CHEVRON (NIG) LTD v. NUPENG & ANOR (2021)

CHEVRON (NIG) LTD v. NUPENG & ANOR

(2021)LCN/14965(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, January 15, 2021

CA/L/188/2014

RATIO

COURT: POSITION OF THE LAW ON RAISING AN ISSUE SUO MOTU

Indisputably, the law seriously frowns on a Court raising an issue suo motu, on its own motion, and deciding same without input from the parties. Such an untoward judicial exercise will drag the Court into the arena of conflict as well as impinge on the inviolable rights of parties to fair hearing as entrenched in Section 36 (1) of the Constitution, as amended. See INEC v. Ogbadibo LG (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 167; Gwede v. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) 56; Egbuchu v. Continental Merchant Bank Plc. (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513); Adedayo v. PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1382); Odedo v. Oguebego (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1476) 229; Mainstreet Bank Ltd. v. Binna (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 316; Mabamije v. Otto (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 171; A-G., Fed. v. A-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Ogar v. Igbe (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 534. However, it is not an inelastic rule of law. It admits of certain exceptions. The need for address by parties becomes unnecessary when: “(a) the issue relates to the Courts own jurisdiction; (b) both parties are/were not aware or ignore a statute which may have bearing on the case…. (c) … on the face of the record serious questions of the fairness of the proceedings is evident. See Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 300 at 332, per Rhodes – Vivour, JSC; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2000) 10 NWLR(Pt.1150) 592; Effiom v. C. R. O. S. I. E. C. (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt.1213) 106; Gbagbarigha v. Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 289; Kusamotu v. APC (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1670) 51; Garba v. Tsoida (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1716) 1. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
JURISPRUDENCE: WHO IS A JURISTIC PERSON

By way of prefatory observations, a juristic person is an entity armed with the capacity to ventilate his/its complaints

in judicio. Generally, it is only natural persons, id est, human beings and artificial persons, such as body corporate/corporation, an artificial being which is invisible, intangible and exist only in the contemplation of the law, that are imbued with the capacity to sue and be sued in law Court. The jural units, which the law has cloaked with the garment of legal personality, are: human beings, incorporated companies, corporate sole with perpetual succession, trade unions, partnerships and friendly societies. No action can be commenced by or against any party except a natural person(s) save such a party has been accorded by a statute, expressly or impliedly, or by common, either a legal personality under the name by which it sues or is sued or right to sue or be sued by that name. Where either of the parties is not a legal person, capable of exercising legal rights and obligations in law, the action is plagued by incompetence and liable to be struck out on account of want of legal personality, see Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd. v. General Manager G.B. Ollivant Ltd. (1961) 2 SCNLR 317; Kate Ent. Ltd. v. Daewoo Nig. Ltd. (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 116; Fawehinmi v. NBA (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.105) 558; Ataguba & Co. v. Gura (Nig) Ltd. (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429; A. – G Anambra State v. A.-G Fed., (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4; Admin./Exec., Estate, Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; M.M.A. Inc. v N.M.A. (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 506; Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt.1355) 28; BB. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206, Interdril (Nig.) Ltd v. U.B.A. Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt.1581) 52; Dairo v. Regd. Trustees, T. A. O.., Lagos (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt.1599) 62; Bajehson v. Otiko (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1638) 138; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 313; Moses v. NBA (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 59; Persons, Name Unknown v. Sahris Int’l Ltd. (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 203. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.
PLEADINGS: DUTY OF COURT IN RELATION TO READING PLEADINGS

The law commands the Court to read pleading holistically in order to garner a flowing story of it. See Okochi v. Animkwoi (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 1; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 366. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

EVIDENCE: NATURE OF ADMISSION

My noble Lords, in the mind of the law, admission connotes a statement, oral or documentary, made by a party which suggests an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. See Section 20 of the Evidence Act, 2011; UBA Plc. v. Jargaba (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 237; Oguanuhu v. Chiegboka (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 588. It “is a concession or voluntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence of certain facts; a statement made by a party of the existence of a fact which is relevant to the cause of his adversary; a voluntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence of the truth of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claims in an action”. See Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534 at 558 per Fabiyi, JSC; UBA v. Jargaba (2007) 31 NSCQR 144; N.B.C.I. v. Integrated Gas (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 916) 617; Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205; N.A.S. Ltd. v. UBA Plc (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 421. It is classified, in the stratification of evidence, as the best evidence against the party making it, see Daniel v. INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463) 133. It constitutes a concession against the interest of a party making it. SeeOnovo v. Mba (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 391. Hence, in the view of the law, an admitted fact does not need any proof. See Our Line v. S.C.C. Nig. Ltd. (2009) 7 SCNJ 358; Jolasun v. Bamgboye (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 285; Offor v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 421; Jitte v. Okpulor (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1497) 542; Cole v. Jibunoh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 499; Orianzi v. A.-G., Rivers State (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1561) 224; Mba v. Mba (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 177; Adeokin Records v. M.C.S.N (Ltd/GTE) (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1643) 550; N.R.M.A & FC v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (1656) 247. PER OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Obande Festus Ogbuinya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Jamilu Yammama Tukur Justice of the Court of Appeal

Balkisu Bello Aliyu Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

CHEVRON NIGERIA LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

NATIONAL UNION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS WORKERS (NUPENG) (For And On Behalf Of NUPENG Delog Branch, NUPENG T.A. Amussah & Sons Limited Branch, NUPENG J2 Const. & General Service Branch, NUPENG Tobinsco Nigeria Limited Branch, NUPENG Astral Contracting Limited Branch And NUPENG Gladwyn Investment Limited Branch) 2. LOGISTICS AND FACILITIES AFFAIRS LIMITED RESPONDENT(S)

OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal queries the correctness of the decision of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN), holden in Lagos (hereinafter addressed as “the lower Court”), coram judice: B.B. Kanyip, J. (now-PNICN), in Suit No. NIC/LA37/2010, delivered on 2nd December, 2013. Before the lower Court, the appellant and the respondents were the claimant and the defendants respectively.

The facts of the case, which transformed into the appeal, are amenable to brevity and simplicity. The appellant, which carries on the business of oil and petroleum exploration in Nigeria, had “outstanding contracts” with the first respondent, a duly registered Trade Union, whereby it provided unskilled and semi-skilled workers to the appellant. The second respondent provided the services of drivers to the appellant at its requests. In June, 2010, members of the second respondent were unionized. The second respondent was unresponsive to the alleged unionisation. That sparked off demonstrations and picketing of the members of the first respondent against the second defendant at the

entrance, within and inside the precincts of the appellant’s premises located at No. 2 Chevron Drive, Lekki, Lagos State. The appellant claimed the demonstrations and picketing were illegal and violated its right to own, use and enjoy its property. Sequel to that, the appellant beseeched the lower Court, via a complaint filed on 21st October, 2010, and tabled against the respondent, the following reliefs:
“1. A DECLARATION that the 1st Defendant and its branches (i.e. NUPENG Delog Branch, NUPENG T. A. Amussah Branch, NUPENG J2 Const. & General Services Branch NUPENG Tobinsco Nigeria Limited Branch, NUPENG Gladwyn Investment Limited Branch and NUPENG Astral Contracting Limited Branch) have no right to embark on picketing or demonstrations inside or within the precincts of the Claimant’s properties, premises or locations in furtherance of the between the 1st Defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd Defendant.
2. A DECLARATION that the disruption of the Claimant’s business and operations by the picketing and demonstrations embarked upon by the 1st Defendant and/or its branches (i.e. NUPENG Delog Branch, NUPENG T. A. Amussah Branch, NUPENG J2

Const. & General Services Branch, NUPENG Tobinsco Nigeria Limited Branch, NUPENG Gladwyn Investment Limited Branch and NUPENG Astral Contracting Limited Branch) inside and within the precincts of the Claimant’s premises, properties and locations in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st Defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd Defendant is unwarranted and illegal.
3. A DECLARATION that the disruption of the Claimant’s operations by the picketing and demonstrations embarked upon by the 1st Defendant and/or its branches (i.e. NUPENG Delog Branch, NUPENG T. A. Amussah Branch, NUPENG J2 Const. & General Services Branch, NUPENG Tobinsco Nigeria Limited Branch, NUPENG Gladwyn Investment Limited and NUPENG Astral Contracting Limited Branch) inside and within the Claimant’s premises, properties and locations and in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st Defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd Defendant is a violation of Claimant’s constitutional right to its properties, premises and locations.
4. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the 1st Defendant and its branches (i.e. NUPENG Delog Branch, NIJPENG T. A. Amussah

Branch, NUPENG J2 Const. & General Services Branch, NUPENG Tobinsco Nigeria Limited Branch, NUPENG Gladwyn Investment Limited Branch and NUPENG Astral Contracting Limited Branch) from any further from of picketing or demonstration within and inside the Claimant’s properties locations and premises either in furtherance of the dispute between the 1st Defendant, its aforesaid branches and the 2nd Defendant or at all.”

In reaction, the respondents joined issue with the appellant and denied liability by filing their respective statements of defence.

Following the rival claims, the lower Court had a full-scale determination of the case. In proof of the case, the appellant fielded one witness. In disproof of it, the second respondent called one witness. The first respondent called no witness. At the closure of evidence, the parties, through counsel, addressed the lower Court in the manner allowed by law. In a considered judgment, delivered on 2nd December, 2013, found at pages 304 – 319 of the record, the lower Court dismissed the case.

The appellant was aggrieved by the decision. Hence, on 20th January, 2014, the appellant lodged a

2-ground notice of appeal, copied at pages 320 – 323 of the record and prayed this Court for the same reliefs already enumerated at the dawn of this judgment. Thereafter, the parties, through counsel, filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument in line with the procedure for hearing civil appeals in this Court. The appeal was heard on 20th October, 2020.

During its hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, Ladipo Soetan, Esq., adopted the appellant’s brief of argument, filed on 11th April, 2014, as representing his arguments for the appeal. He urged the Court to allow it.

Similarly, learned counsel for the first respondent G.O. Tamuna, Esq., adopted the first respondent’s brief of argument, filed on 18th September, 2017 but deemed properly field on 24th October, 2017 as forming his reactions against the appeal. He urged the Court to dismiss it. Also, learned counsel for the second respondent, l. C. Mordi, Esq., adopted the second respondent’s brief of argument, filed on 25th February, 2015 but deemed properly filed on 20th October, 2020 as consisting his submissions against the appeal. He urged the Court to dismiss it.

In the appellant’s brief of argument, learned counsel distilled two issues for determination to wit:
i) Whether having regard to the lack of dispute regarding the Appellant’s existence, the learned trial judge was right when he held that the Appellant failed to prove that it is a citizen and if the failure to prove same extinguished the appellant’s constitutional right to property as guaranteed under Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution.
ii) Whether the lower Court was right in its judgment when it ignored established legal principles on the nature and of extent employees’ right to picket when juxtaposed with Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution.

In the first respondent’s brief of argument, learned counsel crafted three issues for determination, viz:
1. Whether the Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria within the context of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and therefore entitled to enjoy the fundamental rights provided for under Section 43 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
2. Whether based on evidence on the record of proceedings, the Appellant had failed to prove its case at the lower Court thereby

resulting in the judgment dismissing its claims?
3. Whether the judgment of the lower Court dismissing the Appellant’s claims was right?

In the second respondent’s brief of argument, learned counsel nominated a single issue for determination, namely:
1. On the state of the evidence, whether the Appellant has the competence to stop the 1st Respondent from engaging in union activities in his place of work.

A close look at the three sets of issues shows that they are identical in substance. In fact, the respondents’ issues can be conveniently subsumed under the appellant’s. For this reason of sameness, I will be deciding the appeal on the issues formulated by the appellant; the undisputed owner of the appeal.

Arguments on the Issues:
Issue one.
Learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the respondents admitted, in their pleadings and evidence, that the appellant was a limited liability company registered under the Companied and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) so that its legal personality was not in dispute to warrant its proof. He relied on Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534;

Edokpolo Co. Ltd. V. Ohenhen (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 356) 511. He asserted that the lower Court raised the issue of the appellant’s citizenship suo motu. He stated that the appellant, on incorporation, was a company with all the rights and functions available thereto in the ownership and enjoyment of immovable property as a fundamental right. He added that the appellant enjoyed a presumption of regularity under Section 167 (c) of the Evidence Act, 2011. He cited Sections 37 and 38(1) of CAMA; Peenok Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd (1982) 12 SC 1.

On behalf of the first respondent, learned counsel reproduced the definitions of citizen as noted in Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, page 278. He further reproduced Sections 25(1) and 26 of the Constitution, as amended, on the methods of acquisition of citizenship by birth and registration. He contended that the appellant is not a citizen of Nigeria to own immovable property under Section 43 of the Constitution, as amended, because it is not a natural person. He stated that the provision of Sections 25 – 28 of the Constitution, as amended are clear and must be given liberal and holistic

construction. He relied on JAMB v Orji (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072 (sic); Mbani v. Bosi (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 991) 400; Agbreh v. Mimra (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt.1071) 378; S.P.D.C. v. Isaiah (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 508) 236; FRN v. Dariye (2021) (Pt. 1265) 521. He conceded that the appellant is a legal personality but not a Nigerian citizen. He reasoned that Sections 25 – 28 of the Constitution, as amended, superseded the provisions of Sections 37 – 39 of CAMA. He referred to Speakers K.S.A.A v. Adegbe (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 68; Itsueli v. S.E.C. (2012) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1284) 329; A. – G., Abia State v. A. – G., Fed.(2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265. He declared Peenok Investment Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (supra) as inapplicable as a case is an authority for which it decided. He cited Osahon v. FRN (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt. 845) 8

For the second respondent, learned counsel argued that the lower Court’s reference to Section 43 of the Constitution, as amended, was obiter as the issue before it was not about the right to own property by the appellant.

Issue two
Learned appellant’s counsel submitted that the lower Court wrongly construed

Section 43 of the Trade Union Act, Cap T14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, LFN, 2004 as permitted the picketing workers intimidation of non-picketing or incursion into the appellant’s premises which was an infringement of its right to enjoyment of its property. He relied on Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners (1908) 21R 214 (262 – 273); Picardi Hotels Ltd. v. Egwu (1999) 6 BLLR 601 (LC) (274 – 278); Fourways Mall (Pty) Ltd. v. South African Commercial Catering 1999 (3) SA 752 Labour Relations Law (A Comprehensive Guide) 4th ed. Pages 304 — 308; Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Great Britain by Bob Hepple and Sandra Freedman, 2nd edition, page 496 (294 – 297). He stated that there was unchallenged evidence that the picketing took place within the appellant’s premises. He noted that the Constitution is the grund norm and other laws derive their validity from it. He cited A – G., Abia State v. A. – G., Fed (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264; PDP v. INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) 200. He postulated that the provision of Section 43 of the Trade Union Act must be read subject to the appellant’s fundamental right in Section 43 of the Constitution, as amended.

He opined that Section 43 of the Trade Union Act did not provide for deprivation of the appellant’s fundamental right. He referred to UNTH Mag. Board v. Nnoli (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 363) 376; Achu v. Civil Service Commission of Cross Rivers State (2009) 3 NWLR (Pt.1129) 475; PDP v. INEC (supra). He concluded that the Court had a duty to protect the right provided in the Constitution. He cited PDP v. INEC (supra).

On behalf of the first respondent, learned counsel contended that Section 43 of the Trade Union Act allowed for picketing within the appellant’s premises and should be given its liberal construction. He relied on NPA Plc v. Lotus Plastics Ltd (2005) 19 NWLR (Pt. 959) 158. He described the evidence of the appellant’s witness as contradictory and an admission against interest which could not be relied on by the lower Court. He cited C & C Const. Co. Ltd. v. Okhai (2003) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 133; Nnajifor v. Ukonu (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 36) 504; INEC v. Oshiomhole (2009) 174 LRCN 183. He maintained that the lower Court’s finding on ingress and egress was not appealed against and was binding on the appellant. He referred to Buhari v. INEC (2008) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 12;

Nnakwe v. State (2003) 7 SC (Pt. 29) 137. He took the view that foreign judgments, cited by the appellant, did not interpret the exact words in Section 43 of the Trade Union Act. He cited Olafisoye v. FRN (2004) NWLR (Pt. 864) 580. He posited that the appellant’s witness was discredited under cross-examination and the first respondent was entitled to judgment without calling a witness. He referred to Hawad lnt’l Schl. Ltd. v. Mima Pros. Vent Ltd. (No. 1) (2005) 1 NWL (Pt 909) 567.

On the part of the second respondent, learned counsel argued that Section 43 of the Trade Union Act is clear and should be given liberal construction. He relied on A. – G., Fed. V. A. – G., Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1380) 249; Dangana v. Musa (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 50. He persisted that the evidence of the appellant’s witness was inconsistence and could not be relied on. He cited Ayanwale v. Atanda (1988) ALL (sic) 24; Muka v. State (1976) 9 – 10 SC 305; Onyemena v. State (1974) ALL NLR 522. He concluded that the lower Court properly evaluated the evidence and an appellate Court would not interfere with it. He referred to Ayorinde v. Fayoyin (2001) FWLR

(Pt. 75) 483; Plateau Investment & Properties Dev. Co. Ltd. v. Ebhota (2001) FWLR (Pt. 64) 374.

Resolution of the Issues.
In the interest of orderliness, I will attend to the issues in their numerical sequence of presentation by the feuding parties. To this end, I will kick off with the treatment of issue one. The meat of the issue is simple. It chastises the lower Court’s finding on the appellant’s right vis-a-vis the provision of Section 43 of the Constitution as amended. The appellant bemoaned and christened it as raising issue suo motu which violated his right to fair hearing as entrenched in Section 36 (1) of the Constitution, as amended.
Indisputably, the law seriously frowns on a Court raising an issue suo motu, on its own motion, and deciding same without input from the parties. Such an untoward judicial exercise will drag the Court into the arena of conflict as well as impinge on the inviolable rights of parties to fair hearing as entrenched in Section 36 (1) of the Constitution, as amended. See INEC v. Ogbadibo LG (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 167; Gwede v. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1438) 56; Egbuchu v. Continental Merchant Bank Plc.

(2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513); Adedayo v. PDP (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1382); Odedo v. Oguebego (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1476) 229; Mainstreet Bank Ltd. v. Binna (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1526) 316; Mabamije v. Otto (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 171; A-G., Fed. v. A-G., Anambra State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 314; Ogar v. Igbe (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 534. However, it is not an inelastic rule of law. It admits of certain exceptions. The need for address by parties becomes unnecessary when: “(a) the issue relates to the Courts own jurisdiction; (b) both parties are/were not aware or ignore a statute which may have bearing on the case…. (c) … on the face of the record serious questions of the fairness of the proceedings is evident. See Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 300 at 332, per Rhodes – Vivour, JSC; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2000) 10 NWLR(Pt.1150) 592; Effiom v. C. R. O. S. I. E. C. (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt.1213) 106; Gbagbarigha v. Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 289; Kusamotu v. APC (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1670) 51; Garba v. Tsoida (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1716) 1.
It is decipherable from the record, the spinal cord of every appeal, that the warring parties joined issue, in their evidence and final

written addresses, on the applicability of Section 43 of the Constitution, as amended, to the case which parented the appeal. In the view of the law, an issue is joined on a particular fact, necessitating its proof, when its assertion is disputed by an opposing party. See Galadima v. State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636)357. Put the other way round, the parties proffered evidence and addressed the lower Court on the point. In this wise, the law mandates the lower Court to make finding(s) thereon. See Odunukwe v. Ofomata (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 404); Abah v. Monday (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 569; Ikpeazu v Otti (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1513) 38.
The lower Court’s finding orbits around the appellant’s entitlement to tap the right in Section 43 of the Constitution, as amended, which was a tangential dispute in the case. Thus, the lower Court did not, proprio vigore, raise the issue of the appellant’s right in that provision. It merely, and rightly in my view, analysed the evidence offered by the contending parties on it. That cannot, under any guise or imagination, snowball into raising an issue ex proprio motu. The propriety or otherwise of the finding is a different

consideration. It follows that the allegation of raising issue suo motu is not only uncharitable but unsustainable. The decision was not guilty of the pseudo-charge as the lower Court acted in accordance with the tenet and spirit of the law. The net effect is clear. The appellant’s inviolable right to fair hearing did not suffer any erosion in the unbiased judicial hands of the lower Court. Indubitably, the appellant cannot harvest from the sanctuary of the beneficent provision of Section 36 (1) of the Constitution, as amended.
The foregoing legal expositions, with due deference, puncture the learned appellant’s counsel’s seemingly sterling contention on the point of raising the issue of the right in Section 43 (supra) suo motu. It is disabled from its birth!

That brings me to the heart of the appellant’s agitation on the issue, id est, whether the appellant could exercise the fundamental right entrenched in Section 43 of the Constitution, a amended. The contending parties weaved their submissions on juristic personality.

By way of prefatory observations, a juristic person is an entity armed with the capacity to ventilate his/its complaints

(1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.105) 558; Ataguba & Co. v. Gura (Nig) Ltd. (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429; A. – G Anambra State v. A.-G Fed., (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) 4; Admin./Exec., Estate, Abacha v. Eke-Spiff (2009) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1139) 97; SLB Consortium Ltd. v. NNPC (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1252) 317; M.M.A. Inc. v N.M.A. (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 506; Uwazuruonye v. Gov., Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt.1355) 28; BB. Apugo & Sons Ltd. v. O.H.M.B. (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1529) 206, Interdril (Nig.) Ltd v. U.B.A. Plc (2017) 13 NWLR (Pt.1581) 52; Dairo v. Regd. Trustees, T. A. O.., Lagos (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt.1599) 62; Bajehson v. Otiko (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1638) 138; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1653) 313; Moses v. NBA (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1673) 59; Persons, Name Unknown v. Sahris Int’l Ltd. (2019) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 203.

Now, the appellant’s chief grievance, indeed its trump card on the stubborn issue, is that its juristic personality was not a subject of disputation between the parties. Incontestably, where the legal personality of a party is challenged by an adversary, the onus probandi resides in that party to lead evidence, parol or documentary, to

establish its legal capacity. The most reliable/dependable way incorporation of a company can be proved is by tendering certificate of its incorporation. See NNPC v. Lutin Inv. Ltd. (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 965) 506; Citec Int’l Estate Ltd. v. E. Int’l & Associates (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 33; Socio-Political Research Dev. v. Min., FCT (supra). The casus belli, between the feuding parties, is whether the appellant duly disputed the juristic entity of the respondent to warrant its proof of it.

In due loyalty to the desire of the law, I have visited the record – the bedrock of every appeal. My port of call is the residences of the pleadings of the parties which monopolise pages 1 – 8, 138 – 141 and 159 – 162 for the appellant, first and second respondents respectively. l have perused them with the finery of a tooth comb. Admirably, they are obedient to clarity and comprehension. The law commands the Court to read pleading holistically in order to garner a flowing story of it. See Okochi v. Animkwoi (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 1; Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) 366.

I have, in total fidelity to this injunction, given a global

examination to the pleadings in order to discover whether or not the parties joined issue on the corporate personality of the appellant. At the cradle of appellant’s pleading, it claimed:
1. That Claimant is a limited liability company duly registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act with its registered office at 2, Chevron Drive, Lekki, Lagos…
In paragraph 3, at page 139 of the record, the first respondent adopted the appellant’s averment, displayed above, ipsissima verba, with this suffix: “and carries out the business of oil and petroleum exploration with operational bases all over Nigeria”. It will be recalled that the lower Court, in its judgment, at the bottom/foot of page 317 of the record, dismissed the appellant’s claim against the second respondent without any appeal against the findings. The first respondent’s wholesale adoption of the appellant’s averment about its jural status is a concrete evidence that the parties were not disputing the corporate entity of the appellant. Indeed, it is a classic exemplification of admission.
My noble Lords, in the mind of the law, admission connotes a statement, oral or documentary, made by a

party which suggests an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. See Section 20 of the Evidence Act, 2011; UBA Plc. v. Jargaba (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) 237; Oguanuhu v. Chiegboka (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 588. It “is a concession or voluntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence of certain facts; a statement made by a party of the existence of a fact which is relevant to the cause of his adversary; a voluntary acknowledgement made by a party of the existence of the truth of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claims in an action”. See Adusei v. Adebayo (2012) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1288) 534 at 558 per Fabiyi, JSC; UBA v. Jargaba (2007) 31 NSCQR 144; N.B.C.I. v. Integrated Gas (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 916) 617; Omisore v. Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205; N.A.S. Ltd. v. UBA Plc (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 421. It is classified, in the stratification of evidence, as the best evidence against the party making it, see Daniel v. INEC (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463) 133. It constitutes a concession against the interest of a party making it. SeeOnovo v. Mba (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1427) 391. Hence, in the view of the law, an admitted fact

does not need any proof. See Our Line v. S.C.C. Nig. Ltd. (2009) 7 SCNJ 358; Jolasun v. Bamgboye (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1225) 285; Offor v. State (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1333) 421; Jitte v. Okpulor (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1497) 542; Cole v. Jibunoh (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 499; Orianzi v. A.-G., Rivers State (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1561) 224; Mba v. Mba (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 177; Adeokin Records v. M.C.S.N (Ltd/GTE) (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1643) 550; N.R.M.A & FC v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (1656) 247. By dint of that undiluted admission, the first respondent, without any nudge/prompting, conceded to the corporate personality of the appellant. The admission binds the first respondent. l therefore on the footing of the pleadings and admission, crown the appellant with the deserved toga of juristic personality in the case.

There is no gainsaying the fact that, in the eyes of the law, a limited liability company, such as the appellant, is a persona ficta. It is an artificial person/being, which is invisible, intangible and exists only in the contemplation of the law, with rights and liabilities. On the incorporation of the appellant, the law granted it the unbridled

licence to exercise enormous powers to hold land, perpetual succession, sue and be sued and “all the powers of natural person of full capacity”, see Sections 37 and 38(1) of CAMA. The appellant, armed with these solemn attributes/hallmarks, bestowed on it by the law, has the right, as of a right, to exercise the fundamental right, available to a Nigerian citizen, as enshrined in Section 43 of the Constitution, as amended. On this premise, the appellant has the right to own immovable property, anywhere in Nigeria, and enjoy same subject to any constitutional or statutory limitations. To my mind, the lower Court’s importation of qualification of citizenship as a ground for the appellant to reap its fundamental right guaranteed under Section 43 of the Constitution, as amended, with due reverence, has no blessing of the law.

This brief legal anatomy, with due respect, exposes the poverty of the seemingly alluring and copious submission of the first respondent on Nigerian citizenship. The elegant submission is lame in the face of the appellant’s corporate personality. It cannot fly! In the end, even though I had, at the cradle of the issue,

acquitted/discharged it of the accusation of suo motu, I have no choice than to resolve it in favour of the appellant and against the respondents.

Having dispensed with issue one, I proceed to settle issue two. The issue is plain and canalised within a narrow compass. It castigates the lower Court’s finding that the appellant’s workers had the right to picket within its premises.
The lower Court erected its finding on the provision of Section 43(1) of the Trade Union Act. Since the provision is the cynosure of the issue, it is germane to pluck it out from where it is ingrained in the statute, verbatim ac litteratin, thus:
43. Peaceful picketing
It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own behalf of a trade union or registered Federation of Trade Unions or of an individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information or of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

</br<>

The provision does not harbour any ambiguity. On this score, the law compels the Court to accord it its ordinary grammatical meanings without any interpolation. See Bakare v. NRC (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606; PDP v. Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1323) 205; Kawawu v. PDP (2017) 3 NWLR (pt.1553) 420; Setraco (Nig) Ltd. v. Kpaji (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1558) 280; Adeokin Records v. MCSCN (2018) NWLR (Pt. 1643); Ecobank v Honeywell Flour (2019) NWLR (Pt. 1655) 55.
I have, in due allegiance to the letter and spirit of the law, visited the records, the touch stone of all appeals. It is discernible from the appellant’s pleading, statement of facts which occupy pages 5 – 8 of the record, that the respondents, at the behest of the appellant, provided it with workers, in the semi-skilled and unskilled category, who worked for it. The evidence of the appellant’s only and star witness, CW, Taye Abiodun, its adviser, colonise pages 332 – 339 of the record. The evidence, which was in sync with the pleading amply disclosed that the picketing workers worked for the appellant. It also clearly revealed that the strike or demonstrations took place near and/or

within the premises where the picketing workers worked or carried out their business, id est the appellant’s premises at No. 2 Chevron Drive, Lekki, Lagos. In so far as the demonstration took place around and within the precincts of the appellant’s premises aforesaid, it was a lawful/legitimate picketings which is sanctioned by the provision of Section 43(1) of the Trade Union Act chronicled above.
The appellant implored this Court to employ the doctrine of comparative jurisprudence in the interpretation of the provision of Section 43 of the Trade Union Act, citing a galaxy of foreign decisions to that effect. To begin with, it is elementary law that foreign decisions do not bind Nigerian Courts. At best, they are persuasive authorities on the need for expansion of frontiers of Nigerian Jurisprudence, See Egbue v. Araka (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt. 848) 1; A.-G., Rivers State v. A. – G., Akwa Ibom (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1248) 31; South Atlantic Pet. Ltd. v. Min., Pet. Res. (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1396) 24; Sifax (Nig.) Ltd. v. Migfo (Nig) Ltd. (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1623) 138; In Re: Abdullahi (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 272. Secondly, as already noted, the provision of

Section 43 of the Trade Union Act is very submissive to clarity such that its interpretation does not necessitate any embellishments nor the legal voyage to a foreign land to harness from comparative jurisprudence. On this score, I dishonour the appellant’s salivating invitation to this Court to deploy the doctrine of comparative jurisprudence in the construction of the clear provision of Section 43 of the Trade Union Act.
In the twilight of the judgment, at page 319, lines 3 – 6 of the record, the lower Court declared:
The premises of the claimant is therefore a place of work for them. This being the case, the workers in question has(sic) the right to picket within the premises of the claimant contrary to the submissions of the claimant; and I so find and hold. This being the case, the claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed as per its complaint and statement of facts.
In the light of the above brief juridical survey, done in due obeisance to the law, the lower Court did not, in the least, fracture the law in its finding. It is an immaculate one. In this regard, all the diatribes, which the appellant rained against the finding,

pale into insignificance. It will smell of judicial sacrilege to tinker with a finding that has not disclosed an enmity with the law. As a result, I will not hesitate to resolve the issue two against the appellant and in favour of the respondents.

At this juncture, in order to forestall any ambiguity, it is imperative to assemble and synthesise the divergent resolutions of the two issues. I had resolved issue one in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. It is vice versa for issue two which went against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. I am afraid, the appellant scored only a barren victory in the resolution of issue one in its favour. The reason is not far-fetched. The issue one is an adjunct of issue two which, being the kernel of the issue before the lower Court, has to define the destiny of the appeal. In effect, issue one will not fetch the appeal in the appellant’s favour.

On the whole, having resolved the decisive issue two against the appellant, the fortune of the appeal is obvious. It is bereft of any morsel of merit and deserves the reserved penalty of dismissal. Consequently, I dismiss the appeal.

I affirm the judgment of the lower Court delivered on 2nd December, 2013. The parties shall bear the respective costs they expended in the prosecution and defence of the ill-fated appeal.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: My learned brother OBANDE FESTUS OGBUINYA, JCA afforded me the opportunity of reading in draft before today the lead judgment just delivered and I agree with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein, I adopt the judgment as mine with nothing further to add.

BALKISU BELLO ALIYU, J.C.A.: I agree with the well-considered judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Obande Festus Ogbuinya, JCA.

Appearances:

Ladipo Soetan, Esq. For Appellant(s)

O. Tamuna, Esq. – for first respondent.
l. C. Mordi, Esq. – for second respondent.
For Respondent(s)