DEC OIL AND GAS LTD v. SHELL (NIG) GAS LTD & ANOR (2021)

DEC OIL AND GAS LTD v. SHELL (NIG) GAS LTD & ANOR

(2021)LCN/15130(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, March 18, 2021

CA/L/40/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Obande Festus Ogbuinya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Obietonbara O. Daniel-Kalio Justice of the Court of Appeal

Onyekachi Aja Otisi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

DEC OIL AND GAS LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

SHELL NIGERIA GAS LIMITED (SNG) 2. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION (EFCC) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

Issue of jurisdiction is numero uno in adjudication. The law compels the Courts to handle issue of jurisdiction first when raised in any proceedings. See Okwu v. Umeh (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Co. Dev. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; PDP v. Umeh (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579); APC v. Nduul (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 1; Adama v. Maigari (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1658) 26; APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254. I will obey this legal commandment so as not to insult the law. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

MEANING OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction, a mantra in adjudication, connotes the authority/power of a Court to determine a dispute submitted to it by contending parties in any proceeding. See Ajomale v. Yaduat (No. 1) (1991) 5 SCNJ 172; Mobil Pro. co. Untltd. v. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt 798) Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 IM SLR 300; Ebhodagbe v. Okoye (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 472; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 144; A.-G., Kwara State v. Adeyemo (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 210; Isah v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1544) 175; Angadi v. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1; Nduul v. wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHEN IS A COURT OF LAW INVESTED WITH THE JURISDICTION TO HEAR A MATTER

A Court of law is invested with jurisdiction to hear a matter when: “1. it is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of members of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and 2. the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and 3. the case comes before the Court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction”. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim(2006) 2 LC 2081961 NSCC (vol. 2) 374 at 379, per Bairamian F. J., Tukur v. Taraba State (1997) 6 SCNJ 81; Daro v. UBN (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1029) 164; Okereke v. Yar’Adua (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100); Saraki v. FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc. (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1549) 282; Bello v. Damisa (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1550) 455; Osi v. Accord Party (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1553) 387; Nworika v. Ononeze-Madu (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 422; Adeleke v. Oyetola (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 440. The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction into a Court.

EFFECT OF A PROCEEDING CONDUCTED OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Where a Court is drained of the jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the proceeding germinating from it, no matter the quantum of diligence, dexterity, artistry, sophistry, transparency and objectivity injected into it, will be enmeshed in the intractable web of nullity. See Elugbe v. Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 319; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; Garba v. Mohammed (supra); Isah v. INEC (supra).

POSITION OF THE LAW ON WHAT WILL BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Nota bene, the case-law has endorsed, in toto, a statement of claim as the major yardstick to be used by the Court to measure the presence or absence of its jurisdiction. See Ikine v. Edjerode (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446; A.D.H. Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Oni v. Cadbury (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Ladoja v. Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 87; B.B. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206; Yar’adua v. Yandoma (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 213; Akpamgbo-Okadigbo v. Chidi (No. 2) (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1466) 124;Isah v. INEC (supra); Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. In an action commenced by dint of originating summons/motion, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim. See Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

POSITION OF THE LAW REGARDING WHEN A PIECE OF EVIDENCE IS CREDIBLE AND CONCLUSIVE

A piece of evidence is credible when it is worthy of belief. See Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353; Eta v. Dazie (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 248; A. J. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380; Emeka v. Chuba-lkeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345. In the same vein, a piece of evidence is conclusive if it leads to a definite result. See Nruamah v. Ebuzoeme (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHAT IS PROOF

Proof, in law, is a process by which the existence of facts is established to the satisfaction of the Court. See Section 121 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Olufosoye v. Fakorede (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 747; Awuse v. Odili (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt. 952) 416; Salau v. State (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 399, (Pt. 1372) 474; APC v. Karfi (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 479; Ojobo v. Moro (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1700) 166. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

WHEN CAN A VERDICT OF THE COURT BE SAID TO BE PERVERSE

A verdict of Court is perverse when: it runs counter to the pleadings and evidence before it, a Court takes into account matters it ought not to take into consideration, a Court shuts its eyes to the evidence, a Court takes irrelevant matters into account or it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Udengwu v. Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) 136; Nnorodim v. Ezeani (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 378) 448; Lagga v. Sarhuna NWLR (Pt. 1114) 427; Onykwelu v. Elf Pet (Nig.) Ltd (2009) 5 BWKR (Pt. 1133) 181; Momoh v. Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) 217; lhunwo v. lhunwo (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1357) 550; Olaniyan v. Fatoki (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 477; Udom v. Umanah (No. 1) (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179 Adeokin Records v. M.C.S.N. (Ltd)/GTE) (supra); Mamonu v. Dikat (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt 1672) 495; MTN (Nig.) Comm. Ltd. v. Corporate Comm. Inv. Ltd. (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 427; Offodile v. Offodile (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 189; Bi-Courtney Ltd. v. A-G, Fed. (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1679) 112; Fredrick v. Ibekwe (2019), 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 467; Uzodinma v. lhedioha (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1718) 529. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal probes into the correctness of the decision of the Federal High Court of Nigeria, Lagos Division (hereinafter addressed as “the lower Court”), coram judice, J. T. Tsoho, J. (now CJ) in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/774/2007, delivered on 16th December, 2016. Before the lower Court, the appellant and the second respondent were the second and first defendants respectively while the first respondent was the plaintiff.

The facts of the case, which transformed into the appeal, are amenable to brevity and simplicity. In March, 2000, the first respondent, an incorporated company engaged in the business of natural hydrocarbon gas exploration, transmission, management, distribution and sales, and the appellant, an engineering and construction company, entered into a contract for the construction of a gas distribution pipeline at Agbara/Ota. There arose a dispute over the contract which led to its termination by the first respondent in 2001. In 2002, the appellant sued the first respondent in the lower Court for general and special damages for a breach of that contract. While the suit was pending

and being heard, the appellant invited the second respondent to investigate and decide the contractual rights of the parties in that contract. That led to the arrest and detention of the first respondent’s employees by the second respondent between 2004 and 2005. Sequel to that, the first respondent beseeched the lower Court, via a writ of summons filed on 20th August, 2007, and tabled against the second respondent and the appellant, jointly and severally, the following reliefs:
1. A DECLARATION that the 1st Defendant in all its activities, particularly in exercise of its powers under the law that set it up, is not above the provision of the Constitution and must comply with and be subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Rules of Natural Justice and the Rule of Law.
2. A DECLARATION that the provisions of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment etc.) Act 2004 do not vest the 1st Defendant with powers to interfere sitting in its office or elsewhere, in the contractual disputes or order the Plaintiff to pay any damages or any money in any guise to the 2nd Defendant under Annexure “A”.

The 1st Defendant (EFCC) is not a party to the Contract, Annexure “A”.
3. A DECLARATION that any power exercised or decision taken in pursuance of the unlawful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s power are without jurisdiction, null, void and are of no effect.
4. A DECLARATION that the rights, duties, disputes or liabilities, inter parties, between the Plaintiff and 2nd Defendant must be settled in accordance with and within the provisions of Annexure “A”.
5. Perpetual mandatory injunction to restrain the 1st Defendant from inviting, arresting, or detaining any Director, Officer, Agent or any Person acting for or on behalf of the Plaintiff in respect of any contractual matter or relationship between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant anytime or anywhere whatsoever.
6. A Perpetual mandatory injunction to restrain the Defendants and each of them, in the case of the 1st Defendant, by its officers, servants, agents, privies or however otherwise and in the case of the 2nd Defendant by itself, its servants, agents or however otherwise from further interfering in the said contract Annexure “A” between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant.

Ten Million Naira as Exemplary and/or Aggravated Damages against the Defendants jointly and severally.
8. An Order for costs in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendants jointly and severally on indemnity basis.
9. Any other relief or reliefs the Court can grant to the Plaintiff.

In reaction, the appellant joined issue with the first respondent by filing a statement of defence. The second respondent filed no defence after entering a conditional appearance.

Following the rival claims, the lower Court proceeded to a full-scale determination of the case. In proof of the case, the first respondent fielded two witnesses, PW1 and PW2, and tendered four documentary evidence, Exhibits A, B, C and C1. The appellant and the second respondent called no witness. The appellant rested its case on that of the first respondent. At the closure of evidence, the parties, through their counsel, addressed the lower Court in the manner required by law. In a considered judgment, delivered on 16th December, 2016, found at pages 1055 – 1078, volume III, of the record, the lower Court granted the first respondent’s reliefs, minus/save relief 8.

The appellant was aggrieved by the decision. Hence, on 22nd December, 2016, the appellant lodged a 3-groilnd notice of appeal, copied at pages 1091 – 1094, volume Ill, of the records, wherein it prayed: “That the Honourable Court allow the Appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court delivered on the 26th day of December, 2016″. Thereafter, the parties, through counsel, filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument in line with the procedure for hearing civil appeals in this Court. The appeal was heard on 11th January, 2021.

During its hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, C.I. Igbinedion, Esq., adopted the appellant’s brief of argument, filed on 19th March, 2019 but deemed properly filed on 17th October, 2019, as representing his arguments for the appeal. He urged the Court to allow it. Similarly, ‘learned counsel for the first respondent, Efosa Osagie, Esq., adopted the first respondent’s brief of argument, filed on 26h June, 2019 but deemed properly filed on 7th October, 2019, as forming his reactions against the appeal. He urged the Court to dismiss it. The second respondent was, duly, served but filed no brief of argument.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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In the appellant’s brief of argument, learned counsel distilled two issues for determination to wit:
a. Whether the learned Trial Judge was right in the evaluation of evidence before him when he granted the reliefs sought by the 1st Respondent?
b. Whether the Federal High Court had the requisite Jurisdiction to have entertained the Matter owing to the fact that the cause of the Action arose from a simple contract?

In the first respondent’s brief of argument, learned counsel crafted two issues for determination, viz:
Issue One
Whether the trial Court had the requisite jurisdiction to determine the issue/matter before it?
Issue Two
Was the trial Court right to have granted the reliefs of the Plaintiff/1st Respondent, having regards to the pleadings and the evidence before this Honourable Court?

A close look at the two sets of issues shows that they are identical in substance. In fact, the first respondent’s issues can be conveniently subsumed under the appellant’s. For this reason of sameness, I will decide the appeal on the issues nominated by the appellant; the indisputable owner of the appeal.

Arguments on the issues:
Issue one
Learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the duty of the Court is to decide a matter on the basis of evidence before it. He relied on Ushae v. C.O.P., Cross River State Command (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 499. He listed the obvious facts before the lower Court. He stated that the first respondent failed to discharge the burden on it in respect of the allegation. He explained that the first respondent was being investigated by the second respondent based on the appellant’s statement to it and it was performing its duty of investigation and prosecution of the persons suspected to have committed economic and financial crimes. He cited Sections 6(e)(ii) and (m) and 46 of the of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 (the EFCC Act); Abacha v. FRN (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1402) 43; Dariye v. FRN (2015) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1467) 325; A. – G., Anambra State v. Uba (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt. 947) 44; Kalu v. FRN (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 1. He asserted that every person is entitled to his liberty except on a reasonable suspicion of a crime or to prevent him his committing offence. He referred to

Section 35(1) of the Constitution, as amended; A.-G., Anambra State v. Uba (supra); Dokubo-Asari v. FRN (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1048) 320; EFCC v. Yanaty Petrochemical Ltd. (2017) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 171. He claimed that a person who made a report to a law enforcement agent would not be liable for the arrest and detention of the suspect. He cited Fajemirokun v. Commercial Bank Ltd. (2009) 2 – 3 SC (Pt. 1) 26; UAC (Nig.) Plc. v. Sobodu (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1030) 368.

Learned counsel posited that the decision of the lower Court was perverse. He cited Onuigwe v. Emelumba (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 371. He reasoned that the lower Court failed in its duty to properly evaluate the evidence and the appellate Court has a duty to re-evaluate them and interfere with the findings. He relied on Onyeama v. Obodoh (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114) 576; Asika v. Atuanya (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1117) 484; Osaghae v. Amadasun (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 346; Faloughi v. First Impression Clearness Ltd. (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1108) 439.

On behalf of the first respondent, learned counsel explained the significance of evaluation of evidence. He conceded that where the findings of a trial Court were perverse, an

appellate Court would interfere with them. He relied on Unity Bank Plc v. Bouari (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 372; Akubuiro v. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Plc. (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1319) 42. He claimed that the first respondent proved the case through the oral and documentary evidence it placed before the lower Court. He noted that the appellant did not give evidence and that of the first respondent was unchallenged and the lower Court was right to rely on it. He cited Baba-Ahmed v. Ahmed (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 473) 1257. He persisted that the appellant’s pleading went to no issue as it did not call any witness. He relied on Ojoh v. Kamalu (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt. 958) 523; Alechenu v. Oshoke (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 773) 521.

Issue two
Learned appellant’s counsel enumerated the features of jurisdiction. He relied on Peenok Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1983) 4 NCLR 122. He listed the determinants of jurisdiction. He cited NDIC v. CBN (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 766) 272. He opined that a Court would consider the claims in considering its jurisdiction. He referred to FMBN Ltd. v. Nwadiale (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 625; Tukur v. Govt., Taraba State (1999) 6 NWLR

(Pt. 510) 549; SPCDC (Nig.) Ltd. v. Makon (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 541. He described the Federal High Court as a special Court with limited jurisdiction. He referred to Minister of Works & Housing v. Tomas (Nig.) Ltd. (2002) 2 NWLR (Pt. 752) 740. He contended that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to hear the action in simple contract or debt recovery. He cited Section 251 (1) of the Constitution, as amended; Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393; 7UP Bottling co. v. Abiola & Sons Ltd. (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 469. He maintained that the lower Court would have jurisdiction over matters concerning the administration or management and control of a Federal Government Agency. He cited Minister of Works & Housing v. Tomas (Nig.) Ltd (supra); NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 79. He concluded that the dispute between the parties was founded on simple contract for which the lower Court had no jurisdiction under Section 251 (1) of the Constitution (as amended).

For the first respondent, learned counsel contended that the claims/reliefs would determine the jurisdiction of the Court. He relied on Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31;

Anyanwoko v. Okoye (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 525) 214; Okolo v UBN Ltd. (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 539) 618; Barclays Bank v. CBN (1976) 6 SC 175; Stallion M & M co. Ltd. v. Stallion Fisheries Ltd. (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 157) 501; Adeogun v. Fashogbon (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1115) 149. He explained that the first respondent’s reliefs were not simple contract but for prevention of violation of its fundamental rights. He insisted that the second respondent’s powers of investigation never permitted it to violate the first respondent’s guaranteed rights. He cited Danfulani v. EFCC (2016) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1493) 223. He took the view that the lower Court and the High Court had concurrent jurisdiction on fundamental right matters. He referred to Grace Jack v. University of Makurdi (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208. He maintained that the second respondent dabbled into the contractual affairs of the first respondent and the appellant and the lower Court rightly condemned the conduct.

Resolution of the Issues
In an abiding loyalty to the injunction of the law, I will settle issue two first. The plinth of the issue is plain. It centers on the jurisdiction of the lower Court to hear the

suit which mothered this appeal. Issue of jurisdiction is numero uno in adjudication. The law compels the Courts to handle issue of jurisdiction first when raised in any proceedings. See Okwu v. Umeh (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1501) 120; Brittania-U (Nig.) Ltd. v. Seplat Pet. Co. Dev. Ltd. (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 541; Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc. (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; Diamond Bank Ltd. v. Ugochukwu (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1517) 193; PDP v. Umeh (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1579); APC v. Nduul (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 1; Adama v. Maigari (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1658) 26; APC v. Lere (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1705) 254. I will obey this legal commandment so as not to insult the law.

Angadi v. PDP (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 1; Nduul v. wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548.

(2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 422; Adeleke v. Oyetola (2020) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 440. The three ingredients must co-exist in order to infuse jurisdiction into a Court.

Lau v. PDP (supra); Azubuogu v. Oranezi (supra); Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 386; A.-G, Fed. v. A.-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Roe Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 518. In an action commenced by dint of originating summons/motion, the affidavit in support serves as the statement of claim. See Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 28; PDP v. Ezeonwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187; Lau v. PDP (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 60; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; CBN v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130.

Now, the main anchor of the appellant’s chief grievance, indeed its trump card on the terminal issue, is that the lower Court was disrobed of the jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent’s suit, which parented the appeal, in that it fell squarely within the four walls of simple contract. In other words, the casus belli between the contending parties is whether or not the res in the first respondent’s suit, which sired the appeal orbits around simple contract for which the lower Court has

no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. As expected, the parties are diametrically opposed on the stubborn point. While the appellant claims it is a simple contract, the first respondent disowns it. In this wise, the provision of Section 251 (1) (a) – (r) of the Constitution as amended , is of note. To this end, I will at the risk of verbosity but borne out of necessity, pluck it out, where it is ingrained in the Constitution, ipsissima verba, thus:
251.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters-
(a) Relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(b) Connected with or pertaining to the taxation of companies and other bodies established or carrying on business in Nigeria and all other persons subject to Federal taxation;
(c) Connected with or

pertaining to customs and exercise duties and export duties, including any claim by or against the Nigeria Customs Service or any member or officer thereof, arising from the performance of any duty imposed under any regulation relating to customs and excise duties and export duties;
(d) Connected with or pertaining to banking, banks, other financial institutions, including any action between one bank and another, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria arising from banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bills of exchange, letters of credit, promissory notes and other fiscal measures:
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to any dispute between an individual customer and bank in respect of transactions between the individual customer and the bank;
(e) Arising from the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act or any other enactments replacing the Act or regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act;
(f) Any Federal enactment relating to copyright, patent, designs, trademarks, and passing-off, industrial designs and merchandise mark, business names,

commercial and industrial monopolies, combines and trusts, standards of goods and commodities and industrial standards;
(g) Any admiralty jurisdiction, including shipping and navigation on the River Niger or River Benue and their effluents and on such other inland waterway as may be designated by any enactment to be international waterway, all Federal ports, (including the constitution and powers of the ports authorizes for Federal ports) and carriage by sea;
(h) Diplomatic, consular and trade representation;
(i) Citizenship, naturalization, and aliens, deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria, extradition, immigration into and emigration from Nigeria, passport and visa;
(j) Bankruptcy and insolvency;
(k) Aviation and safety aircraft;
(l) Arms, ammunitions and explosives;
(m) Drugs and poisons;
(n) Mines and minerals (including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas);
(o) Weights and measures;
(p) The administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(q) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation

and interpretation of this Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies;
(r) Any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
It is sufficiently settled law that once a cause of action appertains to any of the items in the provision, the lower Court (the Federal High Court) will imbued with the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain it. The converse is true, id est, where a matter falls outside them, save in few recognised exceptions, the lower Court will be robbed of jurisdiction. See C.G.G. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Ogu (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 366; Bronik Motors Ltd. v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 272;Cotecna Int’l Ltd. v. I.M.B. Ltd (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 985) 275; Trade Bank Plc. v. Benilux (Nig.) Ltd (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 825) 416; FMBN v. Olloh(2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 773) 475; Omnia (Nig.) v. Dyktrade(2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1056) 576; I.T.P.P. Ltd. v. UBN Plc. (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 483; NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 79; Olutola v. Unilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416;

S.P.D.C. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Tiebo Vil (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 931) 439; Nkuma v. Odili (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 977) 587; S.P.D.C. v. Isaiah (supra); NNPC v. Orhiowasele (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1371) 211; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (supra); John Int’l Ltd. v. FHA (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1533) 427; Oguebego v. PDP (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 446, Oni v. Cadbury Nig. Plc (2016) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1516) 80; A-G., Bauchi State v. A.-G., Fed. (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt 648) 299; Rahman Brothers Ltd v. NPA (2019) 6 NWL (Pt.1667) 126. It is also trite that in determining the jurisdiction of the lower Court, a Court considers the parties and subject-matter of an action. See Obiuweubi v. CBN (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 46 N.E.P.A. v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 79; Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83;NNPC v. Orhiowasele (supra); NURTW v. RTEAN (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 170; Agbule v. W.R.P. Co. Ltd. (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 318; Enterprises Bank Ltd. v. Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1394) 256; ABEC v. Kanu (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1370 69; Wema Sec. & Fin. Plc v. NAIC (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1484) 93. Here, the appellant quarrels with the subject matter, and not the party, jurisdiction of the lower Court.

It is trite elementary law that once an action is rooted in a simple contract, the lower Court will be disrobed of the jurisdiction to entertain it. The reason is not far-fetched. The expansive provision of Section 251, catalogued above, does not warehouse simple contract as one of the items in the civil jurisdiction of the lower Court. In such a case, it is the High Court of a State that will be equipped with the requisite jurisdiction over the matter. See I.T.P.P. Ltd. v. UBN Plc (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 483 at 504, per Ogbuagu, JSC, Adelekan v. ECU-Line NV (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 33; A.D.H Ltd. v. A.T. Ltd. (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 989) 635; Osun State Government v. Dalami (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 66; Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd. (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393; Wema Sec. Fin. Plc v. NAIC (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1484) 93. P & C.H.S. Co. Ltd. v. Migfo (Nig.) Ltd. 2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 555; Essi v. Nigeria Ports Plc (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1604) 361; Ogbebor v. INEC (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1614) 1; ROE Ltd. v. UNN (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 420; TSKJ (Nig.) Ltd. v. Otochem (Nig.) Ltd. (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1630) 330; Ikpekpe v. W.R. & P. Co. Ltd. (2018) 17 NWLR

(Pt. 1648) 280; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 13; Rahman Brothers Ltd. v. NPA (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1667) 126; O.& G.E.F.Z.A v. Osanakpo (2019) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1668) 224; Dec Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Shell (Nig.) Gas Ltd. (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 273.

I have, in due fidelity to the desire of the law, consulted the record, the bedrock of every appeal. My first port of call is the residence of the first respondent’s pleading, amended statement of claim, which colonises pages 611 – 622, volume II of the mountainous record. This is because, as already noted, the statement of claim is the major barometer which the Court uses to gauge the presence or absence of its jurisdiction over a matter. I have perused it with the finery of a tooth comb. Admirably, it is submissive to clarity and comprehension.

The law commands the Court to read pleading holistically in order to garner a flowing story of it. See Okochi v. Animkwoi (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 1; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595)366; NNPC v. Roven Shipping Ltd. (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1676) 67. I have, in total obedience to this injunction, given a global examination to the appellant’s

pleading. Incidentally, I am unable to locate therein, even with prying eagle-eye of an appellate Court, where the first respondent weaved its claim on simple contract. The contract mentioned in its pleading pertains to that entered by the disputing parties on 15th March, 2000 over the construction of a gas distribution pipeline at Agbara/Ota. It was averred therein that the disputation germinating from that contract had been a subject of litigation in Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1075/2002 which had meandered its way, at the measured speed of Court processes, from the lower Court to the Supreme Court. Thus, it was not the res between the feuding parties to the first respondent’s suit that fathered the appeal. I discern two principal complaints of the first respondent in the suit, videlicet: (a) That the second respondent, EFCC, in connivance with and at the instigation of he appellant, unjustifiably, arrested and detained its employees/staff over a contractual relationship that is pedente lite. (b) That the second respondent, EFCC, illegitimately, assumed jurisdiction over the determination of the contractual debt in that contract when it was a sub judice. These two

agitations are totally divorced from the incidents of simple contract. They are mutually exclusive and share no confluence point in their connotations. In effect, the first respondent’s grouse, which cried for the attention of the lower Court’s intervention, did not fall within the perimeter of simple contract which is outside the realm of the jurisdiction of the lower Court to adjudicate on.

That is not all. In the eyes of the law, relief too is one of the determinants of jurisdiction of Court. See Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (Pt. 988) 382; Garba v. Mohammed (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1537) 114; PDP v. Oranezi (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 245; Gbileve v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 394; Wambai v. Donatus (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 223; Emeka v. Chuba-lkpeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345; Cocacola (Nig.) Ltd. v. Akinsanya (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1593) 74; Dec Oil & Gas td. v. Shell (Nig.) Gas Ltd. (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692).

I had, at the cradle of the judgment, catalogued the nine reliefs which the first respondent implored the lower Court to grant and it granted. It is pointless to importing them here in terms of replication. Suffice to say that

l have subjected them to a clinical examination. Interestingly, they are rebellious to equivocation. None of them is pegged on breach of contract between the disputing parties. Nor any of them hedged on claim for debt; a liability on a claim, a specific sum of money due from one person to another by agreement or otherwise; or indebtedness – a condition or state of owing money, something owed, a debt due from one person to another. See Barbedos Ventures Ltd. v. FBN Plc. (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1609) 241. In essence, the prayers do not come within the firmament of reliefs that are cognisable within the province of breach of simple contract. In effect, they bear no semblance to simple contract.

In the light of this brief legal anatomy on simple contract, conducted in consonance with the law, the first respondent’s claim, as exemplified in its amended statement of claim, discloses serious hostility to the doctrine of simple contract being brandished and paraded by the appellant to castrate the validity of the suit. Put simply, the lower Court is the forum competens for the determination of the first respondent’s action which has no grain of romance with simple

contract. I hasten to crown the suit with the deserved toga of validity. On this score, all the strictures, which the appellant rained against the competency of the suit, pale into Insignificance. The above legal dissection, with due reverence, punctures and exposes the poverty of the learned appellant’s counsel’s scintillating argument on the issue. It is is disabled from birth. In the end, I have no choice than to resolve the issue two against the appellant and in favour of the first respondent.

Having dispensed with the jurisdictional issue two, I retreat to settle issue one. The kernel of the issue is simple. It chastises the lower Court’s evaluation of evidence. Put bluntly, the appellant accused the lower Court of improper evaluation of evidence because the judgment was against the weight of evidence. A castigation of a decision on the premise that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, invariably couched as an omnibus ground, connotes that the decision of the trial Court cannot be supported by the weight of evidence advanced by the successful party which the Court either wrongly accepted or that the inference it drew or conclusion it reached,

based on the accepted evidence, is unjustifiable in law. Also, it implies that there is no evidence, which if accepted, will buttress the finding of the trial Court. Furthermore, it denotes that when the evidence adduced by the complaining appellant is weighed against that given by the respondent, the judgment rendered to the respondent is against the totality of the evidence placed before the trial Court. In ascertaining the weight of evidence, the trial Court is enjoined by law to consider whether the evidence is admissible relevant, credible, conclusive or more probable than that given by the other party. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC 91; Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 2 NSCC Vol. 17, 799 at 806/6986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 731; Nwokidu v. Okanu (supra) (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362; Akinlagun v. Oshoboja (2006) 42 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60; Gov., Lagos State v. Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 291; Oyewole v. Akande (2009)15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 011; Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 412.

The law has saddled a trial Court, like the lower Court herein, with the primary duty to evaluate relevant and material evidence, both oral and documentary, after hearing and

watching the demeanour of witnesses called by the parties in any proceedings having regard to their pleadings. To discharge that bounden duty, a trial Court must show how and why it arrived at its findings of fact and final determination of the issues before it. It has to be cautious and understand the distinction between summary or restatement of evidence and evaluation of evidence which means assessment of evidence and giving them probative value. It appraises evidence by constructing an imaginary scale of justice and putting the evidence of the parties on the two different pans of the scale. Then, it weighs them to determine which is heavier, not in terms of quantity, but quality of the testimonies. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC 91; Olagunju v. Adesoye (2009) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1146) 225, Oyewole v. Akande (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 11; Ayuya v. Yonrin (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1254) 135; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534; Odutola v. Mabogunje (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 522; Ndulue v. Ojiakor (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 311; Okoro v. Okoro (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 506; D.M.V (Nig) Ltd. v. NPA (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1652) 1635; Oguntade v. Oyelakin (2020) 6 NWLR

(Pt. 1719) 41. I have matched the decision of the lower Court with the positions of law x-rayed above with a view to identifying their infractions or compliance.

The appellant’s grudge here is canalised within a narrow compass. It quarrels with lower Court’s grant of the first respondent’s reliefs without proof.

To begin with, it is decipherable from the record, the spinal cord of the appeal, that the appellant, in its infinite wisdom, through the counsel of its choice, rested his case on that of the first respondent. A party’s (defendant’s) decision not to call evidence has always been regarded as a legal strategy, not a mistake, which enhances/strengthens his case if it succeeds. See Akanbi v. Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 118. In the sight of the law, a defendant resting his case on that of the claimant signifies any of these: (a) that the defendant is stating that the plaintiff has not made out any case for the defendant to respond to; or (b) that he admits the facts of the case as stated by the plaintiff, or (c) that he has a complete defence in answer to the plaintiffs case. See Newbreed Org. Ltd. V. Erhomosele (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 974) 499;

Admin/Exec., Estate, Abacha v. Eke-spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; Mezu v. C.C.B. (Nig.) Plc (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 188; Ojigho v. NBA (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 399.
In domain of procedural law, issues are joined in the pleading. In the mind of the law, an issue is joined on a particular fact, necessitating its proof, when its assertion is disputed by an opposing party. See Galadima v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636) 357. The appellant, even though it filed pleading, amended statement of defence, it called no witness to adduce evidence in proof of it. Unarguably, the appellants acted in due obedience to the law. However, it took a big risk and gamble. By that procedural strategy, it accepted hook, line and sinker, the evidence proffered by the first respondent in proof of the case. In effect, it abandoned its pleading and did not join issue with the respondent on all the allegations against it in the case. The appellant shut itself out of evidence and owns the blame. It has to sink with the evidence of its adversary, the respondent which goes one way without any corresponding evidence from it. See Durosaro v. Ayorinde (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 407;

Adekunle v. State (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 719; Admin/Exec., Estate Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (supra); Oduwole v. West (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 598; Mezu v. C.C.B. (Nig.) Plc (supra); Ahmed v. Regd. Trustees AKRCC (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1665) 300; Ojigho v. NBA (supra).
It stems from the foregoing that the appellant’s failure to adduce evidence in support of its pleading occasioned a corrosive effect on its case to the advantage of the first respondent’s evidence. By that singular act, a costly failure at that the appellant played into the hands of the first respondent vis-a-vis the evidence it offered in proof of its case. The net effect of the first respondent’s evidence was obvious. It acquired/gained the enviable status of incontrovertible evidence. The law grants the Court the unriddled licence to act on unchallenged evidence to reach a decision. See Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (supra); Tanko v. Echendu (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 253; Jim-Jaja v. C.O.P., Rivers State (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225; Nwakonobi v. Udeorah (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1354) 499; lghreriniovo v. S.C.C. (Nig.) Ltd. (2013) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1361) 138; C.B.N. v. Okojie (2015) NWLR (Pt. 1479) 231;

Interdrill (Nig.) Ltd. v. UBA Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1581) 52; Owuru v. Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1599) 1; Chiadi v. Aggo (2018) 2 NWLR (1603) 175; Ugwuegede v. Asadu (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 460; Aderonpe v. Eleran (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1661) 141. The lower Court acted ex debito justitiae when it relied on the unrefuted evidence of the first respondent in arriving at its decision. In sum, the appellant’s voluntary employment of the adjectival style of resting its case on that of the first respondent’s constitutes a serious coup de grace in its stance on the issue.

In keeping with the dictate of the law, I have again visited the record, the bible of the appeal, particularly at the abode of the lower Court’s 23-page succinct judgment which is in the heat of expunction. It monopolises pages 1055-1078, volume III of the elephantine record. It is comprehension-friendly. The lower Court dedicated pages 1063-1077 thereof to the appraisal of the evidence, both parol and documentary evidence, presented by the contending parties before it. The lower Court, to my mind, carried out a meticulous and thorough analyses of the evidence, viva voce and documentary,

proffered by the warring parties after assigning them to their respective pans in the imaginary scale of justice. It attached deserving probative weight to the respective evidence offered by the parties. It found that the first respondent’s pan in the imaginary scale of justice hosted more admissible, credible and conclusive evidence. A piece of evidence is credible when it is worthy of belief. See Agbi v. Ogbeh (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1; Dim v. Enemuo (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1149) 353; Eta v. Dazie (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 248; A. J. Inv. Ltd. v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc. (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 380; Emeka v. Chuba-lkeazu (2017) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1589) 345. In the same vein, a piece of evidence is conclusive if it leads to a definite result. See Nruamah v. Ebuzoeme (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1372) 474. The lower Court found rightly in my view that the evidence of the first respondent, based on their qualitative nature, preponderated over those of the appellant’s. Remarkably, owing to the appellant’s strategy, resting its case on that of the first respondent, there was no evidence to put on its own side of the proverbial scale of balance as against its opponent’s evidence.

Thus, the onus probandi on the first respondent was naturally discharged on minimal proof. See Admin/Exec., Estate Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (supra). The net effect is that the first respondent proved its case.

The appellant stigmatised the finding/decision of the lower Court as perverse. Since perversion is the cynosure of the point, it is germane to x-ray its purports for easy appreciation. A verdict of Court is perverse when: it runs counter to the pleadings and evidence before it, a Court takes into account matters it ought not to take into consideration, a Court shuts its eyes to the evidence, a Court takes irrelevant matters into account or it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. See Udengwu v. Uzuegbu (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 836) 136; Nnorodim v. Ezeani (1995) 2

NWLR (Pt. 378) 448; Lagga v. Sarhuna NWLR (Pt. 1114) 427; Onykwelu v. Elf Pet (Nig.) Ltd (2009) 5 BWKR (Pt. 1133) 181; Momoh v. Umoru (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) 217; lhunwo v. lhunwo (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1357) 550; Olaniyan v. Fatoki (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 477; Udom v. Umanah (No. 1) (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 179 Adeokin Records v. M.C.S.N. (Ltd)/GTE) (supra); Mamonu v. Dikat (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt 1672) 495; MTN (Nig.) Comm. Ltd. v. Corporate Comm. Inv. Ltd. (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 427; Offodile v. Offodile (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 189; Bi-Courtney Ltd. v. A-G, Fed. (2019) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1679) 112; Fredrick v. Ibekwe (2019), 17 NWLR (Pt. 1702) 467; Uzodinma v. lhedioha (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1718) 529.

I have, in total allegiance to the desire of the law, situated the judgment, sought to be decimated with the elements of perverse decision adumbrated above. The raison d’etre behind the juxtaposition is simple. It is to discover if the judgment is mired in the intractable web of the elements of perversion chronicled above. The judgment of the lower Court, which harbours no ambiguity, is not antithetical to the pleadings and evidence presented before it by the

contending parties. At the same time, the lower Court did not import alien/foreign matters into the Judgment. It utilised the evidence the parties presented before it as displayed above. The finding does not, in the least, smell of any charge of perversity levelled against it by the appellant. In effect, the decision of the lower Court is not marooned in the murky ocean of perversion to magnet the intervention of this Court.

In the twilight of the dexterous and judgment, at pages 1076 and 1077, volume III of the windy record, the lower Court found:
It is my respectful opinion that every step that the 1st Defendant took with respect to the Plaintiff in this matter was wrongful, hence unlawful and unconstitutional. All such actions of the 1st Defendant are encapsulated in the evidence of PW1 and PW2, these actions caused them and by extension the Plaintiff a lot of trepidation. The bitterly complained of having been detained, constantly subjected to harassment and intimidation and made to appear with their Lawyers before, the Shell panel, and also made to pay for the services of an expert when they were not privy to that arrangement. Considering the

entire facts and circumstances of this case, it is my respectful view that as the 1st and 2nd Defendants did not adduce any evidence to refute that of the Plaintiff which I regard as credible, they have failed to discharge the burden of proof that rested on them. I therefore hold that the Plaintiff’s case against the Defendants must succeed.

Flowing from the above juridical survey, done in due consultation with the law, the lower Court’s ultimate and solemn finding is an immaculate one. It did, in the least, fracture the law to render its faultless finding guilty of the accusation of perfunctory evaluation of evidence hurled against it by the appellant. In fact, the allegation is a pseudo-one as well as uncharitable and unsustainable. On this premise, l, with due respect, dishonour the learned appellant’s counsel’s salivating invitation to sacrifice the finding, on the proof of the claim, on the underserved altar of improper evidential evaluation. As a result, I resolve the issue one against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.

On the whole, having resolved the two issues against the appellant, the fortune of the appeal is clear. It is

bereft of any morsel of merit and deserves the reserved penalty of dismissal. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal affirm the lower Court’s judgment delivered on 16th December, 2016. The parties shall bear the respective costs they expended in the prosecution and defence of the doomed appeal.

OBIETONBARA O. DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.: I have read the draft judgment of my learned brother OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA and I agree with the reasoning and conclusions in the said judgment. The appellant challenged the evaluation of evidence as done by the trial Court. At trial, the appellant rested his case on that of the 1st Respondent. The decision of a defendant to rest his case on that of a plaintiff is a decision as to strategy. See AGUOCHA V. AGUOCHA (2005) 1 NWLR (Part 906 p.165 at 184. It is now settled that where a defendant rests his case on the plaintiffs case, it means (1) that the defendant is stating that the plaintiff has not made out any case for the defendant to respond to, or (2) that the defendant admits the facts of the case as stated by the plaintiff, or (3) that the defendant as a complete defence in answer to the plaintiffs case. See AKANBI V. ALAO

(1989) 1 NWLR (Part 108) p.118; ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF ABACHA V. EKE-SPIFF & ORS (2009) LPELR-3152 (SC) 59-60. In that event, the defendant chooses not to lead any evidence of his own, confident that regardless of the evidence led by the plaintiff, such evidence is unlikely to earn the plaintiff victory in view of the very strong case of the defendant. The strategy of a defendant in resting his case on the plaintiffs case has its legal implication and it is this, the evidence of the plaintiff is unchallenged and uncontroverted and consequently it is open to the trial Court seised of the matter to accept and act on such unchallenged evidence before it. See OWNERS OF MV GONGOLA HOPE & ANOR V. SMURFIT CASES (NIG) LTD & ANOR (2007) LPELR-2849 (SC) (30-31); ODULAJA V. HADDAD (1973) 11 SC 357; ISAAC OMOREGBE V. LAWANI (1980) 3-7 SC 108 at 117; CHIEF DUROSARO V. AYORINDE (2005) 3 SCNJ 8 at 18. The lower Court in evaluating the evidence before it had only the unchallenged evidence of the Respondent to consider and acting on the strength of that evidence, found against the Appellant. Obviously therefore, the gambit of the appellant in

resting its case on that of the 1st Respondents case did not go according to plan as to strategy. It is now too late, in view of the failed strategy of resting its case on the 1st Respondent’s case, for the appellant to now seek to fault the judgment of the lower Court on the premise that the lower Court did not evaluate the evidence before it.
I agree with my Lord Ogbuinya, JCA that the appeal lacks merit.
It is dismissed.

ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read before now, a copy of the lead judgment just delivered by my Learned Brother, Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JCA, in which this appeal has been dismissed. I agree with the reasoning and conclusions therein.

The appeal is without merit. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the lower Court.

Appearances:

C.I. Igbinedion, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Efosa Osagie, Esq. – for first Respondent
No legal representation for the second respondent For Respondent(s)