CYPRIAN EKWOMCHI & ORS v. CHIEF S.N. UKWU & ORS(2001)

CYPRIAN EKWOMCHI & ORS v. CHIEF S.N. UKWU & ORS

(2001)LCN/1013(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Thursday, the 7th day of June, 2001

CA/E/24/2000

Before Their Lordships

EUGENE CHUKWUEMEKA UBAEZONUJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

SULE AREMU OLAGUNJUJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMADJustice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

CYPRIAN EKWOMCHI
2. RAPHAEL UKWU
3. F. N. OGBODO
4. ANTHONY UGWU
5. CHIEF NNABUENYIAppellant(s)

AND

CHIEF S.N. UKWU
2. CHIEF SAMPSON ANIAGU
3. CHIEF SAMPSON NGENE
4. CHIEF OKORIE ENERespondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT IT IS PART OF A COURT FUNCTION TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS IN AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE

Furthermore, since the case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd (1975) AC 396 which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Obeya Memorial Hospital v. A.G. Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 325 at 337, it has become trite that it is not part of the court’s functions to resolve conflicts in affidavit evidence as to facts on which contending parties base their claim or objection to the grant of an injunctive relief. Such an exercise must be reserved for the full trial. Infact, all that the applicant needed to do, and here that can be seen and said to have been done, is to show that there was a serious question between the parties to be tried at the hearing to entitle him to the relief he got. See Onyesoh v. Nze Christopher Nnebedun & Ors (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 315; and Kotoye v. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.9 8) 419 and (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 270) 462. PER MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.

THE DUTY OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERING AN APPLICATION FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION

The admonition has been elaborated upon and applied in a number of subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court to underscore the fact that in considering application for an interlocutory injunction resolution of conflicts in the affidavit evidence of the parties is not important for the exercise of the court’s discretion whether to grant or refuse the application. See Oduntan v. General Oil Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 387) 1; (1995) 4 SCNJ 145, 153-154; Ayorinde v. Attorney-General of Oyo State (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.434) 20; (1996) 2 SCNJ 198, 208-209; African Continental Bank Ltd. v. Awogboro, (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.437) 383; (1996) 2 SCNJ, 233, 239-240; and Falowo v. Banigbe (1998) 7 NWLR (pt.559) 679; (1998) 6 SCNJ 42, 60. Those cases are complemented by 7Up Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Abiola & Sons Nigeria Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.389) 287; (1995) 3 SCNJ 37, 45-47, in which consideration of applications for an interim injunction and interlocutory injunction was contrasted and underlined with a view to showing that in deliberating over the former the court does not have to determine contentious issues while in considering the latter the court should not concern itself with resolving conflicts in affidavit evidence. From the examination of the findings and conclusion of the court below reviewed earlier, I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge operated within the limits set for granting an interlocutory injunction. PER MUHAMMAD, J.C.A.

M.D. MUHAMMAD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal challenges the lower court’s exercise of its discretionary powers. The appeal is an interlocutory one against the decision of E.C. Ahanonu, J. of the Enugu High Court delivered on 15th July, 1999. Let me restate the brief facts of the case that brought about the appeal.
The respondents before us as plaintiffs filed a suit on 21/11/98 at the lower court against the appellants who then were defendants claiming the following reliefs:-
(i) A declaration that all that parcel of land particularly bounded by the Ayo River, Nyaba River the old Awgu Road and the Federal Science Equipment School Federal Grains Board at Akegbe Ugwu is the subject matter of the appellate court’s judgment of 10/3/52 as delivered by the Assistant District Officer, Udi Division.
(ii) A declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to the right of occupancy of all that parcel of land stated in prayer 1 herein above.
(iii) An order directing the parties herein to comply with the judgment stated herein above.
(iv) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from entering the parcel of land stated in prayer 1 of the reliefs herein.
(v) 5 million naira damages against the defendants.
The respondents at the time of filing their suit also sought an ex parte interim order of injunction against appellant in respect of the same piece of land. The respondent were obliged pending the determination of a motion on notice for interlocutory injunction in the same terms as canvassed by the respondents’ ex parte application.
On 30/6/99, the court took arguments in respondent’s application for interlocutory injunction which was earlier filed on 27/11/98 and thereafter in a thirteen page considered ruling, granted the respondents the order so sought. The appellants being dissatisfied have instituted the present appeal.
Parties to this appeal have filed briefs of arguments wherein they formulated issues to determine the appeal.
The appellants’ two issues are:
(i) Whether on the materials placed before the court, the injunction so ordered can be justified?
(ii) Was the trial court’s assessment of the balance of  convenience as between the parties done in the proper exercise of the court’s discretion?
On the part of the respondents, quite apart from their two issues also, notice of preliminary objection as to the competence of the very appeal had been imbedded and argued in their briefs. The three understated issues had thus been presented by the respondents for the determination of appeal. The issues are:-
(i) Are the grounds of appeal competent?
(ii) Whether the appellate court can validly disturb the decision complained against? and
(iii) Whether the trial court’s assessment of the balance of convenience as between the parties occasioned a misdirection in the decision that compensation will be adequate should the appellants prove to be owners of the disputed land?
Mr. Akputa has abandoned the preliminary objection to the hearing of this appeal and, in our view, that was the correct step to take.
Learned counsel for the appellants has forcefully stated the position of the law. It is true that this is an interlocutory appeal against the injunctive order of the lower court. By s.241(1)(f)(ii) of the 1999  Constitution where the appeal is against the grant or refusal of an injunctive order, once it is within the time allowed by s.25(2)(a) of  the Court of Appeal Act, the appeal would be one lodged as of right. In the instant case, the decision being appealed against was given On 15/7/99. The notice and grounds of appeal was filed on 28/7/99. The appeal was filed within time and does not require leave of this court for its competence, see Elobisi v. Onyeonwu (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 120) 224 CA; Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.41) 282.
The appellants had asked if the materials before the court justified the exercise of the discretionary powers of the court in favour of the respondents. This forms the appellants’ first issue for the determination of this appeal and in fact encompasses the second issue as well. Learned counsel for the appellants answered the question in the negative and made several submissions both in their brief and orally when the appeal was heard.
Learned counsel argued that pleadings had not been filed by parties when the court took arguments in respondents’ application for injunction and granted same. In essence the injunctive order was granted simply on the basis of the motion paper and the affidavits for and against the application, counsel admitted however, that the  respondent had annexed Exh. ‘I’, the sketch indicating the area claimed, to his application. It was also argued that respondent had, as indicated at p.19-22 of the record, applied and had their writ amended. By this amendment respondent not only abandoned totally the relief for an injunction but distorted the description of the area regarding which the interlocutory injunctive order was sought. This brought about serious conflict in the affidavits of the parties, the resolution of which required oral testimony. Failure of the court to resolve the conflict was fatal. So was respondents’ failure to ascertain the boundaries of the land in respect of which they asked for the court’s order. Counsel relied on FSB International Bank Ltd. v. Imano Nig. Ltd. (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 679) 620; 7 SCNJ 2000; and Daniel Idehen v. Osemwenkhae (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 525) 358; (1997)7 SCNJ 581 at 590 and Umesie v. Onuaguluchi (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 515; (1995)12 SCNJ 120 respectively for these two  submissions.
Under this first issue, learned counsel finally argued that respondent was unable to clearly state their interest to the court and at what point in time the interest was interfered with by the appellants this was necessary for the court to determine in the exercise of  equitable powers that respondents had not been guilty of delay. The combined effect of all these lapses submitted counsel is that the court’s discretionary relief had wrongly been obtained.
Under the 2nd issue, it was argued that the lower court’s findings at 58 line 26 that both parties laid claims to the disputed land made it all the more inappropriate for the respondents to secure the  injunctive order simply on the basis of the undertaking for damages they offered. In its consideration of the balance of convenience, the court only considered the convenience of the respondents alone to the detriment of the appellants. Learned counsel submitted that respondents had not been in occupation of the land in disputes. Appellants were. The balance of convenience should have been viewed more from the perspective of the appellants rather than that of the respondents. This failure was fundamental and on the authority of the case of Ilechukwu v. Iwugo (1989)2 NWLR (Pt. 101)99, counsel submitted, the injunctive order was wrongly granted.
On the whole, learned counsel rounded up his arguments by submitting that where the description of the land in dispute is uncertain, the interest of the respondents undefined in addition to the difficulty in ascertaining in whose favour the balance of convenience really was, at best the lower court could have ordered accelerated hearing and declined the grant of the injunctive order. This position is all the more justifiable when by their affidavit the respondents had alleged that appellants were already occupying the trespassed land. Injunctions, counsel submitted are never granted against a completed act. It would also not be granted where the same relief had not been asked in the substantive suit. The lower court’s order having been acquired on the basis of insufficient materials the exercise of the court’s discretion was resultantly wrong. Counsel asked that the appeal be allowed.

In arguing the appeal, respondents’ counsel rather than gearing his submissions to the issues they formulated, chose to tackle the submissions and arguments proffered by appellants’ counsel. This was done in a disorganized manner. Learned counsel argued that the assertion that the boundaries of the land claimed by the respondents had not been clearly demarcated cannot be correct. The respondents’ affidavit in paragraphs 3, 4, and 6, paragraph 3 of the further affidavit and Exh, ‘I’ the sketch accompanying the respondents’ supporting affidavit clearly described the area in dispute. These clear boundaries of the land had been known and agreed to by both parties such that none could be heard to deny its limits, or demand a survey plan to indicate same. The judgment of 1952 in respect of the land in dispute and para. 7 of the appellants’ counter affidavit along with all such other facts supplied by the respondents had fully defined the boundaries. The court was correct in accepting the description without necessarily asking for a survey plan. Counsel relies on Etiko v. Aroyewuni (1959) SCNLR 308; (1959) FSC. 129.
Learned respondents’ counsel submitted further that respondents had shown they had an arguable case. It is not the law that respondents must make a case on the merits to be able to secure the order sought. Once a substantial case had been made out by an applicant, and respondents had made out such a case, he became entitled to the relief he got. Counsel referred to the following cases: Obeya Memorial Hospital v. A.G .Federation (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 325 at 340; Globe Fishing Ind. Ltd. v. Coker (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt.162) 265 at 281. The Judge rightly declined going into matter which only trial of the substantive matters would have resolved. The position taken at this interlocutory stage was proper. Counsel relies on Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 247) 266, 287.
On the issue of delay, learned counsel submitted that since the  issue was not made by the appellant at the lower court, the issue cannot be raised now since leave had not been obtained. In any event, by respondents’ averments in paragraph 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the further affidavits and Exh. 3, 4, and 5A to 75 annexed thereto, respondents were in possession of the land in dispute from 1982 through 1998 before the commencement of the suit and the eventual prayer for the order they were granted. The complaint against the activities of the appellants therefore related to the period just before the suit instituted by the respondents. Delay cannot therefore be ascribed to the conduct of the respondents as at the time the injunctive order was granted.
Learned respondents’ counsel argued that by virtue of paragraphs 7, 8,9 of their affidavit and paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the further affidavit and Exh. 3-75 viewed against the background of paragraph 14 of the appellants’ counter-affidavit,  respondents had shown clearly that they were in occupation of the land. They built on the land and allowed their tenants to develop same. The appellants on the other hand only asserted that they were farming on the land in dispute without more. Respondents from available facts before the court stood to suffer more if the application  was refused. The court was right to have exercised its discretion to such a party. The order has preserved the status quo and that was what such orders were aimed at achieving. Learned counsel in buttressing his point cited Ayorinde v. A.G., Oyo (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.434) 20; (1996) 35 LRCN 257 and Nigeria Cement Co. v. NRC (1992)1 NWLR (Pt.220) 747, 759.
Finally, learned counsel argued that although there was a motion for the amendment of their writ same had not been argued and determined. It thus cannot be true that respondents had amended their writ.
On the whole, counsel submitted there was enough materials before the court to justify the order it granted. He asked that we dismiss the appeal.
It must be pointed out straight away that arguments proffered by appellants’ counsel had shown a complete misapprehension of the very many judicial authorities governing the grant or otherwise of interim injunctive orders and what the attitude of an appellate court  would be in regarding appeals from such decisions.
Firstly, I must state what my examination of the record of appeal has revealed. It must be conceded to the respondents that it is not true that they had effected amendment in their writ thereby abandoning the prayer for the injunctive relief in the substantive case. The record of appeal speaks for itself and binds us all.
The point has vigorously been canvassed by the appellant’s counsel that there was conflict in the affidavit evidence as to the boundaries of the land in dispute which made the calling of oral evidence necessary for the resolution of the conflict. Learned appellants’ counsel must be reminded that the lower court needed not to go to the extra extent he wanted it to once inspite of any conflict in the affidavits of parties the boundaries of the land sought to be protected by acquiring the injunctive order had been otherwise fully described. Happily, here, apart from the description of the land in dispute in the writ, the ex-parte and motion on notice in respect of the injunctive order, Exh. ‘I’ a sketch regarding the area had equally been annexed to the respondents’ motion. From the copious averments of parties it has become clear too that parties were fully aware and certain about the extent of the land in respect of which the injunction was granted. Thus in this case, there was no difficulty about the identity of the land upon which the injunctive order was tied. The court was right to have exercised its discretion in respect of such land the identity of which from materials before it had been shown to be precise. It is also instructive to note that in Kufeji v. Kogbe (1961) 1 All NLR (Pt.1) 113, it has been held that where the identity of the land is known to the defendant the non placement of the exact description of the land before the court would not be fatal to the grant of an injunctive order.

It is evident from the record that the lower court was fully appreciative of its duties when it held at p.56 as follows:
“Indeed, this court is not required at this stage to decide the conflicts in the affidavits of the parties. It seems to me at this stage that what is required to be considered is whether the applicants have disclosed a right capable of being protected by injunction and serious question capable of invoking the jurisdiction of this court at this stage.”
Having found that applicant had disclosed sufficient interest to warrant the court’s protection, the court then considered the twin requirement of balance of convenience. The court’s finding spanning Pp 57-59 reproduced hereunder is unassailable.
Firstly, he asked the following important questions:
“who then is likely to suffer more inconvenience if the application is not granted? To answer this question fully we must also ask the complementary question, having regard to the facts outlined above, would the applicants be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss they would sustain should the respondents be left to continue encroaching on the land and building between now and end of the hearing should applicants succeed ultimately?
Another question is complementary to these and that is, although applicants have undertaken to pay damages should the application be found to be frivolous, would such damages be adequate compensation to respondents for the loss they would suffer for being prevented from going into the land between now and final determination of the suit?”
The court thereafter reviewed the evidence before it and concluded thus:-
“I am satisfied that this application comes within equitable jurisdiction of this court. The applicants have disclosed a serious question to be tried and a right which stands the risk of violation unless protected.
It does not matter at this stage whether or not the applicants will succeed in the end. What is important is that his alleged right is not jeopardized before they are heard.
In other words, the res should be maintained. In this case, both parties claim rights over the land in dispute but I am satisfied that the applicants have adduced superior reasons to warrant this court exercising its discretion in their favour.”
With the foregoing, it must be pointed that with the sufficient materials at the disposal of the lower court, the court in the use of same had remarkably complied with all those requirements on the basis of which by many judicial authorities injunctive reliefs are granted.
Appellants have neither sustained the allegation of perversity made against the exercise by the lower court of its discretionary powers, nor shown what injustice the grant of the order had caused them. In consequence, their appeal must fail. It is accordingly decided that it has.
The respondents are entitled to cost of N3,000.00 which appellants should pay.

UBAEZONU, J.C.A.: I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother Muhammad, J.C.A. just delivered. I agreed that the appeal should be dismissed and I also dismiss the same.
The preliminary issue raised in the brief of the respondent having been abandoned in court by respondent’s counsel after listening to learned senior counsel for the appellants’ submission as to whether the appellants can appeal as of right, the only issue worthy of consideration in this appeal is whether the lower court sufficiently considered the balance of convenience before making the order of injunction. My learned brother has elaborately considered the issue of balance of convenience that I have not much to add. respondents claim to be in possession of the land by living on it while the appellants claim to be in possession by farming on it.
Surely, the balance of convenience should be on the side of the respondents who live on it and who would suffer more inconvenience if the defendants/appellants are not restrained. Such an order will maintain the status quo ante pending the determination of the substantive suit.

OLAGUNJU, J.C.A.: I have had a preview of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother Muhammad, JCA., and I agree with his conclusion that this appeal has no merit and should be dismissed. The thrust of the challenge of the order of interlocutory injunction centred on the competence of the appeal and the merits of the injunctive order made. On both scores, the leading judgment has tackled the issues in depth to clear the mist that hovered round the decision under review in the ferment of the murky arguments that were brought to bear on the issues raised which took the force of compelling reasoning to unravel.
The competence of the appeal was attacked by learned counsel for the respondents who contended that the grounds of appeal are defective because having grounds of facts camouflaged as grounds of law no leave of the court below or this court was obtained by the appellants as required by a combination of section 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, and section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, Cap. 75 of the Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 1990. The preliminary objection is, with respect, misplaced. The appeal being against an order of injunction made by the State High Court it lies to this court as of right by virtue of sub-section 241(1), (f), (ii) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the notice of appeal having also been filed within 14 days of the decision appealed from as stipulated by sub-section 25(2)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act it satisfied the second requirement to clinch the validity of the appeal filed as in due compliance with the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. It is immaterial that the four grounds of appeal filed by the appellants are, in the main, grounds of facts or mixed facts and law.
On the merit of the appeal, the bit and pieces of arguments crammed together as a missile to attack the ruling of the court below has been shown to be largely brittle with no dent or smearing impact on the decision of the court below. The allegation that the respondents as the plaintiffs/applicants at the court below had amended their writ of summons to exclude the relief for an injunction, a straight attack that goes to the root of the relief granted by the court below, question of the identity of the land that is alleged to be in doubt when the description of the boundaries of the land given in the respondents’ affidavits at the court below was amply supported by Exhibit ‘I’, the sketch showing the area of the land in dispute. There is nothing sacrosanct about identification of the land in dispute as the problem is eased by the principle that where from the evidence before the court there is no difficulty in identifying the land in dispute it is open to the court to make an order of declaration on it: see Etiko v. Aroyewun, (1959) SCNLR 308, (1959)4 FSC. 129, 130; and Kufeji v. Kogbe, (1961) All NLR. (Pt.1) 113, 114.

The same consideration applies, with stronger reason, to the making of an order of injunction over a disputed piece of land.
In the finding of the trial court the question of who was in possession of the land in dispute tilted in favour of the respondents who built on the land as against the appellants who were farming on the land. Thus, in the final analysis, the area of controversy on which the arguments of the learned counsel are centred is narrowed down to ‘balance of convenience’, a decider that mops up the remaining pocket of controversies when all odds are even.
In his judgment, the learned trial Judge examined the whole compass of the factors that are considered necessary to be sifted in application for an interlocutory injunction within the criteria enunciated in Kotoye v. Central Bank of Nigeria, (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419, 441. He came out with the answers that the application disclosed a right capable of being protected by injunction and that the balance of convenience was in favour of the respondents who would suffer more injury if the application was refused than the appellants would suffer if the application was granted that the nature of the injury that would follow a refusal of the application is of such a magnitude that cannot be compensated by damages if at the end of the trial the respondents succeeded. He concluded that both parties claim rights over the land in dispute but he was satisfied that the applicants have adduced superior reasons to warrant this court exercising its discretion in their favour.’
Using the criteria formulated as the benchmark for examining the merit of an application of this nature to test the findings and conclusion of the learned trial Judge in the light of the affidavit evidence of the parties the whole matters requiring examination have painstakingly been gone into to commend the decision of the learned trial Judge for endorsement by this court. Such misgivings as may linger on from the argument of learned counsel for the appellants are bound up with inconclusiveness on some points that have not been subjected to the traditional crucible of a trial. The hangover is inevitable having regard to the objective of an interlocutory injunction that is not the same as one of a final decision. The point has been envisaged in some decisions on the matter in which a line was drawn between the approach to an interlocutory matter and a final decision. Particularly instructive is the Supreme Court’s decision in Obeya Memorial Specialist Hospital v. Attorney-General of the Federation, (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 325; (1987) 7 SCNJ 42, in which the issue was canvassed drawing on the decision of the English House of Lords in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) A.C. 396, 407.
Explaining the nature and object of an interlocutory injunction the Supreme Court, per Obaseki, JSC. At page 54, said:
“When an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a defendant from doing acts alleged to be a violation of the plaintiff’s legal rights is made upon contested facts, the decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when, ex hypothesis, the existence of the right or the violation of it or both is uncertain and will remain uncertain until final judgment is given in the action. It was to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period the uncertainty could be resolved that the practice arose of granting him relief by way of interlocutory injunction The object of interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial; but the plaintiff’s need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff’s undertaking in damages if the uncertainty were resolved in the defendant’s favour at the trial. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the “balance of evidence lies.”

The keynote of the exposition in the above passage is the need to harmonize the interests of the parties that are at cross-purposes poised as they are to contest the right over the same subject matter. But in the court’s endeavour to strike a balance with a view to coming to a decision that would reconcile opposing interests premium is placed on the peculiar nature of the proceedings for interlocutory injunction that set them apart from the trial of the substantive action. This is highlighted in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd. supra, where it is cautioned, at page 407, that “it is no part of the court’s function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavits as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial.”
The admonition has been elaborated upon and applied in a number of subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court to underscore the fact that in considering application for an interlocutory injunction resolution of conflicts in the affidavit evidence of the parties is not important for the exercise of the court’s discretion whether to grant or refuse the application. See Oduntan v. General Oil Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 387) 1; (1995) 4 SCNJ 145, 153-154; Ayorinde v. Attorney-General of Oyo State (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.434) 20; (1996) 2 SCNJ 198, 208-209; African Continental Bank Ltd. v. Awogboro, (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt.437) 383; (1996) 2 SCNJ, 233, 239-240; and Falowo v. Banigbe (1998) 7 NWLR (pt.559) 679; (1998) 6 SCNJ 42, 60. Those cases are complemented by 7Up Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Abiola & Sons Nigeria Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.389) 287; (1995) 3 SCNJ 37, 45-47, in which consideration of applications for an interim injunction and interlocutory injunction was contrasted and underlined with a view to showing that in deliberating over the former the court does not have to determine contentious issues while in considering the latter the court should not concern itself with resolving conflicts in affidavit evidence. From the examination of the findings and conclusion of the court below reviewed earlier, I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge operated within the limits set for granting an interlocutory injunction.
With the explication of the nature and object of an interlocutory injunction by the upper echelons of the judiciary the skepticism of learned counsel for the appellants about failure of the learned trial Judge to go full length in resolving conflicts in the parties’ affidavit evidence at the interlocutory stage of decision making is based on a misconception. The removal of the blinkers that blurred the perspectives of seeing clearly the conceptual difference in the technical approach to deliberations on an interlocutory injunction and a final decision would, in all probabilities, aid the comprehension of learned counsel for the appellants to see the wood for the trees so as to steer him away from the blind spot.
However that may be, for the grounds variously canvassed above and the fuller grounds discussed in the leading judgment this appeal is devoid of any merit. It is accordingly dismissed. I adopt the N3,000 costs awarded in the leading judgment against the appellants jointly and severally.
Appeal dismissed.

Appearances

J.H.C. Okolo, SAN.For Appellant

AND

Afam Akputa, Esq.For Respondent