BAKO ZAKA & ORS v. NJANGOR EGBE NJOM & ORS (2019)

BAKO ZAKA & ORS v. NJANGOR EGBE NJOM & ORS

(2019)LCN/13376(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 30th day of May, 2019

CA/YL/11/11

RATIO

LAND LAW: OWNERSHIP: MEANING

In FAGUNWA & ANOR VS. ADIBI & ORS (2004) LPELR 1229 (SC) PP. 22-22 Paragraphs G-A, ((2004) 7 SC (PT. 11) P.99) his Lordship Tobi, JSC defined ownership and its implication thus:

Ownership generally connotes the totality of or the bundle of the rights of the owner over and above every other person on a thing. It connotes a complete and total right over property. The property begins with the owner and also ends with him. Unless he transfers his ownership of the property to a third party he remains the alloidal owner.PER CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.

WHO IS AN AGGRIEVED PERSON

In defining who an aggrieved person is , in MOHAMMED ABACHA VS. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2014) LPELR 2 2014 (SC) PP. 50-51, Paragraphs E-C. (2014) 6 NWLR (PT. 1402) P. 43) his Lordship Ariwoola, JSC held thus:

To be aggrieved, a person must have legal rights that are adversely affected, having been harmed by an infringement of legal rights. A person aggrieved must be a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. See, In Re: ALHAJI AFUSAT IJELU & ORS VS. LAGOS STATE DEVELOPMENT & PROPERTY CORPORATION & ORS (1992) NWLR (PT. 266) 414; (1992) LPELR 1464. The Court below was therefore correct in holding that in the instant con, the expression person aggrieved refers to any person whose legal right was invaded by the forfeiture order, whose financial interest was directly and adversely affected by the said decree and whose right or property may be established or divested.PER CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.

LOCUS STANDI: DEFINITION

Locus standi has been defined as the legal right of a party to an action, to be heard in litigation before a Court or tribunal. The term connotes the legal capacity of instituting or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever. Standing to sue touches on justiciability, it focuses on the party seeking to have his complaint before the Court not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated upon. See, THOMAS & ORS VS. OLUFOSOYE (1986) LPELR 3237 (SC), B.B. APUGO & SONS LTD VS. OHMB (2016) LPELR 40598 (SC), INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 423 at 601 602, H-B, SENATOR ABRAHAM ADESANYA VS. PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ANOR (1981) 5 SC 112 and ITEOGU VS. L.P.D.C. (2009) 17 NWLR (PT. 1171) 614.PER CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.

JUSTICES:

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

1. BAKO ZAKA

2. IBRAHIM USMAN

3. GEORGE ORUME

4. NASIR MOHAMMED

5. BULUS LANGYU

6. ILIYASU MUSA JODA

7. KIBI BAWA

8. DAVID YAKUBU

9. SALISU AUGUSTUS

10. MALLAM AUDU YAKOKO

11. AUGUSTINE ZABADI

12. MAKERI USMAN

13. SAMBO ELKANAN

14. LIATU JONATHAN

15. OBIDAH BULUS

16. SANI LAWAL

17. SERAH WESLEY

18. RIMANSHUMA KWATISHE

19. PHILIANA JENJO

20. ELIZABETH HAMZA

21. TANKO NAS

22. ILIYASU GARBA

23. EDWARD IKOMBO

24. DAVID NYAM

25. ABOKI NWUWUKHEN – Appellant(s)

AND

1. NJANGOR EGBE NJOM

2. ALHAJI A. A. LIMAN

3. ALHAJI ABUBAKAR A. RAHAMAN

4. MARAN DABALE

(Suing as next friend of Sadique Dabale, an infant)

5. JOHN WESLEY

6. CYRUS KEFAS MAVULA

7. EMMANUEL ONAH

8. MOSES AMANYE

9. EMMANUEL EBU

10. VINCENT AKANA

11. YOUNGSON HAMIDU

12. TARABA STATE GOVERNMENT

13. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TARABA STATE

14. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION – Respondent(s)

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment):The 1st 11th Respondents as Plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the Claimants) commenced this action against the 1st 25th Appellants and the 12th 14th Respondents as Defendants (hereinafter referred to as the Defendants) at the Taraba State High Court on the 20th of June, 2002 wherein they sought for a declaration of title over the Mile 6 Housing Estate also known as Shagari Housing Estate, Jalingo, Taraba State. In their amended statement of claim dated 14th October, 2008, the Claimants sought for the following reliefs:

1.AN ORDER evicting the 1st-25th Defendant (Sic) from houses Nos. 14A, 24A, 24B, 27A, 27B, 21A, 21B, 22A, 22B, I Lau Street, 2 Lau Street, 7 Mubi Street, 8 Mubi Street, 18A, 18B, 9 Michika Street, 7 Donga Street, 5 Yola Street, 6 Yola Street, 7A, 23 Taraba Street and 3A respectively and possession of same delivered to the respective Plaintiffs as per the purchase of each of the Plaintiffs.

a.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 14A & 14B in favour of the 1st Plaintiff.

b.AN

ORDER declaring title to houses No. 24A, 24B, 27A & 27B in favour of the 2nd Plaintiff

c.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 21A, 21B, 22A & 22B in favour of the 3rd Plaintiff.

d.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 1 & 2 Lau Street and 7 & 8 Mubi Street in favour of the 4th Plaintiff.

e.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 18A & 18B in favour of the 5th Plaintiff.

f.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 7 & 8 Donga Street and 9 & 10 Michika Street in favour of the 6th Plaintiff.

g.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 5 & 6 Yola Street in favour of the 7th Plaintiff.

h.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 7A in favour of the 8th Plaintiff.

i.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 23 Taraba Street in favour of the 9th Plaintiff.

j.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 17 Taraba Street in favour of the 10th Plaintiff.

k.AN ORDER declaring title to houses No. 3A in favour of the 11th Plaintiff, all lying and situated at Federal Low Cost Estate (Shagari Estate Mile Six Jalingo).

3.AN ORDER declaring the 1st 27th Defendants trespassers to the houses in dispute.

4.AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st 27th defendants, their agents, assigns or whosoever claims from them or through them, from carrying out any act that would interfere with the peaceable and peaceful dealing with the said premises by the Plaintiffs in the manner bought by each of them.

5.Special damages of Two Thousand Naira (N2,000:00) per month against each of the 1st 25th Defendants severally and jointly for use and occupation from the date of purchase bye (sic) each of the plaintiffs to the date of determination of this matter.

6.Cost of litigation of One Hundred Thousand Naira (N100,000:00) to each of the Plaintiffs.

7.AND for any Order of (sic) further Orders as this Honourable Court may deem just.

The background facts on the part of the Appellants are that the Appellants who were the 1st 25th Defendants at the trial Court were and still are the occupants of the Federal Low Cost Housing Estate, having been put into possession by the 26th Defendant sometime in 1992 following the creation of Taraba State out of the defunct Gongola State. The Housing Estate was prior to the creation

of the Taraba State handed over to the defunct Gongola State by the Federal Government and with the creation of Taraba State, the 26th Defendant by virtue of the said state creation, took ownership and possession of same, subsequent upon which it put the Appellants into possession of same.

At the trial, the claimants called a lone witness, one Emmanuel Nwaneri Olengbe, who testified as the PW1 and tendered 67 Exhibits which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits P1 P26F.

The Appellants as 1st 25th Defendants, called three (3) witnesses who testified as DW1, DW2 and DW3 and tendered one (1) Exhibit which was admitted in evidence. While the 12th and 13th Respondents as the 26th and 27th Defendants called two (2) witnesses and tendered nineteen (19) Exhibits. At the close of the trial, on 31st day of July, 2009 the trial Court delivered its judgment in which it declared title of the disputed property in favour of the Claimants (1st 11th Respondents). The Appellants who were dissatisfied with the decision appealed to this Court.

Three issues were distilled for the determination of the appeal as follows:

ISSUE NO. 1

WHETHER the claims of the Respondent (sic) as well as the entire proceedings and resultant judgment of the trial Court are competent in law?

Distilled from Grounds Five, Six and Seven of the 2nd further amended Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE NO. 2

WHETHER the Trial Court was right to have placed reliance on inadmissible evidence and also arrive at the conclusion that the Federal Government through a committee set up by the Federal Ministry of Works & Housing sold the houses in dispute to the 1st 11th Respondents Distilled from grounds Two, Three and Four of the 2nd further amended Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE NO. 3

WHETHER it was proper for the learned trial Judge to have granted the claims of the 1st 11th Respondents Respondent (sic) rather than dismissing same, regard being had to the fact that no valid root of title was pleaded and proved by them in the suit

Distilled from Ground Eight of the 2nd further amended Notice of Appeal.

In response, the 1st 11th Respondents raised and argued a preliminary objection in their Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on 7/8/15, argued in their

further amended brief of argument filed on the 29/10/18, deemed properly filed and served on 21/11/18, pages 4 10 of the said brief of argument. In the alternative, the 1st 11th Respondents formulated three (3) issues for the determination of the appeal thus:

(i)That the writ of summons with which the action was commenced is incompetent, in that it was not prepared in compliance with the repealed High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1997, being the Rules in force at that material time and herein thereafter referred to as the defunct Rules. See paragraphs 4.01 4.13 of the further amended Appellants brief.

(ii)That the proceedings before the lower Court was conducted on a wrong supposition that there was a valid amended writ and statement of claim. See paragraphs 4.14 4.19 of the Appellants further amended brief.

(iii)That the 1st 11th Respondents, upon the joinder of the 14th Respondent failed to timeously amend the originating processes and serve same on the 14th Respondent, in line with the defunct Rules. In other words, there was no valid further amended

statement of claim with which the 1st 11th Respondents would have fought and won their case before the lower Court. See paragraphs 4.20 4.23.

The 14th Respondent also raised and argued a Preliminary Objection to the appeal in his Notice of Preliminary Objection filed on 18/8/15, argued in the 14th Respondents brief of argument filed on 21/11/18 deemed properly filed and served on 21/11/18, pages 3-6 of the Brief of Argument. In the alternative in his brief of argument, the 14th Respondent adopted and relied on the three issues distilled by the Appellant for the determination of the appeal.

On the preliminary objection raised against the hearing of the appeal, the essence is to truncate the hearing of the appeal on the merits, where the preliminary objection to the appeal succeeds, there would be no need to consider such appeal on the merit. I would therefore first deal with the preliminary objections. In the preliminary objection raised and argued by the learned counsel to the 1st 11th Respondents, the Learned Counsel E. A. Ibrahim Effiong Esq. relied on his preliminary objection in his Notice filed on

7/8/15 in which the competence of the appeal was challenged. The grounds are as follows:

i. The Appellants do not have the requisite locus standi to maintain this Appeal, thereby rendering the Appeal incompetent.

ii. The two issues formulated for the determination of this appeal are defective.

The Learned Counsel adopted his argument in his brief of argument filed on 29/10/18, deemed properly filed on 21/11/18 in urging us to strike out the appeal. The Learned Counsel distilled a sole issue for the determination of the preliminary objection thus:

Whether from the facts and circumstances of this appeal, the Appellants qualify as aggrieved persons within the purview of Section 243 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), to clothe them with the requisite locus standi to maintain this Appeal

In arguing the preliminary objection it was submitted that the fulcrum of the suit before the lower Court was the ownership of the houses in dispute. The 1st 11th Respondents claimed that they acquired the houses from the then Federal Ministry of Works and Housing, through the

committee set up for that purpose. It was made out that after the acquisition, the Appellants refused, failed or neglected to deliver up possession, despite repeated entreaties, the further Amended Statement of Claim was referred to. The Appellants on their part contended that there was no privity of contract between them and the 1st 11th Respondents. They made out that they were in lawful possession of the houses, having been put in possession by the 12th Respondent (Taraba State Government) to whom they were paying rents, the relationship between them and the 12th Respondent was that of tenants and landlord shown in the further amended statement of defence of the Appellants. It was argued that the 12th and 13th Respondents strengthened the Appellants case by asserting that they owned the houses and admitted putting the Appellants in possession as their tenants. The 12th and 13th Respondents counter claimed. In course of the trial the 5th Appellant as the DW1 tendered a document titled ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENT OWNED/ HIRED QUARTERS with Ref. No. SSG/SA/ACC/1/VOL.1/ 141 dated 22/9/1992. Further, in proof of the allocation of house

No. 22B to the DW1 by the 12th Respondent, which was marked Exhibit D1, the evidence of the DW1, DW2 and DW3 was reviewed to the effect that they were allocated the houses they live in by the Taraba State Government (12th Respondent). It was submitted that the dispute between the Appellants and the 1st 11th Respondents was because the Appellants occupied the houses at the instance of the 12th Respondent. It was the contention of the learned counsel that the Appellants were strangers to the claim of the 1st 11th Respondents against the 12th Respondent and counter claim of the 12th Respondent against the 1st 11th Respondents in respect of the ownership of the houses. See, CHIEF ADEOYE ADIO FAGUNWA & ANOR VS. CHIEF NATHANIEL ADIBI & ORS (2004) LPELR 1229 at 21 22, Paragraphs F-B. 102 103 (SC), SULE DANJUMA USMAN VS. NIGERIA BANK PLC & ORS (2013) LPELR 20404 at 39 41, Paragraphs E-C (CA) amongst others.

It was argued that the aggregate of the enforceable rights flowing from the judgment of the lower Court are vested in the 12th Respondent alone and she is the only person or the 13th

Respondent (The Attorney General of Taraba State) who has the locus standi to institute an action. See, A.G. ANAMBRA STATE VS. A.G. FEDERATION (2007) 12 SCM (PT.1) 1 at 62 63 and HON. WUNMI BEWAJI VS. CHIEF OLUSEGUN OBASANJO & ORS (2007) LPELR 4266 at 26 Paragraphs A-C (CA). It was submitted that it is only an aggrieved party in a case that has the right of appeal. Reference was made to Section 243(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) (hereafter referred to as the Constitution). See, SOCIETE GENERAL BANK NIGERIA LIMITED VS. LITUS TORUNGBENEFADE AFEKORO & ORS (1999) LPELR 3082, 25, Paragraphs A-D (SC); ABACHA VS F.R.N. (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 726) 412 at 456, Paragraphs F-G and BAKARE & ORS VS. ADEOGUN & ORS (2014) 2 SCM 62 at 90 Paragraphs H-I.

It was the submission of the learned counsel that the Appellants do not have the requisite locus standi to present this appeal. It was argued that a right of appeal is a right inherent to a party by law, not a privilege and its absence renders the matter non-justiciable. See, PROGRESSIVE ACTION CONGRESS VS. INEC (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 478)

260 at 338, Paragraphs E-F and OPOBIYI & ANOR VS. MUNIRU (2011) 12 (PT. 2) SCM 433 at 444, Paragraphs H-I. It was concluded that the concept of locus standi was developed to ensure that busy bodies are barred from inundating the Courts with baseless matters merely to annoy the other party. Further, that the absence of locus standi by a party deprives the Court of the jurisdiction to adjudicate. We were urged to strike out the appeal.

In response, the learned counsel to the Appellants, J. A. Oguche Esq. relied on his amended reply brief filed on 8/2/19, deemed properly filed and served on 4/3/19 in urging us to dismiss the Preliminary Objection for being misconceived and bereft of merit. The learned counsel faulted the manner in which the preliminary objection was argued wherein an issue was formulated for determination. See, UDENZE & ORS VS. NWOSU & ORS (2008) VOL. 154 LRCN 110 at 116 and ILOEGBUNAM VS. OBIORA (2012) 4 NWLR (PT. 1291) 405 at 416. It was submitted that the sole issue formulated for the determination of the preliminary objection is incompetent and should be discountenanced along with the argument in its support.

On the other hand the learned counsel to the Appellants responded to the substantive preliminary objection on the merit and adopted the sole issue as formulated by the 1st 11th Respondents in their preliminary objection. The learned counsel in response distinguished this case from the case of MOBIL PRODUCING NIG. UNLTD VS. MONOKPO (2004) ALL FWLR (PT. 195) 576 at 616 cited and relied upon by the learned counsel to the 1st 11th Respondents. It was argued that the 1st Defendant in the above case was not deemed an aggrieved person because there was no order affecting him which was made by the trial Court. While it was argued that the orders made by the trial Court in the present case were against the Appellants, for instance to vacate the houses they occupied and they were restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceable dealings with the said premises. The guidelines to be considered in deciding whether a person has locus standi or not were highlighted while reliance was placed on the cases of NNADI VS. OKORO (1998) 1 NWLR (PT. 535) 573 at 600, CHIEF GANI FAWEHINMI VS. AKILU & ANOR (1987) 4 NWLR (PT. 67) 797 and L.S.P.D.C. VS. DAKOUR

(1992) N.S.C.C (PT. 111) 488 at 495. It was concluded that the Appellants who were defendants at the trial Court had the locus standi to have instituted the action.

The 14th Respondent was not in Court to argue his preliminary objection. The Notice of Preliminary Objection was filed on 18/8/15 and argued in the 14th Respondents further Amended Brief of Argument filed on 21/11/18, deemed properly filed and served on the same day, same was deemed argued. The 14th Respondent also challenged the competence of the Appellants appeal on the following grounds:

1.The Appellants do not have the locus standi to prosecute this appeal, rendering the Appeal incompetent.

2.The two issues couched by the Appellants/Respondents for determination by the Hon. Court are defective and incompetent.

In the brief of argument settled by Aliyu Ishaq Lolo Esq., Chief State Counsel Federal Ministry of Justice in support of the preliminary objection, it is noted that the sole issue for determination and the argument in its support is similar to the argument proferred by the learned counsel to the 1st 11th Respondents in arguing their

preliminary objection. There would be no need to reproduce the same submissions all over again.

The learned counsel to the Appellants in response also proferred the same argument as in the response to the preliminary objection raised by the 1st 11th Respondents. We were also urged to dismiss the preliminary objection for lacking in merit.

Where a preliminary objection has been raised as to the competence of an appeal, same has to be resolved first before looking into the substantive appeal if need be. A successful preliminary objection in this case has the effect of disposing of the appeal, see my earlier decision in OLAGBENRO & ORS VS. PRINCE SALIU OLAYIWOLA & ORS (2014) LPELR 22597 (CA), ALL STATES TRUST BANK LTD VS. KING DAVIDSON ENTERPRISES (NIG.) LTD (2000) LPELR 10631 (CA) and in OKOROCHA VS. UBA BANK & ORS (2018) LPELR 45122 (SC) where his lordship of the Apex Court Sanusi, JSC at P. 13, Paragraphs E-F simply put the position of the law thus:

It is settled law, that Preliminary Objection where raised by a party, should firstly be determined before determining the substantive appeal if

the need to do so arises.

Guided by the above principle, I would consider the preliminary objections and rule on them before considering the substantive appeal if need be. See, also EFET VS. INEC & ORS (2011) LPELR 8109 (SC), AGBAREH & ANOR VS. MIMRA & ORS, (2008)1 SCNJ 409, ONYEKWULUJE VS. ANIMASHAUN & ANOR (1996) 3 SC NJ 24, ONYEMEH & ORS VS. EGBUCHULAM & ORS (1996) 4 SCNJ 235, and NUC VS. ALLI & ANOR (2013) LPELR 21444 (CA). The learned counsel to the Appellants had objected to the formulation of an issue in the preliminary objection raised by the 1st 11th Respondents and the 14th Respondent respectively. To this I would say the method could be an inelegant way of drafting rather than incompetence. I discountenance the objection.

I will jointly resolve the preliminary objections, the arguments in support and reply thereto are similar. From the contest at the lower Court it is clear that what was at stake was the title to the houses in dispute between the 1st 11th Respondents on one side (who claimed to have bought from the then Federal Ministry of Works and Housing) and the

12th Respondent (the Taraba State Government who let the houses to the Appellants) on the other side, over the ownership of the houses in dispute. The 1st 11th Respondents averred and led evidence to the effect that they bought the houses from the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing through a committee set up by her. The 12th Respondent also counter claimed title to the same houses on the ground that the houses formed part of the assets inherited by her upon the creation of Taraba State from Gongola State. There is no dispute that the Appellants were tenants of the 12th Respondent, and they did not lay claim to the houses, the relationship between the Appellants and the 12th Respondent was that of Landlord and Tenants. The DW1 (5th Appellant), DW2 (1st Appellant) and DW3 (2nd Appellant) for instance, all gave evidence to the effect that they believed the 12th Respondent (Taraba State Government) who allocated the houses for them to reside in were the owners. At page 403 of the printed records of appeal, the trial Court noted that the case of the Appellants was that they were lawful tenants of the 12th Respondent. The Appellants were therefore

strangers to the claim of the 1st 11th Respondents against the 12th Respondent and to the counter claim of the 12th Respondent against the 1st 11th Respondents, regarding the ownership of the houses. The Appellants are not claiming title or ownership. As rightly argued by the learned counsel to the 1st 11th Respondents, ownership connotes a complete and total right over a property, the property begins and ends with the owner leaving no room for the sharing of its right with anybody, including a tenant unless there is total transfer of such right. In FAGUNWA & ANOR VS. ADIBI & ORS (2004) LPELR 1229 (SC) PP. 22-22 Paragraphs G-A, ((2004) 7 SC (PT. 11) P.99) his Lordship Tobi, JSC defined ownership and its implication thus:

See, SURAJU SOMADE & ORS VS. OTUNBA AYO JAIYESIMI & ORS

(2006) LPELR 11866 (CA). At the close of the trial the lower Court declared title in favour of the 1st 11th Respondents and dismissed the counter claim of the 12th Respondent; pages 406 413 of the printed records of appeal. In its judgment, the main order was that of declaration of title against the landlord of the Appellants (12th Respondent) and in favour of the 1st 11th Respondents. Therefore, the aggrieved person is the 12th Respondent who was the Counter Claimant for the same houses, whose Counter Claim was also dismissed. The 12th Respondent did not make out that she shared any right of ownership with the Appellants who were only tenants. In defining who an aggrieved person is , in MOHAMMED ABACHA VS. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2014) LPELR 2 2014 (SC) PP. 50-51, Paragraphs E-C. (2014) 6 NWLR (PT. 1402) P. 43) his Lordship Ariwoola, JSC held thus:

decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. See, In Re: ALHAJI AFUSAT IJELU & ORS VS. LAGOS STATE DEVELOPMENT & PROPERTY CORPORATION & ORS (1992) NWLR (PT. 266) 414; (1992) LPELR 1464. The Court below was therefore correct in holding that in the instant con, the expression person aggrieved refers to any person whose legal right was invaded by the forfeiture order, whose financial interest was directly and adversely affected by the said decree and whose right or property may be established or divested.

(Underlined mine for emphasis).

See, also SOCIETE GENERAL BANK NIGERIA LTD VS. LITUS TORRUNGBENEFADE AFEKORO & ORS (1999) LPELR 3082 (SC) P. 25, PARAGRAPHS A-D to the effect that any person aggrieved by any order of the Court is entitled to appeal, it defined who an aggrieved person is, his lordship Ogundare, JSC held thus:

In Ex parte Sidebotham, in Re Sidebotham (1880) 14 ch. D 458 at 465 James L. J., declared as long ago as over a century: ?It is said that any person

aggrieved by any order of the Court is entitled to appeal. But the words person aggrieved do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully affected his title to something. (Underlined mine for emphasis).

The aggrieved person at the lower Court is the 12th Respondent against whom judgment was given in respect of the property right of the 1st 11th Respondents and her Counter Claim. The 12th Respondent conceded the judgment of the trial Court and did not appeal against same but, her tenants appealed against the decision of the trial Court and included their landlord the 12th Respondent who lost, they are wrong to have done so. This is so because the Appellants had no personal or property rights which has been adversely affected by the judgment of the lower Court. The Appellants who were tenants cannot be rightly said to have been wrongfully deprived of

something that rightfully belongs to them. The Appellants had no property rights to the houses in question, they had no stake in the title of the houses they occupied as tenants to the 12th Respondent. See, BAKARE & ORS VS. ADEOGUN & ORS (2014) 2 SCM 62 at 90. In the final order of the trial Court the 1st 11th Respondents were adjudged the rightful owners of the houses, in consequence at page 413 of the printed records of appeal ordered the Appellants to vacate the houses and were restrained with the 12th Respondent from interfering with the peaceable dealing with the premises by the 1st 11th Respondents. It is clear that the property right of the 12th Respondent was what was taken away by the judgment of the lower Court and she is the aggrieved person who had the right to appeal, but, she chose not to. The Appellants, I would say were affected by the consequence of the said decision of having their tenancy abruptly terminated by the judgment. The Appellants had no right of appeal. The Appellants do not qualify as persons aggrieved and therefore had no locus standi to have appealed against the judgment of the trial Court.

The Appellants are not the proper persons to seek a redress over the judgment given against the 12th Respondent. Locus standi has been defined as the legal right of a party to an action, to be heard in litigation before a Court or tribunal. The term connotes the legal capacity of instituting or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever. Standing to sue touches on justiciability, it focuses on the party seeking to have his complaint before the Court not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated upon. See, THOMAS & ORS VS. OLUFOSOYE (1986) LPELR 3237 (SC), B.B. APUGO & SONS LTD VS. OHMB (2016) LPELR 40598 (SC), INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 423 at 601 602, H-B, SENATOR ABRAHAM ADESANYA VS. PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA & ANOR (1981) 5 SC 112 and ITEOGU VS. L.P.D.C. (2009) 17 NWLR (PT. 1171) 614. I hold that the Appellants who had no pecuniary or property right in the houses/property in question lacked the standing and competence to maintain the appeal, thus depriving this Court of the

jurisdiction to determine same.

With the success of ground one of the preliminary objection challenging the Appellants locus standi to have brought this appeal, there would be no need to look into the Appellants issues which were also adjudged incompetent under ground two, having been over taken by the resolution of the preliminary objection on the first ground.

In sum I hold that the preliminary objection of the 1st 11th Respondents is meritorious, same is sustained. The resultant effect is that the appeal having been filed by the Appellants who lacked the capacity to have done so, is incompetent, same is hereby struck out.

In respect of the preliminary objection of the 14th Respondent, I adopt the order in respect of the preliminary objection of the 1st 11th Respondents, I sustain same as also being meritorious.

Having sustained the preliminary objections, there is nothing left of the substantive appeal which has been struck out.

Parties are to bear their respective costs.

JAMES SHEHU ABIRIYI, J.C.A.: I read in advance in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my

learned brother CHIDI NWAOMA UWA JCA; and I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion in the said judgment.

For the reasons contained in the lead judgment, I too strike out the appeal.

I abide by all other orders in the leading judgment including the order as to costs.

ABDULLAHI MAHMUD BAYERO, J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances:

J. A. Oguche, Esq. with him, R. O. Ekrigwe, Esq. and M. D. Arosanyin, Esq. For Appellant(s)

E. A. Ibrahim-Effiong, Esq. with him, C.P. Ezeokoye, Esq., K.C. Ezugwu, Esq., Rejoice Magaji, Esq. and P.F. Asuquo, Esq. for the 1st-11th Respondents.

12th-13th Respondents’ Counsel served but absent.

14th Respondent’s Counsel served but absent For Respondent(s)

Appearances

J. A. Oguche, Esq. with him, R. O. Ekrigwe, Esq. and M. D. Arosanyin, Esq. For Appellant

AND

E. A. Ibrahim-Effiong, Esq. with him, C.P. Ezeokoye, Esq., K.C. Ezugwu, Esq., Rejoice Magaji, Esq. and P.F. Asuquo, Esq. for the 1st-11th Respondents.

12th-13th Respondents’ Counsel served but absent.

14th Respondent’s Counsel served but absent For Respondent