OYEDOTUN & ORS v. AWOTAYO & ANOR
(2020)LCN/15284(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(AKURE JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Wednesday, June 17, 2020
CA/AK/188/2018
Before Our Lordships:
Mohammed Ambi-Usi Danjuma Justice of the Court of Appeal
Ridwan Maiwada Abdullahi Justice of the Court of Appeal
Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. H.R.M. OBA ABDUL-WAHAB KAYODE OYEDOTUN (THE ORANGUN OF ILA) 2. CHIEF BURAIMO ADEGBOYEGA (THE OBAAFA OF ILA) 3. CHIEF OYEKUNLE OLADIMEJI ADENIYI (THE OBAALE OF ILA) 4. CHIEF JAMES EBO AJITERU (THE OBAARO OF ILA) 5. CHIEF AKINLOYE OYEBANJI (THE OBASINKIN OF ILA) 6. CHIEF R. A. ADEDAPO (THE ELEMONA OF ILA) 7. CHIEF LASISI BABALOLA ANIFOWOSE (THE AGBERI OF ILA) 8. CHIEF JIMOH ESUDIPE (THE OBALUMO OF ILA) 9. CHIEF KAREEM SUNDAY (THE OBAJISUN OF ILA) 10. CHIEF OLUSEGUN IDOWU OLADOSU (FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF GANGANGUNGUN BRANCH OF OBAJOKO RULING HOUSE OF ILA-ORANGUN) APPELANT(S)
And
1. ALHAJI HAMED AWOTAYO 2. MR. MURAINA AGBOLADE (FOR THEMSELVES AND ON BEHALF OF ABAEDORO BRANCH OF OBAJOKO RULING HOUSE OF ILA-ORANGUN) RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT ONLY NATURAL PERSONS CAN SUE AND BE SUED
As a general principle of law, only natural persons, that is human beings and juristic or artificial persons such as body corporate are competent to sue and be sued. ATAGUBA & CO V GURA NIG LTD (2005) 8 NWLR, PT. 927, 429, REGT TRUSTEES OF THE AIRLINE OPERATORS V NAMA (2015) 8 NWLR, PT 1408, 1 and UBA PLC V GOSTAR INVESTMENT CO LTD (2018) LPELR – 44886 (CA). The rationale behind this principle understandably is that law suits are the determination of legal rights and obligations in any given situation. Therefore only such natural and juristic persons in whom the rights and obligations can be vested are capable of being proper parties to law suits before Courts of law. PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
In a hierarchical judicial system like we have in Nigeria, the doctrine of stare decisis as the concept is sometimes called precludes the judges of subordinate Courts from altering what has been determined by a higher Court. In other words, it helps to keep the scale of justice even, steady and predictable and not liable to waiver to the whims and caprices of every judge. The concept makes for consistency of the judicial system, enabling strong judicial policy which provides for an orderly and reliable development of legal rules. See the cases of ADESOKAN V ADETUNJI (1994) 5 NWLR, PT. 345, 540; OKEKE V OKOLI (2000) 1 NWLR, PT. 642, 641, OSAKUE V FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ASABA (2010) 10 NWLR, PT. 1201, 1 and DALHATU V TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR, PT. 843, 310. PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
DUTY OF THE COURT IN INTERPRETING A STATUTE
This is that in interpreting a statute, the words therein must be given their natural ordinary and grammatical meaning. BUHARI & ANOR V OBASANJO & ORS (2005) 13 NWLR, PT. 941, 1. To give the interpretation sought by the Appellants in this case to include reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) under SECTION 22(3) of the Law will in the words of TOBI JSC in ARAKA V EGBUE (2003) MJSC, 17, amount to going “outside the words in the statute in search of an interpretation which is convenient to the Court or to the parties or one of the parties….”PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.
PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Respondents, plaintiffs in the Court below, by a writ of summons dated 09/04/2014 and filed on the 10/04/2014 sought the following reliefs against the defendants/appellants:-
(i) Declaration that the Obajoko Ruling House of Obajoko Chieftaincy of Ila-Orangun consist of three branches namely:-
(i) Abaedoro;
(ii) Apaatu; and
(iii) Gangangungun
(ii) Declaration that under the native law and custom of Obajoko Ruling House of Ila-Orangun the Chieftaincy position of Obajoko of Ila-Orangun is rotational among the said three branches of Obajoko Ruling House of Ila-Orangun.
(iii) Declaration that it is now the turn of Abaedoro branch of Obajoko Ruling House of Ila-Orangun to present a candidate to fill the vacant position of Obajoko of Ila-Orangun after the demise of the last occupant of the said position, Late Chief James Ayanda Oladosu from Gangangungun branch of Obajoko Ruling House of Ila-Orangun who died sometimes in March, 2013.
(iv) Declaration that the purported appointment and installation of the 12th Defendant by the 1st – 11th Defendants as the Obajoko of Ila-Orangun is not in accordance with the native law and custom of Obajoko Ruling House of Ila-Orangun and therefore is null and void.
(v) Perpetual injunction restraining the 12th Defendant from further parading himself or holding himself out as the Obajoko of Ila-Orangun.
(vi) Perpetual injunction restraining the 1st – 11th Defendants from recognizing or continue to recognize the 12th Defendant as the Obajoko of Ila-Orangun.
The claim of the Respondents stemmed from the appointment and installation of the 10th Defendant/Appellant as Obajoko of Ila-Orangun after the demise of Late Chief James Oladosu the last holder of the chieftaincy title sometimes in March, 2013. The case of the Respondents was that Obajoko Ruling House which is responsible for producing the Obajoko Chieftaincy of Ila-Orangun consists of three branches: Abaedore (2) Apaatu and (3) Gangangungun. That the chieftaincy position of Obajoko of Ila-Orangun is rotational and it was the turn of the Abaedoro branch to produce the next obajoko of Ila-Orangun upon the demise of the last Obajoko, Chief James Ayanda Oladosu from Gangangungun branch. In making out their case further, the respondents traced the history of the Obajoko Chieftaincy title to one Ontimeyin Awoyemi who came from Ojoko Compound, Ipee, Kwara State to found the present Obajoko compound in Ila-Orangun and was installed as the Obajoko of Ila-Orangun by Orangun Igbonnibi. That the said Ontimeyin Awoyemi had two children, Apaatu Awopetu and Fatimeyin Abaedoro and a brother, Jojolade Orisadaisi Gangangungun. That the chieftaincy is a joint entitlement of these three branches who constitute the ruling house. The Respondents contended that the ascension to the chieftaincy by these three branches was on rotational basis.
The Defendants/Appellants on their part contended that only the 10th Appellant’s family, Jojolade Gangangungun has the exclusive right to the chieftaincy title and that the title had never rotated with the Respondents’ family.
In proof of their case, the Plaintiffs/Respondents called five witnesses and tendered five exhibits marked as Exhibits A-E. The Defendants/Appellants called four witnesses and tendered three exhibits marked as Exhibits F-H. In the course of the hearing, the learned trial judge asked both parties to address the Court on its jurisdiction in the matter in view of SECTION 22 of the CHIEFS LAW CAP 25, LAWS OF OSUN STATE, 2002. At the conclusion of hearing, the learned trial judge Hon. Justice A. L. Adegoke of the Osun State High Court sitting in Ila-Orangun in a judgment delivered on the 08/01/2018 gave judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents in respect of reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) and struck out reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) for being premature and incompetent pursuant to SECTION 22 of the CHIEFS LAW, CAP 25, LAWS OF OSUN STATE, 2002.
Dissatisfied with this judgment, the Appellants have appealed to this Court on the following six grounds:
1. The Learned trial Judge erred in law by holding that the Plaintiffs’ omission to put the words “members of” before the expressions “Abaedero Branch of Obajoko Ruling house of Ila-Orangun” in the representative capacity of the plaintiffs on the heading of the writ of summons and other accompanying processes in the suit is a mere misnomer or misdescription not sufficient to render the plaintiffs’ suit not properly constituted.
2. The Learned trial Judge erred in law in holding that the Plaintiffs’ failure to make representation to the Osun State Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs to seek for nullification or setting aside of the decision of the 1st Defendant approving the appointment of the 10th Defendant as Obajoko of Ila-Orangun as mandatorily required by Section 22(4) Cap 25 Chiefs Law of Osun State 2002 could not affect reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Plaintiffs before the lower Court; when there was evidence before the Court that the three reliefs were engendered by dispute over Obajoko of Ila Chieftaincy title, a minor Chieftaincy under the provisions of the Chiefs law of Osun State, 2002, and thereby came to a wrong conclusion in law.
3. The Learned trial Judge erred in law in holding that – “having studied the claims of the plaintiffs in this suit, I agree with the submission of the plaintiffs’ Counsel that the provisions of Section 22 of the Chiefs Law can only affects (sic) reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) of the Plaintiffs. I hereby hold that this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) of the Plaintiffs claims challenging the appointment of the 10th Defendant as Obajoko of Ila Orangun as the Plaintiffs have not exhausted statutory local remedies provided in the Chiefs Laws before instituting the action for the said claims. Relief(s) (iv), (v) and (vi) of the Plaintiffs claim are hereby struck out. I now proceed to deal with the claims in reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the statement of claim”; when the Court also lacks jurisdiction to entertain reliefs (i) to (iii) of the Plaintiffs and thereby came to a wrong conclusion which has occasioned miscarriage of justice.
4. The Learned trial Judge misdirected himself in law and reached a wrong conclusion in law in holding that – “I therefore hold the view that the preponderance of evidence provided by Exhibits ‘A’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’ and ‘H’ in this suit makes the narration of the Plaintiffs more credible and probable on this issue. In the circumstance the rule in KOJO II VS BONSIE Supra will not apply. I also hold the view that while Exhibit ‘F’ established the fact that there is only one ruling house called Obajoko Ruling House of Ila Orangun and in (sic) comprises of three branches namely (a) Gangangungun Jojolade (b) Apaatu and (c) Abaedero, Exhibit ‘A’ confirmed the said number of branches and that the aforementioned three branches are entitled to the said Obajoko Chieftaincy title in order of rotation.
I hereby grant reliefs (i), (ii), and (iii) in their entirety”; when the evidence of traditional histories adduced by both Plaintiffs and Defendants in proof of their respective assertions on the entitlement or non entitlement of the Plaintiffs to Obajoko of Ila Chieftaincy title were not considered, or evaluated at all by the trial judge before proceeding to examination of Exhibits ‘A’, ‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ upon which he based his judgment; and thereby occasioned miscarriage of justice.
5. The Lower Court erred in law in not holding the evidence of traditional history adduced by the Defendants in proof of the 10th Defendant’s claim of exclusive right to Obajoko of Ila Chieftaincy title more probable than evidence of traditional history adduced by the Plaintiffs in proof of their Claim of right to the Chieftaincy title when there were cogent, uncontradicted and preponderance of evidence of traditional history strengthen (sic) by evidence of facts or acts in recent years adduced by the defendants/appellants before the Court which support the probability of the Defendants/appellants’ claim than that of the Plaintiffs/Respondents.
6. The lower Court gravely erred in law in granting reliefs (i), (ii), and (iii) of the Plaintiffs/Appellants before the lower Court in spite of the obvious and material contradictions, inconsistencies and insufficiency touching on the evidence of traditional history adduced by the Plaintiffs/Respondents in proof of not only their descent, geological or links to Obajoko of Ila Orangun Chieftaincy title but also evidence of facts or acts in recent years adduced by them in respect of their entitlement to Obajoko of Ila Chieftaincy title and thereby came to a wrong conclusion in law which occasioned miscarriage.
Whereof the appellants sought the order of this Court allowing this appeal and setting aside the judgment of the trial Court granting reliefs (i), (ii), and (iii) to the Plaintiffs/Respondents and striking same out.
In prosecuting the appeal, the Appellants filed their brief of argument on the 19/07/2018. In arguing this appeal on the 20/01/2020, MR J. A. Adebisi of counsel for the Appellants adopted the brief as their legal arguments in support of their appeal. In it, Counsel formulated five issues for the determination of the Court, namely:-
i. Whether the learned trial Judge was right not to have held the Plaintiffs/Respondents’ suit not properly constituted and incompetent when “Abaedoro Branch of Obajoko Ruling House of Ila Orangun” on whose behalf they have instituted the suit is not a juristic person that could be so represented in that capacity. (Ground 1).
ii. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have assumed jurisdiction over reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Plaintiffs/Respondents when the three reliefs emanated from a dispute over Obajoko Chieftaincy title a minor Chieftaincy title and the Respondents did not fully exhaust the statutory local remedies provided by Section 22 Cap 25 Chief Law of Osun State 2002 before the institution of the suit. (Grounds 2 and 3)
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iii. Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right by his failure to consider, evaluate and make specific findings of facts on the traditional evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs/Respondents through PW1, PW2, PW4 and PW5 as well as on the vital traditional evidence adduced by the Defendants/Appellants through DW1, DW2, DW3 and DW4. (Ground 4).
iv. Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right not to have dismissed legs (I), (II) and (III) of the Plaintiffs/Respondents’ case when the traditional evidence led by the Plaintiffs in proof of them was inconclusive and improbable as a result of conflict and contradictions in same which the Court failed to resolve. (Ground 6).
v. Whether the Learned Trial Judge was right by his failure to hold the evidence of traditional history adduced by the Defendants/Appellants in proof of their assertion of 10th Defendants exclusive right to Obajoko of Ila Chieftaincy title more probable than the traditional evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs/Respondents in proof of their claim of joint entitlement to same with the 10th Defendant’s family when the traditional evidence of the Defendants/Appellants is strengthened by evidence of facts in recent years which are obviously lacking in the Plaintiffs/Respondents evidence. (Ground 5).
The summary of the submissions of Appellants’ Counsel on these issues is that the decision of the Learned Trial Judge to assume jurisdiction over the matter and grant reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Plaintiffs/Respondents was faulty. This according to Counsel is based on the fact that the suit was instituted on behalf of a non juristic person. Counsel contended that failure on the part of the Plaintiffs/Respondents to first exhaust the statutory local remedies under SECTION 22 CHIEFS LAW, CAP, 25, LAWS OF OSUN STATE, 2002 by taking their grievances in respect of this matter, a minor chieftaincy matter to the Osun State Commissioner for Chieftaincy Matters before the institution of this action renders same incompetent and ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. Counsel submitted that the failure of the trial Judge to consider, evaluate and make specific findings of fact on evidence of traditional histories adduced by both parties was fatal to the case of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. Counsel argued that it was wrong for the Trial Judge to refuse to hold that the traditional evidence led by the Plaintiffs/Respondents in proof of their claim was inconclusive in the face of unresolved conflicts and contradictions contained therein. That it was also wrong for the trial Court to have failed to uphold the evidence of traditional history adduced by the Defendants/Appellants in proof of the 10th Defendants’ right to the Obajoko Chieftaincy title which history was strengthened by evidence of facts in recent memory as more probable and conclusive than that of the Plaintiffs/Respondents’ claim of joint/rotational right to the chieftaincy title. Counsel referred to the case of FASANU V ADEKOYA (1974) 1 ANLR 35, AT 41 to call on this Court to disturb the decision of the trial Court granting the three reliefs to the Plaintiffs/Respondents by striking out same for want of competence and jurisdiction.
MR. Babajide Shiyanbola of Counsel for the Respondent filed their brief of argument on the 16/04/2019. Same was deemed properly filed on the 20/01/2020. Counsel adopted the brief as his legal arguments in opposition to the appeal. In it, Counsel formulated three issues for the determination of the Court:-
1) Whether or not the learned trial judge was right to have held that the omission of the words, “members of” in the description on the title of the suit amounts to mere misdescription or misnomer.”
2) Whether or not the learned trial judge was right to have assumed jurisdiction on reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Plaintiffs/Respondents having struck out reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi).
3) Whether the trial Court properly evaluated the evidence before it in holding that the Plaintiffs/Respondents are in joint entitlement with the 10th defendant’s family to Obajoko of Ila chieftaincy title.
On issue (1), MR Shiyanbola submitted that the omission of “members of” before “Abaedoro Branch of Obajoko Ruling House of Ila-Orangun” in the description of the title of the suit only amounts to mere irregularity, misdescription and/or misnomer. That even though the said words “members of” were inadvertently omitted in the description of the title of the suit, they are contained in the body of the Plaintiffs’ pleading and the Appellants are not misconceived as to the capacity of the Plaintiffs. Counsel referred to the cases of MINISTRY OF WORKS V TOMAS (NIG) LTD (2002) 2 NWLR, PT. 732, 783 and BRITISH – AMERICAN INSURANCE CO LTD V EDEMA SILLO (1993) 2 NWLR, PT. 277, 570 AT 637, RATIO 4 to submit that the justice of a case should not be sacrificed on the altar of technicalities. Counsel referred to the case of EBOH V OGBU (1994) 5 NWLR, PT. 347, 703 to contend that the plaintiffs whose names were mentioned in the writ of summons have legal capacity to sue for themselves apart from suing in a representative capacity for their branch of the ruling house. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents.
On issue (2) Counsel submitted that the reliefs granted by the trial Court are not covered by SECTION 22 of the Chiefs Law of Osun State, not being an issue to determine whether a person appointed as a minor chief has been so appointed in accordance with customary law. That it is only issues that bother on dispute and appointment that are subject to SECTION 22. That the three reliefs granted by the Court were properly granted not being within the provisions of and affected by SECTION 22. Counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents.
On the third and final issue, MR Shiyanbola submitted that the trial judge properly evaluated the said evidence before making his findings that the traditional history of the Respondents was more probable than that of the Appellants. Counsel referred to the cases of NETUFO V OMOOLORUN (2005) 12 NWLR, PT 938, 1 AT 21 PARAS G-H – 22 PARAS F-H, OMOYEMI V ADEKOYA (1998) 6 NWLR, PT. 560, 70 AT 83, PARAS A-E and OMAYE V OMAGU (2008) 8 NWLR, PT. 1087, 477 AT 510, PARAS A-C to contend that where the trial Court has properly evaluated the evidence the appellate Court should not interfere to substitute its views with those of the appellate Court. Counsel urged the Court to also resolve this issue in favour of the respondents and to dismiss this appeal with substantial costs.
I have considered the issues raised by both parties. I can decipher that both sets of issue are saying the same things in different ways issue (1) in both briefs for instance is the same thing. So is issue (2) in both briefs. Issue (3) in both briefs is also basically the same. I have also noticed that issues (4) & (5) of the Appellants’ brief are repetitions of issue 3. I find that the three issues formulated by the Respondents are more concise, better expressed and cover all the concerns raised by the Appellants. I would therefore use the issues raised by the Respondents to determine this appeal.
Issue (1) is concerned with the juristic personality of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. As a general principle of law, only natural persons, that is human beings and juristic or artificial persons such as body corporate are competent to sue and be sued. ATAGUBA & CO V GURA NIG LTD (2005) 8 NWLR, PT. 927, 429, REGT TRUSTEES OF THE AIRLINE OPERATORS V NAMA (2015) 8 NWLR, PT 1408, 1 and UBA PLC V GOSTAR INVESTMENT CO LTD (2018) LPELR – 44886 (CA). The rationale behind this principle understandably is that law suits are the determination of legal rights and obligations in any given situation. Therefore only such natural and juristic persons in whom the rights and obligations can be vested are capable of being proper parties to law suits before Courts of law.
The contention of the Appellants as I understand it under this issue is that “Abaedoro branch of Obajoko ruling house of Ila Orangun” on whose behalf the Plaintiffs/Respondents purportedly brought this suit at the lower Court lacks juristic personality. Counsel also contended that the learned trial Judge was wrong when he held that the omission of the words “members of” in the description of the title of the suit can be treated as a misnomer or misdescription as the words are contained in the body of the plaintiffs’ pleading. For the avoidance of doubt, I reproduce the title of the plaintiffs’ suit/claim:-
“1. Alhaji (Chief) Tijani Aremu Bamigbose
2. Alhaji Hamed Awotayo
3. MR Murainu Agbolade
(For themselves and on behalf of Abaedoro Branch of Obajoko Ruling House of ILA-ORANGUN)”
In his judgment at pages 455-456 of the records, the learned trial Judge found as follows:
“It is my view that even if the words “members of” were omitted in the description on the title of the suit, they are contained in the body of the plaintiff’s pleading and as such it can be treated as mere misdescription or misnomer of the plaintiffs on the title of the suit which does not, and has not been shown to have affected the understanding of the defendants as to the identity or capacity of the plaintiffs in this suit. Permitting this suit to be struck out on this ground, in my view, will occasion a serious miscarriage of justice as it will amount to glorifying technicalities at the expense of doing substantial justice to the case of the parties inter se.”
The Learned Trial Judge rightly in my view found that the justice of the case would be better served more in refusing than in allowing the objection. What is more, as the Respondents’ Counsel aptly argued, the three plaintiffs who are representatives are natural persons. They sued for themselves and on behalf of members of the family. It follows that since these three Plaintiffs have the locus standi to maintain the action, the trial Court in my respectful view was right in refusing to declare the suit incompetent on account of the omission of the words “members of” before the word family. By and large therefore, I uphold the submission of Learned Counsel to the Respondents that the omission complained of in this instance is at best a mere irregularity which does not warrant this Court to interfere with the findings of the trial Court. I accordingly resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents against the Appellants.
The second issue touches on the jurisdiction of the Court vis a vis the competence of the action in the face of SECTION 22 OF THE Chiefs Law of Osun State. This Law provides in part as follows:-
“SECTION 22
(2) Where a person is appointed, whether before or after the commencement of this law, to fill the vacancy in the office of am (sic) minor chief by those entitled by customary law so to appoint and in accordance with customary law, the prescribed authority may approve the appointment.
(3) Where there is a dispute whether a person has been appointed in accordance with customary law to a minor chieftaincy the prescribed authority may determine the dispute.
(4) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the prescribed authority in the exercise of the power conferred on the prescribed authority by Sub-sections (2) and (3) of the section may, within 21 days from the date of the decision of the prescribed authority, make representation to the commissioner to whom responsibility is assigned for chieftaincy affairs that the decision be set aside and the commissioner may, after considering the representations, confirm or set aside the decision.
(5) Before exercising the powers conferred by Subsection (4) of this section, the commissioner may cause such inquiries to be held in accordance with Section 21 as appear to him necessary or desirable.”
The contention presented to the Learned Trial Judge was that the Law having provided local remedies for challenging the appointment of a minor chief before the commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs, going directly to the Court without exhausting these local remedies makes the action premature and incompetent thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the trial Court. The Learned Trial Judge after reviewing what he referred to as a ‘litany of authorities’, many of them conflicting, chose to be bound by the Supreme Court decision of BUKOYE & ORS V ADEYEMO & ORS (2017) 1 NWLR, PT. 1546, 173 which the Learned Judge had referred to as BUKOYE V MAGAJI (2017) AFWLR PT. 877, 338 AT 362. The justification for following this authority according to the Learned Trial Judge is because it was based on SECTION 3(3) of the Kwara State Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law Cap C9, Laws of Kwara State, 2006.
Section 3(3) reads:-
“In the case of any dispute, the Governor, after due inquiry and consultation with persons concerned in the selection, have the final say as to whether the appointment of any chief has been made in accordance with customary law and practice.”
According to the Supreme Court, the Governors “final say as to whether the appointment of any chief has been made in accordance with customary law and practice” is a condition precedent to the institution of an action in Court by any person aggrieved in the selection of a chief under the chief’s law (supra).
This surely cannot be said to be in pari material with SECTION 22(4) of the Osun State Law which provides thus:-
“22(4) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the prescribed authority in the exercise of the power conferred on the prescribed authority by Sub-sections (2) and (3) of the section may, within 21 days from the date of the decision of the prescribed authority, make representation to the commissioner to whom responsibility is assigned for chieftaincy affairs that the decision be set aside and the commissioner may, after considering the representations, confirm or set aside the decision.
The case of OGUNRINDE & ORS V EWERINDE & ORS (2015) AFWLR, PT. 805, 150 which the learned trial Judge chose as within his rights to follow is on all fours with this case in the sense that the Chiefs Law of Oyo State, CAP 28, 2000 upon which the case was decided is a replica of the, Osun State Chiefs Law. Again, the chieftaincy dispute that went to Court is a minor chieftaincy like the instant case. In the case of OGUNRINDE & ORS V EWERINDE (SUPRA), my learned brother, Gumel, JCA did a very detailed distinction of the facts and circumstances in some conflicting Supreme Court judgments on the matter before him. He distinguished the facts and circumstances in EGUAMWENSE V AMAGHIZEMWEN (1993) NWLR, PT. 315, 1 and chose and relied on the cases of OSAGIE V OFFOR (1998) 1 SCNJ, 122 and ODUGBO V ABU (2001) 14 NWLR, PT. 732, 45.
The educative point being made here is that while there is no quarrel with the creation or existence of a domestic forum for settlement of chieftaincy or any kind of disputes, an aggrieved citizen must be free to decide if and when to go for the domestic remedies which should not be allowed to act as a hindrance for all times. In the instant case for instance the provision is for the aggrieved party to make a representation to the prescribed authority within 21 days from the date of the decision or appointment of the minor chief. Can this law which limits the rights of parties to only three weeks to react to an appointment of a chief not be said to restrict a citizen’s constitutional right under SECTION 236 of the 1999 Constitution?
I should not be misunderstood to be opposed to the doctrine of precedence which binds the trial Court. Nigeria being a common law country has its foundation strongly rooted in the doctrine of judicial precedent. In a hierarchical judicial system like we have in Nigeria, the doctrine of stare decisis as the concept is sometimes called precludes the judges of subordinate Courts from altering what has been determined by a higher Court. In other words, it helps to keep the scale of justice even, steady and predictable and not liable to waiver to the whims and caprices of every judge. The concept makes for consistency of the judicial system, enabling strong judicial policy which provides for an orderly and reliable development of legal rules. See the cases of ADESOKAN V ADETUNJI (1994) 5 NWLR, PT. 345, 540; OKEKE V OKOLI (2000) 1 NWLR, PT. 642, 641, OSAKUE V FEDERAL COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, ASABA (2010) 10 NWLR, PT. 1201, 1 and DALHATU V TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR, PT. 843, 310. I will bring this issue to a close by drawing attention to the fact that in the application of the doctrine it is paramount that the facts and the law are the same.
The flipside of the partial finding of the Court in respect of the reliefs granted by the Court is the rationale by the Court in its failure to grant all the reliefs sought or allowing them to prove the other three reliefs while striking out the other three. A cardinal principle of law is that litigation should not be piece meal. This is to discourage or minimize abuse of Court process: OKOROCHA V PDP (2014) 7 NWLR, PT. 1406, 213 AT 290, SHUAIBU & ANOR V MAILAYA (2017) LPELR – 43192 (CA) and DIAMOND BANK V OPARA & ORS (2018) LPELR – 43907 (SC).
A major rationale for not condoning multiplicity of suits in administration of justice is the public policy thrust that there should be an end to litigation. In the spirit of discouraging abuse of Court process and double jeopardy, it would have been prudent for the learned trial Judge to have distinguished rather than followed EGUAMWENSE V AMAGHIZEMWEN (SUPRA) as they are not on all fours with the instant case. The Respondents in this case have not cross appealed on their three reliefs struck out. It is therefore not a life issue in this appeal. I will accordingly not dwell on it any further.
In resolving the issue whether or not the trial Court was right to have assumed jurisdiction on the Respondents’ issues (i), (ii) and (iii), having struck out issues (iv), (v) and (vi), I must without hesitation commend the ingenious way the learned trial Judge made the distinction between the two sets of reliefs to have jurisdiction in one set and decline jurisdiction in the other. I would rather His Lordship went the whole hog and declared that SECTION 22 (4) OF THE LAW was inapplicable as the relief challenging the appointment of the Obajoko chieftaincy was not the only relief being sought from the Court by the respondents. That to shut him out on that account will amount to denying the Respondents their constitutional right to ventilate their claims. However, as I have already found in this judgment, this issue which is not a life issue in this appeal is neither here nor there.
The learned trial Judge in assuming jurisdiction in reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) appropriately interpreted SECTION 22 (3) of the Law when he held:
“However, a close study of the provisions of Section 22 of the Chiefs Law, particularly Sub-section (3) thereof shows that the so-called local remedies are designed for resolution of dispute on “……. Whether a person has been appointed in accordance with customary law…” by a prescribed authority and or the Commissioner in charge of Chieftaincy Affairs. In other words, the said provisions will only apply where the reliefs sought deal with dispute as to the propriety of the appointment of a person to a minor chieftaincy. Where the reliefs sought do not challenge the appointment or approval of appointment of a minor chief, the provisions of Section 22 of the Chiefs Law as well as the authorities cited hitherto will not apply.”
I totally agree with the learned trial Judge in his findings on this point. I adopt it as mine. This finding is in tune with one of the basic canons of interpretation. This is that in interpreting a statute, the words therein must be given their natural ordinary and grammatical meaning. BUHARI & ANOR V OBASANJO & ORS (2005) 13 NWLR, PT. 941, 1. To give the interpretation sought by the Appellants in this case to include reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) under SECTION 22(3) of the Law will in the words of TOBI JSC in ARAKA V EGBUE (2003) MJSC, 17, amount to going “outside the words in the statute in search of an interpretation which is convenient to the Court or to the parties or one of the parties….”
In the instance case, I find that the interpretation given by the learned trial Judge is appropriate, valid and in conformity with acceptable legal principles. I find no reason to disturb the finding of the learned trial Judge in respect of reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. The learned trial Judge was right to have assumed jurisdiction in these reliefs and rightly exercised same in the circumstances of this case. As a consequence, I resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents against the Appellants.
The third and final issue is whether the trial Court properly evaluated the evidence beholding finding in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. The contention of the Appellants is that they have by uncontradicted/uncontroverted traditional evidence proved the entitlement of the 10th Defendant/Appellant to the exclusive right of the Obajoko of Ila Chieftaincy. That the trial Court refused to follow the decision in KOJO II V BONSIE (1957) WLR, 1223 AT 1226 by examining the two traditional histories against facts in recent years to know which of them is more probable and so came to the wrong decision in favour of the Plaintiffs/Respondents. l have considered the submission of both Counsel soberly. I have also carefully and slowly read the judgment of the trial Court. The core issues that the learned trial Judge tried to resolve under this determinant issue were whether there were three branches in the Obajoko Ruling House of Ila-Orangun and whether the Obajoko Chieftaincy title was rotational among these three branches.
In trying to resolve these issues, the Learned Trial Judge of the lower Court reviewed the traditional evidence as given by both sides of the claim. His Lordship in examining the evidence of both parties reviewed the traditional evidence led by them. He found that in 1976 by Exhibit F there was only one ruling house entitled to obajoko Chieftaincy in Ila Orangun. That this ruling house has three branches:-
(i) Gangangungun – Jojolade
(ii) Apaatu and
(iii) Abaki (also known as Abaedoro)
Exhibit F, His Lordship found concluded that the traditional title of Obajoko Chieftaincy belong exclusively to the Gangangungun branch of the family. The learned trial Judge also reviewed Exhibit A, the report of another investigative panel into the obajoko Chieftaincy matter in 1980. This report reviewed Exhibit A, also known as the Obasa Commission of Enquiry. The following finding was made on page 9 of Exhibit A:-
“It is quite evident that Mr. Obasa got to the root of the matter investigated by him a couple of years ago. The fact that he recognized the existence of three branches of the Obajoko family in his report is itself an acceptance of the indisputable fact that there is only one ruling house. Having recognized the existence of these branches. He was wrong to have concluded that only the Jojolade Gangangungun family “is entitled to the Obajoko Chieftaincy.”
His Lordship found that Exhibit A also recommended that “all the branches of the Obajoko family should be regarded as constituting one ruling house”. It was also found that Exhibit A was not only the latest report accepted by Government on the Obajoko Chieftaincy of Ila Orangun but that it was also designed to correct the error in Exhibit F. His Lordship also relied on Exhibit D. This is a letter dated 24/10/1980 to the then family head of the Obajoko Ruling House of Ila Orangun, MR Ajiteru Atowo and from the then secretary to the Oyo State Government. Exhibit D called on the Obajoko family to provide candidates for the vacant stool of Obajoko of Ila and that “all branches of the Obajoko family shall be regarded as constituting one Ruling House”. The exhibit also requested that the meeting for selection of the candidates “should be a joint family meeting of all the various branches of the Obajoko Ruling House …”
There was no form of challenge from the Appellants in respect of these pieces of evidence. In trying to prove that the Obajoko Chieftaincy was exclusive to the 10th Defendant/Appellant’s family, the Appellants alleged that MR. Jimoh Awojide from the Apaatu family who was appointed and installed Obajoko of Ila Orangun was removed because he was not from the Gangangungun family of the Obajoko ruling house. His Lordship used Exhibit E to debunk this assertion. Exhibit E is the certified true copy of the judgment of the Court of Appeal which allowed the appeal of Jimoh Awojide in 1988 and set aside the judgment of the High Court which had nullified the appointment and installation of Jimoh Awojide as Obajoko of Ila Orangun. The appeal against the decision of this Court to the Supreme Court was struck out for want of prosecution. This means that the appointment of Jimoh Awojide as the Obajoko of Ila Orangun remained valid until his demise when James Ayanda Oladosu from Gangangungun branch became the next Obajoko of Ila Orangun.
I am satisfied that the learned trial Judge has properly and painstakingly reviewed the evidence before him and rightly in my view came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs/Respondents proved their claim to the three reliefs granted them by the Court. The Appellants’ counsel who had urged this Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court has not shown that there was indeed improper evaluation or consideration of evidence. In the case of MUHAMMED V STATE (2014) LPELR – 23608 (CA) this Court held that “an appellant who relies on improper evaluation of evidence to set aside a judgment has the duty to identify the evidence improperly evaluated or not evaluated and to show convincingly that if the error complained of had been corrected, the conclusion reached would have been different and in his favour. See NKEBISI V STATE (2010) 5 NCC, 84 AT 104. The Appellants have not made any specific allegation of lack of or improper evaluation of evidence which they have themselves supported by evidence. In alluding to the failure of the trial Court to rely on the principle in KOJO II V BONSIE (SUPRA), learned counsel relied heavily on Exhibit F, the OBASA Report because it was favourable but had nothing whatsoever against the lucid findings of the Court based on the evaluation of Exhibits A and D in particular which are later in time. More than that they confirm the position of the trial Court that it was justified in not following the principle in KOJO II V BONSIE (SUPRA).
It has become such an elementary principle of law that the function of evaluation of evidence is essentially that of the trial judge. And when satisfactorily done as in the instant case, this Court will not interfere to re-appraise the evaluation of the evidence of the lower Court or to substitute its views there for. BOLANLE V STATE (2010) 5 NCC, 1 AT 9 AND MUHAMMED V STATE (SUPRA).
The only situation in which this Court will readily interfere with the findings of fact of the trial Court is if the findings are perverse; AKPAN V BOB (2010) 17 NWLR, PT 1223, 421 AT 479, ENUKORA V FRN (2018) LPELR – 43822 (SC)
On the whole and after a careful perusal of the judgment of the lower Court, I do not see how the lower Court would have arrived at a decision different from the one given. Indeed rather than interfere to disturb the judgment, I would rather applaud the learned trial Judge for a very well considered judgment. I therefore resolve this last issue also against the Appellants.
Having resolved all the issues against the Appellants, I hold that this appeal lacks merit. It fails and I accordingly dismiss it.
Cost is said to follow events.
The Respondents should ordinarily be entitled to costs but due to the sensitivity of this family matter, the better wisdom is not to make any order as to costs. I defer to that wisdom. Each party is to bear its own cost.
MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.: I adopt the reasoning and conclusion of my Lord, Patricia A. Mahmoud JCA, in dismissing this appeal for lack of merit and in affirming the decision of the trial Court.
The evidence on record was properly evaluated at the trial Court and the findings thereat have not been shown to be perverse. Indeed, the life issues in the 3 issues raised were properly resolved in favour of the Respondent and the appeal was rightly dismissed. I agree.
RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: My learned brother, Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud, JCA availed me the opportunity of reading the lead judgment delivered. I am in agreement with the resolution of issues therein and adopt same as mine. I found nothing wrong with the decision of the trial Court that could attract interference of this Court.
The appeal as argued lacks merit and accordingly dismissed as done in the lead judgment.
I too make no order as to costs.
Appearances:
J. A. Adebisi For Appellant(s)
Babajide Shiyanbola For Respondent(s)
