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National Industrial Court

Mr. Ishmael Nna & ors -VS- Rivers State Government & 5 ORS

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE OWERRI JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT OWERRI

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE I. S. GALADIMA

 

Dated: 1st April, 2019                                          SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/177/2013

Between:

Mr. Ishmael Nna

Mr. Chukwuka Akwu                                                                       ===  Claimants

 

And

  1. Rivers State Government
  2. Rivers State Ministry of Commerce and Industry
  3. Rivers State Ministry of Culture and Tourism
  4. The Office of the Permanent Secretary, Establishment          === Defendants

 Training, and Pensions Bureau of the Governor’s Office

 Rivers State.

  1. Rivers State Civil Service Commission
  2. Attorney General Rivers State

Representation:

 

  • J. O. Agbo for the Claimants.
  • T.O. Ishmael-Fibs for the Defendants.

JUDGMENT:

These Claimants along with several others, were purportedly employed by the Defendants (particularly the 1st, 2nd and 3rd), on 12/3/1999 as security guards on Salary Grade Level 01, by letters of appointment purportedly signed by one C. W. Esukpa on behalf of the Permanent Secretary, Rivers State Ministry of Commerce, Tourism and Industry and were accordingly deployed to the International Airport Hotel, Omagwa in Rivers State. According to their letters of employment, their formal letters of permanent appointment were supposedly to have been issued by the 4th Defendant subsequently. During the purported employment period, the Claimants allege they were only paid the sum of N3000 per month as salaries for March, April, May and June 1999, but were not paid from the month of July 1999 to date. The Claimants allegedly wrote several letters complaining of and demanding for the payment of their salaries by the Defendants who kept promising to pay them but to no avail which thus necessitated the commencement of this here action. The Claimants allege also that to date, they still work as security guards for and on behalf of the Defendants.

Accordingly, this action was filed by the Claimants on the 12/11/2013 by way of a general writ of complaint for the following reliefs:

  1. The sum of N18.5 million representing the Claimants’ unpaid salaries from 1999 to date.
  2. An order mandating the Defendants to promote the Claimants to the level of their mates who were employed the same month and the same year with them.
  3. The sum of N3 million naira cost of litigation and instituting this suit against the Defendants.
  4. The sum of N4 million naira as general damages for the difficulties and hardships that these acts of the Defendants have exposed the Claimants to.
  5. An order of 20% interest monthly on the unpaid salaries starting from November 2013 until judgment is delivered and thereafter 25% interest on the judgment sum annually until the judgment is fulfilled in favour of the Claimants.

The Defendants entered a joint conditional appearance on 10/2/2016 and filed their joint statement of defence on the same date including other originating processes vide a motion for extension of time. The Claimants subsequently filed a reply to the statement of defence on the 23/2/2016 and further deposition on oath. Thus done, issues were accordingly deemed as properly joined and trial commenced before me properly, from the 19/11/2017. There was an interregnum from the time the matter was first filed till its first mention before me in 2017 which is the reason for the seemingly protracted litigation till now.

CLAIMANTS’ CASE:

The 2nd Claimant on 14/2/2017 testified as the first witness for the Claimants. He was duly cross-examined on the same day. He tendered a total of 8 documents as exhibits in the course of this trial thus:

Exhibit CW1 A —2nd Claimant’s appointment letter dated 12/3/1999.

Exhibit CW1 B —1st Claimant’s appointment letter dated 12/3/1999.

Exhibit CW2A — reminder letter dated 10/5/2007.

Exhibit CW2B — letter to the 2nd Defendant dated 12/9/2007.

Exhibit CW2C — reminder letter dated 10/5/2007

Exhibit CW2D — reminder letter dated 5/3/2009.

Exhibit CW2E — letter to Head of Service of the 5th Defendant dated 5/3/2009.

Exhibit CW2F — letter to the Director of tourism of the 2nd Defendant dated 23/6/2009.

Exhibit CW2G — letter to Permanent Secretary of the 2nd Defendant dated 23/6/2009.

Exhibit CW2H — letter to Permanent Secretary of the 2nd Defendant dated 3/2/2011.

Exhibit CW2I — letter to Commissioner of the 2nd Defendant dated 15/1/2003.

Exhibit CW3A — Claimants’ solicitor’s letter dated 5/10/2012.

Exhibit CW3B — Photocopies of Abex Parcel services shipment airway bills

Exhibit CW4 — solicitor’s receipt for N1.5M as litigation fees.

The 1st Claimant was the second witness for the Claimants. He was examined in chief by adopting his written deposition on 24/10/2018. He too was cross-examined on the same day whereupon they closed their case. Portions of their testimonies shall be relied upon in this judgment.

DEFENDANTS’ CASE:

The Defendants on the same 24/10/2018, called their sole witness, one Nwido Liyera, who adopted his written deposition but did not tender any documents as exhibits. The Claimants’ counsel cross-examined him on that same day.

With the close of evidence, the parties’ Counsel were ordered to file their written final addresses in compliance with the Rules of this Court. The final addresses of both Counsel, having now been duly filed and served were adopted on the 14/2/2019 and adjourned to today, the 1/4/2019 for the pronouncement of this here judgment.

DEFENDANTS’ FINAL SUBMISSIONS:

The joint Defendants’ Counsel identified four issues for determination in his written final arguments franked by Alphonso Sibi, Esq. and filed on 4/1/2019, thus:

  1. Whether there was a valid contract between the Claimants and the 1st Defendant or any of its agencies?
  2. Whether the Claimants should be regarded as employees under the extant Labour Act?
  3. Whether the Claimants are entitled to any unpaid salaries or any other claims?
  4. Whether this suit is statute barred or not and whether this Court has the jurisdiction to try a case that is statute barred?

On the first issue, Counsel argued that an offer of employment is only a valid contract if it contains the essential ingredients of offer, acceptance, consideration, intentions to create legal relationship and the requisite capacity to contract. However, exhibits CW1(A & B) do not accordingly, constitute valid contracts because no consideration was furnished as to the exact monies the Claimants were to be paid as salaries. See Orient Bank v Bilante Intl Ltd (citation supplied). It was contended that the Defendants never intended to create any legal relationship since those letters of appointment between the parties was predicated on a pre condition which is the issuance of a further letter by the Permanent Secretary, Establishment and Pensions Bureau in the Governor’s Office.

Counsel chided on that a legal relationship could only be created if the condition precedent for the issuance of a formal appointment letter to the Claimants was established. As such, purportedly relying on section 33(1) of the Labour Act that there being no evidence that the Claimants underwent any medical examination to ascertain their fitness, their purported contracts of employment were illegal and unenforceable – per TAOFIK ALAO v ACB (citation supplied). Being an illegal contract therefore, the Claimants are not entitled to any remedy or relief from this Court and as such, their claims must be refused. The court shall accordingly, refuse to allow any action be maintained even where the illegality is not pleaded by the Defendants, said the learned Counsel.

Regarding issue two, learned Counsel argued that the Claimants could not have been employees of the Defendants since the conditions precedent in their offers of appointment were never fulfilled and since their appointment were in fact and law, illegal.

On issue three, he submitted that an illegal contract is void and therefore cannot be the foundation for any legal rights; neither can it be relied upon nor enforced by any Court.

Finally, on issue four, learned Counsel submitted that a study of the processes in this suit indicate that this suit was filed 14 years after the cause of action arose, making this suit statute barred, in view of section 16 of Cap 80 of the Rivers State Laws of 1999 that specifies actions founded on tort and contract must be commenced within five years after the cause of action arose. Also, Counsel contended that by virtue of section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act, the extant suit is statute barred.

The Court was urged to dismiss this suit for the foregone reasons.

CLAIMANTS’ FINAL SUBMISSIONS:

The Claimants’ Counsel on 5/2/2019 filed his final address, in which he adopted those 4 issues formulated by the Defendants’ Counsel as well.

On issue one, learned Counsel submitted that by the evidence elicited from the Defendants’ witness during cross-examination, it is accordingly clear that there is absolutely nothing suggesting that the Claimants were temporarily employed by them (the Defendants) or that exhibit CW1 was forged. Counsel submitted further that exhibit CW1(A and B) indicate that the Claimants are public servants whose employments are statutorily governed by the public service Rules – per Olaniyan V. Unilag (CITATION SUPPLIED). Accordingly, these Claimants do not hold their respective employments either at the pleasure of the Rivers State Government or anybody at all. Rather, they hold same under the provisions of the civil service rules. It was therefore wrong for them to have refused or denied paying the Claimants their salaries and other entitlements relying on an alleged illegality in their (the Claimants’) mode of appointment.

It was contended further by Counsel that there is no evidence suggesting that the responsibility for the payment of salaries and allowances was transferred to the International Hotel, Omagwa, or that the Claimants’ employments were terminated. According to learned Counsel, Section 1, Rule 020107 of the Public Service Rules 2008 prohibits the employment of unpaid staff. Section 3, Rule 020301 further provides that officers on probation will be required to serve for two years before being confirmed. It was accordingly wrong for the Defendants’ Counsel to insinuate that since the Claimants were not confirmed within two years of working without pay, they ought to have left the employment of the Defendants with the knowledge that they need not receive termination letters from the Defendants to realize that their services were no longer required. If the Defendants wanted to terminate the Claimants, they are required to comply with the Public Service Rules particularly those which provide how a person under probation can be terminated from service, said Counsel. Unfortunately, these Defendants failed to terminate the Claimants and thus withholding their salaries became unlawful. He questioned the propriety for a government to have conducted interviews, employed successful candidates with the issuance of letters of appointment and a subsequent renege claiming a lack of intention as it’s purportedly the case here. As such, once delivered and accepted,  the letters of appointment can only be terminated in the manner prescribed by statute.

Moreover, that even though the employment relationship between the parties may have the semblance of a master/servant relationship, but a closer look at these documents and circumstances of the case indicate that the employments of these Claimants are statutorily flavoured. It was submitted on that by Chapter 2, Section 1 rules 020103, sub rules (a), (b) and (c) of the Civil Service Rules 2008, each ministry had the power to appoint/employ junior staff as such it was wrong for the Defendants’ Counsel to allege that the 5th Defendant particularly, had no power to employ these Claimants.

On issue two, learned Counsel argued that the Claimants had averred in their pleadings that they were interviewed and passed their interviews showing they were fit for the work they were employed to do, and the mere stoppage of their salaries is not the appropriate way to terminate their appointments even though they were undeniably on probation.

Regarding issue three, Counsel argued that the Claimants are entitled to their claims because they worked for it. He went further to draw the Court’s attention to the case of P.C. IMOLOAME v WAEC (citation supplied) where it was accordingly held that in a case of wrongful dismissal the measure of damages is prima facie the amount the plaintiffs would have earned had the employment continued according to the contract subject to any extenuating circumstances. He argued strenuously for the grant of all the Claimants’ reliefs including their promotion to their otherwise current Grade Levels which is due to them after almost 20 years of service.

He urged this Court to grant judgment in favour of the Claimants and in the interest of justice.

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ON PONTS OF LAW:

In the Reply filed on 14/2/2019, the Defendants’ Counsel reiterated his earlier positions in his final address, and submitted that there is a wide difference between morality and law, and the stipulations of the Labour Act are issues of law which must be obeyed.

Counsel finally urged this Court to dismiss this suit based on illegality, and as being contrary to the spirit and intendment of the extant Labour Act.

 

 

COURT’S DECISION:

I must make a subtle observation before going on to consider this case on its merits. I am compelled to pronounce that the entire submissions of the Defendants’ Counsel on his issue four relating to the instant suit being statute barred, shall not be countenanced. This is because I had on the 24th of May, 2018, delivered a ruling on this issue refusing to dismiss this suit on the grounds that it is not statute barred and it seems to me revisiting same in this judgment would tantamount to sitting on appeal over my earlier decision. Moreover, as though in affirmation of my rationale in my ruling, the Supreme Court, per Ariwoola, JSC, had in a very recent decision of NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION ALLOCATION AND FISCAL COMMISSION V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON AND 10 ORS (2019) 2 NWLR (PART 1656) 247 AT 270-271 delivered on the 4th February, 2019, held specifically that Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply to cases of contracts of service. That decision has now laid to rest the question whether this suit must be considered statute barred and thus affirms this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

Interestingly, the circumstances and facts of the Supreme Court case of NRMFC V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON AND OTHERS (Supra) are quite similar to the facts of this case and it is consequently impossible to see how the decision in this case shall run counter to the decision arrived at by the revered Justices of the Supreme Court.

Albeit the foregone observation, I studied closely all the processes filed in this action by both the Claimants and Defendants and consider three issues call for resolutions and they are:

  1.             Whether a contract of employment exist(ed) between the Claimants and Defendants?
  2.             If the answer to (i) above is in the affirmative, whether the Claimants’ employment is statutorily flavoured?

      iii.            Whether the Claimants are entitled to their reliefs?

 

Resolution of issue one:

Learned Counsel for the Defendants had argued that the Claimants’ contracts of employment tendered as exhibit CW1(A) and CW1(B), fall short of what a valid contract of employment should be. He also stood firm in his belief that the Claimants who did not show they were medically examined, cannot sue on a purportedly ‘illegal’ contract. Of course the Claimants think otherwise insisting that the very basis of their employment is found on the offer of appointment conveyed to them by letters dated 12/3/1999 which were accepted by them.

It is promptly my considered view that the submissions by the Defendants’ Counsel are in fact, misconceptions of the law and this is why.

To verify simply what a legal contract of employment is, recourse may be had to the Labour Act. For example, Section 91 of the Labour Act provides that a  “contract of employment” means any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other person agrees to serve the employer as a worker;”. See Shena Security Co Ltd v Afropak Ltd (2008) 18 NWLR (pt 1118) 77 at 94 C-E.

Thus, even the absence of a specific amount to be paid to the Claimants (as contended by the Defendants’ Counsel in reference to exhibit CW1), does not minimize the import of the expressed intention of the Defendants to employ the Claimants. There is clearly every reason to believe there was an offer and an acceptance by the respective Claimants. The letters given to them conclusively suggest unequivocally, that the Defendants had employed them to provide the services of securing their premises and properties.

Here is a reproduction of the said Exhibit CW1 A for the purpose of elucidation:

Ref no: MCI&T/1777/Vol I/116                                12 March, 1999.

Chukwuka Akwu.

Sir,

OFFER OF APPOINTMENT:

With reference to your application for appointment into River State Civil Service and the interview you attended at the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism on 3rd March, 1999, I am directed to offer you appointment as Security Guard on Salary Grade Level 01. This appointment is with effect from the date you assume duty.

  1. The Permanent Secretary, Establishment Training and Pension’s Bureau of the Governor’s office, Port Harcourt will issue a formal letter of permanent appointment to you in due course.

You should please report to the undersigned to complete employment formalities.

Yours faithfully,

C.W. ESUKPA

For Permanent Secretary.

Without mincing words, the letters neither state that the Claimants were appointed as temporary or casual workers nor do they suggest the Claimants were to be treated as such. I reckon also that the bare ingredients of an otherwise valid contract of employment have been duly established in these exhibits because there was an offer by the Defendants (i.e the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) and an acceptance by these Claimants. Therefore, I find and hold that exhibits CW1(A) and (B) do indeed qualify as valid contracts of employment regardless of the fact that they do not contain the exact sums of money to be paid as salaries to the Claimants.

Ultimately, the 2nd Defendant having issued exhibits CW1 (A) and (B) to the Claimants, shall be estopped from arguing that the Claimants did not pass any medical examinations prior to their engagements. The Supreme Court explained in S.P.D.C.N. LTD v NWAWKA (2003) 6 NWLR(PT  815) 184, at 206 that when parties make a contract, they make their own law, to which they are subject and which creates rights and obligations which bind them; to which the general law only gives recognition or force.

Besides, the Defendants cannot contend that exhibit CW1 (A) and (B) are illegal contracts, when it is clear on the face of those documents that medical tests or examinations were never a prerequisite for the Claimants’ employments. In agreement with the Claimants’ Counsel, it is inequitable to conclude that just because these Claimants never underwent any medical examinations, their subsequent contracts must be deemed illegal – See NRMFC V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON (Supra). The burden indeed lies on the Defendants to establish the illegality of those contracts of employments and this burden has not been discharged. I therefore find it improbable and refuse the arguments proffered by the Defendants’ Counsel on this issue. Issue one is hereby resolved in favour of these Claimants and I so hold.

Resolution of Issues two and three:

Statutorily flavoured employments are different from those of a master and servant. An employment is said to have a statutory flavour when the appointment and termination is protected by statute or laid down regulations made to govern the procedure for employment of an employee. The rules and regulations are part of the terms and conditions of the employees’ employment which gives it statutory flavour. For an employee to effectively claim that his or her employment is coated with statutory flavour, the employment must;

  1. Have an employer who is set up by statute;
  2. The establishing statute must make express provisions regulating the employment of staff in the category of the employees;
  3. have statutory reinforcement or at any rate, be regarded as mandatory;
  4. be within the meaning of the relevant statute and directly applicable to the employee or persons of his cadre; and
  5.  be seen to be protected under the statute.

See Idoniboye-Obu v NNPC (2003)2 NWLR  (pt 805) 589 at 632-3.

From the above ingredients, it appears that the Claimants’ employments in the 2nd and 3rd Defendants Ministries enjoy statutory flavour. The reasons for my view stem from the fact that from the Public Service Rules applicable when they were appointed, Section 1, Rule 020103 (a) provides that a Ministry or Extra Ministerial Office is empowered to appoint Junior Staff on Grade Level 06 and below, subject to the approval of the Permanent Secretary/Head of Extra Ministerial offices, as was done by the 2nd Defendant in the instant case.

Again, and contrary to the submissions of the Defendants’ Counsel that these Claimants could not have been employees since the pre condition to their offers of appointment was unfulfilled, it was the responsibility of specifically the 4th Defendant to have issued formal letters of appointment which was never done.

Why should the Claimants now suffer the brunt of what was completely outside their control and not their responsibility?

The fact is these Claimants are for all intents and purposes, civil servants of the Rivers State Government. Their appointment and termination are therefore subject to the applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations. It follows therefore that their employment has statutory coloration protecting them from arbitral dismissal. In order to effectively terminate or disengage them, the Defendants must take appropriate and legal steps in doing so. The fact that they were never confirmed as staff or permanent employees of the Defendants is of no moment since it is assumed that having been in the Defendants’ employment for more than 2 years, they  automatically became confirmed civil servants.

In Iderima v. R.S.C.S.C. (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt.951)378, the Supreme Court stated as follows:

Except in employments governed by statute wherein the procedure for employment and discipline including dismissal of an employee are clearly spelt out, any other employment outside the statute is governed by the terms under which the parties agreed to be master and servant. Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the relevant statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent therewith is null and void and of no effect. But in other cases governed only by agreement of parties and not by statute, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to. Any other form connotes only wrongful termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void.” Per ONU, J.S.C (P.17, paras.A-E).

This is a Court of law, equity and justice. The Defendants cannot be allowed to benefit from the fruits of their neglect particularly in issuing these Claimants with formal permanent letters of appointment or confirmation. Justice is not merely one of the most important duties to ensure; it is the only important duty for a Court to perform. The Defendants’ Counsel indeed brilliantly argued that the International Airport Hotel, Omagwa where these Claimants were deployed to, ceased to be in operation since 1999. This fact notwithstanding, still does not exonerate the Defendants from their responsibilities for these Claimants. Besides, the address of Counsel no matter how pleasant and well crafted cannot take the place of evidence or pleadings. There is no evidence before me suggesting that the defunct International Airport, Omagwa was the employer of these Claimants. There is also no evidence to establish otherwise that the Claimants did not perform their duties as security guards at their deployed location from the day they were deployed there in 1999 to date.

Therefore, having resolved the above two issues again in favor of the Claimants, I find and hold that there is nothing before this Court to show that the engagements of the Claimants were dispensed with or terminated according to any laid down rules or procedures. The refusal by the Defendants, whether willfully or inadvertently, to either issue them with permanent letters of appointment and or letters of termination of their respective appointments, was indeed wrong and unlawful. Non payment of their salaries and entitlements from the year 1999 to date is indeed a gross illegality which shall not be condoned. All civil servants are entitled to their salaries at the end of each month and to have withheld the salaries of these Claimants for close to 20 years, is indeed most wrongful and unfair.

Consequently, I declare that these Claimants’ appointments subsist with all their accrued salaries from July 1999 to date, (1st April, 2019 – the date of this judgment). See the decision in NBC Plc v Edward (2015) 2 NWLR (pt 1443) 201 at 235; NRMFC V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON AND ORS (Supra).

In UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC V. EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES (2012) LPELR-8018(CA), the Court of Appeal held that “An employment is said to have a statutory flavor when the appointment and termination of same are governed by statute. It is only in this circumstance that a declaration that the contract still subsists will be made. In other circumstances, it is rarely made”. See P. C. Imoloame v. West African Examination Council (1992) 9 NWLR. 303. See also Iderima v. RSCSC (Supra) where the Supreme Court held that… “it is settled law that once the dismissal of a civil servant is declared null and void, the effect of such a pronouncement is that the civil servant was always and still is a civil servant.” Per EDOZIE, J.S.C (P.27, paras.E-F)

As such, it is now up to these Defendants to either elect to formally and properly ratify the Claimants’ employments by enlisting them into the Civil Service records appropriately or to dispense with their services through the legally recognized channels for termination. For it is settled law that an employment with a statutory flavor must be terminated only in the way and manner prescribed by that statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the relevant statute is null and void and of no effect – Akintemi Vs Onwumechili (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt 1) 68, Aiyetan Vs NIFOR (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 59) 48, Sapara Vs University College Hospital Management Board (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt 86) 58. The Claimants’ if not properly terminated, remain full fledge employees and staff of the Defendants and are entitled to their monthly salaries and other allowances. It goes without saying that a government employment can never be terminated by the denial, refusal, or neglect of that government to pay its employees’ salaries. The government’s liability for them is only discharged if and only if, their appointments are terminated in accordance with the laid down Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

Giving the above legal reasonings, I shall now consider the fates of the reliefs sought.

In their Relief A, these Claimants claim the sum of N18.5 Million Naira jointly purportedly being their accrued and owed salaries from 1999 to the date of Judgment. I am keen in finding out how they arrived at this figure. The law requires a party who makes claims for special damages to particularize them with exactitude, giving credible facts and circumstances for how such amount was reached. Judging from the pleadings as well as the depositions of these Claimants however, I do not find any shred of evidence to explain how the sum of N18.5 M was arrived at. The only evidence before this Court of the quantum of salaries paid per month to them is as contained in their paragraph 6 of their joint statement of facts as well as in paragraph 10 of their respective depositions of 12/11/2013. The Defendants made a general and sweeping denial of this averment without further proof against their claim. The Defendants deny ever employing these Claimants and further that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants specifically, do not have the requisite power to employ security guards – See joint Statement of Defence filed on 25/9/2014. I however believe the Claimants’ accounts are more probable particularly when they stated that they were only paid by cash for the months of March, April, May, and June 1999, the sum of N3,000 per month by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants Ministries. This being the only available proof of the amount of salary paid to them per month, it is thus my informed decision to award the Claimants the sum total of arrears of salaries from July 31, 1999 to March 31 2019 as their due entitlements. From July 31 1999 to March 31 2019 is a total of 236 months or 19years, 8 months and 1 day. Therefore, N3,000.00 multiplied by 236 months is N708,000.00.

Consequent upon the above findings, I therefore award the sum of N708,000.00 to each of the Claimants as unpaid salaries from July 1999 to March 2019.

As for relief B which is for an order mandating the promotion to the current grade levels attained by their colleagues who were employed on the same date as they, I make haste to deny same. This is simply because promotions in the civil service are not automatic – See the recent NICN case of ONNOGHEN V. MINISTER FOR HEALTH (unreported NICN/ABJ/212/2018 delivered on 15/3/2019 per Kado, J). Promotion within the civil service sector of this country is not a right but a mere privilege. Besides, there are usually other factors to consider like periodic examinations, commendations, effectiveness of the staff and other formalities to be done like the consideration of periodic staff disposition reports, annual (salarying) increment forms and the submission of Annual Performance and Evaluation Reports (APERs) before promotions can be recommended and or effected in the civil service. There is absolutely no evidence suggesting that these Claimants are entitled to the relief sought here as such it is accordingly refused.

On relief C which is for the sum of N3M being the cost of litigating this action, I shall only award the sum of N750,000.00 to each of the Claimants as cost of litigating and maintaining this suit from 2013 to date as per their Exhibit CW 4.

Reliefs (D which is for N4M general damages) and E (which is for pre and post judgment interests), are hereby refused.

So, from the totality of the foregone findings and for the avoidance of all doubts whatsoever, I hereby make the following declarations and award these sums only to the Claimants against these Defendants thus:

  1. Declare the Claimants as civil servants under the Defendants who are entitled to be paid their salaries and allowances as per their letters of employment of 12th March, 1999 to date.

  1. Order the Defendants to pay the 1st Claimant the sum of N708,000 as his unpaid salaries from July 1999 till date.

  1. Order the Defendants to pay the 2nd Claimant the sum of N708,000 as his unpaid salaries from July 1999 till date.

  1. Order the Defendants to pay the sum of N750,000.00 to each of the Claimants as costs for this action.

  1. Order the Defendants to pay the total judgment sums in (1), (2) and (3) above totaling N2,916,000.00 within 30 days of this here judgment failing which the entire sum shall attract interest at 10% per annum until fully paid.

This suit succeeds in part only and I so pronounce.

Delivered in Owerri this 1st day of April, 2019.

Hon. Justice Ibrahim S. Galadima,

Presiding Judge.

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