CP.,ONDO STATE & ORS v. KILADEJO (2020)

CP.,ONDO STATE & ORS v. KILADEJO

(2020)LCN/14644(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(AKURE JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, October 08, 2020

CA/AK/269/2019

RATIO

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: WHEN WILL THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROCEDURE RULES BE INVOKED

The Fundamental Rights Procedure Rules enshrined in Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution can be invoked when the main or principal complaint in an application is the enforcement of a Fundamental Right: EMEKA V OKOROAFOR & ORS (2017) 11 NWLR, PT 1677, 410; TUKUR V GOVERNMENT, TARABA STATE & ORS (1997) 6 NWLR, PT 510, 549 and DIKE & ORS V AG, ANAMBRA STATE & ORS (2019) LPELR-46497 (CA). PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.

POLICE: ATTITUDE OF THE COURT TOWARDS USING THE POLICE FOR COLLECTION OF DEBT

The situation as found by the Trial Court which unfortunately has been the trend now for some time is not only unfortunate but frightening. That the Police, an agency of government charged with maintaining law and order, detecting, investigating and prosecuting crimes has now turned itself into a debt collector! What is more disheartening as is evident from the instant case is that lawyers are the architects of all this entrenched breach of fundamental rights of our citizens. Lawyers no longer go to the Civil Courts to prove any liabilities but resort to the Police to arrest their victim, subject him or her to torture and many a time force them to sign an undertaking of indebtedness in the claimed amount. Sometimes, these forceful undertakings are then used to obtain judgments on the undefended list in favour of the culprits! This is indeed a very sad commentary on the level of legal practice in Nigeria today. It also speaks volumes on the status of the Police and most often the EFCC as well, that in the face of heightened insecurity and rise in crime, including financial crimes, the institution charged with maintaining sanity in these areas have abandoned their statutory duties and turned themselves into debt collectors! The Apex Court had occasion to berate this ugly practice when it held in the case of EFCC V DIAMOND BANK PLC & ORS (2018) 8 NWLR, PT 1620, 61 thus:

“It can be seen that even from the deposition of the 1st respondent there was an absence of criminality in the transaction and so at the point the 1st and 2nd respondents transformed into fraudsters were not explained to warrant the bringing into the pictures the appellant as law enforcer to intervene in this simple and pure contract of overdraft facilities without a shade of fraud or fraudulent practice therein embedded. Therefore when the appellant propelled by 1st respondent invited the 3rd respondent for interrogation in respect of the transaction shown clearly in the affidavit in support and even the counter affidavit, the fundamental right of the 2nd and 3rd respondents had been breached and the appellant CANNOT CALL IN AID ITS POWERS UNDER THE POLICE ACT Section 4 …UPON WHICH IT COULD EXERCISE THOSE POWERS”
In the case of ABDULLAHI V BUHARI (2004) LPELR-11257 (CA) this Court, per Jega JCA (of blessed memory) puts it more bluntly as follows:
“The duty of the Police is as enumerated in the Police Act. They do not include, debt collection”

What my learned brothers of this Court have said so loudly but which has gone unheeded and which I will reiterate nonetheless is that the Police has no business in the resolution of purely civil matters. It does not make a difference what colouration the complainant gives to it, ‘419’, cheating, name it. The Police have a responsibility to investigate a criminal complaint. Where, however, as in this case, it is clear that it is a purely civil transaction, the Police will do well not to allow themselves be dragged into it even if the complainant has tagged it ‘advance fee fraud’. This Court gave this warning very succinctly in the case of ANOGWIE & ORS V ODOM & ORS (2016) Per OHO JCA thus:
“………. the invitation of the police to intervene in a matter that is purely civil in nature cannot be justified under any circumstances. The duties of the Police as provided under Section 4 of the POLICE ACT, Cap 359 LFN 1990 does not include the settlement of civil disputes or the collection of debts or enforcement of civil agreements between parties. The mere fact that the police are usually invited into just about every matter under the sun is no justification to get the police involved in the resolution of civil disputes. The police has recently held itself out as a responsible law enforcement organization should be seen to live up to its billings in quickly turning down matters not statutorily assigned to it so as to avoid embarrassments of matters of this nature. There are usually dire consequences at every turn of event, in the event of things of this nature happening. The position is and has always been that the private individual who uses the police to settle a private score, would himself be liable for the wrongful act of the police.”
See also NKPA V NKUME (2001) 6 NWLR, PT 710, 543; OGBONNA V OGBONNA (2014) LPELR-22308 (CA); SALAMI V OLAOYE (2018) LPERLR-47256 (CA); GUSAU V UMEZURIKE (2012) AFWLR, PT 655, 291; OSIL LTD V BALOGUN (2012) 7 WRN, 143; IBIYEYE V GOLD (2013) AFWLR, PT 659, 1074 and a host of other cases.
This plethora of cases should not be mistaken to be saying that once there is a contractual relationship or the initial transaction is civil in nature the Police have no power under the Police Act even on invitation to wade in and investigate whether indeed an offence has been committed. The point being made is that where aggrieved creditors resort to the police using one guise of criminal wrong doing or another to get their debtors detained until they pay the debt or sign an undertaking to do so as clearly evident in this case is what is being deprecated. The cases or occasions where these ploys are used are usually very clear to the Police. PER MAHMOUD, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Oyebisi Folayemi Omoleye Justice of the Court of Appeal

Ridwan Maiwada Abdullahi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (ONDO STATE COMMAND) 2. SUPOL ADEREMI (ATTACHED TO ONDO STATE CID) 3. OYEDOKUN OYEKANMI APPELANT(S)

And

MRS BOLA KILADEJO RESPONDENT(S)

PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): By an application for the enforcement of her Fundamental Rights brought pursuant to the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 and filed on the 25th March, 2019, before the Ondo State High Court sitting at Ondo, the Applicant/Respondent sought the following six orders against the Respondents/Appellants:-
1. DECLARATION that the arrest and detention of the Applicant on the 13th of September, 2018 to the 15th day of September, 2018 by the 1st and 2nd Respondents at the instance of the 3rd Respondent without an order of the Court and without any just cause is an infringement and violation of Applicant’s Fundamental Rights under Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria.
2. DECLARATION that the arrest and detention of the Applicants by the Respondents at the Ondo State C.I.D, Alagbaka, Akure, Ondo State on the 13th September 2018 to 15th September, 2018 by the 1st and 2nd Respondents at the instance of the 3rd Respondent without an order of Court is in violation of the Applicant’s Fundamental Rights which is very wrong and

unconstitutional and in (sic) contrary to the provision of Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria.
3. AN ORDER awarding the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira Only) being damages against Respondents for the unlawful arrest, detention of the Applicant illegally and unconstitutionally and in contravention of his Fundamental Right guaranteed by provision of Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria.
4. AN ORDER releasing the Certificate of Incorporation of the Applicant’s Company in possession of the 1st and 2nd Respondents.
5. AN ORDER OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION restraining the Respondents whether by themselves, their agents, privies, and servants from arresting, harassing, molesting, intimidating, restraining or in any way or manner restrict or interfere with the liberty of the applicant.
6. AND FOR SUCH ORDERS OR SUCH FURTHER ORDER as this honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances for the redress of the infringement of the Applicant’s Fundamental Rights.

The application was supported by a twenty six paragraph affidavit, statement of facts, a verifying

affidavit and accompanied by a written address. Upon being served with the application the Respondents/Appellants filed their counter affidavit which was also accompanied by a written address. In it the respondents/appellants raised three issues. The applicant/respondent filed a better and further affidavit which was also accompanied by a written address.

At the hearing, both parties through their counsel adopted their written addresses in support of their cases respectively.

At the conclusion of hearing, his Lordship Hon. Justice A. O. Adebusoye, in a considered Judgment delivered on the 3rd June, 2019 decided in favour of the respondent as per her claim, save relief No. 3.

Therein the learned Trial Judge awarded N1,500,000 instead of the N5,000,000.00 sought by the applicant/respondent as damages for the unlawful arrest and detention against the respondent/appellant.

Dissatisfied with this decision, the appellants by a Notice of Appeal dated and filed 3rd July, 2019 appealed to this Court on the following three grounds with their particulars to wit:

GROUND ONE
The learned Trial Court erred in law when it entered judgment for the

Applicant/Respondent without properly evaluating the piece of evidence proffered by the parties and unfairly placing them on imaginary scale of justice to weigh them appropriately thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice to the Respondent.
PARTICULARS
i. The failure, neglect or omission of the learned Trial Court to evaluate, assess and place the evidence of the parties on imaginary scale of justice had denied the Respondent/Appellants of their right to fair (sic) as enshrined in the Constitution.
ii. Had the learned Trial Court properly evaluate, assess and place the evidence of the parties’ side-by-side it would have dismissed the application in its entirety.
iii. That the learned Trial Court had a sacred duty to properly evaluate the evidence of the witnesses one against the other before arriving at a conclusion as to which piece of evidence to accept or reject, failing which its findings are liable to be set aside as being perverse.
GROUND TWO
The learned Trial Court erred in law when it held thus: “The Respondents have thus contradicted themselves on the issue of which bail was granted to the

Appellant” and then rejected the vital evidence of the Respondents/Appellants which therein occasions injustice to them.
PARTICULARS
i. The failure of the Trial Court to first properly analyse the different actions enumerated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Respondents/Appellants counter affidavit which facts clearly established offer of bail on 7th September 2018 and fulfilment of it on 8th September, 2018 before concluding that there was contradiction and then reject the evidence of the Respondents/Appellants thereby constituting injustice.
ii. The failure of the learned Trial Court to admit the evidence of the Respondent/Appellant upon the ground of alleged contradiction is adversorial to their right to fair hearing.
GROUND THREE
The judgment is against the weight of evidence.
i. The learned Trial Court omitted to evaluate properly the evidence of the Respondents/Appellants and place them side-by-side which proves commission of criminal acts of the Applicants/Respondents during the hearing of the suit.
ii. The learned Trial Court upon failure to properly place evidence of parties side-by-side wrongly held the decision

that Respondents/Appellants need not to have ever detained the Applicant/Respondent in view of the supposedly held notion that the transaction between the parties was civil and not criminal.
iii. Had the learned Trial Court properly evaluate facts and evidence proffered by the Respondent/Appellants it would have dismissed the application.

Whereof the appellants sought an order of Court declaring the arrest of the Applicant/Respondent on the 6th September, 2018 as legal and constitutional.

In prosecuting their appeal the appellant’s brief which was settled by MR K. A. Olatunji was filed on 30th of August, 2019. In it counsel distilled two issues for determination by the court:
1. Whether or not from the available material evidence and exhibits D and E of the Respondent’s further and better affidavit the Trial Judge, having failed to evaluate, analyse and assess same, was right in law to hold that the transactions stated therein was civil and not criminal thereby awarding damages against the Respondent.
2. Whether or not from evidence adduced and circumstances of the case the judgment was not against the

weight of evidence such that the Trial Judge erroneously held that there was breach of the Respondent’s fundamental rights.

This appeal was set down for hearing on the 14th July, 2020. On the said date the appellant inspite of having been served with hearing notice. The briefs of both counsel having been properly filed and served, the court deemed the appeal was as duly argued pursuant to ORDER 19(9)(4) OF THE RULES of COURT, 2016.

On issue (1) counsel submitted that the 1st and 2nd Appellants are creatures of SECTION 214 OF THE 1999 Constitution and SECTION 4 OF THE POLICE ACT, 2004, charged with the responsibility of detecting, investigating and prosecuting crime. That in that capacity they received a complaint or petition, Exhibit A from the 3rd Appellant on allegations of obtaining money by false pretence and threat to life against the Respondent. That the case as made out by the complainant against the Respondent was that the Respondent, a registered travel agent had been given an advance of N400,000 out of an agreed amount of N900,000 to procure Denmark visa for one Olalekan Moshood introduced to the Respondent for this purpose by

the 3rd Appellant. The allegation was that the Respondent had used fake documents in procuring the said visa which was refused as a consequence of the fake documents. The contention of the 2nd appellant was that their investigation established the offences of obtaining money by false pretences, forgery and “uttering” fake documents by the Respondent who therefore made a recommendation to the to the Deputy Commissioner of Police for arraignment of the Respondent in Court. That it was the Respondent who pleaded to dialogue with 3rd Appellant for amicable resolution of the matter which plea was granted and the Respondent was accordingly offered administrative bail on the 7th September, 2018, a day after the Respondent was invited by the 1st and 2nd Appellants following the Petition of the 3rd appellant on the 6th September, 2018. Counsel submitted that the learned Trial Judge failed to properly evaluate Exhibit A vis a vis the affidavit evidence of the Respondent where she admitted professing herself to be a travelling agent with profound skill in procuring visa whereas she forged documents submitted to the embassy and therefore committed a crime.

That this justified the intervention of the 1st and 2nd Appellants in investigating and prosecuting this crime. That if the learned Trial Judge had been unbiased in his consideration of the exhibits and documents before him, he would not have found the appellants liable to the respondent as all they did was within their constitutional duty of investigation and prosecution of crimes and their powers under the Police Act.

On issue (2), counsel referred to the affidavit evidence of the Respondent where she alleged the infringement of her fundamental right and the statutory powers of the police to conduct investigation, detect crime and apprehend offenders pursuant to the provisions of Sections 4 and 24(1)(a) & (b) of the Police Act, 2004. Counsel argued that by the averments in their counter affidavit, the Respondent gave out herself as a travel agent and in the process of procuring visa for a client introduced by the 3rd Appellant committed a crime. Counsel contended that had the learned Trial Judge dispassionately evaluated the evidence, he would not have come to the conclusion that the transaction between the 3rd Appellant and the Respondent was

purely civil. That since bail was granted to the Respondent but she failed to get a surety to perfect it, the learned Trial Judge erred by holding that there was a breach of the appellant’s fundamental right. Counsel submitted that the decision of the Trial Court is perverse having regard to the evidence before the Court. Counsel urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Trial Court to allow the investigation and possible prosecution of the Respondent.

Upon being served with the appellant’s brief, the Respondent whose brief was settled Sir Adeyinka Adeyosoye and filed on the 16th October, 2019, also distilled two issues for determination thus:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT TO HOLD THAT THE TRANSACTIONS STATED HEREIN WAS CIVIL AND NOT CRIMINAL. (GROUND I).
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS RIGHT TO HOLD THAT THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE RESPONDENT’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FROM THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED. (GROUNDS 2 & 3).

In opposing the appeal, MS O. L. SALAMI of counsel for the Respondent adopted their brief as their legal arguments in opposition to the appeal. On issue (1)

counsel submitted that the allegation of the appellants that the respondent committed a crime, was arraigned on the 7th September, 2018 and offered bail on the same date but failed to get a surety amounts to a mere reference to an offence which only existed in the appellants’ imagination. Counsel also submitted that the documents alleged to have been forged by the Respondent as contained in pages 28-41 of the record (paragraph 7 of the Respondent’s further and better affidavit) include Police Character Certificate, Application for Schengen Visa and Statement of Account of Olalekan Moshood with First Bank Plc. Counsel contended that all the documents are verifiable and on the authority of UKEJE V UKEJE (2015) EJSC VOL. 3, SC, also reported in (2014) 11 NWLR, PT 1318, 384 based on SECTION 114 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT, the Supreme Court held that there is presumption of regularity by Courts with respect to a document executed by an authorised Government Official pursuant to Section 114(1) of the Evidence Act. Counsel further submitted that the appellants who alleged that the Respondent committed a crime, however failed to provide substantial proof

in support of the allegations. That the duties of the Police under Section 4 of the Police Act includes prevention and detection of crime. That in the instant case, rather than investigate the perceived crime the 1st and 2nd Appellants pressed for a refund of the amount paid for her professional fees at the instance of the 3rd Appellant. Counsel contended that the learned trial judge rightly found that Exhibits A and C were mere ploys to give the 1st and 2nd Appellants a cover to get a refund of the money paid to the Respondent by the 3rd Appellant for the processing of the Denmark Visa. That the learned Trial Judge after properly evaluating the evidence and upon finding that the appellants did not prove any crime came to the right conclusion that the transaction which led to the arrest and incarceration of the respondent was wholly civil in nature and devoid of criminality. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the arguments of the Appellants on this issue.

On the second issue, counsel submitted that the Appellants made contradictory depositions in their affidavit evidence. That where this happens, the Court is enjoined to reject the entire evidence

as it cannot choose and pick which of the conflicting versions to follow. That the learned Trial Judge was therefore right to hold that the evidence of the Appellants at the trial Court was useless.

Counsel submitted that the findings of the Trial Court was not perverse but based on evidence led at the Trial Court. That the Trial Court having properly evaluated the evidence, this Court has no business in disturbing its findings. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the appeal with substantial costs.

The real issue in this appeal in my view is whether the circumstances

of this case amount to a breach of the Respondent’s fundamental rights or it was an actual case of crime for which the Appellants were entitled to arrest and detain the Respondent with a view to prosecuting her? An answer to this double barrel poser will resolve the two issues formulated by the Appellants. This appeal will therefore be determined on this issue as posed.

The application that resulted in this appeal was brought before the Lower Court pursuant to Order 1, Rules 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 as well as Sections 34, 35 and 36 of the 1999 Constitution. ORDER 2, Rule 1 states thus:
“Any person who alleges that any of the fundamental rights provided for in the Constitution and to which he is entitled, has been, or is likely to be infringed may apply to the Court in the state where the infringement occurs or likely to occur, for redress.”
Section 46 (1) of the 1999 similar to the above provision states:
“Section 46 (1): Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in

relation to him may apply to a High Court in that State for redress”
The claim of the Respondent in the Lower Court was predicated on Section 35(1) of the 1999 which provides as follows:
“35(1)(c): Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law –
(c) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the Order of a Court or upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence, or to such extant as may be reasonably necessary to prevent his committing a criminal offence.”
The Respondent in her affidavit in support of the application, the further and better affidavit and the exhibits annexed to both affidavits made out her case and showed that her arrest and detention for three days by the 1st and 2nd Appellants on the promoting of the 3rd Appellant was outside the purview of the investigative powers of the 1st and 2nd Appellants as provided under Section 4 of the Police Act.
There is no dispute from the affidavit evidence on record that there was a

transaction/agreement between the Respondent and one MR Olalekan Moshood through the 3rd Appellant in respect of the procurement of Denmark Visa for the said MR Olalekan Moshood which transaction did not have the expected end. Exhibits A, B, C & D of the respondent’s further and better affidavit confirm without a doubt that the Respondent processed the said visa with the Denmark Embassy which visa was refused on the grounds that the applicant might not return to Nigeria. As a result of the failure of the Respondent to secure the visa the 3rd Appellant asked her to return the visa fee given to her. When she failed to do so the 3rd Respondent instructed his lawyer to write the petition, Exhibit A to the counter affidavit of the Appellants, to the 1st and 2nd Appellants. The Appellants, especially the 1st and 2nd viewed Exhibit A as not only an invitation but a justification to invoke their powers under Section 4 of the Police Act. The position of the Appellants is that Exhibit A creates a duty in them to investigate the authenticity or otherwise of the allegation of receiving by false pretences and threat to life against the applicant/respondent. That

their invitation and subsequent detention of the Respondent for a short period was to enable them charge her to Court. That their action based on a criminal complaint against the Respondent could therefore not constitute a breach of her fundamental rights as sought from the Court.
The said Exhibit A which the 1st and 2nd Appellants try to hang on to as justification for their action is very explicit as it referred to the visa processing transaction between the Respondent and the 3rd Appellant and how the transaction went askew. Very importantly, the 3rd Appellant in his statement of complaint to the Police on the 6th September, 2018, annexed to the appellants’ counter affidavit as Exhibit D makes it very obvious that it was the refusal of the Respondent to refund the visa procurement fee of N500,000 or so to the 3rd Appellant on demand that prompted him to write the petition in the first place. For all we know and considering the notorious antecedents of the police in turning themselves into debt collectors Exhibit A may have been written after the Respondent went to Court to enforce her fundamental rights as their defence or a cover up.

Be that as it may, I am in total agreement with the learned Trial Judge in his finding at pages 80-81 of the record thus:
“I really do not see the business of the 1st and 2nd respondents in the visa transaction between the applicant, the 3rd respondent and Mr. Olalekan Moshood, which transaction, being a civil matter, went awry. In my own view, the petition, Exhibit A, attached to the counter-affidavit and titled “OBTAINING MONEY BY FALSE PRETENCE AND THREAT TO LIFE AGAINST ONE MRS BOLA OLANIPEKUN AND HER COHORTS”, is just a ploy to call a dog a bad name in order to hang it. In other words, the petition, Exhibit A, written on behalf of the 3rd respondent by his solicitors, is just to confer “jurisdiction” on the 1st and 2nd respondents to assist the 3rd respondent take on the applicant and secure the refund of the money paid to the applicant by the 3rd respondent for processing the Denmark visa. The 1st and 2nd respondents ought not allow themselves to be unwittingly dragged into a business transaction between the applicant and the 3rd respondent which did not end well. One would have expected the 1st and 2nd respondents to have

directed the 3rd respondent back to his lawyer who issued the petition, Exhibit A, with an advice that a civil claim should be initiated in a Court of law so as to retrieve whatever money was released to the applicant for processing the said visa to Denmark. The processing of the Denmark visa by the applicant for Mr. Olalekan Moshood is purely, in my own view, a contractual agreement, albeit oral, which only a court of law can interpret in a civil claim or action. What the 3rd respondent sought to do by initiating the arrest and detention of the applicant vide the petition, Exhibit A, attached to the counter-affidavit, was to employ the services of the 1st and 2nd respondents as debt collectors so as to secure the refund of the money given to the applicant for the processing of the Denmark visa in favour of Mr. Olalekan Moshood and nothing more. This is certainly an uncivilized way of going about the transaction, which was purely civil between the applicant and the 3rd respondent.”
The situation as found by the Trial Court which unfortunately has been the trend now for some time is not only unfortunate but frightening. That the Police, an agency

of government charged with maintaining law and order, detecting, investigating and prosecuting crimes has now turned itself into a debt collector! What is more disheartening as is evident from the instant case is that lawyers are the architects of all this entrenched breach of fundamental rights of our citizens. Lawyers no longer go to the Civil Courts to prove any liabilities but resort to the Police to arrest their victim, subject him or her to torture and many a time force them to sign an undertaking of indebtedness in the claimed amount. Sometimes, these forceful undertakings are then used to obtain judgments on the undefended list in favour of the culprits! This is indeed a very sad commentary on the level of legal practice in Nigeria today. It also speaks volumes on the status of the Police and most often the EFCC as well, that in the face of heightened insecurity and rise in crime, including financial crimes, the institution charged with maintaining sanity in these areas have abandoned their statutory duties and turned themselves into debt collectors! The Apex Court had occasion to berate this ugly practice when it held in the case of EFCC V DIAMOND BANK PLC & ORS (2018) 8 NWLR, PT 1620, 61 thus:

the sun is no justification to get the police involved in the resolution of civil disputes. The police has recently held itself out as a responsible law enforcement organization should be seen to live up to its billings in quickly turning down matters not statutorily assigned to it so as to avoid embarrassments of matters of this nature. There are usually dire consequences at every turn of event, in the event of things of this nature happening. The position is and has always been that the private individual who uses the police to settle a private score, would himself be liable for the wrongful act of the police.”
See also NKPA V NKUME (2001) 6 NWLR, PT 710, 543; OGBONNA V OGBONNA (2014) LPELR-22308 (CA); SALAMI V OLAOYE (2018) LPERLR-47256 (CA); GUSAU V UMEZURIKE (2012) AFWLR, PT 655, 291; OSIL LTD V BALOGUN (2012) 7 WRN, 143; IBIYEYE V GOLD (2013) AFWLR, PT 659, 1074 and a host of other cases.
This plethora of cases should not be mistaken to be saying that once there is a contractual relationship or the initial transaction is civil in nature the Police have no power under the Police Act even on invitation to wade in and investigate whether

indeed an offence has been committed. The point being made is that where aggrieved creditors resort to the police using one guise of criminal wrong doing or another to get their debtors detained until they pay the debt or sign an undertaking to do so as clearly evident in this case is what is being deprecated. The cases or occasions where these ploys are used are usually very clear to the Police. In the instant case for instance the Police upon an allegation of obtaining by false pretences and threat to life were perfectly within their statutory powers to invite the respondent for questioning. But the moment the respondent confirmed to them that the transaction between her and the 3rd Appellant was an agreement to facilitate procurement of Denmark visa for someone recommended to her by him and gave them all the documents, they should have released her that same day to go and revert to her or re-invite her for possible arraignment if they find evidence to support either or both allegations of wrong doing. The Police detained the Respondent for three days; forced her husband to pay N25,000 before the Respondent was released and in addition made her swear to an

affidavit under duress. Also significant is the attitude of the 1st and 2nd Appellants who without investigating the claim especially the documents submitted by the Respondent which show that she actually processed the visa application dismissively termed them fake. If the Police had merely invited the Respondent, taken her statement, investigated her claim, arraigned her in Court for an offence revealed from their investigation, she would not have come to Court seeking to enforce her fundamental rights. I have no doubt in my mind, from all the surrounding circumstances of this case that the interest of the 1st and 2nd Appellants in this case was only one: surely not to detect, investigate and prosecute the respondent for any offence committed by her but solely to coerce her to refund the money given to her to procure Denmark visa for one MR Olalekan Moshood. I agree that this is a clear case of the Police allowing themselves to intervene in a matter that is purely civil in nature. They cannot be heard on this occasion to fall back on their powers under Section 4 of the Police Act. The powers vested in the 1st and 2nd Appellants under the Act does not include

the use of the criminal process to resolve or influence the resolution of any civil dispute under the guise of investigating criminal features in such disputes.
I am satisfied from a careful perusal of the record of appeal especially the judgment of the Trial Court, that his lordship not only properly evaluated the evidence on record but also appropriately applied the law. I have no reason or desire whatsoever to interfere with the said judgment. His Lordship rightly found that the Appellants all acted ultra vires their powers under the Police Act by inviting and detaining the Respondent for three days without arraigning her in Court within a reasonable time and thereby infringed her fundamental right to freedom of movement as guaranteed by Section 35(1) of the 1999 Constitution.

Consequently, I hold that this appeal lacks merit, it fails and I accordingly dismiss it. The judgment of the Trial Court delivered on the 3rd June, 2019 is hereby affirmed.

I assess costs at N100,000 for this appeal in favour of the Respondent against the Appellants, jointly and severally.

OYEBISI FOLAYEMI OMOLEYE, J.C.A.: I have read the draft of the leading

judgment, in this appeal, just delivered by my learned Brother, P. A. Mahmoud, J.C.A.

I agree with His Lordship’s line of reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merits. I equally dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders, including that of costs, contained in the said leading judgment.

RIDWAN MAIWADA ABDULLAHI, J.C.A.: I concur with my learned brother, PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, JCA on the resolution of the issues in the lead judgment delivered.

Consequently, I hold that this appeal lacks merit, it fails and I accordingly dismiss same.

The judgment of the Lower Court delivered on the 3rd day of June, 2019 is hereby affirmed as in the lead judgment.

I abide by the order as to costs of N100,000.00 in favour of the Respondent against the Appellant.

Appearances:

APPELLANT ABSENT AND UNREPRRESENTED. For Appellant(s)

MS O. L. SALAMI For Respondent(s)