HIS ROYAL MAJESTY, EDIDEM EKPO ABASI OTU v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, CROSS RIVER STATE & ORS (2019)

HIS ROYAL MAJESTY, EDIDEM EKPO ABASI OTU v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, CROSS RIVER STATE & ORS

(2019)LCN/13013(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 2nd day of April, 2019

CA/C/39/2018

JUSTICES

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

HIS ROYAL MAJESTY, EDIDEM EKPO ABASI OTU
(Obong of Calabar and Grand Patriarch of the Efiks) Appellant(s)

AND

1. ATTORNEY-GENERAL, CROSS RIVER STATE
2. THE SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE GOVT OF CRS ON CHIEFTAINCY AFFAIRS
3. HIS ROYAL MAJESTY, (DR) PATRICK INOK OQUA AGBOR
(Ndidem and Grand Patriarch of the Oquas) Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT LEGAL PROCEEDINGS CAN BE INSTITUTED AFTER THE EXPIRATON OF A PRESCRIBED LIMITATION PERIOD

Clearly, where a statute of limitation prescribed the period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period, as same has become statute barred. See EKEOGU V. ALIRI [1991] 3 NWLR [Pt. 17a] 258 SC; YABUGBE V. C.O.P [1992] 4 NWLR [Pt. 234] 152 SC; EGBE V. YUSUF [1992] 6 NWLR [Pt. 245] 1 SC; DAUDU V. UNAM [2002] 17 NWLR [Pt. 796] 362; UNILORIN V. ADENIRAN [2007] 6 NWLR [Pt. 1031] 498; IBRAHIM V. J.S.C. [1998] 14 NWLR [Pt. 584] 1 SC. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.

RATIONAL SUPPORTING THE EXISTENCE OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION

In AREMO II VS. ADEKANYE [2004] 13 NWLR [Pt. 891] 572, [2004] LPELR ? 544 SC, Edozie, JSC said the rationale or justification supporting the existence of statutes of limitation includes the following:
1. That long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; LLOYDS V. BUTLER [1950] 1 K. B @ 81 ? 82.
2. That a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispose a stale claim; JONES V. BELLGROVE PROPERTIES LTD. [1949] 2 K.B. 700 @ 704 and
3. That persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence: BOARD OF TRADE V. CAYZER IRVINE & CO. [1927] AC 610 @ 628.
See also ABUBAKAR, JCA, in IHESIABA V YOUNG SHALL GROW MOTORS LTD. [2016] LPELR 42257 CA. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Cross River State presided over by S. M. Anjor, J. in Suit No. HC/132/2016 and delivered on the 15/3/2017, whereby the learned trial judge upheld the objection of the Respondents that the Appellant suit was statute barred and struck out the suit for incompetence and want of jurisdiction.

The Appellant who was plaintiff in the Court below filed an originating summons on the 21/3/2016 seeking for the interpretation and application of Sections 18(1) and (2), 19 and 20 of the Traditional Rulers Law, Laws of Cross River State Cap. T4, 2004. The suit was later amended by order of Court. The Appellant raised three questions and five reliefs composed of three declarations and two orders as stated on pages 154 ? 155 of the Record of Appeal.

QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION:
i. Whether upon the true interpretation of Sections 18(1) and (2) and Sections 19 and 20(1) of the Traditional Rulers Law, Laws of Cross River State Cap T4 2004, it is lawful for the Ndidem of the Quas to be recognized as the Paramount Ruler of Calabar Municipality.

ii. Whether the 3rd respondent is entitled to preside or continue to preside over the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipality when his predecessor in office, as the Ndidem of the Quas, presided over the said council during his lifetime to the complete exclusion of the plaintiff.
iii. Whether upon the true interpretation of S. 18(1) and (2) of the Traditional Rulers Law, Laws of Cross River State Cap T4 2004, the plaintiff as the President of the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipality, is not entitled to preside over the affairs of the said Traditional Council.
RELIEFS SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFFS
1. A declaration that the proclamation, certification or recognition of His Royal Majesty, The Ndidem of the Quas as the Paramount Ruler of Calabar Municipality is unlawful, illegal, ultra vires and in breach of the provisions of Section 18(1) & (2) and Section 20(1) of the Traditional Rulers Law, CAP T4 laws of Cross River State 2004.
2. A declaration that the Obong of Calabar is entitled to officiate alternately, with the 3rd Respondent as President of the Traditional Council of the

Calabar Municipality as provided for in Section 18(2) of the Traditional Rulers Law, CAP T4 Laws of Cross River State 2004.
3. A declaration that the person who was accorded official recognition as the Ndidem of the Quas, having officiated and/or presided over the Traditional Council of the Calabar Municipality throughout the lifetime of His Royal Majesty Ndidem Thomas Ika Ika Oqua; the plaintiff, as the only qualified Traditional Ruler provided for in Section 18(2) of the Traditional Rulers Law of CRS to preside alternately, is entitled to preside in the office of President of the Traditional Council of Calabar Municipality.
4. An order compelling the 1st & 2nd Respondents to issue a certificate of Recognition to the Plaintiff as President of the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipality and to publish or cause to be published, in the Order establishing the Traditional Council, the alternating order of Presiding Over the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipality, granting the plaintiff presiding rights.
5. Any other ORDER or RELIEF to which the Plaintiff may be found entitled by this honourable Court.

The 1st and 2nd Respondents and the 3rd Respondent separately by way of preliminary objection challenged the competence of the suit and the jurisdiction of the trial Court to adjudicate upon the suit. Their respective objections amongst other things were on the ground that the Appellant?s action was statute barred and was not well suited for originating summons procedure.

The Preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd Respondents as contained on pages 307 ? 308 of the Record of Appeal was predicated on the following grounds:
1. The Calabar- Municipal Local Government Area (LGA) was created on the 12/12/96 when the then Calabar Municipality Local Government Area was divided into two Local Government Areas and became Calabar- Municipal Local Government Area and Calabar South Local Government Area. The Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Traditional Provisions) Decree No. 7 of 1997 created the two Local Government Area.
2. Calabar Municipality Local Government Area which ceased to exist on the 12/12/96 is different from Calabar-Municipal Local Government Area in size and population, etc.

3. Since 12/12/96, when Calabar- Municipal Local Government Area was created till date, about 20 years now, the Ndidem of the Quas has been presiding exclusively as the Paramount Ruler of Calabar Municipal- Local Government Area and also the President/Chairman of the Traditional Rulers Counsel of Calabar- Municipal Local Government Area.
4. In spite of the provisions of Sections 3(1) and 18 of the Traditional Rulers Law, Cap T4 Laws of Cross River State 2004, (THE LAW) which require the Obong of Calabar, the Muri-Munene of the Efuts and the Ndidem of the Quas to preside as the President of the Traditional Rulers Council of the Calabar Municipality, in alternation, the Claimant, the Obong of Calabar has never presided or indicated any interest to preside over the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar- Municipal Local Government Area since the 12/12/96 till on the 21/3/16, when this suit was filed.
5. The Muri-Munene of the Efuts has also not presided or indicated any interest to preside over the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar- Municipal Local Government Area since 12/12/96.
6. The Obong of Calabar and the Muri-Munene of the Efuts are now resident in Calabar South

Local Govt. Area and not in Calabar Municipal Local Govt. Area.
7. The 1st & 2nd Respondents are juristic persons and any action against them must be brought within 6 months from 12/12/96 when Calabar-Municipal Local Govt. Area was created or from 21/5/15 when the 3rd Respondent was recognized and certificated by the 1st Respondent as the Ndidem of the Quas, the Paramount Ruler and the Chairman of the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipal LGA.
8. The Claimant has acquiesced, waived his right and is stopped from invoking Section 3(1) and 18 of the Law to act as the President of the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipal LGA.
9. This suit, HC/132/16 filed on the 21/3/16 more than 6 months when the cause of action arose, is incompetent and this honorable Court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon same.

Parties exchanged affidavit and written addresses. Both the objection of the 3rd Respondent and that of the 1st and 2nd were argued on 21-2-2017.

?The learned trial judge upheld the objections of both the 3rd Respondent and the 1st and 2nd Respondents and struck out the suit for being incompetent and

statute barred. At pages 366 ? 367 of the Record of Appeal, he held as follows:
As submitted by 1st and 2nd Respondents? counsel which fact has not been disputed by claimant?s counsel, the cause of action in this matter from the facts arose both on 12th December, 1996 as well as 21st May, 2015 when 1st Respondent recognized and certificated 3rd Respondent, while this action was commenced on 21st March, 2016 for which in both situations, the period of 3months stipulated in the law produced above had since lapsed. And as earlier noted, plaintiff counsel had not denied these facts about the dates of accrual of the cause of action and commencement of the suit, safe that according to him, the law does not apply to 1st and 2nd Respondents as they did not act in good faith. But there is no affidavit before the Court nor did he explained as to show how the 1st & 2nd Respondents performed their official duties fraudulently or in abuse of their offices in this case so as not to benefit from the protective shield of the law under consideration under the principles in OFFOBOCHE V. OGOJA LGA (supra).
It is not enough to just say the 1st

and 2nd Respondents acted fraudulently without more. See MADAKI VS GOVERNOR NASARAWA STATE & ORS. (2011) LPELR ? CA/J/87/07; EGBE V. ADEFARASIN & ANOR. (1987) 1 NWLR (PT. 47) @ 21 and IBRAHIM VS LAWAL & ORS. (2015) LPELR SC 99/2009, where the Apex Court held inter alia:
? where a statute of limitation prescribed the period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period, as same has become statute barred?
Their Lordships also held that statute of limitation also applies to chieftaincy matters such as the one at hand. See also SYLVA V INEC & ORS. (2015) LPELR SC- 85/2014.

Dissatisfied with the decision, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal containing four grounds of appeal on 28/3/2017. The relevant briefs of Argument are:
1. Appellant?s brief of Argument filed on 6/3/2018. It is settled by C.N. Nwajiobi.
2. 1st and 2nd Respondents brief of Argument filed on 26/4/2018 but deemed filed on 26/11/2018. It is settled by I. E. Ikona, Dir. Civil Litigation, Ministry of Justice, Cross River State.

3. 3rd Respondent?s brief of Argument filed on 15/5/2018 was deemed filed on 26/1/2018.
4. Appellant?s Reply brief to the 1st ? 3rd Respondents was filed on 23/01/2019 but deemed filed on 26/2/2019.

Learned counsel for the Appellant nominated three (3) issues for determination. They are:
1. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that this suit is statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Cross River State Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. P. 17, Laws of Cross River State, 2004. (Ground 4).
2. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that the suit leading to this appeal, cannot be properly determined by way of an originating summons procedure. (Ground 1).
3. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he delved into the substantive suit at the time of determining the objection of the Respondents. (Grounds 2 and 3).

Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents adopted the three issues nominated by the Appellant.

?Learned counsel for the 3rd Respondent however formulated four (4) issues for the determination of the appeal. They are:

<br< p=””
</br<

1. Whether the trial Court was not right in holding that the Appellant?s action is statute barred. [Distilled from ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal]
2. Whether having regard to the contentious facts of this case, originating summons is not an inappropriate means of commencing the action as held by the trial Court. [Distilled from ground 1 of the notice of appeal]
3. Whether the affidavit evidence of the Appellant in support of his summons discloses any cause of action whatsoever against the 3rd Respondent. [Distilled from ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal]
4. Whether the trial Court was not right in holding that the Appellant failed to show how the proclamation, certification or recognition of the 3rd Respondent as the Paramount Ruler of Calabar Municipality is unlawful, illegal and ultra vires and in breach of Section 18(1), 19(2) and 20(1) of the Traditional Rulers Law of Cross River State. [Distilled from ground 2 of the notice of appeal].

?In this appeal, I will deal with the submissions of the Appellant on one side of the scale and the submissions of the two sets of Respondents together on the other side of the scale as

those of the ?Respondents?. This is for the reason of the shared common interest between the two sets of Respondents and also for convenience.

?On issue one, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned trial judge was wrong to have struck out the Appellant?s suit on the ground that the suit was commenced outside the three (3) months period prescribed by Section 1(1)(a) of the Cross River State Public Officer?s Protection Law 2004. He submitted that the said Cross River State Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. P17, though a limitation statute does not operate without any exceptions. That though the law is intended as much as within limits to protect a public officer from detraction and unnecessary litigation, it is never intended to deprive a party of legal capacity to ventilate his grievance on the face of stark injustice such as in the cases of continuance of damage or injury. Also, that the said Public Officers Protection Law does not cover a situation where the person relying on it acted outside the colours of his office or outside his statutory or constitutional duty. He referred to the cases of

A-G, RIVERS STATE V. A-G, BAYELSA STATE [2013] 3 NWLR [Pt. 1340] 123 @ 149; OBA J. A. AREMO II V. S. F. ADEKANYE & ORS. [2004] 13 NWLR [Pt. 891] @ 593 ? 594 and concluded on issue one that the 1st and 2nd Respondents acted outside their statutory powers and against the provisions of Section 18(2) of the said Cross River State Traditional Rulers Law. Their duty, said counsel, is to recognize alternate Presiding and not to, in abuse of their office, recognize only one traditional ruler of one of the three recognized by Section 18 of the Traditional Rulers Law. That there is no limitation time for actions sought in construction or interpretation of a statute. The words of a statute remain in force until repealed, and therefore cannot be caught by any limitation law.

The Respondents more especially through the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted on issue one that the trial Court was right in holding that the Appellant?s Suit No. HC/132/2016 was statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Cross River State Public Officers Protection Law Cap. P17 Laws of Cross River State, 2004 as amended in 2007.

Respondents submitted that the Appellants suit was

filed on the 21/3/2016 when the cause of action arose on the 12/12/1996 and/or on the 21/5/2015. That a careful look at the record shows that the Appellant?s main issue in this suit is his right to presiding on Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipality Local Government Area which does not really exist.

They [Respondents] submitted that Calabar Municipality LGA was divided into two LGA?s on the 12/12/1996 to wit- Calabar Municipal Local Government and Calabar South Local Government Area. The two Local Governments were created by the Local Governments [Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions] Decree No. 7 of 1997. Respondents submitted further that from 12/12/96, Calabar Municipality Local Government Area ceased to exist as a Local Government Area in the State and Section 3(1) and 18 of the Law became impossible to apply due to the change in the Constitution of the Local Government Area. The change in the size, population and residences of two of the three traditional rulers under reference have made these provisions of the law impossible to apply.

Learned counsel to the Respondents submitted further that Section 3(1) and

18 of the Traditional Rulers Law 1978 which require alternate presidency became oti-ose after the division of the Calabar Municipality Local Government Area into two Local Government Areas by the Local Governments [Basic Constitutional & Transitional Provisions Decree No. 7 of 1997].

Also that the recognition and certification of the 3rd Respondent as Paramount Ruler was/is as Chairman Calabar Municipal Local Government which is completely different from the now non-existing Calabar Municipality which the Appellant is complaining about.

The Respondents submitted that the Appellant never presided or indicated any interest to preside as the President of the Traditional Rulers Council of Calabar Municipality or Calabar- Municipality Local Government Area from 12/12/96, till 21/3/16 when the Appellant?s suit was filed, a period of about 20 years rendering this suit incompetent and robbing the trial Court of jurisdiction to determine the suit. That the Appellant is stopped from laying claims to the Presidency/Paramount Ruler of Calabar Municipality which does not exist or Calabar Municipality Local Government having failed to indicate any

interest in the throne since 1996 when the right to the office of the President accrued. That the Appellant expressly admitted in his affidavit in support of the originating summons and the Amended Originating Summons at paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the respective affidavits that he was aware that there were previous Presidents of the Traditional Rulers Council of the Local Government Area from 1996 and he was excluded.

They [Respondents] added that contrary to the submissions of the Appellant?s in paragraphs 4.04, 4.05 and 4.06 of the Appellant?s brief of argument, that the Cross River State Public Officers Protection Law as amended protects the 1st and 2nd Respondents as the exercise of the powers of the State Governor was in pursuance of Public duty and that there is no continuing damage or injury against the Appellant occasioned by the action of the Respondents. That this case does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the application of Limitation Laws including the Cross River State Public Officers Protection Law. And, that the cases of ATTORNEY-GENERAL, RIVERS STATE V ATTORNEY-GENERAL, BAYELSA STATE [2013] 3 NWLR [Pt. 1340]

page 349; OBA J.A. AREMO II V S.F. ADEKANYE & ORS. [2004] 13 NWLR [Pt. 891] @ 593 ? 594 and other cases cited by the Appellant in the brief of argument are inapplicable in the instant case.

Learned counsel to the Respondents referred to the cases of IHESIABA V. YOUNG SHALL GROW MOTORS LTD. [2016] LPELR [42257] CA and also to AREMO II V. ADEKANYE [2004] 13 NWLR [Pt. 891] 572, [2004] LPELR- 544 SC and submitted that the Public Officers Protection Law is to protect public officers from unnecessary and unwarranted litigation as the instant case and that every statute of limitation forestalls a party?s right of action, thereby rendering unenforceable the cause of action which would ordinarily be available to the party.

The [Respondents] further referred to the case of OFFOBOCHE V OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA [2001] 16 NWLR [Pt. 739] 488 and concluded on issue one that Suit No. HC/132/16 is incompetent, statute barred being contrary to Section 1(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Cross River State and the trial judge rightly declined jurisdiction to hear same.

?The most important points in relation to Appellant?s issue

one as also brought out by the learned trial judge are that from the affidavit evidence of the Appellant and counter affidavit of 3rd Respondent and restated in the objection of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, Calabar Municipal Local Government Area was created on 12th December, 1996 when same was split into 2, that is Calabar Municipal LGA and Calabar South LGA which is a period of over 20 years, and that only 3rd Respondent predecessors and the 3rd Respondent himself have been presiding exclusively as Paramount Ruler of Calabar Municipal Local Government Area and President/Chairman of the Traditional Rulers Council, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3(1) and 18 of the Traditional Rulers Law without any complaint by the Appellant until 21st March, 2016 when the present action was instituted. It is also common ground that 3rd Respondent was recognized and certificated by the 1st Respondent as the Ndidem of the Quas, the Paramount Ruler/Chairman of the Traditional Rulers Council, Calabar Municipal Local Government Area on 21st May 2015, which is over three or even six months period within which an action has to be brought against 1st and 2nd Respondents

who are sued in their official capacities. These dates that is 12/12/1996 and or 21/5/2015 as accrual dates of the Plaintiff?s Appellant?s cause of action were not in any way denied by the Appellant. Consequently, the Appellant?s suit was caught by the provision of Section 1(1)(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. P.17 Laws of Cross River State 2004 [as amended]. Clearly, where a statute of limitation prescribed the period within which an action must be commenced, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period, as same has become statute barred. See EKEOGU V. ALIRI [1991] 3 NWLR [Pt. 17a] 258 SC; YABUGBE V. C.O.P [1992] 4 NWLR [Pt. 234] 152 SC; EGBE V. YUSUF [1992] 6 NWLR [Pt. 245] 1 SC; DAUDU V. UNAM [2002] 17 NWLR [Pt. 796] 362; UNILORIN V. ADENIRAN [2007] 6 NWLR [Pt. 1031] 498; IBRAHIM V. J.S.C. [1998] 14 NWLR [Pt. 584] 1 SC.
In the instant case, there was equally no suggestion from the affidavit evidence before the trial Court that the Appellant?s case was brought within any of the recognized exceptions to the application of the Public Officers Protection Law

as in the case of fraud, malice or even continuance of damage or injury.
The learned trial judge said as much on page 367 of the Record of Appeal:
But there is no affidavit before the Court nor did he explain as to show how the 1st and 2nd Respondents performed their official duties fraudulently in abuse of their offices in this case so as not to benefit from the protective shield of the law under consideration under the principles in OFFOBOCHE V. OGOJA LGA [supra].
It is not enough to just say that the 1st and 2nd Respondents acted fraudulently without more. See MADAKI V. GOVERNOR NASARAWA STATE & ORS. [2011] LPELR ? CA/J/87/07 ?
In all the circumstances of the case, the Appellant?s suit was statute barred. In AREMO II VS. ADEKANYE [2004] 13 NWLR [Pt. 891] 572, [2004] LPELR ? 544 SC, Edozie, JSC said the rationale or justification supporting the existence of statutes of limitation includes the following:
1. That long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; LLOYDS V. BUTLER [1950] 1 K. B @ 81 ? 82.
2. That a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispose a

stale claim; JONES V. BELLGROVE PROPERTIES LTD. [1949] 2 K.B. 700 @ 704 and
3. That persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence: BOARD OF TRADE V. CAYZER IRVINE & CO. [1927] AC 610 @ 628.
See also ABUBAKAR, JCA, in IHESIABA V YOUNG SHALL GROW MOTORS LTD. [2016] LPELR 42257 CA.
In the instant case, the learned trial judge was right to have declined jurisdiction to hear the Appellant?s suit on the ground that it was statute barred and incompetent.
Issue one is resolved against the Appellant.

Having resolved issue one in this appeal against the Appellant and the said issue being a jurisdictional issue, I do not find it necessary to deal with other issues in this appeal.
Issue one has turned out to be a determinant issue in this appeal. The appeal lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Suit No. HC/132/2016 is struck out.
There shall be no order as to costs.

?OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.: I had the singular privilege to peruse, in draft, the erudite leading judgment delivered by my learned brother: Mojeed Adekunle Owoade,

JCA- I endorse, in toto, the reasoning and conclusion in it.

For the sake of emphasis, the appellant, no doubt, possessed a cause of action. However, it does not accrue to him ad infinitum. He, in his infinite wisdom, slept over his right and allowed it to become soured. The law does not grant the Court the licence to attend to stale action such as the appellant’s. The lower Court paid due fidelity to the law when he declined jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the footing of statute-bar.

In the light of the foregoing, coupled with the well-articulated reasons in the leading judgment, I too, penalize the appeal with a deserved dismissal. I abide by the consequential orders decreed in it.

YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, J.C.A.: I was afforded the privilege of reading in advance the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, JCA and I agree with him in the reasoning and conclusion arrived at in the judgment. My lord in a concise and succinct manner set out when an action is said to be caught by the Limitation Law and applied it to the facts in this appeal to find that the claim is statute barred.

The purpose of limitation law was restated in the case of JFS INVESTMENT LTD. VS. BRAWAL LINE LTD. & ORS. (2010) LPELR- 1610 (SC) thus:
“In SANNI V. OKENE LG 2005 14 NWLR PT. 944 p. 60 The main purpose of the limitation period is to protect a defendant from the injustice of having to face a stale clam. Put in another way a claim which he never expected to have to deal with. For example if a claim is brought a longtime after the events in question, there a strong likelihood that evidence which was available earlier may have been lost, and the memories of witnesses may have faded.” Per RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC.
Stale claims cannot be allowed on the docket because it will cause injustice on the defendant and any person with a grouse should seek to ventilate it within a reasonable time. I also agree that the claim is statute barred and must be struck out. I also abide by the other Orders made therein.

Appearances:

C. N. NwajiobiFor Appellant(s)

I.E. Ikona (Dir. Civil Litigation, MOJ, CRS) for 1st & 2nd RespondentsFor Respondent(s)

Appearances

C. N. NwajiobiFor Appellant

AND

I.E. Ikona (Dir. Civil Litigation, MOJ, CRS) for 1st & 2nd RespondentsFor Respondent