?s guidelines; on the other hand by paragraphs 21 – 25 of the affidavit her complaint is that the decision of the Appeal Committee by upholding the declaration of the 2nd Respondent as the Borno North Senatorial District candidate, and causing his name to be published by the 3rd Respondent as the 1st Respondent?s above described candidate is wrong. From what I have said so far, I am of the view that the only recognizable cause of action under

Section 87 (9) (supra); is a complaint of failure to comply with the provisions of the Electoral Act and the guidelines of a political party in the selection and nomination of a candidate of a political party for election. Therefore by a combined reading of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution (supra) and Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act (supra), an aspirant as Appellant in this case, who complains that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act and the Guidelines of her political party was not complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of the political party for election, has 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of to seek redress at the Federal High Court or High Court of a state or FCT. From the Originating Summons and its supporting affidavit, the event that took place on 3rd October, 2018 was the APC Borno North Senatorial primary election, resulting to the decision that the 2nd Respondent emerged the winner. On the event or decision complained of in the action filed at the trial Court for failure to comply with the Electoral Act and Guidelines of the 1st Respondent, only one date was

consistently stated in the Originating Summons and deposed to in the affidavit of the Appellant and which date is 3rd October, 2018.
In the instant case therefore, what constitutes the cause of action of the Appellant by virtue of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, from the Originating Summons and the affidavit in support is the Appellants complaint that on 3rd October, 2018, at the Borno North Senatorial primary election, after the other two contestants withdrew from the primary election, she remained unopposed but in disregard to the provisions of the Electoral Act and the 1st Respondent?s Guidelines, the 2nd Respondent who was not a candidate was declared the winner and the partys Borno North Senatorial flag bearer for 2019 election in the indirect primary held on 3rdOctober, 2018. The 14 days time as prescribed by Section 285 (9) of the Constitution therefore began to run from 3rd October, 2018. Accordingly, the Appellant?s suit filed on 30th October, 2018 was filed in contravention of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution thereby rendering the suit statute barred.
The submission of the Appellant that primary election is

a process is correct. I am also aware of this Court?s decision in APC & ANOR V. AGODA & ANOR (2019) LPELR 47174 (CA). I want to draw a distinction between this case and APC V. AGODA (SUPRA). IN APC V. AGODA (supra), the Claimant therein won the primary election, his name was forwarded to INEC, he later discovered his name was replaced with another name, he appealed to the Appeal panel and got his name restored, later his name was replaced again and he appealed to the National Working Committee which upheld his appeal yet at a later date his name was not forwarded to INEC, so this Court held that his cause of action concretized the date he got to know his name was not forwarded. Importantly, it must be noted that in APC V. AGODA (SUPRA), the Claimant who won the primary election and had his name forwarded had no complaint against the primary election but the counter decision not to forward his name. This was also the line of reasoning and decision of this Court in the unreported decision of Court of Appeal, Jos Division in Appeal No. CA/J/130/2019 Between SAIDU ABDU ISAH V. BELLO HARUNA & 2 ORS.; JOS Division Unreported Appeal No.

CA/J/131/2019 Between BELLO HARUNA V. ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS & 2 ORS. In the referred cases the Claimants? actions were complaints of non compliance with the Electoral Act and Guidelines of their parties in that having won their parties primaries in compliance with the Electoral Act and Guidelines of their parties their respective parties failed to comply with the Electoral Act and their Guidelines to the effect that, it is the name of the aspirant who scored the highest vote at the primary election and declared the winner that should have his name forwarded to INEC. So the decision in the referred cases not to forward the name of the declared winner of the primary election was the cause of action. The case is different here where the Appellant was not declared winner neither did she allege to have scored the highest vote at the primary election, her complaint simply is that on 3rd October, 2018, at the Borno North Senatorial primary election, after the other two contestants withdrew from the primary wherein she remained unopposed, but in disregard to the provisions of the Electoral Act and the 1st Respondent?s Guidelines, the 2nd Respondent

who was not a candidate was declared the winner and the party?s Borno North Senatorial flag bearer for 2019 election in the indirect primary held on 3rd October, 2018. This made her cause of action come under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act. Although in the circumstance of this case the Appellant had a right to exhaust the party?s domestic remedy but by Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, and Section 285 (9) of the Constitution, a cause of action had accrued which complaint in a suit must be filed in the Court within 14 days.
The 14 days prescribed in the Constitution for filing of a pre – election matter is sacrosanct and that period being secured from profanation cannot be subjected to the Constitution and Guidelines of APC. Again because of the superiority of the Nigerian Constitution by virtue of Section 1(1) & (3) of the said 1999 Constitution, (as amended), both the Constitution and Guidelines of APC must give way to it whenever their paths cross. AMADI V. INEC (2012) LPELR – 7831 (SC) 34. The trial Court therefore was right when despite the fact that it was on 15th October, 2018 the Appeal Committee released its report; found

that the cause of action arose on 3rd October, 2018; the date of the indirect primary election. The decision of the learned trial Judge on this was neither wrong nor perverse, given the facts of this case. This does not by any means indicate that a cause of action under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, must necessarily arise from the date of a primary election. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of a case but the emphasis is that the complaint of the aspirant filed in the suit before the court must be a bleat of failure to comply with the provisions of the Electoral Act and Guidelines of a party in the event of selection and nomination of a candidate of a political party for election. For what I have said above, I remain firm in agreement with the learned trial Judge that the Appellant?s suit was statute barred having been filed on 30th October, 2018.
?In furtherance to the stand that the Appellant?s cause of action arose on 3rd October, 2018; is the fact that by paragraph 7 of the Appellant?s reply to the 1st and 2nd Respondent?s counter affidavit; and Exhibit 12 attached thereto which is the Appeal Committee?s

report; the Appellant has no cause of action arising from the Committee?s report. Exhibit 12 the Appeal Committee?s report upheld the Appellant?s appeal and so was in favour of the Appellant. The Appellant who could not possibly be dissatisfied with a report in her favour cannot logically have a complaint against the decision of the Committee, and as such cannot have a cause of action accruing as a result of the Appeal Committee?s report of 15th October, 2018.
?In the event that the argument of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that the Appellant had a cause of action under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act by her complaint of the decision of the National Appeal Committee upholding the primary election declaration in issue has merit, it would still appear that the conclusion of this case would not be far different as the action filed by the Appellant would still be incompetent. Let me reiterate that the action maintainable under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act is restrictive. The reason is not farfetched, although Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, has been enacted by the legislature to curb the wings of the

political parties in their arbitrariness, the fact still remains that the right of a political party to select or nominate its candidate for an election is exclusive to the party as that right cannot be curtailed except when the party violates its own Guidelines and the Electoral Act. Accordingly, any complaint no matter how closely related or connected to non compliance of the Electoral Act and Guidelines of a party if it is not a complaint against failure to comply with the Electoral Act and Guidelines of a party in the event of selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election; the same cannot be maintained as an action under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act. Interpreting the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, outside giving it its plain and ordinary meaning will amount to construing the provisions of the law to defeat its evident purpose. What I am saying in essence is that, the courts have limited jurisdiction under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act. This view is firmed by the case of PDP V. EZEONWUKA (2018) 3 NWLR (PT. 1606) 187 @ 238- 239, where the Supreme Court puts the position

thus;
?It has been held in a plethora of decisions of this court that the jurisdiction of a court to entertain a complaint under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act falls within a very narrow compass. The complainant must be an aspirant who participated in the primary and his complaint must relate to non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act or the guidelines of the political party. see: UWAZURUIKE V. NWACHUKWU (2013) 3 NWLR (PT. 1342) 503 @ 526 E-G; PDP V. SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR (PT. 1316) 85 @ 148 C-D; 149 A- E; LADO V. C.P.C. (2011) 18 NWLR (PT. 1279) 689; (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 607) 598 @ 622-623 F-H; APGA V. ANYANWU (2014) 7 NWLR (PT. 1407) 541; (2014) 2SC (PT. 1) 1. The rationale for this position is that the nomination and sponsorship of a candidate for an election is within the domestic affairs of a political party and the Courts have no jurisdiction to nominate a candidate for any party. See: PDP V. SYLVA (2012) 13 NWLR (PT. 1316) 85 @ 146 A-E: GWEDE V. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (PT. 1438) 56 @ 1480149 H-B; ONUOHA V. OKAFOR (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; EMENIKE V. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (PT. 1315) 556.?
Accordingly, even if the case of

the Appellant had been against the decision of the Appeal Committee of the 1st Respondent as contended by the Appellant (which I have not held to be), the trial Court would still have been justified to decline jurisdiction on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This is because Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act confers only limited jurisdiction on the trial Court regarding political party primary elections. The jurisdiction arises only when the cause of action stems on failure to observe the provisions of the Electoral Act and the Guidelines of the political party in question in the course of selection and nomination of a candidate to bear the party?s flag in a general election. Considering the issue from another perspective, the action filed on 30th October, 2018 from 15th October, 2018 when the Appellant contends her cause of action accrued was filed 15 days from the date the Appellant?s alleged her cause of action arose. So from whatever angle, the irresistible conclusion that must be drawn is that the case now on appeal is a complaint of the Borno North Senatorial primary election held on 3rd October, 2018 and the return of the 2nd Respondent

as the winner thereof; in which case the Appellant had a maximum period of 14 days under the Constitution to file the pre-election matter which she failed to do. The case was therefore statute barred as correctly found by the trial Court.

For all I have said above, what is left of me is to resolve Issue 1 in favour of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

Having come to the conclusion that the Appellant?s suit is statute barred, the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to hear and determine the same. It is now well settled that jurisdiction is the life wire of a Court as no court can entertain a matter where it lacks the jurisdiction. It is also well settled that the jurisdiction of courts in this country is derived from the Constitution and statutes. No Court is permitted to grant itself power to hear a matter where it is not so endowed and if it does, the entire proceedings and judgment derived therefrom, no matter how well conducted, is a nullity. Therefore every Court must ensure that it is endowed with the jurisdiction to hear a matter before embarking on the exercise else it would be wasting precious judicial time. See: UTIH V. ONOYIVWE (1991) 1

NWLR (PT. 166) 166, (1991) 1 SCNJ 25; MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 ALL NLR (PT. 11) 5.

Furthermore, the implication of the action being statute barred is that a plaintiff who ordinarily would have had a cause of action by judicial process because the period of the time laid down by the Limitation Law for instituting such an action has elapsed, automatically loses that right to approach the Court to ventilate his grievance. ASABORO & ANOR. V. PAN OCEAN OIL CORPORATION NIG. LTD. & ANOR. (2017) LPELR ? 41558 (SC); EBOIGBE V NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (PT. 347) 649. This is to say that once an action is statute barred there is nothing for the Claimant to build on NASIR V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION KANO STATE (2010) LPELR ? 1943 (SC). An action commenced after the expiration of the statutory period within which an action must be brought is not maintainable. In other words, when a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action must be initiated, legal proceedings cannot be properly and validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Any such action instituted must be struck out as not being properly instituted

before the Court. EGBE V. ADEFARASIN (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) 1; OBIEFUNA V. OKOYE (1964) 1 ALL NLR 96; ADEOSUN V. JIBESIN (2001) 11 NWLR (PT. 724) 290; IBRAHIM V. JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMITTEE KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) 1; EBOIGBE V. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (PT. 347) 649; ODUBEKO V. FOWLER (1993) 7 NWLR PT. 308 PG. 637. The sum up in the circumstance that I have found that the Appellant?s suit at the trial court was statute barred, is that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the same no matter how meritorious the case was. The order of dismissal or striking out is merely academic as the legal point is that the Appellant at the stage her suit was found to be statute barred had an empty and unenforceable cause of action if any.

?Finally, I uphold the decision of the Federal High Court sitting in Maiduguri delivered on 2/4/19 in Suit No. FHC/MG/CS/60/2018. Consequentially, I hold that since an appeal cannot be maintained on an incompetent action which is statute barred, this appeal fails and is liable to be struck out. Appeal No: CA/J/153/2019 is hereby struck out. I make no order as to costs.

MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A.: My lord, UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, JCA obliged me with the leading Judgment just delivered.

I endorse the reasoning and conclusion that the Appeal fails and should be struck out.
I also strike out the Appeal and abide by the consequential orders therein.

BOLOUKUROMO MOSES UGO, J.C.A.: I read in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, JCA, and I am in agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. I have nothing useful to add. I also strike out the appeal for lack of merit.

Appearances:

Ibrahim K. Bawa, SAN with him, Abdul Mohammed, Chiemelie N. Onyia, Rabiu Alhassan Bawa, Mukaila Yahaya MavoFor Appellant(s)

Yusuf Ali (SAN) and K.K. Eleja (SAN) with them, K.S. Lawan, I.O. Atofarati, A.O. Mohammed, R.T. Bamigboye for 1st and 2ndFor Respondent(s)

Appearances

Ibrahim K. Bawa, SAN with him, Abdul Mohammed, Chiemelie N. Onyia, Rabiu Alhassan Bawa, Mukaila Yahaya MavoFor Appellant

AND

Yusuf Ali (SAN) and K.K. Eleja (SAN) with them, K.S. Lawan, I.O. Atofarati, A.O. Mohammed, R.T. Bamigboye for 1st and 2ndFor Respondent

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