BRAIMAH v. MAMUDU & ORS
(2020)LCN/14615(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(BENIN JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Monday, September 28, 2020
CA/B/337/2013
RATIO
PLEADINGS: SIGNING COURT PROCESS AND THE MEANING OF SIGNATURE.
To be brief on the matter, it is settled law that a Court process may be taken out and signed by a party himself. A Court process may also be taken out and signed by a legal practitioner, on behalf of his client or the litigating party. Where a party engages a legal practitioner to take out and file the Court process, the legal practitioner must sign the Court process.
I agree with Prof. Ekpu, that generally in the conduct of a case, the sin or sins of counsel should not be visited on the party that he represents. See Adekeye & Ors. v. Akin-Olugbade (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 214 and Ndika v. Chiejina (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 802) 451. I think, however, that this principle of law does not apply where an originating process filed by the learned counsel is so fundamentally defective that it deprives the Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the action, case, cause or suit.
In this case, the live question to be answered is whether or not the 1st – 4th respondents’ action or suit was competent having regard to the nature of the ‘signature’ on the writ of summons and the person who signed it.
What is the meaning of “signature”? In its ordinary meaning, “signature” is:
“Your name as you usually write it…..” or
“…..the act of signing something.”
And to “sign your name” means:
“…. To write your name on a document, letter, etc. to show that you have written it, that you agree with what it says, or that it is genuine.”
Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary, 7th Edition, pages 1367 and 1366, respectively.
In legal parlance, “signature” means:
“A person’s name or mark written by that person or at that person’s direction.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, page 1415.
The endorsement on the original writ of summons was done by “A. O. O. Ekpu Esq” whose name simpliciter was type-written thereon without more. Counsel argued that the said endorsement is a sufficient signature. I do not agree. He was required to “sign” it and not merely type-write his name on the process. Anybody can use a typewriter or computer to type the name of a person and the responsibility of such a document, on which only a name is type-written, cannot be attached to any person. The essence of signing a legal process is to authenticate the content therein and to claim responsibility for it. Therefore, in the wisdom of the law, an unsigned document or process is worthless and has no efficacy. See Ojo v. Adejobi (1978) 11 NSCC 161; A.G; Abia State v. Agharanya (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 362 and Omega Bank (Nig.) PLC v. O.B.C. Limited (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547; (2005) 1 SCNJ 150.
Learned counsel for the 1st – 4th respondents argued that the signature of the Registrar of the lower Court is sufficient to validate it. I do not also agree.
The signature of the Registrar of the lower Court, on the writ of summons, is merely to send out the invitation or request, commanding the defendant to appear and answer to the plaintiff’s case or claim and that failure to appear before the Court, as commanded, would attract the sanction specified therein. It is not to indicate liability or responsibility for the plaintiff’s claim or relief endorsed on the writ of summons. The Court is neutral and does not claim relief for any plaintiff or party. This is one of the reasons that, in respect of the column: Endorsement to be made on the writ before issued thereof: there is a proclamation that “This writ was issued by XYZ……” and not by the Court.
It is clear, that whereas the Registrar of the Court conveys the plaintiff’s claim to the defendant, in the required Court’s writ, what is claimed by the plaintiff is solely the plaintiff’s business and he has to authentic his claim by signing the relevant portion of that writ himself or by his legal practitioner. In this case, the Court proceeded with the 1st – 4th respondents’ action and determined same on their further amended writ of summons, purportedly issued or taken out by the law firm of “A. O. O. Ekpu & Co.” It is now settled that a law firm, such as “A.O.O. Ekpu & Co.” is not a legal practitioner, within the meaning of Sections 2 (1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. See Okafor .v. Nweke (2007) 3 S.C. (Pt. II) 55 at 62 – 63 where the Supreme Court stated that: “In reality ‘Adewale Adesokan & Co’ which signed the originating summons is not a legal practitioner known to the applicable Legal Practitioners Act… …it is not in doubt that the signature of “Adewale Adesokan & Co’ on the originating summons of the appellant robs the process of competence ab initio…”
Similarly, in the case of SLB Consortium Limited v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt.1252) 317 at 366, per Onnoghen, J.S.C. (he then was, later CJN), the Supreme Court held as follows:
“In law, a business name is not accorded legal personality; it is not recognized as a legal person capable of taking or defending actions in the law Courts”.
See also Vincent Nnamdi Okwuosa v. Prof. N. E. Gomwalk & Ors. (2017) 9 NWLR (Pt.1570) 259 and the recent case of Alhaji Fatai O. Yusuf v. Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt.1710) 1.
Having regard to the meaning of signature, the type-writing of the name of “A.O.O. Ekpu, Esq.”, on the writ of summons issued on the 1st day of June, 2004, is not the same thing as the signature of the said learned counsel. It does not also mean that the said writ of summons was signed by him.
In this case, neither the original writ of summons nor the further amended writ of summons is competent. They both suffer from incurable, irreversible, irredeemable or unamenable legal deformities or woes that I have no choice than to hold that the 1st – 4th respondents’ suit was not competent and the trial Court, ab initio, had no jurisdictional competence to entertain it.
The effect of a legal practitioner signing an originating process, such as a writ of summons, in the name of a law firm, is that the entire suit is incompetent, ab initio, and it is regarded as non-existent. See Ministry of Works & Transport, Adamawa State v. Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 481 and Chukwudi Nnalimuo v. Sunday Elodumuo (Appeal No. SC: 278/2005 delivered on 12/01/2018).
The proceedings of the lower Court, therefore, amount to a mere nullity. See Akpene .v. Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. (1977) 1 SC 47, Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 and In re: S.C. Ezendu & 8 Ors. (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 312. Per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.
RATIO
PLEADINGS: WHAT SHOULD THE COURT DO WITH THE OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES RELATING TO THE SUBSTANTIVE DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM ON APPEAL.
What should the Court do with the other issues raised by the parties relating to the substantive dispute between them? Now it is settled that an intermediate appellate Court, such as this Court, has a duty to resolve all issues raised by the parties. See Ifeanyi Chukwu (Osondu) Ltd v. Soleh Boneh Ltd. (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 322.
However, where the Court considers an issue of jurisdiction and it is crystal clear that it lacks jurisdiction, it then becomes unnecessary to consider other issues. See Ikechukwu v. FRN (2015) 7 NWLR (Pt.1457)1 and Owuru v. Adigwu (2018)1 NWLR (Pt.1599) 1. It is trite law that where a decision or judgment of a trial Court is null and void, as in this case, there is no valid decision or judgment from which an appeal could lie to the Court of Appeal. See Customary Court of Appeal, Edo State v. Chief (Engr.) E. A. Aguele & Ors. (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1607) 369 at 396 – 397, per Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C.; where the Supreme Court stated that:
“In the event that the High Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction, it follows that the entire proceedings and any decision reached therein would amount to a nullity and would accordingly be void. Where the decision of the trial Court is a nullity, it means there is no valid decision from which an appeal could lie. The Court of Appeal, in the circumstance, would also be bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal before it”. In this case, the proceedings of the trial Court were based on an incompetent writ of summons. The law is that proceedings based on a void writ of summon are themselves void: Adegoke Motors Ltd .v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 and In re: S.C. Ezendu & 8 Ors. (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 312. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider and resolve the other issues in this appeal. Per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A.
Before Our Lordships:
Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein Justice of the Court of Appeal
Tinuade Akomolafe-Wilson Justice of the Court of Appeal
Biobele Abraham Georgewill Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
CHIEF USMAN BRAIMAH APPELANT(S)
And
- ALHAJI SHAEBU MAMUDU (The Imam Of Ewora) 2. CHIEF MOMODU OJEANELO (The 3rd Odionwele And The Daudu Of Ewora) 3. MALLAM YUSUF ABU (The Chairman Of Ewora Community) For Themselves And On Behalf Of The Ewora Community Of Anwain Clan Except Chief Sheidu Ogbeide And His Supporters 4. CHIEF P. SHAIBU MAMUDU IDOJERHIE 5. THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF EDO STATE 6. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF EDO STATE 7. ETSAKO WEST TRADITIONAL COUNCIL 8. ETSAKO WEST LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL RESPONDENT(S)
MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Suit No. HAU/40/2004 was commenced by way of a writ of summons in the High Court of Edo State, Auchi Judicial Division, holden at Auchi. The writ of summons was issued on the 1st day of June, 2004. It was amended two times. The statement of claim was also amended twice. In paragraph 42 of their further amended statement of claim, the plaintiffs (now the 1st – 4th respondents in this Court) sought the following relief:
a) “A declaration that Anwain Clan is made up of five villages namely – Ewora, Idegun, Iyoba, Eware and Amah with each village administered by a titular Village Head.
b) A declaration that Ewora village is comprised of two Quarters to wit: Oteh and Ovughu.
c) A declaration that the defendants lack locus standi and/or right under any law whether customary or otherwise to single handedly create any village or alter the status of the existing villages in Anwain Clan without consultation with or consent and concurrence of the people of the village concerned and/or holding public inquiry with all stakeholders in Anwain Clan.
d) A declaration that
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the purported division of Ewora village buy the defendants into two separate and independent villages to wit: Oteh and Ovughu without the prior consent or concurrence of the entire people of Ewora is unconstitutional, wrongful, illegal, null and void and of no legal effect and grossly offends the customary law of Anwain people.
e) A declaration that the decision of the Executive Council of Edo State as contained in the Edo State of Nigeria Gazette No. 51, Vol. 13 of 15th December, 2003; (i) abolishing the position of Village Head of Ewora, (ii) Creating the positions of ‘Village Head of Ovughu” and “Village Head of Oteh” is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, null and void and of no legal effect.
f) An order setting aside the said decision of the Executive Council of Edo State.
g) A declaration that the succession to the Clan Headship of Anwain clan is rotational among the 5 villages namely: Idegun, Iyoba, Eware, Ewora and Amah and not six villages Oteh and Ovughu) being not separate villages.
h) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd defendants from amending B.S.L.N: 137
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of 1979 Declaration stating the Customary Law Regulating Succession to the Traditional Ruler Title of Clan headship of Anwain, without holding public inquiry.
i) An order of perpetual injunction restraining all the defendants from recognizing Ovughu 2003 (Traditional and Chief Edict 1979 (Amendment) Order 2003).
j) An order of perpetual in junction restraining the 1st – 4th defendants from appointing installing or approving any person other than the 4th plaintiff as a village head in Ewora as presently constituted (Oteh and Ovughu).”
Upon the exchange of pleadings, and after the hearing of evidence of the parties and the addresses of their respective learned counsel, the trial Court, per Ikponmwen, J. (as he then was, later C.J.) delivered a reserved judgment on 05/06/2013 where the 1st defendant (initially H. R. H. John Iyoha Oarhe but was later substituted by the appellant) was “restrained perpetually from parading himself or referring to himself as the village head of Oteh or claiming that Oteh is a village distinct from Ewora”.
The trial Court also stated as follows:
“I make the declaration sought in
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relief 42(c) of the amended statement of claim.”
The appellant was not satisfied with the decision of the trial Court and he filed a notice of appeal on the 7th day of June, 2013 covering pages 112 and 113. A second notice of appeal was filed on the 23rd of July, 2013 and it is on pages 113A to 113E of the record. The appellant’s brief of arguments was based on the notice of appeal filed on 23/07/2013 and, at the hearing of the appeal, the notice of appeal filed on 07/06/2013 was withdrawn and it was, accordingly, struck out. It is on record that the 1st – 4th respondents filed a notice of intention to contend that the judgment should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied on by the Court below and arguments thereon were canvassed in their brief.
The appeal was heard on the following processes:
a) Appellants brief filed on 10/10/2013 and deemed as filed on 28/02/2014.,
b) 1st – 4th respondents’ amended brief filed on 19/06/2020 but deemed filed on 15/09/2020; and
c) Appellants reply filed on 22/05/2017 and deemed as filed on 28/05/2020.
Mr. K. O. Obamogie, learned counsel for the appellant raised the
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following issues for determination:
“1. Whether the lower Court was right when it struck down the independence or autonomy accorded Oneh Community by 5th – 8th Respondents representing the Government of Edo State and Etsako West Local Government. This issue is distilled from Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 7.
2. Whether the proceedings of the lower Court based on the further amended writ of summons dated 30th March, 2010 taken out by A.O.O. Ekpu & Co. (a firm of legal practitioners) are not rendered void by reason of non – compliance with Sections 2(1)and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. Distilled from Ground 2.
3. Whether proof of compliance with the provisions of Sections 4 (1) and 5 (1) of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Law, 1979 was a fundamental prerequisite for the validity of the independence or autonomy granted Oteh Community by Edo State Government. Distilled from Ground 5.
4. Whether the trial Court was not wrong when it held that succession to the Clan Headship of Anwain is rotational. Distilled from Ground 6.”
On behalf of the 1st – 4th
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respondents, Prof. A.O.O. Ekpu, their learned counsel, also identified four issues for determination but framed thus:
“I. Whether the Lower Court was not right when it de – recognized the autonomy of independence granted Oteh Community by the 5th – 8th Respondents without due regard to the custom of Ewora people.
II. Whether the alleged defect in the further amended Writ of Summons dated 30 Mach 2010 is sufficient to fundamentally affect the Judgment of the Lower Court.
III. Whether proof of compliance with the provisions of Section 4(1) and 5(1) of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Law of 1979 was not a fundamental precondition to creation of the Oteh Village Headship.
IV. Whether the Lower Court was wrong when it held that succession to the clan headship of Anwain is rotational among 5 villages namely Idegun, Iyoba, Eware, Ewora (made up of Ovughu and Oteh quarters) and Amah.”
The second issue respectively formulated by the both parties borders on the competence of the 1st – 4th respondents’ not suit and I shall take and treat it first. In doing so, I adopt the issue as couched by the appellant, namely:
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“Whether the proceedings of the lower Court based on the further amended writ of summons dated 30th March, 2010 taken out by A.O.O. Ekpu & Co. (a firm of legal practitioners) are not rendered void by reason of non – compliance with Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.”
The appellant’s argument is that the further amended writ of summons was taken out by “A.O.O. Ekpu & Co.” who “is not on the roll of legal practitioners in Nigeria”. Learned counsel argued that the proceedings based on it were incompetent because the said “A.O.O. Ekpu & Co.” could not and cannot take out Court processes. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed on Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 2004 and the cases of Oketade v. Adewunmi (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 63 and Okafor v. Nweke (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521.
Learned counsel for the 1st – 4th respondents submitted that “the use of “A.O.O. Ekpu & Co.” in the respondents’ further amended writ of summons is not capable of nullifying
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the entire proceedings before the lower Court.” He contended, inter alia, as follows:
“In the first place while we concede that an amendment of a Writ relates back to the date of the original, we however contend that such legal proposition is relevant only to the live issues to be tried and not to the form or style in which the Process was drafted. In other words, the legal proposition only states that a Court of Law is required to base its findings on the issues embodied in the amended Process and not on the original Process that has been amended. See the case of Dansol Org. Limited v. N.T.C. Limited (2001) FWLR (Pt. 59) 1267 at 1280 paras C – D, where was held that “It is trite that law that when pleadings are amended it is the amended pleadings that define the issues between the parties.” This proposition has nothing to do with the form in which the processes were drafted.” Hence where the Reliefs sought in the Original and the amended Processes are the same, as in the Suit leading to this Appeal, any defect in drafting the amended process should be treated as immaterial. In any case, a Writ of Summons is, strictly
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speaking, not a pleading and the rule on amendment of pleadings cannot apply to it.”
Prof. Ekpu argued that “even if the further amended writ of summons was taken out by “A.O.O. Ekpu & Co”, a firm of Legal Practitioners instead of a Legal Practitioner in the firm, that ground alone is not sufficient to set aside the judgment of the lower Court” because the original writ of summons was “duly or properly” taken by “A.O.O. Ekpu, Esq.” which initials appearing on the said writ identified same as being the act of the named counsel with the said initial able to then appropriately pass as the signature of the concerned counsel on writ”. On the method of signing and meaning of signature, learned counsel cited and relied on the cases of Galadanchi v. Abdulumalik (2014) LPELR-23593 (CA), Adebayo Adegbola v. Idowu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 747) 712 and Soroungbe & Ors. v. Lagos State Urban Renewal Boards & Ors. (2017) LPELR-43378 (CA).
In urging the Court to resolve this issue against the appellant, learned counsel for the 1st – 4th respondents,
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relied on the case of S.C.C. (Nig.) Ltd. V. Elemadu (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 230) 1168 at 1185, 1203-1204 and submitted, inter alia, as follows:
“It is on the strength of the foregoing judicial authorities that we strongly submit that the original writ which has taken out in the name of A. O. O. Ekpu was duly signed and as a result the instant suit was properly commenced. In consequence whereof, whatsoever malafides may be found on the Further Amended Writ cannot negate the said original writ and hence cannot vitiate this instant suit.”
Learned counsel for the 1st – 4th respondents finally argued that the cases relied on by the appellant are not applicable to this case, since they are distinguishable. He proceeded to give the distinction between the cases in paragraphs 5.13 to 5.29 of his very comprehensive or elaborate brief of arguments.
I have read the arguments of the parties on this issue. I have also read the record of appeal.
The original writ of summons is on pages 1 to 3 of the record. The amended writ of summons covers pages 16 to 18 and the further amended writ of summons spans pages 19 to 21 of the record of appeal.
In respect of the original writ of
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summons, issued on the 1st day of June, 2004 under the column: “Endorsement to be made on the writ before issue thereof” the endorsement relevant to this issue is as follow:
“This writ was issued by A.O.O. Ekpu Esq; whose address for service is 147 Benin Auchi Road, Ekpoma, Legal practitioner for the plaintiffs who resides (sic) at Ewora, Anwain Clan.”
The corresponding endorsement on both the amended writ of summons and further amended writ of summons is as follows: “This writ was issued by A.O.O. Ekpu & Co. whose address for service is 147 Benin Auchi Road Ekpoma, Legal practitioners for the plaintiffs who reside at Ewora, Anwain Clan.”
It is instructive to note that in all the endorsements on three writs of summons, save for the type-written endorsements, as reproduced above, there was no sign or mark of the legal practitioner or legal practitioners mentioned therein.
To be brief on the matter, it is settled law that a Court process may be taken out and signed by a party himself. A Court process may also be taken out and signed by a legal practitioner, on behalf of his client or the litigating party.
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Where a party engages a legal practitioner to take out and file the Court process, the legal practitioner must sign the Court process.
I agree with Prof. Ekpu, that generally in the conduct of a case, the sin or sins of counsel should not be visited on the party that he represents. See Adekeye & Ors. v. Akin-Olugbade (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 214 and Ndika v. Chiejina (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 802) 451. I think, however, that this principle of law does not apply where an originating process filed by the learned counsel is so fundamentally defective that it deprives the Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the action, case, cause or suit.
In this case, the live question to be answered is whether or not the 1st – 4th respondents’ action or suit was competent having regard to the nature of the ‘signature’ on the writ of summons and the person who signed it.
What is the meaning of “signature”? In its ordinary meaning, “signature” is:
“Your name as you usually write it…..” or
“…..the act of signing something.”
And to “sign your
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name” means:
“…. To write your name on a document, letter, etc. to show that you have written it, that you agree with what it says, or that it is genuine.”
Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary, 7th Edition, pages 1367 and 1366, respectively.
In legal parlance, “signature” means:
“A person’s name or mark written by that person or at that person’s direction.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, page 1415.
The endorsement on the original writ of summons was done by “A. O. O. Ekpu Esq” whose name simpliciter was type-written thereon without more. Counsel argued that the said endorsement is a sufficient signature. I do not agree. He was required to “sign” it and not merely type-write his name on the process. Anybody can use a typewriter or computer to type the name of a person and the responsibility of such a document, on which only a name is type-written, cannot be attached to any person. The essence of signing a legal process is to authenticate the content therein and to claim responsibility for it. Therefore, in the
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wisdom of the law, an unsigned document or process is worthless and has no efficacy. See Ojo v. Adejobi (1978) 11 NSCC 161; A.G; Abia State v. Agharanya (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 362 and Omega Bank (Nig.) PLC v. O.B.C. Limited (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547; (2005) 1 SCNJ 150.
Learned counsel for the 1st – 4th respondents argued that the signature of the Registrar of the lower Court is sufficient to validate it. I do not also agree.
The signature of the Registrar of the lower Court, on the writ of summons, is merely to send out the invitation or request, commanding the defendant to appear and answer to the plaintiff’s case or claim and that failure to appear before the Court, as commanded, would attract the sanction specified therein. It is not to indicate liability or responsibility for the plaintiff’s claim or relief endorsed on the writ of summons. The Court is neutral and does not claim relief for any plaintiff or party. This is one of the reasons that, in respect of the column: Endorsement to be made on the writ before issued thereof: there is a proclamation that “This writ was issued by XYZ……” and not by
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the Court.
It is clear, that whereas the Registrar of the Court conveys the plaintiff’s claim to the defendant, in the required Court’s writ, what is claimed by the plaintiff is solely the plaintiff’s business and he has to authentic his claim by signing the relevant portion of that writ himself or by his legal practitioner. In this case, the Court proceeded with the 1st – 4th respondents’ action and determined same on their further amended writ of summons, purportedly issued or taken out by the law firm of “A. O. O. Ekpu & Co.” It is now settled that a law firm, such as “A.O.O. Ekpu & Co.” is not a legal practitioner, within the meaning of Sections 2 (1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. L11, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. See Okafor .v. Nweke (2007) 3 S.C. (Pt. II) 55 at 62 – 63 where the Supreme Court stated that: “In reality ‘Adewale Adesokan & Co’ which signed the originating summons is not a legal practitioner known to the applicable Legal Practitioners Act…
…it is not in doubt that the signature of
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“Adewale Adesokan & Co’ on the originating summons of the appellant robs the process of competence ab initio…”
Similarly, in the case of SLB Consortium Limited v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2011) 9 NWLR (Pt.1252) 317 at 366, per Onnoghen, J.S.C. (he then was, later CJN), the Supreme Court held as follows:
“In law, a business name is not accorded legal personality; it is not recognized as a legal person capable of taking or defending actions in the law Courts”.
See also Vincent Nnamdi Okwuosa v. Prof. N. E. Gomwalk & Ors. (2017) 9 NWLR (Pt.1570) 259 and the recent case of Alhaji Fatai O. Yusuf v. Mobil Oil Nigeria Plc (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt.1710) 1.
Having regard to the meaning of signature, the type-writing of the name of “A.O.O. Ekpu, Esq.”, on the writ of summons issued on the 1st day of June, 2004, is not the same thing as the signature of the said learned counsel. It does not also mean that the said writ of summons was signed by him.
In this case, neither the original writ of summons nor the further amended writ of summons is competent. They both suffer from
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incurable, irreversible, irredeemable or unamenable legal deformities or woes that I have no choice than to hold that the 1st – 4th respondents’ suit was not competent and the trial Court, ab initio, had no jurisdictional competence to entertain it.
The effect of a legal practitioner signing an originating process, such as a writ of summons, in the name of a law firm, is that the entire suit is incompetent, ab initio, and it is regarded as non-existent. See Ministry of Works & Transport, Adamawa State v. Yakubu (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 481 and Chukwudi Nnalimuo v. Sunday Elodumuo (Appeal No. SC: 278/2005 delivered on 12/01/2018).
The proceedings of the lower Court, therefore, amount to a mere nullity. See Akpene .v. Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. (1977) 1 SC 47, Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 and In re: S.C. Ezendu & 8 Ors. (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 312.
Without more, this issue is hereby resolved in favour of the appellant and against the respondents.
The next question is: What should the Court do with the other issues raised by the parties relating to the substantive dispute between them?
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Now it is settled that an intermediate appellate Court, such as this Court, has a duty to resolve all issues raised by the parties. See Ifeanyi Chukwu (Osondu) Ltd v. Soleh Boneh Ltd. (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 322.
However, where the Court considers an issue of jurisdiction and it is crystal clear that it lacks jurisdiction, it then becomes unnecessary to consider other issues. See Ikechukwu v. FRN (2015) 7 NWLR (Pt.1457)1 and Owuru v. Adigwu (2018)1 NWLR (Pt.1599) 1.
It is trite law that where a decision or judgment of a trial Court is null and void, as in this case, there is no valid decision or judgment from which an appeal could lie to the Court of Appeal. See Customary Court of Appeal, Edo State v. Chief (Engr.) E. A. Aguele & Ors. (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1607) 369 at 396 – 397, per Kekere-Ekun, J.S.C.; where the Supreme Court stated that:
“In the event that the High Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction, it follows that the entire proceedings and any decision reached therein would amount to a nullity and would accordingly be void. Where the decision of the trial Court is a nullity, it means there is no valid decision from which
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an appeal could lie. The Court of Appeal, in the circumstance, would also be bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal before it”.
In this case, the proceedings of the trial Court were based on an incompetent writ of summons. The law is that proceedings based on a void writ of summon are themselves void: Adegoke Motors Ltd .v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 and In re: S.C. Ezendu & 8 Ors. (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 312.
Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider and resolve the other issues in this appeal.
In conclusion, having resolved the live issue in this appeal in favour of the appellant and against the respondents, I hold that this appeal is meritorious and it is hereby allowed.
The judgment of the trial Court, delivered on the 5th day of June, 2013 in Suit No. HAU/40/2004, is hereby set aside for want of jurisdiction.
The sum of N150,000.00 (one hundred and fifty thousand naira only) is hereby awarded as costs in favour of the appellant and against the 1st – 4th respondents.
TINUADE AKOMOLAFE-WILSON, J.C.A.: I have read in advance, the Judgment just delivered by my learned
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brother, MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, J.C.A. I am in agreement with his reasoning and the conclusions reached therein.
I abide by the consequential orders, including the order as to costs.
BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A.: I agree.
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Appearances:
K.O. Obamogie, Esq. with him, C.C. Okpaleke, Esq. For Appellant(s)
Prof. A.O.O. Ekpu with him, N.O. Aidomokhai, Esq. for the 1st – 4th respondents.
I.O. Kadiri, Esq. (Senior State Counsel, Edo State Ministry of Justice) for the 5th – 8th respondent. For Respondent(s)
