OYEBANJI & ORS v. SHODARA (2020)

OYEBANJI & ORS v. SHODARA

(2020)LCN/15259(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, May 27, 2020

CA/L/235/2013

Before Our Lordships:

Mohammed Lawal Garba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Obande Festus Ogbuinya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Tijjani Abubakar Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

PRINCE SAMUEL OYEBANJI 2. MR. WASIU AMUDA 3. MR. SUNDAY ALABI 4. OLUBADE ADIGUN 5. MR. DELE AYANDELE 6. MR. FATAI YUSUF 7. CHIEF SAHEED FAJEMISIN 8. MR. LATEEF BABATUNDE 9. MR. TAJUDEEN ISIKALU 10. MR. FATAI NAFIU APPELANT(S)

And

CHIEF SAKIRU OWOLABI SHODARA RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A DECLARATORY RELIEF IS GRANTED AT THE DISCRETION OF A COURT

The law is settled, firmly, that a declaratory relief is one at the discretion of a Court and in the nature of an equitable remedy granted in deserving cases. In the case of Mohammed v. Mohammed (2011) LPELR-3729 (CA) @ 48, it was held that:-
“There is no doubt that a declaratory relief is an equitable relief the grant of which requires the exercise of the Court’s discretion which must be done judicially and judiciously to state or declare an existing state of affairs in law in the claimant’s favour as seen from the avernments in the statement of claim.”
See also the cases of Dantata v. Mohd. (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 756) 144 @ 166; Thompson v. Arowolo (2003) 4 SC (Pt. II) 108 and Morenkeji v. Adegbosin (2003) 4 SC (Pt. l) 44 were referred to by Ogunwumiju, JCA, for the position. See Also Savannah Bank, Nig. Plc. v. Crown Star & Co Ltd. (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 815) 1; P & C H. S. C. Ltd. v. Migfo Nig. Ltd (2008) LPELR-4862 (CA); Int. Textiles Ind. Nig. Ltd. v. Aderemi (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 268; Dantata v. Mohd. (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 664) 176.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTY SEEKING DECLARATORY RELIEF HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE ENTITLEMENT TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT

It is also the law that a declaratory relief is only granted by a Court in circumstances where it is fully satisfied, convinced and of the opinion that the party seeking it, is, when all the facts he presents are taken into account, along with the peculiar circumstances of the case, fully entitled to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in his favour. The party seeking a declaratory relief has the burden and duty to show, by facts in pleadings and/or cogent, credible, sufficient and reliable evidence that he is entitled to the grant of the declaration and pronouncement he seeks from the court. In this regard, a party seeking declaratory relief(s) must succeed on the strength of the case he presents alone, and the admission or default by the other party against whom the relief is sought, does not obviate or mitigate the burden or duty to prove entitlement to the relief to the satisfaction of the Court before it could be granted.
A declaratory relief cannot properly be granted on the basis of admission, consent or default of the party against whom it is sought, but only and strictly, on the satisfactory discharge of proof of the entitlement of the party seeking same from the case he presents to the Court. Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC, 101 @ 120; Okedion v. F. A. A. N. (2007) LPELR-8678(CA); Anyaru v. Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 462 @ 447; Abdullahi v. Mil. Adm. (2003) LPELR-7194(CA); Motunwase v. Sorungbe (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90; Odumeru v. Adenuga (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 682) 466 @ 476-7;Ndu v. Unudike Prop. Ltd (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1094) 1; Chukwumah v. SPDCN Ltd(1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 1; Ogolo v. Ogolo (2006) ALLFWLR (Pt. 313) 1; Dumez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361. PER GARBA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE NOT SUPPORTED BY FACTS IN PLEADINGS GOES TO NO ISSUE

Authorities galore on the law that evidence not supported by facts in pleadings or evidence on a fact not pleaded, goes to no issue, just like pleadings of facts not supported by relevant evidence. Bamgboye v. Olanrewaju (1991) 3 LRCN, 897 @ 913; Odunsi v. Bamgbala (1995) 1 SCNJ, 275 @ 285; Adejumo v, Ayantegbe(1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 110) 417; Amobi v. Amobi (1996) 9-10 MAC, 101 @ 116; SPDCN, Ltd v. Ambah (1999) @ SCNJ, 152 @ 164; Okeke v. Aondoakaa (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 673) 501 @ 525-6; Chime v. Chime (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 527 @ 556; Nwanji v. Coastal Services Nig. Ltd (2004) 6-7 SC, 38; Dabo v. Abdullahi (2005) 2 SC (Pt. 1) 75; Adebayo v. Shogo (2005) 2 SC (Pt. I); Okoko v. Dakolo (2006) ALLFWLR (Pt. 336) 201; Olubodun v. Lawal (2008) 9 MJSC 1; Ajagbe v. Idowu (2011) 5-7 MJSC (Pt. 1) 80. PER GARBA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT GENERAL DAMAGES ARE TO BE SPECIFICALLY PLEADED AND STRICTLY PROVEN

WHETHER OR NOT COST FOLLOWS EVENTS IN THE AWARDING OF COSTS

On the issue of awarding of costs, the law is trite that costs follow events and that a successful party in litigation is entitled to the award of costs at the discretion of the Court, unless there are reasons, to be recorded, why he should be deprived of same. See Obayagbona v. Obazee (1972) 5 SC, 246; Amira Nig. Ltd v. Mal. Nig. Ltd (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 742) 464; Idam v. Meme (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 74.
So, a Court has the discretionary power and even duty, to award costs for the prosecution of a case before it to the successful party as an indemnity for genuine and reasonable expenses incurred in the course of prosecuting the case, but not as a bonus to him or a punishment on the party who pays them. See N. B. C. I v. Alfijir Nig. Ltd (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 345; Ijebu-Ode L. G. v. Adedeji Balogun & Co. Ltd (supra); Adeniran v. Alao (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 223) 350 @ 375; Flemington Dev. Nig. Ltd v. Anaemene (2006) ALLFWLR (pt. 308) 1360.
Costs do not have to be prayed or asked for by a successful party before the Court could grant them and can be granted suo motu by the Court. Again, the Court has the discretion to assess the quantum of the costs to be awarded to a successful party in a case taking in the consideration, among other relevant factors: –
(a) costs of filing the case,
(b) fees for engagement and services of Counsel,
(c) duration of the proceedings,
(d) genuine and reasonable out of pocket expenses incurred in the prosecution of the case,
(e) purchasing power or value of Nigerian currency; the Naira at the material time.
See Onabanjo v. Ewetuga (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 443 @ 450; Uzoma v. Okorie (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 692) 882 @ 893; Int. Offshore Constr. Nig. Ltd v. Shoreline Lift-Boats Nig. Ltd (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 157 @ 179; Sogunro v. Yeku (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 853) 664 @ 667; Flemingdon Dev. Nig. Ltd v. Anaemene (supra). The law does not allow or permit an appellate Court to interfere with the award of costs made by a trial or lower Court except it is satisfied that the amount awarded is apparently so high or excessive or ridiculously so low in the circumstance of the case, as to make it wholly, as an injudicious award on ground that irrelevant factors were considered or relevant factors ignored in the assessment thereof. Adim. v N.B.C. Ltd (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1200) 543;Coomassie v. Tell Comm. Ltd (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 802) 551. PER GARBA, J.C.A.

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgement by the High Court of Lagos State (Lower Court) delivered on the 22nd of October, 2012 in favour of the Respondent by which the vote of no confidence passed against him as Vice Chairman of the Lagos State Taxi Drivers and Cab Operators Association, Ikorodu Branch (the Association), was declared unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional and gross breach of the rules of natural justice.

General damages and costs of One Hundred Thousand Naira (₦100,000.00) were awarded to the Respondent in the judgement and being aggrieved therewith, the Appellants; members of the Executive of the Association, brought the appeal by the Notice and Grounds of Appeal dated 17th of December, 2012 on four (4) grounds.

In the Appellants’ brief filed on the 26th of April, 2013, three (3) Issues are said to arise for decision by the Court in the following terms: –
“a. Whether the lower Court properly exercised its equitable discretion in favour of the Respondent when it granted the declaratory relief that the vote of no confidence and resolution arising therefrom were unlawful, illegal, unconstitutional and constitute a gross breach of the Rules of Natural Justice. (Distilled from ground 1)
b. Whether the Lower Court properly exercised its discretion in favour of the Respondent when it held that the Respondent was entitled to all benefits connected with the office of vice chairman in terms of financial perquisites and awarded the sum of ₦250,000 as general damages. (Distilled from grounds 2 and 3)
c. Whether the award of ₦100,000 as costs by the lower Court was a proper exercise of judicial discretion in the circumstances of this case. (Distilled from ground 4).”

The same issues are couched in slightly different terms and set out in the Respondent’s brief filed on 13th of December, 2013 for determination in the appeal.
I intend to consider the arguments by Counsel on all the issues together.

Appellants’ Submissions:
It is submitted on Issue (a) that the Lower Court erred in granting the declaratory and equitable relief sought by the Respondent on the vote of no-confidence passed on him because he has lied in both pleadings and evidence that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before the vote was passed on him, thus did not come to equity with clean hands. The case of Barclays Bank v. Ashiru (1978) 6-7 SC, 99 was cited in support of the submission and it is maintained that the Lower Court’s discretion was not properly exercised.

On Issue (b), it is again submitted that the Lower Court did not exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously when it held that the Respondent was entitled to all benefits connected with the office of the Vice Chairman which are in the nature of special damages when he did not specifically plead and strictly prove such benefits by evidence. According to Learned Counsel, the Respondent merely claimed to be entitled to “all rights, benefits and privileges connected with the office of the Vice-Chairman” without any evidence to prove them and so they are deemed abandoned on the authority of, among other cases, UBN, Plc. v. Sparkling Breweries Ltd (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 200 and Ochin v. Ekpechi (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 565) 225; Omoetuk v. UBN, Plc. (2001) FWLR (Pt. 81) 1849.

In the alternative, it is argued that even if the so called entitlements were pleaded, since there was no evidence adduced to support them, the grant of the relief by the Lower Court is perverse since it is not borne out by the evidence placed before it by the Respondent, and reliance was placed on Lagga v. Sarhuna (2008) 50 WRN, 63 @ 90. In addition, it is the contention of Learned Counsel that the award of damages by the Lower Court is not supportable in fact and the law and on the authority ofEsso W. A. v. Oyegbola (1969) NMLR, 21; Soleh Boneh Overseas Nig. Ltd. v. Ayodele (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt.99) 549 and Sodipo v. Daily Times (1972) 4 SC, 69 @ 76, it is arbitrary and liable to be set aside since it was not based on any principle of law.
The Court is urged to resolve the issue in Appellants’ favour.

On Issue (c) it is submitted that the law on the award of costs, on the authority of Olasope v. NBN (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 11) 147, is that it is not imposed as a punishment on the party who pays it or given as a bonus to the party who receives it, but rather as an indemnity to the party entitled to it, at the discretion of the Court.

Also, that where the award of costs is arbitrary and punitive, it would not be a proper exercise of the court’s discretion and liable to be set aside. Igbuaya v. Eregare (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 139) 425 @ 434 and Esso W. A. Ltd. v. Oyegbola (supra) and the Practice Directions Order No. 3 of 2nd August, 2007 are referred to and it is argued the cost awarded by the Lower Court was excessive in the circumstances of the case.
The Court is urged to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellants.

In conclusion, the Court is prayed to allow the appeal, reverse the judgement of the Lower Court and dismiss the Respondent’s case.

Respondent’s Submissions:
The submission on Issue 1(one) are that it is based on the credibility of witness which is outside the purview of an Appellate Court, on the authority of CBN v. Archibong (2001) FWLR (Pt. 58) 103 @ 1052-3, since the primary duty of evaluation of evidence is that of a trial and the Appellate Court cannot substitute its own view of the evidence on the ground that it would have come to a different conclusion. Agbeje v. Ajibola SC34/1966, January 11, 2002, Ukpe v. State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 103) 416 @ 435-6; Obidike v. State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 87) 784 @ 823-4 and Okeowo v. A. G.,Ogun State (2002) FWLR (Pt. 93) 1878) @ 1891 are cited.

The submissions on Issue 2 (two) are that in law, general damages are presumed to flow naturally from the wrong complained of and so do not need to be pleaded or claimed before they could be awarded by a Court in deserving cases. For the submission, NDIC v. KB & CA Ltd (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 357) 916; Gari v. Sarafina Nig. Ltd (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt. 399) 439 @ 477 and Rokonoh Prop. Co. Ltd v. NITEL, Plc. (2001) FWLR (Pt. 67) 885 are relied on and the situations when an Appellate Court will interfere with the award of damages by a trial as stated in UBA, Plc. v. BTL. Ind. Ltd (2007) ALLFWLR (Pt. 352) 1615; UBA Ltd v. Odusote Bookstores Ltd (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 558 and Obere v. Mng. Bd, Eku Baptist Hospital (1978) 6-7 SC, 15 are set out. It is then submitted that the Lower Court acted in line with established principles in arriving at the sum awarded as general damages.

The cases of Odua Invest. Co. Ltd v. Akinyemi (2002) FWLR (Pt. 84) 172 and Salau v. Araba (2004) ALLFWLR (Pt. 204) 88 @ 123 are referred to on the factors to be considered by a Court in the award of costs in a matter, in the submissions on Issue (3). It is said that the law is that except where provided for by Statutes or Rules of Court, the amount or sum to be awarded as costs is at the discretion of a Court, on the authority of Ladega v. Akinluyi (1975) 2 SC, 9 and Maya v. Oshuntokun (2001) FWLR (Pt. 81) 1777 and that Rules of Court made for one Court do not bind another Court on the authority of Fasakin Foods Nig. Ltd. v. Shosanya (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 987) 126. Reference to the 2007 Practice Directions on amount of costs is said to be misconceived and the Court is urged to discountenance same for being of no moment.
The Court is urged in conclusion, to dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision by the Lower Court.

Resolution:
The pith of the Appellants’ complaint under Issue (a) is that because the Respondent is said not to be a witness of truth for denying being afforded an opportunity to be heard before the vote of no-confidence was passed on him, the Lower Court erred in granting him the declaration sought on the vote-of no-confidence, it being an equitable remedy. The law is settled, firmly, that a declaratory relief is one at the discretion of a Court and in the nature of an equitable remedy granted in deserving cases. In the case of Mohammed v. Mohammed (2011) LPELR-3729 (CA) @ 48, it was held that:-
“There is no doubt that a declaratory relief is an equitable relief the grant of which requires the exercise of the Court’s discretion which must be done judicially and judiciously to state or declare an existing state of affairs in law in the claimant’s favour as seen from the avernments in the statement of claim.”
See also the cases of Dantata v. Mohd. (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 756) 144 @ 166; Thompson v. Arowolo (2003) 4 SC (Pt. II) 108 and Morenkeji v. Adegbosin (2003) 4 SC (Pt. l) 44 were referred to by Ogunwumiju, JCA, for the position. See Also Savannah Bank, Nig. Plc. v. Crown Star & Co Ltd. (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 815) 1; P & C H. S. C. Ltd. v. Migfo Nig. Ltd (2008) LPELR-4862 (CA); Int. Textiles Ind. Nig. Ltd. v. Aderemi (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 614) 268; Dantata v. Mohd. (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 664) 176.
It is also the law that a declaratory relief is only granted by a Court in circumstances where it is fully satisfied, convinced and of the opinion that the party seeking it, is, when all the facts he presents are taken into account, along with the peculiar circumstances of the case, fully entitled to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in his favour. The party seeking a declaratory relief has the burden and duty to show, by facts in pleadings and/or cogent, credible, sufficient and reliable evidence that he is entitled to the grant of the declaration and pronouncement he seeks from the court. In this regard, a party seeking declaratory relief(s) must succeed on the strength of the case he presents alone, and the admission or default by the other party against whom the relief is sought, does not obviate or mitigate the burden or duty to prove entitlement to the relief to the satisfaction of the Court before it could be granted.
A declaratory relief cannot properly be granted on the basis of admission, consent or default of the party against whom it is sought, but only and strictly, on the satisfactory discharge of proof of the entitlement of the party seeking same from the case he presents to the Court. Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC, 101 @ 120; Okedion v. F. A. A. N. (2007) LPELR-8678(CA); Anyaru v. Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 462 @ 447; Abdullahi v. Mil. Adm. (2003) LPELR-7194(CA); Motunwase v. Sorungbe (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90; Odumeru v. Adenuga (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 682) 466 @ 476-7;Ndu v. Unudike Prop. Ltd (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1094) 1; Chukwumah v. SPDCN Ltd(1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 1; Ogolo v. Ogolo (2006) ALLFWLR (Pt. 313) 1; Dumez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361.

In this appeal, the Appellants have not questioned and are not complaining about the proof by the Respondent of his entitlement to the declaratory relief sought on the strength of the facts and evidence he placed before the Lower Court, but rather that because he was said to have lied in the case, it was not equitable to grant him the relief on the ground that he did not come to equity with clean hands. All that needs be said is that the Lower Court, contrary to the claim and denial that he was not afforded the opportunity to be heard before the vote of no-confidence was passed on him, had found that the Appellant was in fact afforded such opportunity of a hearing. The unequivocal finding by the Lower Court, at page 75 of the Record of Appeal, is that: –
“The Claimant was given right to present his case in writing and he did so in his response to the query issued to him.”

Although in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim and in his Statement on Oath, the Respondent claimed he was never invited or given the opportunity of being heard before the vote of no-confidence was passed on him, the query issued to him and his answer or response to it which were documents tendered by the Appellants in evidence, clearly show that the claim and denial by the Respondent was not true and correct, on the facts.

However, this position would not affect the exercise by the Lower Court of its discretion in his favour if it found that even though the Respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard by the Appellants, the provisions of the Constitution of the Association, which binds the parties, were not complied with in taking the decision of the vote of no-confidence.

The fact that the Respondent lied in the case, if there are facts and evidence before the Lower Court which show that the Appellants in deed and fact, did not comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Association in passing the vote of no-confidence on him, will not dis-entitle the Respondent from the declaration to that effect, by the Lower Court. But the pertinent question that should arise is whether the Lower Court is right that the Appellants did not follow or comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Association in passing the vote of no-confidence on the Respondent?

In its judgement, the Lower Court said from the evidence placed before it, the Appellants failed to comply with the other steps as provided for in the Constitution when disciplinary action is to be taken against any of their members. It made reference to Article XIV, Section 1 of the Constitution of the Association admitted in evidence at the trial and marked as Exhibits “B”, which provides for “AUXILIARY”.

It is Article XII of the Exhibit “B” which provides for “DISCIPLINE” and provisions of which were correctly set out in the judgement by the Lower Court. The Article has two (2) Sections as follows: –
“1. The Executive Council shall have power to prescribe any disciplinary measure for any act prejudicial to the image or interest of the Association provided that:
a. No disciplinary measure shall be taken against any member unless such proposal is supported by not less than two third of the members of the Executive Council.
b. The disciplinary measure is thereafter approved by not less than two third of the majority of all members of the Central Working Committee.
2. The right to due process of law to present his case is under this Constitution guaranteed to any person accused of any act prejudicial image (sic) or interest of the Association.”
Then, there is Article III, (c) of Exhibit ‘B’ which provides that: –
“Expulsion: – Without prejudice to Article XIV of this Constitution, a member may be expelled for acts prejudiced to the interest of the association or for any criminal act. Provided that no member shall be expelled until he has received NOTICE of the complaints or grievances made against him in writing and has been given the right to defend himself before the Executive or such other committee set up to look into the allegations made against him.”

Put briefly, Section 1(a) and (b) of Article XII provides that no disciplinary measure shall be taken against any member unless the proposal or measure is supported by not less than half of the executive committee and approved by not less than two third majority of all members of the Central Working Committee. Although Exhibit ‘B’ did not specifically provide for a “vote of no-confidence” as a disciplinary measure against members of the Association, the issuance of a query by the Appellants in which some allegations were labeled or made against the Respondent which called for response, answer or reaction from him, leaves no doubt that the action or measure taken by the Appellants was a disciplinary one against the Respondent. Being a disciplinary measure or action taken by the Appellants; acting in their capacity as the Executive Council of the Association, against the Respondent; who is a member of the Association, it has to be done or taken in accordance and compliance with the provision of Article XII, Section 1(a) and (b) above for it to be proper, valid, effective and binding. Even though the “Resolution” on the vote of no-confidence passed by the Appellants in the letter of 21st of August, 2006 to the Respondent; admitted in evidence at the trial and marked as Exhibit ‘C’, did not say or purport to suspend, remove or expel him from either the Executive Council or membership of the Association or to even stop or prevent the Respondent from the performance of his functions or duties as Vice-Chairman or member of the Association, it was clearly a real and genuine threat to his right as the Vice-Chairman and member, in respect of which he could take an action to forestall.

In his claim, the Respondent did not say that he was suspended, removed or even stopped or prevented from discharging the duties or functions of his office as Vice-Chairman or member of the Association, but only claimed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Claim that the Appellants are “fomenting trouble to restrain the claimant from performing the role assigned to him by the Constitution of the Association” and that “unless the Defendants are restrained he would be denied what legally and legitimately belong to him.”

The Respondent did not place any evidence of real denial or breach of his right to the office of the Vice Chairman or member of the Association by the Appellants in passing of the vote of no-confidence on him since he was, as rightly found by the Lower Court, afforded the opportunity to be heard before the resolution was passed on him. The testimony by the Respondent in his statement on that, among others, “I was purportedly removed from office on the 21st of August, 2006 through a letter dated the same date”, goes to no issue in the absence of the requisite pleadings that the letter of 21st of August, 2006 in fact stated that the Respondent was removed from office. The letter speaks for itself as follows: –
“Monday, August 21, 2006
To:
Chief Shakiru Owolabi Shodara
Vice Chairman, Ikorodu Branch
of Lagos State Taxi Drivers Cab Operators Association.
Dear Sir,
VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE ON CHIEF SHAKIRU OWOLABI (VICE CHAIRMAN LAGOS STATE TAXI DRIVERS AND CAB OPERATORS ASSOCIATION IKORODU BRANCH
INTRODUCTION
This is a vote of no confidence passed on Chief Shakiru Owolabi (Vice Chairman, Lagos State Taxi Drivers and Cab Operators Association, Ikorodu Branch. This development is informed by the activities of the said Chief Shakiru Owolabi, which activities are in gross violation of the Constitution and the norms of the Association. The said activities constitute the grounds for the passing of the vote of no confidence thereon.
GROUND
1. Much against the spirit of the Constitution of the Association, Chief Shakiru Owolabi has formed the habit of absenting himself from the meeting of the Association. Worse still, he rarely gives any reason(s) for his absence.
2. He has unlawfully created a fractional group within the Association. Chief Shakiru Owolabi often invites some unit to his house at Igbogbo wherein he holds secret and unlawful meeting with the said officers for purpose of destabilizing the smooth administration of the Association. The concerned officers are: Mr. Wasiu Muhammed (Chairman, Oluye Taxi Park), Mr. Mukaila Ayodele (former Chairman, Grammar School Taxi Park),and his group, and officers of Jiboro Elepe Taxi Park, which is a newly created park. This act is unlawful, unconstitutional and unacceptable to the Association.
3. In the last administration i.e., from 2000 to 2004, the sum of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) was given to Chief Shakiru Owolabi in final settlement out of Court of the suit which he instituted against the Association between 1996 and 2000 over. Thereafter, he desisted from attending the unit and branch meetings of the Association. In this wise, we seek to rely on the Association’s Attendance register.
4. It is on record that Chief Shakiru Owolabi, at a point in time, almost destroyed the Association to its root when he introduced the obnoxious idea of having only natives of Ikorodu become chairman thereof, he wasted the Association’s money on this unjust and irrational course before same was subsequently resolved the parties thereto making an undertaking to jettison the unholy idea.
5. Moreover, there is a confirmed report that Chief Shakiru Owolabi holds meetings with our former President, Otunba Olatunji Odujobi and proclaims that he has become a member of Omo-Ola Car Hire Service. This is in breach of the Constitution of the Association.
6. Nonetheless, on the 13th of June, 2006, new officers were elected to see to the smooth running of the affairs of the Association. To ensure fairness at the poll. Chief Shakiru Owolabi invited policemen to the venue. Consequently, the election was devoid of any irregularities; it was free and fear. At the polls, Chief Shakiru Owolabi sponsored some candidates which was tagged “the Mukaila Group”. This group lost out in the elections and its sponsor became aggrieved, alleging that the election was not free and fear and did not want to concede victory to the elected officers, instead, the group should foment trouble and destabilize the smooth administration of the affairs of the Association. At a truce meeting called by concerned members and officers of the Association, Chief Shakiru Owolabi requested that, for peace to reign at the park, the Association should replace Four (4) out of the Nine (9) elected officers with members of his group, threatened to sue the Association and make life unbearable for the elected officers and some members of the Association.
7. Rather ironically, Chief Shakiru Owolabi, our Vice Chairman is not a financial member of the Grammar School Taxi Park and does not possess the park identification card.
RESOLUTION
We have realized that, for peace and harmony to be restored to the Association, it is expedient to take the bull by the horn and to deal with Chief Shakiru Owolabi’s situation timeously. Thus, we, the undersigned, being members of the Executive Council of the Association, hereby, jointly and severally, and for the aforementioned grounds, pass a vote of no confidence on Chief Shakiru Owolabi, Vice Chairman, Lagos State Taxi Drivers and Cab Operators Association, Ikorodu Branch.
1. Prince Samuel Oyebanji (Chairman)
2. Mr. Wasiu Amuda (Secretary)
3. Mr. Sunday Alabi (Asst. Secretary)
4. Olubade Adigun (Treasurer)
5. Mr. Dele Ayandele (Fin. Secretary)
6. Mr. Fatai Yusuf (Auditor)
7. Chief Saheed Fajemisin (Org – Secretary)
8. Mr. Lateef Babatunde (P. R. O.)
9. Mr. Tajudeen Isikalu (Taskforce I)
10. Mr. Fatai Nafiu (Taskforce II)
Cc. To State Headquarters L. S. T. D. C. O. A.”

Although the tenor of the opening sentence of the Resolution appears to convey the intention “to take the bull by the horn and to deal with the Respondent’s situation timeously,” the above letter did not reasonably, purport to remove the Respondent from the office of the Vice-Chairman of the Association. But even if it did, it remains evidence of a fact not pleaded either by the Respondent, as claimant or the Appellants, in their pleadings.

In the above premises, there was neither pleadings nor credible evidence that the Respondent was removed from office of vice chairman of the Association by the letter of 21st of August, 2006 for any of his entitlements or benefits of that office to have been denied or breached which would have entitled him to a judicial remedy or relief of damages in respect thereof. In that regard, the vote of no confidence in the letter of 21st of August, 2006 cannot rightly be said to be unlawful or in breach of the Exhibit ‘B’ simply because the procedure set out in Article XII, Section 1 (b), was not complied with, since though a species of a disciplinary measure the Appellants are empowered to prescribe, it did not say or purport to deny or breach the right of the Respondent to the office of the Vice-Chairman of the Association. Like I have stated earlier, all that the Letter of 21st of August, 2006 can be said to constitute, is a real threat to the Respondent’s office of vice-chairman of the Association, which he is entitled to take a legal action to protect and prevent the denial or breach of his right to. Exhibit ‘B’ did not provide or say that the Appellants; as the Executive Council of the Association, cannot pass a vote of no confidence on any member of the Executive Council without compliance with the provisions of Article XII, Section 1 (b) which provides for the procedure for a disciplinary action that was to affect the right of any member of the Association either as such a member or any other position he holds in the Association.

In the absence of credible proof of the breach of any legal right, there cannot be the remedy or relief of damages available to the Respondent in the circumstances of the case before the Lower Court.

However, with the unchallenged case that the letter of 21st of August, 2006 was written to the Respondent by the Appellants, the threat to his office as Vice-Chairman of the Association is no longer in issue or dispute between the parties. In the circumstances, the Respondent is entitled to the declaration he sought in Relief (b) of the Statement of Claim to the effect that notwithstanding the Letter of 21st of August, 2006, he still remained the Vice Chairman of the Association until he was removed from that office by the procedure set out in the Exhibit ‘B’ or the expiration of the term of the office pursuant to the provisions of the said Exhibit ‘B’.

The finding that the Respondent is only entitled to the Relief (b) of the Statement of Claim has effectively subsumed the arguments on the award of damages and costs since there was no evidence of denial or breach of his right to the office of vice-chairman, but only a threat thereto which the relief adequately takes care of.

This position as it is, I should say that it remains the law that by their nature, general damages are those presumed to flow naturally, ordinary and directly from the breach of a legal right and so do not need to be specifically claimed and/or strictly, proved in terms of quantum before a Court can properly award them. Once there is satisfactory proof of the breach of a legal right of a party, in equity, such a party is entitled to a remedy or relief in the form of general damages which are presumed to be the natural consequences that flow from the injuries caused by the breach of the legal right, even if the party did not specifically asked or prayed any particular sum. Ijebu-Ode L. G. v. Adedeji Balogun & Cons. Ltd (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 166) 136. (1991) 1 SCNJ, 1; Acme Builders Ltd v. Kaduna State Water Board (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 590) 288 @ 305; Osuji v. Isiocha (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623; Rockonoh Prop. Co. Ltd v. NITEL (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 733) 468; N. B. B.B. Co. Ltd v. A. C. B. Ltd (2004) 1 SC, (Pt. l) 32; Akinkugbe v. Ewulum (2008) 6 MJSC, 134; Anambra State v. Ekwenem (2009) 7 MJSC, (Pt. l) 118; UBN, Plc v. Ajabule (2011) 12 MJSC (Pt, ll) 155; Johnson Wax Nig. Ltd. v. Sanni (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 235. In the present appeal, the Respondent specifically in Relief (d) of the Statement Claim, claimed the sum claimed the sum of ₦2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) as general damages for the alleged removal from office. If he had proved the alleged removal by the Appellants, he would have been entitled to general damages, the quantum of which the Lower Court has the discretion to assess and award; taking into account the peculiar facts and circumstances and guided by established principles on the award of such kind of damages. Johnson Wax Nig. Ltd v. Sannmi (supra), Tanko v. Maiwaka (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1176) 468; Dahiru v. Kamale (2006) ALLFWLR (Pt. 295) 616; UBN, Plc v. Ajabule (supra). I have earlier found that the Respondent did not make and/prove a case for the breach of his right to the office of the vice chairman and so not entitled to damages in that regard.
On the issue of awarding of costs, the law is trite that costs follow events and that a successful party in litigation is entitled to the award of costs at the discretion of the Court, unless there are reasons, to be recorded, why he should be deprived of same. See Obayagbona v. Obazee (1972) 5 SC, 246; Amira Nig. Ltd v. Mal. Nig. Ltd (2001) 17 NWLR (Pt. 742) 464; Idam v. Meme (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1196) 74.
So, a Court has the discretionary power and even duty, to award costs for the prosecution of a case before it to the successful party as an indemnity for genuine and reasonable expenses incurred in the course of prosecuting the case, but not as a bonus to him or a punishment on the party who pays them. See N. B. C. I v. Alfijir Nig. Ltd (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 287) 345; Ijebu-Ode L. G. v. Adedeji Balogun & Co. Ltd (supra); Adeniran v. Alao (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 223) 350 @ 375; Flemington Dev. Nig. Ltd v. Anaemene (2006) ALLFWLR (pt. 308) 1360.
Costs do not have to be prayed or asked for by a successful party before the Court could grant them and can be granted suo motu by the Court. Again, the Court has the discretion to assess the quantum of the costs to be awarded to a successful party in a case taking in the consideration, among other relevant factors: –
(a) costs of filing the case,
(b) fees for engagement and services of Counsel,
(c) duration of the proceedings,
(d) genuine and reasonable out of pocket expenses incurred in the prosecution of the case,
(e) purchasing power or value of Nigerian currency; the Naira at the material time.
See Onabanjo v. Ewetuga (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 443 @ 450; Uzoma v. Okorie (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 692) 882 @ 893; Int. Offshore Constr. Nig. Ltd v. Shoreline Lift-Boats Nig. Ltd (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 157 @ 179; Sogunro v. Yeku (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 853) 664 @ 667; Flemingdon Dev. Nig. Ltd v. Anaemene (supra). The law does not allow or permit an appellate Court to interfere with the award of costs made by a trial or lower Court except it is satisfied that the amount awarded is apparently so high or excessive or ridiculously so low in the circumstance of the case, as to make it wholly, as an injudicious award on ground that irrelevant factors were considered or relevant factors ignored in the assessment thereof. Adim. v N.B.C. Ltd (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1200) 543;Coomassie v. Tell Comm. Ltd (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 802) 551.
For being the successful party in the case before it, the Lower Court was right to award costs in favour of the Respondent its judgement. However, the award and the quantum were made by decree without any indication of the factors considered or taken into account in the assessment of and for the amount awarded as costs in favour of the Respondent. Just like in a situation where the successful party is to be deprived of the award of costs, a Court has a duty to state reasons for the award of a particular amount or sum as costs to such a party where the award is made. The exercise of the judicial discretion of a Court to award costs cannot be judicially and judiciously done by mere decree without a clear demonstration of the factors considered and reasons for the award of a particular amount or sum as costs to a successful party in line with the guidelines set out in the aforenamed judicial authorities.

On the facts and in the circumstances of the Respondent’s case, the award of the sum of One Hundred Thousand Naira (₦100,000.00) as costs is clearly excessive and high in view of the fact that he did not make a case for this removal from office which he alleged. The grant of Relief (b) of the Statement of Claim would adequately remedy the threat contained in the Letter of 21st of August, 2006 and the grant of nominal costs for the prosecution of the action before the Lower Court would meet the justice of his case.

In the final result, I find some merit in the appeal which I allow in part in respect of Orders 1, 3 and 4 made by the Lower Court in the judgement delivered on 22nd of October, 2012. The said orders are hereby set aside and costs of Twenty-Thousand Naira (₦20,000.00) made in favour of the Respondent in the Lower.

I should perhaps also state that the Learned Respondent’s Counsel is right that the reference to the Practice Directions, 2007, of this Court, on costs to be awarded, is clearly a misconception by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants since they were not applicable or binding in the Lower Court on the authority of the case of Fasakin Foods Nig. Ltd v. Shosanya (supra). See also Nneji v. Chukwu (1988) 6 SCNJ, 132, (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 81) 184; Tukur v. Govt., Gongola State (1988) 1 NWLR page 39 @ 50; Owoniboys Tech. Services Ltd v. John Holt (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 199) 550; Busari v. Hussaini (1992) 4 WLR (Pt. 237) 563.

The Relief (b) on the Statement of Claim of the Respondent is granted in place of the Order 2 made in the judgement of the Lower Court.

Parties shall bear their respective costs of prosecuting the appeal since each of them is successful in the above terms.

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.: I had the singular privilege to peruse, in advance, the succinct leading judgment delivered by my learned brother: Mohammed Lawal Garba, JCA. I endorse, in toto, the reasoning and conclusion in it. l, too, allow in part the appeal in the manner decreed in the leading judgment.

TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.C.A.: My Lord and learned brother GARBA JCA, granted me the privilege of reading in draft the comprehensive leading Judgment prepared and I endorse the entire reason rendered in this appeal and conclusion, and adopt the Judgment as my own. I have nothing extra to add.

Appearances:

Aladesanmi with R. O. Awobimpe. For Appellant(s)

…For Respondent(s)