ETUH v. STATE (2020)

ETUH v. STATE

(2020)LCN/14202(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, May 21, 2020

CA/A/129C/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Uchechukwu Onyemenam Justice of the Court of Appeal

Jamilu Yammama Tukur Justice of the Court of Appeal

James Gambo Abundaga Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

MICHAEL IKEO-OJO IDAKWO ETUH APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

CULPABLE HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITH DEATH

Even though the appellant was charged with culpable homicide punishable with death under Section 221 (a) of the Penal Code, the trial Court convicted him under Section 222 (4) of the Penal Code. The said Section 222 (4) of the Penal Code provides:
“Culpable homicide is not punishable with death if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken under advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation: – It is immaterial in such cases which party first provokes the other or commits the first assault.”
The prosecution in order to secure conviction under Section 224 (2) of the Penal Code must establish the following:
(I) That the death of a human being occurred,
(II) That the death was caused by the accused person by a rash or negligent act. See the case of Iregu Ejima Hassan V. The State (2016) LPELR –42554 (SC). PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL MATTERS

Being a criminal offence the requirement of the law is that the burden is always on the prosecution, and never shifts; and is on the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
To discharge that burden the prosecution usually adopts one or a combination of the following methods: -(1) By direct eye-witness evidence,
(2) By circumstantial evidence,
(3) By the confessional statement of the accused person. See the case of Gidado Adamu V. The State (2019) LPELR – 46902 (SC). PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACCUSED PERSON CAN BE CONVICTED ON HIS RETRACTED CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

Now, it is well settled that an accused can be safely convicted on his retracted confessional statement if the trial Court is satisfied that the accused made that statement and as to the circumstances which give credibility to the contents of the confession. It is however, desirable that before a conviction can be properly based on such retracted confessional statement there should be some corroborative evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true. See Asuquo Okon Asuquo V. The State (2016) LPELR – 40597 (SC), Karimu Sunday V. The State (2017) LPELR – 42259 (SC). The retraction of the confessional statement by the appellant was considered by the trial Court. This can be seen at page 23 paragraph 2 thereof where the trial Court stated:
“A confessional statement does not become unreliable because the maker resiled from it. In deciding whether or not a retracted confessional statement was made by an accused person, the relevant factors for consideration have been clearly articulated in several decided cases. See The State V. Isa (2012) 7 SCNJ (Pt. 111) 626,Oseni V. The State (2012) SCNJ 215, and Chiokwe V. The State (2012) 12 SCNJ (Pt. 111) 102. PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

ADMISSIBILITY OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

Now, the law is that a confessional statement, so long as it is free and voluntary and it is direct, positive and properly proved is enough to sustain a conviction. The law however mandates the Court not to act on the confession without first subjecting it to certain tests to test its truth. The tests for determining the veracity or otherwise of a confessional statement as laid down by law include:
(1) Whether the statement is corroborated no matter how slight.
(2) Whether the facts contained therein so far as can be tested, are true.
(3) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true.
(4) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence.
(5) Whether the confession was consistent with facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter.
(6) Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. See the case of Onyia Ifeanyi V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) LPELR – 43941 (SC). PER ABUNDAGA, J.C.A.

JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of High Court of Justice of Kogi State in Case No: IDHC/2C/2017 holden at Idah, delivered by Hon. Justice F. Ajayi on 9th June, 2017.

The appellant herein as an accused person was arraigned before the Kogi State High Court, Idah (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”) on the following one count charge:
“That you, Michael Iko-OjoIdakwo Etuh, on or about the 24th day of December, 2016 at opposite Our Lady Church, Idah, Idah Local Government Area, within the Kogi State Judicial Division did commit culpable homicide punishable with death in that you caused the death of one Chukwudi Onah by doing an act, to wit; you stabbed the above named Chukwudi Onah on his neck and leg with a knife with the knowledge that his death would be the probable consequence of your act and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 221 (a) of the Penal Code.”

The Appellant pleaded guilty, but being a capital offence, the trial Court, as it were in keeping in fidelity with the requirement of the law that a plea of not guilty be

recorded even when the accused person pleads guilty, the Court deemed the plea of guilty as one of not guilty and called on the prosecution to prove the charge as required by law.

In the bid to discharge that burden, the respondent called one witness, and tendered the appellant’s extra judicial statement which was admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit P1 and closed its case.

The Appellant elected to testify his defence, and did testify and closed his case. The counsel for the appellant and respondent orally addressed the Court.

In its judgment, the trial Court found the charge proved but convicted the appellant under Section 222 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to 5 years imprisonment without option of fine.

Dissatisfied with the judgment, the appellant appealed to this Court vide a notice of appeal which contains three grounds inclusive of the omnibus ground of appeal. Grounds one and two which are the substantive grounds of appeal, shorn of their particulars are as follows:
GROUND ONE:
The trial Court erred in law when it convicted the Appellant, holding that the ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide not

punishable with death were established against the Appellant.
GROUND TWO:
The trial Court erred in law when it finds the Appellant guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not punishable with death solely on Appellant’s retracted statement (Exhibit P1).

Ground three which is the omnibus ground is thus couched:
“The Judgment of the trial Court is against the weight of evidence adduced before the Court.”
The law is that in a criminal appeal the general ground is that the verdict is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, whilst an omnibus ground in civil appeal is that the judgment is against the weight of evidence.
While in criminal matters, the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, civil matters are decided on preponderance of evidence. It is therefore wrong to couch a general ground of appeal in a criminal matter in clear violation of the required standard. SeeJohn Ajibo V. the State (2013)LPELR – 21359 (CA), Okafor V. State (2017) LPELR – 42860 (CA).
Being inappropriately couched according to law, ground three is hereby struck out. See Okafor V. The State (supra).

Two issues are formulated from the three Grounds of Appeal in the Appellant’s brief of argument, settled by Joe Abah, Esq.
The two issues are:
(I) Whether the trial Court was right in holding that the ingredients of offence culpable homicide not punishable with death were established by the prosecution against the Appellant (Distilled from grounds 1 and 3).
(II) Whether the trial Court was right when it found the Appellant guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not punishable with death solely on the retracted confessional statement of the Appellant? (Distilled from ground 2).

Issue one is formulated from ground 2 which is competent and ground 3 which is incompetent. The settled position of the law is that where an issue for determination is formulated from a combination of competent ground (s) of appeal and incompetent ground (s) of appeal, such issue is in itself incompetent and liable to be struck out. See Queen Chioma Ezuma & Anor V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) LPELR – 43382 (CA), Yakubu V. Tsauri (2003) 52 WRN 110, Tiamiyu V. Olaogun (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt 1115) 66, NPF & Ors V. Omotosho & Ors (2018) LPELR – 45778 (CA).

Issue one is therefore liable to be struck out but the temptation to strike out issue one is strongly resisted in view of the fact that counsel have not been invited to address the Court on it. The settled position of the law is that a Court has no jurisdiction to raise an issue suo motu and proceed to make pronouncement on same without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on the issue. See Groner & Anor V. EFCC & Anor (2014) LPELR – 24466 (CA), PAM & Ors V. ABU & Ors (2013) LPELR – 21406 (CA).

In arguing issue one, counsel for the Appellant sets out the ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide not punishable under Section 224 of the Penal Code as follows:
(I) That death of a human being occurred;
(II) That the accused person caused the death of the deceased;
(III) That the accused intended to cause death or bodily injury as likely to cause death.

The ingredients, counsel submits must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. He relies on Sections 131 (1) and (2) and 135 (1) and (3) of the Evidence Act, 2011, and the case of Nasiru V. The State

(1999) LPELR – 1945 (SC) para C.

On the 1st ingredient, counsel submits that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Chukwudi Onah actually died. That the prosecution must adduce direct, cogent and credible evidence showing clearly that there was death of a human being. However, counsel submits that there was no such evidence. Rather, the Appellant, counsel submits gave unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence that on 24/12/16 he went to Ephraim’s shop to buy recharge card and went back home that night and was arrested on 25th December, 2016 for the alleged offence.

He submits further that the evidence of the prosecution (if any) as to the fact that death occurred is completely hearsay. He relies on the case of Utteh V. State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt 223) 257 at 273.

Coming to the second ingredient, it is submitted that to prove a case of culpable homicide not punishable with death the prosecution must lead evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that it was the act of the Appellant that caused the death of the deceased. Reliance for this submission is placed on the case of Oguntolu V. State (1996) 2 NWLR

(Pt 432) 503 at 570 paras D – E.

It is further submitted that the onus can be discharged by the prosecution by direct or circumstantial evidence. Counsel relies on Akpan V. State (1992) LPELR – 381 (SC), paras C – D, amongst other cases he cites.

It is submitted that there is no piece of evidence before the Court showing the cause of death of the said Chukwudi Onah let alone same being linked to the Appellant. It is submitted that there is no eye witness account of how the Appellant stabbed the deceased and of how and where he died. That post-mortem Report or medical certificate, and death certificates were not tendered in evidence. It is further submitted that where the nature of injury inflicted is in issue, the medical report by a Doctor to determine the cause of death becomes imperative. Counsel relies on the case of Aruna V. The State (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt 155) 125.

On the last ingredient, which is the mental element, it is submitted that the prosecution failed to lead evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause death or bodily injury as likely to cause death. It is further submitted that the

totality of the evidence of the Appellant was neither challenged nor controverted and therefore same should be deemed admitted. Reliance is on the case of The State V. Femi Oladotun (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt 1256) 542 at 558 – 559 paras G – B. We are therefore urged to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

The gravamen of the appellant’s submissions in issue two is that the confessional statement was retracted, and therefore before same can be relied upon to convict, it should be subjected to the following tests:
(a) Is there anything outside it to show that it is true?
(b) Is it corroborated?
(c) Are the facts stated in it true as can be tested?
(d) Was the accused the man who has the opportunity of committing the crime?
(e) Is the confession possible?
(f) Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved. Counsel relies on the case of Ikechukwu Okoh Vs. The State (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt 1410) P. 502 at 533 paras E – H.

Counsel submits that the trial Court failed to look for evidence however slight outside the confessional statement that corroborated Exhibit P1 and which makes

the confession probable before relying on it to convict the Appellant. That it was therefore not safe for the trial Court to have convicted the Appellant.

The Appellant’s counsel points out that the purported confessional statement of the Appellant, even if found to have been made by the Appellant is completely at variance with his evidence in Court. That in this premise the trial Court ought to have rejected the confessional statement as well as the appellant’s evidence in Court. Reliance is placed on the case of Francis Asanya V. The State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt 180) 422 at 427 – 433. It is submitted that if both the confessional statement and the Appellant’s evidence in Court are rejected, there is no other evidence led by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Appellant. Counsel therefore impresses upon the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

In conclusion, we are urged to allow the appeal and set aside the conviction of the Appellant.

S.E. Atule, Esq., who settled the Respondent’s brief of argument formulated a lone issue for determination, and that issue is, whether the Learned trial Judge

was right to convict the Appellant on the strength of the extra judicial statement, Exhibit P1 (Distilled from grounds 1, 2 and 3 of grounds of appeal).

Counsel submits that it is now trite law that an accused person can be convicted solely upon his confession if the Court believed that it is true and voluntarily made. Counsel relies on the case ofBasil Akpa V. The State (2008) 4 KLR (Pt 1563) P. 1579, and Alarape V. State (2001) 1 SC 114. That it does not matter if the confessional statement is retracted. Counsel further relies on Ladan V. State (2016) 5 NWLR (Pt 1506) 405 at 419 paras F – G, Telkwet V. The State (2019) LPELR – 47156 (CA). It is further submitted that there is no requirement of the law that there must be corroboration before conviction can be secured in culpable homicide cases. Cited in support is the case of Ali V. The State (2012) NWLR (Pt 1299) 209 at pages at 234 para F – G, and the case of Oguonzee V. The State (1998) NWLR (Pt 55) 521.

Besides the foregone submission, counsel submits that the trial Court subjected Exhibit P1 to the tests referred to by the Appellant’s counsel before he relied on it to

convict the appellant. We are referred to page 23 paragraph 2, of the record of appeal.

It is also the contention of Respondent’s counsel that the contents of Exhibit P1 constitutes the prosecution’s evidence in respect of all the ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide under Section 221 of the Penal Code. Counsel submits that Exhibit P1 captures the name of the deceased as Chukwudi Onah. It is further submitted that Exhibit P1 is explicit on the point that the deceased was stabbed on the neck close to the lung and other vital veins and blood tissue with a Jack Knife and bled to death on the spot. Counsel further submits that the law is well settled that a man who stabs another on a vulnerable part of the body resulting to death must be taken as intending death as a probable consequence. Reliance is placed on the case of Bakuri V. The State (1965) NWLR 163 at 164.

In response to the submission of appellant’s counsel that there was no medical report to ascertain the cause of death, it is urged for the Respondent that a medical report is not an absolute necessity for proof of culpable homicide, and that a crime can be proved

in either of three ways – confession, eye witness account and circumstantial evidence. Cases cited and relied on are Ismail V. State (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt 1111) 593 at 622 paras E – G, and Ibrahim V. State (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt 1394) 305 at 338.

In reply to the appellant’s argument on the inconsistency rule, placing reliance on the case of Francis Asanya V. The State (Supra), it is submitted for the Respondent that by a long line of decided authorities, it is now settled that the rule of inconsistency does not apply to confessional statement of an accused person. Reliance is placed on Ladan V. The State (Supra) at page 419 paras D – F, and Okeke V. The State (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt 3927) 676 at 704, Noah V. State (2014) LPELR – 23810 (CA).
On this note, counsel urges us to resolve his lone issue in the respondent’s favour.

In the final analysis, he urges us to dismiss the appeal as it lacks merit, and to affirm the decision of the trial Court.

The argument proffered in the briefs of argument of the parties encapsulates into a single straight forward issue, which I identify as, “whether the trial Court was right

in convicting the appellant for culpable homicide not punishable with death under Section 222 (4) of the Penal Code.”

is always on the prosecution, and never shifts; and is on the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
To discharge that burden the prosecution usually adopts one or a combination of the following methods: -(1) By direct eye-witness evidence,
(2) By circumstantial evidence,
(3) By the confessional statement of the accused person. See the case of Gidado Adamu V. The State (2019) LPELR – 46902 (SC).

The Appellant was not convicted on the evidence of any eye-witness nor on circumstantial evidence, but on the confessional statement of the appellant, which in this case is Exhibit P1.

It is the Appellant’s complaint/submission that the Appellant denied making Exhibit P1. In other words, that Exhibit P1 was retracted. That in the circumstance the trial Court was wrong to have convicted the appellant without looking for evidence of corroboration outside the said confessional statement, Exhibit P1. That the trial Court did not apply the tests laid down by law where an accused person resiles from a confessional statement. The Respondent’s counsel submits otherwise.

Now, it is well settled that an accused can be

safely convicted on his retracted confessional statement if the trial Court is satisfied that the accused made that statement and as to the circumstances which give credibility to the contents of the confession. It is however, desirable that before a conviction can be properly based on such retracted confessional statement there should be some corroborative evidence outside the confession which would make it probable that the confession was true. See Asuquo Okon Asuquo V. The State (2016) LPELR – 40597 (SC), Karimu Sunday V. The State (2017) LPELR – 42259 (SC).

The retraction of the confessional statement by the appellant was considered by the trial Court. This can be seen at page 23 paragraph 2 thereof where the trial Court stated:
“A confessional statement does not become unreliable because the maker resiled from it. In deciding whether or not a retracted confessional statement was made by an accused person, the relevant factors for consideration have been clearly articulated in several decided cases. See The State V. Isa (2012) 7 SCNJ (Pt. 111) 626,Oseni V. The State (2012) SCNJ 215, and Chiokwe V. The State (2012) 12 SCNJ

(Pt. 111) 102. My consideration of Exhibit P1 with (SC) the light of the established guidelines indicate that Exhibit P1 was not only probable but also contain facts which are known to only the accused person and which are consistent with ascertained and proved facts. Let me illustrate the point. Exhibit P1 states in astounding detail the personal information of the accused person which could not have been given except by the accused person himself. See Mohammed V. The State (2014) 5 SCNJ (Pt 111) 724 at 772. In addition, Exhibit P1 indicates that accused person had worked with Kako security, that he went to a shop in the evening of 24/2/2016 to buy recharge card. There (SIC) are facts clearly consistent with testimony of the person in Court… From the totality of facts and circumstances of this case I am convinced and find as a fact that Exhibit P1 was voluntarily made by the accused person.”

The appellant has nowhere in this appeal complained against the above findings of the trial Court that those facts which it considered as constituting the tests laid down by law to be applied where a Court seeks to rely on a retracted confessional statement

do not satisfy the tests. The tests which are six (6) have earlier been set out in this judgment in the case of Ikechukwu Okoh V. The State (supra). What the appellant did argue is that the trial Court did not at all apply those tests. Having not appealed against the facts considered by the trial Court as satisfying those tests, the appellant is deemed to have conceded to the finding of the trial Court that those facts indeed constitute the tests which the law has mandated a Court relying on a confessional statement to apply. See Buhari & Ors V. Obasanjo & Ors (2003) LPELR – 24859 (SC), Anyanwu V. Ogunewe & Ors (2014) LPELR – 22184 (SC).

contained therein so far as can be tested, are true.
(3) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true.
(4) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence.
(5) Whether the confession was consistent with facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter.
(6) Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. See the case of Onyia Ifeanyi V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2018) LPELR – 43941 (SC).

Notwithstanding the presumed concession of the appellant with the finding of the trial Court on the application of the tests, I hold that as an appellate Court, I have a duty to evaluate the evidence with a view to finding whether on application of the facts on record, there are facts outside the confession that give credence to the making of the confession by the appellant. The appellant admitted under cross examination that he went to Ephraim’s shop to buy detergent and recharge card. In relation to this issue, in Exhibit P1 he stated that on 24/12/16 at about 20.80hrs he went to Mr. Joseph’s shop near Our Lady Mother of Mercy Catholic Cathedral Church Idah to

buy MTN and Airtel recharge cards. Again, in Exhibit P1 which the appellant made on 30/12/16 the appellant stated that he was then an employee, to be specific, a security under Kakos security Co. branch Idah. In his evidence in Court, the appellant stated while testifying on 9/5/17, that he was once employed at Kako security and was retrenched. Further, in Exhibit P1, the appellant gave his address as No. 5B GRA Idah, and while testifying he told the Court that he lives at GRA Idah. The consistency between the aforementioned facts in the appellant’s extra judicial statement and his evidence in Court are not mere coincidence. The facts are matters within the exclusive knowledge of the appellant. The onus shifted to the appellant to explain to the Court how the police, who by appellant’s denial of Exhibit P1 suggests, concocted Exhibit P1, came about those facts. This onus, the appellant left undischarged.

Now again, it is clear from the record of appeal that when the charge was read to the appellant, he pleaded guilty. I refer to page 8 of the record of appeal. The correctness of this record has not been challenged; and it has not been

contended in this appeal that the appellant did not understand the charge before he pleaded guilty to it. The consistency between the facts earlier on highlighted in Exhibit P1 and the appellant’s testimony in Court points to, not merely possibility but probability of the appellant having made Exhibit P1, which going by the evidence of PW1 whose credibility I have no reason to doubt was recorded by the Appellant himself. The appellant’s plea of guilty is consistent with the admission of the offence by the appellant in Exhibit P1.

In my view the trial Judge was on solid ground when he found that Exhibit P1 was made by the Appellant.

I now come to the question whether the respondent proved the last ingredient of the offence, which is, that the death was caused by a rash or negligent act of the accused.

In Exhibit P1, the appellant by his own hand stated the circumstances in which the deceased, Chukwudi Onah was stabbed to death by him on the neck and leg with his jackknife as a result of which he died. Therein he proffered his defence, which is, that he did not intend to kill him the deceased. As can be clearly seen, all the

ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide not punishable with death are all inclusive in Exhibit P1.

The Appellant argued in effect that the failure to tender the medical report of cause of death is fatal to the case of the respondent. It is established law that medical report is not absolutely necessary to prove death where death was instantly caused by the act or attack by the accused person as in the instant case in which the appellant himself stated in his confessional statement that he used the jackknife in his possession to stab the deceased on the neck and he died. See Shabe Alh. Galadima V. The State (2017) LPELR – 41911 (SC), Inyang Etim Akpan V. The State (1994) LPELR – 382 (SC).

The Appellant posed yet another defence in relation to Exhibit P1. It is, that the inconsistency rule applies to the effect that both Exhibit P1 and the evidence of the appellant should be rejected. He relies on the case of Francis Asanya V. The State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 180) 422 at 427 – 433 where the Supreme Court Per Nnaemeka Agu, JSC, inter alia stated:
“The rule that when a witness is shown to have made previous statements

inconsistent with the evidence given by that witness at the trial the Court should reject both the previous statements and the evidence is not limited to the evidence of prosecution witnesses. It is equally applicable to the evidence of the accused person and a fortiori, witnesses for the accused.”
The rule does not apply to a situation in which an accused person resiles from or retracts his confessional statement. In the case of Okeke V. The State (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 392) 676 at 704, the Court held:
“The inconsistency rule does not apply to confessional statements of accused persons because it would be an escape route for an accused to freely take without any hindrance to escape from justice. It would be in the interest of society not to allow a man who has confessed to a crime to walk out of Court simply because he had a change of mind. The whole trial would be a mockery.”
My Learned brother, Uchechukwu Onyemenam, JCA, who presided over the hearing of the instant appeal, in the case of Noah V. The State (2014) LPELR – 23810 (CA) held:
“Retracted confessions are normally extra judicial statements which amount to

confessions but which are inconsistent with testimony at the trial. Whereas, the inconsistency rule deals with such extra judicial statement which is inconsistent with the testimony at trial if the maker is a witness, the rule does not apply to a retracted statement of an accused person…” (Pp 30 – 31, paras 30 – 31). The cases of Onubogu V. The State (1974) SC 1, Egboghonome V. State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 906) 383 were referred to.
It is therefore clear that appellant’s counsel’s submission on the inconsistency rule cannot fly.
To sum up, I cannot but resolve the lone issue formulated by the Court in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
In the result, this appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed.
The Judgment of the trial Court delivered on 9th June, 2017 convicting the appellant is hereby affirmed.

UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENAM, J.C.A.: I was obliged the draft copy of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, JAMES GAMBO ABUNDAGA, JCA. I agree with the conclusion reached thereat.

I also affirm the judgment of the High Court of Kogi State, in Case No. IDHC/2C/2017, delivered

on 9th June, 2017; convicting the Appellant under Section 222 of the Penal Code.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: My Learned brother James Gambo Abundaga JCA afforded me the opportunity of reading a copy of the draft of the Judgment just delivered. I agree that the appeal lacks merit and I also dismissed same and affirmed the Judgment of the lower Court.

Appearances:

Joe Abah, Esq. For Appellant(s)

Atule S. Stanley, Esq. For Respondent(s)