KANAWA & ANOR v. INEC & ORS (2020)

KANAWA & ANOR v. INEC & ORS

(2020)LCN/14733(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(KANO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, November 25, 2020

CA/KN/98/2020

RATIO

JURISDICTION: WHAT DETERMINES WHETHER A COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Now, the law is as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the Appellants that it is the plaintiff’s claim that determines whether a Court has jurisdiction over the suit. Plethora of authorities on this trite law are without number. PER WAMBAI, J.C.A.

COURT: NATURE OF JURISDICTION OF COURTS

It is settled law that all Courts are creatures of statutes, either of the Constitution or the specific statute creating the Court, with their jurisdiction specifically stated or prescribed. A Court should therefore not assume jurisdiction over a matter except it is statutorily prescribed by the enabling law – GAFAR V. GOVT OF KWARA STATE (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt 1024) 375. Since jurisdiction is a radical question of competence, where a Court assumes jurisdiction when it has none, the proceedings no matter how well conducted is and remains a nullity as the defect in competence is not intrinsic but extrinsic to adjudication Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 @ 348, – OKPE V. FAN MILK PLC & ANR (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt 1549) 282.

For a Court to assume jurisdiction, same must be expressly and clearly donated to it. It cannot be implied, nor can it be conferred by consent or agreement of parties nor can the Court donate jurisdiction to itself where none has been provided OSADEBAY V. A.G. BENDEL STATE (1991) 22 NSCC (Pt 1) 137 A.G. of Lagos State V. AGF. Once a Court is not conferred with jurisdiction to entertain a matter, it becomes incapacitated from exercising any adjudicatory power over the case. On the other hand, a Court will be failing in its duty to assume jurisdiction where it has been vested with the requisite jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and with no other inhibiting factors precluding if from exercising its jurisdiction. PER WAMBAI, J.C.A.
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT: PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS

By the principle of stare decisis which is a fundamental principle in our jurisprudence, all Courts in this country are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. This is a settled principle of judicial policy which compels an inferior Court to be bound by the decision of a Superior Court. See OBIUWEUBI V. C.B.N (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt 1247) 465, PDP V. ORANEZI & ORS (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt 1618) 245. This is irrespective of whether the lower Court believes that the decision was wrongly decided. In fact, no matter how certain an inferior Court is that the decision of Superior Court was wrongly decided, he is bound to follow it, USMAN V. UMARU (1992) 7 SCNJ 388, C.B.N. V. OKOJIE (2015) LPELR 24740 (CA), Osakwe V. FCE (Technical) Asaba, (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1201)1. In NEPA V. ONAH (1997) LPELR 1959 (SC), the Apex Court held that it is a cardinal principle of law under the doctrine of stare decisis that an inferior Court is bound by a decision of a Superior Court however sure it may be that it has been wrongly decided.

There is however a caveat to this general law. The caveat is that it is only the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Superior Court or of previous decision of the Court or a Court of coordinate jurisdiction that is to be followed if the facts are the same. Where the facts and context are different, the principle will not apply. In SAMUEL V. YAHAYA (2011) LPELR 4200 (CA) Garba JCA (as he then was) stated this position succinctly when he said:
“Let me point out that a situation where every statement by a higher Court or even the apex Court will attract itself the binding effect of a precedent without regard to the peculiar facts of a given case is not likely to be the contemplation of the doctrine of stare decisis.”
It is therefore trite that for one case to be precedent for and be binding on another, the facts of the two cases must be the same or almost so. This is so because decisions of Courts draw their inspiration and strength from the facts which framed the issues for the decision. See FAWEHINMI V. NBA (No.2) (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt 105) 558, ABUBAKAR V. NASAMU (No. 2) (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1330) 523. It is therefore important to bear in mind that the decision of a Court must be considered in the light of its own peculiar facts of circumstances, hence the legal truism that each case is only an authority for what it decides and nothing more. See SKYE BANK PLC & ANOR V. CHIEF MOSES BOLANLE AKINPELU (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt 1198) 179, UDO V. STATE (2016) ALL FWLR (Pt 840) 1179. PER WAMBAI, J.C.A.

INTERPRETATION: CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORDS “SUBJECT TO” WHEN USED IN A STATUTE

The words “subject to” when used in a statute means liable, subordinate, subservient to or governed by or as a proviso, and it is often used in statutes to introduce a condition, a proviso, a restriction and indeed a limitation. See EBHOTA & ORS V. PLATEAU INVESTMENT & PROPERTY DEV. CO. LTD (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt 948) 266, KAYCEE (NIG) LTD V. PROMPT Shipping Cop. & Anor (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 15) 180.
Whenever the expression is used in a provision or enactment, it means that it subordinates the provisions of the subject section to the section or enactment referred to which is intended not to be affected by the provisions of the latter. The phrase is used to express a clear intention of subordination of the subject section to the section or enactment referred to, to allow the referred Superior Provision fulfil itself. PER WAMBAI, J.C.A.

COURT: POWER OF A COURT TO REVIEW ITS DECISION

No Court except the Supreme Court has the power to review its decision once delivered. Once a Court has given its decision except in the circumstances when it can set aside the decision, it becomes functus officio and ceases to possess any power to revisit the judgment except as may be permitted under the slip – Rule. See Enterprise BANK LTD V. AROSO & ORS (2015) ALL FWLR (Pt 795) 314, MADU V. MBAKWE & ANOR – (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt 109) 293. It cannot alter, vary or in any way review the decision. See Ministry of Lagos Affairs, Mines and Power & Anr V. Chief Akin Olugbade & Ors (1974) LPELR – 1878 (SC) Integrated Realty Ltd V. Odofin (2018) 3 NWLR (1606) 316. PER WAMBAI, J.C.A.
COURT: FINALITY OF THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL INVOLVING ELECTION INTO NATIONAL AND STATE HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY

The finality of the decision of the Court of Appeal involving election into the National and the State Houses of Assembly election has been laid to a final rest at least until an amendment is effected to Section 246 (3) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is a matter well settled constitutionally and by case law. Our law reports are replete with such decisions. See for instance EMORDI V. IGEKE (2011) 4 SC (Pt 11) 107 @ 145, UDENWA V. UZODINMA & ANOR (Supra), OPARA & ANOR V. AMADI (2013) 6 -7 NSC (Pt 2) 49, OKADIGBO V. EMEKA & ANR (2012) LPELR – 7839 (SC) 17 DANGANA V. USMAN (2012) LPELR – 7827 (SC) ONUAGULUCHI V. NDU (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt 712) 309. PER WAMBAI, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Abubakar Datti Yahaya Justice of the Court of Appeal

Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru Justice of the Court of Appeal

Amina Audi Wambai Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. SURAJA IDRIS KANAWA 2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY APPELANT(S)

And

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) 2. ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) 3. MOHAMMED SHAMSUDEEN BELLO RESPONDENT(S)

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the refusal of the Federal High Court to assume jurisdiction to hear and determine Suit No. FHC/ KN/CS/202/2019 as contained in its judgment delivered on 1st June, 2020 by Hon. Justice A.L. Allagoa.

The event that stirred up the case leading up to this appeal is the substitution of the 3rd Respondent who won the primary election of the 2nd Respondent, with one Kawu Suleiman Abdulrahaman.

The 3rd Respondent (Muhammed Shamsudeen Bello) won the primary election of the 2nd Respondent (APC) conducted on 3rd October, 2018 for the Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State but the 2nd Respondent decided to substitute him with Kawu Suleiman Abdulrahaman.

In Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/04/2019, the 3rd Respondent challenged the substitution. While the legal battle was on, the General election was conducted by the 1st Respondent. The said Kawu Suleiman Abdulrahaman contested the 23rd February, 2019 election for the seat of Member House of Representatives for the Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency as the candidate of the 2nd Respondent. The 1st

Appellant (Suraja Idris Kanawa) was the candidate of the 2nd Appellant at the election. At the end of the election Kawu Suleiman Abdulrahaman was declared the winner and was issued with the certificate of return.

The 1st Appellant who scored the 2nd highest votes after Abdulrahaman filed an election petition EPT/KN/HR/11/2019 challenging the declaration and return of the 2nd Respondent’s candidate (Abdulrahaman).

Meanwhile, on the 18/4/2019, the Federal High Court delivered its judgment and declared the 3rd Respondent as the winner of the primary election, and granted all his reliefs. In separate Appeals Nos. CA/K/253/2019 and CA/K/254/2019 filed by Abdulrahaman Kawu and the 2nd Respondent (APC) respectively, the Tribunal’s decision was challenged before the Kaduna Division of this Court. Both appeals were dismissed and the decision of the Federal High Court was affirmed. Further appeals to the Supreme Court in Appeals No. SC 812/2019 and SC 813/2019 were equally dismissed on 1/8/2019. The 3rd Respondent was re-affirmed the winner of the primary election. Meanwhile, based on the disqualification of Abdulrahaman, and upon the

Appellants’ prayer, the Election Petition Tribunal on the 30/8/2019 declared the 1st Appellant as the winner of the election having scored the 2nd highest number of votes cast at the election.

The 3rd Respondent having obtained leave of Court to appeal as an interested party, in Appeal No. CA/K/EPT/NA/12/19 and the 2nd Respondent in Appeal No. EPT/NA/13/2019 challenged the decision of the Tribunal. The two appeals were allowed on the 25/10/2019 and the decision of the Election Petition Tribunal was set aside. The petition was struck out for want of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear the petition same being incompetent. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the 3rd Respondent be returned as duly elected.

The 1st Respondent issued a certificate of return to the 3rd Respondent. The Appellants were aggrieved and approached the lower Court. They took out an originating summons pursuant to Section 285 (13) of the Constitution Fourth Alteration Act, No. 21, 2017 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. They were granted leave to amend same. By the amended Originating Summons, the Appellants raised two questions before the lower Court namely:-

WHETHER in view of the provision of Section 285 (13) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Fourth Alteration Act No. 21 2017 and in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ABDULRAUF ABDULKADIR MODIBO VS. MUSTAPHA USMAN & 2 ORS in Suit No. SC 790 delivered on the 30th day of July, 2019, the 1st Respondent acted ultra vires when it issued a certificate of return to the 3rd Respondent as the member of the House of Representative representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State, the 3rd Respondent having not participated in the elections held on 23rd February, 2019.
2. Whether the 1st Plaintiff is entitled to be issued a certificate of return by INEC having scored the second highest number of valid votes in the election after KAWU SULEIMAN ABDURRAHMAN who was the candidate of APC in the election held on 23rd February 2019.
The Appellants prayed for the following reliefs: –
A. A DECLARATION OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT that the 3rd Defendant did (sic) participate fully in the process of the General Election held on the 23rd day of February, 2019 conducted for the election of

Member of the House of Representatives for Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State.
B. A DECLARATION OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT that the 3rd issuance of a certificate of return to the 3rd Defendant by the 1st Defendant is illegal, null and void.
C. A DECLARATION OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT that the 3rd Defendant is not entitled a Member of the House of Representatives representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State in view of the Provisions of Section 285 (13) of Federal Republic of Nigeria Fourth Alteration Act No. 21 2017 and by virtue of the decision of Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ABDULRAUF ABDULKADIR MODIBO VS MUSTAPHA USMAN & 2 OTHERS IN SUIT NO. SC.790 delivered on the 30th day of July, 2019.
D. AN ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT directing the 3rd Defendant to vacate the office of the member of the House of Representatives representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency based on the decision of the Supreme Court in suit No. SC.812/2019 & No. SC.813/2019.
E. ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT directing the 1st Defendant to issue the 1st plaintiff with a certificate of return in respect of the

Takai/Sumaila Federal constituency of Kano State, in respect of the general election conducted on the 23rd February, 2019 into the office of the Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State having scored the 2nd highest votes in the said election.
F. And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in order to give effect to the reliefs sought herein.”

The 1st and 3rd Respondents (as 1st and 3rd defendants therein) filed counter-affidavit to oppose the summons. In addition, the 1st Respondent (INEC) filed a Notice of Preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the originating summons. The Court heard and considered argument of all counsel on the preliminary objection and resolved issues 1, 2, & 3 raised therein in favour of the 1st Respondent and it sustained the preliminary objection. It declined jurisdiction to entertain the substantive matter and struck out the originating summons. Unhappy with the decision, the Appellants caused their counsel Ibrahim A. Buba Esq to file a Notice of appeal on the 17th June, 2020. It contains 4 grounds.

From the 4 grounds of

grounds of appeal, learned counsel Ibrahim A. Buba Esq., who settled the Appellants’ brief of argument filed on 12th August, 2020 distilled 2 issues for determination, to wit:
“1. Whether by virtue of S.6 and S. 251 (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution of the FRN as amended, the learned trial Court ought to have assumed jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s originating summons? Ground 1
2. Whether the case of the Appellants before the lower Court was for the interpretation of the Judgment of ABDULRAUF ABDULKADIR MODIBO VS. MUSTAPHA USMAN & 2 ORS IN SUIT NO. SC./790/2019 delivered on the 30th July, 2019? Ground 2.”

Appellants also filed a reply brief to the 1st, 2nd & 3rd Respondents briefs on the 6/10/2020 and was deemed properly filed and served on 26/10/2020.

The brief of the 1st Respondent was settled by Suleiman Alkali Esq. It was filed on 25/9/2020 and deemed on 26/10/2020. Therein a sole issue was nominated for determination namely:
“Whether the trial Court was right in striking out the Appellant suit for lack of jurisdiction.”

Abdulhafees D. Khalid Esq., who settled the 2nd

Respondent’s brief of argument filed on 16/9/2020 also nominated a solitary issue for consideration and determination of this court to wit: –
“Whether from the circumstance of this case, the trial Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain and determine the Appellants’ suit.”

On the part of the 3rd Respondent whose brief of argument filed on 15/9/2020 was settled by Nureini S. Jimoh Esq, a sole issue, which in his opinion will determine the appeal, namely.
“Whether the trial Court is justified in its decision striking out the suit was formulated for determination.”
Was formulated for determination.

The sole issue formulated by each of the Respondents is similar in substance and comprehensive enough to accommodate the two issues submitted for the Appellants. I shall adopt with slight modification the issue distilled by the 1st Respondent as follows:
“Whether from the circumstances of this case, the lower Court was right in striking out the suit for lack of jurisdiction.”

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSION
In arguing his issue No. 1, learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted

that it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines whether a Court has jurisdiction and that the Appellants’ case is for the interpretation of Section 285 (13) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) in the light of the Supreme Court decision in the case of MODIBO V USMAN & 2 ORS in Suit No. SC 790 delivered on 30/7/19 to determine the correctness or otherwise of the administrative action of the 1st Respondent in issuing a certificate of return to the 3rd Respondent. He referred to Sections 6 and 251 (1) (q) and (r) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the case of PETER OBI V INEC & ORS (2007) LPELR – 2166 (SC) to argue that the Federal High Court is vested with jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the Constitution and make the declarations sought as was done by the Apex Court in the OBI V INEC’s case (Supra).

Counsel faulted the holding of the lower Court which he quoted in extenso, that the Appellants cannot approach the Court to seek interpretation of Section 285 (13) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that any such

interpretation will amount to reviewing or altering the Supreme Court decision as being erroneous because according to him, the cause of action which warranted the filing of the Originating Summons arose when the 1st Respondent issued certificate of return to the 3rd Respondent though the Supreme Court made no such order and after Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/06/2019, Appeals CA/K/253/2019 and No. SC/813/19/2019 were dispensed with which cases could not have dealt with the injury suffered by the Appellants by virtue of the 1st Respondents action.

Counsel employed us to apply the maxim “ubi jus ubi remedium”, where there is a right, there is a remedy, to the Appellants, having regards to the disqualification of Abdulrahaman Kawu and in the light of the interpretation of the Supreme Court inMODIBO V USMAN (Supra), the 1st Appellant who scored the 2nd highest votes and has been denied enjoyment of his right should not be left without a remedy. He cited the case of Orianzi v Rivers State Govt (2017) LPELR – 41737 (SC). In urging us to hold that the Supreme Court judgment in SC/813/19/2020 made no order relating to the status of

the 3rd Respondent, learned counsel insisted that the issue before the Courts in Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/06/2016, CA/K/253/2019 and SC/813/19/2019 is whether the 3rd Respondent is the right candidate of the 2nd defendant and not the status of the 3rd Defendant as a member of the House of Representatives representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency in the National Assembly.

On their 2nd issue, it was submitted that the Appellants’ 1st question on the Originating Summons did not call for interpretation of Modibo’s case but its application as a judicial precedent in interpreting Section 285 (13) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. That the question only calls for Section 285 (13) to be interpreted in the light of Modibo’s case and giving a different interpretation to it will lead to gross miscarriage of justice. He argued that if the Court had read the Originating Summons together with the Reliefs and the affidavits in support, it would have shown that the Originating Summons did not call for interpretation of Modibo’s case but its application as judicial precedent, A.G. Anambra State V A.G. Federation (2007)

LPELR – 24343 (SC) @ 78; AC Marafa & Ors V. Dan Alh. and Ors (2019) LPELR – 470212. He submitted that the lower Court ought to have applied the principle of law that regular Courts ought not to declare a person who did not participate in an election as winner, as decided in Modibo’s case. That the duty of the Court is to be interested in determining the substance of the real issues between parties and not to rely on technicalities. See ABIODUN V FRN (2018) LPELR – 43838 (SC).

It was further submitted that this Court ought to take advantage of Section 16 of the Court of Appeal Act to hear and determine the Originating Summons because all the documents needed to hear same are available before the Court, and on the strength of the case of OBI V INEC (Supra) to enter judgment for the Appellants contending further that the decision of the Kaduna Division of this court in CA/K/EPT/NA/12/2019 which ordered the issuance of certificate of return to the 3rd Respondent is null and void and should be set aside by us having been given without jurisdiction in that since the Court reached a decision that the lower

court has no jurisdiction, it was also robbed of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and make any orders therefrom. He cited the cases of EHUWA V ONDO STATE INEC & ORS (2006) LPELR – 1056 (SC) BANK OF INDUSTRY LTD V AWOJU GBAGBE LIGHT LTD (2018) LPELR – 43812 (SC) DINGYADI & ANOR V INEC (2011) LPELR – 950 (SC), in urging us to so set aside the decision of this Court.

The 1st Respondent’s Submission
On his part, the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent submitted that the lower Court having considered and pronounced on the provisions of Section 285 (13) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and affirmed by the Supreme Court, it was by the principles of stare decisis and issue estoppel, estopped from reviewing the matter decided not only by it but also by the Supreme Court and was thus right in declining jurisdiction, citing the cases of ATOLAGBE V AWUNI & ORS (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt 522) 536 at 564 and DALHATU V TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 843) 310 @ 399 where the Supreme Court frowned at the failure of the High Court to follow its

decision. Counsel urged us to affirm the decision of the lower Court that it had considered and pronounced upon Section 285 (13) in the context of the instant case which was concurrently affirmed by this Court and the Supreme Court.

On the Appellant’s submission on the application of the maxim “ubi jus ubi remedium”, to this appeal, it was submitted that as same was not canvassed before the lower Court and leave of this Court was not obtained to canvass the issue, the argument thereon should be discontinued. SeeCBN V AZORO (2018) LPELR – 44389 Fagge v. Amadu (2015) LPELR – 25980. Moreover, he submitted that it is not enough that a party is deprived of certain right to approach the Court, he must have commenced his action by a due process of law and contended that the Appellants action was alien to the law having been brought on grounds not falling either within a pre-election or an election category.

Learned counsel submitted that the 1st Respondent which issued the 3rd Respondent the certificate of return on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Appeal No. SC 813/19 did so in the discharge of its statutory duty

conferred by Section 75 of the Electoral Act, 2010 and its inherent powers to enforce orders of Courts, and not as an administrative duty thus, its action cannot be unlawful as erroneously argued by the Appellants’ Counsel.

He further pointed out that this Court being the final Court on the election in issue had held that the 3rd Respondent was the winner of the election of 23/2/2019 for the seat of member representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency and that in whatever way this appeal is looked at, the conclusion is that the Appellants failed woefully to fault the judgment of the lower court urging as to dismiss the appeal and resolve the issue in their favour.

2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSION
The submission of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in their respective briefs which are almost identical is to the effect that the heavy reliance placed on the case of OBI V INEC (Supra) by the Appellants to argue that the lower Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit is highly misconceived and quoted out of context as the facts are quite dissimilar and the principle upon which it was based, “ubi jus ubi remedium”,

which was not canvassed before the lower Court, cannot be argued on appeal without leave of this Court which has not been obtained, submitting further that an appeal is not a forum to change a party’s case but to test the correctness of the decision of the lower Court.

Similarly, it was submitted that the Originating Summons having not been filed under Section 251 (1) but under Section 285 (13) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria the argument that the action was instituted at the lower Court because 1st Respondent is an agency of the Federal Government and the argument canvassed thereon premised on Section 251 (1) (q) (f) (r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria ought also to be discountenanced as because they amount to shifting the goal post FRN v IWEKA (2011) LPELR – 9350 (SC), OSUJI V-EKEOCHA (2009) LPELR – 28165 (SC). Similarly, the Appellant’s argument that the suit was seeking the determination of the validity or otherwise of the 1st Respondent is a fresh issue raised for the 1st time on appeal and without leave of Court, hence, should be discountenanced.

On the interpretation of

Section 285 (13), CFRN sought by the Originating Summons, it was argued that same had previously been interpreted by the Court in exhibit NJC 1, and affirmed by this court (Kaduna Division) in Exhibits NJC 2A & 2B as well as the Supreme Court in NJC 3A & NJC 3B and that having been done, by virtue of Section 235 of the Constitution, the lower Court has no jurisdiction to review same for the purpose of granting any relief claimed. See OKONKWO VS FRN and ORS (2011) 11 NWLR CPL 1258)25.

They are also in agreement with the lower Court that the Originating Summons seeks the interpretation of the decision of the case of MODIBO V UMAR (Supra) (also reported as (2020) NWLR (Pt 1712) 470) and not its application as evidenced by juxtaposing the question with relief C, which interpretation they argued, is not one of the instruments the Court is empowered by Order 3 Rule 6 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019 to interpret as decided in the case of RACE AUTO SUPPLY CO. V. AKIB (2006) 13 NWLR (Pt 997) 333, 351 – 352 E – A, INCORP. TRUSTEE OF NIG. GOVERNMENT FORUM & ORS V. RIOK LTD (2018) LPELR – 44915, nor can a Court

interpret the decision of the Supreme Court.

They distinguished the facts and circumstances of MODIBO V. USMAN’s case (Supra) delivered on 30/7/19 from the instant appeal wherein the Court emphatically held that the 3rd Respondent was the candidate of the 2nd Respondent in the general election.

Learned counsel stressed the point that the jurisdiction to grant the Appellants’ principal relief, a declaration that the 3rd Respondent is not entitled to remain a member of House of Representatives, is vested only on the Election Petition Tribunal and the Court of Appeal by virtue of Section 140 (3) Electoral Act and Section 285 (1) of the Constitution as had been done by Exhibits NJC 2A, 2B, and NJC 3A & 3B. That the jurisdiction of the lower Court has expressly been excluded by Section 285 (1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as decided ABUBAKAR V. DANKWAMBO & ORS (2015) LPELR 25716 (SC). It was their submission that the issue of the interpretation of Section 285 (13) having been dealt with in Exhibit NJC 1 and affirmed by this Court and Supreme Court in Exhibits NJC 2 & 3 series, the Appellants are caught by the

doctrine of “estoppel per rem judicatum” and precluded from re-litigating same by whatever guise. They argued that Appellants cannot raise any complaint regarding Section 285 (13) that has been laid to rest in NJC1, NJC2, NJC3. Citing the cases of Esi & Ors V. Chief Secretary of the Fed. Nig. & Ors (1973) LPELR 1168 (SC), IYAJI V. EYIGEBE (1987) LPELR – 1571 (SC), APC V. PDP & ORS (2015) LPELR – 24587 (SC).

In further argument they submitted that since Section 251 (1) (q) & (r) does not envisage the filing of an election suit before the Federal High Court, an appellate Court will also have no jurisdiction over the matter. See BANK OF INDUSTRY LTD V. AWOJUGBAGBE LIGHT LTD (2018) LPELR – 43812 (SC).

They also pointed out that contrary to the Appellants’ contention, the issuance of Certificate of Return to the 3rd Respondent was done by the 1st Respondent as a statutory duty vide Section 75 of the Electoral Act and not as an administrative action, the performance of which duty can only be challenged before an Election Petition Tribunal and not before a Federal High Court. See CHIBUIKE CHARLES ONYIRIMBA V. SENATOR BEN UWAJUMOGU & ORS (2019) LPELR – 49196 (CA).

On the invitation to us to nullify the decision of this Court (Kaduna Division) in Exhibit NJC 5A and to invoke Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act to hear the suit on its merits, counsel cited among others the cases of UDENWA V. UZODINMA & ANR (2012) LPELR – 22283 (SC) SALVADOR V. INEC (2011) LPELR – 14932 (CA) to argue that this Court has no power to sit over its own decision, in the absence of any of the permitted exceptions to review its decision in Exhibit NJC5 to resolve any question that has already been decided with finality, this Court being the last Court on the matter. On the Appellants application for the invocation of Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, it was submitted and that the argument is misconceived and should be discountenanced, IBOM POWER COMPANY LTD V. MR BRIAN HARDING & ORS (2015) LPELR – 40907 (CA). They submitted that the Certificate of Return having been issued, the return of the 3rd Respondent by the 1st Respondent cannot under any guise be challenged before the Federal High Court. See OLOFU V. ITODO & ORS (2010) LPELR

– 2585 (SC), VIVIAN C. AKPAMGBO – OKADIGBO & ORS V. EGBE THEO CHIDI & ORS (2015) LPELR 24565 (SC).

Replying to the Respondents’ argument, Mr. Buba submitted that contrary to the Respondents’ submission, the argument on the principle of “Ubi jus ibi remedium” and on the application of Section 251 (1) (q) & (r) flows from the issue of jurisdiction founded on ground 1 and is not a fresh issue.

On the none stating of Section 251 (1) (q) and (r) of the Constitution on the Summons, his reply is that the failure to state the law under which an application is made does not render the application incompetent – ARMA YAU ABDULLAHI & SONS LTD & ANOR V. F.H.A. HOMES LTD (2005) LPELR – 5362.

On OBI V. INEC’s case (Supra), he submitted that in considering whether a case is fit as judicial precedent only the fact significant to the resolution of the question is important and not the entire facts of the case and that the significant part of OBI’s case is the objection to jurisdiction of the Court which is substantially the same in the instant case, thus, reliance placed

on the case is appropriate, relying on Prof. Chukwu V. PDP & Ors (2016) LPELR – 40962 (CA).

On the issuance of Certificate of Return being a statutory or administrative duty, Mr. Buba submitted that it is preposterous to argue that such an act does not come within Section 251 (1) (q) & (r) of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

In reply to the Respondents’ argument that the lower Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appellants’ case which bothers on post-election matters. Counsel referred to the case Agada V. INEC (2019) LPELR 48476 (CA) to argue that since the Appellants cause of action did not arise from the conduct of the election but from the issuance of a certificate of return to 3rd Respondent who did not participate in the election, the suit was properly commenced by Originating Summons and within the jurisdiction of the lower Court to grant the reliefs.

On the argument that Section 285 (13) had exhaustively been interpreted and cannot be relitigated, learned counsel submitted in reply that a Court within the meaning of Section 285 (13), includes every Court and is not restricted by

141 (2) Electoral Act as interpreted in Jev V. Iyortyom (Supra) being likened to Section 285 (13) by Respondents and that Section 285 (13) as interpreted in MODIBO V. UMAR (Supra) is the extant position of law not the position of JEV V. Iyortyom (Supra). He cited the case in IWUOHA V. NIG. COUNCIL FOR MANAGEMENT (2008) LPELR 3800 CA.On issues estoppel and res judicata, he submitted that issue estoppel and res judicata are inapplicable to this appeal. Finally, counsel also distinguished Okadigbo & Ors V. Egbe Theo Chidi & Ors case (Supra) from this appeal which he argued bothers not on an election and return of a candidate at an election but on the issuance of a certificate of return to a person who did not participate in an election.
RESOLUTION OF APPEAL
It is clear from the arguments of all counsel that what calls for determination in this appeal is whether the lower Court was on sound legal ground when it declined jurisdiction to hear and determine the Originating Summons. The lower Court has been faulted in its stand mainly on two grounds; (a) in its interpretation of the purport of the Appellants’ case & (b) in its

conclusion that it had previously interpreted the same provisions of the Constitution sought to be interpreted. The effect of the Appellants submission is that the trial Court got it all wrong when it declined jurisdiction to hear the Originating Summons on its merits. Appellants proceeded to urge us to invoke Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act to hear the suit on its merits.

The case of the Appellants on the Originating Summons is for the determination of the question raised therein and the grant of the reliefs sought. They have been reproduced earlier in this judgment but for ease of reference and to facilitate the discourse, the questions for the lower Court to answer are; (1) whether in view of the provisions of Section 285 (13) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Fourth Alteration Act No. 21 2017 and in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of ABDULRAUF ABDULKADIR MODIBO VS. MUSTAPHA USMAN & 2 ORS

in suit No. SC 790 delivered on the 30th day of July, 2019, the 1st Respondent acted ultra vires when it issued a certificate of return to the 3rd Respondent as the member of the House of Representative representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State, the 3rd Respondent having not participated in the elections held on 23rd February 2019; and, (2) Whether the 1st Plaintiff is entitled to be issued a certificate of return by INEC having scored the second highest number of valid votes in the election after KAWU SULEIMAN ABDURRAHMAN who was the candidate of APC in the election held on 23rd February, 2019.

The first Respondent filed a Notice of preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Court to determine the questions. Similarly, all the other Respondents also presented the same obstacle on the path of the Court in answering the question. These were embedded in their respective briefs of argument. The lower Court took the 1st Respondent’s preliminary objection point by point and in stating the nature of the preliminary objection and what a Court faced with such an objection

is required to do, stated thus: –
“The 1st Respondent’s preliminary objection touches on the subject matter, jurisdiction; whether this Honourable Court is competent to exercise same.
In matters such as in the instant case commenced by originating summons supported by affidavit evidence, it is the reliefs sought on the body of the motion paper and the affidavit in support that the Court need to examine in the determination whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the matter. See PDP VS ABUBAKAR (2007) 3 NWLR (PT. 1022) 15; INAKOJU VS. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT. 1025) 427.”

On what the 1st question and the related reliefs postulates, the learned trial judge said:
“In the instant suit, the reliefs sought and the depositions in the affidavit are on record, and looking at the first question for determination:
a) It calls for interpretation of SECTION 285(13) OF THE CONSTITUTION FOURTH ALTERATION ACT NO. 21, 2017.
b) The interpretation of the case ofABDULAUF ABDULKADIR MODIBO VS. MUSTAPHA USMAN & 2 ORS in Suit No. SC. 790.
The consequential relief No. A and B is for a declaration that the

3rd Defendant is not entitled to be issued with a certificate of return by INEC in the 2019 General Election as member of the House of Representatives for Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency upon interpretation of SECTION 285 (13) (Supra) the 3rd Defendant not being a person who participated in all stages of the said election. The reliefs D and E borders on consequential orders bordering on the declaratory reliefs.”

As to whether it was competent to answer that 1st question, the Court expressed its view in the following manner.
“I am aware that in Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/06/2019, this Honourable Court interpreted the provisions of SECTION 285 (13) (Supra) in judgment delivered on the 18th day of April, 2019, and held that the Plaintiff remains the bona fide candidate to represent the 2nd Respondent in Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency in the forthcoming 16th February, 2019 General Elections in the Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency for the seat of House of Representatives. The matter went up to the Court of Appeal in CA/K/253/2019 and then to the Supreme Court in SC/813/19/2019, and the decisions of this Honourable Court including the

interpretation of the provisions of Section 285 (13) (Supra) were affirmed.
Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot approach this Honourable Court to interpret the provisions of SECTION 285(13) (Supra) in relation to the 3rd Defendant as member of the House of Representative representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State, and this is irrespective of how Plaintiff counsel has formulated the questions for determination.
I am in agreement with counsel for the 1st Respondent that, this Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to construe, interpret, vary, alter or make any determination on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Appeal No. SC. 813/2019 – ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC) VS. MOHAMMAD SHAMSUDEEN BELLO & 2 ORS delivered on 1st August, 2019.”

Since jurisdiction is a radical question of competence, where a Court assumes jurisdiction when it has none, the proceedings no matter how well conducted is and remains a nullity as the defect in competence is not intrinsic but extrinsic to adjudication Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 @ 348, – OKPE V. FAN MILK PLC & ANR (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt 1549) 282.

For a Court to assume jurisdiction, same must be expressly and clearly donated to it. It cannot be implied, nor can it be conferred by consent or agreement of parties nor can the Court donate jurisdiction to itself where none has been provided OSADEBAY V. A.G. BENDEL STATE (1991) 22 NSCC (Pt 1) 137 A.G. of Lagos State V. AGF. Once a Court is not conferred with jurisdiction to entertain a matter, it becomes incapacitated from exercising any adjudicatory power over the case. On the other hand, a Court will be failing in its duty to assume jurisdiction where it has been vested with the requisite jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and with no other inhibiting factors precluding if from exercising its jurisdiction.

The Appellants counsel argued that by virtue of the decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of PETER OBI V. INEC (Supra), the lower Court has jurisdiction vide Section 251 (1) (q) & (r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) to entertain the suit since it borders on the interpretation of the Constitution.

It is however the contention of the Respondents’ counsel that reference to Section 251 (1) by the Appellant in arguing this appeal amounts to changing the goal post from their case on the Originating Summons. A look at the Originating Summons supports the Respondent’s argument because as rightly submitted the Originating Summons was brought specifically, pursuant to the provisions of Section 285 (13) of the Constitution fourth ALTERATION Ret No. 21, of 2017, and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Honourable Court. That notwithstanding, the fact that Section 251 (1) was not cited on the Originating Summons should not preclude argument on it, more so, that the argument is jurisdiction based.

In determining whether a Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s case, it is important to consider the subject matter of the suit, thus, both the claims and reliefs sought

must be read together before arriving at the conclusion whether the Court is not only competent to entertain the claim but is also competent to grant the reliefs sought. See INAKOJU V. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (PT 1025) 427.

There is no doubt that in addition to its general jurisdiction in Section 251 (1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal High Court has specifically been donated jurisdiction to entertain pre-election matters by virtue of Sections 31 (5) and 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). It is also without doubt that the Federal High Court is imbued with jurisdictional competence to interpret the provisions of the Constitution as it relates to the Federal Government or its agency as specifically provided. In the case of OBI V INEC’s case (Supra) heavily relied upon by the Appellants and to which our attention was drawn, the Supreme Court held that by virtue of S. 251 (1) (q) & (r) the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs’ Originating Summons and to grant to relief therein sought. He has urged us to abide the decision and to hold that the lower Court has

jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant the Appellants reliefs sought on the Originating Summons.

Court must be considered in the light of its own peculiar facts of circumstances, hence the legal truism that each case is only an authority for what it decides and nothing more. See SKYE BANK PLC & ANOR V. CHIEF MOSES BOLANLE AKINPELU (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt 1198) 179, UDO V. STATE (2016) ALL FWLR (Pt 840) 1179.

The case of OBI V. INEC (Supra), it must be noted was a pre-election matter and the relief sought was a determination of when the plaintiff/Appellant’s four-year term began to run. The relief sought by the Appellant was only for a declaration as to when his tenure as Governor would come to an end. The relief had nothing to do with the election of the Appellant as the Governor of Anambra State or for a declaration whether he was validly elected.
I agree with the Respondents that this distinctive factor which the Appellants omitted in their quotation, was clearly brought out by the Court, when it held thus:
“The above Section 285(1) & (2) of the Constitution presupposes that an election has been held and a petition has been presented. The only adjudicating body that has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine such petition is

the Election Petition Tribunal. The present action pre-dates the election held on the 14th of April, 2007. And, as I have said, all the plaintiff/appellant is seeking is a legal pronouncement or a declaration in law, as to when his tenure as the Governor of Anambra State would come to an end as dictated by the Constitution.”
I have also perused and carefully considered the case of OGEWU DAVID AGADA and ANOR V. INEC (2019) LPELR – 48476 (CA) relied upon by the Appellants in their reply brief in fortifying their position that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction in post-election matter to grant their reliefs. The only similarity between that case and the instant appeal is that INEC refused to issue Certificate of Return to the Appellant who was declared the winner of the election. That is the only similarity, if I may say so, between that case and the case at hand but the facts are materially and fundamentally different. The Appellant therein only sought an order, pursuant to Section 75 of the Electoral Act that he be issued with the certificate of return and nothing more.
In the case at hand, the Appellants reliefs B, C, & D seeking

not only a declaration nullifying the already issued Certificate of Return to the 3rd Respondent, but also an order directing the 3rd Respondent to vacate office to which he had been declared as duly returned brings out clearly the distinction between it and the AGADA’s and OBI’s cases (Supra) and indeed distances it a million poles apart from those cases.
Therefore, neither the case of OBI V. INEC (Supra) nor that of AGADA V. INEC (Supra) is an authority that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a post-election matter which directly or indirectly by whatever guise questions the election of a person already issued with a certificate of return, the nullification of the certificate of return and then an order for the issuance of the certificate of return to the plaintiff.
I am not alone in this position. I am fully fortified by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of OKADIGBO V. EGBE THEO CHIDI & ORS (Supra) per Muhammad JSC when the jurist held thus:
“I am inclined to agree with the learned Appellants’ counsel that given the foregoing reliefs and facts on the basis of which the reliefs are

canvassed, 1st – 5th Respondents claim, being against the issuance of certificate of return to the Appellants by the 6th Respondents, is one that questions Appellants election and return. 133 (1) No election and return at any election under this act shall be questioned in any manner other than by a petition complaining of an undue election or undue return (in this Act referred to as Election Petition) presented to the competent Tribunal or Court in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act, and in which the person elected or returned is joined as a party.”
I must state here therefore that though Section 251 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria begins with the phrase “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution” which is intended to exclude an impending effect of any other provision, paragraph (q) subjects itself to the provisions of the Constitution in the interpretation of the Constitution as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
The words “subject to” when used in a statute means liable, subordinate, subservient to or

governed by or as a proviso, and it is often used in statutes to introduce a condition, a proviso, a restriction and indeed a limitation. See EBHOTA & ORS V. PLATEAU INVESTMENT & PROPERTY DEV. CO. LTD (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt 948) 266, KAYCEE (NIG) LTD V. PROMPT Shipping Cop. & Anor (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 15) 180.
Whenever the expression is used in a provision or enactment, it means that it subordinates the provisions of the subject section to the section or enactment referred to which is intended not to be affected by the provisions of the latter. The phrase is used to express a clear intention of subordination of the subject section to the section or enactment referred to, to allow the referred Superior Provision fulfil itself. The phrase “subject to” by which Section 251 (1) (q) is commenced implies that other specific provisions of the Constitution to the contrary shall govern, control or prevail over the provision of that paragraph. It follows that Section 251 (1) (q) must be construed as being subservient to and restricted or limited by the express provision of Section 285 (1) of the same Constitution which specifically assigns the

exclusive jurisdiction of hearing and determining petition as to whether any person has been validly elected as a member of the House of representatives, to an Election Petition Tribunal in accordance with Section 133 (1) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).
In sum, the point I am trying to make is that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit by whatever means in whatever guise instituted which questions the election and or return of any person or involves a determination of the validity of the person’s remaining in office or challenges the legality of the Certificate of Return issued by INEC. In other words, the interpretative function of the Federal High Court in Section 251 (1) does not include a determination of whether a person declared duly returned as a member of House of Representatives and issued with Certificate of Return is entitled to remain in office or be ordered to vacate office. Such a determination falls only on election Tribunal or Court.

The other reason the lower Court declined jurisdiction after analyzing the Appellants 1st prayer as requiring an interpretation of Section 285 (13) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Fourth Alteration Act No. 21, 2017

and an interpretation of the case of Abdulrauf Abdulkadir Modibo V. Mustapha Usman & Ors (Supra), is that it had previously in Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/06/2019 delivered on 18/4/2019 interpreted the same Section 285 (13), and held that the plaintiff therein (3rd Respondent herein) remains the bona fide candidate to represent the 2nd Respondent at the then forth coming General election into the Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in CA/K/253/2019 and the Supreme Court in SC/813/19/2019. On that account, the lower Court held that the Appellants could no longer approach it to interpret Section 285 (13) of the Constitution in relation to the 3rd Respondent as member of the House of Representative representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State.

Predicated on this, the Court then held that it lacks jurisdiction to construe, interpret, vary, alter or make any determination on the judgment of the Supreme Court.

The learned trial judge correctly stated the scope of the 1st prayer on the Originating Summons, and we

fail to see the distinction strenuously sought to be drawn between that and the purport or meaning of the question as ascribed to it by the Appellants. It is merely a distinction without a difference or is like the difference between tweedelum and twedledee. Assuming there is any difference, it is negligible and that does not change the substance of what the question calls to determine. The question for determination obviously includes the interpretation of Modibo’s case. While the first arm seeks an interpretation of Section 285 (13) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (already construed), the other arm seeks firstly an interpretation of MODIBO V UMAR’s case (Supra) and then its application with respect to the action of the 1st Respondent in issuing the 3rd Respondent with a Certificate of Return.

We have perused Exhibit NJC 1 particularly at pages 318, 321 – 323 of the record and cannot but agree with the learned trial Judge that the same question was raised and considered therein, wherein the Court concluded that Section 285 (13) does not apply to the Federal High Court as a pre-election Court.

Admittedly, as argued by the Appellants’ counsel as at the time of Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/06/2019 (Exhibit NJC 1) which judgment was delivered on 18th April, 2019, the cause of action which is the issuance of the Certificate of Return by the 1st Respondent to the 3rd Respondent had not occurred nor did the decision of this Court in CA/K/253/2019 (Exhibit NJC2A and CA/K/254/2019 (Exhibit NJC 2B) as well as the Supreme Court decision in SC/813/2019 deal with the injury allegedly suffered by the Appellants.

Two Corollary questions flow from this, namely (1) Does the lower Court have jurisdiction to interpret the decision of the Supreme Court? (2) Does the Court have the competence to re-interpret the said provision to review, alter, or vary the interpretation of the Supreme Court or the decision of the Court of Appeal in the light of the status of 3rd Respondent as member of House of Representative representing Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency, Kano State?

On the 1st poser, while it is the constitutional and statutory power of the Court to interpret laws and statutes including the provisions of the Constitution, it is not the duty and indeed not within the

competence of one Court to interpret the decision of another Court. Least expected for an inferior Court to interpret the decision of a Superior Court and in this case, that Superior Court being the Apex Court of the land. It is surely not within the competence of the lower Court to interpret the decision of the Supreme Court in MODIBO V. UMARU (Supra).

On the 2nd poser, the answer is obvious. No Court except the Supreme Court has the power to review its decision once delivered. Once a Court has given its decision except in the circumstances when it can set aside the decision, it becomes functus officio and ceases to possess any power to revisit the judgment except as may be permitted under the slip – Rule. See Enterprise BANK LTD V. AROSO & ORS (2015) ALL FWLR (Pt 795) 314, MADU V. MBAKWE & ANOR – (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt 109) 293. It cannot alter, vary or in any way review the decision. See Ministry of Lagos Affairs, Mines and Power & Anr V. Chief Akin Olugbade & Ors (1974) LPELR – 1878 (SC) Integrated Realty Ltd V. Odofin (2018) 3 NWLR (1606) 316.

The question of reviewing the decision of the Supreme Court or any Superior

Court does not even arise for that will amount to a gross judicial impertinence for an inferior Court to review, or attempt to review, or outrightly vary the decision of a Superior Court it is obligated to follow without an option whether he thinks the judgment is right or wrong. See among several authourities on this statement of the law, the case of Dalhatu V. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt 843) 310 @ 399 where the Supreme Court descended heavily, and I say heavily on the lower Court for suggesting to it the (Apex Court) to review its decision.
The lower Court here in accepting the fact that it has no power to do so, stated thus;
“The main point is that, any interpretation that this Honourable Court may make in relation to SECTION 285 (13) (Supra) which will expressly or impliedly affect the decision of the Supreme Court with respect to the 3rd Defendant and his status as member of the House of Representatives Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency in the National Assembly will be tantamount to this Honourable Court reviewing or altering the decision of the Supreme Court. God forbid that I should so indulge.”

This finding is pukka and we agree with him.

Most instructively is the decision of the Court of Appeal, from the Election Petition Tribunal, in Appeal No. CA/K/EPT/NA/2019 (NJC 5A) delivered on 25/10/2019 which gave effect to the Supreme Court decision of 1/8/2019 in Exhibit NJC 3B declaring the 3RD Respondent as the winner of the Primary election of the 2nd Respondent in affirmation of the lower Court’s decision and the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/K/253/2019 and CA/K/254/2019 delivered on 19/6/2019.
In Exhibit NJC 5A, the Court of Appeal as the final Court in respect of that election held inter alia;
“The Appellant has by reason of one decision of the Apex Court in Appeal No. SC 813/2019 been the candidate who participated and contested in the general elections, had met the requirements set out in Section 285 (13) of the Constitution. See the decision of this Court in Engr. Suleiman Aliyu Lere vs. Hon. Rabiu Muhhad Lawal & 4 Ors. (unreported) Appeal No. CA/K/EPT/NA/4/2019 delivered on the 20th July, 2019.
Victory secured by the Appellant at the Supreme Court vide SC 812/2019 and SC 813/2019 (Supra) cannot be wished way as empty

or barren victory rather, the victory by him is substantial and tangible and the Courts, including this Court have a duty under Section 287 (1)(2) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended, to enforce the Judgment of the Apex Court. See Gbande vs. Afaor (2012) LPELR – 8613 (CA); Dalhatu vs. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR.
The Court then ordered inter alia: –
“The Appellant who was/is the candidate of the All Progressive Congress (APC) (4th Respondent), won the election held or conducted on the 23rd February, 2019 for the seat of Takai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State for the House of Representative, shall be returned as duly elected.”
These are the words of the final Court on the matter. The Court had spoken and it did so clearly and explicitly leaving no room for any ambiguity. Can the lower Court review that decision to conflict with, contradict or contravene that decision? Methinks not. Surely, the lower Court possesses not the power to do so, not even Supreme Court can competently set aside the decision. Whether the decision was given rightly or wrongly the only duty of the lower Court is to obey,

comply with and enforce the judgment. YAR-ADUA & ORS V. YANDOMA & ORS (2015) 4 NWLR (Pt 1448) 123, DALHATU V. TURAKI (Supra). It has no power to re-open or revisit the decision, as it where, to sit on appeal over the decision of the Court of Appeal. The lower Court was thus quite right when it forbade itself from doing that.
As the final Court, this is the final bus stop and not even the Supreme Court can entertain an appeal arising from the decision of this Court involving the election into the National and State Houses of Assembly. As rightly submitted by 2nd and 3rd Respondents, the journey has been disembarked on the 25/10/19 when Exhibit NJC5A was made.
The finality of the decision of the Court of Appeal involving election into the National and the State Houses of Assembly election has been laid to a final rest at least until an amendment is effected to Section 246 (3) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is a matter well settled constitutionally and by case law. Our law reports are replete with such decisions. See for instance EMORDI V. IGEKE (2011) 4 SC (Pt 11) 107 @ 145, UDENWA V. UZODINMA & ANOR (Supra),

OPARA & ANOR V. AMADI (2013) 6 -7 NSC (Pt 2) 49, OKADIGBO V. EMEKA & ANR (2012) LPELR – 7839 (SC) 17 DANGANA V. USMAN (2012) LPELR – 7827 (SC) ONUAGULUCHI V. NDU (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt 712) 309.
Assuming the decision can be re-opened or revisited the Federal High Court is certainly the wrong venue for that venture. Therefore, we cannot agree more with the Respondents’ counsel that in the face of all the decisions herein before referred to and in particular Exhibit NJC 5A, the Appellants are estopped from instituting the suit before the lower Court. They cannot be allowed even before a competent Court to re-litigate the same issue over and over again. See APC V PDP & ORS (Supra), Fatai V. Gbadamosi (2015) LPELR – 41724 (CA).

The Appellants have urged upon us to declare the decision in NJC 5A a nullity and to invoke Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act to hear the suit on its merits. As a starting point, the Section vests wide powers on the Court of Appeal to do several things and make certain orders. It allows the Court of Appeal to assume full jurisdiction over the entire proceedings as if the proceedings had

been instituted in the Court of Appeal as a Court of first instance. It allows the Court to rehear the case in part or in full or remit the case to the Court below; to make necessary orders for the proper determination of the real question in controversy. See OBI V. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt 1046) 565, INAKOJU V. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt 1025) 423 and ADAMS V. UMAR (2008) LPELR – 3591 (CA). Technically, it allows the Court of Appeal to step into the shoes of the lower Court to do what the Court below ought to have done but failed to do. This presupposes that the lower Court had the shoes to wear but did so wrongly or could have won the shoes but failed to do so. Where the Court below had no shoes to wear the appellate Court would have no shoes to step into.
Therefore, the power vested in the Court of Appeal is exercisable only where the Court below has jurisdiction over the matter. It cannot be exercised where the Court below has no power to entertain the matter nor can the power be exercised to do what the trial Court could not have doneA.G. ANAMBRA STATE V. OKEKE (2002) 5 SCNJ 318.
It stands out that for the provision to apply,

the following conditions must exist, to wit: (a) that the lower Court or trial Court must have the legal power to adjudicate in the matter before the appellate Court can entertain it, (b) that the real issue raised by the claim of the appellant at the lower Court or trial Court must be seen to be capable of being distilled from the grounds of appeal; (c) that all necessary materials must be available to the Court for consideration (d) that the need for expeditious disposal of the case or suit to meet the ends of justice must be apparent on the face of the materials presented; and, (e) that the injustice or hardship that will follow if the case is remitted to the Court below must be clearly manifest.
In the case at hand, the most important and the foundational condition which is the pillar upon which the other conditions rest, is absent. The jurisdiction of the lower Court is the pre-condition for the exercise of the power of this Court to the invocation of the provision. Having reached a decision that the lower Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter, the precondition and the proper setting necessary for the invocation of Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act

is completely absent and there is no jurisdiction in this Court to hear the merits of the suit.

Let me say in conclusion that in addition to the obvious fact that this appeal is without any thread or atom’s weight of merit, it also glaringly constitutes a flagrant abuse of process, the issue which the appeal seeks to determine having been conclusively decided with finality in Exhibit NJC 5A. The Appellants are only forum shopping by this appeal. They cannot be allowed to do that without swallowing the bitter pill. In DINGYADI V. INEC & ORS (2010) 17 – 12 SC. 105 (also reported as (2011) LPELR – 950 (SC)), the Supreme Court held:
“This Court in Dingyadi V INEC (No.2) stated categorically that abuse of Court is not merely an irregularity that can be pardoned but constitutes a fundamental defect, the effect of which will lead to dismissal of the process which is abusive…..
Once a Court is satisfied that the proceeding before it amounts to an abuse of process, it has the right, in fact the duty to invoke its coercive power to punish the party which is in abuse of its process.

Quite often, that power is exercised by a dismissal of the action which constitutes the abuse Per Adekeye JSC.”

Consequently, we dismiss this appeal and resolve the sole issue in this appeal against the Appellants and in favour of the Respondents. We affirm the judgment of the lower Court in Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/202/19 delivered on 1st June, 2020 by Hon. Justice A. L. Allagoe. The Respondents are entitled to cost assessed at N200,000. (Two Hundred Thousand Naira). These shall be the orders of the Court.

ABUBAKAR DATTI YAHAYA, J.C.A.: I have read in advance, the leading Judgment of my learned brother Wambai JCA just delivered and I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached therein. It is not controverted, that Courts do not exist for the purpose of interpreting the decisions of other Courts. Once a decision is given and that decision is tested at the Supreme Court, the matter ends there. No Court will have the jurisdiction to interpret that decision. After all, what would be the benefit of doing so? To reach a different position from that of the Supreme Court? Perish the thought! The Federal High Court clearly

had no jurisdiction to entertain the Originating Summons and grant the reliefs sought, as they had already been the subject of pronouncement by the Supreme Court. It seems to me that the only reason for coming to this Court, is to get to the Supreme Court to test the waters. I also dismiss the appeal and affirm the decision of the Federal High Court delivered on 1st June, 2020 in Suit No. FHC/KN/CS/202/2019. I abide by the order as to costs.

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading before now the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Amina Audi Wambai, JCA. His Lordship has ably considered and resolved all the issues in contention in the appeal. I agree with the reasoning and abide by the conclusion reached therein.

This appeal is, perhaps, the most flagrant example of abuse and misuse of Court process that I have encountered in recent times. The Appellant was the candidate of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the second Appellant, in the election conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the first Respondent, for the office of Member of the House of

Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State on the 23rd of February, 2019. One Suleiman Abdur Rahrnan Kawu was the candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC), the second Respondent, in the election.

Prior to the holding of the election, one Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello, the third Respondent in this appeal, commenced a pre-election action in the Federal High Court in suit No FHC/KN/CS/04/2019 challenging the nomination and submission of the name of the said Suleiman AbdurRahman Kawu by the All Progressives Congress (APC) to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as its candidate in the election. It was his case that Suleiman AbdurRahman Kawu did not participate in the primary election of the All Progressives Congress (APC) held on the 3rd of October, 2018 to select the candidate for the election into the office of Member of the House of Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State and that he participated in and won the primary election and was the proper person to have been nominated and whose name should have been submitted as the candidate of All Progressives Congress

(APC) for the election.

The Federal High Court heard the suit on the merits and, in a judgment delivered on the 18th of April, 2019, the Federal High Court upheld the case of Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello and declared that he was the bona fide candidate of All Progressives Congress (APC) in the election and it directed the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to recognize him as the flag bearer of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in the election. Suleiman AbdurRahman Kawu was dissatisfied with the judgment and he appealed against it to the Court of Appeal sitting in Kaduna in Appeal No CARK/253/2019. The All Progressives Congress (APC) was also dissatisfied with the judgment and it appealed against it to the Court of Appeal sitting in Kaduna in Appeal No CA/K/254/2019. In separate judgments delivered on the 19th of June, 2019, the Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals. Further appeals to the Supreme Court by Suleiman AbdurRahrnan Kawu and the All Progressives Congress (APC) as Appeal Nos SC .812/2019 and SC.813/2019 were dismissed on the of August, 2019. In other words, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal High Court

declaring Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello, the bonafide candidate of All Progressives Congress (APC) in the election and directing the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to recognize him as the flag bearer of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in the election.

Meanwhile, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) conducted the election into the office of Member of the House of Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State on the 23rd of February, 2019 with the name of Suleiman AbdurRahman Kawu as the candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) on the ballot. At the conclusion of the election, Suleiman AbdurRahman Kawu was declared the winner and returned as the Member of the House of Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State; the first Appellant was the runner-up in the election. The first and second Appellants were dissatisfied with the outcome of the election and they filed a petition before the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal sitting in Kano in Petition No EPT/KN/HR/11/2019.

It was in the course of the hearing of election

petition that the Supreme Court delivered the judgments in Appeal NOS SC .812/2019 and SC.813/2019 affirming that Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello and not Suleiman AbdurRahrnan Kawu, was the proper candidate of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in the election. Consequently, the Election Tribunal delivered judgment on the 30th August, 2019 wherein it set aside the return of Suleiman AbdurRahman Kawu as the winner of the election and it ordered the withdrawal of the Certificate of Return issued to him and directed the return of the first Appellant, who scored the next highest votes, as the winner of election.

Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello was dissatisfied with the judgment of the Election Tribunal and he sought for and obtained leave of Court to appeal against it and he filed an appeal in the Court of Appeal, sitting in Kaduna, in Appeal NO.CA/K/EPT/NA/12/19. The All Progressives Congress (APC) too was dissatisfied with the judgment and it also filed an appeal against it in the Court of Appeal, sitting in Kaduna, in Appeal No CA/K/EPT/NA/13/2019. In separate judgments delivered on the 25th of October, 2019, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the Election

Tribunal and struck out the Petition of the Appellants and the Court of Appeal went further in Appeal No CA/K/EPT/NA/12/19 to hold as follows:
“Victory secured by the Appellant at the Supreme Court vide SC.812/2019 and SC.813/2019 (supra) cannot be wished away as empty or barren victory rather, the victory by him is substantial and tangible and the Courts, including this Court, have a duty under Section 287(1)(2)of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) to enforce the judgment of the apex Court…
In consequence to this and other discourse in this exercise, I make the following Orders:
1. An order is made setting aside the decision of the National and State Houses of Assembly Election Tribunal Kano in Petition No. EPT/KN/NHR/11/2019 delivered on 30th August, 2019.
2. An order is made striking out Petition No. EPT/KN/NHR/11/2019 dated 16th of March, 2019 and
3. The Appellant who was/is the candidate of the All Progressive Congress (APC)… won the election held or conducted on the 23th February, 2019 for seat of Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State for the House of Representative shall be returned as duly elected.”

Consequent on these orders, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) returned Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello as the winner of the election and issued him with a Certificate of Return accordingly.

The Appellants thereafter commenced the present action in the Federal High Court by means of an Originating Summons against the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the All Progressives Congress (APC) and Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello, as first to third respondents respectively, and they posed the following questions for determination:
i. Whether in view of the provisions of Section 285 (13) of the Constitution or the Federal Republic of Nigeria Fourth Alteration Act No. 21, 2017 and in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nigeria in the case of ABDULRAUF ABDULKADIR MODIBO VS MUSTAPHA USMAN & 2 ORS IN SUIT NO SC.700/2019 delivered on the 30th day of July, 2019, 1st Respondent acted ultra vires its powers when it issued a certificate of return to the 3th Respondent as member of House of Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State, the 3rd Respondent having not participated in the elections held on 23rd February, 2019.

Whether the first Appellant is entitled to be issued a certificate of return by INEC having scored the second highest number of valid votes in the election after Kawu Suleiman Abdul-Rahman who was the candidate of APC in the election held on 23rd February, 2019.The Appellants sought for declaratory orders seeking for withdrawal of the certificate of return issued to the 3rd Respondent, the removal of the 3rd Respondent as the member of House of Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State and the issuance of the certificate of return to the first Appellant as the appropriate person who won the election.
In the unreported decision in Appeal No. SC.790/2019 – AbduiRauf AbdulKadir Modibo Vs Mustapha Usman, relied upon by the Appellants in filing their Originating Summons before the lower Court, the Supreme Court stated:
“The undisputed fact and the practical implication of the concurrent judgments of the trial Court and the lower Court are that as at the close of the period or of the window INEC gave political parties to submit the names of their candidates, and at the close of the time for the formal

nomination of candidates, and of course as at the date of the election, the 2nd Respondent (APC) had no candidate at the election. A similar situation played out in APC V Karfi … and this Court held that since the pre-election dispute as to who the party candidate should be was not determined until after the election, the affected political party had in actuality no candidate at the election, and that INEC ought to have declared and returned runner up with the majority of lawful votes from that election. In the instant case, there is no candidate in law to substitute or replace since neither appellant nor the 1st respondent was actually the candidate of the 2nd respondent on the ballot at the general election conducted on 23rd February, 2019.”

This Court has read through the above excerpt of the judgment of the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the orders made by the Court of Appeal in Appeal No CA/K/EPT/NA/12/19 – Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello vs Suraja Idris Runawa & 4Ors. It is obvious that, stripped of its embellishments, disguises and pretensions, what the Appellants desired from the lower Court by their Originating Summons was not an interpretation of

Section 285(13) of the 1999 Constitution, but for the lower Court to do the following: (i) declare the orders made by the Court of Appeal in Appeal No CA/K/EPT/NA/12/19 – Mohammed Shamsudeen Bello Vs Suraja Idris Runawa & 4Ors as having been given per incuriam, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Appeal No SC.790/2019 – AbdulRauf AbdulKadir Modibo Vs Mustapha Usman; (ii) consequentially nullify and invalidate the orders; (iii) override the two judgments of the Court of Appeal in Appeal NO. CA/K/EPT/NA/12/19 and Appeal No CA/K/EPT/NA/13/19 setting aside the judgment of the Election Tribunal and striking the petition of the Appellants; and (iv) thereafter restore the judgment of the Election Tribunal which returned the first Appellant as the winner of the 23rd of February, 2019 election of member of House of Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State. These are the logical effect of the prayers sought by the Appellants on the Originating Summons before the lower Court.

Now, Nigeria is a common law country and the foundation upon which the common law system is erected is the doctrine of judicial

precedent. In common law legal systems, a precedent or authority is a principle or rule established in a previous legal case that is either binding on or persuasive for a Court or other Tribunal when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts. The doctrine of judicial precedent is commonly referred to as the principle of stare decisis, and it is a legal principle by which Judges are obliged to respect the precedent established by prior decisions. The words originate from the phrasing of the principle in the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere: “to stand by decisions and not disturb the undisturbed.” In a legal context, this is understood to mean that Courts should generally abide by precedent and not disturb settled matters.
Its meaning is that when a point of law has been once solemnly and necessarily declared by the decision of a competent Court, it will no longer be considered open to an examination, or a new ruling, by the same Court or Tribunal or by those which are bound to follow its adjudications. In a hierarchical judicial arrangement, it precludes the Judges of subordinate Courts from changing what has been determined by

a higher Court. In other words, they should keep the scale of justice even and steady and not liable to waver with every Judge’s opinion – Adesokan vs Adetunji (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt 345) 540, Okeke vs Okoli (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt 642) 641. Adherence to precedent is one of the strongest principles of judicial policy which provides for an orderly and reliable development of legal rules and it does not involve an exercise of judicial discretion; it is mandatory – Amaechi Vs Independent National Electoral Commission (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt 1080) 227 and Dingyadi Vs Independent National Electoral Commission (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 347.
Thus, it does not lie in the mouth or within the province of a lower Court to comment on the correctness or otherwise of the decision of a higher Court and no lower Court can declare the decision of higher Court as having been given per incuriam, no matter the level of its conviction on the point. It will be an act of judicial rascality, judicial tempestuousness and judicial foolishness for a lower Court to attempt to do so – Sambawa Farms Ltd vs. Bank of Agriculture Ltd (2015) LPELR 25939(CA). In Dalhatu vs Turaki (2003) 15

NWLR (Pt 843) 310, the Supreme Court explained thus:
“The doctrine of judicial precedent otherwise known as stare decisis is not alien to our jurisprudence. It is a well settled principle of judicial policy which must be strictly adhered to by all lower Courts. While such lower Courts may depart from own decisions reached per incuriam, they cannot refuse to be bound by decisions of higher Courts even if those decisions were reached per incuriam. The implication is that a lower Court is bound by the decision a higher Court even where that decision was given erroneously …In the case of N.A.B. Ltd. Vs. Barri Eng. (Nig.) Ltd (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 418) 257 at pp.289-290, the principle of judicial precedent was restated thus:
“The doctrine of judicial precedent (otherwise called stare dccisis) requires all subordinate Courts to follow decisions of superior Courts even where these decisions are obviously wrong having been based upon a false premise; this is the foundation on which the consistency of our judicial decision is based.”
In Osakwe VS Federal College of Education (Technical) Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt 1201) 1, the Supreme Court further made the

point thus:
“The Court of Appeal has no business with whether or not the decision of the Supreme Court is right or wrong. In the hierarchy of Courts, the lower Court is bound by the decision of the higher Court. It is not for a lower Court to question or say that a decision of a higher Court reached per incuriam. That is a privilege of the higher Court if after considering its former decision, it is satisfied that the previous decision had been reached per incuriam. The doctrine of stare decisis is a well settled principle of judicial policy. Thus, while it is open for a lower Court to depart from its own decision reached per incuriam, the lower Court cannot refuse to be bound by a decision of a higher Court even if it is reached per incuriam.”
The Supreme Court reasserted in the same case that:
“It is not open to a lower Court to disagree with the decision of a higher Court on any point even if the decision of the higher Court was reached per incuriam. The only course open to a lower Court on any point is to state the case to the higher Court for consideration. In the hierarchy of Courts in this country, however contemptuous of the higher Court

that a lower Court is, it is still bound by the decision of the higher Court. It is wrong for a lower Court to deliberately go against the decision of a higher Court or not to consider it when cited before the said lower Court. This is the discipline of the law. It is what makes the law certain.”
In other words, a lower Court has no vires, power or jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment of higher Court as having been given per incuriam, no matter how assured it is of its position – University of Lagos vs Aigoro (1985) LPELR 3429 (SC), NEPA vs Onah (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt 484) 680, Atolagbe vs Awuni (1997) LPELR 593(SC), Ogunsola Vs National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1211) 255, Emeluwa vs Onuigwe (2011) 13 NWLR (Pt 1265) 449, Peoples Democratic Party Vs Oranezi (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt 1618) 245. The lower Court in the instant case was precluded from entertaining the Originating Summons of the Appellants and its finding that it had no jurisdiction to do so cannot be faulted.

I must express my disappointment in the Counsel to the Appellants. This case shows that Counsel to the Appellants is either shamefully ignorant of the

fundamentals of the doctrine judicial precedent and of the hierarchical structure of the Nigeria Courts, which are taught as part of the principles of Nigerian Legal System to second law students in Nigerian Universities, or that he has been deliberately mischievous in commencing this suit in the hope of forcing through the desperate desire of his clients to be declared winners of the 23rd of February, 2019 election member of House of Representatives representing Tukai/Sumaila Federal Constituency of Kano State. Either way, the action of Counsel is not noble.

Rule 32 (3)(k) of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners forbids a lawyer from, in way, doing or performing an act which may obviously amount to an abuse of process of the Court.
In the case of Mbas Hotel Ltd vs Wema Bank Plc (2013) LPELR 20736(CA), I had cause to comment, on such attitude of a Counsel, thus:
“Lawyers as operators of the administration of justice system owe a duty to the society that nurtured them and made them what they are, to ensure that they conduct their activities in a manner that edifies and brings honor, respect and belief to the justice system.

They should not allow themselves to be used by litigants to bring the justice system into disrepute. It is pertinent that this Court reminds Counsel of the eternal words of a great jurist J., Wesley McWilliarns who writing in an American Bar Association Journal in January 1955 (41 ABA 18) wrote in an article he titled “The Law as a Dynamic Profession” thus:
“We belong to an ancient, to a great, to an honored profession. The practice of Law is a worthy calling. It has rewarded us with financial success and with prestige and leadership in our communities. It has given us much happiness and the good life. From it we received the gratitude and respect of our friends and neighbors whom we have served. Our word affords intellectual pleasure with dignity and independence, in competition with our fellow lawyers with whom we have cemented wane friendships and enjoyed happy companionships. For these blessings, we cannot but have a sense of gratitude and of obligation. The most productive, unselfish and wholly satisfying repayment of the obligation is constructive work to increase the effectiveness of our judicial system and the welfare of the profession.”

It is hoped that legal practitioners will understand that their foremost duty is to uphold the administration of justice system, and not to manipulate, abuse and misuse same to achieve desired goals of desperate clients.

It is for these reasons and the fuller exposition of the law in the lead judgment that I too find no merit in this appeal and I hereby dismiss same. I affirm the decision contained in the judgment of the Federal High Court, sitting in Kano, delivered in Suit NO FHC/KN/CS/202/2019 delivered by Honorable Justice A. Lewis-Alagoa on the 1st of June, 2020. I abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.

Appearances:

Ibrahim A. Buba. For Appellant(s)

Suleiman Alkali – for the 1st Respondent
Abdulhafees D. Khalid – for the 2nd Respondent
Nureini S. Jimoh – for the 3rd Respondent For Respondent(s)