LUGBE & ORS v. FCDA & ORS (2021)

LUGBE & ORS v. FCDA & ORS

(2021)LCN/14996(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Monday, February 01, 2021

CA/A/595/2014

RATIO

LAND LAW: DUTY OF A PLAINTIFF WHO SEEKS DECLARATION OF TITLE TO LAND

There is no doubt that the law is firmly settled and needs no restatement that a Plaintiff or Claimant who claims or seeks for declaration of title to land or right to statutory right of occupancy must give credible or believable evidence to establish or indicate his ownership of the land to enable the Court to exercise its discretion in his favour. The Claimant or the plaintiff must also identify the land or parcel of land he claims with clarity. This is imperative particularly where such Claimant or the Plaintiff is also seeking for Order of Injunction to restrain his adversary from trespassing or further trespassing or encroaching upon the land or res he claims.
It is when he has been able to prove all of these that onus will shift on the Defendant to show a better title. PER PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

LAND LAW: WAYS A PALINTIFF IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF TITLE CAN PROVE HIS CASE

The Claimant or the Plaintiff in an action for declaration of title is only required to prove his case on the balance of probabilities and he can do it in any of the ways established by the decisions of the apex Court in the land. I call in aid the following decisions: –
1. NAPOLEON ORIANZI VS THE A.G. OF RIVERS & ORS (2017) 6 NWLR (PT. 1561) 224 AT 264 E – H – 265 A – C per GALINJE, J.S.C. who said: –
“Clearly, the appellant set out a claim for declaration of title to the disputed property. The law is settled that the burden of proof in a claim for declaration of title to land lies on the plaintiff, who generally must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. See Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336; Udegbe v. Nwokafor (1963) 1 SCNLR 184; Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291; Piaro v. Tenalo (1976) 12 SC 31. PER PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

LAND LAW: WAYS OF PROVING TITLE TO LAND

It is also the law that a claim for declaration of title to land may be proved by any of the five ways stated and restated in numerous decisions of this Court. See Piaro v. Chief W. Tenalo (supra); Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 1 NMLR 200; Makanjuola v. Balogun (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 192; Olukoya v. Ashiru (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 322) 1479; (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1. These five methods of proving title or ownership to land are:
1. by traditional evidence;
2. by production of document of title which must be duly authenticated;
3. by the exercise of numerous and positive acts of ownership over a sufficient length of time to warrant the inference that the person is the true of the land;
4. by acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land; and
5. by proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstance rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land would in addition to the owner of the land in dispute.
In Olukoya v. Ashiru (supra), this Court gave the third method of proving ownership of land as follow:
“By acts of selling, leasing, renting out all or part of the land or farming on it or on a portion thereof.”
2. KABURU PADA V. WOYA GALADIMA & ORS (2018) 3 NWLR (PART 1607) 436 AT 455 A – G where SANUSI J.S.C. said:-
“My Lords, let me start by stating that it is well settled law, that there exist five methods known to law for establishing ownership of land. These methods briefly comprise the followings: –
(i) Proof of traditional history or evidence
(ii) Proof by grant or the production of document of title;
(iii) Proof of acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time, numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference that the persons exercising such acts is true owner(s) of the land.
(iv) Proof of acts of long possession; and
(v) Proof by possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of the such land would in addition, be the owner of the land in dispute.
See Idundun and Ors v. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 SC 277 at 246- 250; Atanda v. Ajani (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 511; Anyanwu v. Mbara (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 381; Kyari v. Alkali (2001) 5 SCNJ 448; (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 724) 412; Balogun v. Akanji (2005) 4 SCNJ 109-110; (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 933) 394. PER PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.
LAND LAW: MEANING OF OCCUPATION IN RELATION TO LAND

Occupation, as used in relation to land, entails more physical control of the land in the time being. It is a matter of fact. Such a control may have originated from mere permission or loan from the actual land owner or it may even be by stealing or by tortuous trespass. See Udeze v. Chidebe (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 141 SC. Ezukwu v. Ukachukwu (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 902) 227.” PER PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Elfrieda Oluwayemisi Williams-Dawodu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

HRH NDAKUZO LUGBE 2. HRH CHIEF ISA NDAKUZO JAREMI 3. CHIEF GALADIMA GOMNA (YOUTH LEADER SABO LUGBE) 4. CHIEF E. B. JERUMI (FOR AND ON BEHALF OF SABO-LUGBE COMMUINTY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, AIR-PORT ROAD, ABUJA) APPELANT(S)

And

FEDERAL CAPITAL DEV. AUTHORITY 2. THE HON. MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 3. ABUJA METROPOLITAN MGT. COUNCIL 4. ABUJA MUNICIPAL AREA COUNCIL (AMAC) RESPONDENT(S)

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By their Amended statement of claim dated and filed on 20th October, 2009, the Appellants as Plaintiffs claimed against the Respondent as Defendants at the lower Court jointly and severally the following reliefs:
“1. A declaration that the plaintiffs are rightful owners of the land by resettlement and indigenes of Sabon Lugbe.
2. An order directing the defendants to stop the threat or further threat to demolish the properties of indigenes of Sabon Lugbe who are lawfully on the layout they were resettled since 1981.
3. An order compelling the defendants, their servants, privies or whosoever to make adequate arrangement to compensate/and or relocate the plaintiffs before carrying out their planned demolition exercise.
4. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, against, servants, privies, jointly and severally from demolishing the plaintiffs’ properties unless and until adequate compensation and/or relocation is seen to be done property to the Saban Lugbe Community.
5. An order compelling the defendants particularly 1st and 2nd defendants to

release to the indigenes the approval layout of Saban Lugbe and all necessary documents pursuant to their resettlement in 1981.”

The Appellants were aggrieved and have by their Amended Notice of Appeal dated 30th March, 2018 and filed on the 3rd of May, 2018 appealed to this Court on six grounds which without their particulars are as follows:
“GROUND 1
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he gave his judgment against the Appellants on the strength and interpretation of the FCT Act only, without regard to the established judicial proof of title to land on the ground of long possession as postulated by the provisions of Land Use Act 1974 and Constitution of Federal Republic Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
GROUND 2
The issue of eminent and apparent act of trespass on the Appellants’ property by the Respondents was not considered at all. The Court only held that the Appellants had no locus standi whereas the 1st – 3rd Respondent admitted resettling the Appellants on a 1 Bedroom Flat at Sabon Lugbe since 1981 more the 30 yrs. ago.
GROUND 3
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that:

“the law is

also trite that the first duty of a plaintiff claiming declaration of title to land is to show clearly the precise area to which his claim relates”.
“agents from the layout plan (survey plan) Exhibit D6 and D7 Which depict the totality of the area called the saban lugbe Resettlement, with the different plot numbers the plaintiffs have however failed to pinpoint with precision or certainty which of these houses or plots their case relates.”
See pages 530 paragraphs 2 and 3 and page 531.
GROUND 4
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that Appellants failed to tender documents of title that establish precise portions claimed when the Respondents admitted moving the Appellants out of their ancestral home and resettled theta and built houses for them and supported that with a Survey Plan in Exhibits D6 & D7 showing clearly the plots and the houses and the area covered by the resettlement policy.
GROUND 5
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held against the weight of evidence as in paragraphs 4-8 of Plaintiffs’ reply that Appellants failed to satisfy all the five ways of proving title to land

particularly acts of long possession.
GROUND 6
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the Appellants failed to list all the names of the Sabon Lugbe indigenes being represented and that the Saban Lugbe Development Association was not linked in their pleading.”

The Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated 11th April, 2018 was filed on 3rd May, 2018 and deemed duly filed on 25th September, 2018 while 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ Brief of Argument dated 11th February, 2019 was filed on 14th February, 2019. It was deemed filed on 21st September, 2020. The 4th Respondent’s Brief of Argument was filed on 18th September, 2020 but dated 17th September, 2020 and deemed filed on 21/9/2020.

The Learned Counsel to the Appellants P. C. Eze Esq., distilled six issues from six grounds of appeal as follows:
“ISSUE I
Whether the learned trial Judge properly directed himself without regard to the merit of Appellants’ case by relying solely on his interpretations of the FCT Act, 1974 in isolation and exclusion of the established judicial proof of title to land and provisions of Section 34 of the Land Use Act 1978 and

Section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (Distilled from Ground 1).
ISSUE II
Whether the learned trial Judge was right to disregard the unlawful act of trespass on Appellants’ resettlement area by Respondents and held that Appellants’ had no locus standi, whereas 1st – 3rd Respondents admitted having resettled Appellants on the entire Sabo Lugbe area with Two-Room Bungalow for each indigene since 1981 which resulted to miscarriage of justice. (Distilled from Ground 2).
ISSUE III
Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he disallowed Appellants’ claim and held that Appellants’ failed to tender documents of title that establish their resettlement on the entire Sabo Lugbe area even after their historical evidence and act of long possession and uninterrupted enjoyment for over 30 years was not denied nor controverted by Respondents. (Distilled from Ground 5).
ISSUE IV
Whether the learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that Appellants’ claim for declaration of title failed upon their failure to show clearly the precise portions to which their claim relates whereas

Exhibit D6 and D7 (i.e., the Layout Survey Plan tendered and admitted by both parties) show the entire area referred to as sabon lugbe resettlement area. (Distilled from Ground 3).
ISSUE V
Whether the learned trial judge was right by not ascribing probative value to Exhibits D6 & D7 where same were pleaded, admitted in evidence and oral evidence adduced on them. (Distilled from Ground 4).
ISSUE VI
Whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that the names of several persons being represented in a/representative action were not listed or enumerated, and that the Appellants were not linked with the Sabon Lugbe Development Association which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. (Distilled from Ground 6).

The Learned Counsel to the 1st – 3rd Respondents CHIMA OKEREKE Esq., distilled five issues for determination as follows:
a) “Whether the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed the Appellants’ case.
b) Whether the learned trial Judge did not rightly consider the laws dealing with title to lands within the FCT in determining the Appellants’ claims.
c) Whether the learned trial Judge did not

rightly discountenance the Appellants’ argument in respect of alleged act of trespass and whether the trail Judge held that the Appellants had no locus standi
d) Whether Exhibits D6 and D7 are enough description of the precise identity of land to which the Appellants’ claim relates and whether the trial Court ought to have assigned more probative value to the said Exhibits D6 & D7 than it did.
e) Whether the trial Court was wrong when it held that the Appellants were not linked with Sabon lugbe Development Association.”

The fourth Respondent’s Learned Counsel C. I. OKOYE Esq., formulated a sole issue for determination of the appeal as follows:
“Whether the Learned trial Judge was right in dismissing suit No. FCT/HC/CV/900/09 in its entirety (Grounds 1, 2, 3. 4. 5, & 6).”

The appeal will be determined on the six issues formulated by the Appellant.
1. Whether the learned trial Judge properly directed himself without regard to the merit of Appellants’ case by relying solely on his interpretations of the FCT Act, 1974 in isolation and exclusion of the established judicial proof of title to land and provisions of

Section 34 of the Land Use Act 1978 and Section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (Distilled from Ground 1).
2. Whether the learned trial judge was right to disregard the unlawful act of trespass on Appellants’ resettlement area by Respondents and held that Appellants’ had no locus standi, whereas 1st – 3rd Respondents admitted having resettled Appellants on the entire Sabo Lugbe area with Two-Room Bungalow for each indigene since 1981 which resulted to miscarriage of justice. (Distilled from Ground 2).
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he disallowed Appellants’ claim and held that Appellants’ failed to tender documents of title that establish their resettlement on the entire Sabo Lugbe area even after their historical evidence and act of long possession and uninterrupted enjoyment for over 30 years was not denied nor controverted by Respondents. (Distilled from Ground 5).
4. Whether the learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that Appellants’ claim for declaration of title failed upon their failure to show clearly the precise portions to which their claim relates whereas Exhibit D6

and D7 (i.e., the Layout Survey Plan tendered and admitted by both parties) show the entire area referred to as Sabon Lugbe resettlement area. (Distilled from Ground 3).
5. Whether the learned trial Judge was right by not ascribing probative value to Exhibits D6 & D7 where same were pleaded, admitted in evidence and oral evidence adduced on them. (Distilled from Ground 4).
6. Whether the learned trial judge was right when he held that the names of several persons being represented in a/representative action were not listed or enumerated, and that the Appellants were not linked with the Sabon Lugbe Development Association which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. (Distilled from Ground 6).
They will be taken in one fell swoop.

Under issue 1, it is the submission of the Appellant that the learned trial Judge failed to recognize the constitutional rights to their customary rights of occupancy before the establishment of FCT and that the fact that the Appellants were resettled by the Respondents did not erode them from their Constitutional rights as Nigerians with Customary rights recognized by Sections 28(1) (3) (a), 9(1) (3) (C)

(4) (b) of Land Use Act and Sections 34 and 44(1) (a) (b) of 1999 Constitution as amended. According to the Learned Counsel to the Appellant, the learned trial Judge was wrong in his interpretation of FCT Act 1974 in that he failed to consider Section 34 of Land Use Act since it was the Federal Government through the Respondents that resettled them who are indigenous people of LUGBE from their ancestral and historical homes to new location called Sabon-Lugbe Abuja for overriding public interest/purpose and established the present Federal Housing Authority Estate Lugbe. He relied on cases of SOBANDE v. IGBOKWE (2016) 11 NWLR (PT 1523) 335 at 356 G – H and YUSUF V. OYETUNDE (1998) 12 NWLR (PT 5779) 483 at 353.

That any act of the Government overreaching the vested interests of the Appellants as in this case ought to have made the lower Court to strictly interpret the law against the Respondents from interfering with their rights over their landed properties. That Section 6(1) and 40(1) a – c of FCT Act 1974 was not complied with and that the Respondents violated Appellants right when they only provided two room apartments to adults of the Appellants

without plan for the offspring since 1981 let alone of issue of compensation for the farmland burial ground, artifacts, worship centres for different religious etc. He stated that provisions of Land Use Act Section 34 were violated by Respondents relying on paragraphs 14, 15 and 21 of Amended Statement of Claim.

That trial Judge failed to consider all the provisions of the law available to him in deciding the claim of the Appellants for declaration of title “premixed on their historical title endowed on them constitutionally”. He relied on the cases of OPUTA v. ANACIN (2010) 16 NWLR (PART 1539) 437 at 474 G – H and Adesanya v. S.D. Aderonmu (2000) 9 NWLR (Part 672) 370, on what Appellants must prove to satisfy the Court claim for title.

On issue 2 as to whether the lower Court was right to disregard what Learned Counsel to Appellant referred to as unlawful act of trespass on Appellant resettlement by Respondents and held that Appellants lacked locus standi, the Learned Counsel to the Appellants submitted the lower Court was wrong in that Respondents admitted in evidence to the fact that they resettled the Appellants in 1981. That the contention of

the Appellant is that Respondents committed acts of unlawful entry to land in Appellants possession which area according to Learned Appellants Counsel is covered by Exhibits D6 and D7, the resettlement area and that Respondent are not entitled to disturb their possession. That Learned trial Judge contradicted himself on issue of locus standi on pages 184, 186 – 187. That on 24th April, 2009, the lower Court held in a Ruling that Appellant had locus standi but contradicted that position in his judgment on pages 525 – 256 of the record. He referred to the cases of IDUNDUN V. OKUMAGBA (1979) 9 – 10 SC 277 and OPOTO V. ANAUN (2016) 16 NWLR (PT 1539) 437 – 474 on what a claimant claiming title must prove.

That the finding of the trial Court that all lands in the Federation are vested in Federal Government of Nigeria, means the FCT Act cannot oust the right conferred on any community in FCT and that the power vested in FCT Minister by FCT Act cannot be superior to the act of Federal Republic of Nigeria.

On issue 3 on whether the lower Court was right in its finding that Appellant failed to tender documents of title that could establish their resettlement

on the entire Sabo Lugbe area, Learned Counsel contended the lower Court was wrong. That the Respondents put them there after forcefully acquiring their ancestral land from Appellants.

That one of the claims of Appellants was for release of title documents by Respondents to Appellants. That the trial Judge admitted this much on pages 530 – 351 of the record.

He submitted that the testimonies of Appellants were not based on speculations and that lower Court ought to have made orders sought against the Respondents. That the identity and location of the land in dispute is clear having regard to Exhibits D6 and D7 showing the Sabon Lugbe resettlement Area. That the trial Court was in error in refusing to grant the reliefs sought by Appellants since they have satisfied the onus placed on them for declaration of title to land in dispute. He relied on the cases of NSA v. ENENE (2016) NWLR (PT. 1511) 284 and ATOLAGBE v. SHORUN (1985) 1 NWLR (PART 2) 360 at 265 (sic). That Appellants are in exclusive possession of the land in dispute.

On issue 4 as to whether in view of Exhibits D6 and D7, the lower Court was right when he held that Appellants failed

to show clearly precise portions to which their claims relate. He repeated part of his submissions under issue 3 to the effect that the sole witness to Respondents DW1, Kayode Ojou!ape admitted that the Appellants were resettled at Sabon Lugbe resettlement scheme under cross-examination at page 478 of the record and that tendered Survey Plans in respect of proposed Sabon Lugbe layout prepared in (1995) as Exhibits D4 – D4A and D4B.

That there is no dispute on the precise area being claimed by the Appellants vide DW1’s evidence. He relied on the cases of AYENI V. STATE (2016) 12 NWLR (PART 525) 51 at 69 G – H and OLUSANMI VS. OSHASONA (1992) 6 NWLR (PART 245) 2 at 33 – 34.

That having visited the locus in quo the learned trial Judge saw the place and that the trial Judge cannot justify his decision that a survey plan tendered by the Respondents cannot constitute the title document claimed by Appellants. He referred to the finding of lower Court on page 538 of the record to submit that evidence showed they were original owner of Lugbe before they were relocated and resettled by the Respondents and are thus entitled to the land in dispute.

That the lower Court ought to have raised and enforce presumption of withholding evidence against Respondents vide Section 149 D of the Evidence Act 1990 LFN.

On issue 5 as to whether the lower Court was wrong in failing to ascribe probative value to Exhibits D6 and D7 which he said were pleaded and admitted in evidence. He submitted the Learned trial Judge erred in law in failing to accord probative value to Exhibits D6 and D7 relying on the case of FBN PLC V. NWADIALU & SONS LTD (2016) 18 NWLR (PT 1543) at 47 – 48 F – 50. He relied on five ways to proving ownership of title to further submit that all the conditions were met by the Appellants. That Appellants proved they were in long and exclusive possession of the land in dispute. He urged the Court to resolve issue 5 in Appellants favour.

On issue 6 as to whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the names of several persons being represented in the action were not listed or enumerated and that Appellant were not linked with the Sabon Lugbe. Development Association in the pleading, the Learned Counsel to the Appellant stated that in a representative action

there is no need to name all the persons represented as it is a case of common interest.

That the judgment of the lower Court acknowledged the representative’s capacity of the Appellants albeit reluctantly. He relied on pages 529 of the record. That there is no doubt that the Appellants were representing the entire Sabon Lugbe indigenes resettled by the defendants at a specific and defined area called resettlement area depicted in Exhibit D6.

That the findings of the trial Judge on the representative capacity the Appellant are wrong and contrary to laws governing representative action. He relied on APEH v. PDP (2016) supra and RAPHEAL EJEZIE & ANOR v. ANUWU SUPRA. That the Defendants who were not one of the persons represented cannot challenge the capacity of the Appellants as to whom they represent. He relied on the case of SHELL v. EDAMKUE (2009) 39 NSCQR 597 at 621. That evidence of DW1 showed that Appellants demanded for resettlement documents from the Respondents relying on pages 515 – 516 of the record. He urged the Court to allow the appeal.

The Learned Counsel to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents commenced his argument on

whether the suit was rightly dismissed and whether the lower Court did not consider the law dealing with title to lands within FCT in determining the Appellants claims to title to the land in dispute. He submitted that the trial Judge was right in dismissing the Appellants suit. He supported the findings of the lower Court to the effect that having regard to Section 297(3) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 as amended and Section 1(3) of the FCT Act 1976 all lands in FCT are vested in the Government of the Federation. That 2nd Respondent is the sole authority appointed to administer land comprised in the FCT on behalf of Federal Government vide Section 307 of the aforesaid Constitution.
The Learned Counsel to the 1st – 3rd Respondents therefore submitted that since it is the claim of the Appellants that they are entitled to the land in dispute by virtue of a purported resettlement granted to them by the Federal Government they were required by law to produce documents issued to them by the 2nd Respondent as evidence of grant of Resettlement and this they failed to do.

That Exhibits D6 and D7 tendered by Respondents showing layout plans depicting

the Sabon Lugbe General Layout inside which the resettlement area is situated do not convey title to Appellants and that reliance placed on the said Exhibits D6 & D7 by Appellant was rightly rejected. He submitted that under Section 131 of Evidence Act 2011 and the case of Nwokorobia v. Nwogu (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt 1150) 553 at 585 the Appellants are under a duty to prove the title they claim via any of the five methods stipulated by law.

He submitted that the argument of Appellant in paragraph 6. 1 claiming historical evidence and act of long possession of uninterrupted ownership of the land in dispute for 30 years were not pleaded and they cannot change their position on their pleaded case in his Court relying on ADEGOKE MOTORS LTD V. ADESANYA (1989) 3 NWLR (PART 109) 251. That their title as claimed was founded on a resettlement by Federal Government of Nigeria. That no traditional evidence of possession of the land was led by the Appellant and none was pleaded. He relied on SALISU BABA IRAWO OSAN & ANOR v. CHIEF J. O. FOLARIN (2007) LPELR – CA/I/170/2002 and that Appellants must show how the land devolved on them.

He submitted that the entire map of SABON LUGBE is not the land in dispute in this case and that the Appellants failed to prove the exact area of land being claimed by them.

That when the Court visited the locus in quo the Appellant failed to show the Court identity of any particular buildings allocated to any of them in the resettlement area upon which their case for declaration of title could be founded.

He relied on pages 523 – 524 of the record to show that lower Court considered the provisions of Section 34 of Land Use Act contrary to the submissions of Appellant.

That SOBANDE’S case relied upon by the Appellants is not applicable to the facts of this case. He submitted that there is no conflict between Section 6(1) of FCT Act and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

On whether the trial Judge the trial Judge rightly discountenanced Appellants arguments in respect of alleged act of trespass and whether the trial Judge held that the Appellants had no locus standi, 1st – 3rd Respondents Learned Counsel relied on the finding of trial Court on pages 538 – 539 of the record to submit that the lower Court was right in its judgment and that issue of

trespass did not for part of the claim of the Appellant. He stated that parties are bound by their pleadings. He relied on the case of AREMU v. ADETORO (2007) 234 at 261 E.

On issue of locus Standi, the Learned Counsel to the 1st – 3rd Respondents wondered where the issue of locus standi came from because according to him there was no such decision in the judgment delivered on 20th November, 2013. That the issue was raised by Respondents Notice of Preliminary Objection of Respondents that the trial Judge ruled that the Appellants have locus standi. That the Ruling was delivered on 24th April, 2009. He referred to pages 178 – 190 of the record. He urged the Court to discountenance the argument on issue of locus standi.

On whether the learned trial Judge ought to have used Exhibits D6 and D7 to found for the Appellants, he submitted that in this case parties are not in agreement as to the precise area the Appellants claimed related to and that the onus still lied on the Appellant to prove the area of land they were claiming. He relied on the case of ODUNZE v. NWOSU (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 1 at 34 A – C and submitted that the lower Court was right

that Appellants failed to link their case to any indigenes of FCT who were resettled in Sabon Lugbe area who they claimed to represent on behalf of Lugbe Community Development Association Airport Road Lugbe, Abuja. He relied on the observation of the lower Court on page 533 of the record to further submit that the findings of trial Court are supported by facts on record.

On the complaint of Appellants that lower Court wrongly held that Appellants were not linked to Sabon Lugbe Development Association, the Learned Counsel to the 1st 3rd Respondents submitted that the trial judge was right when he held that the Appellants failed to plead and/or establish by evidence their link with the Sabon Lugbe Community Development Association, Airport Road, Abuja upon whom they purportedly instituted the action for and on behalf of. He relied on page 504 of the record of appeal.

In conclusion, he urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
In his own submissions, the Learned Counsel to 4th Respondent. C. I. OKOYE Esq., stated that the facts adduce at the trial Court categorically, are centred on the Defendants compensating the Plaintiffs with land and buildings at

Sabon Lugbe Federal Capital Territory by the Defendants for the Construction of Federal Housing Estate. He referred to the findings of the trial Court on pages 493 – 540 and 524 – 428 of the record. He submitted that 1st and 2nd Respondents exercise of powers to administer land within FCT vide Section 297 (2) and 304 of the Constitution does not abrogate customary right of occupancy within the FCT. He relied on Section 49 of the LAND USE ACT. The 4th Respondents submissions are to the effect that the lower Court was wrong in not granting the reliefs sought. That Learned Counsel to the 4th Respondent answered the sole issue he raised in the negative. The Learned Counsel engaged himself in incongruous argument and unsteady submissions with no head or tail.

The Reply on point of law filed by Appellants against the Respondents Brief of Argument contained a mere rehearse and repetition of submissions already canvassed in the main Brief of Argument of the Appellants. The said Reply Brief is hereby discountenanced.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
The complaints of the Appellants under issue 1 is that the learned trial Judge relied solely on interpretation of

FCT Act, 1974 to dismiss the Appellants suit for declaration of title and without due regard for method of establishing title to land. To them, the learned trial Judge failed to take cognizance of Section 34 of LAND USE ACT.
There is no doubt that the law is firmly settled and needs no restatement that a Plaintiff or Claimant who claims or seeks for declaration of title to land or right to statutory right of occupancy must give credible or believable evidence to establish or indicate his ownership of the land to enable the Court to exercise its discretion in his favour. The Claimant or the plaintiff must also identify the land or parcel of land he claims with clarity. This is imperative particularly where such Claimant or the Plaintiff is also seeking for Order of Injunction to restrain his adversary from trespassing or further trespassing or encroaching upon the land or res he claims.
It is when he has been able to prove all of these that onus will shift on the Defendant to show a better title. The Claimant or the Plaintiff in an action for declaration of title is only required to prove his case on the balance of probabilities and he can do it in

any of the ways established by the decisions of the apex Court in the land. I call in aid the following decisions: –
1. NAPOLEON ORIANZI VS THE A.G. OF RIVERS & ORS (2017) 6 NWLR (PT. 1561) 224 AT 264 E – H – 265 A – C per GALINJE, J.S.C. who said: –
“Clearly, the appellant set out a claim for declaration of title to the disputed property. The law is settled that the burden of proof in a claim for declaration of title to land lies on the plaintiff, who generally must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. See Kodilinye v. Odu (1935) 2 WACA 336; Udegbe v. Nwokafor (1963) 1 SCNLR 184; Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291; Piaro v. Tenalo (1976) 12 SC 31. In this case, the appellant who was the plaintiff at the trial Court had the burden to prove that he is entitled to the declaration which he sought at that Court and he was required to discharge this burden of proof on preponderance of evidence. It is also the law that a claim for declaration of title to land may be proved by any of the five ways stated and restated in numerous decisions of this Court. See Piaro v. Chief W. Tenalo (supra);

Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 1 NMLR 200; Makanjuola v. Balogun (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 192; Olukoya v. Ashiru (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 322) 1479; (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 990) 1. These five methods of proving title or ownership to land are:
1. by traditional evidence;
2. by production of document of title which must be duly authenticated;
3. by the exercise of numerous and positive acts of ownership over a sufficient length of time to warrant the inference that the person is the true of the land;
4. by acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land; and
5. by proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstance rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent land would in addition to the owner of the land in dispute.
In Olukoya v. Ashiru (supra), this Court gave the third method of proving ownership of land as follow:
“By acts of selling, leasing, renting out all or part of the land or farming on it or on a portion thereof.”
2. KABURU PADA V. WOYA GALADIMA & ORS (2018) 3 NWLR (PART 1607) 436 AT 455 A – G where SANUSI J.S.C. said:-
“My Lords, let me start by stating that it is well

settled law, that there exist five methods known to law for establishing ownership of land. These methods briefly comprise the followings: –
(i) Proof of traditional history or evidence
(ii) Proof by grant or the production of document of title;
(iii) Proof of acts of ownership extending over a sufficient length of time, numerous and positive enough as to warrant the inference that the persons exercising such acts is true owner(s) of the land.
(iv) Proof of acts of long possession; and
(v) Proof by possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of the such land would in addition, be the owner of the land in dispute.
See Idundun and Ors v. Okumagba (1976) 9-10 SC 277 at 246- 250; Atanda v. Ajani (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 511; Anyanwu v. Mbara (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 242) 381; Kyari v. Alkali (2001) 5 SCNJ 448; (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 724) 412; Balogun v. Akanji (2005) 4 SCNJ 109-110; (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 933) 394.
It must however be stressed here, that where a party claims title of a disputed land by way of his possession of same, if there is litigation between the parties as in

this instant case, the onus is on the other side which is asserting the contrary, to prove that he is the true owner of the land. This is because there is usually a tendency to confuse possession with mere occupation. Occupation, as used in relation to land, entails more physical control of the land in the time being. It is a matter of fact. Such a control may have originated from mere permission or loan from the actual land owner or it may even be by stealing or by tortuous trespass. See Udeze v. Chidebe (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 141 SC. Ezukwu v. Ukachukwu (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 902) 227.”
I have read the pleadings of the parties and the findings of the learned trial judge and I am of the firm view that the Appellants have not shown by any of the methods legally laid down for proving ownership of land that the land in dispute was vested in them or that they own the land. The land they are claiming according to them is a resettlement land meaning that they were displaced in their previous places of abode and that the Federal Government relocated them to land in dispute. The Appellants failed to produce any document(s) of title to show that ownership of

the properties over which they were resettled according to them have been granted to them by the Hon. Minister of FCT. There is evidence on record to show that the Appellants (all and singular) cannot and were unable to identify any portion, area or building on the resettled land as belonging to them or which could be said to have been vested in them by the appropriate Agent or Agency of the Federal Government having regard to the fact that the land is within the Federal Capital Territory Abuja.
What the learned trial Judge justifiably did was to examine the laws governing ownership of land or acquisition of land within the Federal Capital Territory as provided by the Constitution, the Land Use Act and the FCT Act of 1976. The interpretation(s) placed on the said laws by the Learned trial judge cannot be faulted. See GRACE MADU V. DR. BETRAM MADU (2008) 6 NWLR (PART 1083) 296 at 319 D – H – 322 A – C per ADEREMI, J.S.C. of blessed memory.
In the same judgment ONU, J.S.C. said on pages 324 H to 325 A-C said:
“Be it noted that it is well settled that the ownership of the land comprised in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is absolutely

vested in the Federal Government of Nigeria vide Ona v. Atenda (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) page 244 at page 267 paragraphs C – D. See also Section 297(1) & (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 236 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 and Section 1 (3) Federal Capital Territory, Act 1976. Section 18 of the Federal Capital Territory Act, Cap. 503 Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 vests power in the Minister for the FCT to grant statutory rights of occupancy over land situate in the Federal Capital Territory to any person. By this law, ownership of land within the FCT vests in the Federal Government of Nigeria who through the Minister of FCT vest same to every citizen individually upon application. Thus, without an allocation or grant by the Hon. Minister of the FCT, there is no way person including the respondent could acquire land in the FCT.”
The lower Court was on a strong wicket when it held on pages 526 – 528 as follows:
“Therefore, provision of Section 7 of the F.C.T Act, forbids and makes it unlawful for any person or body to undertake any development, whether temporary or permanent,

within the Federal Capital Territory without the written approval of the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory.
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs had more or less traced their purported title to the resettlement area to the Defendants. They seem also to have relied on long possession since they claimed that they had been in occupation since 1981. Their situation is however covered by the provision Section 33 of the Land Use Act, which gives Government the discretion to provide resettlement as a means of reasonable alternative accommodation for any person whose land is acquired by Government, where applicable.
But then, where the Minister of Federal Capital Territory grants allocation of land to any person or group of persons within the Federal Capital Territory, whether by way of direct allocation or by resettlement as is the case of the Plaintiffs in the instant case, the only way to prove the existence of such a grant is by the production of title documents in the manner of right of occupancy or by deed of assignment coupled with the Minister’s consent, as the case may be.
In the instant case, even though the Plaintiffs claim

ownership to land in the Sabon Lugbe resettlement area, they were unable to provide any documentary evidence of such resettlement.
It is obvious that in the Federal Capital Territory, in view of its peculiar creation by law, title to land cannot be established by long possession or by traditional history alone without more. There must be evidence of grant by the 2nd Defendant. Therefore, as correctly noted by Mr. Okereke, the contention of Mr. Eze that the Plaintiffs traced their “historic title” to the land called Sabon Lugbe, cannot be sustained in the circumstances of this case. Invariably too, the authority of Oko Vs. Okenwa (2010) 5 WRN 178 @ 180, cited by Mr. Eze, to support proof of title to land by traditional history is clearly inapplicable in the circumstances of the instant case.

The above far-reaching findings of the learned trial Judge was not appealed against. The Appellant must be deemed to be satisfied with the said findings and are bound by it. See 1. PDM & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2020) 17 NWLR (PART 1753) 303 at 335 G – H to 336 A per EKO, J.S.C. who said: “The law is settled a finding of fact not appealed is

taken as accepted and conceded. It remains binding as between the parties. It is clear from Oshodi v. Eyifunmi (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 2.) 145, (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 298; Michael v. State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt.1104) 361. This point was further reiterated recently, in Gilbert Nnadike & Anor v. Jude Afamefuna Nwachukwu (2019) LPELR – 4813 (SC) at 27 – 28, (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1698) 239 per Augie, J.S.C. that the effect of appealing only some points in the decision and not appealing other points is that “the other points not appealed remain unchallenged.”
2. ADEKUNLE A. AKINLADE & ANOR VS. INEC & ORS (2020) 17 NWLR (PART 1754) 439 at 461 H per EKO, J.S.C.
The Appellants woefully failed to show their nexus or interest in land they claimed to be “the rightful owners of the land by resettlement and indigenes of Sabon-Lugbe”. Issue 1 is resolved against the Appellants.

On issue 2 as to accusation against the lower Court for failing to consider the trespass of defendants on their land and that the Court only held that Appellant has no locus standi, the Appellant had contended that lower Court had earlier on held in the proceedings that

Appellants had locus standi and further submitted that based on the insistency of Appellants that Respondents put them in possession of the entire resettlement area (Exhibits D6 and D7) and as such the Appellants case of trespass against the Respondents ought to have been upheld.

The 1st – 3rd Respondents Learned Counsel argued the contrary and submitted that the Appellants are not entitled to such protection in that they were unable to point to any building in the resettlement area belonging to them and no portion of the land was shown to the trial Court at locus in quo as belonging to any of the Appellants or the type of trespass committed by the Respondents against any of the Appellants.

The learned trial Judge succinctly brought out what transpired at the locus in quo on pages 532 – 533 of the record and his findings as follows:
“Perhaps it is proper at this point to make reference to the visit undertaken by the Court to the locus in quo, that is the Sabon Lugbe resettlement area, on 20/04/2012; a venture to which the contending parties acceded to.
At the locus, the Court was shown physical evidence of the following:

The resettlement area comprising of the prototype houses built by the Federal Government for persons resettled in the area;
ii. Structures built as attachments to the resettlement buildings; some already demolished and some other marked for demolition;
iii. Many resettlement houses which remained intact and untouched.
It must however be pointed out that the Plaintiffs, who were present at the visit to the locus, did not make reference to or identify any particular buildings allocated to any of them individually in the resettlement area, upon which their case for declaration of title could be founded. As such, my summation is that the visit to the locus in quo, undertaken by the ‘Court, was of no useful purpose to the Plaintiffs’ case.”

It is quite amazing and outlandish for the Appellants who did not claim nor did they make any claim for trespass are now complaining that lower Court failed to hold that the Respondents were trespassers. There is no such claim in Appellants Writ of Summons and their Amended Statement of Claim. Their relief 4 seeking for perpetual injunction against Defendants from demolishing their properties until adequate

compensation or relocation is done cannot stand as it is vague and nebulous.

The Appellants were unable to point to any “Plaintiffs properties” at the locus in quo meaning the Appellants have no legal or equitable title or interest in the land they are laying claim howbeit on false premises. There is no scintilla of evidence to ascribe ownership of any kind to the Appellants.

Parties are bound by their pleadings and the Court will not decree in favour of any party before it what he or she does not claim. See:
1. AGIP VS. AGIP (2010) 5 NWLR (part 1187) 346 AT 427 B – C per FABIYI J.S.C. who held:
“It is pertinent at this point to express it clearly that a Court should not grant a prayer that is not contained in a motion paper. See Chief R. A. Okoya vs Santilli & Ors (1990) 2 NWLR (pt. 131) 172 at 205. By extension, a Court should not award that which was not claimed. This is because a Court is not a charitable organization.”
2. HON. CHIEF OGUEFI OZOMGBACHI V. MR. DENNIS AMADI & ORS LPELR – 45152 (SC) 1 AT 53 per PETER- ODILI, J.S.C. who said:
“It needs be reiterated that parties are bound by their pleadings and no party is

allowed to make a case different from what it set out from inception and so for the Appellant to seek to depart from their pleadings and embark on a fresh or brand new case different from the very beginning is an act in futility. The obvious reason is that a case retains its original nature from the commencement and the colour would not change because it is on appeal since an appeal or appeals are merely a continuum of that matter that entered from the very first time at the Court of first instance. It follows that the brilliant address of Counsel would not scratch the surface in the apparent quest to a change of nature of the case. See Effiom v. C.R.S.I.E.C (2010) 14 NWLR (PT 1213) 106; Alahassan v. Ishaku supra at 286 per Ogunbiyi, J.S.C.: Ogunsanya v. The State (2011) LPELR – 2349 SC 44 – 54 per RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.”

On issue of Locus standi, I am of the view that the Learned Counsel to the Appellants, with profound respect to him, misapprehended the finding of learned trial Judge. What the learned trial judge unassailably found is that the Appellants pleaded no facts to show in any form or manner their relationship with SABON-LUGBE DEVELOPMENT

ASSOCIATION whether as officers, members or in any other capacity. His Lordship had earlier found on page 504 of the record that a careful perusal of the averments in Appellants Amended Statement of Claim showed that there is no averment to explain the relationship of the Plaintiffs to the Association represented and that the evidence of 1st, 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs and their sole witness did not show any link between them and association they claimed represent. Again, there was no appeal against the decision by the Appellants. More importantly the decision of the lower Court is to the effect that the Appellants have no reasonable cause of action to prosecute either for themselves or on behalf of persons they claim to represent having regard to their pleadings and pieces of evidence led which did not and could not have enabled them to succeed on any of the reliefs sought by them.
Issue 2 is resolved against the Appellants.

On issue 3 as to whether the Appellants are not entitled to declaration of title to the entire resettlement area on basis that they have been on the land since 1981 or 30 years long possession, they contended the trial Court was

wrong in holding that they have no documents to support their claims. They relied on Exhibit D6 which is survey plan to cover Sabon-Lugbe resettlement Area and Exhibit D7 which covers the resettlement Area and general layout of Sabon-Lugbe resettlement Area. Exhibits D6 and D7 are not documents of title in favour of Appellants. They admitted that no documents of title have been given to them by the Respondents even though they have applied for same. It is on record that none of the Appellants was able to point out or identify any of the resettlement buildings allocated to displaced persons by the Respondents as a result of development in Federal Capital Territory. In other words, they are not one of the beneficiaries of the allocation of the two rooms bungalow which the 1st to 3rd Respondents unchallenged evidence show were allocated to the indigenes of the indigenous communities within the affected areas carved out for the creation of Federal Capital Territory. The said 1st – 3rd Respondents made it clear that the Appellants were not among those resettled in the Area. The position of the said Respondents was confirmed by the Appellants who were unable, even

through their witness to identify any of the buildings or portions of the land in the resettlement Area. They also failed to identify building or land belonging to them to the Learned trial Judge at the site of the locus in quo.

Long possession cannot ripen into ownership of a property in favour of a person who cannot show any iota of acts of ownership on the land he claims to be in long possession. No such long possession was established from the facts contained in the record. Issue 3 is resolved against the Appellants.

Issue 4 as to whether the Appellants failed to show the precise portions which their claim relates. The Appellants had argued that Exhibits D6 and D7 the Survey Plans of the Resettlement Scheme and its Layout tendered by the 1st 3rd Defendants and Appellants showed the entire area referred to as Sabon Lugbe resettlement area.

They also relied on the evidence of DW1. What the DW1 said on page 478 of the record is that homes were built for indigenes in Sabon Lugbe resettlement scheme and that what was demolished was unauthorized structures such as attachments of Kiosks and so on. He also stated that there is no plan to resettle

the already resettled indigenes of Sabon-Lugbe resettlement Area by the Defendants.

Clearly, it cannot be said that the evidence of Defendants witness (DW1) amounted to evidence of identity of precise area of land the Appellants are claiming. There is nothing on Exhibits D6 and D7 showing the names of the Appellants or Lugbe Community Development Association Airport Road Abuja. No such thing on Exhibits D6 and D7. There is nothing discernible from the Appellants writ of summons and Amended statement to show precise area of land they claimed.
On the need for Claimant or Plaintiff in an action for declaration of title or Statutory or Customary Right on Occupancy to scrupulously identify the land in dispute with precision, I refer to the cases of:
1. KUBURU PADA VS WOYA GALADIMA & ANOR (2018) 3 NWLR (PART 1607) 366 AT 455H TO 456A per SANUSO J.S.C. who said:
“Now having stated the position law above as it is, let me now consider the evidence adduced at the trial Court by the parties. But before doing so, my lords, permit me to digress and emphasize here, that a claimant of declaration of title to land has the burden to give clearly,

the identity of the land he is claiming, because no Court should grant a declaration on an unidentified land. In short, he must lead credible evidence describing an identifying the land with certainty. See Ogedengbe v. Balogun (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1030 380: Adelusola v. Akinde (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 851) 1.”
At page 465 of the Report, Aka’ahs, J.S.C. said:
“As pointed out by the learned trial Judge in an action for declaration of title to land, the Claimant has the primary duty to prove clearly and unequivocally the precise area to which his claim relates citing the case of Ijade vs. Ogunyemi (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 470) 17.”
2. MICHAEL AIYEOLA VS RAMOTA YEKINI PEDRO (2014) 13 NWLR (PART 1424) 409 AT 439 G – H per PETER-ODILI, J.S.C. who said:
“The onus of proof lies on the plaintiff who seeks a declaration of title to land and or an injunction to establish with certainty and precision and without inconsistency the area of land to which lies claim relates. The point clearly emphasized is that a declaration to title to land can only be granted in respect of land which has definite, precise and accurate boundaries. Therefore, a way to discharge the

onus of proving the identity of the land in dispute by such description of the land that any surveyor acting on such description could produce an accurate plan or the land in dispute.”
The record of appeal is replete with evidence and facts showing that the Appellants did not at all establish with precision or any certainty the area of land they are claiming both on the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence before the lower Court. The lower Court rightly found against the Appellants that they failed to identify area of land they claimed.

Issue 4 is resolved against the Appellants.

On issue 5 as to whether the learned trial Judge was right in not ascribing probative value to Exhibits D6 and D7 same having been pleaded and admitted, the Appellants are of the view that admission of the documents in evidence is sufficient to grant them reliefs sought from lower Court.

I think it is preposterous for the Appellants who admitted by their pleadings that they have no documents vesting the land they claimed in them and who have failed outrightly to establish any legal or equitable interest in the land they are laying to now contend that the

Map of a resettlement scheme and its layout should be utilized to vest title in them. The documents do not belong to the Appellants and the Appellants have not shown that they are even beneficiaries of any of the properties contained in Exhibits D6 and D7.
By the authority of this Court relied upon in FBN PLC v. NWADIALU 718 NWLR (PART 1543) 47 – 48 F – G and 50 A, it was held that such documentary evidence is to be used as hanger to assess the oral evidence of the parties in order for the Court to find out the truth in the matter. Thus, using Exhibits D6 and D7 as hanger to assess the oral evidence in this matter, point irresistibly to the fact that the Appellants have no interests, legal or equitable in the subject matter of this action. The said Exhibits D6 and D7 are clearly not in support of the Appellant.

The case of Appellants is that of a person who built his castle in the air, it is moribund and speculative. They claimed Respondents built over 100 units of houses for indigenes at the Saba resettlement Area which they said are now inhabited by over 500 people yet the Appellants cannot point to any of the 100 units of houses which belong

to them and SABO-LUGBE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION AIR-PORT ROAD FCT ABUJA they claimed to represent.

On pages 540 – 531, the learned trial Judge amply found against the Appellants as follows:
“Apart from the layout plans Exhibit D6 and D7, which depicts the totality of the area called the Sabon-Lugbe resettlement, with the different plot number, the Plaintiffs have however failed to pin point with precision or certainty which of those houses or plots their case relate. Further, documents of title, which should have established beyond conjecture, the precise portions claimed by the Plaintiffs were also not tendered. As correctly submitted by Mr. Okereke, Survey Plans alone do not convey title without more but can only be used to support evidence of title already led. This is even more so in the Federal Capital Territory where title can only be established by production of documents of grant issued by the 2nd Defendant.”

Again, the above findings against the Appellants were not appealed against. The settled position of the law is that any adverse or damaging findings of a trial Court or appellate Court not appealed against

means the person against whom the damaging or adverse findings are made is satisfied with the findings and have no cause to complain.
The Appellants are bound by the above quoted findings of the lower Court. See:
1. GILBERT NNADIKE & ANOR V. JUDE A. NWACHUKWU (2019) 16 NWLR (PART 1698) 23 at 266 G – H per AUGIE, J.S.C.
2. YUSUF WALI VS APC & ORS (2020) 16 NWLR (PART 1749) 82 at, J.S.C. who said:
“An adverse finding of fact, not challenged by the party against whom it is made is deemed as accepted by him and therefore taken as established.”

Issue 5 is resolved against the Appellants.

On issue 6 as to whether the trial judge was right in holding that the names of several persons being represented in a representative action were not listed or enumerated and that Appellants were not linked with SABON-LUGBE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION in the pleading, it is the submission of the Appellants that it is not necessary because they have common interest.

The learned trial Judge adequately considered the subject matter of issue on page 529 of the record found that even if the Appellants action was filed on behalf of the

indigenes resettled at Sabon Lugbe there must be effort to verify the individual allottees on the resettlement houses as an action on behalf of the entire resettlement without specific reference to particular persons whose houses were demolished/attempted to be demolished by 1st – 3rd Respondents, cannot suffice in the circumstance having regard to Appellants evidence.

It is also important to say that the Defendants (DW1) had categorically stated that it is the attachments or additional illegal extension of the two-bedroom bungalow by the allottees without appropriate approval of the appropriate authorities were the structures marked for demolition and not the buildings in their Original State.

The findings of the learned trial Judge is well founded and supported by the evidence on record.

The onus is always on the Appellants to prove or establish that a judgment is perverse or not supported by evidence on record or that the oral and documentary evidence before the trial Court were not properly assessed or evaluated. The Appellant must show that there is a failure of justice or miscarriage of justice making it necessary for an Appellate Court to

intervene and remedy the situation. See:
1. ALHAJI MOHAMMED BUHARI AWODI & ANOR VS MALLAM SALIU AJAGBE (2015) 3 NWLR (PART 1447) 575 at 599 G – H per OKORO, J.S.C.
2. DR. ROY PEDRO UGO VS. AUGUSTINA CHINYELU UGO (2017) 18 NWLR (PART 1597) 218 AT 239 D – F per EKO, J.S.C. who said:
“In our jurisprudence, Counsel’s bare Statement from the Bar has no force of evidence. The address or submissions of Counsel contained in a written brief of argument are not legal evidence nor are they intended to be. The basic rule is he who asserts must prove that the facts he asserts exist. Where the appellant alleges a miscarriage of justice, the burden rests on him to establish the miscarriage of justice. The event of his failure to so establish the appellate Court will not intervene to set aside the judgment he appeals against. See Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Starite Industries Overseas Corporation (2009) 2 – 3 SC 8: (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 49.”

Issue 6 is hereby also resolved against the Appellant.

In the result, the Appellants appeal is lacking in merit and it is hereby dismissed in its entirety. The judgment of the High Court of the

Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria (Coram) Hon. Justice O. A. ADENIYI delivered on 20th November, 2013 is HEREBY AFFIRMED.
There will be no order as to costs.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

I agree in full with the reasoning and conclusion. I also, for the same reasons, find the appeal lacking in merit. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

ELFRIEDA OLUWAYEMISI WILLIAMS-DAWODU, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading in advance the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.

I completely agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein. I also dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria (Coram) Hon. Justice O. A. Adeniyi delivered on 20th November, 2013.
I make no order as to costs.

Appearances:

C. EZE ESQ. with him, A. A. IDRIS For Appellant(s)

CHIMA OKEREKE – for 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents
C. I. OKOYE – for 4th Respondent For Respondent(s)