ABDULLAHI SHABA GBARA v. MOHAMMED ABDULLAHI ADAMU & ORS
(2019)LCN/13340(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Friday, the 24th day of May, 2019
CA/A/308/2019
RATIO
JURISDICTION: DEFINITION
Jurisdiction is the authority, given to the Court by the Constitution, legislation to decide matters that come before it. Jurisdiction is a threshold issue. So once it is raised, it must be resolved. It is so fundamental in that if a Court hears a case or matter in which it has no jurisdiction, no matter how well the case was conducted and decided, it would be a nullity. See MADUKOLU VS. NKEMDILIM 1962 2 NSCC PG 374.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
LIMITATION LAW: WHEN AN ACTION STARTED BY AN ORIGINATING SUMMONS BECOMES STATUTE BARRED
If the time contained in the originating summons as the time the cause of action arose is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. See the cases of; MUHAMMED VS. MIL. ADMIN, PLATEAU STATE (2001) 16 NWLR PT. 740 PG 570; OBIKA VS. OBIKA(2018) LPELR – 43965.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
LIMITATION: STATUTE BAR IN ELECTION PETITION
Election related matters are sui generis. They are unlike ordinary civil proceedings without a time bar. See:HASSAN VS. ALIYU (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 539) 1007 AT 1046.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
PRE-ELECTION MATTERS: WHEN DOES A CAUSE OF ACTION BEGIN IN A PRE-ELECTION MATTER
By virtue of the provisions of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution 4th Alteration Act, 2017, the cause of action in every pre-election matter arises from date of the occurrence of action complained of by the Plaintiff in his suit.PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
APPEAL: RESPONDENT’S BRIEF TO BE FILED WITHIN 5 DAYS OF SERVICE OF APPELLANTS BRIEF
Also, the Supreme Court in PDP Vs INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (PT. 1437) P. 525 AT 554 PER OKORO JSC while interpreting paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions (Election Appeals to the Supreme Court (No. 33 of 2011) which provides that the Respondent’s brief shall be filed within 5 days of the service of the Appellant’s brief held as follows:
“The 26th Respondent was served on 22nd August, 2014. Its time started to run from that same date irrespective of the fact that it was served at 4.00pm, or thereabout. Accordingly its time for filing its brief expired on 26th August, 2014. The subsequent filing of the brief on 27th August 2014 was done outside the time allowed by the practice directions… On the whole, I hold that the brief of the 26th respondent filed on 27th August, 2014, having been filed in flagrant disobedience to paragraph 6 of the practice direction is incompetent and is hereby struck out.”PER ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A.
JUSTICES
ADAMU JAURO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
ABDULLAHI SHABA GBARA Appellant(s)
AND
1. MOHAMMED ABDULLAHI ADAMU
2. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)
ADAMU JAURO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The appeal herein is against the Judgment of the Federal High Court, sitting at Minna, (herein after referred to as the trial court) delivered on 29th day of March, 2019 in Suit No. FHC/MN/CS/42/2018 by Hon. Justice A.B. Aliyu.
The Appellant herein was the 1st Defendant at the trial Court, while the 1st Respondent was the claimant/Plaintiff. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents were the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively.
This case was originated by the 1st respondent who as plaintiff took out an originating summons against the appellant and the 2nd and 3rd respondents as 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants at the trial Court. The originating summons was taken out on 23rd November, 2018 and sought the determination of four questions and several consequential reliefs.
The parties joined issues on the originating summons and the trial Court on 29th day of March, 2019 entered judgment for the 1st respondent, granting the reliefs 1 to 6 sought in the originating summons.
?Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed the instant appeal vide notice of appeal filed on 5th April, 2019.
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There are three grounds of appeal listed in the notice of appeal.
The record of appeal was transmitted to this Court on 11/04/2019. The briefs of argument were subsequently filed and exchanged by the parties in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Appellant filed his brief of argument. Then the 1st respondent filed his brief of argument. The 2nd and 3rd respondents have not filed any brief of argument. On 16th May, 2019, the appeal was heard before the Court. The appellant’s and the 1st respondent’s adopted their briefs as their respective arguments in this appeal.
The Appellant from their 3 grounds of appeal distilled two issues for determination as follows:
1. Whether the suit, as filed before the trial Court was not statute-barred, having been brought 48 days after the act complained of, which took place on 6/10/2018 contrary to Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) 4th alteration Act, 2017? (Distilled from ground 1)
2. Whether the learned trial Court erred in law and thereby occasioned miscarriage of justice when it held that the 1st respondent pulled the highest number of votes
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casted and ought to be declared the winner of the primary election held on 6/10/2018? (Distilled from Ground 2 of the Notice of Appeal)
The 1st Respondent adopted the two issues as distilled by the appellants.
Therefore, this appeal will be determined based on the two issues as distilled by the appellant.
ISSUE ONE
Whether the suit, as filed before the trial Court was not statute-barred, having been brought 48 days after the act complained of, which took place on 6/10/2018 contrary to Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) 4th Alteration Act, 2017? (Distilled from ground 1)
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the 2nd respondent’s primary election for nomination of state assembly candidates for the 2019 general election took place on 6th October, 2018, and this is admitted by the 1st respondent. He referred the Court to paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 and 34 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons of the 1st respondent at pages 7 and 9 of the record of appeal.
He contended that the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)(4th alteration, No. 21) Act, 2017
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is very clear and unambiguous; therefore it ought to be given its literal meaning. He referred the Court to the interpretation of the said provision in the cases of;PDP VS. ADEBAYO DAYO (unreported) SC 968/2018; CHIEF ENG. ADEBAYO DAYO & 8 ORS VS. PDP & 3 ORS (unreported) SC 2/2019; SALEH VS. ABAH 2017 12 NWLR PT. 1578 100 AT 159, CHIGBU VS. TONIMAS NIG. LTD 2006 9 NWLR PT. 984 AT 205, APC VS KARFI 2018 6 NWLR PT.1616 AT 508; AWOLOLA VS. GOV EKITI STATE 2019 ALL FWLR PT. 971 AT 18; ASABORO VS. PAN OCEAN OIL CORP NIG. LTD 2017 7 NWLR PT. 1563 AT 42.
Learned counsel submitted that in the light of the above decisions, the 1st respondent suit filed at the trial Court on 23/11/2018 on an event that is the primary election conducted on 6/10/2018 was filed 48 days after the primary election. He referred the Court to the 1st respondent’s affidavit in support of the originating summons at pages 7 and 9 of the record of appeal.
He contended that the 1st respondent suit at the trial Court is statute barred and cannot confer any right of action in his favour. He urged the Court to so hold. He referred the Court to the
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definition of pre-election matter as defined in Section 285 (14) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (4th alteration, No.21) Act, 2017, and argued that by that Section 285 (14) supra it is not in doubt that the subject matter of the 1st respondent’s suit at the lower Court is a pre-election matter. He referred the Court to the cases of; FAROUK SALIM Vs CPC & ORS (2013) LPELR-19928; AKPANGBO-OKADIGBO & ORS VS. CHIDI & ORS 2015 LPELR-24564 SC; AMAECHI Vs INEC & ORS 2007 18 NWLR PT. 1065 AT 42.
He submitted that having settled that the 1st respondent’s suit at the trial Court is a pre-election matter, the law requires that it shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event complained of in the suit.
Learned counsel argued further that in computing time in election related matters the Court includes Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays. He referred the Court to the cases of; PDP Vs CPC 2011 17 NWLR PT. 1277 AT 506; OKECHUKWU Vs INEC (2014) 17 NWLR PT. 1436 PG 47 AT 78.
He maintained that for the trial judge to hold that the case of OKECHUKWU Vs INEC SUPRA was decided in relation to
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the election matters and not pre-election and as such the day of the occurrence of the event was 9th of November, 2018, and therefore, the 1st respondent’s suit was filed within time, is not in tandem with the provision of Section 285 (9) supra. He referred the Court to the case of ADENIRAN Vs IBRAHIM 2019 ALL FWLR PT. 971 AT 147.
He contended that the phrase from the date of occurrence as used in Section 285 (9) above as distinct from the phrase after the date of occurrence has been interpreted to include the date of the event. He referred the Court to the cases of; ADO ADESULE VS MAYOWA & ORS 2011 LPELR 3691; AMB PAST UBONG IKPE & ORS, OLATUNJI V. OLAKUNDE & ORS 2011 LPELR 4734 CA.
Based on the above, learned counsel submitted that in calculating the 14 days, the date of the primary election which is 6th October, 2018 must be counted. He referred the Court to the cases; AKANDE VS. INEC & ORS (2011) LPELR ? 3680 CA; EKEOGU VS. ALIRI (1991) 3 NWLR (PT. 179) AT 258; ETIM VS. IGP (2000) 11 NWLR (PT. 724) PG 266 AT 284; EBOIGBE VS. NNPC (1994) NWLR (PT. 343) AT 549; OGBORU VS. UDUAGHAN (2012) 11 NWLR (PT. 1131) 357 AT 393.
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He insisted that the suit of the 1st respondent is statute barred and the trial Court was wrong when it agreed with the submission of the 1st respondent that it was on 9th November, 2018 that the cause of action arose. He referred the Court to the cases of; PDP, VS. DR. UZOCHUKWU OBIORA CHIRA & ANOR Unreported in SC 1331/2018; PDP VS. ADEBAYO DAYO (UN REPORTED) SC 968/2018; CHIEF ENG. ADEBAYO DAYO & 8 ORS VS. PDP & 3 ORS (UNREPORTED) SC 2/2019; AJIBONA VS. KOLAWOLE 1996 10 NWLR PT. 476 PG 22, AKIBU & ORS VS. AZEEZ & ORS 2003 5 NWLR PT. 814 PG 643, ABUBAKAR VS TANKO 2019 NWLR PT. 1658 PG 7.
He urged the Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court, same having been given without jurisdiction and resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.
Learned counsel for the 1st respondent on the other hand submitted that the 1st respondent’s suit is not statute barred as the cause of action sequel to the filing of the suit at the trial Court arose on the 9th November, 2019, the date the 3rd respondent published the name of the appellant as the candidate of the 2nd respondent at about 6:25 pm. He referred the Court to paragraph 5 of the 1st
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respondent’s counter affidavit to the appellant’s notice of preliminary objection (which is unchallenged) at page 285 – 287 of the record of appeal, and the cases of; GOV OF ZAMFARA STATE & ORS VS. SULEIMAN & ORS (2012) 4 SCNJ 1; SENATOR NKECHI JUSTINA VS. HON. EMEKA & ORS (2013) 1 SCNJ 217; INEGBEDION VS. SELO-OJEMEN (2013) 1 SCNJ 267; APC & Anor. Vs Engr. Suleiman Aliyu Lere & INEC (unrep.) SC 222/2019.
Learned counsel insisted that by the provision of the Constitution, the cause of action in this suit arose on the 9th November, 2018 when the 3rd respondent published the name of the appellant as the 2nd respondent’s candidate for member, Niger State House of Assembly Mokwa Constituency in the 2019 general elections.
He submitted that from the 9th November, 2018 when the cause of action arose to 23rd November, 2018 when the 1st respondent filed this suit at the Court below is a period of 14 days.
In response to paragraph 4.3 of the appellant’s brief of argument, the 1st respondent submitted that the cause of action in this suit did not arise on the 6th October, 2018. He referred the Court to the 1st respondent’s
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counter affidavit to the appellant’s notice of preliminary objection, and paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the 1st respondent affidavit in support of the originating summons at pages 8 and 286 of the record of appeal respectively to show that parties have joined issues on the date of publication which is 9th November, 2018. He referred the Court also the cases of; SAVAGE & ORS VS. UWECHIA 1972 1 ALL NWLR PT.1 AT 256; CHEVRON VS. LONESTAR DRILLING 2001 11 NWLR PT. 723.
Learned counsel argued that between 6th October, 2018 and 8th November, 2018 no aspirant was declared as the winner of the primary election. He referred the Court to Exhibit A attached to the 1st respondent’s counter affidavit to the appellant’s notice of preliminary objection at pages 299-303 of the record.
He contended that the case of PDP VS ADEBAYO relied upon by the appellant does not apply to the 1st respondent’s suit, as no aspirant was declared as winner in the 1st respondent’s case.
He maintained that the trial Court was right when it held that the case of OKECHUKWU VS INEC was decided in relation to election matter and therefore, not applicable to the 1st respondent’s case
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at the trial Court. He referred the Court to Section 87 (9) of the electoral Act and the case of OKADIGBO VS. EMEKA 2012 1 SCNJ AT 579.
He argued further that it is correct that OKECHUKWU’S CASE did not make rules of Court inapplicable to pre-election matters. He referred the court to Order 48 Rule 1 (a) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009, and urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the 1st respondent.
In the appellant’s reply brief, the appellant submitted that the 1st respondent has failed to appreciate the point on law on the current position of the Supreme Court on the provisions of Section 285 (9) supra. He referred the Court to the case of OLUWA ROTIMI ODUNAYO AKEREDOLU VS DR. OLUSEGUN MICHAEL ABRAHAM & OR (SUPRA). He contended that in the light of the Supreme Court decision in OLUWA ROTIMI ODUNAYO AKEREDOLU’S CASE, the cause of action complained by the 1st respondent was a primary election which was held on 6/10/2019.
He submitted that assuming without conceding that the cause of action arose on 9/11/2018, still from 9/11/2018 to 23/11/2018 the 1st respondent’s case at the trial Court is statute barred.
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He referred the Court to the cases of; INEC VS. ONOWAPKOKO 2018 NWLR PT. 1602 AT 139; INEC VS. OGBADIBO LOCAL GOVT 2015 LPELR-24839 SC, ADESIGBIN VS. MIL. GOV. LAGOS STATE 2017 10 NWLR PT. 1574 AT 442 SC; OSI VS ACCORD PARTY 2017 3 NWLR PT. 1553 AT 390 SC, (Among others).
He urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the trial Court.
Jurisdiction is the authority, given to the Court by the Constitution, legislation to decide matters that come before it. Jurisdiction is a threshold issue. So once it is raised, it must be resolved. It is so fundamental in that if a Court hears a case or matter in which it has no jurisdiction, no matter how well the case was conducted and decided, it would be a nullity. See MADUKOLU VS. NKEMDILIM 1962 2 NSCC PG 374. In the instant case, the point raised all through from the trial Court to this Court, is the fact that Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (4th Alteration Act 2017) has introduced time limitation to pre-election disputes. It provides thus;
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of
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the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.” (Underlining mine for emphasis)
This provision in my view is straight forward and devoid of any shade of construction. It is not in dispute that this case borders on pre-election dispute and thus, strict adherence to the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution must be made. A careful perusal of the provision of Section 285 (9) above, shows that every pre election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
?In the instant case, the 1st respondent’s cause of action as can be gleaned from the originating processes filed at the trial Court, is the submission of the name of the 2nd respondent to the 3rd respondent as the appellant’s candidate, instead of his name, as the aspirant to the office of Niger State House of Assembly representing Mokwa State Constituency of Niger State in the 2019 General election. See paragraphs 7 to 10 of the grounds upon which the reliefs in the originating summons are sought, and also paragraphs 29 and 31 of the affidavit in support of the originating
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summons, at pages 4 and 9 of the record of appeal respectively.
In consideration of whether an action is caught by statute of limitation, what is of paramount consideration is the determination of;
a. The cause of action
b. When the cause of action accrued; and
c. When the action became statute-barred.
To determine these conditions, what the Court would look at are the originating summons and the affidavit in support alleging when the wrong which gave the plaintiff a cause of action was committed and by comparing that date with the date on which the originating summons was filed. If the time contained in the originating summons as the time the cause of action arose is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the action is statute barred. See the cases of; MUHAMMED VS. MIL. ADMIN, PLATEAU STATE (2001) 16 NWLR PT. 740 PG 570; OBIKA VS. OBIKA(2018) LPELR – 43965.
In the instant case, the 1st respondent himself admitted that his cause of action arose on the 9th November, 2018 when the 3rd respondent published the name of the appellant as the 2nd respondent’s candidate for Member, Niger State House of Assembly Mokwa State
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Constituency in the 2019 General Election. While, the appellant on his part contended that the cause of action arose on 6th October, 2018 the date the primary election took place.
In resolving this issue, the trial Court in its judgment held thus;
“As can be gleaned from the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the cause of action arose on the 9th November, 2019 when the name of the 1st defendant was published by the 3rd defendant as the candidate of the 2nd defendant.”
It is not in dispute that the 1st Respondent’s action was instituted at the trial Court on 23rd November, 2018. Election related matters are sui generis. They are unlike ordinary civil proceedings without a time bar. See:HASSAN VS. ALIYU (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 539) 1007 AT 1046. By virtue of the provisions of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution 4th Alteration Act, 2017, the cause of action in every pre-election matter arises from date of the occurrence of action complained of by the Plaintiff in his suit.
Also, this Court in DAVID UMAR VS. APC & 2 ORS (Unreported) Delivered on 8/4/2019 held per S. J. Adah JCA thus;
“The issue of submission of name to the
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INEC on 18th October, 2018 is ancillary to the main issue which is the primary election conducted by the 1st respondent. The authority for this is Section 87 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).”
His Lordship went further to say, thus;
“The issue of forwarding or submitting a candidate’s name to INEC is a function of a successful primary election. So the cause of action is the primary election.”
In the light of the above, it would be right to say that the 1st respondent’s cause of action arose on 6th October, 2018 when the primary election was conducted and the 1st respondent allegedly scored the highest number of votes cast. More so, the parties have joined issues on who among them won the primary erection conducted on the 6th October, 2018, and the trial Court resolved in favour of the plaintiff, when it held in its judgment inter alia as follows;
I find that the plaintiff scored the highest number of votes cast at the election.”
See pages 374 to 376 of the record of appeal.
Furthermore, it is trite law that facts admitted need no further prove. I have earlier said in this judgment that the 1st respondent
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himself admitted that the cause of action arose on 9th November, 2018. From 9th November, 2018 when the cause of action arose, as admitted by the 1st respondent and held by the trial Court, to 23rd November, 2018 when the 1st respondent case was filed at the trial Court, it is well over 14 days. By the authority of OKECHUKWU VS INEC (SUPRA) time will be begin to run from the date of the occurrence of the event, (i.e from 9th November, 2018 when the name of the appellant was published by the 3rd respondent).
Computation of time in Nigeria has always been regulated by statute with series of judicial pronouncements on the effect of such statutes. The Interpretation Act Cap 123, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004 which in its Section 15 (2) (a) provides that;
“(a) reference in an enactment to a period of days shall be construed – (a) where the period is reckoned from a particular event, as excluding the day on which the event occurs;”
?The Interpretation Act is obviously a general statute regulating the construction of other statutes in Nigeria except where a particular statute provides for other interpretations in which case such interpretation
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will govern the statute concerned. As regards computation of time in judicial proceedings, especially in civil litigation, the provisions of Section 15 of the Interpretation Act (Supra) has essentially been adopted by the various procedural rules applicable in Nigerian courts. For instance Order 48 Rule 1 (a) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2009 provides that;
“where, by any law or order made by a Judge, a time is appointed or limited for the doing of any act, the period shall be reckoned: (a) as excluding the day on which the order is made or on which the event occurs;”
The Courts have had occasions to pronounce on the above provisions. See the case of AKEREDOLU Vs. AKINREMI (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 10) P.787.
However, in Election related matters as in the instant case the Interpretation Act does not apply to construction of electoral statutes on the ground that election matters are sui generis. IN OKECHUKWU V. INEC (SUPRA) the Supreme Court held that, time shall run, in the peculiarity of our Electoral Act, Practice Directions and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria “as amended” from the day of the act and the
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day shall not be excluded. The Court held per Ariwoola JSC at page 204 of the report that:
“Ordinarily, but for the sui generis nature of election matters, according to the common construction of the English language: ‘within any number of days after an act is to be understood exclusive of the day of the act:… in Morton Vs Hamson (1962) VR 364 at 365 the Court held that the modern rule in relation to period of time fixed by a statute “within” which an act is to be done after a specified event is that the day of the event is to be excluded, the next day is the first day of the stipulated period and the time expires on the last day of the period, counting from and of course including the first day. However, being aware of the sui generis nature of election related matters in which time is of the essence, and the stand of this Court on the interpretation of the practice directions vis-a-vis Interpretation Act, I hold no hesitation in concluding that the provisions of the Interpretation Act on computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by the practice directions. Time shall run, in the peculiarity of our Electoral Act, Practice
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Directions and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria “as amended” from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded. (Underlining mine for emphasis)
The word “from” as used in Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (Fourth Alteration Act No. 21) 2017 in my view means that the period provided for must be calculated as including the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
In UMARU & ANOR V. ALIYU & ORS (2009) LPELR-5052 (CA) this Court held that:
“From” in that provision connotes immediately without any delay. In other words, it means, the event will be reckoned from the stated period. Perhaps, if we may say, that is what gives the section its uniqueness as election matters are sui generis. It simply means from the happening of the event and in the instant case, the declaration of election results on the 15th April, 2007. The intention of the legislature is clear and it is that the computation must include the date on which the event happened and that is the declaration of the result of the election and time will begin to run from that date and 30 days will include the date on
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which the declaration was made..”
Also, the Supreme Court in PDP Vs INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (PT. 1437) P. 525 AT 554 PER OKORO JSC while interpreting paragraph 6 of the Practice Directions (Election Appeals to the Supreme Court (No. 33 of 2011) which provides that the Respondent’s brief shall be filed within 5 days of the service of the Appellant’s brief held as follows:
“The 26th Respondent was served on 22nd August, 2014. Its time started to run from that same date irrespective of the fact that it was served at 4.00pm, or thereabout. Accordingly its time for filing its brief expired on 26th August, 2014. The subsequent filing of the brief on 27th August 2014 was done outside the time allowed by the practice directions… On the whole, I hold that the brief of the 26th respondent filed on 27th August, 2014, having been filed in flagrant disobedience to paragraph 6 of the practice direction is incompetent and is hereby struck out.”
In view of the above, I do not agree with the trial Court in its interpretation of Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (4th Alteration Act No. 21) 2017 that the day of the occurrence of the event is excluded.
In this case, the 1st
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Respondent’s action was filed at the trial Court on 23rd November, 2018 on a cause of action which he alleged arose on 9th November, 2018. From whichever of the two dates either 6th October, 2016 when the primaries was conducted or the date of publication of names being 9th November, 2018 to 23rd November, 2018 when the 1st respondent filed his suit at the trial Court, as I have earlier said is well over 14 days. Therefore, the failure of the 1st Respondent to file his suit within 14 days from the day of the action complained (in this case submission of the appellant’s name), as required by Section 285 (9) of the CFRN (4th Alteration Act 2017) is fatal to his case and ousted the trial Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
Issue one is resolved in favour of the Appellant.
Having held that the jurisdiction of the trial Court had been ousted, all other issues raised in this appeal have become academic and of no moment.
This appeal is adjudged to be meritorious and it is hereby allowed. The decision of the trial Court in suit No. FHC/MN/CS/42/2018 is hereby set aside, as the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the 1st Respondent’s
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suit filed on 23rd November, 2018.
There shall be no order as to costs.
EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my Learned brother, Lord Justice Adamu Jauro, JCA. I agree with the reasoning, conclusions and orders therein.
MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: My learned brother ADAMU JAURO, JCA afforded me the opportunity of reading before today a draft copy of the lead judgment just delivered.
?I adopt the judgment as mine with nothing further to add.
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Appearances:
M. N. Mohammed, Esq. with him, Michael Eleyinmi, Esq., B.W. Usman, Esq., Olamilekan Joseph, Esq. and Raphael Ashwe, Esq.For Appellant(s)
Oluwole Olukunle, Esq. with him, M.M. Garba, Esq. and M.T. Mohammed, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.
Douglas Oroja, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent.
S.O. Ibrahim, Esq. with him, S.M. Danbaba, Esq. for the 3rd Respondent
For Respondent(s)
Appearances
M. N. Mohammed, Esq. with him, Michael Eleyinmi, Esq., B.W. Usman, Esq., Olamilekan Joseph, Esq. and Raphael Ashwe, Esq.For Appellant
AND
Oluwole Olukunle, Esq. with him, M.M. Garba, Esq. and M.T. Mohammed, Esq. for the 1st Respondent.
Douglas Oroja, Esq. for the 2nd Respondent.
S.O. Ibrahim, Esq. with him, S.M. Danbaba, Esq. for the 3rd RespondentFor Respondent
