HABGITO (NIG) LTD v. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF SOKOTO STATE & ORS (2020)

HABGITO (NIG) LTD v. EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF SOKOTO STATE & ORS

(2020)LCN/14460(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(SOKOTO JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, July 23, 2020

CA/S/91/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Ali Abubakar Babandi Gumel Justice of the Court of Appeal

Frederick Oziakpono Oho Justice of the Court of Appeal

Abubakar Mahmud Talba Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

HABGITO NIGERIA LIMITED APPELANT(S)

And

THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR OF SOKOTO STATE 2. COMMISSIONER FOR AGRICULTURE, SOKOTO STATE 3. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, SOKOTO STATE 4. ACCESS BANK PLC 5. GUARANTEE TRUST BANK PLC 6. STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC 7. SKYE BANK PLC 8. STERLING BANK PLC 9. FIRST CITY MONUMENT BANK PLC 10. UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC 11. ZENITH BANK PLC. RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

MEANING OF ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS

FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This Appeal is against the ruling of the High Court of Justice of Sokoto State sitting in Sokoto Coram: BELLO DUWALE, J dated the 27th day of February, 2019 in Suit No: SS/M.47/2019 wherein the Court, in its decision, struck out the Appellant’s garnishee application for being an abuse of Court process.

On the 25th day of May, 2017 the Court below gave judgment for the Appellant against the 1st-3rd Respondents ordering these Respondents to pay the sum of Ninety-Five Million, Six Hundred Five Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fourteen Naira, Thirty-Kobo (N95,605,714.30) to the Appellant in three equal monthly installments of Thirty-One Million, Eight Hundred Eight Thousand, Five Hundred and Seventy-One Naira Four Kobo (N31,808,571.4) payable every month from June, 2017 to August, 2017. The judgment was based on an agreed terms of settlement signed by the 3rd Respondent on behalf of the 1st-3rd Respondents. The 1st- 3rd Respondents paid only one of the three agreed installments leaving a balance of Sixty-Three Million, Seven Hundred and Thirty Seven Thousand, One Hundred and Forty-Two Naira and

Eighty Seven Kobo (N63,737,142.87) unpaid.

The Appellant then resorted to the bringing of a garnishee application asking the Court below to attach monies belonging to the 1st- 3rd Respondents in bank accounts domiciled in twelve (12) different commercial banks in order to satisfy the balance of the judgment sum and asking the Court below to order the said twelve (12) banks, as garnishees in that application, to show cause why a garnishee order absolute should not be made against them. The Court struck out the application on the ground that the Appellant did not state the names and addresses of the garnishees where the 1st-3rd Respondents’ accounts were held and that the consent of the 3rd Respondent was not sought and obtained before the application was brought.

The Appellant soon brought an application for consent from the 3rd Respondent to attach monies belonging to the 1st-3rd Respondents in 8 commercial banks, which consent was refused by the 3rd Respondent. This prompted the Appellant in bringing up a fresh application before the Court below against 8 (eight) different sets of garnishees showing by affidavit that the 1st- 3rd

Respondents have accounts with these sets of garnishees who are the 4th-11th Respondents herein and giving details of the bank accounts of the 1st-3rd Respondents domiciled with these garnishees and the bank branches where these accounts were held.

The Appellant further provided details of the communications between it and the 3rd Respondent wherein the 3rd Respondent refused to grant consent and the Appellant contended before the Court below that giving the facts and circumstances of the case, the consent of the 3rd Respondent was not relevant since the 3rd Respondent was a party in the case and it was the same 3rd Respondent that signed the terms of settlement on behalf of the 1st-3rd Respondents. The Court below, however, struck out the Appellant’s application for being an abuse of Court process. The Appellant being dissatisfied with the decision of the lower Court has filed an appeal against same in a Notice of Appeal on the 2nd day of April, 2019 at pages 56-62 of the record.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
Three (3) issues were nominated by the Appellant for the determination of this Appeal thus:

Whether having regards to the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Nigeria vs. Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors (2017) LPELR-43940 the consent of the 3rd Respondent was required for the Appellant to institute garnishee proceedings against the 4th-11th Respondents considering the fact that the 3rd Respondent was one of the judgment debtors and the 3rd Respondent personally signed the terms of settlement which the lower Court adopted as the judgment sought to be enforced by the garnishee proceeding.
2. Whether the lower Court was right in striking out the Appellant’s application for being an abuse of Court process when the affidavit evidence before the Court showed that fresh facts have arisen in the application filed by the Appellant.
3. Whether the lower Court accorded fair hearing to the Appellant when it raised the issue of abuse of Court process suo motu without according the Appellant an opportunity to be heard on that issue.

On the part of the Respondent, no brief of Argument was filed. The records show that for over two years, the Respondents were served with the Briefs of Argument of the Appellant but that for reasons best known to the

Respondents, they refused and or/neglected to file any Briefs. On the 13th day of July, 2020 this Court refused to grant an Application for an adjournment in the absence of a formal Application for extension of time to enable the Respondents file their Brief of Argument. The result of this development is this Appeal remains undefended.

The settled position of the law is that although the Respondents are deemed to have conceded to the issues raised and argued in the Appellant’s brief, this being an Appeal, the failure of the Respondents to file their briefs does not translate into an automatic victory for the Appellant who is expected to succeed on the strength of his own case. See JOHN HOLT VENTURES vs. OPUTA (1996) 9 NWLR (PT. 470) 10; ECHERE vs. EZIRIKE (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 323) 1597 AT 1608; CAMEROON AIRLINES vs. OTUTUIZU (2011) LPELR-827 (SC).

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL:
ISSUE ONE:
Whether having regards to the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Nigeria vs. Interstella Communications Ltd & Ors (2017) LPELR-43940 the consent of the 3rd Respondent was required for the Appellant to institute garnishee proceedings

against the 4th-11th Respondents considering the fact that the 3rd Respondent was one of the judgment debtors and the 3rd Respondent personally signed the terms of settlement which the lower Court adopted as the judgment sought to be enforced by the garnishee proceeding.

In arguing this Appeal, learned Appellant’s Counsel contended that Court below erred when it held at Page 37 lines 15-19 of the record that the failure of the Appellant to obtain the consent of the 3rd Respondent before initiating the garnishee proceeding against the 4th-11th Respondents rendered the Appellant’s garnishee application incompetent thereby robbing the Court of its jurisdiction. Court opined that the Court below by so doing, adopted its earlier reasoning at page 54 lines 18-22 of the record. See ground 5 of the grounds of appeal.

Learned Appellant’s Counsel conceded, however, that by the provision of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 the consent of the Attorney-General of Sokoto State is a condition precedent for the grant of a garnishee order to attach monies in the custody or control of a public officer in the State, that it is

not in all cases that the consent of the Attorney-General is needed to attach monies in the custody or control of a public officer as there are certain qualifying conditions for a case to come under the purview of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. Against the background of the forgoing position, Counsel cited the cases of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD & OTHERS (2017) LPELR-43940; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA vs. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2015) 9 NWLR (PT. 1463)1; CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2015) 8 NWLR (PT. 1462) 457 & CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. NJEMANZE (2015) 4 NWLR (PT. 1449) 276.

The argument of Counsel is that the Attorney-General referred to by the Court below at page 37 lines 15-19 of the record is the 3rd Respondent in this appeal, who was sued as the 3rd Respondent was sued as 3rd Defendant at the Court below. He said that the Attorney General, aside being a judgment debtor, was an active participant in the negotiations leading to the consent judgment of the Court as evidenced by his personally signing the terms of settlement on behalf of the 1st- 3rd

Respondent at pages 1-3 of the record. Moreover, Counsel argued that the 1st-3rd Respondents have even gone ahead to comply with the terms of the consent judgment by paying the first part of the judgment debt as stipulated in the consent judgment before reneging on further payment of the balance (See paragraph 3 of the Appellant’s affidavit at page 11 of the record). He also contended that the Court below was therefore in error to have decided to strike out Appellant’s Application the way it did. Counsel urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

ISSUE TWO:
Whether the lower Court was right in striking out the Appellant’s application for being an abuse of Court process when the affidavit evidence before the Court showed that fresh facts have arisen in the application filed by the Appellant?
In arguing this issue, Appellant’s Counsel contended that the Court below erred when it held at page 37 lines 20-22 of the record that the application of the Appellant was not grantable as it was an abuse of Court process and struck out same. Counsel also drew attention to the fact that the Court below held at

lines 1-3 of page 37 that a similar Application was previously filed by the Appellant and was refused by the Court. According to Counsel, the similar application referred to by the Court below is contained at page 39-47 of the record and the ruling of the Court contained at pages 48-55 of the record.

The argument of Counsel is that the concept of abuse of Court process seems boundless and spacious whenever it comes up for definition before the Courts and that for this reason, it is therefore subject to misuse. He opined that the concept has received several judicial definitions over the years and its definition depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in which it comes up for definition and that a common feature in all the definitions is that it involves the improper use of the judicial process by a party to interfere with the due administration of justice. Counsel cited the cases of MRS F. M. SARAKI & ANOR vs. N.A.B. KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (PT. 264) 156 @ 188; ISHMAEL AMAEFULE & ANOR vs. THE STATE (1988) 2 NWLR (PT. 75) 238, (1988) 4 SC 14; OKAFOR vs. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ANAMBRA STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) 659;

OLUTINRI vs. AGBAKA (1998) 6 NWLR (PT. 554) 366; JONPAL LTD vs. AFRIBANK NIG. LTD (2003) 8 NWLR (PT. 822) 290 and OKOROCHA vs. PDP (2014) 1 SCM 163.

This Court was informed that the earlier application filed by the Appellant, the lower Court had held at page 51 lines 17-23 and page 52 lines 1 & 2 of the record that for the Court to assume jurisdiction under Section 83(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, the supporting affidavit must show that the garnishee is within the jurisdiction of the Court by stating the name and address of the garnishee where the judgment debtor’s account is held by the garnishee and that in the instant case going by prayer 1 the judgment creditor/applicant is urging the Court to attach any money of the judgment debtor/respondent owed to them or held by the 1st to 12th garnishee banks or anybody owing the judgment debtor without stating their address to enable the Court to know whether it has jurisdiction or not.

According to learned Counsel, the reasoning of the Court below herein was that there was a defect in the affidavit evidence of the Appellant contained at pages 41-43 of the record, which defect robbed the

Court of the jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant’s prayers before it and that since the Court cannot cure the defect on behalf of the Appellant, the Appellant can re-invoke the Court’s jurisdiction whenever that defect is cured as it was only a defect in form.

The contention of Counsel is that in the latter application, which was struck out for being an abuse of Court process the Appellant in paragraph 6 of its supporting affidavit at pages 10 – 13 of the record (particularly at page 11 lines 27-35) clearly provided the names, bank account numbers and addresses of the bank branches of eight (8) commercial banks (herein 4th-11th Respondents) where the 1st- 3rd Respondents held their accounts as against the initial twelve (12) garnishees whose addresses were not provided in the initial application; that for this reason, the Appellant has therefore corrected the defects complained about in the earlier application. As far as Counsel was concerned the Court below therefore erred to have presumed that the defects were yet to be corrected by the Appellant in its supporting affidavit and was therefore wrong to have struck out the Appellant’s

application for being an abuse of Court process.

The contention of Counsel is that in considering whether there was an abuse of Court process in the fresh application Court below ought to have considered the intention or aim of the Appellant i.e. whether it was a genuine intention to invoke the powers of the Court to do substantial justice or whether it was meant to harass and intimidate the adverse party or to duplicate or multiply the manner in which the Appellant was to exercise his right before the Court below. Counsel cited the cases ofMRS F. M. SARAKI & ANOR vs. N. A. B. KOTOYE (SUPRA) @ PP 188-189; OWELLE ROCHAS OKOROCHA vs. PDP & ORS (SUPRA) @ 212; OKORODUDU vs. OKOROMADU (1977) 3 SC 21; HARRIMAN vs. HARRIMAN (1989) 5 NWLR (PT. 119) 6; JADESIMI vs. OKOTIE-EBOH (1986) 1 NWLR (PT. 16) 278; CHIEF VICTOR UMEH vs. PROF. MAURICE IWU (2008) 5 MJSC 175 & DINGYADI vs. INEC (2010) 9 SCM 1. The contention of learned Counsel here is that with reference to all known definitions and classes of abuse of Court process there was no act of abuse or misuse of the judicial process in the fresh application filed by the Appellant to warrant its

being struck out by the Court below. He urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

ISSUE THREE:
Whether the lower Court accorded fair hearing to the Appellant when it raised the issue of abuse of Court process suo motu without according the Appellant an opportunity to be heard on that issue?
In arguing this issue, the contention of Counsel is that the Court below erred in law when it raised the issue of abuse of Court process suo motu without affording the Appellant the opportunity to be heard on that issue thereby impeding the fundamental right of the Appellant to fair hearing. According to Counsel, the law is trite that where a Court of law raises an issue suo motu it must call upon the parties to address it on same before the deciding on the issue as failure to do so will render its decision on such issue a nullity. See EBELE OKOYE & ORS vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2015) 6 SCM 162 @ 183; OMONIYI vs. ALABI (2015) LPELR SC.41/2004; NOBIS-ELENDU vs. INEC (2015) 6 SCM 117; JOSEPH DANIEL vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2015) 7 SCM 21; GOKE OLAOLU vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2015) 7 SCM 65 @ 79; BOLA TINUBU vs. I.M.B. SECURITIES PLC

(2001) 12 SCM 73; HON E. O. ARAKA vs. AMBROSE EJEAGWU (2001) 1 SCM 50; KUTI vs. BALOGUN (1978) 1 SC 53 and OBAWOLE vs. WILLIAMS (1996) 10 NWLR (PT. 477) 146. Counsel finally urged this Court to resolve this Appeal in favour of the Appellant and set aside the decision of the Court below.

RESOLUTION OF APPEAL
The first issue for determination revolves around the vexed question of the exact juridical import of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 upon which the Court below anchored part of its reasons for striking out the Appellant’s application before it. The Court had relied on the fact that Appellant as Applicant did not seek the consent of the Attorney-General of Sokoto State before filing its motion ex-parte for the institution of a garnishee proceeding before the Court. It is instructive to note that at this stage the Attorney-General of Sokoto State is a party to this case right from its inception and still party to this Appeal sued as the 3rd Respondent. The 3rd Respondent is also said to have played very active roles in the negotiations leading to the consent judgment obtained in the Court

below even as shown by his personally signing the terms of settlement on behalf of the 1st- 3rd Respondents at pages 1-3 of the printed record.
What is rather intriguing in this matter is the fact that it had been the fallout of a consent judgment in which the 1st-3rd Respondents have even gone ahead to comply with the terms of the judgment by making payments in compliance with the first part of the judgment debt as stipulated in the consent judgment before deciding to make a complete summersault on the need to pay the balance (See paragraph 3 of the Appellant’s affidavit at page 11 of the record). This Court cannot help but to be in agreement with learned Appellant’s Counsel that the Court below erred therefore, to have held that the consent of the 3rd Respondent was required to initiate the garnishee proceeding against the 4th-11th Respondents.
The situation of course is such that the requirement to have the consent of the Attorney General of Sokoto obtained is clearly unsupportable by logic and as well as the principles of natural justice, when the 3rd Respondent is also a debtor under the scheme of things. In addition,

and in agreement with learned Appellant’s Counsel, such a requirement is also inconsistent with the terms of settlement, which the parties freely entered into and the Court below had made its judgment between the parties.
Furthermore, and in the clear opinion of this Court, and in agreement with learned Appellant’s Counsel, it would have been superfluous, based on the content of paragraph 4(iii) of the terms of settlement, to have required the Appellant to once again seek the grant of another consent by the 3rd Respondent, when he had at page 2 lines 19-21 of the printed record already given his consent in the following words:
“…in the event that the Defendant (1st-3rd Respondents) fails to comply with the terms contained in paragraph (i) the Plaintiff (Appellant) shall be entitled to recover same as judgment forthwith.”
As rightly argued and submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, the peculiar facts of this case herein, clearly removes it from the purview of the general interpretation of Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 in that the consent of the 3rd Respondent by virtue of his being

a party to the dispute and who was also sued as one coupled with the fact that he played a significant role in the course of negotiation of the terms of the consent judgment as seen clearly in the reproduced excerpt of the Agreement between the parties clearly shows that the need to obtain consent was highly unnecessary.
It should be noted as enunciated by the apex Court in the case ofCENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA vs. INTERSTELLA COMMUNICATIONS LTD & OTHERS (2017) LPELR-43940 that the principle underlying the need to secure the consent of the Attorney General as prescribed in Section 84 Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 is to avoid embarrassment on him of not having the prior knowledge that funds earmarked for some purposes have been diverted in satisfaction of a judgment debt, which the government may not know anything about. See the ONJEWU vs. KSMCI (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt 827) 40 at 89.
The settled position of the law is that in order that Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 to apply on all force, the justice of the case demands that the Attorney General must be a neutral/nominal party in the transactions and proceedings giving

rise to the application for the order nisi and not him being the debtor as in the present case. The facts of this case clearly show that the Attorney General of Sokoto State has been an active participant in the several stages of negotiations, transactions and even part payment of the debt owed. The clear facts of this case further show that by implication Section 84 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 which stipulates “consent” had already been fully complied with as the government itself negotiated the terms, and took steps to settle the debts, before it later reneged on full satisfaction thereof.
Perhaps, the most potent factor which makes Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, 2004 inapplicable herein is because the Attorney-General is also a debtor and has in addition been sued in that capacity. The question that therefore, readily begs at this stage to be answered is that with the Attorney General of Sokoto State being one of the Judgment Debtors therefore, will it not be absurd to require that his consent should be sought especially having by his conduct admitted that he had taken the move by paying part of the debt in

question? This issue, without further ado is resolved in favour of the Appellant.

In respect of issue two, dealing with the question of abuse of process of Court, the term; “abuse of process of Court” generally, is one that is applied to a proceeding which is wanting in bona fides and frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. Abuse of process can also mean abuse of legal procedure or improper use of the legal process. An abuse of process always involves some bias, malice, some deliberateness and some desire to misuse or pervert the course of justice. See AFRICAN REINSURANCE CORPORATION V. JDP CONSTRUCTION NIG. LTD (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) at page 609 at 635 paragraphs F-G; USMAN vs. BABA (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) 113 at 131 paragraphs E-G.
As rightly argued by learned Appellant’s Counsel, the categories of what amounts to an abuse of process are in their legions. An abuse can manifest in a variety of ways, one of which is the multiplicity of actions between the same parties on same issue, seeking the same reliefs. A Court of law frowns at such multiplicity of actions for a number of reasons, some of which are that it may result in the ridicule of the judicial system. Again,

this issue of ridicule may stem from the fact that there may be the possibility of conflicting judgments and orders emanating from the multiple actions and above all else, it is a good example of wasting judicial resources.
The multiple actions therefore, constitute an abuse of process and once a Court is satisfied that any proceeding before it is an abuse of process, it has the power, and indeed the duty to dismiss it. The Court, being the architect of its integrity and dignity, must be ready and willing to protect all of its processes from being abused. What should however be said in addition, is that a Court cannot at will invoke the ground in order to justify its decision to strike out a matter or dismiss same without clear cause. In other words, it is a ground that cannot be invoked at will or by the spontaneous exercise of the whims and caprices of either the Court or a party.
There must be a clear legal cause to do so. Indeed, the party seeking the invocation of the ground must put it beyond doubt on his supporting affidavit and or his exhibits, that the proceedings in question are an abuse. In the instant Appeal what transpired was that the

Court below at page 37 lines 20-22 of the printed record held that the application of the Appellant was not grantable as it was an abuse of Court process and struck out same. The reason proffered by the Court below at lines 1-3 of page 37 was that a similar application was previously filed by the Appellant and that same was refused by the Court. It is important to note that the similar application referred to by the Court below was only struck out by the Court because of some perceived errors or defects, and that by so doing, the Court ended up graciously giving the Appellant another opportunity to revisit the Court with its prayers and to have a second bite at the cherry especially where correction had been effected to the perceived defects in the processes.
This Court is fortified on this position, going by the lower Court’s findings at page 51 lines 17-23 and page 52 lines 1 & 2 of the record, where the Court gave the clear impression that one of its reasons for striking out the said Application was because of the presence of some defect associated with the processes of the Appellant, thus:

“…For the Court to assume jurisdiction under Section 83(1) of the of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act the supporting affidavit must show that the garnishee is within the jurisdiction of the Court by stating the name and address of the garnishee where the judgment debtor’s account is held by the garnishee…in this case going by prayer 1 the judgment creditor/applicant is urging the Court to attach any money of the judgment debtor/respondent owed to them or held by the 1st to 12th garnishee banks or anybody owing the judgment debtor without stating their address to enable the Court to know whether it has jurisdiction or not.”
Against the backdrop of the foregoing, it is rather clear that from the reasoning paraded by the Court below and which clear import was not lost on the Appellant was that there was a defect in the affidavit evidence of the Appellant contained at pages 41-43 of the record and which defect robbed the Court of the jurisdiction to entertain the Appellant’s prayers before it. The implication and clearly the only reasonable thing to do were to re-file the motion, since the Court cannot cure the defect on behalf of the Appellant. Accordingly,

this Court therefore concludes on the issue that the finding of abuse of processes made by the Court below, was clearly one made without cause and it is hereby set aside.

In respect of the third issue, the Court below clearly erred when it raised the issue of abuse of Court process suo motu without according the Appellant an opportunity to be heard on that issue thereby impeding the Appellant’s right to fair hearing. In the final analysis, this Appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the ruling of the High Court of Justice of Sokoto State sitting in Sokoto Coram: BELLO DUWALE, J dated the 27th day of February, 2019 in Suit No: SS/M.47/2019 is hereby set aside. The case file in this matter is remitted to the Hon. Chief Judge of Sokoto State for the matter to be assigned to another Judge of his choice for hearing and determination to its logical conclusions. There are no costs awarded.

ALI ABUBAKAR BABANDI GUMEL, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of an advanced reading of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Oho, J.C.A. I fully agree with his eloquent and adroit resolution of the issues for

determination in this appeal.
I abide by all the consequential orders of my learned brother, including the order on costs.

ABUBAKAR MAHMUD TALBA, J.C.A.: I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and conclusions of my learned brother FREDERICK. O. OHO, JCA, in the lead judgment just delivered by him. The three issues submitted by the appellant for the determination of this appeal has been thoroughly, efficiently and quite admirably resolved by him in line with the settled principles of law on garnishee proceedings, in particular why there was no need to obtain the consent of the Attorney-General of Sokoto State pursuant to Section 84 (1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process, Act 2004. The case of CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA VS INTERSTELLAR COMMUNICATIONS LTD. & ANOR (2017) LPELR-43940 (SC) IS A LOCUS CLASSICUS. And the settled principles of law on abuse of Court process and the right to fair hearing. There is nothing to add to a well written judgment. I too allow the appeal and I abide by the order made in lead the judgment.

Appearances:

IFEANYI NNADI, ESQ. For Appellant(s)

ZULAI BELLO (MRS.) Ag. D.L.D Ministry of Justice, Sokoto For Respondent(s)