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National Industrial Court

MR. SUNDAY ASEIDU & ors -VS- JAPAUL MINES & PRODUCTS

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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE AKURE JUDICIAL DIVISION

                   HOLDEN IN AKURE

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE O.O. OYEWUMI

DATE:  18TH JUNE, 2019                                     

SUIT NO: NICN/AK/01/2016

BETWEEN

  1. MR. SUNDAY ASEIDU
  2. MR. UGWU SAMUEL                         ………………….CLAIMANTS

 

AND

JAPAUL MINES & PRODUCTS LIMITED     …..……………….DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATION

O.S. Aderigbigbe with him O.O. Ilenusi for the claimants

Olabode Shaba for defendant                                                     

JUDGMENT

The claimants approached this Court by a General Form of Complaint on 13th January, 2016 which was later amended on the 22nd of January, 2018, wherein they claimed against the defendant the following reliefs:

  1. A Declaration that the claimants are entitled to compensation from the defendant for the personal injuries sustained by them due to the negligence of the defendant.
  2. A Declaration that the defendant is negligent in the way and manner it treated its staff in its employment.
  3. The sum of N1, 000,000,000.00 (One billion Naira) only as compensation for the 1st claimant for the negligent acts of the defendant leading to the severance of his finger.
  4. The sum of N500, 000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) only as compensation for the severance of the toe of the 2nd claimant by virtue of the negligence of the defendant.
  5. The sum of N500, 000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) only as compensation for the personal injury caused the 3rd claimant by reason of the negligence of the defendant.
  6. The sum of N1,000,000,000.00 (One billion Naira) each for the physical indescribable pains suffered by the claimants as a result of injuries sustained by them by virtue of the negligence of the defendant.

It is the claimants case that they were before the 15th of September, 2015 employees of the defendants. The 1st claimant stated that he was employed by the defendant as a crusher mechanic on 1st September, 2007 with basic salary of N120,000.00 per annum,  that the salary was reviewed at various times, he was promoted via letters dated 29th December, 2008 and 31st May, 2010. The 2nd claimant was employed on the 7th February, 2011 as caterpillar mechanic with no letter of engagement given to him but was paid N15, 000.00 per month. The 1st claimant stated that on the 16th January, 2015, while working on the crusher, the machine severed one of the fingers to his right hand and the second finger seriously wounded, that he was taken to the hospital but was abandoned by the defendant as it only gave him N5,000.00. That upon resumption after spending three and half months at home for treatment, he asked for compensation for the expenses he incurred in respect of his hand, but was told same will be paid whenever he decides to leave the Company.

Regarding the 2nd claimant, he was involved in an accident on 7th September, 2011 after working on one of the caterpillars of the defendant as instructed by his supervisor, while climbing into the back seat of the caterpillar, the driver drove off, and he slipped and his leg entered into one of the components of the caterpillar, in the process, the last toe at his right leg got severed. He was rushed to the hospital and was later transferred to Federal Medical Centre, Owo where he was admitted. That he was without any medical attention for two days as there was no payment except for patient reference personal card, that with the effort of a doctor, the defendant deposited the sum of N10,000.00, which was the last and the only payment made by the defendant for his treatment. He stated that after spending more than a month at the hospital and could no longer pay for the medical bills, he resorted to local treatment as he had already spent N80,820.00 in the hospital. That on his return, he demanded for compensation and for refund of expenses incurred but was informed that all necessary payment will be paid whenever he decides to leave the company. That inspite of the above, the defendant terminated his employment. It is the claimants’ contention that the defendant was negligent in the way and manner it handled the safety of its staff.

PARTICULARS OF NEGLIGENCE

  1. The claimants aver that the defendant Company lacked the necessary safety gadgets in their Company, needed by the workers and never took any safety measures to ensure that its workers are protected.
  2. In the case of the claimants, no safety gadget was provided by the defendant in order to ensure that these avoidable accident did not occur.
  3. On many occasions, the defendant would tell its staff to leave the Company whenever the inspectors were around to inspect the safety facilities of the defendant.
  4. The defendant failed to cover up the evacuation it made or, to make a hedge round in order to prevent the accident that happened to the 3rd claimant.
  5. The claimants aver that the defendant owe them the duty to provide them with the necessary safety gadgets needed for their work which it breached.
  6. The claimants aver that if the defendant has provided them with the necessary safety measures, they would have been saved from the various injuries they had.
  7. The 1st claimant avers that the finger on his right hand was severed because the person operating the machine was not a qualified operator, with adequate knowledge of the machine, but just an ordinary electrician who was substituted for the panel operator.
  8. The 1st claimant also avers that the qualified panel operator was not around that day, if not he would have known what to do in the circumstance. It was the defendant who unceremoniously removed him from his duty post and replaced him with an electrician who knew nothing of the operations.

The 1st claimant averred that he did not fail to obey the instructions of the panel operator as none of such nature was offered. The 2nd claimant again pleaded that the safety gadget he was using before the accident was bought by him, the defendant only provided safety gadget after the accident and that he was never advised and that he never disregarded any advice given by any supervisor or co-worker as regard the caterpillar. Claimants therefore urged the Court to dismiss the defendant’s statement of defence and grant their claims as this suit is not speculative, afterthought, gold-digging, frivolous and a flagrant abuse of Court process.

It is the defence of the defendant that the 1st claimant did not follow the safety measures prescribed by it and was also negligent by not heeding the advice/warning given to him by the panel operator as to when to change slacked conveyor belt, also that the claimants willfully and voluntarily failed or/and neglected to use safety gadgets as all its employees including the 1st and 2nd claimants were at all material time of their employment provided with safety gadgets. That it did not abandon the 1st claimant while he was at the hospital and after he was discharged, the sum of N5,000.00 given to him by one Engineer Akande was upon his request for the purchase of drugs that were not available at the hospital and that all his medical bills and other expenses were shouldered by the defendant as well as payment of 1st claimant’s salaries for the period. The defendant added that the claimants did not make any demand for compensation from it upon resuming work and no letter dated 20/8/2015 or any report of accident was received from him and that it did not at any time promise to pay any compensation whatsoever or at the termination of the 1st claimant’s employment. It is contended that the Dumper truck on which the 2nd claimant worked has only a driver seat and does not have a back seat that the 2nd claimant willfully hung onto the truck while it was in operation, hence, the accident is as a result of his negligence. It again averred that it took on the payment of his medical bills, feeding and other expenses at the hospitals he was taken until he vamoosed from the FMC, Owo without notifying it.

The defendant contended that the claimants were sacked not because they are no longer productive or of their alleged disability but that their services are no longer needed, also that none of them is entitled to any compensation at all for any alleged loss suffered as they resumed work after they were fully recovered from their injuries and worked normally. It therefore urged the Court to dismiss the claimants’ suit with substantial costs as it is speculative, after-thought, gold-digging, vexatious, frivolous and a flagrant abuse of Court process.

At trial, the Claimants testified for themselves as CW 6 and 7. They also testified alongside One Saliu Sadiq CW1, Oluwadare Bankole CW2, Kingsley Eze CW3, Aminu Saliu CW4 and Joseph Enahoro CW5. They all adopted their sworn depositions on oath as their evidence in this case. They also tendered some documents which were admitted in evidence and marked Exhibits SS, OB, SA-SA5, US –US5. One Oredola Richard (DW1) and Bayo Joseph Sunday (DW2) respectively, testified for the defendant and also tendered some documents which were admitted in evidence and marked Exhibit RO and J-J5.

On the 1st of March, 2019 the defendant as it is customary to do, filed its final written address wherein a sole issue was formulated, viz:

Whether each of the claimants has been able to make out a case of negligence (or have proved the case) against the defendant as required by law to entitle them to the reliefs sought in this suit.

As argued by the defendant’s counsel, for the claimants to succeed in an action for negligence, they must satisfy the three conditions as enumerated in the case of Universal Trust Ban of Nigeria v. Ozoemena [2007] Vol. 145 LRCN 607 at pg 718 paras K-U, thus, they must not only plead all the particulars in sufficient details of the negligence alleged and the duty of care owed by the defendant to them but all must be supported by credible evidence and that it is after this, that the burden shifts to the defendant to adduce evidence to challenge negligence on its part, he referred to the case of N.A.S. Ltd v. UBA Plc [2005] ALL FWLR (Pt. 284) 275 @ 285, paras D-E. Counsel submitted that the averments of the 1st claimant in paragraph 39(a-c) and (e-h) of his amended statement of facts and paragraphs 5(c), 15, 19 and 39 of his amended reply when considered together with paragraph 4 of the amended reply shows that he was grossly inconsistent both in his pleadings and evidence and such must be discountenanced as unreliable as he cannot approbate and reprobate on the same material point of non-provision or provision of safety gadgets to him. Reliance was placed on the authority of Emenike v. P.P.P & Ors [2012] 8SCM 111 @ 132 – 133 paras 1, A. The Court was urged to hold that the 1st claimant and other employees of the defendant were at all material times provided with necessary safety gadgets to work with. It is further submitted that the 1st claimant also failed to prove his allegation that it was the defendant’s unqualified panel operator’s negligent act by switching on the machine that led to the injury he sustained since he did not adduce credible evidence that the electrician lack adequate knowledge of the panel system, that the piece of evidence in paragraphs 17 and 18 of his statement on oath dated 13/1/2016 is speculative and lacking in substance.

On the probative value of Exhibit ‘OB’, the alleged photograph of the 4th finger of the 1st claimant’s right hand, learned counsel urged the Court to discountenance same for being a product of perjury and a document procured in anticipation of this suit contrary to Section 83(3) – (4), Evidence Act, 2011, that it is inadmissible evidence and should be discountenanced and expunged. It is also counsel’s submission that the 1st claimant failed to adduce any scintilla of evidence in support of how much he spent personally to treat himself in view of his contention that he is solely responsible for his hospital bills. He submitted that the Court will not go on frolic or inquisition to look for evidence which is not placed before it as the hospital cash receipts tendered by the 1st claimant as Exhibits are not relevant to this case. See Buhari v. INEC & Ors [2009] Vol. 167 LRCN 1 @ 171 para A. In the same vein, it is submitted that the 1st claimant did not state any specific amount he demanded for as compensation from the defendant, as such, it cannot be implied as what is not expressly stated cannot be implied and that there is no evidence in support of his pleadings in paragraphs 43(a); (b); (c) and (f) of the amended statement of facts, hence, the said paragraph should be deemed as abandoned and must fail. He cited the case of Anyafulu & Ors v. Meka & Ors [2014] 6 SCM 1 @ 18 paras H-I and urged the Court to so hold.

It is the learned defence counsel position that the 2nd claimant being the asserting party, failed woefully to discharge the evidential burden to prove his averment that neither he nor any of the defendant’s staff was ever provided with any protective gadget until after the accident as required of him by law. See Sections 131 – 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the case of Mbanefo v. Agbu [2014] ALL FWLR (Pt. 724) 40 @ 91-92, paras H-B. He submitted further that it is beyond doubt that the 2nd claimant has a safety shoe whether provided by the defendant or not but that he neglected or failed to use or wear it on the day of the accident, that if he had worn it, the injury he sustained would have been avoided. It is also contended that the alleged accident was as a result of a voluntary and independent action of the 2nd claimant and not as a result of the defendant’s instruction as the summary of his case is that he sustained the said injury when he decided to climb into the back seat of the caterpillar, which was confirmed to have no back seat but a railing, therefore, that the defendant should not be held liable for the 2nd claimant’s negligence.

It is the counsel’s further argument that the allegation by the 2nd claimant that he was abandoned at Federal Medical Centre, Owo to his fate and paid the hospital bills himself was not supported with credible evidence, that the DW1 under cross examination maintained that it was the practice of the hospital to issue receipts in the name of the patient in respective of whoever paid the money. It is also argued that the sum of N80,820.00 he contended to have expended based on calculation from the receipts he tendered was not established, that those receipts were discredited under cross examination as most of them were duplicated, undated and not signed by the issuers, therefore were not reliable and can never be the basis for any award, the Court is therefore urged to discountenance the contention of the 2nd claimant for the said sum as hospital expenses. It is equally submitted that his compensation for disability was also not proved, no specific amount was requested, and the request was only made orally and was denied by the defendant. That he admitted he still worked with the defendant after he recovered till when he was disengaged. He also admitted that he was paid all his due entitlements at the severance of his employment. Again, that the claims for declaratory orders and monetary claims are deemed to be abandoned as no evidence was led to support them and therefore they are of no moment. The case of Anyafulu & Ors v. Meka & Ors [2014] 6 SCM 1 @ 21, paras G-H was relied upon. Counsel then urged the Court to dismiss the 2nd claimant’s claim in its entirety.

Learned counsel finally urged the Court to hold that the claimants have failed to place before it sufficient, cogent, compelling and credible evidence showing the negligence by conduct or action and the circumstances of its occurrence, culminating into the breach of the defendant’s duty of care to each of them and consequently dismiss their case.

On the 19th of March, 2019, the claimants filed their final written address wherein a sole issue was equally framed, which is:

Whether the claimants are entitled to their claims before the Court.

In addressing this issue, claimants’ learned counsel submitted that the claimants are entitled to all their claims before this Court. It is the submission of counsel that to succeed in a case of negligence, the claimants must prove three (3) ingredients, which are: (i) the fact that the defendant owed the claimants a duty of care, (ii) that the duty was breached; and (iii) that damages arose from the breach of the defendant’s duty of care. It is his contention that the defendant conceded to the 1st ingredient, that is, its liability to care for them. On the 2nd requirement, it is argued that DW2 during cross examination, was not able to point to a particular exhibit among Exhibits J1 – J4 tendered by him showing that the said safety gadgets were provided to the claimants before the occurrence of the accidents. That the answer provided by DW2 when asked whether a welder glove (which the defendant contended was given to the claimants as shown in exhibit J1) is the same as a thick woolen hand glove, leaves room for speculation. Learned counsel submitted that a Court should not decide any case based on speculation while he relied on the case of Edosa v. Jaccala [2006] ALL FWLR (Pt. 306) 881 at 909-910, paras H-A He also urged the Court to reject the evidence of DW1 for being a mere guess as he was not present when the welder glove was purportedly issued to 1st claimant. It is the submission of counsel that Exhibits J1 – J4 are inadmissible in law because the makers of the documents were not disclosed in with Section 83 of the Evidence Act, LFN, 2011, he then urged the Court to reject them as inadmissible. Reference was made to the authorities of Oloruntoki v. Johnson [1990] 6 NWLR (Pt. 158) pg. 600 and Oseni v. Oniyide [1999] 13 NWLR (Pt. 634) pg 258. Counsel further submitted that the failure to call the store man who DW2 mentioned in his evidence as the person who issued Exhibit J1 is fatal to the case of the defendant as he is material witness and also amounts to withholding of evidence. This position is supported by the case of Opolo v. The State [1977] ALL NLR (pt. 312). Still on Exhibit J1, it is contended that the signature on it is not that of the 1st claimant when compared with his signature in his statement on oath attached to the statement of facts and that on his Additional Statement on oath attached to reply to statement of defence, in view of this, he submitted that the 1st claimant did not sign the said exhibit and that the Court should not attach any weight to it. He cited the cases of Yusuf v. Masai & Ors [2017] ALL FWLR (pt. 912) pg. 664 at 693, paras A-B; pg 694 paras C-E. He also posited that assuming without conceding that the documents are admissible and worthy of weight, it is submitted that the said documents have not exonerated the defendant with proof that the necessary safety gadgets were supplied to the claimants before their accidents.

Counsel went on to submit that the defendant never challenged the evidence of CW4 that the said electrician, Mr. Lawrence who operated the machine on the day of the accident never operated the machine prior to the accident of the 1st claimant. he them submitted that the Court should hold the fact as established in law and reject the evidence of DW1 in its entirety for rendering contradictory evidence on those facts while he placed reliance on the cases of Ogbu v. The State [2003] FWLR (Pt. 147) pg 1102 at pg. 1118 paras E-F and Fatuga v. Aina & Ors [2008] ALL FWLR (Pt. 398) pg. 394 at 400 paras D-E.

Counsel on the contention of the defendant that the 2nd claimant was not supposed to climb the caterpillar after it was serviced, is an afterthought as he is not expected to remain under the machine after servicing or repairing it. The Court is urged to so hold, also to hold that the argument of the defendant that the 2nd claimant failed to use the boot he purchased personally for himself and as such, it was not liable, constitutes and admission that the defendant did not provide him with the gadgets and to hold that the 2nd claimant has proved that the defendant breached its duty of care to him.

On the onus to prove that the claimants are entitled to damages as a result of the breach of the defendant’s duty of care, counsel referred to the pleadings of the claimants in paragraph 38 in their amended statement of facts and submitted further that it is a known fact that indescribable pains follow whenever a person’s limbs is severed cruelly as was those of the claimants, he urged the Court to take judicial notice of this, hence the reason for claiming the relief in paragraph 43 of their amended statement of facts, which the Court is urged to award. That in view of the fact that a lost limb which can never be replaced, the sum of N1, 000,000,000.00 is reasonable for each of the claimants. See the case of Niger Mills Co. Plc v. Agube [2008] ALL FWLR (pt. 427) pg. 86 at pg. 113 -114 paras G-B.

From all the above, he urged the Court to hold that the defendant was negligent in its dealing with the claimants as it is the law that issues of negligence is a question of facts and not law.

It is also the contention of counsel that the receipts or documents tendered by the defendant were not the receipts of the hospital as they were written in the name of one Abe Odunayo who was not even called to give evidence and that there was nowhere the defendant produced the ones issued by the hospital. He urged the Court to take into consideration the principles underlying the grant of compensation as stated in the case of Niger Mills Co. Plc v. Agube (supra) and the above arguments and grant relief for compensation to the claimants. In all, counsel urged the Court to grant all the claims of the claimants as contained in their amended statement of facts and reject the submission of the defendant’s counsel to the contrary.

Having carefully read and considered all the processes filed in this suit and the arguments of counsel, it is in my firm view that the issues that would best determined this suit are;

  1. Whether or not the claimants have established a case of negligence against the defendant.
  2.  Whether or not the claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought?

Facts not in dispute are that the claimants were in the employment of the defendants; the nature of their employment is master servant and that the injury which is the cause of action occurred in the premises of the defendants while at work. The area of contention is that according to the claimants, the defendant was negligent in the duty of care it owed to them as it employees, a result of which culminated into the injury for which they seek compensation. The defendants denying this assertion argued that it provided them with the necessary safety gadget to work with but that the claimants willfully failed to use them.

I will like to first deal with some preliminary issues of concern to the parties before delving into the main nub of this case. The defendant by paragraphs 4.1.24 of their final written submission urged the Court to discountenance exhibit OB for being a product of perjury and a document procured in anticipation of this suit contrary to Section 83(3)-(4) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Learned counsel continued to argue that CW2 one Oluwadare Bamikole, a self-acclaimed photographer testified in Chief that he was the one who used his digital camera to snap the photograph in issue and under cross-examination stated that his name is not Blessing contrary to the sworn evidence of the 1st claimant where he maintained that it was one person named Blessing who used his own phone camera to snap the photograph. Under cross-examination 1st claimant stated that he was the one that used his camera to snap the photograph and gave same to CW2 to develop. The claimants did not put argument on this issue. It is seen that Exhibit OB in contention is the photograph tendered by CW2 graphically showing the extent of the injury of the claimant. The 1st claimant by paragraph 26 of his sworn deposition averred thus- “That while I was at the hospital, I told one Blessing to use my phone to snap the injury and he did so. I then went to develop then [sic] myself”. CW2 in his sworn deposition at paragraphs 7 and 8 stated “that I took pictures of the 1st claimant’s right hand where the 4th finger of his right hand reflected in the pictures. 8. That the pictures were taken with my digital camera which I have been using for over time, infact I have been using the camera for over 11 years” under cross examination 1st claimant stated that “when the injury was fresh I used my phone to snap it and later gave to Bankole to put the picture out for me” from the foregoing it is clear that the 1st claimant in one breathe stated that he asked one Blessing to help him take the picture of his injured hand with his own phone, which he in turn took it to CW2 to develop and in another breath, CW2 stated that he took the photograph with his digital camera of over 11 years. The question that springs out from this issue is, is the mode of procurement of exhibit OB material to this suit as to affect the cause of justice or differently put is exhibit OB in breach of Section 83 of the Evidence Act? I answer in the negative as the method of procuring exhibit OB is infinitesimal to the substance of this suit, whether or not exhibit OB is tendered does not affect the cause of justice in this case, the said exhibit as stated earlier merely depicts the extent of the injury of the claimant and nothing more. Also that the tendering of the said exhibit OB has not in any way offended the rules of the Evidence Act. The question of whether or not it was taken by the claimant himself or by Blessing or another cannot impeach the authenticity of the photographs. This is merely a technical issue for which the Court has been guided against in the cause of dispensing justice. It is true that the prime of technicality are far gone! It is equally true that at the present time, the Courts are more concerned with rendering substantial justice to the parties on the merit or otherwise of the claims before the Court. The Courts now deal more with the weightier matters of substantial justice than allowing technical or even trifling matters to ride roughshod over and above substantial justice. See the cases of UBA v Ashimina [2018] LPELR 43858 CA; Jeric Nigeria Ltd v. Union Bank Nig Plc. [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 477; Chief Adebili Adegbuyi v. All Progressives Congress & Ors [2013] LPELR 22799 (CA). Niki Tobi(JSC) (Blessed memory) in Samuel Ayo Omoju v. FRN [2008]ALL FWLR (Pt.415) 1656 at1671-1672 paras. G-B; espoused on doing substantial justice in all cases quipped thus-

Substantial justice, which is actual and concrete justice, is justice personified. It is secreted in the elbows of cordial and fair jurisprudence with a human face and understanding. It is excellent to follow in our law. It pays to follow it as it brings invaluable dividends in any legal system anchored or predicated on the rule of law…

In that case the trial Judge used the word “Nigerian instead of “National” according to the appellant in that case, the Act as cited by the Judge does not exist. His Lordship went on to state that “I am not at all ready for that type of technicality. Let us leave it for the game of chess which players win by technicalities and craftiness. Courts of law have long moved away from the domain or terrain of doing technical justice to doing substantial justice. This is because technical justice, in reality, is not justice but a caricature of it. It is justice in inverted comas and not justice synonymous with the principles of equity and fair play. Caricatures are not the best presentations or representations” 

Aside the position of the Courts as captured in the above cited decision, statutorily, by Section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, states that “Subject to this Act  and any rules made thereunder, the Court (b) shall be bound by the Evidence Act but may depart from it in the interest of justice”  This Court by this provision is given the power to exercise its discretion in upholding substantial justice against technical justice. Where both law and equity conflict, the Court is empowered to allow substantial justice to prevail and depart from the provision of the Evidence Act. Therefore, in the exercise of my discretion under Section 12(2)(b) of NICA 2006, regarding exhibit OB, I make a departure from the provisions Section 83(3)-(4) of the Evidence Act in the overall interest of justice of this case, by resolving this issue in favour of the claimants. My position is further strengthened by the fact that the defendant is not contesting the fact that the 1st claimant had an industrial accident in its premises in their cause of employment with its Company which resulted in an injury. It is premised upon this that I discountenance with the argument of learned defence counsel and dismiss same. I so hold.

It is learned claimants’ counsel contention at paragraph 17 of their written address that exhibits RO and Exhibits J1-J4 tendered by DW1 and DW2 are inadmissible in law because the makers of those documents were not disclosed and no proper foundation was laid before they were admitted in law in line with Section 83(1) and (2) (a) and (b). Learned counsel contended that the documents are unsigned documents thus worthless and inadmissible. He continued that exhibit J1 was made after the accidents of the claimants and hence irrelevant to this suit. The defendants on its part stated by paragraph 4.1.28 of its final address that exhibit J1-J4 are photocopies of pleaded documents on whose foundation was laid by DW2. He stated that the documents were never controverted by the claimant in their pleadings and evidence thus they are legally admissible.

Exhibits RO and J1-J4 in issue are the disengagement and the store requisition forms. The general rule as to who can tender documentary evidence is that documentary evidence should be tendered through its maker. This is because the maker of such documents can validly answer the questions put forward with regards to the documents so his attendance may be necessary to facilitate cross-examination. See Section 91 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also the cases of Statoil Nig. Ltd v. Inducon Nig. Ltd [2014] 9 NWLR (Pt 1411) (P. 94, Paras, A-B). It is not however, at all times that documentary evidence must be tendered by the maker, as the person to whom it is made can also produce it in Court. If it can be shown to the Court by the person seeking to tender same that the maker of the document is dead or unfit by reason of his body or mental condition; that the presence of the maker of the document may also be excused if he is overseas or if it is not reasonably practicable to call him to tender the document in view of attendant expense.  Obaseki, JSC (of blessed memory) in the case of Torti v Ukpabi [1984] 1 SCNLR 214 at 227-228 held thus “…. Where a document is admissible, the issue of proper custody is irrelevant to the issue of admissibility. I would state the principle in reverse, i.e. if a document is inadmissible, the fact of production from proper custody will not make it admissible. A document must be relevant to be admissible. Its production from proper custody goes to weight to be attached to the piece of evidence. If it is from proper custody, it is presumed to be genuine if evidence of execution and identity is not available. If this evidence of execution and identity is available, the evidence of proper custody adds nothing to the weight to be attached to the piece of evidence and if absent, cannot adversely affect the admissibility of the document. There is no general rule of law in civil as well as in criminal cases that evidence which is relevant is excluded merely by the way in which it has been obtained”. See also the cases of Bello v. Ringim (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 206) 668 decided in the Court in appeal No. CA/K/25/90; Alaribe v Okwuonu [2016] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1492) 41 and Omega Bank Plc v. O.B.C Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547. It is obvious that DW1 by his sworn deposition dated 24th March, 2016 at paragraph 26 stated that the author of exhibit J2 dated (21/09/11, 9/9/11, 8/9/11 and 10/10/11) and J3 one Abe Odunayo who is now in Lagos and this to me means that it will be impracticable to call the said Abe Odunayo taking into consideration the cost of transportation and accommodation for the period in which she ought to present her evidence. In the case of 7up Bottling Company Plc v Emmanuel [2013] LPELR 21104 CA the Court of Appeal underscoring the purpose of Section 91 of the Evidence Act relied on the case of Flash Fixed Odds Ltd v Akatugbua [2001] 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 46, where Tobi JCA (as he then was) held as follows  “…. A closer look at the above finding of his Lordship shows that he is not oblivious of the fact that there may arise occasions when it may be impracticable to get the maker of the document to appear for purposes of tendering same hence the proviso “if a person who did not make the document tenders it, (and he can)….” Thus pursuant to Section 91 of the Evidence Act, a document made by a person can be admitted in evidence through another person in specified circumstances and in such circumstances the Court has a duty to consider the probative value to be attached to such documentary evidence before coming to conclusion as to whether or not it establishes the facts stated therein”

From the above, it is right to state and contrary to the argument of the claimants that Exhibits RO and J1-J4 can be admissible irrespective of whether or not the maker was called as a witness by Section 91 of the Evidence Act supra.  More so, the documents in question are relevant as they seek to substantiate the defendant pleadings and to convince the Court that it indeed provided for some safety gadgets for the claimants during the course of their employment. What more, exhibit RO was tendered by DW1 one of the signatories to the said document. The question here and in this instant is not to establish the negligence of the defendants but that they are relevant and they support the pleading of the defendant with regards to their defence that it provided safety equipment for the claimant. The weight to attach to the document is a different ballgame to be decided by the Court later in this judgment. It is in the light of this, that I find that exhibits RO and J1-J4 is relevant to the fact in issue and thus forms part of the record of this Court. I so hold.

With regards to the further arguments of the claimants that exhibit J and J1-J4 are unsigned documents and should thus be held to be worthless and inadmissible. Defendant counsel argued that the said exhibits disclose that the 1st claimant collected hard hat overall and safety shoe. Also that the store requisition form dated 10/07/2013 shows that the 1st claimant indeed collected both welder and general hand gloves from the defendants before the accident. It is notable that exhibit J-J4 are the PPE Issuance, the Store requisition, receipts, site report sheet. It is equally noted that exhibit J1 (dated 12/07/2013) was made before the accident of the 1st claimant in 2015 but after the accident of the 2nd claimant. However, all the other store requisitions were made after the accident which cast doubts in the mind of the Court as to its authenticity. An indepth perusal of documents reveal that they are plain sheet of paper and has no nexus to the defendant, i.e. not on the defendant’s letter head paper. The official receipt were signed, i.e. exhibit J2. Exhibit J3 is also a sheet of paper called site sheet it is unsigned and has no link to the defendant. While exhibit J4 is a signed letter written by the defendant to the claimant’s counsel. A careful study of the documents show that the name and signature of the issuing officer that is the Store/Maintenance officer was not stated with respect to Exhibit J1 and the custody where exhibit J emanated from in the office of the defendant was not stated. In the case of Uzokwelu v. PDP & Ors [2018] LPELR- 43737CA, The law is settled that an unsigned document is a worthless paper. It is inadmissible and where admitted, it cannot be relied upon by the Court to resolve any controversy between the parties as no weight or probative value can be attached to an unsigned document.” Per BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A.  The Supreme Court in Omega Bank (Nig) Plc v. O.B.C. Ltd. [2005] 8 NWLR (Part 928) 547 at 587 Paragraphs C – D per Tobi, JSC (as he then was) the Apex Court held inter alia that:-“…It is my view that where a document is not signed, it may not be admitted in evidence. Even if it is admitted in evidence, the Court should not attach any probative value to it. This is because a document which is not signed has no origin in terms of its maker….at page 582 Paragraph A, His Lordship, Tobi, JSC of blessed memory further emphasized that:” A document which is not signed  does not have any efficacy in law. As held in the cases examined, the document is worthless and a worthless document cannot be efficacious….” see the case of United Investments Ltd v Registrar of Titles, Lagos State & Ors [2016] LPELR 41406 CA. A cue from the above decisions, shows clearly that an unsigned documents are worthless and should not merit any probative value at all. Same goes to documents procured after the accrual of the cause of action. It will be unreasonable for one to agree with the defendant that the claimants obtained safety equipment after the industrial accident sustained on 7th September, 2011 and 16th January 2015 respectively. It all cast serious doubt in the mind of the Court as to the authenticity of those documents. Consequently, I find and hold that exhibits J, J1 and J3 are unsigned documents, has no nexus or link to the defendant, they are thus unreliable, worthless piece of papers, and thus discountenanced and expunged from the record of this Court. While exhibits J2 and J4 are signed documents, to which probative value can be attached.

Now, to the crux of this suit, it is right to state that the essential element of the Claimants claim and the reliefs sought before this Court bothers on the alleged negligent act of the defendant to take adequate care of them whilst in the employ of the defendant, it is not at variance that they sustained injuries while working for the defendant. Their claim hinges on a breach of duty of care of the claimant by the 1st defendant which is a tortious act of negligence. An important question to ask at this stage is, was the claimant’s accident caused by the negligence of the defendant? Negligence is the omission or failure to do something which a reasonable man under similar circumstances can do, or the doing of something which a reasonable or prudent man would not do. More often than not, Negligence in civil matters occur in form of a breach of duty to take care. See the case of Chukwuma & ors v Awoh [2018] LPELR 44830 CA. The Court of Appeal in Musa v. Nigerian Army [2016] LPELR-41595 (CA) has explained negligence as carelessness, disregard, default inadvertence, indifference, inattention, laxity, omission, oversight, shortcoming, slackness, remissness, dereliction, heedlessness, forgetfulness and thoughtlessness”, the Court noted that the term denotes culpable carelessness on a person’s part. By Union bank v. Estate of Late Clement Ogeh [2018] LPELR-46701CA; the proof of the existence of a duty of care, its breach and resultant damages is a sine qua non for a successful claim in negligence. In all cases in which damages is being claimed for negligence the Court is to bear it in mind that negligence is a matter of or question of fact and not law and thus a finding as of fact of the act of omission or commission of the defendant must first be made before damages could be assessed. See also M. O. Kanu & Sons Co. Ltd v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2006) LPELR 1797 (SC) cited in Ogeh’s case supra. It has been consistently held in judicial pronouncements by both the Court of appeal and the Apex Court that in an action for negligence, the claimant will not succeed by merely making allegations of negligence against the defendant. The claimant must as of necessity plead and give full particulars of the items of the negligence relied on in evidence. So the claimant has the duty to itemize the particulars of negligence and bring out the facts which exposes the fault or liability of the defendant. See again Union Bank v. Estate of Late Clement Ogeh, supra;  Hi Tech Construction Ltd v. Onomuaborigho[2018] LPELR- 45193CA; A G Leventis Nig Plc V. Chief Christian Akpu (2007) 6 SC (Pt. 1) 239 or (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1063) 416. I agree with the defence that until the claimants can prove by both cogent and credible evidence the actual breach of the duty of care, the action must fail, see the case of UTB v. Ozoemena, supra. The authorities are replete that a successful plea of negligence consists of proving the trivet issues of duty, breach and subsequent damages. In the case of GKF Investment Nigeria Ltd v. Nigerian Telecommunications Plc [2009] 15 NWLR (Pt 1164) 34, it is settled that the particulars of the pleading the breach of a duty of care is required as stated supra and it can neither be assumed or indirect; where there is no real duty to be exercised by the defendants, negligence will have no limbs to stand and any claim articulated thereon will fail.

A follow up question now is have the claimants established before this Court that the defendant owed them a duty of care that was not exercised which caused the injury they sustained? There is no controversy that the injury for which the claimants based their claims upon in this Court was sustained in the cause of working for the defendant. It is the 1st claimant’s contention that he was employed as a crusher mechanic. That on the 16th of January, 2015 while working in the crusher, the conveyor belt stopped and he was asked to change the new belt, and while working on the conveyor, the electrician, one Mr Lawrence switched on the machine when his hand was still on the conveyor which made it roll, thereby severing one of the fingers to his right hand and the second finger, seriously wounded. The 2nd claimant by his testimony was employed as a caterpillar mechanic and on the 7th of September, 2011, he was sent by his supervisor one Mr. Albert Mhadji to go and work on one of the Caterpillars used by the defendant for their work, which he obeyed without any safety gadget provided for him. That when he was done, he climbed into the back seat of the caterpillar but unfortunately the driver of the caterpillar drove off, which made him to slip and his leg entered into one of the components of the caterpillar. That in the process of trying to get his leg out from the component, the last toe at his right leg got severed. Claimants by paragraph 39 (A-H) of their amended statement of claims stated that the defendant refused/failed to provide them with safety gadget needed for their work and which could avoid the accidents they sustained. The defendant on the other hand posited that the 1st claimant is a trained mechanic and infact the senior supervisor in the production/crushing department of the defendant that he is the same person who usually gives advice and instructions to the subordinate workers under him on safety measures while at their workplace. They continued that the 1st claimant wilfully refused to use any of the safety gadget provided for him by the defendants. According to the defendant, 1st claimant also failed or refused to obey the instructions or warning by the panel operator that he should not attempt to change the conveyor belt of the crusher machine when the power source is/was still on. They also averred that the 2nd claimant was provided with safety gadgets and that he failed to use the safety gadgets, particularly the protective boots provided for him by the defendants. That the dumper truck on which the 2nd claimant worked has only a driver seat and does not have a back seat at all and that the 2nd claimant willfully hung onto the dumper truck while it was in operation against warnings by his superior and co-workers not to do so.

The law is of common that the scope of an employer’s duty to its employee to take reasonable care for the safety of his workman and other employee in the course of their employment, this duty extends in particular to the safety of place of work, the plant and machinery and the method and conduct of work. Duty of care as an act or omission, has its origin on the concept of foreseeability as decided in the old case of Heaven v. Pencher (1983) 11 QBD 503 at 509 where Bret M.R. said “Whenever one person is by circumstance placed in such a position with regard to another, that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to the circumstances he would cause danger, injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care skill and avoid such danger.” See also the Nigerian case of Societe Bancaire (NIG.) Ltd. V. Margarida Saluado De LLUCH [2004] 9-12 SCNJ (Pt.1) 143. By the authorities of Kabo Air Limited v. Mohammed [2014]LPELR-23614; Ojo v. Gharoro [2006] 5 M.J SC 28; IITA v. Amrani [1994] 3 NWLR, PT. 332, 296;. it is the duty of a Company at common law, not to only provide safety protective equipment to its employees but most importantly to ensure that they are used by strict order and under effective supervision, see also the case of Western Nigeria Trading Company Ltd v. Busari Ajao [1965] NMLR 178. Statutorily, Section 23 of the Factory’s Act Cap F1 LFN 2007, provides:

No person should be employed or allowed to work on any machine of process liable to cause bodily injury, unless he has been fully instructed as the dangers likely to arise in connection therewith and the precautions to be taken or observed, or must be under adequate supervisions of a person who has a thorough knowledge and experience of the machine.”

It is evident from the above highlighted provision supra that there is onerous responsibility/obligation on the employer of labour to put adequate safety measures in place to ensure protection, health and well-being of their employees in the course of their employment relationship. See the notorious case on the subject, Green Pack Rubber Ind. Ltd v. Ossai [2004] 2 FWLR (PT. 194) 668. The claimants in prove of their claim that the defendant was in breach of their duty of care called in the evidence of CW3 one Eze Kingsley, CW4 one Aminu Saliu and CW5 one Joseph Enahoro who are now former staff of the defendant but were in the employment of the defendant prior to the incident. They averred by their sworn deposition dated 13th of January, 2016 that safety gadgets were not provided by the defendant to its workers despite several demands made by them. CW3 also stated under cross-examination that the defendant did not give them safety or protective gadgets and the 2nd claimant had to buy one for himself. The CW3, CW6 and CW7 stated that the defendant gave them safety gadget after the accident occurred. The defendant in prove of its defence tendered exhibit RO and J5 which are the disengagement form where it is seen that the claimants upon disengagement returned the following items, safety shoes, hard hat and coverall on the 21st of September, 2015. (This was after the accident.).

CW4 and CW5 corroborated the testimony of the claimants by stating that the person who operated the machine that injured the 1st claimant was not a qualified operator but an electrician one Mr Lawrence and as such that the defendant was negligent to have replaced the former panel operator with an electrician. The defendants by exhibit J5 averred that the said Mr. Lawrence is qualified and experienced electrician cum panel operator. By paragraphs 4, 5 and 9 of the claimants reply to the defendant statement of defence the 1st claimant averred that “4. … that he was provided with safety boot, cover all and helmets by the defendant but rather, it was the defendant electrician that acted negligently when he switched on the machine while the claimant was still working on it. 5. … that safety measures was always followed when the defendant produces the safety gadget. 9. The 2nd claimant denies the allegation of the defendant … and further aver that they are false as no safety gadget were made a vailable for him and the one he was using before he got injured was bought by him and that after he got injured that was when the defendant provided the safety gadgets”

It is apparent from the above testimony of the 1st claimant that he admitted that he was issued boots, gown and helmet, but that the accident occurred because of the negligent act of the electrician who switched on the machine without alerting him, resulting in the injury he sustained. Now, was the electrician a qualified personnel to operate the machine? CW4 and CW5 by their sworn deposition have averred that the person who operated the machine that injured the claimant was not a qualified operator but an electrician and also there is nothing on record stating the qualification of the operator of the machine. What is before the Court are just statement under cross-examination made by DW1 and DW2 where they both stated that the electrician who operated the machine on the day of accident is a qualified panel operator but holds dual position in the establishment of the defendant as an electrician and panel operator and nothing more. It is the statement of the 1st claimant under cross-examination that “when we shot the machine down, I told him that I wanted to work on the conveyor belt and there was no light, we then put on the gen and I told Mr. Lawrence that anytime the gen set is on, he should not put on any machine, he then said he had heard”. I find it difficult to believe DWs assertion that the said Mr. Lawrence was a qualified panel operator, if he is, he would know that he was not supposed to put on the machine while the claimant was working on it. The 1st claimant’s injury was sustained because the electrician cum panel operator switched on the machine while the claimant was still working on it, otherwise, one cannot explain the hooking of the claimant’s finger inside a stationary/immobile machine if not on the carelessness of the said qualified electrician who switched it on. It is equally obvious that the defendant failed to give the claimants hand cloves, to protect first claimant’s hands. In the case of Davie v New Merton Board Mills Ltd [1958] 1QB 210 at 237-238 Parke LJ held “The duty owed by a master to his servant at common law can be stated in general terms as a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of his servants… if the master delegates… the performance of the duty to another he remains liable for the failure of that other to exercise reasonable care… this principle holds good whether the person employed by the master is a servant, a full time agent or an independent contractor”. See also the case of Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co. [1873] LR 8 CP 148, 42 LJCP 78, LT 366 where it was observed that; “Where a servant is acting within the scope of his employment, and so acting does something negligent or wrongful, the employer is liable even though the acts done may be the very reverse of that which the servant was actively directed to do.” See further Limpus v. London General Omnibus co. Ltd. [1862] 1 H & C 526, 32 LJEX 34, 7 LT 641, Warren v. Henlys Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 955, [1948] WN 449. From the foregoing, it is clear that the defendant does not have a safe working environment for its workers which includes the claimant for it to have in its employment an incompetent and unqualified electrician cum panel operator. There is equally no evidence on record to show that the defendant trained any of its staff on the use of the protective equipment. If it did the said electrician would not have acted negligently as he did. I also found that the defendant failed in its duty to ensure that the claimants used the protective safety gadgets given to them if any at all. The 1st claimant in my calm view and on the balance of probabilities has established before this Court that the defendants owed him a duty of care that was not exercised necessitating/resulting in the injury he sustained. It is obvious from the evidence on record that the defendant was negligent in its relationship with the 1st claimant who was its employee, the result of which he sustained an industrial injury in its employment. Consequent upon which I hold that the 1st claimant has succeeded in making out a case of negligence causing industrial accident/injury against the defendant. I so find and hold.

With respect to the claims of the 2nd claimant that the defendant owed him a duty of care while in its employment stated that he was not given safety gadget to work with until 2015 after his accident in 2011. In prove of his case, he called CW3 and CW4 who stated under cross examination that the defendant did not give them safety gadget and the 2nd claimant bought one for himself. The defendant admitting this argued that the 2nd claimant already has a safety shoe whether provided for by the defendant or not but that he neglected or failed to use or wear it in the day of the accident, that if he had worn it, the injury he sustained would have been avoided as the summary of his case is “when he decided to climb into the back seat of the caterpillar which was confirmed to have no back seat but a railing, the defendant should not be held liable.” The question to answer here is, does the fact that the 2nd claimant has a safety shoe absolve the defendant from exercising its duty of care to the 2nd claimant? I believe the answer is in the negative as the principle of Negligence is one of a strict liability, the principle of duty of care on the employer, does not shift except where it has done all that is necessary in ensuring the safety of the employee, the employee fails to comply. This is a matter of fact, which has to be proven by the employer. Assuming but I am not conceding that the 2nd claimant as contended by the defendant that he failed to wear the boots he bought for himself on the day of the accident, what appropriate sanctions measures has the defendant put in place to ensure that erring staff on safety measures comply to the standard of safety precautions rules, none to the knowledge of this Court. To provide a safety equipment without ensuring the use of it by the employer, is like a cripple who requires a wheel chair to move around, has a wheel chair but could not use it because there is no one to put him on it or drive him around with it. The defendant in this suit has relied on exhibit RO defendant disengagement form in defence of their case that it provided safety gadget for the 2nd claimant. A careful study of the exhibit discloses that it was procured after the accident, secondly, it has nothing on it to prove that 2nd claimant was given any protective gadgets. What I found on it is safety shoes and hard hat. It has failed to canvass evidence to prove that the 2nd claimant was given safety equipment and was strictly instructed to wear them before the accident rather it aligns with the evidence of CW3 when he stated that they were issued safety tools after the accident of the claimants. The defendant has not vide any scintilla of evidence revealed to this Court that it was not negligent to relieve it of its liability. The general requirement of the law where there exists a service relationship between employer and employee is that the former is under a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of the latter in all the circumstances of the case so as not to expose him to an unnecessary risk. The level of this duty is the same as that of the employer’s common law duty of care in the law of negligence. See the case of Kabo Air Ltd v Mohammed supra. It is on this premise that I find that the defendant breached the duty of care it owed the 2nd claimant and is equally liable in Negligence. I so hold.

As regards the 1st claimant’s claim for N1,000,000,000.00 (One billion Naira) only as compensation for the 1st claimant for the negligent acts of the defendant leading to the severance of his finger; the sum of N500, 000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) only as compensation for the severance of the toe of the 2nd claimant by virtue of the negligence of the defendant and the sum of N500, 000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) only as compensation for the personal injury caused the 3rd claimant by reason of the negligence of the defendant. I have held that the defendant breached its duty of care to the 1st and 2nd claimants are they entitled to compensation as they claim? The law is that, issue of payment of compensation is a serious matter. It is always a head claim of its own. A party who claims for compensation has to lead evidence to prove same before a Court can decide whether to grant or not. No Court is allowed to award compensation to a party just for the asking as the Court is not a Father Christmas. In the English case of Greif (UK) Ltd & Anor. v Sienkiewicz (Administratix of Estate of Enid Costello Deceased) & Anor [2011] LPELR – 17792 (UKSC), the Supreme Court of England said: “It is a basic principle of the law of tort that Claimant will only have cause of action if he can prove on balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s tortious conduct caused the damage in respect of which compensation is claimed. He must show that, but not for the defendant’s tortious conduct, he would not have suffered the damage…” see also the case of SPDC (Nig) Ltd v Nwagbara [2018] LPELR 43732 CA. The claimants have led credible evidence to evince the fact that they were injured in the cause of their employment with the defendant, they have equally shown to the Court that they expended some amount of money on medical treatment. It is in the light of this that I find that the 1st and 2nd claimant are entitled to compensation for the breach of duty of care owed to them by the defendant which resulted in the injury they suffered. I believe that no monetary award can return back their body part severed as it were, however, it will not be out of place to award a certain reasonable compensation in the circumstance to enable them take care of themselves and family, what is reasonable is the sum of N2, 500,000,000 ( Two Million, Five hundred thousand Naira) each as compensation to the 1st and 2nd claimants, I find protection in Section 19(d) of National Industrial Court Act, 2006 which empowers this Court to in the circumstances of this case award compensation. Accordingly, I award the sum of N2,500,000,000 (Two million, five hundred thousand Naira) each as compensation to the 1st and 2nd claimants. I so find and hold.

With respect to the claim of the 3rd claimant (now deceased). It is clear from the record of Court dated 28th of June, 2018 that the 3rd claimant in this suit is deceased and this Court by an application made on his behalf by counsel, struck out the name of the 3rd claimant. This is in view of the trite position of the law that a dead person ceases to have any legal personality from the moment of death and in such a case can neither sue nor be sued. However the exception to the general principle is where the cause of action survives the death of a party, such action cannot be terminated by the death of either party. Crbrda v Sule [2001] 6 NWLR, (PT 708), 194 AT 204. The above principle is tied around the latin maxim “action personalis moritur cum parsona” which means a personal right of action dies with the person. The Incorporated Trustees of the Jamat-ul-Muslimeen Council of Lagos & ors v Honourable Chief T.A Bankole Oki & ors [2010] 1 NWLR (PT 1176) 616 at 624. This is because the 3rd claimant’s claims are in personam which would require the presence of the claimant now deceased for the prosecution of this suit without which there cannot be any legal decision validly reached. It is upon this premise that I dismiss the claim of the 3rd claimant.

The claimants have claimed the sum of N1,000,000,000.00 (One billion Naira) each for the physical indescribable pains suffered by the claimants as a result of injuries sustained by them by virtue of the negligence of the defendant. Having earlier awarded the claimants the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) as Compensation for the injury they sustained in this judgment, I cannot grant a separate claim for pain, since the injury as a matter of course resulted in pain for which I have awarded compensation. It will therefore amount to double compensation to the claimants if I resolve this claim in favour of the claimants. It is upon this basis that I find and hold that claimants’ claim for N1B fails.

In all, I find that claimant’s case succeeds in the most part and thus I make these declarations and orders-

  1. That the claimants have succeeded in making out a case of negligence causing industrial accident/injury against the defendant.
  2. That the claimants are entitled to compensation from the defendant for the injuries they sustained while in the employ of the defendant.
  3. That the claimants are entitled to the sum of N2,500,000 (Two Million, five hundred thousand Naira) each to be paid by the defendant.
  4. That the 3rd claimant (now deceased) claims fail.
  5. That the claimants claim for the sum of N1,000,000,000.00 (One billion Naira) for the physical indescribable pains suffered by the claimants fail.
  6. All the judgment sums are to be paid within 30 days failing which it is to attract 10% interest per annum.

I award N50,000 each as cost to the claimants.

Judgment is accordingly entered.

 

 

Hon. Justice Oyewumi Oyebiola O.

Presiding Judge

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