CRUTECH v. AGBOR
(2020)LCN/14485(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Wednesday, July 08, 2020
CA/C/190/2015
Before Our Lordships:
Mojeed Adekunle Owoade Justice of the Court of Appeal
Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal
Muhammed Lawal Shuaibu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
CROSS RIVER UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY APPELANT(S)
And
MRS. CHRISTIANA JOHN AGBOR (Substituted By Order Of Court Made On 11/01/2017) RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IS LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE OR REVERSED ON THE SLIGHTEST LIKELIHOOD OF BIAS
A judicial proceeding is liable to be set aside or reversed on the slightest likelihood of bias. In considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias the Court only looks at the impression that would be given to other people. Even if the person adjudicating was as impartial as could be nevertheless if right minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if does sit, his decision would not stand. SeeAHMED V. REGD. TRUSTEES OF ARCHDIOCESE OF KADUNA OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH (2019) 5 NWLR (prt 1665) 300 314 – 315. InARIJE V. ARIJE (supra), it was held that where the principle of natural justice is violated it does not matter whether if the proper thing had been done the decision would have been the same. The proceeding would still be null and void. In a similar vein, an employee who was dismissed or otherwise punished for gross misconduct need not prove that the proceedings of the domestic panel that investigated him were indeed pre-judicial to him. In other words, proof of risk of any prejudice is enough. See S.P.D.C V. OLAREWAJU (supra). PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATION BY STATUTORY BODY MUST COMPLY STRICTLY WITH THE RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE
Learned counsel for the appellant while drawing a distinction between recommendation of investigating panel which has no statutory powers and action on the recommendation by a statutory body with requisite statutory powers fails to appreciate the facts that even though the recommendation of the panel of investigation does not affect the civil rights and obligation of the person investigated but acting upon such recommendation does. Hence, the implementation of the recommendation by statutory body must comply strictly with the rules of natural justice. SeeKENON V. TEKAM (2001)14 NWLR (prt 732) 12, GARBA V. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (prt 18) 550 AIYETAN V. NIFOR (1987) 3 NWLR (prt 59) 43, OLAYIOYE V. OYELARAN I (2019) 4 NWLR (prt. 1662) 351 at 375 and OLORUNTOBA-OJU V. ABDULRAHEEM (supra).
The basic attributes of fair hearing are:-
(a) That the Tribunal or Court must hear both sides not only in the case but also on all material issue in the case before reaching a decision.
(b) That having regard to all the circumstances in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done. PER SHUAIBU, J.C.A.
MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the National Industrial Court, sitting in Calabar delivered on 3rd June, 2015 in which judgment was entered in favour of the claimant (now respondent). The respondent’s husband was engaged on a temporary appointment by the erstwhile Polytechnic, Calabar as Auditor in the Audit Department on 21st of November, 1991. He was subsequently offered permanent appointment as Internal Auditor and his appointment was confirmed vide a letter dated 9th May, 1994 with effect from 21st November, 1995. He rose to the position of Senior Internal Auditor before his appointment was terminated on allegations of serious misconduct; gross insubordination and dereliction of duty vide a letter dated 9th April, 2001.
Miffed by the appellant’s termination of his employment, he instituted an action by a complaint at the lower Court. In paragraph 26 of the Amended Statement of claim, the respondent averred:-
“26. The plaintiff states that he suffered tremendously due to the act of the defendant and he claims as follows:
(a) A declaration that the
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termination of the appointment of the plaintiff was unwarranted, invalid, null and void as same was in violation of the right of fair hearing of the plaintiff.
(b) A declaration that plaintiff is entitled to his salary during the pendency of this action and part of his half salary during interdiction and other benefits like outstanding leave days during the pendency of this suit.
(c) Order of Court for the payment of all the plaintiff’s accumulated salary during the pendency of the action, part of his half salary interdiction and other benefits.
(d) The sum of N30,000.00 (Thirty Million Naira) as special and general damages for the mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff due to the act of the defendant and the inherent health problems associating the gunshot on him while in service of (sic) hazard the defendants.”
Pleadings were filed and exchanged and the matter proceeded to trial wherein witnesses were called and exhibits tendered. At the end of the trial and in a considered judgment delivered on 3rd June, 2015, the plaintiff’s claims were granted in part as follows:
“1. It is hereby declared that the
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termination of the appointment of the claimant was unwarranted, invalid, null and void and a violation of the right of fair hearing of the claimant.
2. It is hereby declared that claimant is entitled to his salary during the pendency of this action and part of his salary during interdiction.
3. The defendant shall pay to the claimant the sum of N20,014,317.67 (Twenty Million, Fourteen Thousand, Three Hundred and Seventeen Naira, Sixty Seven Kobo only, being all the claimant’s accumulated salary during the pendency of the action and the balance part of his half salary during interdiction.
4. Cost of this suit put is at N50,000.00 only (Fifty Thousand Naira), payable by the defendant to the claimant. All sums due under this judgment shall be paid within 60 days of this judgment.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the appellant appealed to this Court through a notice of appeal filed on 7th July, 2015. The said notice of appeal at pages 348 – 351 of the record of appeal contains three (3) grounds of appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal on 1st June, 2020 Nta A. Nta, Esq., on behalf of the appellant adopted and relied on
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the appellant’s brief of argument filed on 29/11/2018 in urging this Court to allow the appeal. Chief Onyebukwe F. O. adopted and relied on the respondent’s brief of argument filed on 11/8/2017 but deemed as properly filed on 29/11/2018 in urging the Court to dismiss the appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellant distilled two issues for determination of the appeal thus:
1. Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case and from evidence on record, the claimant’s right to fair hearing was breached and whether the claimant proved his case to entitle him to the reliefs sought.
2. Whether the trial Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the substantive action before it as constituted.
The respondent’s brief was settled by John U. Adung Esq., and adopts the two issues formulated by the appellant.
I shall determine the appeal on the basis of the two issues formulated by the appellant and adopted by the respondent. I intend to start with the second issue for the obvious reason that it touches on the foundation of the suit which culminate to this appeal. The jurisdiction of Court is so fundamental that the
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slightest step taken in a proceeding without jurisdiction renders the entire proceeding a nullity.
Arguing the second issue, learned counsel for the appellant contend that the cause of action arose on 9th April, 2001 whereas the originating process was filed on 1st November, 2014 a period of over 14 years and that by virtue of Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State 2004, an action founded on contract, tort or any action not specifically provided in part I and II thereof, shall not be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action arose.
Assuming but not conceding the fact that the cause of action arose on 12th December, 2013 it was submitted that the action having been filed on 22nd September, 2014 is still outside the six months period provided for in Section 1(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap P. 17 Laws of Cross River State, 2004 (as amended) by Law No 1 of 2007 which prescribes six months period for an aggrieved person to initiate action against public officer. He referred to OLANIYAN V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (prt 9) 579 to the effect that contract of employment like all
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other contracts, the creation and termination are both subject to the general law governing contract and therefore public officers protection law applies to the contract of employment.
In response to the above, learned counsel to the respondent contend that right from 26/4/2001 when the original respondent filed the suit to the date when the lower Court delivered its judgment on 3/6/2015, the action remains a continuous proceedings and thus not statute barred. He submits that the transfer of suit from the High Court of Cross River State to the National Industrial Court as well as the journey to the Court of Appeal did not affect the original date of the accrual of the cause of action since the rights of the parties has not been finally determined.
Still in argument, learned counsel submits that the respondent having been granted an order to amend the writ of summons the date of filing the writ of summons dates back to when the originating process was first filed that is, on 26/4/2001. He referred to HOPE UZODINMA V. IZUNASO & 2 ORS (2011)5 MJSC 27.
The accrual of a cause of action is the event whereby a cause of action becomes complete so
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that the aggrieved party can begin to maintain his action. Thus, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff gets to know that his enforceable claim or right has come into existence or become a present enforceable demand or right or has arisen and to prove as a fact during trial, the time a cause of action accrued or arose in determining whether a cause of action is statute barred or not, the most crucial consideration is when the cause of action arose or accrued. See SAVANAH BANK OF NIGERIA LTD V. PAN ATLANTIC SHIPPING TRANSPORT AGENCIES LTD (1987)1 NWLR (prt 49)212.
In the instant case, the respondent’s cause of action arose when his appointment was terminated vide a letter dated 9th April, 2001. The respondent commenced an action challenging his termination by the appellant herein in suit No HC/177/2001 at the High Court of Cross River State on 26/4/2001. The suit went on appeal in Appeal NO. CA/C/67/2007 and same was determined on 24/3/2009 wherein the matter was remitted to the lower Court for re-assignment to another judge for a hearing on the merit. Also being a labour related matter, same was again transferred to the National Industrial
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Court on 27/11/2012 which heard and delivered its judgment on 3rd June, 2015.
The bone of contention is whether the time spent at the wrong Court and in the Court of Appeal ought not to be counted for the purpose limitation law.
The crucial issue is whether the claims or rights of the parties have been finally determined by the trial Court. Where the claims or rights of the parties have not been examined or looked into by the trial Court and appropriate findings made thereon resulting in a determination, the claims or rights effectively remain pending and can be reviewed by any of the parties in any Court of concurrent jurisdiction or even the same Court that handed down orders of a temporary nature such as striking out order for relisting. In other words, where a suit is struck out the plaintiff has another opportunity to commence action after curing the deficiency, which resulted in the striking out of the suit. See SIFAX (NIG) LTD V. MIGFO (NIG) LTD (2018)9 NWLR (prt 1623) 138 at 191-192.
In this case, the earlier suit filed by the respondent was first remitted to the High Court of Cross River State for hearing on merit by another
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judge and subsequently transferred to the lower Court being a labour related matter. It is thus my view that the effect of remitting the suit back for trial on merit as well as its transfer to the Court, with requisite jurisdiction is a continuous process of a live action. And since the respondent has filed the earlier suit expeditiously, the time spent at the wrong Court is frozen and suspended. Hence, neither the limitation nor public officers’ protection laws of Cross River State applies to the respondent’s action. The second issue is therefore resolved against the appellant.
On the first issue, learned counsel to the appellant contend that the role of the investigative panel was not to try the respondent or any member of his department, being an investigative panel, the issue of fair hearing could not have arisen. He relied on Exhibit CW4, the establishing Act of the appellant and Section 13 thereof that regulates the respondent’s appointment to further contend that the enabling law allows for setting up of investigative panel or committee who will forward their report to the council, and if it appears to the council that a
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misconduct has occurred requiring the disciplining of a staff, it is only then that the staff concerned will be given notice and afforded opportunity to be heard before a decision is taken. The respondent according to the learned counsel did not complain of the procedure taken by the Governing Council Disciplinary Committee proceedings that recommended his termination. And having acknowledge that he was heard by the Governing Council Disciplinary Committee which is the statutory body responsible to act as such, the respondent cannot in the circumstance complain of breach of fair hearing. He submits that investigation panel being merely a fact finding panel cannot carry the toga of fair hearing. He referred to OLORUNTOBA OJU V. ABDULRAHEEM (2009)3 NWLR (prt 1157) 83 at 145 on the distinction between the recommendation of an investigative panel and that of statutory body with requisite powers that affect the civil rights and obligation of person appearing before it.
Learned counsel submits further that whenever a party is challenging his termination or dismissal from employment, the party must produce and tender his condition of service. Thus, it is not the
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duty of the employer to prove any such breach. He referred toIBAMA V. SHELL PETROELUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY NIGERIA LTD (2005)17 NWLR (prt 954) 364 at 378 – 379 KATTO V. CBN (1999)6 NWLR (prt 607) and SULE V. NIGERIA COTTON BOARD (1905)2 NWLR (prt 8)1.
Responding to the above, learned counsel to the respondent referred copiously to NASU’s petition Exhibit CI8, the respondent’s protest letter on the Constitution of the investigation committee as well as the report of the Disciplinary committee presented to the Governing Council which recommended the respondent’s termination in contending that the appellant was a judge in its own cause. He submits that fair hearing is not limited to ensuring compliance with the rules of natural justice but entails a compliance with the provisions of Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution. He referred to SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD V. OLAREWAJU (2008) 8 NWLR (prt 1118)1 at 6 to the effect that the Court has a duty to be watchful in ensuring that the investigation or proceedings of a domestic panel culminating in the dismissal of an employee from his employment complies with the rules of
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natural justice.
On the alleged failure to produce and tender the condition of service learned counsel referred to the averments in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the amended statement of claim and statement on oath wherein Exhibit C6, law establishing the appellant was specifically pleaded. He thus submits that the respondent had proved infractions of his fair hearing in terminating his appointment by the appellant.
By virtue of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended); the right to fair hearing is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter IV of the Constitution. It is the twin pillars of natural justice which supports the rule of law. The twin pillars of natural justice are therefore an indispensable part of the process of adjudication in any civilized society. They are: audi alteram partem (hear the other side, that is one must be heard in his own defence before being condemned) and Nemo judex in causa sua, (no one may be a judge in his own cause). See NDUKAUBA V. KOLOMO (2005)4 NWLR (prt 915) 411 IKOMI V. STATE (1986)3 NWLR (prt. 28) 340 and ARIJE V. ARIJE(2018) 16 NWLR (prt. 1644) 67.
The respondent’s complaint at the
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lower Court was that the allegation of serious misconduct, gross insubordination and dereliction of duty against Mr. John Eno Agbor, was written by the branch chairman of NASU, Comrade Denis A. Itam and the branch secretary, comrade Eno I. Ujong who amongst others were also constituted to investigate the said allegations. Despite a protest letter written by the respondent, the said committee sat and recommended to the Governing Council of the appellant which recommendation culminated to his termination of appointment. The respondent’s complaint was succinctly put at paragraphs 12 – 16 of the amended statement of claim which read as follows:-
“12. The plaintiff was a target of the petition and he objected to the membership of some members of that committee viz. NASU (Denis Item and P. A. Agwu), Rev. F. J. Ekpo, (Chairman), Ubana Iwara (Secretary) Mr. Cletus Ogbang. The plaintiff avers that each of the people whose inclusion was objected to had one serious issue or the other with the plaintiff’s department either in respect of unascertained claim and forgery of the Medical Director’s signature by the wife of Cletus Ogbang
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(Nnanke Bassey Arikpo) which was discovered by the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall rely on the admission made by the wife of Cletus Ogbang in writing dated 29/9/1997. This is a notice on the defendant to produce the original copy of the said letter in the Medical Director’s office. The plaintiff discovered the fraud committed by Nnanke Bassey Arikpo, who was the wife of Mr. Cletus Ogbang. The plaintiff pleads the report he wrote to the Rector as an Internal Audit report dated 14/10/1997 and the Rectors comment, reply by medical director and the admission by Nnanke Bassey Arikpo and letters of medical director to the Rector and the admission by Nnanke Bassey Arikpo and letters of medical director to the Rector and Nnanke Bassey Arikpo dated 2/12/1997 are also pleaded. This is a notice on the defendant to produce the original documents. Also pleaded is the letter of the plaintiff dated 26/5/2000 to the Chairman Governing Council asking for the removal of the some members of the investigating committee. This is a notice on the defendant to produce the original.
13. The plaintiff states that as a result of his objection NASU was asked to withdraw. The
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plaintiff pleads and shall rely on the letter of 26/5/2000 to NASU by the Registrar of the defendant. This is a notice to the defendant to produce a copy of the said letter.
14. The plaintiff states that NASU did not withdraw from the committee but participated in the proceedings and signed the report of the committee. The plaintiff pleads and shall rely on the both minority report and majority report of the committee which were handed over to the then Rector of the defendant. The defendant is put on notice to produce the copies of the reports.
15. The plaintiff states that the defendant relied on the report of the committee and issued queries to him. The queries of 1/6/2000, 12/6/2000, 22/12/2000 and 22/12/2000 are hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon during trial. The plaintiff states considering the influx of queries, it clearly showed the hurriedness of the defendant to do away with him. The plaintiff replied to all the queries and in the meantime, the defendant interdicted the plaintiff, copies are pleaded and defendant is put on notice to produce the original.
16. The plaintiff shall contend at the trial of this suit that the said
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committee’s report was in breach of his right to a fair hearing and so tainted with an incurable vice. It was a fortiori, null and void and nothing could be erected on its illegal foundation.
It is the contention of the appellant that investigation panel being a merely fact finding panel does not need to comply strictly to the observance of fair hearing. More so, the respondent was subsequently heard and afforded hearing by the Governing Council Disciplinary Committee which is the statutory body with powers that affect the civil rights and obligation of the respondent.
Parties are ad idem as to the fact that the respondent’s employment has a statutory flavor. When an office or employment has a statutory flavor in the sense that its conditions of service are provided for by statute or regulations made thereunder; any person in that office enjoys a special status over and above the ordinary master and servant relationship. Thus, in the matter of discipline of such an employee the procedure laid down by such statute must be fully complied with. If not, any decision affecting the right or reputation or tenure of office of that employee will
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be declared null and void. See OLORUNTOBA-OJU V. ABDULRAHEEM (supra).
Section 13 of Exhibit C6, appellant’s establishing law provides for the removal of academic, senior administrative, senior technical and other staff of the appellant as follows:-
“(1) If it appears to the council that the Rector, the Deputy Rector, the Registrar or any other member of the academic, senior administrative or senior technical staff shall be removed from office on ground of misconduct or inability to perform the function of his office the council shall:-
(a) Cause to be issued to the person concerned a query clearly stating the charges against him and giving him reasonable period of time to submit his defence in writing,
(b) Appoint under Section 4(2) an investigating committee and report back to the council.
(c) Ensure that the investigating committee affords the person concerned an opportunity of making before the investigating committee, by himself or by his legal or other representative, representation on the matter;
(d) If after considering the report of the committee under paragraph (b) of this sub-section, the council is satisfied
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that the person concerned should be removed, the council may so remove him by an instrument in writing signed on the direction of the council if;
i. A resolution in which the motion to remove the person is clearly set out is passed for that purpose.
ii. Thirty clear days is given by the chairman in writing to the members of the council and
iii. The resolution is passed by two third majority of the members of the council.
2. In the application of Sub-section (1) of this section, the council may at any stage of the proceeding suspend from office until investigation is completed and a decision is taken concerning any member of staff whose conduct is being investigated and where the offence is not of a serious nature such officer may be interdicted and paid such a portion of his salary as the council may determine, but where the offence is of a serious nature, the offender may be suspended from office and during the period no salary or other remuneration shall be payable to him unless the case is finally determined in his favour.”
The crux of the respondent’s complaint at the lower Court as stated elsewhere in this judgment was
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that the petition that led to his termination of appointment was generated by members of NASU and NASU members formed integral part of the committee that investigated him which was argued to be contrary to the rule of natural justice. I have reproduced the pertinent averments of the respondent’s pleadings in support of his allegations and the learned trial judge at page 311 of the record of appeal made a far reaching findings thus:-
“I find and hold that there is no specific denial on the part of the defendant that Mr. Dennis Item and Philip Agwu were not members of NASU and or were not on the investigation committee.”
The learned trial has held and I totally agree that Nemo judex in causa sua is a rule of natural justice, one of the pillars of fair hearing tailored at ensuring that persons with vested interest or otherwise are not in control or in any part of a procedure that would determine that interest.
Learned counsel for the appellant while drawing a distinction between recommendation of investigating panel which has no statutory powers and action on the recommendation by a statutory body with requisite statutory powers
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fails to appreciate the facts that even though the recommendation of the panel of investigation does not affect the civil rights and obligation of the person investigated but acting upon such recommendation does. Hence, the implementation of the recommendation by statutory body must comply strictly with the rules of natural justice. SeeKENON V. TEKAM (2001)14 NWLR (prt 732) 12, GARBA V. UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (prt 18) 550 AIYETAN V. NIFOR (1987) 3 NWLR (prt 59) 43, OLAYIOYE V. OYELARAN I (2019) 4 NWLR (prt. 1662) 351 at 375 and OLORUNTOBA-OJU V. ABDULRAHEEM (supra).
The basic attributes of fair hearing are:-
(a) That the Tribunal or Court must hear both sides not only in the case but also on all material issue in the case before reaching a decision.
(b) That having regard to all the circumstances in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done.
In AGBITI V. NIGERIAN NAVY (2011) 4 NWLR (prt 1236) 175, per GALADIMA JSC, pages 220 – 221 paras. H – B:
“The appellant objected to the participation of the two members of the Court
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martial, namely Rear Admiral J. M. Ajayi (President) and Rear Admiral A. O. Oni (member). He gave reason that he had crossed path with the president who through a telephone conversation considered him (the appellant) as his “problem” in Nigeria Navy. Rear Admiral Oni on the other hand was actively involved in a publication in the Insider Weekly Magazine which contained adverse comments on the appellant. The objection of the appellant was on the ground of bias. The objection deserves serious consideration and the ruling of the president of the Court.
It was not done. Hence, the appellant claimed the breach of his right to fair hearing which is guaranteed by the 1999 Constitution. The likelihood of bias was established by the appellant. He correctly apprehended that he was not going to be fairly tried.”
In the instant case, the respondent objected to the membership of some of the members of the panel of investigation particularly Denis Item and P. A. Agwu whom he accused of having one serious issue or the other. As a result of his objection NASU was asked to withdraw but did not withdraw from the committee and even went ahead to
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participate in the proceeding including signing the report. At page 312 of the record of appeal, learned trial judge faulted the report of the committee as follows:-
“From the foregoing, I find that the rules of natural justice were not observed in the conduct of the investigation committee. The fact that even one member of NASU was on the committee investigating allegation put forward by NASU is unacceptable, empanelling any NASU, member in a committee to investigate allegations covered by NASU smack of unfair advantage, complicate, despotic interference and conclusion and takes aware (sic) vestige of impartiality in the NASU cause. The report of such a committee is rendered unreliable reason of the non-observance of the law of equity, undue interference, teleguided result and corruption.
In addition, the defendant set up a senior staff disciplinary committee whose report the council purportedly (sic) implementing by terminating the claimant this senior staff disciplinary committee. I find that there is no provisions of a senior staff disciplinary committee or any of bi camera committee in Exhibit C6.”
A judicial proceeding is liable
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to be set aside or reversed on the slightest likelihood of bias. In considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias the Court only looks at the impression that would be given to other people. Even if the person adjudicating was as impartial as could be nevertheless if right minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if does sit, his decision would not stand. SeeAHMED V. REGD. TRUSTEES OF ARCHDIOCESE OF KADUNA OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH (2019) 5 NWLR (prt 1665) 300 314 – 315. InARIJE V. ARIJE (supra), it was held that where the principle of natural justice is violated it does not matter whether if the proper thing had been done the decision would have been the same. The proceeding would still be null and void. In a similar vein, an employee who was dismissed or otherwise punished for gross misconduct need not prove that the proceedings of the domestic panel that investigated him were indeed pre-judicial to him. In other words, proof of risk of any prejudice is enough. See S.P.D.C V. OLAREWAJU (supra).
In the instant case, the risk of violating the rule
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of natural justice was apparent in the course of the investigation that culminated in the termination of the respondent from his employment. I also resolved the first issue against the appellant.
The totality of all that has been said is that the appeal is bereft of any merit. The decision of the lower Court is hereby affirmed while the unmeritorious appeal is accordingly dismissed. Costs of N50,000.00 are awarded against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment delivered by my learned brother Muhammed L. Shuaibu, JCA. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached in the judgment.
I also dismissed the appeal and abide with the order as to costs.
HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A.: I was opportune to have read in draft the judgment of my learned brother Muhammed L. Shuaibu, JCA.
The reasoning and conclusions are agreeable to me. I also dismiss the appeal and abide on order made as to costs.
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Appearances:
Nta A. Nta Esq. For Appellant(s)
Chief Onyebukwe F. O. For Respondent(s)
