Austin Okonyia -VS- Union Bank for Africa

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE AWKA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT AWKA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J.I. TARGEMA, Ph.D

DATE: MAY 31, 2019 SUIT NO. NICN/AWK/09/2014

BETWEEN:

Austin Okonyia…………………………………………………..Claimant

AND

United Bank for Africa Plc……………………………………….Defendant

REPRESENTATION

Chief S.O. P. Okeke with C.I.A. Nwokekie and E.N. Ugwuanyi for the Claimant

Ogochukwu Onyekuluje with U. Mbaeke for the Defendant

JUDGMENT

The claimant commenced this action by a complaint filed on 9^th October, 2014 and accompanied with the statement of claim, witness deposition of the claimant, list of witness, list and copies of documents. By the complaint and statement of claim, the claimant is claiming against the defendant the following reliefs:

(a) A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s appointment is wrongful, null and void.

(b) An order of court directing the defendant to reinstate the claimant.

The sum of N753, 322.08 (Seven Hundred and Fifty Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Twenty Two Naira Eight Kobo) being the total sum of the claimant’s 4 months salary, pension and telephone allowances for the months of June, July, August and September 2014.
The monthly salary, pension and telephone allowances from the month of October, 2014 till Judgement is delivered.

(d) General damages

The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) to cushion the physical, psychological, social and economic hardship suffered by the claimant.

By order of court dated 11^th November, 2015 extending the time, the defendant entered conditional appearance and then filed its statement of defence, statement on oath of defendant’s witness, list of witnesses, list and copies of documents.

In response, the claimant filed a reply to the statement of defence dated 16^th February, 2015.

At the trial, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW; while David Motuanya, a staff/ Human Resources Business Partner of the defendant testified as DW. The claimant tendered Exhibits CW1, CW2, CW3, CW4 and CW5 while DW tendered none. At the close of trial, parties filed their respective final written addresses. The defendant’s final written address was filed on 28^th November, 2018, while the claimant’s was filed on 14^th February, 2019. The defendant’s reply on point of law was filed on 28^th February, 2019.

THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

The claimant was an employee of the defendant bank by virtue of letter of employment dated 16^thJuly 2007 until 7^th May 2014 when his appointment was terminated by the defendant for services no longer required. That the termination of his appointment followed the issue of collaterization of loan facility of Mr Ebose Paul Ejima with the account of Late Dr. Obadike; that claimant was Account Officer of the Late Dr. Obadike; that Dr. Obadike authorized claimant on two previous occasions to use his fixed deposit account to collaterize a loan facility granted one Mr Ebose Paul and this was verified by the Operations Department of the defendant bank before approval was given for the loan facility; that Paul Ejima was not able to defray totally the debt that had accrued in respect of the last loan and interest thereon leading to the defendant bank collapsing part of the fund in Late Dr. Obadike’s account unto the debt account of the former. The son of the Late Dr. Obadike petitioned the defendant bank protesting the disparity in the account balance of his late father’s account domiciled with the defendant bank. The claimant was invited to appear before the investigative panel set up by the defendant bank and later resumed work when the Late Dr Obadike’s son consequently withdrew the petition after sufficient comprehension of the issue of Late Obadike’s beneficiary transactions. On 16^th June, 2014, claimant was served with letter of termination of employment for services no longer required. The letter was dated 7^th May, 2014.

THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT

The case of the defendant is that the claimant was an employee of the defendant having been employed by letter dated 13^th July, 2007; the claimant’s employment was terminated by defendant vide letter dated 7^th May, 2014; that prior to the termination of the claimant’s employment, the claimant was questioned on cash collaterized loan facility involving Obadike Memorial Hospital and Mr. Ebose Ejima. That the claimants (sic) letter of termination gave him one month salary in lieu of notice; that the letter of termination stated that claimants (sic) employment was terminated for services no longer required; that the claimant was by letter of July 16, 2014 paid all his entitlement (sic) including his one month salary in lieu of notice.

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT

The defendant submitted three issues for determination, namely:
Whether the defendant properly terminated the employment of the claimant
Whether the claimant is entitled to his claim for reinstatement
Is the claimant entitled to his claim for damages.
Regarding issue (1), the defendant submitted that parties are bound by the terms of the contract entered into; that terms and conditions of contract of service are the determining factor in the issue of whether termination is wrongful or not; that the terms must be pleaded by the claimant. Reference was made to Idoniboye- Obu v. NNPC (2003) 2 NWLR (pt 865) 589 SC; Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd v. Dudusola (2005) 18 NWLR (pt 957) 292 and NITEL Plc v. Akwa (2006) 2 NWLR (p. 964) (sic) 391. That the function of the court in the determination of any issue concerning terms of employment is to interpret the meaning of such terms or terms in a manner consistent with realism, citing Baba v. Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre (1986) 5 NWLR (pt 42) 514; Ajayi v. Texaco Nigeria Ltd (1987) 3 NWLR (pt 62) 577. That in this case, the express term of the contract of employment which the claimant accepted is that any of the parties can terminate the contract by giving one month notice or payment of one month salary in lieu of notice; that the claimant under cross-examination admitted this fact as contained in the letter of employment (Exh. CW1); that the claimant’s only grouse with the termination is that his employment was terminated without any reason whatsoever.

The defendant went on that a master can terminate the employment of his servant at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all provided the termination is in accordance with the terms of their contract; that the motive which impels the master to terminate the contract of employment with his servant is irrelevant. That consequently the exercise of a right to terminate a contract of employment by a master cannot be vitiated by proof of malice or improper motive; referring to Osisanya v. Afribank Nig Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (pt 1031) 565; Fakuade v. OATH (1993) 5 NWR (sic) (pt 291) 47; and Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum Dev Corporation (1993) 4 NWLR (pt 289) 52 at 560 (sic) in which the principle on this point was laid.

It was the contention of the defendant that by letter dated 16^th July 2014 the defendant (sic) was paid all his terminal benefits including one month salary in lieu of notice in the sum of N71, 297. 91; that the said letter was admitted in evidence under cross-examination as Exh. CW7; that the claimant admitted that he received the sum of N554, 547. 10 inclusive of the one month salary in lieu of notice and that he did not challenge the said payment made to him. That the combined effect of Exh. CW1- letter of employment, Exh. CW3-letter of termination and Exh. CW7- letter wherein the claimant was paid his entitlements, show clearly that defendant kept to the terms of the employment when in terminating the Claimants (sic) employment, it paid the claimant one month salary in lieu of notice; that the defendant having complied with this terms of employment cannot be said to have breached the terms of the contract; that the termination cannot also be said to have been wrongful since it complied with the express terms of the contract.

The defendant continued that the claimant in his evidence in chief and his pleadings tried to show that there was motive for the termination; that claimant pleaded the petition written by Chief Dr. A.J.C. Mogbana concerning the issue of cash collaterized facility given to Mr. Ebose Ejima and the debit of the account of Obadike Memorial Hospital as the remote cause or the motive for the termination of his employment. That it must be noted that the exercise of the right to terminate a contract of employment by a master cannot be vitiated by proof of malice or improper motive; See Osianya v. Afribank Nig. Plc. (2007) 6 NWLR (pt. 1031) 565; Ekpeogu v. Ashaka Cement Company Plc (1997) 6 NWRL (pt. 508) 280. That in the instant case the Claimant did not in fact prove any motive; that when asked under cross-examination whether the defendant alleged anything against him after the said petition, the claimant said: ‘no’. The defendant then submitted that the only reason for termination is as contained in the letter of termination i.e. “services no longer required”; that the Court cannot read any other thing into the letter except as stated in the said letter of termination; that following from above, the claimants (sic) employment was properly terminated and therefore not wrongful.

For issue (2), whether the claimant is entitled to the claim for reinstatement, the defendant submitted that a Court of law cannot grant specific performance of a contract of service; that the Court can only grant damages for unlawful termination; citing Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 9) 599; Shitta Bay v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40. That where an employee is wrongfully removed either by a summary dismissal which is not justified or by giving of insufficient notice (which is not the case here) the normal remedy to which he is entitled is damages which is limited to that amount which he would have earned if he was not wrongfully dismissed or terminated. See Ativie v. Kabelmental (sic) Nigeria Ltd (2008) 10 NWLR (pt. 1095) 399. That termination of employment even if unlawful brings to an end master –servant relationship; that the only remedy available is in damages. See Osisanya v. Afribank Plc. (2012) 2 NWLR NILR 214; Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Corporation (supra); Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. v. Chinyere (2012) 2 NILR 41 at 65 and 66. Defendant therefore submitted that under a master-servant relationship, re-instatement is not a remedy at all; that the Court is urged to hold that claimant is not entitled to re-instatement even if the Court comes to an unlikely decision that the termination was wrongful; that all the claimant can get is damages and damages is limited to the salary for the period of notice assuming notice was not given. That in the instant case, the claimant was paid one month salary in lieu of notice and he collected same and did not challenge the amount paid to him; See Ativie v. Kabelmetal Nigeria Limited (supra), Olaniyan v. Unilag (supra).

On issue (3), whether the claimant is entitled to his claims for damages, the defendant submitted that the law is trite that a person who is unlawfully dismissed or whose employment is unlawfully terminated cannot get both damages and re-instatement at one and the same time; that it must be one or the other. See Kabelmotal (sic) Nigeria Ltd v. Ativie (2002) 10 NWLR (pt. 775) 250; Ativie v. Kabelmetal Nigeria Ltd (2008) 10 NWLR (pt. 1095) 399; African Newspaper Ltd & Ors v. Jacob Akano (2011) All FWLR (pt.605) 345. That in Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (supra) the Supreme Court in holding that the appellant was only entitled to two months salary in lieu of notice as damages affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal which set aside the award of N2million general damages awarded to the appellant.

To the defendant, the claims of the claimant in paragraph 27 (c) (i), 27(c) (ii) and 27(c) are predicated on the ground that the claimants (sic) employment was wrongfully terminated on 7^th May, 2014 and that the said termination did not bring to an end his employment with the defendant; that it is submitted that the claimants (sic) case is built on a wrong premise and is liable to fail; that as ealier shown, the employment of the claimant was properly terminated on 7^th May, 2014 and he was paid all that he was entitled to, including his one month salary in lieu of notice; that the claimant admitted under cross-examination that he has not challenged the amount paid to him; that by admission, the claimant has shown that he received all he was entitled to at the time of termination including his one month salary in lieu of notice.

The defendant went on that the claimant’s claim for salaries, pensions and telephone allowances for the month of June, July, August and September, 2014 cannot stand in view of the act and as demonstrated above, his employment came to an end on the date his employment was terminated i.e 7^th May 2014; that the claimants (sic) other claims for salaries and allowances from October 2014 till judgment is not supported by any term of contract or any judicial authority. That on the contrary since the claimants (sic) employment came to an end with his termination on 7^th May, 2014, the claimant is not entitled to anything more from the defendant; that claimant cannot be paid salaries and allowances when he was no longer in employment. That the claimant is also not entitled to general damages as claimed; that general damages follow events; that since the termination was lawful and regular as contended above, the claimant is therefore not entitled to general damages. That the Court is urged to dismiss this head of damages as being frivolous and without merit on the authorities of Olaniyan v. Unilag (supra); Ativie v. Kabelmental (sic) Nigeria Ltd., African Newspapers Ltd v. Akano (supra).

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT

The claimant submitted a lone issue for determination, to wit: whether from the circumstances of this case vis-a-vis the conventional and international labour law standard, the termination of the employment of the claimant was one done with a valid reason, and if not, whether the claimant is not entitled to be reinstated. To the claimant, granted that the relationship between the claimant and the defendant was one of master-servant relationship; granted also that the Claimant’s employment with defendant is not one with statutory flavour, it is humbly submitted that going by the recent provisions of the Constitution, International Labour Organization (Termination of Employment Convention 1982) No. 158, ILO Convention, National Industrial Court Act, 2006, a master (in this case the defendant) cannot again fire his servant (in this case the claimant) without a good reason connected with the performance of the servant’s duties. Reference was made to Section 254C (1) (f) and (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended), Section 7 (6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and Article 4 of the ILO (Termination of Employment Convention) 1982- No. 158. That Nigeria has been a member of the ILO since 17^th October, 1960; that when the ILO (Termination of Employment) Convention was formulated in 1982, Nigeria was a signatory to the said Convention, that when the said Convention came into force in 1985, Nigeria ratified it. The claimant submitted that from the unambiguous provisions of Article 2(1) of the said Convention; it is obvious that the nature of the employment of the applicant (sic) in the instant case is not part of the sort of employment which the ILO Convention urges its member (sic) to exclude from the operation of the said Convention; that the implication of it is that the instant employment of the applicant (sic) is one of the employment being regulated by the said Convention. Reference was made to Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc (2015) 58 NLLR (pt 199) 92 in contention that it is no longer conventional for a master to fire his servant at any time without a valid reason given for that.

The Claimant continued that the defendant admitted that the termination of the employment of the claimant has nothing to do with Obadike’s case but on the basis of “service no longer required;” that service no longer required cannot be a valid reason for termination of employment of a confirmed employee going by the ILO Convention and the case of Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc (supra) cited above (sic).

The claimant proceeded that the defendant did not show that there was a redundancy as at the time the claimant’s employment was terminated which promoted the needless (sic) of the service of the Claimant in the defendant bank. That assuming without conceding that there was a redundancy at the time of termination of the claimant’s employment, it is submitted that the defendant did not follow the procedure set out in the Group Staff Handbook in handling the redundancy; citing Article 9.6 at page 65 of the defendant’s Group Staff Handbook. That the defendant never complied with the terms of the Handbook cited assuming there was redundancy at the time the claimant’s employment was terminated; that going by the authorities cited above, the claimant is entitled to be reinstated in line with the international best practice and labour law standard, the applicant’s (sic) employment being the one terminated without any valid reason. See Aloysius v. Diamond Bank (supra) and Article 4 of the ILO (Termination of Employment) Convention, 1982. The claimant therefore urged the Court to so hold; and resolve this issue in applicant’s (sic) favour.

In reaction to other issues raised in the defendant’s final written address, the claimant firstly, submitted that the argument of the defendant that a master can terminate the employment of his servant at any time for any reason or without any reason at all does (sic) no longer represent the current position in labour law practice taking into consideration the combined effect of Sec. 254C (1) (f) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution as amended in 2010 and Section 7 (6) of the NIC Act, 2006 vis-à-vis the ILO (Termination of Employment) Convention, 1982 which Nigeria has ratified; that with the insertion of Sec.254C (1) (f) and (2) into our Constitution which now confer (sic) exclusive jurisdiction to this Court with respect to labour matters and which also clothed this honourable court (sic) the powers to take into consideration the international labour standard and best practice in deciding any labour related dispute, the effect of the combined provisions of the above mentioned statutes and the ILO Convention is that a master can only terminate the employment of the servant for a valid reason that is connected to the conduct and performance of his/her duty; see Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc (supra). That once the termination of the employment of a servant by a master is not done with valid reason, the current position is that such termination is void and the employee is entitled to be reinstated; that all the cases cited by the defendant’s counsel and of course the more recent cases are all good laws but they were either decided by the Court before the enactment of Section 254C (1) (f) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution as amended in 2010 and Section 7 (6) of the NIC Act, 2006 or were commenced at High Court before the advent of those recent enactments referred above and as such cannot be applied in the instant case.

Secondly, the claimant submitted that the argument of the defendant’s Counsel that the exercise of the right to terminate a contract of employment by a master cannot be vitiated by proof of malice or improper motive, is an old and unconventional common law principle from which new trends in labour law standard and practice have emerged; that Article 4 of the ILO (Termination of Employment) Convention, 1982 has now placed a qualification on termination of the employment of a confirmed employee which is that, for the termination of employment of employee to be valid; it must be done with a reason that is connected with the conduct and performance of the employee’s duties.

Thirdly, the claimant submitted in answer to the argument of the defendant’s Counsel as contained in paragraph 7.03 of his final address, that the standard now is that the master must give a valid reason that is connected to the servant’s conduct and performance of his duty before terminating his employment (The claimant did not disclose the purported argument contained in paragraph 7.03 referred to). To the claimant it will be injustice to the claimant in the instant case that the Group Staff Handbook which regulates the relationship between the defendant and her staffs (sic) including the claimant at its paragraph 9.2.2 page 62 after providing for the duration of notices that would be given by different cadres of employee in the case of resignation still went ahead at paragraph 9.2.3 to provide the process of resignation, but never provided for processes which the bank will follow before terminating the employment of her staff. That a community reading of 9.2.3 1-9.2.3.7 of the Group Staff Handbook of the defendant’s Bank would show that for employee of the Bank to resign his employment, he/she must communicate the reason for his resignation to his supervisor apart from giving notice. That the implication is that an employee cannot just wake up one morning without a reason (sic) say that he has resigned from the Bank; that the person has to follow the laid down procedure and that laid down procedure provides some sort of security and guarantee in favour of the defendant and against the applicant; that in times of the defendant deciding to terminates the employment of the employee, it can just terminate the employee without giving any reason as argued by the defendant provided that the sacked employee gets one month salary in lieu of notice where notice was not given. To the claimant, it is the unfair terms as in the instant case which the master normally insert in the terms of contract with his servant and as even obtained under the common law that the ILO Convention of 1982 set out to remedy; that this Court was granted the power by Section 7(6) of the NIC Act (supra) and Sec 254C (1) (f) and (2) of the Constitution as amended in 2010 to apply the said Convention. The claimant then urged the Court to discountenance the argument of the defendant as contained in its written address.

The Claimant submitted in conclusion that going by all the recent authorities both statutory and judicial cited by the claimant especially the ILO Convention of 1982 together with the relevant provisions of Constitution as amended, the current trend in labour law practice is that a master must give a valid reason connected with a confirmed servant’s conduct and performance of his duty before terminating his/her employment; that where no reason was advanced by the master for terminating the servant’s employment such termination is liable to be vitiated by Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc.(supra)

Flowing from the above, the Claimant urged the Court to so hold and grant all the claims of the applicant (sic).

REPLY ON POINT OF LAW

On the ILO Convention, the defendant submitted that it is imperative to determine which of the Convention that is in issue here and whether the said Convention has been ratified by Nigeria; that the Claimant did not show which of the ILO Convention that he is relying on; that there are over 1,200 ratified ILO Conventions in place; that it is also important to determine whether such ratified Convention has been domesticated in Nigeria; citing Fawehinmi v. Abacha (2000) 6 NWLR (pt 660) 228 at 314-315. That ratified but undomesticated ILO Conventions do not rank above statutes validly enacted by the National Assembly; that such undomesticated ILO Convention (sic) are inferior to laws of Nigeria made by the National Assembly which is the highest law making body in Nigeria.

On Section 254C (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) the defendant contended that the real intent of the provisions of Section 254C (2) is for the National Industrial Court to apply the ILO Conventions when there no clear provisions (sic) regarding a situation within the Nigerian Law or where the provisions in the Nigerian Law is ambiguous and not clear; that the application of the ILO Convention by NIC can only come into play where there are no sufficient statutory provisions to cover a given subject or when the particular labour rights protected by ILO Convention are not contained in our domestic labour statutes. That by Sections 7, 9 and 11 of Labour Act, it is clear that there are statutory provisions in the Nigerian Labour Law that are clear and ambiguous (sic) on the subject matter now in dispute, i.e. termination of employment; that the provisions of the ILO Convention are therefore not necessary.

The defendant submitted that Nigerian Courts operate the doctrine of precedent in which the NIC is obliged to abide by the decisions of the superior Courts, that is, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court; that it will amount to judicial rascality for a lower Court to refuse to abide by the decision of the Superior Courts in this case the Supreme Court which has recently in 2018 decided this issue in Obanye v. UBA plc (2018) 17 NWLR (pt 1648) 375 SC.

The defendant urged the Court to discountenance the submissions of Counsel and the decision of Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc cited by the claimant’s counsel.

COURT’S DECISION

I have carefully considered the processes filed and the submissions of the parties. The claimant’s grouse in the case relates to the termination of his employment by the defendant for services no longer required. The claimant’s case, as amended by order of Court dated 14^th January, 2019, is as follows: (a) A declaration that the termination of the claimant’s appointment is wrongful, unlawful, null and void; (b) An order of Court directing the defendant to reinstate the claimant; (c) An order of the Court directing the defendant’s (sic) Bank to pay all the claimant’s arrears of salary and other entitlement starting from the month of June 2014 when the claimant’s employment was terminated till the time the claimant is reinstate; and (d) general damages of N10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira) against the defendant. This means that this Court must decide the following issues:
Whether the determination of the claimant’s appointment was actually wrongful, unlawful, null and void
Whether the claimant is entitled to a reinstatement
Whether the claimant is entitled to the arrears of salary and other entitlements from the time claimant’s appointment was terminated till the time the claimant is reinstated; and if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the claimant has proved the entitlement to the said sum.
Whether the claimant is entitled to and has so made out a case for damages beyond the usual payment in lieu of notice.
In employment cases, the Supreme Court in Ekeagwu v. The Nigerian Army (2010) LPELR-1076 (SC); (2010) 16 NWLR 419 per His Lordship Onnoghen, JSC (later CJN) reminded us that in an action for wrongful termination/dismissal/retirement only two primary issues call for determination. These are: whether the termination/dismissal/retirement of the plaintiff is wrongful; and the measure of damages recoverable where the termination/dismissal/retirement is found to be wrongful. Even at this, the rule is that he who asserts must prove, and in employment law, the onus is on the claimant who asserts that his termination is wrongful to show how wrongful it actually is. And to do this the Claimant must place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and then prove in what manner the said terms were breached. See Aji v. Chad Basin Development Authority & anor (2015) LPELR-2462 (SC) and Ademola Bolarinde v. APM Terminals Apapa Ltd unreported suit No. NICN/LA/268/2012, the judgment of which was delivered on February 25, 2016. It is not for the defendant to prove any of this. See further Akinfe v. UBA Plc (2007) 10 NWLR (pt 1041) 187 CA and UTC Nigeria Ltd v. Peters (2009) LPELR-8426 (CA).

In relief (a), the claimant prayed that the termination of his employment be declared “wrongful, unlawful, null and void.” The claimant does not seem to understand that case law authorities in this Country make a distinction between termination/dismissal that is wrongful and termination/dismissal that is unlawful/illegal, null and void. See for instance, BCC Plc v. Ager (2010) 9 NWLR (pt1199) 292 SC, which held that there is a distinction between mere wrongful dismissal and an invalid or null dismissal. That where the Court makes a finding of wrongful dismissal, a payment in lieu of notice will apply; but where the finding is that the dismissal or termination was null and void, then there is no dismissal or termination as what the employer did was a nullity before the law.

The basis of the claimant’s argument is that he was an employee of the defendant having been employed via letter dated 13^th July, 2007, which is Exhibit CW1; that the claimant’s employment was confirmed by the defendant vide Exhibit CW2; that the Claimant’s employment was terminated by the defendant vide letter dated 7^th May 2014 (Exhibit CW3); that the defendant did not state any reason for the termination of the employment of the Claimant other than “service no longer required”; that prior to the termination of the Claimant’s employment, the claimant was questioned on Cash Collaterized loan facility involving Dr. Oba-dike’s fixed deposit account and Mr. Ebose Paul Ejima; that the outcome of the questioning was never communicated to the Claimant before the termination of his employment; and that the Claimant was paid one month salary in lieu of notice.

The Claimant further argued that the termination of his employment for services no longer required cannot be a valid reason for termination of employment of a confirmed employee going by International Labour Organization, Articles 2(1) and 4 thereof. The Claimant did not cite the details of the Convention especially in terms of whether it was one among the 8 ratified by Nigeria. I so hold. Be that as it may, the argument of Counsel to the defendant on domestication of ILO Conventions and the jurisdiction of this Court to apply ratified ILO Conventions in appropriate cases is untenable. The provisions of Section 254C (2) of the 1999 Constitution are clear on the jurisdiction of this Court on the subject and such powers are not circumscribed by Section 12 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), and I so hold.

To the Claimant, the termination of appointment for services no longer required would have been tenable if the defendant showed that there was a redundancy as at the time Claimant’s appointment was terminated; that the defendant did not follow the procedure set out in the Group Staff Handbook particularly Article 9.6 at page 65 thereof. Article 9.6.1 is the procedure to follow in time of redundancy. The claimant argued that the defendant never complied with Article 9.6.1 of Exhibit CW8 “assuming there was redundancy at the time the claimant’s employment was terminated.” Having placed the matter of redundancy in the realm of speculation or conjecture, I do not think that the claimant’s argument in or that respect is tenable. I so hold. In my respectful view, the Claimant has failed to prove that the terms and conditions of his employment were violated by the defendant in the termination of claimants employment; especially the claimant having acknowledged being paid one month salary in lieu of notice. I so find and hold. Relief (a) fails and is accordingly dismissed.

On relief (b), whether the claimant is entitled to reinstatement, the position of the law is well settled that where an employee’s service is protected by statute and his employment is wrongfully terminated he would be entitled to reinstatement in his office and in addition damages representing his salaries during the period of his purported termination/dismissal. See Odeyemi v. NITEL Plc (2009) LPELR-4982 (CA); CBN v. Igwillo (2007) 4-5 SC 154 and FRSC v. Idowu (2016) LPELR-40153 (CA). Having made a finding that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was not wrongful, the claimant is not entitled to a reinstatement. I so hold. Relief (b) accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed.

Relief (c) is for an order of the Court directing the defendant’s (sic) Bank to pay all the claimant’s arrears of salary and other entitlements starting from the month of June 2014 when the claimant’s employment was terminated till the time the claimant is reinstated. These are species of claim that fall under special damages. Unlike general damages, special damages must be claimed specifically and proved strictly and the Court is not entitled to make its own estimate of the same. See IBWA Ltd v. Hotel Metropole International Ltd (2010) LPELR-4272 (CA); UBN Plc v. Ajabule & anor (2011) LPELR-8239 (SC); NBC Plc v. Ubani (2013) LPELR-21902 (SC); Apugo & Sons Ltd v. Orthopedic Hospital Management Board (2016) LPELR-40598 (SC) and Eneh v. Ozor & anor (2016) LPELR-40830 (SC). The Court should not act within the realm of conjecture in awarding special damages and also should not rely simply on fluid and speculative estimate of alleged loss or injury sustained by the plaintiff. See Ngilari v. Mothercat Ltd (1999) 12 SC (pt 11) 1 and Osuji v. Siocha (1989) 6 SC (pt11) 158. The claimant stated in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the amended statement of claim that he was placed on a total annual salary and benefits to the tune of over N2.4 Million; that claimant’s salary and monthly pension as at May 2014 stands at N172,210.84 and N14,119.68 respectively; that he is entitled to a monthly telephone allowance of N2,000 and an annual leave allowance of N75,079.72. Aside the mention of Approved Compensation Package on which document the claimant sought to validate the hazarded figure “of over N2.4 Million” for total annual salary and benefits,” the Claimant did not plead or place reliance on any other document in proof of this head of claim. The claimant has failed to prove his entitlement to this head of claim. Relief (c) fails and is accordingly dismissed.

Relief (d) is for general damages of N10Million against the defendant. General damages claimed herein are uncalled for and as such not grantable. I so hold. Relief (d) fails and is accordingly dismissed.