HDP v. NAT CHAIRMAN OF INEC & ANOR (2020)

HDP v. NAT CHAIRMAN OF INEC & ANOR

(2020)LCN/14588(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, September 01, 2020

CA/A/506/2020

RATIO

PLEADINGS: THE POWER TO DEREGISTER A POLITICAL PARTY.

I considered the provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration No. 9) Act 2017 which provides thus:
“255A. The Independent National Electoral Commission shall have power to de-register a political party for –
(a) Breach of any of the requirements for registration; (b) Failure to win at least twenty-five percent of votes cast in:
(i) One state of the Federation in a Presidential elections; or
(ii) One Local Governments of the State in a Governorship election;
(c) Failure to win at least –
(i) One ward in the Chairmanship election;
(ii) One seat in the National or State House of Assembly election; or
(iii) One seat in the Councillorship election.”
As rightly argued by learned counsel in their briefs, the law is trite that in construing any provision of the Constitution and any enactment whether by the National or State Assemblies, Courts are enjoined to accord these provisions their plain and ordinary meaning in line with the underlying intention of the draftsmen, especially where there is no ambiguity. In Global Excellence Communications Limited & 3 Ors. v. Duke (supra) the apex Court, per Onnoghen, JSC, (as he then was) held thus:
“…the principles guiding the Court in interpreting or construing the provisions of our Constitution include the following:
1. Effect should be given to every word.
2. A construction nullifying a specific clause will not be given to the Constitution unless absolutely required by the context.

A constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain unconditional result.
4. The language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evidence meaning.
5. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entity, a particular provision cannot be dissevered from the rest of the Constitution.
6. While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances progressive society for which it was designed, yielded new and fuller import to the meaning.
7. A constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defeat its evident purpose.
8. Under a Constitution conferring specific powers, a particular power must be granted or it cannot be exercised.
9. Delegation by the National Assembly of its essential legislative function is precluded by the Constitution (Section 58, (4) and Section 4(1)).
10. Words are the common signs that mankind make use of to declare their intention one to another and when the words of a man express his meaning plainly and distinctly and perfectly, there is no occasion to have recourse to any other means of interpretation.
11. The principles upon which the Constitution was established rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used, measure the purpose and scope of its provisions.
12. Words of the Constitution are therefore, not be read with stultifying narrowness.”
Therefore, the golden rule of interpretation of statutes is that where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous they ought to be given their natural and ordinary meaning, unless doing so would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the statute. So where the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, no more is required to expound them. In such circumstances the words of the statute best declare the intention of the lawmakers. See Dankwambo v. Abubakar (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1495) 159.
I noted that by the provision of Section 1(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Constitution is the grund norm from which all other statutes derive their legitimacy. The provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (Fourth Alteration No. 9) Act, 2017 are very clear as to the powers of the 2nd Respondent to be duly exercised upon violation of any of the sub heads of those provisions. This Court has no powers to interpret the clear and unambiguous words of any statute; including the Constitution, beyond their clear and unambiguous meaning or to place burden on the otherwise clear and unambiguous provisions. It is trite law that the function of the Judex is restricted to the interpretation and application of provisions of a statute, no more no less. Obi v. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 565 at 643, the apex Court per Aderemi, JSC, held thus:
“The Judge must always draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. The next question that follows, is, what are these principles? Judges in the exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction must only interpret the words of a statute or constitutional provision, where they are as clear as crystal, according to their ordinary and grammatical meaning without any coloration. It is true that Courts are always enjoined in the course of interpreting the provisions to find out the intention of the legislature, but there is no magical wand in this counseling. The intention of the legislature, or to put it bluntly the intention of the National Assembly at the Federal level or the State House of Assembly at the State level is to be judged by what is in mind but by its expression of that mind couched in the words of the statute.”
Upon my finding that the provisions of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (supra) are very clear and unambiguous as to the powers of the 2nd Respondent to de-register political parties that failed to meet the requirements contained therein, the next point I will consider is the import of the use of the word “or” in qualifying the distinctiveness of Subsections (b) and (c) of the said Section 225A as it raises the issue of whether the said provisions are to be taken separately or in conjunction with one another. That is to say whether they are to be interpreted disjunctively, in which case violation of one condition would warrant the exercise of the powers of the 2nd Respondent or conjunctively, in which case, the appellant must be in breach of all the conditions before the 2nd Respondent can validly exercise the powers vested upon it. I find the answer in Section 18 (3) of the Interpretation Act, Cap. 123, LFN, 2004, which provides thus:
“18(3) The word “or” and the word “other” shall in any enactment, be construed disjunctively and not as implying, similarity.”
Upon considering the provision of Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act (supra), it is my finding that the word “or” that qualified the distinctiveness of subsections (b) and (c) of Section 225A (supra), shall be construed disjunctively thus violation of one condition would warrant the 2nd Respondent to exercise its powers to de-register the Appellant, and I so hold. The argument put forward by the Appellant in paragraph 2.08 of its brief that the de-registration by the 2nd Respondent of the Appellant was premature as the said 2nd Respondent cannot predict into the future the outcome of pending elections which are continuation of 2019 general elections as governorship elections are yet to hold in three states of Edo, Ondo and Anambra and almost all the 774 Local Government Areas and 8,809 electoral wards across the country is baseless and is hereby discountenanced by me. This is because the Appellant did not show that during the General Election conducted in 2019, (which included the elections into all the positions listed in Section 225A (supra), it has won at least 25% of total votes cast in the Presidential election, or one local government in the Governorship election of a state etc. The Appellant did not adduce evidence before the lower Court to convince it that it has won at least 25% in either the Presidential or Governorship elections, Ward election or a Seat at the National or State Houses of Assembly election that took place in 2019.
The contention by the Appellant that chairmanship and councillorship elections are yet to be conducted in various states so it ought not to be de-registered is also untenable. The 2nd Respondent conducted elections into the Area Councils of the Federal Capital Territory, after the coming into effect of the Fourth Alteration Act (supra) and is therefore, armed with the data to assess the compliance or otherwise of the Appellant for the purpose of exercising its powers pursuant to Section 225A of the Constitution (as amended). Moreover, the exercise of the 2nd Respondent’s powers under Section 225A (c) is not subject to the conduct of election by the State Independent Electoral Commissions. Therefore, having regard to the fact that Area Councils have the same meaning and purpose as Local Government Areas, the conduct of election by the 2nd Respondent into Area Councils is satisfactory for the purpose of de-registration of political parties pursuant to Section 225A (c) of the Constitution. Also Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution does not envisage anticipatory or futuristic elections, moreso, as evidence of the conduct of the said elections have not been placed before the lower Court by the Appellant. The Courts, as a rule, do not act on speculation or hypothetical situation; it deals with hard facts properly placed before it as evidence. Hypothesis and speculation are in the domain of the academia. In Agharuka v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd & 2 Ors. (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 at 482, Abdullahi, JCA, (of blessed memory) held thus:
“The Court of law can therefore not be asked to speculate on possibilities which are wholly unsupported by evidence…”
Therefore, I resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents against the Appellant. It is my holding that the lower Court is right when it held that the de-registration of the Appellant as a political party was lawfully done by the 2nd Respondent in exercise of the powers vested on it by Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Per BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.

RATIO

PLEADINGS: THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS.

The view expressed above is based on the doctrine of stares decisis as made applicable to this Court by many decisions of the Supreme Court and even of this very Court.
As far back as 24th day of July, 1992, the Supreme Court dwelling on the principle of stares decisis and bindingness of the decisions of the Court of Appeal on it (Court of Appeal), stated in the case of USMAN V. UMARU (1992) LPELR-3432(SC) thus: –
“It is now well settled that under the doctrine of stares decisis, the Court below as an intermediate Court of Appeal between the Court below it and this Court as the final appellate Court, is bound by its own decisions except in circumstances specified in circumstances specified In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944) 2 All E.R. 293, 300, that is (a) the Court of Appeal is entitled to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow; (b) it will refuse to follow its own decision which, though not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion stand with a decision of this Court; and (c), it is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam- See …”
See also the case of ROSSEK & ORS V. ACB LTD & ORS (1993) LPELR-2955(SC).
Indeed, in the case of DADA V. KADIRI (2008) LPELR-8496(CA), this Court, dwelling on what the principle of stares decisis entails in relation to it (Court of Appeal) stated thus: –
“What the principles of stare decicis entails could not have been better put than did Uwaifo JCA (as he then was) in CAMPTEL INT’L SPA VS. DEXSON LTD. (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 459)170 AT 184. Where his lordship inter alia stated thus: “…It is a matter of policy that the Court of Appeal should stand by precedent and not disturb settled point of law decided by it. The doctrine thrives on the basis that when the Court has at one time laid down a principle of law as applicable to certain state of facts, it will not unsettle that principle but will adhere to it, and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same, irrespective of whether the parties and subject matters are the same. This is because there ought to be certainty in legal principles so that individuals may know how to manage their affairs as regards the requirement of the law. For the Court to fail to follow its earlier decision – to refuse to be bound by precedent – can usually be a hard step sometimes fraught with obvious difficult explanations.”
Lastly, the fact that the doctrine of stares decisis, has no application where the facts of a case decided earlier in time are not similar with the facts of a case decided later in time, is the case of ADISA V. OYINWOLA & ORS (2000) LPELR-186(SC) wherein the Supreme Court stated thus: –
“A previous decision Is not to be departed from, or even followed, where the facts or the law applicable in that previous case are distinguishable from those in the later case. Where relevant statute laws have changed since the previous decisions, what is called for is “distinguishing” rather than “departure”.
The doctrine of stare decisis is based, first and foremost, on the relevant likeness between two cases – the previous case and the one before the Court. Where there is no relevant likeness between the two, it is an idle exercise to consider whether the previous one should be followed or departed from. …”
I am of the considered view that in the instant appeal, this Court has fully complied with every aspect of the doctrine of stares decisis in portion of its judgment regarding the manner in which the provisions of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) as they relate to the de-registration of registered political parties, are to be interpreted. It is that the provisions in question are to be interpreted disjunctively. This was the position of this Court in CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020: ADVANCE CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS [ACD) & 21 ORS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ANOR Per BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.

Before Our Lordships:

Ayobode Olujimi Lokulo-Sodipe Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mudashiru Nasiru Oniyangi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Bitrus Gyarazama Sanga Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

HOPE DEMOCRATIC PARTY APPELANT(S)

And

NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION 2. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) RESPONDENT(S)

BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant as Plaintiff filed an Originating Summons dated 13th February, 2020, on 14th February, 2020, against the Respondents as Defendants before the Federal High Court of Nigeria Abuja Judicial Division, Taiwo O. Taiwo J., presiding; seeking for the determination of the following questions:
1. Whether by express provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) Defendants’ de-registration of Hope Democratic Party is constitutional.
2. Whether by express provision of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the exercise of the power by the Defendants amounts to the infringement on the rights of Hope Democratic Party.

Upon determination of the questions above, the Plaintiff seeks the following reliefs against the Defendants:
1. A Declaration that INEC cannot de-register Hope Democratic Party except in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
2. A Declaration that the Defendants’ decision of deregistration of the

Hope Democratic Party is unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect.
3. A Declaration that the Defendants’ shall immediately reverse their decision of deregistration of Hope Democratic Party.
4. An Order of Interlocutory Injunction directing the Defendants whether by itself, agents, privies or howsoever described to relist Hope Democratic Party.

An 8 paragraph affidavit in support accompanied the Originating Process deposed to by one Tapre Poland Awini, who described himself as the National Chairman of the Plaintiff. Mr. Awini also deposed to an Affidavit of Non-Multiplicity of Action containing 6 paragraphs. A copy of letter on letter-headed paper of INEC reference No: INEC/DEPM/CCP/123/VOL. V, dated 6th February, 2020, addressed to the “The National Chairman, Hope Democratic Party (HDP), Plot 43, First Avenue Gwarimpa Estate, Abuja, headed: “DE-REGISTRATION OF HOPE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (HDP)”, signed by one Rose Oriaran-Anthony, Secretary to the Commission, also accompanied the Originating Summons. Learned counsel to the plaintiff filed a Written Address in support of the Originating Summons. (Pages 3 – 13 of the record of appeal).

I noted that the plaintiff filed a Motion ex-parte seeking for an Order of Interim Injunction directing the Defendants to “immediately reverse the purported deregistration of Hope Democratic Party(HDP) pending the hearing and determination of the Motion on Notice”, and to relist the said Hope Democratic Party. An affidavit in support, affidavit of urgency and a Written Address accompanied the ex parte application. (pages 14 – 15) of the record). At pages 26 to 35 of the record of appeal is a Motion on Notice filed by the Plaintiff seeking for similar reliefs contained in the Motion ex parte. On 11/03/2020, during hearing, the learned trial Judge refused to allow learned counsel to the applicant move the Motion ex parte. He held thus: “…as I will want him to put the Defendants/Respondents on notice by serving on them all the processes he filed including the ex parte application”. In respect to the ex parte application, the learned trial Judge ordered the Defendants to, within Seven (7) days, file an affidavit and Written Address” showing why this Court should not grant the Interim Order

being sought”. He adjourned the matter to 19/3/2020. On that date the learned trial Judge held thus:
“I intend to abridge time on this matter and I hereby do so that parties shall by the 25th March, 2020 must have exchange processes so that on the twenty fifth of March, 2020, I shall hear this case. The Motion for Interlocutory Injunction shall abide the decision of the Court on the substantive matter. I therefore, adjourned this matter to the 25th of March, 2020, for hearing unfailingly.” (Pages 123 – 125 of the records).

On 3rd June, 2020, during hearing, learned counsel to the Plaintiff withdrew the pending Motions he filed and they were struck out by the lower Court. Thereafter, learned counsel to the parties moved the Court in terms of the Originating Processes upon which they relied and adopted same respectively. Learned trial Judge adjourned the matter to 5th June, 2020, for judgment.

Upon evaluating and reviewing, the Originating Process and other processes filed before him by learned counsel to the Plaintiff and the Defendants, the learned trial Judge formulated one issue as follows:

Whether in the circumstances of the present case, the Plaintiff is entitled to any of the reliefs sought.

Learned trial Judge cited and quoted Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and several judicial authorities in his efforts to resolve the questions sought in the Originating Summons and the issue raised for determination. He thereafter, reached the following decision:
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria cannot intend or be interpreted to suspend the constitutional powers of the Defendants, vested upon it, vide Section 225A of the Constitution on the mere basis of an act which is yet to crystalize and which even the party alleging it does not know or have any material evidence of its possible occurrence, existence or factuality. The plaintiff has the onus to prove its case that it is not caught by any of the provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution. I pause to add that Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) which guarantees freedom of association to form and belong to any political party cannot be extended to mean that the defendant must register all political parties even when they

do not meet the criteria for registration. I refer to Section 221 and 222 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Neither can it be extended to the extent that the defendant cannot deregister any political party in line with Section 225A. There is nothing before the Court by the Plaintiff that the defendant has failed to consider any of the provisions of Section 225A before it was de registered. I note paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff’s reply affidavit and I quote” that the de-registration of the Hope Democratic Party was borne out of malice which was occasioned by a suit in No: FHC/ABJ/CS/904/2015, between Hope Democratic Party (HDP) & Ors. v. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & Ors., which we filed against the 2nd Defendant in 2015 which said suit is still pending at the Federal High Court 3 Abuja, up till today. The said suit is herewith attached and marked as “Exhibit 2…”
This is only an assumption and I hold that it is frivolous with respect to the Plaintiff. In line with the rules of pleadings, the plaintiff ought to give particulars of the malice… The mere allegation that a suit was filed

against the Defendants is not sufficient enough to prove malice, I so hold…
In this vein, constitutional powers of the government or any of its agencies cannot be casually undermined in any material particular. To do so will impinge the obvious constitutional powers duly vested upon the Defendant by the constitutional provisions that the Defendant is imbued with the constitutional powers to de-register any political party that does not fulfill the requirements of the law, as in the case of the Plaintiff. The Court is not a Father Christmas who can go about granting reliefs being sought by a party before it, who has not proved his case and in contravention of constitutional provisions.
From the foregoing, I cannot but come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff has failed to prove its case against the Defendants. From my understanding of the provisions of Section 225A, the Defendants can de-register a political party for any of the reason stated thereunder.
Arising from the above, this Court finds that the de-registration of the Plaintiff as a political party was lawfully done in exercise of the vested constitutional powers of the

Defendants in accordance with the provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (the 4th Alterations No. 9) Act of 2017, and this has terminated the legal existence of the Plaintiff as a political party and consequently any other rights and obligations pertaining thereto.
This is the judgment of the Court. Parties are to bear their respective costs.” (The entire judgment is at pages 136 – 161 of the record of appeal).

This decision by the lower Court aggrieved the Plaintiff. It filed a Notice of Appeal containing 3 grounds of appeal on 24th June, 2020. (Pages 162 – 165 of the record of appeal). The record of appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Court on 7/7/2020. The Appellant’s brief of argument was prepared by Bofede T. Okporu Esq. It is dated 14/7/2020 and filed on 15/07/2020. Learned counsel formulated three issue for determination as follows:
1. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that the powers of Defendants is not dependent upon only on elections that have been held or purported Local Government or Councillorship elections yet to be held which are merely anticipatory.

Whether the trial Court can be said to be correct when it struck out the Plaintiff’s Further Counter Affidavit alongside its Written Address in Opposition to Defendants’ Further Counter in error or mistaken in taking depositions that were deposed to by Shamsudeen D. Musa, for Defendants as if it were deposed to by Plaintiff.
3. Whether the trial Court was right when it held that Exhibit 2 of the Plaintiff’s reply affidavit is only an assumption of malice.

The Respondents’ brief of argument was filed on 28/7/2020. It was settled by Wendy Kuku Esq. Learned counsel to the respondents reframed the three issues formulated by the appellants as follows:
1. Whether the trial Court correctly held that the de-registration of the Appellant as a political party was lawfully done in exercise of the vested constitutional powers of the Respondents in accordance with the provisions of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution.
2. Whether the trial Court wrongly struck out paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Appellant’s Further Counter-Affidavit in opposition to the Respondents’ further counter affidavit and

whether there was miscarriage of justice to the Appellant.
3. Whether the trial Court correctly held that the Appellant did not prove malice against the Respondents.

In determining this appeal, I will adopt the issues as canvassed by learned counsel to the respondents. Issue 1 is:
Whether the trial Court correctly held that the de-registration of the Appellant as a political party was lawfully done in exercise of the vested constitutional powers of the Respondents in accordance with the provisions of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution.

While arguing this issue, learned counsel to the Appellant submitted that the cardinal rule in interpretation of statute is where the provision of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the duty of the Court is to simply interpret the clear provision by giving the plain wordings their ordinary interpretation. It is not the function of the Court to bend over backwards to sympathize with a party in a case merely for the reason that the language of the law seems harsh or is likely to cause hardship. Cited: Weide & Co. (Nig.) Ltd v. Weide & Co. Hamburg (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 627 at 641,

Gbagbarigha v. Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1250) 289 at 300, Wema Bank Nig. Plc v. Nigeria Stock Exchange Ltd (1997) 7 SCNJ 160 at 170.

That in this case, the Respondents relied solely on Section 225A (a), (b), i, ii, (c), i, ii, iii of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) 4th Alteration, (No. 9) Act, 2017, which specifically makes it mandatory for a political party to score 25% votes cast in previous elections as condition to retaining the status of registration, as may be applicable; i.e (a) one state of the Federation in a Presidential election; (b) one local government of the state in Governorship election; (c) one ward in Chairmanship election; or (d) one seat in Councillorship election. That these words are clear and unambiguous. That when words in a statute are clear and unambiguous there is need to give them their ordinary meaning when construing them. Cited:Niger Progress Ltd v. N.E.I Corp. Commission (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 449, Bamaiyi v. A.G. of the Federation (2001) 90 LRCN 2738, Ainabebholo v. E.S.U.W.F.M.P.C.S, Ltd (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1017) 33 at 37.

Learned counsel to the appellant submitted further that the case of his

client is that Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution did not envisage or state that elections to the office of Chairmanship and Councillorship of the Area Councils of Federal Capital Territory is satisfactory for the purpose of de-registration of the Appellant. That in the instant case, the use by Respondents of the Chairmanship or Councillorship election of the Area Councils of the Federal Capital Territory to de-register the Appellant cannot be said to be satisfactory for the purpose of de-registration of the Appellant. That it is trite law that whatever is not expressly provided for is excluded. Cited:Sun Insurance Nig. Plc. v. Umez Engineering Construction Co. Ltd (2015) 11 WLR (Pt. 1471) 576 at 602.

Learned counsel submitted that by the provision of Section 1 (1) and (3) of the 1999 Constitution, the said Constitution is supreme or is the grundnorm from which all other statutes derived their legitimacy. That the de-registration of the Appellant by the Respondents is premature at this stage as the Respondents cannot predict into the future the outcome of pending elections which are the continuation of the 2019 general election. That some governorship

elections are yet to be held in Edo, Ondo and Anambra States, also in almost all the 774 Local Government Areas and almost 8,809 electoral wards nationwide. That Courts have a duty when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution to look at the provisions in such a way as not to frustrate the hopes and aspirations of those who have made strenuous efforts to provide the Constitution for the good government and welfare of all persons in the country on the principles of freedom, equality and justice. Cited: Senator Abraham Ade Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1981) 5 SC 112 at 134.

That in the instant case, Section 225A is clear and unambiguous and using the Federal Capital Territory Area Councils elections to determine the qualifications of a political party which is not mentioned in the 1999 Constitution cannot stand. Cited: Ogunmade v. Fadayiro (1972) 8/9 SC at 15, Global Excellence Communications Limited & 3 Ors. v. Duke (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1059) 1567) 167. Learned counsel urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant and to set aside the decision by the lower Court and allow this appeal.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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In his submission while arguing this issue, learned counsel to the Respondents, after citing and quoting Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution as amended by the Fourth Alteration No. 9 Act, 2017, stated the trite position of the law that while construing the provisions of the Constitution and any enactment whether of the National Assembly or Assembly of any State in the Federation, the Courts are enjoined to accord the provisions their plain and ordinary meaning in line with the underlying intention of the draftsmen, especially where there is no ambiguity. Cited: Buhari & Anor v. Obasanjo & 264 Ors. (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1. That over the years the Supreme Court laid down principles to guide the Courts in the interpretation of the Constitution. Learned counsel cited: Global Excellence Communications Limited & 3 Ors. v. Duke (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1059) 22 at 42 and Dickson v. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167. Learned counsel reiterated the golden rule of interpretation of statutes, that where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their natural and ordinary meaning, unless doing so would lead to absurdity

or inconsistency with the rest of the statute. Cited: Dankwambo v. Abubakar (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1495) 157. Learned counsel also reiterated the trite position of the law that the Constitution is the grund norm from which all other statutes derive their legitimacy. That the supremacy of the Constitution was aptly captured by Section 1(1) of the 1999 Constitution thus:
“This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”

Learned counsel cited the authorities of Balonwu v. Governor of Anambra State (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 503) 1206 at 1233, Amadi v. INEC (2013) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 595 at 634 – 635, Duru v. FRN (2013) 1 – 2 SC (Pt. iv) 134 at 152, (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1351) 441 at 460, Ogboru v. President, Court of Appeal (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 369) 1221, Progressives Peoples Alliance v. INEC (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 215 at 247, Oni v. Fayemi (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 696) 451 at 476, Attorney General of Abia State v. Attorney General of the Federation (2003) 531. That Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is very clear as to the powers of

INEC to be duly exercised upon violation of any of the sub heads of the said provisions. That the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the clear and unambiguous words of any statute, including the Constitution, beyond their clear and unambiguous meaning or place enormous weight or burden on the otherwise clear and unambiguous provisions. That it is said that the functions of the judex is restricted to the interpretation and application of provisions of the statute and nothing more. Cited: Obi v. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 565 at 643.

As for the import of the use of the word “or” in qualifying the distinctiveness of Subsections (b) and (c) of Section 225A, learned counsel submitted that by resorting to Section 18 (3) of the Interpretation Act, the word “or” and “other” shall be construed disjunctively and not conjunctively as held by the apex Court in Abubakar v. Yar’Adua (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1 at 212 – 213, when it had course to interpret the provision of Section 145 (1) of the Electoral Act, 2006 on interpreting the word “or” and it held, pursuant to Section 18 (3) of the Interpretation Act

that it shall be construed disjunctively. That it is trite law that where a Court is faced with the construction of a statutory provision which is in pari materia with that previously construed by a Court, it ought to follow the principle laid down in the earlier case. Cited: Bakare v. Nigeria Railway Corporation (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1064) 606 at 640.

In response to the Appellant’s submission at paragraph 2.04 – 2.05 of their brief that 2nd Respondent ought not to de-register it because the 2019 circle of elections are yet to be concluded since governorship elections are to hold in three states of Edo, Ondo and Anambra and almost all the 774 Local Government Areas and almost 8,809 electoral wards in the country, learned counsel to the Respondents submitted that, that submission has no basis in law. That the Appellant did not show that in the general elections held, which included the elections into all the position listed in Section 225A of the Constitution, that it won 25% of the total votes cast in any state in the Presidential election or a local government in a governorship election of a state etc., and yet it was de-registered by the 2nd Respondent.

On the submission by the Appellant that chairmanship and councillorship elections are yet to be conducted in various states, so it ought not to be de-registered, learned counsel to the respondents submitted that, that argument by the appellant is also untenable. That it will be absurd to interpret the said provisions to be applicable to purported conduction of election in future. That the 2nd Respondent conducted elections into the Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory after the coming into effect of the Fourth Alteration to the 1999 Constitution and it therefore, armed with data to assess the compliance or otherwise of the Appellant for the purpose of exercising its powers under Section 225A of the said 1999 Constitution. That Section 225A (supra) does not envisage anticipatory or futuristic elections, more so when evidence of the conduct of the said elections have not been placed before the Court by the appellant. That the Court cannot act on speculation or hypothetical situation as it deals with facts properly placed before it. Cited: Agharuka v. First Bank of Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors. (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 at 482.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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Learned counsel to the Respondents urged the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that all elections contemplated within the ambit of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution have been conducted since the registration of the Appellant as a political party. That local governments and councillorship elections have also been held in various states yet there is nothing before the Court to show that the Appellant (even in the positions in respect of which elections outlined in Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution have been conducted) have met the criteria to obviate its deregistration. That the Appellant is also bound by the de-registration exercise carried out by the 2nd Respondent on 6/2/2020 as same enjoys the presumption of regularity. Cited: Section 169 of the Evidence Act and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) v. INEC & Ors. (2014) LPELR – 23808 (SC).

As for the declaratory reliefs sought by the Appellant, learned counsel to the Respondents submitted that such reliefs are granted only where it has proven that in all circumstances, it is entitled to the reliefs sought. That declaratory orders are not granted as a matter of course or even based

on admission, as held in the following authorities: CBN v. Amao (2012) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1219) 271 at 280, Ndayako v. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 at 214, A.G. Cross River State v. A.G. Federation (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1327) 425 at 487. That the Appellant failed to prove the declaratory reliefs sought and this Court is urged to resolve this issue against it and to dismiss this appeal.

Finding on Issue 1:
Issue One is:
Whether the trial Court correctly held that the de-registration of the Appellant as a political party was lawfully done in exercise of the vested constitutional powers of the Respondents in accordance with the provisions of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution.

In order to determine this question, I considered the provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (Fourth Alteration No. 9) Act 2017 which provides thus:
“255A. The Independent National Electoral Commission shall have power to de-register a political party for –
(a) Breach of any of the requirements for registration; (b) Failure to win at least twenty-five percent of votes cast in:
(i) One state of

the Federation in a Presidential elections; or
(ii) One Local Governments of the State in a Governorship election;
(c) Failure to win at least –
(i) One ward in the Chairmanship election;
(ii) One seat in the National or State House of Assembly election; or
(iii) One seat in the Councillorship election.”
As rightly argued by learned counsel in their briefs, the law is trite that in construing any provision of the Constitution and any enactment whether by the National or State Assemblies, Courts are enjoined to accord these provisions their plain and ordinary meaning in line with the underlying intention of the draftsmen, especially where there is no ambiguity. In Global Excellence Communications Limited & 3 Ors. v. Duke (supra) the apex Court, per Onnoghen, JSC, (as he then was) held thus:
“…the principles guiding the Court in interpreting or construing the provisions of our Constitution include the following:
1. Effect should be given to every word.
2. A construction nullifying a specific clause will not be given to the Constitution unless absolutely required by the context.

A constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain unconditional result.
4. The language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must be given its plain evidence meaning.
5. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is an organic scheme of government to be dealt with as an entity, a particular provision cannot be dissevered from the rest of the Constitution.
6. While the language of the Constitution does not change, the changing circumstances progressive society for which it was designed, yielded new and fuller import to the meaning.
7. A constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defeat its evident purpose.
8. Under a Constitution conferring specific powers, a particular power must be granted or it cannot be exercised.
9. Delegation by the National Assembly of its essential legislative function is precluded by the Constitution (Section 58, (4) and Section 4(1)).
10. Words are the common signs that mankind make use of to declare their intention one to another and when the words of a man express his meaning plainly and distinctly and perfectly, there is no occasion to have

recourse to any other means of interpretation.
11. The principles upon which the Constitution was established rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used, measure the purpose and scope of its provisions.
12. Words of the Constitution are therefore, not be read with stultifying narrowness.”
Therefore, the golden rule of interpretation of statutes is that where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous they ought to be given their natural and ordinary meaning, unless doing so would lead to absurdity or inconsistency with the rest of the statute. So where the words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, no more is required to expound them. In such circumstances the words of the statute best declare the intention of the lawmakers. See Dankwambo v. Abubakar (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1495) 159.
I noted that by the provision of Section 1(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Constitution is the grund norm from which all other statutes derive their legitimacy. The provisions of Section 225A of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, (Fourth Alteration No. 9) Act, 2017 are very clear

as to the powers of the 2nd Respondent to be duly exercised upon violation of any of the sub heads of those provisions. This Court has no powers to interpret the clear and unambiguous words of any statute; including the Constitution, beyond their clear and unambiguous meaning or to place burden on the otherwise clear and unambiguous provisions. It is trite law that the function of the Judex is restricted to the interpretation and application of provisions of a statute, no more no less. Obi v. INEC (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 565 at 643, the apex Court per Aderemi, JSC, held thus:
“The Judge must always draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. The next question that follows, is, what are these principles? Judges in the exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction must only interpret the words of a statute or constitutional provision, where they are as clear as crystal, according to their ordinary and grammatical meaning without any coloration. It is true that Courts are always enjoined in the course of interpreting the provisions to find out the intention of the legislature, but there is no magical wand in this counseling.

The intention of the legislature, or to put it bluntly the intention of the National Assembly at the Federal level or the State House of Assembly at the State level is to be judged by what is in mind but by its expression of that mind couched in the words of the statute.”
Upon my finding that the provisions of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (supra) are very clear and unambiguous as to the powers of the 2nd Respondent to de-register political parties that failed to meet the requirements contained therein, the next point I will consider is the import of the use of the word “or” in qualifying the distinctiveness of Subsections (b) and (c) of the said Section 225A as it raises the issue of whether the said provisions are to be taken separately or in conjunction with one another. That is to say whether they are to be interpreted disjunctively, in which case violation of one condition would warrant the exercise of the powers of the 2nd Respondent or conjunctively, in which case, the appellant must be in breach of all the conditions before the 2nd Respondent can validly exercise the powers vested upon it. I find the answer in

Section 18 (3) of the Interpretation Act, Cap. 123, LFN, 2004, which provides thus:
“18(3) The word “or” and the word “other” shall in any enactment, be construed disjunctively and not as implying, similarity.”
Upon considering the provision of Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act (supra), it is my finding that the word “or” that qualified the distinctiveness of subsections (b) and (c) of Section 225A (supra), shall be construed disjunctively thus violation of one condition would warrant the 2nd Respondent to exercise its powers to de-register the Appellant, and I so hold. The argument put forward by the Appellant in paragraph 2.08 of its brief that the de-registration by the 2nd Respondent of the Appellant was premature as the said 2nd Respondent cannot predict into the future the outcome of pending elections which are continuation of 2019 general elections as governorship elections are yet to hold in three states of Edo, Ondo and Anambra and almost all the 774 Local Government Areas and 8,809 electoral wards across the country is baseless and is hereby discountenanced by me. This is because the Appellant did not show

that during the General Election conducted in 2019, (which included the elections into all the positions listed in Section 225A (supra), it has won at least 25% of total votes cast in the Presidential election, or one local government in the Governorship election of a state etc. The Appellant did not adduce evidence before the lower Court to convince it that it has won at least 25% in either the Presidential or Governorship elections, Ward election or a Seat at the National or State Houses of Assembly election that took place in 2019.
The contention by the Appellant that chairmanship and councillorship elections are yet to be conducted in various states so it ought not to be de-registered is also untenable. The 2nd Respondent conducted elections into the Area Councils of the Federal Capital Territory, after the coming into effect of the Fourth Alteration Act (supra) and is therefore, armed with the data to assess the compliance or otherwise of the Appellant for the purpose of exercising its powers pursuant to Section 225A of the Constitution (as amended). Moreover, the exercise of the 2nd Respondent’s powers under Section 225A (c) is not subject to

the conduct of election by the State Independent Electoral Commissions. Therefore, having regard to the fact that Area Councils have the same meaning and purpose as Local Government Areas, the conduct of election by the 2nd Respondent into Area Councils is satisfactory for the purpose of de-registration of political parties pursuant to Section 225A (c) of the Constitution. Also Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution does not envisage anticipatory or futuristic elections, moreso, as evidence of the conduct of the said elections have not been placed before the lower Court by the Appellant. The Courts, as a rule, do not act on speculation or hypothetical situation; it deals with hard facts properly placed before it as evidence. Hypothesis and speculation are in the domain of the academia. In Agharuka v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd & 2 Ors. (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1182) 465 at 482, Abdullahi, JCA, (of blessed memory) held thus:
“The Court of law can therefore not be asked to speculate on possibilities which are wholly unsupported by evidence…”
Therefore, I resolve this issue in favour of the Respondents against the Appellant. It is my

holding that the lower Court is right when it held that the de-registration of the Appellant as a political party was lawfully done by the 2nd Respondent in exercise of the powers vested on it by Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

Before I conclude, I have to state that I am not unaware of the decision by this Court delivered on 10th August, 2020, in Appeal No: CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020: Advance Congress of Democrats (ACD) & 21 Ors v. Attorney General of the Federation & Anor, wherein a 5-man panel of the Court headed by the Honourable President of the Court of Appeal considered and pronounced on the de-registration of 22 political parties by the 2nd Respondent, wherein it found that the de-registration of the Appellants by the 2nd Respondent was illegal and, held thus:
“The de-registration of the Appellants by the 2nd Respondent during the pendency of this suit is hereby set aside.”

I am also aware of the earlier decision by this Court in Appeal No: CA/A/CV/426/2020: National Unity Party v. Independent National Electoral Commission, delivered by a 3-man panel of this Court on 29th July, 2020 wherein it upheld the

decision by the trial Court when it held that the 2nd Respondent was right when it de-registered the National Unity Party. The facts in Appeal No: CA/A/CV/426/2020, are in pari materia with this appeal thus I am bound to follow that decision. I found support in my decision in the judgment of the 5-man panel when it held at page 30 as follows:
“The decision in NATIONAL UNITY PARTY V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (APPEAL NO: CA/A/CV/426/2020) still stands. However, the facts of that case differs from the facts in the instant Appeal. In Appeal No: CA/A/CV/426/2020, the political parties were not in Court at the time of their de-registration as in the instant case. For this reason, I would refrain from following that decision. The learned trial Court in the instant appeal misconstrued the grouse of the Appellants at the trial Court. The Appellants are challenging the process of their de-registration and not the authority of the 2nd Respondent to de-register the Appellants as put by the learned trial Court. Where there is a laid down procedure for carrying out an act, this procedure must be followed otherwise there will be chaos and anarchy

in the society. The power vested in the 2nd Respondent to de-register the Appellants is not a discretionary power but one backed by Statute which is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Court is the custodian of the Constitution and has the responsibility to ensure that a right conferred shall not be taken away without due process.”

As I stated above, the facts in Appeal No: CA/A/CV/426/2020, are the same as the instant appeal since the Appellant was not in Court at the time it was de-registered by the 2nd Respondent unlike Appeal No: CA/ABJ/CV/506/2020, where the Appellants were before the lower Court as at 6th February, 2020, when they were de-registered. I therefore find it necessary to refrain from following the decision by the 5-man panel of this Court delivered on 10th August, 2020 and adopt that of the 3-man panel in Appeal No: CA/A/CV/426/2020, delivered on 29th July, 2020. It is therefore, my judgment that this appeal is bereft of merit and is hereby dismissed. The judgment delivered by the lower Court in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/169/2020, on 5th June, 2020, is hereby upheld by me.

I make no order as to costs.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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AYOBODE OLUJIMI LOKULO-SODIPE, J.C.A.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment prepared in the instant appeal by my learned brother, BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, JCA; and I cannot but agree with his reasoning and conclusions therein.

My Lord having come to the conclusion that the facts of the case on appeal in the instant appeal are on all fours with the facts of the case on appeal in APPEAL NO: CA/A/CV/426/2020: NATIONAL UNITY PARTY V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (and I am in total agreement with this finding), was duty bound to follow and absolutely too, the decision of this Court in the said APPEAL NO. CA/A/CV/426/2020.
The view expressed above is based on the doctrine of stares decisis as made applicable to this Court by many decisions of the Supreme Court and even of this very Court.
As far back as 24th day of July, 1992, the Supreme Court dwelling on the principle of stares decisis and bindingness of the decisions of the Court of Appeal on it (Court of Appeal), stated in the case of USMAN V. UMARU (1992) LPELR-3432(SC) thus: –
“It is now well settled that under the doctrine of stares decisis, the Court

below as an intermediate Court of Appeal between the Court below it and this Court as the final appellate Court, is bound by its own decisions except in circumstances specified in circumstances specified In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1944) 2 All E.R. 293, 300, that is (a) the Court of Appeal is entitled to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow; (b) it will refuse to follow its own decision which, though not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion stand with a decision of this Court; and (c), it is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam- See …”
See also the case of ROSSEK & ORS V. ACB LTD & ORS (1993) LPELR-2955(SC).
Indeed, in the case of DADA V. KADIRI (2008) LPELR-8496(CA), this Court, dwelling on what the principle of stares decisis entails in relation to it (Court of Appeal) stated thus: –
“What the principles of stare decicis entails could not have been better put than did Uwaifo JCA (as he then was) in CAMPTEL INT’L SPA VS. DEXSON LTD. (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 459)170 AT 184. Where his lordship inter alia stated thus:

“…It is a matter of policy that the Court of Appeal should stand by precedent and not disturb settled point of law decided by it. The doctrine thrives on the basis that when the Court has at one time laid down a principle of law as applicable to certain state of facts, it will not unsettle that principle but will adhere to it, and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same, irrespective of whether the parties and subject matters are the same. This is because there ought to be certainty in legal principles so that individuals may know how to manage their affairs as regards the requirement of the law. For the Court to fail to follow its earlier decision – to refuse to be bound by precedent – can usually be a hard step sometimes fraught with obvious difficult explanations.”
Lastly, the fact that the doctrine of stares decisis, has no application where the facts of a case decided earlier in time are not similar with the facts of a case decided later in time, is the case of ADISA V. OYINWOLA & ORS (2000) LPELR-186(SC) wherein the Supreme Court stated thus: –
“A previous decision Is not to be departed from, or even

followed, where the facts or the law applicable in that previous case are distinguishable from those in the later case. Where relevant statute laws have changed since the previous decisions, what is called for is “distinguishing” rather than “departure”.
The doctrine of stare decisis is based, first and foremost, on the relevant likeness between two cases – the previous case and the one before the Court. Where there is no relevant likeness between the two, it is an idle exercise to consider whether the previous one should be followed or departed from. …”
I am of the considered view that in the instant appeal, this Court has fully complied with every aspect of the doctrine of stares decisis in portion of its judgment regarding the manner in which the provisions of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) as they relate to the de-registration of registered political parties, are to be interpreted. It is that the provisions in question are to be interpreted disjunctively. This was the position of this Court in CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020: ADVANCE CONGRESS OF DEMOCRATS [ACD) & 21 ORS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ANOR

I was in the panel that decided APPEAL NO: CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020; and I am of the considered view that it was clearly brought out in the decision of the Court in the said Appeal that the facts of the case on appeal therein, were not the same as those in case on appeal in APPEAL NO: CA/A/CV/426/2020: NATIONAL UNITY PARTY V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION.This much would appear to be clear when the Court stated in its decision in APPEAL NO: CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020 thus:-
“The decision in NATIONAL UNITY PARTY V. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (APPEAL NO: CA/A/CV/426/2020) still stands. However, the facts of that case differs (sic) from the facts in the Instant Appeal. In Appeal No: CA/A/CV/426/2020, the political parties were not in Court at the time of their de-registration as in the instant case. For this reason, I would refrain from following that decision. The learned trial Court in the instant appeal misconstrued the grouse of the Appellants at the trial Court. the Appellants are challenging the process of their de-registration and not the authority of the 2nd Respondent to de-register the Appellants as put by the

learned trial Court. Where there is a laid down procedure for carrying out an act, this procedure must be followed otherwise there will be chaos and anarchy in the society. The power vested in the 2nd Respondent to de-register the Appellants is not a discretionary power but one backed by Statute which is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Court is the custodian of the Constitution and has the responsibility to ensure that a right conferred shall not be taken away without due process.”
As the facts of the case on appeal in APPEAL NO: CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020 and APPEAL NO: CA/A/CV/426/2020 were not similar even though both cases had to do with the de-registration of political parties by INEC, it stands to reason in my considered view, that in APPEAL NO: CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020 the Court should not have been expected; and indeed the Court in my considered view, and rightly too, did not feel bound to follow the decision in APPEAL NO: CA/A/CV/426/2020 hook line and sinker or in all ramifications.
In my considered view, it therefore requires no complicated thought process that this Court in arriving at its decision in the instant appeal

cannot be accused of refusing to be bound by its decision in APPEAL NO.CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020 (which is later in time) in preference to its decision in APPEAL NO. CA/A/CV/426/2020 (which was first in time). This Court obviously was not bound to follow the decision in APPEAL NO. CA/A/426/2020 in APPEAL NO: CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020 in all ramifications, just as it also cannot be expected to follow its decision in APPEAL NO: CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020 in its judgment in the instant appeal. This is due to the peculiar facts of the case on appeal in APPEAL CA/ABJ/CV/507/2020 vis-a-vis the facts of the cases on appeal in APPEAL NO: CA/A/CV/426/2020 and the instant appeal.

It is in light of the foregoing and for the more detailed reasoning in the leading judgment, that I have before now expressed my total agreement with the decision therein.

MUDASHIRU NASIRU ONIYANGI, J.C.A.: I read before now a copy of the lead judgment by my learned brother, BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA J.C.A, just delivered. As he has made clear in the judgment, we are confronted with the question whether or not the independent electoral commission has the vires to de-register any political party pursuant to

Section 225 (A) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Bearing in mind the fact of this case and after juxtaposing and comparing same with the fact in Appeal No CA/A/CV/426/2020 determined by this Court on 29th July, 2020 and which facts are impari material, same and binding on this Court, and which renders applicable the principle of “Stare decisis et nonquela movera” meaning: “to stand by what has been decided and not disturb and unsettle things which are established”. Put in another way: “to abide by former precedents where the same point come again in litigation”. That is to say that the provision of Section 225 (A) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, has been solemnly declared and determined in Appeal No CA/A/CV/426/2020. There is therefore no existing distinguishable fact to warrant any departure from that decision of this Court. See ADESOKAN VS. ADETUJI (1994)5 NWLR (PT. 345) 540, GODDY OKEKE AND 12 ORS VS. CHIEF MICHEAL OZO OKOLI AND 5 ORS (2000) 1 NWLR 641 AT 645 – 646 RATIO 5 AND 6, ALHAJI MUHAMMADU MAIGARI DINGYADI AND ANOR VS. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND ORS

(2011) LPELR- 950 AND CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA AND ORS VS. AITE OKOJI (2015) LPELR 24740.

For the foregoing and the succinct reasons ably and elaborately set out in the lead judgment to which I concur, I conclude that this appeal lacks merit, dismiss it and abide by the consequential orders made therein.

Appearances:

Okporu, Esq., with him, R.F. Olusegun, Esq. For Appellant(s)

T.M. Inuwa, Esq., (SAN), Alhassan A. Umar, Esq., (SAN) with them, Wendy Kuku, Esq., and S.M. Danbaba, Esq. For Respondent(s)