NSII v. ITU LOCAL GOVT (2020)

NSII v. ITU LOCAL GOVT

(2020)LCN/14120(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, April 16, 2020

CA/C/184/2018

Before Our Lordships:

Mojeed Adekunle Owoade Justice of the Court of Appeal

Philomena Mbua Ekpe Justice of the Court of Appeal

Hamma Akawu Barka Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

ELDER EMMANUEL CHUKWU NSII APPELANT(S)

And

ITU LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT OF LAW HAS JURISDICTION OR POWER TO EXPAND THE JURISDICTION OF ANY COURT MORE THAN WHAT IS BEEN DONATED BY THE ENABLING STATUTE

The Supreme Court has held in plethora of authorities that a Court of law has no jurisdiction or power to expand the jurisdiction of any Court more than what is been donated by the enabling statute. He referred to the case of Amadi vs. INEC (2013) 4 NWLR (pt. 1345) 595 @ 632, Paras. G-H, where the Supreme Court held thus:
“The constitutional role of the Supreme Court under the Constitution is to interpret the law and not to usurp the role of the legislature. A judge is to expound the law and not to expand the law.” PER OWOADE, J.C.A.

THE APPLICABLE RULE OF INTERPRETATION

On a major note, the applicable rule of interpretation here is the maxim generalis specialibus non derogant that is (general things do not derogate from special things).
In other words, where the legislature either intentionally or mistakenly, makes two provisions, the one general and the other special, over one and the other item or subject matter in a statute, the general provision will cave in and make way for the application of the special provision. See Abukakar vs. Nasamu (No. 1) (2012) 17 NWLR (pt.1330) 407, Madumere vs. Okwara (2013) 12 NWLR (pt. 1368) 303, PDP vs. Umoh (2017) 12 NWLR (pt.1579) 272.
This rule of interpretation according to a learned author Obande Festus Ogbuinya “Guideline to Interpretation of Nigerian Statutes” (2019) pp. 140-141 (Snapp Press) derives its pedigree from the age long principle of law that: whereas general things do not derogate from special things, the reverse is the case, id est, that special things detract from general things.
The Learned author added that one philosophical basis for the rule is the superiority of special provision over general provision. In that the special provision is taken as having anticipated or contemplated the general provision. See Dickson vs. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (pt. 1567) 167, another reason is that a statute “maker will not be presumed to have given a right in one section and taken away in another” see Osadebay vs. A. G. Benue State (1991) 1 SCNJ 162 at 208 (1991) 1 NWLR (pt. 169) 525, yet said the learned author, another wisdom behind it (the rule) is cocooned in the decision of the erstwhile West African Court of Appeal (WACA) in Bamigboye vs. Administrator–General (1954) 14 WACA 616 at 619 per Bairamain J. PER OWOADE, J.C.A.

MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal from the judgment of Hon. Charles U. Ikpe of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State sitting at Uyo delivered on 23rd day of March, 2017 in Suit No. HU/2A/2017.

The suit leading to this appeal originated from the Revenue Court of Akwa Ibom State and then proceeded to the High Court on appeal. The Appellant herein was the Defendant at the Revenue Court and the Appellant at the High Court. The Respondent sued the Appellant at the Revenue Court claiming rent for the shop occupied by the Respondent as a tenant of the Respondent. The Appellant through their Counsel raised objection to the competence of the Revenue Court to hear the suit. The Revenue Court over ruled the Appellant to hold that the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. The Appellant then appealed to the High Court of the State (hereinafter referred to as to “the Court below”). The appeal was dismissed and the Ruling of the Revenue Court was upheld. The Court below reproduced the provision of Section 4 (1) and (2) of the Revenue Law of Akwa Ibom State made particular reference to

items (e) and (f) of the said Section 4 (2) of the law that is:
e) Any fees, rates, levies and taxes by whatever name called imposed under any law in force in the State
f) Any fees, rates, levies and charges (by whatever name called duly imposed by any Local Government Council under any bye – laws of such council).

The learned trial judge reasoned that under sub-sections (e) and (f) of Section 4 (2) the nomenclature of fees or rates in charges are irrelevant. That once the Local Government or Government Agency can properly identify a particular revenue as fees, or levy or rate …the focus is on money and once the counsel is satisfied that it is entitled to its accrual, the semantics of classification is avoided.

The learned trial judge in further justifying that the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to try the case of the parties which undisputedly relate to rents under a Landlord/Tenant relationship added that
“It appears to me that this long draw (sic) drawn controversy only became necessary because the counsel on the opposing sides decided to confine themselves to the narrow impart (sic) import of the Revenue Court

Law. There are other registration (sic) that if them (sic) they were aware could have afford them better understanding of this matter.”

In this respect, the learned trial judge referred to Item 1 (b) and (d) of the 4th Schedule to the 1999 Constitution as amended on the functions of a Local Government council as well as the Tenement Rating Law Cap. 130 Laws of Akwa Ibom State 2000 where under Part 1 Section 3 the Local government as a rating authority has power to impose rates on property or structures as designated for the purpose.
He concluded that
“The Revenue Court which empowered (sic) under Section 4 (2) (b) to exercise jurisdiction and hear and determine matters pertaining to tenement rates under the Tenement Rating Law operated squarely within her powers …the Court was this (sic) thus right in her Ruling that the Court had jurisdiction to hear and entertain the suits…“

The Appellant’s appeal to the High Court from the Revenue Court was dismissed for lack of merit.

Dissatisfied with the above judgment of the High Court per Charles U, Ikpe J; the Appellant at first filed a Notice of Appeal containing

two (2) grounds of Appeal in this Court on 7th March, 2008.
However, by leave of this honourable Court, the Appellants filed an amended Notice of Appeal also containing two (2) grounds of Appeal on 28th January, 2020.

The relevant briefs of argument are:
1. Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated and filed on 31st May, 2018. It is settled by C. I. Odo Esq.
2. Respondent’s Brief of Argument dated and filed on 22nd January, 2020 but deemed filed on 10th March, 2020. It is settled by Edidiong Akpanuwa Esq.
3. Appellant’s Reply Brief dated 28th February, 2020 and filed on 3rd March, 2020 but deemed filed on 10th March, 2020. It is settled by C. I. Odo Esq.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant nominated two (2) issues for determination of the appeal. They are:
1. Whether the lower Court was right to affirm the ruling of the Revenue Court that it has jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Revenue Law Cap. III Laws of Akwa Ibom State 2000 to hear and determine landlord and tenant relationship existing between the Appellant and the Respondent.
2. Whether the lower Court Judge was right to have raised the new

issues of Tenement Rate under the Tenement Rating Law of Akwa Ibom State and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) suo motu and proceeded to resolve the issues against the Appellant without calling on the parties to address the Court on them.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent adopted the issues for determination as formulated by the Appellant. On issue 1, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the jurisdiction donated to the trial Revenue Court of Akwa Ibom State under which the Respondent commenced their action against the Appellant never empowered the Revenue Court to hear and determine matters relating to landlord and tenant relationship. He reproduced the said Section 4 of the Revenue Court Law of Akwa Ibom State Cap. III Laws of Akwa Ibom State 2000 as follows:
Section 4(1)
The Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction summarily to hear and determine all causes and matters of relating to the Revenue of the Government and in which the government or any person suing or being sued on behalf of the Government of any organ of Government or any Local Government Council is a party.

(2) Without prejudice to the Generality of the provisions of subsection (1) of this Section, the Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction summarily to hear and determine all causes and matters relating to the collection of:
a. Personal income tax under income tax Management Act
b. Tenement rates under the Tenement Rating Law.
c. Levy under Economic Development Levy Law
d. Fees under registration of Business premises Law.
e. Any fees, rates, levies and Taxes (by whatever name) called imposed under any other law in force in the state.
f. Any fees, rates, levies and charges (by whatever name) duly imposed by any Local Government Council under any bye laws of such council.

He submitted that the said Section 4 of the Revenue Court Law of Akwa Ibom State does not cover the contractual relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent as their relationship is that of tenant and landlord, contractual personal and consensual contrary to the provision of Section 4(2) of the Revenue Court Law requiring the Revenue Court to hear matters concerning fees, rates, charges and rates provided that they are provided for by any law of the State or bye

law of the Local Government, as such the Trial Revenue Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between the Appellant and the Respondent for want of jurisdiction.

After referring to the case of Zakari vs. Nigerian Army (2015) 17 NWLR (pt. 1487) 77 at 106, Learned Counsel for the Appellant expressed worry on how the Court below arrived at its decision in pages 176 – 177 of the Record of Appeal.

He submitted that the reasoning of the Court below on pages 176 – 177 of the record is misleading in two ways. First, if a litigant is allowed to pick and choose any Court of his choice to determine a matter, it will defeat the exercise of the law on jurisdiction and it will amount to forum shopping.
On this, Appellant’s Counsel referred to the case of ONI VS. CADBURY NIG. PLC (2016) 9 NWLR (pt. 1516) 80 at 86 – 87.

He submitted further that where in landlord and tenancy relationship, the landlord chooses to enforce his right to arrears of rent as in this case and he chose to classifying it as debt or whatever nomenclature the suit must be commenced at the appropriate Court that has the jurisdiction to hear and

determine cases between landlord and tenant and not any Court of his choice.

He referred to the case ofNBCI vs. Dauphin (Nig.) Ltd. (2014) 16 NWLR (pt. 1432) 90 at 95 where it was held that
“Where a statute has identified a Court and donated to it an exclusive jurisdiction over a particular cause of action, the other Court not similarly mentioned would appear to have been ousted.”
He asked, if the words in the bracket in Section 4 (2) (e) and (f) “By whatever name called” qualifies fees, rates, levies and taxes, what is implication of the preceding phrase outside the bracket “imposed under any other law in force in the State” and duly imposed by any Local Government Council under any bye laws of such council” in subsection (2) (e) and (f).

He reiterated that the Law only empowers the Court to hear and determine matters involving Revenue accruing to Government or its agencies in the form of taxes, levies, rates etc as provided by various Laws of the Local Government. For the Revenue Court to have jurisdiction, the Revenue sought to be enforced by the Government must be a revenue that is

statutorily imposed.

He referred again to Section 4 (2) (e) and (f) of the Revenue Court Law of Akwa Ibom State. He emphasized that there is nowhere in the said law that the collection of rent as in this case is envisaged. The relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent is contractual which is personal and consensual and not statutory. What Section 4 of the Revenue Law of Akwa Ibom State envisages are statutory revenue and not contractual and personal ones.

He submitted that the generality of the provisions of Section 4 (1) of the Revenue Court Law of Akwa Ibom State was qualified by subsection 2 of Section 4 of the Law.

He referred to the case of Grand Systems Petroleum Ltd. vs. Access Bank Plc (2015) 3 NWLR (pt. 1446) 317 at 326 and submitted that in the interpretation of statute the law is clear that specific interpretation of a statute override the general provisions.

He submitted that while Section 4 (1) of the Revenue Law aforesaid is a general provision to summarily hear and determine matters relating to the revenue of Government, including the Local Government Council, Section 4 (2) (f) relied on by both the Respondent and

the trial Court specifically and specially provide for “fees, rates, levies and charges (by whatever name called) duly imposed by any Local Government council under any bye laws of such Council”. In the instant case, it is conceded by the Respondent that it is not seeking rent, but rate imposed by the Respondent, albeit without any proven Bye Law of the Respondent on which its demand for rent is predicated on. Respectfully said counsel without any claim premised upon such Bye Law, as in this case, the Trial Revenue Court lacks jurisdiction and the High Court was in error to hold that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. By the position of the Respondent, on the one hand, and the general and special provisions of Section 4 (1) and 4 (2) (e) and (f) respectfully, on the other hand, it was not open to the trial Court to hold that:
“The combined effect of these sections of the law is that the sum of N10,000.00 per month from 1st day of November, 2012 -29th day of September, 2016 imposed by the Respondent on the Applicant can be said to be revenue accruing to the Government. I therefore hold that the Court has the jurisdiction

to entertain the matter. The application is accordingly dismissed as same is lacking merit.”

The above judgment of the Trial Revenue Court said counsel was erroneously affirmed by the High Court and he submitted that there can be no basis for such combination, the two sub-section making provision for two distinct situations.

He submitted that, the combination of the special provision in Section 4(2) (f) relied upon by the Respondent and found by the trial Court, could not be combined with the general provision in Section 4 (1) of the Revenue Court Law. That in the case of Martin Schroder and Co. vs. Major and Company (Nigeria) Ltd. (1989) 2 NWLR (pt. 101) 1 (SC), the Supreme Court held at Pp. 13-14 paras. F-A, that:
“…Where a thing is mentioned in both general and special provision, the provision of the special provision shall apply to it. This is the rule of interpretation applicable and the Latin Maxim is “generalaspecialibus non derogant”, meaning general things do not derogate from special.”

Also inFederal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria vs. Olloh (2002) LPELR – 1271 (SC) the same Court held at P. 11 Paras

E-G as:
“The law is that where there is a general provision in a statute, a later general provision in the same statute capable of covering the same subject matter is not to be interpreted as derogating from what has been specially provided for individually unless an intention to do so is unambiguously declared. To do otherwise is to indirectly use a general provision to alter the intention to provide specially by way of an exception for a subject-matter.”

He submitted it is clear that the lower Court allowed itself to be misled by the inconsistent argument of the Respondent at pages 153 -157 of the Records of Appeal that the Revenue Court Law begins with the phrase without prejudice. This he said is so unfortunate as the law is settled that general provision cannot override or derogate from specific provision of a statute. Therefore, the lower Court was wrong to have expanded jurisdiction of the Revenue Court of Akwa Ibom State to hear and determine matters of simple contract involving a landlord and tenant as in this case. The Supreme Court has held in plethora of authorities that a Court of law has no jurisdiction or power to expand

the jurisdiction of any Court more than what is been donated by the enabling statute. He referred to the case of Amadi vs. INEC (2013) 4 NWLR (pt. 1345) 595 @ 632, Paras. G-H, where the Supreme Court held thus:
“The constitutional role of the Supreme Court under the Constitution is to interpret the law and not to usurp the role of the legislature. A judge is to expound the law and not to expand the law.”

He urged us to set aside the judgment of the lower Court expanding the jurisdiction of the Trial Revenue Court to hear and determine the case filed against the Appellant by the Respondent in that Court as to do otherwise would give credence to the lower Court’s admonition to the Respondent to christen their cause of action by any name that pleases them and choose any Court that pleases them to institute an action in breach of the enabling statute.

On issue No. 1, Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit, the subject matter of this appeal.

He also reproduced the provision of Section 4 of the Revenue Court Law relying on the case of

Akinremi Banor vs. Akinremi & ORS. (2017) LPELR – 42235 that the only document the Court will look at, at this stage in determining jurisdiction is the plaint before the Revenue Court. He reproduced a copy of the Defendant/Appellant’s plaint from pages 10-112 in the Record of Appeal thus:-
PLAINT
The Plaintiff is entitled to the sum of N390,000.00 (Three Hundred and Thirty-Nine Thousand Naira) only being revenue accruing to her from the Defendant in respect of shop FS/3 Etaha Itam Market. The rent is from 1st November, 2012 to 29th February, 2016 at the rate of N10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Naira ) per month.

The Plaintiff did served (sic) serve on the Defendant a demand notice but notwithstanding the said notice, the Defendant still failed, neglected, omitted and refused to pay his rent copy of the notice is attached.
WHEREOF the Plaintiff claims as follows from the Defendant
1. Arrears of shop rate – N390,000.00
2. Cost of the action – N20,000.00

He submitted that the rent as claimed on the plaint is revenue accruing to the Respondent and therefore the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to hear the suit.

He referred to the cases of A.G. Benue State vs. AGBOFODOH & ORS. (1999) LPELR – 616 (SC) P.44, A-G Fed vs. A.G Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (pt. 1380) 249 at 346 -347 as judicial authorities permitting use of dictionaries to resolve issues.

Respondent’s Counsel then referred to the definition of Revenue as contained in the Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition as:
“The gross receipts of a business, individual, government, or other reporting entity. The receipts are usually the results of product sales, services rendered, interest earned, etc. As applied to the income of a government, a broad and general term, including all public moneys which the State collects and received from whatever source and in whatever manner.”

He submitted that from the above definition of revenue, “revenue” includes rent or any money accruing to the Respondent irrespective of the relationship existing between the Appellant and the Respondent. That the argument by learned counsel for the Appellant that the Revenue Court Law does not cover tenancy relationship is not tenable in law.

Respondent’s Counsel continued and submitted that

Section 4 (2) of the Revenue Court Law is made without prejudice to the generality of Section 4 (1) of the Revenue Court Law (SUPRA). In essence, Section 4 (2) of the Revenue Court Law does not limit and/or restrict the jurisdictional power of the Revenue Court to hear and determine “all causes and matters relating to the revenue of the Government.” The word “without prejudice” when used in a statute means without loss of any right, in a way that does not harm or cancel the legal rights or privileges of a party.

He referred to the case of ACMEL (NIG.) LTD. VS. F.B.N. PLC. (2014) 6 NWLR (pt.1402) 158 at 180, Paras. C-D. That contrary to the submission of counsel for the Appellant, the case ofGRAND SYSTEMS PETROLEUM LTD. VS. ACCESS BANK PLC. (2013) 3 NWLR (pt. 1446) 317 at 326 is not in pari materia with the instant case and so not applicable; the issue of a special provision overriding a general provision is not applicable in this case. The same can also be said of the cases of MARTIN SCHRODER AND CO. VS. MAJOR AND COMPANY (NIGERIA) LTD. (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 101) 1 (SC) and Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria VS. OLLOH (2002) LPELR – 1271 (SC), cited by

counsel for the Appellant.

He submitted further that the subject matter of this suit apart from the general provision of Section 4 (1) also falls within the provision of Section 4 (2) (b) and (e) of the Revenue Court Law of Akwa Ibom State, Section 3 of the Tenement Rating Law, Cap 130, Vol. 6, Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000, which empowers the Respondent to impose and collect all tenement rates in its area of authority, in the instant case within Itu Local Government Area. Section 26 of the Tenement Rating Law defines “tenement” as:
“Land within building which is held or occupied as a distinct or separate holding or tenancy or any wharf or prier or quarry site or runway or storage space occupied for profit or business but does not include land without buildings.”

He urged that the claim as shown in the plaint clearly falls under the tenement rating as contemplated under the Tenancy Rating Law. In essence by virtue of Section 4 (2) (b) of the Revenue Court Law, the Revenue Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.

He submitted that Section 4 (2 (e) of the Revenue Court Law gives the Revenue

Court jurisdiction over “any fees, rates, levies and taxes (by whatever name called).” That based on the phrase “by whatever name called,” rent conveniently falls within the provision of Section 4 (2) (e) of the Revenue Court Law and therefore the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.

Section 4 of the Revenue Court Law of Akwa Ibom State Cap. 111 Laws of Akwa Ibom State is again reproduced as follows:
Section 4 (1)
The Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction summarily to hear and determine all causes and matters of relating to the Revenue of the Government and in which the Government or any person suing or being sued on behalf of the Government or any organ of Government or any Local Government Council is a party.
(2) without prejudice to the Generality of the provisions of subsection (1) of this Section, the Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction summarily to hear and determine all causes and matters relating to the collection of”
a. Personal income tax under income tax Management Act.
b. Tenement rates under the Tenement Rating Law.
c. Levy under Economic

Development Levy Law.
d. Fees under registration of Business Premises Law.
e. Any fees, rates, levies and taxes (by whatever name called) imposed under any other law in force in the State.
f. Any fees, rates, levies and charges (by whatever name called) duly imposed by any Local Government Council under any bye laws of such council.
On the face of the said statute, there is a general provision in Section 4 (1) as to the exercise of summary jurisdiction in matters relating to the Revenue of the Government etc etc. By Section 4 (2) and without prejudice to the generality of Section 4 (1) the Court is specifically enjoined to have and exercise jurisdiction again summarily to hear and determine all causes and matters relating to the collection of items (a) – (f) in Section (2) including (b) Tenement Rates under the Tenement Rating Law.
It seems to me that whatever broad definition that could be given to the word “Revenue” perhaps as “Income” under Section 4 (1) of the statute; the provision of Section 4 (2) has deliberately and intentionally limited the summary jurisdiction of the Court to matters of taxes,

rates, tenement, fees, levies, charges etc imposed under any law in force in the State as in (e) or imposed by any Local Government council under any bye laws of such council as in (f) of Section 4 (2) of the enactment.
It is important at this juncture to remind the learned counsel to the Respondent that the question here is not the grammatical or etymological meaning of the word “Revenue” as he tried to demonstrate in his brief of Argument. Rather, the question is the proper application of the general rules of interpretation of statute to the enactment under consideration.
On a major note, the applicable rule of interpretation here is the maxim generalis specialibus non derogant that is (general things do not derogate from special things).
In other words, where the legislature either intentionally or mistakenly, makes two provisions, the one general and the other special, over one and the other item or subject matter in a statute, the general provision will cave in and make way for the application of the special provision. See Abukakar vs. Nasamu (No. 1) (2012) 17 NWLR (pt.1330) 407, Madumere vs. Okwara (2013) 12 NWLR (pt. 1368) 303,

PDP vs. Umoh (2017) 12 NWLR (pt.1579) 272.
This rule of interpretation according to a learned author Obande Festus Ogbuinya “Guideline to Interpretation of Nigerian Statutes” (2019) pp. 140-141 (Snapp Press) derives its pedigree from the age long principle of law that: whereas general things do not derogate from special things, the reverse is the case, id est, that special things detract from general things.
The Learned author added that one philosophical basis for the rule is the superiority of special provision over general provision. In that the special provision is taken as having anticipated or contemplated the general provision. See Dickson vs. Sylva (2017) 8 NWLR (pt. 1567) 167, another reason is that a statute “maker will not be presumed to have given a right in one section and taken away in another” see Osadebay vs. A. G. Benue State (1991) 1 SCNJ 162 at 208 (1991) 1 NWLR (pt. 169) 525, yet said the learned author, another wisdom behind it (the rule) is cocooned in the decision of the erstwhile West African Court of Appeal (WACA) in Bamigboye vs. Administrator–General (1954) 14 WACA 616 at 619 per Bairamain J.

“The reason behind the rule is that legislature in making the special provision in considering the particular case and expressing its will in regard to that case; hence the special provision forms an exception importing the negative, in other word the special case provided for in it is excepted and taken out of the general provision and its ambit, the general provision does not apply.”
In the instant case, the specific provision of the Revenue Court of Akwa Ibom State as to its summary jurisdiction in Section 4 (2) (a) – (f) is excepted from the general provision as to “Revenue” under Section 4 (1) of the statute. See also A-G Kwara State vs. Abolaji (2009) 7 NWLR (pt. 1139) 190 at 216. What I would term the minor premise in the context of the interpretation of the subject matter here, that is the provision of Section 4 of the Revenue Law of Akwa Ibom State is the equally important rule of interpretation termed the Negative – Implication Canon that is “The expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others” (Expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
Context establishes the conditions for

applying this canon, but where those conditions exist as in the instant case, the principle that specification of the one implies exclusion of the other validly describes the understanding of verbal expression. See e.g Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. vs. Union Planters Bank 530 U. S. I (2000) (per Scalia J.), Gonzaga Univ. vs. DOE, 536 U. S. 273, 287 (2002) per (Rehnquist C. J.).
In the instant case, the principle that the expression of one thing excludes the operation of another applies to the interpretation of Section 4 (2) (a) – (f) which listed the coverage of the summary jurisdiction of the Revenue Court of Akwa Ibom State to include taxes, tenement rates fees, levies, Rates, charges, all, in the family of taxes imposed by Government and or Local Governments. These cannot be construed to include rents, arrears of rents or debts even though these would qualify in a broad sense as Revenue. In the case of Grand Systems Petroleum Ltd. vs. Access Bank Plc (2015) 3 NWLR (pt. 1446) 317 at 326 the Court held:
“In the interpretation of statute or the Constitution, it is a basic principle that specific mention of one thing excludes the

general mention of others that is when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same class of those listed.”
A more general rule of interpretation which embraces the earlier ones and could be described as just commonsensical is the Harmonious – Reading Canon. In other words, the provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory. One part of a statute is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together. Indeed, the imperative of harmony among provision is more categorical than most other canons of construction because it is invariably true that intelligent drafters do not contradict themselves. See Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner “Reading Law; The Interpretation of Texts” page 180 (2012) Thomson/West.
Going back to the provision of Section 4 of the Revenue Law of Akwa Ibom State, it is obvious that the general use of the word “Revenue” in Section 4 (1) cannot defeat the specific listing of the summary jurisdiction of the

Court in Section 4 (2) (a) – (f) of the statute.
Clearly to my mind, the summary jurisdiction of the Court under Section 4 would not cover the indebtedness of the Central Bank of Nigeria to the Itu Local government on the failure to pay upfront interest in Treasury Bills. Neither would it cover the failure of the First Bank of Nigeria to remit or transfer interest on fixed deposit of Itu Local Government to her account in that bank. Yet, the two situations are Revenues, incomes and or debts accruing to the Itu Local government. The above example has limited the efficacy of the provision of Section 4 (1) in creating an appropriate exception for the efficacy of Section 4 (2) (a) – (f) of the provision of the statute. It is for the reason of a harmonious and holistic interpretation of statutes that the Supreme Court held in the case of Nobis – Elendu vs. INEC (2015) 16 NWLR (pt. 1485) 197 at 223 that:
“The interpretation task of the forgoing desired a communal consideration from the lower Court. Whenever a Court is faced with the interpretation of statutory provision, the statute must be read as a whole in determining the

object of a particular provision. Thus, all provisions of the statute must be read and considered together unless there is a very clear reason why a particular provision of the statute should be read independently. To achieve a harmonious result, section must be read against the background of another to which it relates. The principle is indispensable in giving effect to the true intention of the makers of the statute.”
See also A.G, Lagos State vs. A. G, Federation (2014) 9 NWLR (pt. 1412) 217 at 259 – 260, Orakul Resources Ltd. vs. Nigeria Communication Commission (2007) 16 NWLR (pt. 1060) 270 at 313.
In resolving issue No. 1, I have no doubt that the learned counsel for the Appellant was right and on sound footing when he said that the lower Court was wrong to have expanded the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court of Akwa Ibom State to hear and determine matters of simple contract involving a landlord and tenant and concerning arrears of rent.
The Court below was indeed wrong to affirm the ruling of the Revenue Court that it has jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Revenue Court Law Cap. III Laws of Akwa Ibom State 2000 to hear and

determine landlord and tenant relationship existing between the Appellant and the Respondent.

On issue No. 2, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the trial Judge raised the Issue of item 1 (b) and (d) of the 4th Schedule of the 1999 Constitution as and under Part II Item 9 of the Concurrent Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution as amended and held that the Constitution empowers the State House of Assembly in this case, the Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly to enact the Tenement Rating Law Cap. 130 Laws of Akwa Ibom State, 2000 which empowers every Local Government Council which the Respondent is one to impose rates on property or structure as designated for the purpose.

That the learned lower Court Judge went on to hold in page 178 thus:
“Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the State House of Assembly enacted or is deemed to have enacted the Tenement Rating Law, Cap. 130 Laws of Akwa Ibom State 2000. Under Part 1 Section 3 of the Law, every Local Government Council is classified as a rating authority with power to impose rates on property or structure as designated for the purpose. Under the said Law Tenement is

defined in the Section 26 interpretation Section as “Land with buildings which is held or occupied as a distinct or separate holding or tenancy or any what or pier or quarry or runaway or storage space occupied for profit or business but does not include land without buildings” the word occupier in relation to tenement means. The person in occupation of the whole arising part of such tenement but does not include a lodger. The combined effect of the above definitions presupposed that any land with building within a Local Government Council in which an occupier occupies whether as a distinct separate holding or under a tenancy with the intent to carry on business or making profit is a subject of tenement. Therefore all the argument by the Appellant’s counsel that the present Appellant operate under the tenancy of the Respondent simply fizzles out in the fact of the time position and operation of the law.”

He submitted that this is an issue none of the parties raised or argued in any of their brief before the Court. The lower Court suo motu raised it during judgment and went ahead to resolve it alone and based on its own resolution,

the lower Court dismissed the Appeal of the Appellants.

He referred to the cases ofEgbuchu vs. Continental Merchant Bank (2016) 8 NWLR (pt. 1513) 192 at 208 per Kekere – Ekun JSC, Federal Republic of Nigeria vs. Okey Nwosu (2016) at 302 – 303 to say that the law is settled that the Court is not entitled to raise an issue suo motu and decide on it without affording the parties an opportunity to be heard. This he said is because the concept of fair hearing entrenched in our Constitutional Provision by Section 36 (1) of the 1999 Constitution frowns on the idea of a Court determining a party’s case on an issue it raised suo motu without hearing that party on the issue.

He submitted that the issue of Item 1(b) and (d) of the 4th Schedule and Part II Item 9 of the Concurrent Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution and the issue of Tenement Rating Law of Akwa Ibom State which empowers Local Government Council such as the Respondent to impose and collect Tenement rates from the Appellant was the basis for the lower Court to uphold the ruling of the Revenue Court that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the case filed by the

Respondent thereby dismissing the Appeal of the Appellant. The Lower Court in the final analysis in page 179 of the Record of Appeal leaves no one in doubt as to that fact when it held thus:
“Accordingly, the Revenue Court which is empowered under Section 4 (2) (b) to exercise jurisdiction and hear and determine matters pertaining to tenement rates under tenement rating law operated squarely within the power whereas she entertained the suits of the Plaintiff/Respondent filed against the several Defendants/Appellants. The Court was thus right in her ruling that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and entertain the suits.”

He concluded on issue No. 2 that the trial Court’s judgment ran contrary to the principles of Law and Practice and urged us to set aside the judgment of the Court below.

On issue No. 2, Learned Counsel for the Respondent referred to in the case of Gbagbarigha vs. Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (pt. 1350) 289 at 310 and submitted that the law provided for instances where it would be unnecessary for the Court to invite parties to address the Court when the Court raises an issue suo motu. They are:

When the issue relates to the Court’s own jurisdiction
b. Both parties are not aware of or ignores a statute which may have a bearing on the case; or
c. When on the face of the record, a serious question of the fairness of the proceedings is in evidence.

Respondent’s Counsel submitted that from the decision of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case especially as it relates to (a) and (b) thereto the Court below did not need to call the parties to address the Court, the Court having raised the issue of the Tenement Rating Law of Akwa Ibom State suo motu.

He submitted that both parties ignored the provision of Item 1 (b) and (d) of the 4th Schedule and Part II Item 9 of the Concurrent Legislative List of the Constitution of the 1999 (as amended) and also the provision of the Tenement Rating Law, Cap 130 Vol. 6 Law of Akwa Ibom State 2000 in making submission at the Revenue Court and the Court below.

He submitted that the Court below was therefore right to suo motu raise the issue and proceed to pronounce on same without calling on parties to proffer their address on the issue. That in the circumstances the Appellants cannot complain

of lack of fair hearing.

In the instant case, both the Appellant and the Respondent are agreed that a new issue was raised by the Court below while the Appellant argued that the Court ought to have called on parties to address, the Respondent’s Counsel insisted that the situation fell under the Supreme Court decision in the case of Gbagbarigha vs. Toruemi (Supra) where it was held amongst others that in raising an issue suo motu the Court would not be obliged to call the parties for address where
a. The issue relates to the Court’s jurisdiction.
b. Both parties are not aware of or ignored a statute which may have a bearing on the case, or
c. …”
From the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I readily agree with the learned counsel for the Respondent that the learned trial judge in the Court below was perfectly right to refer to statutes which were not mentioned before him in the determination of the case before him one way or the other without calling on counsel to further address on his reference to statutes.
Incidentally and with due respect to both counsel in this appeal, I consider the action of the learned

trial judge in the Court below a little less than raising issue suo motu. I would have thought that a judge should be able to refer to relevant statutes and case law to buttress his own view of a matter before him. In any event the learned counsel for the Respondent was right to consider the trial judge’s references as an exception to the rule that when an issue is raised suo motu counsel must be called to address on same.
See Comptoir Commercial & Ind. S. P. R. Ltd. vs. O. G. S. W. C. (2002) 9 NWLR (pt. 773) 629; Kolawole vs. A-G, Oyo State (2006) 3 NWLR (pt. 966) 50.
I think the larger question that would have arisen under Appellant’s issue 2 is whether the conclusion of the learned trial judge was nevertheless right in spite of the references to the 4th Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the Tenement Rate Laws of Akwa Ibom State. And not has the Appellant puts it whether he was denied fair hearing for not addressing an issue supposedly raised by the learned trial judge.
Issue 2 is resolved in favour of the Respondent

The Appellant nominated two (2) issues for the

determination of this appeal. Issue No. 1 was resolved in favour of the Appellant. However issue No. 2 was revolved in favour of the Respondent.

In spite of the resolution of issue No 2 in favour of the Respondent, the appeal still has merit and it succeeds. This is because issue No.1 is critical and indeed the determinant issue for the appeal.
The appeal is meritorious and it is accordingly allowed.

The judgment of His Lordship Hon. Charles U. Ikpe delivered on 23rd day of March, 2017 in Suit No. HU/2A/2017 is hereby set aside.
Accordingly Suit: REU/1/2016 to REU/104/2016 pending in the Revenue Court Uyo, Akwa Ibom State are hereby struck out.
The parties shall bear their respective costs.

PHILOMENA MBUA EKPE, J.C.A.: I was given the privilege of reading in advance the draft copy of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mojeed A. Owoade, JCA. I agree that the appeal is meritorious and it is hereby allowed.
I also abide by the orders made in the lead judgment.

HAMMA AKAWU BARKA, J.C.A.: I was privileged to have read in draft the judgment of my Learned brother MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, JCA which was made available to

me before now.

Having also read the briefs and the records of proceedings, I agree that the appeal has merit and is allowed. The judgment of Charles U. Ikpe, delivered on the 23/3/2017 is hereby set aside. I abide on all orders made including that as to costs.
I abide on all orders made as to costs.

Appearances:

I. Odo Esq. For Appellant(s)

Edidiong Akpanuwa Esq. For Respondent(s)