CHARLES v. FRN (2020)

CHARLES v. FRN

(2020)LCN/14061(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Tuesday, March 24, 2020

CA/A/637C/2016

Before Our Lordships:

Abdu Aboki Justice of the Court of Appeal

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

GABRIEL OLUGBENGA CHARLES APPELANT(S)

And

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION IS OBLIGED TO CALL A HOST OF WITNESSES

The law seems to be settled beyond peradventure that there is no obligation on the prosecution to call a host of witnesses. All the prosecution needs to do is to call enough material witnesses to prove its case and in so doing, it has a discretion in the matter as to who to call. See; ADAJE V. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 18 at 28. ADEGBITE V. STATE (2017) LPELR 42585 SC. PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

THE OFFENCE OF OBTAINING BY FALSE PRETENCE

Now for the offence of obtaining by false pretence, Section 1(1)(a) of the Advance Fee and Other Related Offences Act 2006 provides as follows:-
1. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment of law, any person who by any false pretence, and with intent to defraud
(a) Obtains from any other person in Nigeria or in any other country for himself or any other person… commits an offence under this Act.”
False pretence is defined in Section 20 of the Act as:
“‘False pretence‘ means a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made by word, in writing or by conduct, of a matter of fact of law, either past or present, which representation is false in fact or law, and which the person making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true.”
Now, for the offence of obtaining by false pretences to be committed it must be proved that the accused person had an intention to defraud and that the thing is capable of being stolen. An inducement on the part of the accused person to make his victim part with a thing capable of being stolen or make his victim deliver a thing capable of being stolen will expose the accused person to imprisonment for the offence. PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

INGREDIENTS TO ESTABLISH THE OFFENCE OF OBTAINING MONEY BY FALSE PRETENCES

It is the law that the ingredients or elements that are required to be proved to establish the charge of obtaining money by false pretences are:
1. That there was a pretence.
2. That the pretence emanated from the accused person
3. That the pretence was false.
4. That the accused person knew of the falsity of the pretence or did not believe in its truth.
5. That there was an intention to defraud.
6. That the property or thing capable of being stolen.
7. That the accused person induced the owner to transfer his whole interest in the property.
See:
ALAKE V. THE STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (PT. 205) 567 at 591, ONWUDIWE V. FRN (2006) LPELR (2715) 1 at 55; and
ODIAWA V. FRN (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 439) 436. PER ABOKI, J.C.A

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

It is trite law that where the findings made in a case are supported by the evidence believed by the trial Court, an appellate Court will be loath to interfere with such findings unless they are evidently perverse. See IGBI V. THE STATE (2000) LPELR (1444) 1 at 15. PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein was arraigned at the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, sitting at Abuja, on a two count charge, as follows:
CHARGE ONE
That you, Gabriel Olugbenga Charles, sometime in the month of July 2011, at Abuja, within the Abuja Judicial Division of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, pretended to be an operative of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, (EFCC) and demanded Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira (N880,000.00) from one Dr. Precious Gbeneol, a former Hon. Secretary Health and Human Services Secretariat, Abuja as bribe to close the case against her when you knew you are not an EFCC operative and you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 132 of the Penal Code CAP 532 LFN (Abuja) 1990.
CHARGE TWO
That you, Gabriel Olugbenga Charles, sometime in the month of July 2011, at Abuja, within the Abuja Judicial Division of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, with intent to defraud, obtained the sum of Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira (N880,000.00), through your Skye Bank account number 1018934528

domiciled in Abuja from one Dr. Precious Gbeneol, a former Hon. Secretary Health and Human Services Secretariat Abuja as bribe to close the case against her when you knew you are not an EFCC operative and thereby committed an offence contrary to Section 1(1)(a) of Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006, and punishable under Section 1(3) of the same Act
He pleaded not guilty to the two head of charge.

The story of the Appellant is that he sought to return some bundle of documents belonging to one Mrs. Precious Gbeneol, (the Complainant), which he found at the car park of the premises of his former place of work, (FCMB). To this end, he contacted Mrs. Precious Gbeneol who asked him to bring the said documents to her in Port Harcourt, and she elected to pay his air fare. On his arrival at Port Harcourt, the Complainant treated him with civility and hospitality wherein in appreciation of her kindness, the Complainant, in the company of her husband, Pastor and Brother decided to reciprocate by augmenting the financial burden of Gbenga in the school fees of a Course he had earlier planned to undertake in South Africa. Pursuant to this,

Mrs. Gbeneol allegedly paid in the sum of Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira (N880,000.00) only to the Bank Account of Gbenga who proceeded to pay his School fees to travelled to South Africa for his Course. According to the Appellant, In a sudden summersault, the Complainant, Mrs. Gbeneol allegedly went to the EFCC and lodged a complainant and he was later arrested and arraigned as stated above.

In proof of its case, the Respondent called two witnesses, and tendered some exhibits.
Friday Ebelo (PW1) gave evidence to the effect that the Commission (EFCC) received a petition from PW2 (the nominal complainant) i.e. Dr. Precious Gbeneol, which was accepted and investigated in which the Appellant was shown to have obtained the sum of N880,000.00 (Eight Hundred and Eighty Eight Thousand Naira) only from PW2 under the disguise of being an EFCC operative and he also tendered the following Exhibits in proof of the Prosecution’s case to wit: Exhibit A (The Petition), Exhibit B and B1, being the EFCC’s letter of Investigation activities to Skye Bank Plc and Skye Banks PLC deposit slip respectively, Exhibit C being the response from Skye Bank Plc to

EFCC’s letter of investigation activities including the statement of account of the Appellant, Exhibit D-D2 being six pages of the written statement of the Appellant.

PW2 is Dr. Precious Gbeneol, the nominal complainant. She testified to the effect that she recognized the Appellant because she had received a call from someone who introduced himself as the Appellant and that he works with the EFCC and he is assigned to investigate a case against her. That he suggested they meet at the Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja but since she was in Port Harcourt, she gave him her Church address so that she can meet up with him in the presence of her husband and Pastor. According to her, he came during the midweek service wearing an EFCC ID Card and had on his arm an EFCC jacket. That he claimed he had investigated some prominent Politicians including Bankole. He brought some bank statements and stated that they were companies he was assigned to investigate, which he found out were not linked, as claimed by one Jacinta Nwosu, from FCMB. That he needed to write a proper report and use the MTN through their facility to stop further bugging of her phone, and write a

comprehensive report which process will take N880,000.00 (Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira only). That she lodged him in a Hotel for three days and paid air fare to and fro and gave him money for feeding and pleaded with him to give her time to make up the N880,000.00. That he called her some days later, saying that she was delaying the movement of the investigation. She then made payment of the money to an account number provided by the Appellant, i.e. Skye Bank Plc Account Number 1018934528 using the name Victory Manwar, a pseudo name. That the Appellant stopped communicating with her after her making the payment, which prompted her visit to the EFCC Office, to make a compliant and she was informed later that the Appellant had been apprehended and he has been traced to FCMB where he is actually a driver to one of the Managers in FCMB.
The Appellant gave evidence and called no other witness.

At the close of trial, parties filed, exchanged and adopted their written addresses, and in its judgment delivered on the 23rd of June 2016, the Trial Court, per U.P. KEKEMEKE, J., found the Appellant guilty of the two count charge of impersonation and

obtaining money under false pretence, and he was according sentenced to six months imprisonment without an option of fine, on the first count, and to seven years imprisonment without an option of fine, on the second count. He was also ordered to refund the sum of N880,000.00, as well as the N60,000.00 to the Complainant.

The Appellant is aggrieved by this decision and appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal filed on the 29th of July 2016, upon Four (4) Grounds. (See pages 252 — 255 of the Record.)

In line with the Rues and practice of this Court, parties filed and exchanged briefs of arguments, which they adopted and relied on as their arguments in support of their various positions, when the appeal came up for hearing on the 20th of January, 2020.

The Appellant’s brief of argument was dated and filed on the 15th & March 2019. E. U. CHINEDUM Esq., who settled the brief, formulated the following two issues for this Court’s determination. They are:
1. Under the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, can the Prosecution be said to have discharged the burden of proof sufficient to sustain a charge against a

Defendant, when it failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt?
2. To sustain a charge under our criminal jurisprudence, the Prosecution is required to lead credible evidence in proof of all the ingredients of the offence charged was the lower Court right in the conclusion it reached against the Appellant on the basis that he believed the evidence of the Prosecution witness without any shred of evidence to sustain such conclusion?

The Appellant also filed a Reply Brief to the Respondent’s Brief dated and filed on the 14th of January 2020.

For the Respondent, a brief of Argument dated the 6th of January 2020, was also filed on the same date. ANDREW A. AKOJA. ESQ., who settled the brief, also submitted two issues for determination, namely:
1. Whether the Trial Court was not right to have held that the Respondent proved the charge of impersonation of a Public Servant against the Appellant i.e. operative or Staff of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission as presented to the PW2, at the Trial Court Dr. Precious Gbeneol beyond reasonable doubt upon which the Appellant was convicted?
2. Whether the Trial Court was not

right to have held that the Respondent proved the charge of obtaining money by false pretenses beyond reasonable doubt as brought against the Appellant and upon which he was convicted?

I have read through the issues distilled for determination by Counsel on both sides. They are the same in purport, though couched differently. I hold the view that this appeal can be determined under this broad issue to wit: Whether the Prosecution had sufficiently discharged the burden of proving the offences charged, against the Appellant. (This broad issue encompasses the two issues distilled by counsel on both sides.)

It is submitted for the Appellant that the burden of proof is always on the Prosecution. Relying on the case of KALU V. NIGERIAN ARMY (2010) 4 NWLR (PT 1185) 43, as well as Section 132 of the Penal Code, learned Counsel for the Appellant listed the ingredient that the Prosecution must prove to discharge the burden on a charge of impersonating a public officer, and maintained that at no time in the testimony of the Appellant, did he introduce himself as an EFCC operative or a public servant, or carried any insignia to give the impression that he was a

public servant.

It is his view that aside the testimony of PW2, which the Appellant vehemently denied, the Prosecution failed to place anything before the Trial Court in proof of this charge. He argued that no one shall be punished for an offence or an act which he did not commit or cause to be committed. He called in aid the case of MANDILLAS KARABERIES LTD V. IGP (1958) 1 NSCC 70.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant opined that the standard of proof in criminal cases is one beyond reasonable doubt. He stated that the conclusion reached by the Trial Court is not founded on any evidence before the Trial Court. According to him, the only evidence required for the Prosecution to discharge this first ingredient is that they must show that the Appellant either wore an EFCC ID Card or EFCC jacket and the witnesses who allegedly saw the Appellant with the EFCC ID card and EFCC jacket, were never invited by the EFCC or called as a witness to corroborate same. He relied on these cases:
NDIDI V. STATE (2007) 5 SC 175 @ 198;
NWOSU V. STATE (1986) 4 NWLR (PT 35) 359.

Learned counsel contended that where an allegation of a crime is made and a

Defendant denies same, it is the duty of the prosecution to lead all material witnesses to establish the offence, failure of which is fatal to the case of the Prosecution. He called in aid these cases:
EDOHO V. STATE (2004) 5 NWLR (PT 865) 17 @ 51;
OGUONZE V. STATE (1998) SC 155-156

He maintained that the consequence of the Prosecution not calling material witnesses is that the offence of Impersonation as contemplated under Section 132 of the Penal Code has not been discharged. He placed reliance on these cases:
ALABI V. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (307);
NNOLIM V. STATE (1993) 3 NWLR (PT 283) 569.

It is further contended for the Appellant that the learned trial Judge was not right in the conclusion it reached that the Prosecution had established the charge of obtaining by false pretenses, under Section 1(1)(a) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant listed the ingredients which the Prosecution must prove to sustain the charge and stated that the Prosecution had failed to discharge this burden. He placed reliance on these cases:
OSHUN V. D.P.P SCN 357;

UZOKA V. FRN (2010) 2 NWLR (PT 1177) 118;

In furtherance to the above, it is the view of learned counsel for the Appellant that the testimony of PW2, is not sufficient to sustain the charge made out against the Appellant as it was fraught with inconsistencies which the Trial Court failed to consider in reaching its decision that the Prosecution had proved its case against the Appellant, and the Trial Court was wrong to have rejected the evidence of the Appellant as regards the agreement between him and PW2, which was inconsistent with the testimony of PW2. He called in aid the following cases:
UDOH V. STATE (1994) 2 NWLR (PT 329) 672;
IBEH V. STATE (SUPRA)

He maintained that the conclusion that the sum of N880,000.00 (Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira) only, was for writing a report or stopping MTN from bogging her phone Is Incongruent with the earlier testimony that the Appellant found nothing incriminating on account details that does not belong to her. His view therefore is that an essential element of the offence charged, which is the intention to defraud, was not proved. The case of R V. CHURCHILL (1967) 2 AC 224, was relied on.

This Court is urged to hold that the elements of the offences charged were not proved by the Prosecution against the Appellant.

In conclusion, this Court is urged to resolve the two issues raised in this appeal in favour of the Appellant, set aside the decision of the Trial Court, discharge and acquit the Appellant.

In its response, it is submitted for the Respondent there is no doubt that the Courts have in a plethora of authorities, laid down the standard of proof in criminal cases to be proof beyond reasonable doubt and not proof beyond all shadow of doubt.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent listed the ingredients which the Prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction under Section 132 of the Penal Code and submitted that the Respondent has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

He rehashed the evidence adduced at the trial by the Prosecution witnesses and argued that the Respondent proved its case beyond reasonable doubt before the Trial Court that the Appellant impersonated a Public Officer in this case, an Officer of the EFCC.

He urged this Court to disregard the submissions of learned counsel for the Appellant that the finding of

the Trial Court was not founded on any evidence before it, but reached out of inferences and natural conclusions. He relied on the following cases:
IDRIS V. STATE (2014) LPELR 23803 (CA);
OBED V. STATE (2014) LPELR 23123 (CA)

Learned Counsel for the Respondent invited this Court’s attention to the judgment of the Trial Court at Pages 203 – 206; 211 – 214; 215 – 217; 223 – 226 of the Record; and submitted that taking the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses side by side with that of the Appellant, one is left in no doubt that the Trial Court had ample evidence on record to arrive at its conclusion.

On the need to call for corroborative evidence, by calling other witnesses, such as PW2’s Pastor and/or husband, it is the view of Learned Counsel for the Respondent that there is no particular number of witnesses that the Prosecution is required to call, to prove its case. Reliance was placed on these authorities:
SECTION 200 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT, 2011;
ADEGBITE V. STATE (2017) LPELR 42585 (SC);
IKO V. STATE (2001) LPELR 1480 (SC);
IBRAHIM V. STATE (2014) LPELR 22306 (CA);
OGUNBAYO V. STATE (2007) LPELR 2323(SC)

He maintained that the Trial Court arrived at a just decision and to hold otherwise would be against the weight of evidence adduced at the trial.

On the second charge against the Appellant, learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the provisions of Section 20 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006, and listed the ingredients the Prosecution must prove, to succeed in a charge of obtaining by false pretences. He called in aid these cases:
ONWUDIWE V. FRN (2006) 10 NWLR (PT 988) 382;
ALAKE V. STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (PT 205);
EDE V. FRN (SUPRA)

On whether the ingredients of the offence has been proved by the Prosecution, learned Counsel invited the attention of this Court to Exhibits A, B, B1,C3 and D-D2 on Pages 117, 121 -126; and 102, 106 -115 of the Record, and submitted that from the totality of the evidence on record, the Respondent has discharged the duty imposed on it by law, in proving that the Appellant committed the offences charged.

In conclusion, this Court is urged to resolve the two issues raised in this appeal against the Appellant, dismiss the appeal and uphold the

decision of the Trial Court.

In reply, it is submitted for the Appellant that the failure of the Respondent to call vital and material witnesses is fatal to their case. Learned counsel for the Appellant made a distinction between a host of witnesses, and material witnesses, and contended that in the instant case, failure to call the witnesses who allegedly saw the Appellant impersonate an EFCC Official, is fatal to the case of the Prosecution.

Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the Respondent, as Prosecution, has failed to discharge the duty imposed on it by law, in proving that the Appellant impersonated a public officer, or obtained money from PW2, under false pretences. He maintained that there was no Intention by the Appellant to defraud or obtain money by false pretences, from PW2, as erroneously held by the Trial Court.

This Court is therefore urged to discountenance the contents of the Respondent’s brief and uphold the arguments canvassed by the Appellant, in allowing the appeal.

The fulcrum of this appeal and the submissions of learned counsel on both sides of the divide is on whether the Prosecution proved

beyond reasonable doubt the offences of impersonation of a public officer, in this appeal, an operative of the EFCC, contrary to Section 132 of the Penal Code, and obtaining by false pretence with intent to defraud under Section 1 (1) (a) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, for which the Trial Court convicted the Appellant as charged.

Now Section 132 of the Penal Code provides thus:
“Whoever, pretends to hold a particular office as a public servant, knowing that he does not hold such office, or falsely personates any other person holding such office, and in such a assumed character does or attempts to do any act under colour of such office, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.”
The above implies that for the Prosecution to prove this charge, it is required to establish that:
1. The accused personated a public servant or that he pretended to hold the post of a public servant;
2. That he was not such a servant, or did not hold the post pretended;
3. That he acted falsely or that he knew that he did not hold the post in question;<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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That he, when assuming the character, did or attempted to do something under colour of his assumed office.In resolving the question of whether there was an impersonation on the part of the Appellant, the Trial Court believed the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses and found that the charge of impersonating a public servant was proved against the Appellant.
Learned counsel for the Appellant has argued vigorously that the evidence of the PW2, was not corroborated. According to him, failure at the Prosecution to call in evidence, the Husband and Pastor of PW2, is fatal to the Prosecution’s case. He also added that neither the ID Card, nor the jackets were produced by the Prosecution, in proof of its case.

The law seems to be settled beyond peradventure that there is no obligation on the prosecution to call a host of witnesses. All the prosecution needs to do is to call enough material witnesses to prove its case and in so doing, it has a discretion in the matter as to who to call. See;
ADAJE V. THE STATE (1979) 6-9 SC 18 at 28.
ADEGBITE V. STATE (2017) LPELR 42585 SC

In the appeal at hand, I believe the evidence of PW2,

the nominal complainant is sufficient to prove a case of impersonation, against the Appellant. As borne out of the record, PW2 gave a vivid account of how she was approached by the Appellant, how he travelled to Port Harcourt to meet with her and how he pretended to be an officer of the EFCC. The Appellant has not denied that he travelled to Port Harcourt and was lodged for some days by the PW2. He is also not denying the fact that he is a driver with FCMB. All this Information and more, are contained in his statement found at pages 25 -31 of the Record.

What is more, the Appellant. denied being paid the sum of Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira by the PW2, but made a volte face after being confronted with evidence showing that he was indeed paid the sum of Eight Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira. The Trial Court was therefore right to believe the evidence of the Prosecution witnesses and hold that a case of impersonation was made out against the Appellant.
I endorse this decision and hold that the Prosecution has made out a case of impersonation against the Appellant.

Now for the offence of obtaining by false pretence,

Section 1(1)(a) of the Advance Fee and Other Related Offences Act 2006 provides as follows:-
1. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment of law, any person who by any false pretence, and with intent to defraud
(a) Obtains from any other person in Nigeria or in any other country for himself or any other person… commits an offence under this Act.”
False pretence is defined in Section 20 of the Act as:
“‘False pretence‘ means a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made by word, in writing or by conduct, of a matter of fact of law, either past or present, which representation is false in fact or law, and which the person making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true.”
Now, for the offence of obtaining by false pretences to be committed it must be proved that the accused person had an intention to defraud and that the thing is capable of being stolen. An inducement on the part of the accused person to make his victim part with a thing capable of being stolen or make his victim deliver a thing capable of being stolen will expose the accused person to imprisonment for the offence. It is the law that the

ingredients or elements that are required to be proved to establish the charge of obtaining money by false pretences are:
1. That there was a pretence.
2. That the pretence emanated from the accused person
3. That the pretence was false.
4. That the accused person knew of the falsity of the pretence or did not believe in its truth.
5. That there was an intention to defraud.
6. That the property or thing capable of being stolen.
7. That the accused person induced the owner to transfer his whole interest in the property.
See:
ALAKE V. THE STATE (1991) 7 NWLR (PT. 205) 567 at 591,
ONWUDIWE V. FRN (2006) LPELR (2715) 1 at 55; and
ODIAWA V. FRN (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 439) 436.

In resolving the question of whether there was a false pretence emanating from the Appellant and which induced the PW2 to part with her money, the Trial Court after reviewing, evaluating and assessing the evidence adduced concluded as follows:-
“I believe the evidence of the Prosecution witness. There is a pretence which emanated from the Defendant which was false. The Defendant knew he is not an operative of the EFCC and it

was made with the Intention of obtaining the sum of N880,000.00. There is also evidence that the nominal complainant was induced to transfer N880,000.00 to the Defendant.”
(See page 246 of the Records).

The gravamen of the submissions of the Appellant in his arguments can be summed up as being that the Prosecution did not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt because the ingredients of the offence charged were not made out. Is this position correct? I have already set out the findings made by the Trial Court on the basis of which it held that the essential ingredients or elements of the offence had been made out and the offence proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The false pretence on the part of the Appellant is very clear. It is firstly that he is an

operative of the EFCC investigating a petition involving PW2, the nominal complainant. The other representation is that with the sum of N880,000.00, he would write a proper report and will meet MTN to stop further bugging of her phone and further disturbance. The Appellant’s version of events is nothing other than a denial of having had any such dealings with the PW 2.
At the time the Appellant made the representation he knew that he was neither an operative of the EFCC, nor was he investigating the nominal complainant, to justify the money collected to write a “proper report’. That made the pretence false. Since the Appellant had the intention to defraud, the Appellant kept away from the PW2 after he received the sum of N880,000.00 deposited in his account.
The action and conduct of the Appellant was insincere and nonsensical, by which the Appellant fleeced the PW2 of a huge sum of money, the money being a thing capable of being stolen.
In the old English case of R V. JOHN JAMES SULLIVAN 3 OCR APP R 132 at 134 which was quoted with approval by Obaseki, JSC in IJUAKA V. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (1976) LPELR (1466) 1 at 11,

Humphreys, J. dealing with what has to be proved in order to establish the intent to defraud stated as follows:
“In order that a person may be convicted of that offence it has been said hundreds of times that it is necessary for the prosecution to the prove to the satisfaction of the Jury (Court) that there was some mis-statement which in law amounts to a pretence, that is, a mis-statement as to an existing fact made by the accused person; that it was false and false to his knowledge; that it acted upon the mind of the person who parted with the money; that the proceeding on the part of the accused was fraudulent. That is the only meaning to apply to the words with intent to defraud.”
As manifest from the evidence on record which was found and accepted by the Trial Court, it was the representation that the Appellant could write a proper report purportedly exonerating the PW2 from whatever imaginary investigation she was involved in. Let me hasten to add that this representation was not futuristic. It was very much in the present: advance money so the Appellant can write a proper report. It is actually what the law under which the

Appellant was charged is aimed at: advance fee fraud. The Appellant having received the money did not utilise the money for the purpose for which the representation which induced the PW2 to part with the money was made. The evidence on record supports the finding of the Trial Court that the Appellant obtained the money from the PW2, under false pretence.
This finding by the Trial Court has ample support in the testimony of the PW1 and PW2. Without a doubt and as rightly found by the Trial Court, the ingredients of the offence of obtaining by false pretences were made out and the charge against the Appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. See AMADI vs. THE STATE (2008) LPELR (441) 1 at 25 SC.
Consequently, there is no basis on which this Court can interfere. In my view, the Prosecution had proved the offence of obtaining by false pretences against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In the final analysis, I find no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.

The judgment of the Trial Court, delivered on the 23rd of June 2016, is hereby affirmed.
I make no order as to costs.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Abdu Aboki, JCA.
I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal has no merit. The appeal is hereby dismissed and I abide by the consequential order thereat.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A.: I agree.

Appearances:

Kene Obiezu For Appellant(s)

Ayodeji Fadahunsi For Respondent(s)