HON. SUMBO OLUGBEMI v. HON. OLUJIDE ADEWALE LAWRENCE & ORS(2017)

HON. SUMBO OLUGBEMI v. HON. OLUJIDE ADEWALE LAWRENCE & ORS

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 28th day of April, 2017

SC.993/2016

RATIO

POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT WITH RESPECT TO PRE-ELECTION MATTERS

Section 251 (1)(s) “1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High court shall have and exercise Jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cases and matters.” (Underlining mine).”(S) Such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.” (Underlining mine). Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended states:- “Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.” In the case of Lokpobiri v Ogola & Ors (2015) 10-11 MJSC Pg. 74 at 93-94, paras G to G, this Court said:- “I want us to also note that both the opening of Section 251 (1) and Paragraph S of the subsection confer authority on the National Assembly, in addition to the general provision of legislative powers in Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution as amended to enact an Act conferring additional Jurisdiction on the Federal High Court either exclusive or concurrently with State and Federal Capital Territory High Courts. It is on the basis of the above constitutional provision particularly Sub-section (1) Paragraph (s) of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution that the National Assembly enacted the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended and conferred concurrent Jurisdiction in pre-election matters on the Federal High Court and State and Federal Capital Territory High Courts in Section 31 (5) and (6) and 87 (9) therefore which provide, inter alia…. Also to be referred is the case of Jev v Ivortvom (2014) All FWLR (pt. 747) pg. 749 at 773 Paras F-A, where the Supreme Court held: “However, where the political party decides to conduct primary election to choose its flag bearer, any dissatisfied contestant at the primary is now empowered by Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) to ventilate his complaint before the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory; Peoples Democratic Party v Timipre Sylva. The said Section 87 (9) is clear and unambiguous, the Courts are enjoined to give them their ordinary grammatical meaning: Egbe v. Yusuf (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 245) 1. By inserting this new provision into the Electoral Act, the legislation has made its intention very clear as to the reason, and purport, that a member of a political party who contested the primary election is entitled to challenge a breach of the party Constitution or Guidelines or Electoral Act, by filing an action at the Federal High Court or State High Court or the Federal Capital Territory High Court, simpliciter.” The appellant really made a lot of fuss on main or principal relief as against ancillary relief upon which jurisdiction of Court may or may not be activated. Perhaps this Court had in a clairvoyant manner gone to great lengths in dealing with this attempt at creating boundaries of main and ancillary reliefs in relation to jurisdiction of Court in the case of Lokpobiri v Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (pt. 1499) 328 at 366. The Court said:- “To me, it is erroneous to say that for the Federal High Court to entertain a pre-election matter, the main relief(s) must be shown to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court because both jurisdictions are different. In a concurrent jurisdiction, if Court A has Jurisdiction to hear all the reliefs claimed, it necessarily follows that Court B must have the same jurisdiction otherwise it means giving something to someone with one hand and taking it away with the other hand. It is settled law that election and election related matters are sui generic (sic) and that the jurisdiction to hear and determine them is statutory just as the rights and obligations connected therewith or arising there from. It is in that respect that the principles of common law may not be appropriate in election and related matters. It is not in dispute that in civil actions, the jurisdiction of a Court to hear and determine the plaintiffs action depends on the claim(s) in the writ of summons and his pleadings. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of a Court to hear and determine an election or election related matter is statutory as provided in the statute establishing the cause of action and conferring Jurisdiction on the appropriate or particular Court(s) to hear and determine same. In terms of election or election related matters, the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to hear and entertain such matter is rooted in the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended earlier reproduced in this judgment. In respect of matters relating to post election jurisdiction of the Court, see Section 251 (4) of the 1999 Constitution as amended also supra. If we insist on the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court on pre- election and/or post election matters being exercisable only where the main claim(s) is/are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, it will result in injustice on the litigants which is clearly not the intention of the legislature. It is therefore very clear that the concurrent jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court to hear and determine pre-election and even post election matters is clearly outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution as amended but in addition to the said exclusive jurisdiction and consequently subject to different consideration. It is therefore my considered opinion when the Federal High Courts pre-election jurisdiction is invoked, the parties claims and relief(s) must be in conformity with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, not under the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. In fact, INEC may be a nominal party or be liable to an ancillary claim in a pre-election or post elections jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. The position I have taken on this issue is advised by the decision of this Court in Jev v Iyortom (2014) 14 NWLR (pt. 1428) 575 at 611-613; 626- 627; 630 and 631-632. My attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the Respondent to the decision of this Court in PDP v Sylva (2012) 8-13 NWLR (pt. 1316) 85 and Kakih v PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (pt. 1430) 374 said to be in support of their contention that for the Federal High Court to exercise its pre-election jurisdiction under the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, the main claim(s) or reliefs of the plaintiff must be within the purview of the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. A detailed reading of the facts of PDP v Sylva supra does not support that contention. The case simply held that Sylva who was not screened by his party (PDP) for the primaries in question nor participated in the said primaries, failed to bring himself within the provisions of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended and as such he had no locus standi to institute an action under the Section 87 (9) in any Court in Nigeria as his complaints were within the internal affairs of a political party which are not Justiciable. So, the reliefs claimed in that action were incapable of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court- see pages 127 & 137-139 or the report. It must be pointed out that the effect of the decision in Sylvas case is that the action as constituted was not a pre-election matter and as such, it could not be entertained in any Court. Any other thing said is clearly obiter. With respect to the decision of this Court in the case of Kakih v PDP, supra. I wish to emphasise that the Court did not hold the Federal High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine pre-election matters. It held that it does but that the jurisdiction so conferred is exercisable by that Court when the main claim of the plaintiff falls within the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and not when the claim against an agency of the Federal Government is ancillary. Having regard to what I have stated earlier in this judgment with respect to the Sui generic nature of an election or election related matter and the jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain them, which are special statutory jurisdictions, the fact that the Federal High Court, by operation of Section 251 (4) of the 1999 Constitution is also clothed with jurisdiction to entertain post election matters whose claims or reliefs may not necessarily involve/affect the Federal Government or any of its agencies, it is clear that the intention of the legislature in conferring the additional jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in relation to pre-election and post-election matters is clearly that the additional jurisdiction is to be exercised by the Court in accordance with Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, creating the jurisdiction as well as Section 251 (4) of the 1999 Constitution. It is therefore clear that Kakihs case as regard the issue of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in pre-election matters is limited to its peculiar facts and circumstances having regard to the decision in Jev v Iyortvom supra. It follows therefore that once an aggrieved party comes within the ambit of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the issue of main relief as against an ancillary one does not come into play or arise. Removing jurisdiction for some of the reliefs and endowing for other reliefs to a Court will lead to confusion as one Court will be dealing with a particular relief while the other Court is sorting out the reliefs allotted to it in a severance method that beats the imagination. It would produce a never ending dispute since the facts in the two Courts are the same arising from the same base. What is obtaining in the matter at hand as 1st respondent as plaintiff has his claim well positioned under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended, the original claims as captured in the Writ of summons and statement of claim and thereafter the Amended Statement of Claim. The said Section 87 (9), is opened with the word ”aspirant” which the 1st respondent is as defined under Section 156 of the said Electoral Act to mean a person who aspires or seeks or strives to contest an election to a political office. Also to be noted is that reliefs 15 (vii), (x), (xi) and (xii) in the amended statement of claim which are to direct the 4th defendant, INEC, a Federal Agency not only to deny recognition to the 1st defendant and party but to direct the said 4th defendant to withdraw the certificate of return already issued to the 1st defendant as candidate of 2nd defendant and to issue the certificate to the plaintiff. Certainly what is sought in those reliefs cannot in all honesty be treated with the levity to which an ancillary claim would be labelled as they are principal or major claims and prayers. Again I seek refuge in the case of this Court in Lokpobiri v. Ogola supra at at page 106 Paras A-D, The Supreme Court said:- “In Section 251 (1) and (s) of the Constitution (supra) read together with Section 31 (5) and Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act (supra), it is specious and spurious to argue, as the respondent did, that the Federal High Court has no Jurisdiction, if the claim brought pursuant to Section 87 (9) of the Act (supra) does not involve the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party the claim against it must be a principal relief and not a mere subsidiary thereof. This is a fallacy created by skewed construction of the provisions of the Constitution (supra) and the Electoral Act (supra) (Underlining mine). In my humble view, the Federal Government or any of its agencies does not have to be a party in suit brought pursuant to Section 31 (5) and 87 (9) of the Electoral Act (supra) before the Federal High Court can exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it. To hold the contrary view is to render inoperative and unnecessary the underlined portions of Section 251 (1) and (S) of the Constitution (supra). Clearly, appellant had cited Kakih v PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374 out of con for the facts therein are not on all fours with what we are here faced with. Indeed, the matter herein is laid to rest as the two Courts below were right in holding that the Federal High Court was seised with jurisdiction to hear the pre-election matter before that Federal High Court pursuant to Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). The controversy on the issue of main or principal or ancillary relief does not arise and this appeal definitely lacks merit as the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Courts below are not to be tampered with, the exceptions that would have empowered this Apex Court to so interfere, upset, disturb those findings PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

JUSTICES

IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

HON. SUMBO OLUGBEMI Appellant(s)

AND

HON. OLUJIDE ADEWALE LAWRENCE
2. ALL PROGRESSIVE CONGRESS (APC)
3. THE CHAIRMAN, ALL PROGRESSIVE
CONGRESS, OYO STATE
4. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL
COMMISSION (INEC) Respondent(s)

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal Ibadan Division or Court below or Lower Court, Coram: Monica B. Dongban-Mensem, Modupe Fasanmi, Chinwe Eugenia Iyizoba JCA with Fasanmi JCA delivering the lead judgment on the 28th day of October, 2016.

The appellant being dissatisfied with the said judgment filed an appeal to this Court vide his Notice of Appeal of two grounds.

FACTS BRIEFLY STATED:
The 1st respondent filed an action before the Federal High Court, Ibadan on the 24th day of October, 2014 wherein he sought two declaratory reliefs and five ancillary orders. The pleadings and claims of the 1st respondent as plaintiff are as contained in the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claims in the said pleadings to throw light into what are at stake, thus:-
i. A DECLARATION that the plaintiff is the duly elected flag bearer of the 2nd defendant for February, 2015 general elections into the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan, Oyo State having polled the majority of lawful votes cast at the primary

election conducted by the 2nd defendant on the 7th day of December, 2014, and was so declared the winner.
ii. A DECLARATION that the nomination of the 1st defendant as the 2nd defendant’s candidate or flag bearer for the February, 2015 general elections for the seat of the member of House of Representative to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency is ultra-vires, null and void,
iii. AN ORDER nullifying the nomination of the 1st defendant and the substitution of the plaintiff by the 2nd defendant as its candidate for the representative representing Oluyole Federal Constituency, Ibadan.
iv. AN ORDER directing the 2nd and 3rd defendants to forthwith accord the plaintiff his due recognition as their flag bearer for February 2015 general election into the House Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency, Ibadan.
v. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd and 3rd defendants from recognizing, acting or doing anything in recognition of the nomination and selection of the 1st defendant as the 2nd defendants candidate for the forthcoming February, 2015 elections into the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal

Constituency, Ibadan, Oyo State.
vi. AN ORDER nullifying the purported nomination of the 1st defendant by the 2nd defendant as its flag bearer to contest for the seat of the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan in the forthcoming general election scheduled to hold in February, 2015.
vii. AN ORDER directing the 4th defendant not to recognise or accord any recognition to the name of SUMBO OLUGBEMI or any person other than the name of Hon. OLUJIDE ADEWALE LAWRENCE as the 2nd defendant candidate for the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan, Oyo State.
viii. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court nullifying the nomination and election of the 1st defendant into the Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislative Seat, Ibadan, Oyo State of the House of Representatives.
ix. AN ORDER declaring the Claimant as the lawful Candidate of the 2nd defendant at the general election held on the 28th day of March, 2015 for Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislative seat (Oyo State) of the House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
x. AN ORDER directing the

4th defendant to immediately withdraw the certificate of return it issued to the 1st defendant as the candidate of the 2nd defendant in the general election held on the 28th day of March, 2015 into the Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislative seat (Oyo State) of the House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
xi. AN ORDER directing the 4th defendant to immediately issue a certificate of return to the Claimant as the lawfully elected candidate of the 2nd defendant in the general election held on the 28th day of March, 2015 for the Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislative seat Oyo State) of the House of Representative, National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
xii. OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE to Paragraph XI above, AN ORDER of this Honourable Court ordering the 4th respondent to conduct a fresh general election into the Oluyole, Ibadan, Oyo State, Federal Constituency Legislative Seat of the House of Representatives, Federal Republic of Nigeria.
xiii. Cost of this action.

Subsequent to the amendment, the appellant herein filed an application to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial Court to

entertain the claims of the 1st respondent vide his application dated 11th November, 2015 and filed on 12th November, 2015. The trial Court took the application and his lordship Hon. Justice N. Ayo Emmanuel dismissed the application on the 9th December, 2015.

The appellant being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court appealed against the same vide his Notice of Appeal of 23rd December, 2015.

At the Court below, the appellant sought and was granted leave to amend his notice of appeal, which amended Notice of Appeal dated 1/4/16 was deemed properly filed on 4/4/16.

On the 1st of February, 2017 date of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, Kazeem A. Gbadamosi adopted his brief of argument filed on 1/12/1016 and in it he crafted a single issue, viz-
Whether having regards to the pleadings and the reliefs claimed by the 1st respondent, the learned Justices of the Court below were wrong in dismissing the appellants appeal by holding that the Federal High Court had jurisdiction over the claim of the plaintiff and that the main reliefs sought by the 1st respondent were against a Federal Government Agency (INEC). Covers grounds

1 and 2 of the notice of appeal.

Learned counsel for the 1st respondent, Olakunle A. Faokunla Esq. adopted his brief of argument filed on 11/1/2017 and formulated a sole issue, viz:-
Whether the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal, Ibadan Division were right by holding that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the 1st respondents claim having regards to the provisions of Section 251 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, and Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended.

Olasoji O. Olowolafe Esq. of counsel for the 2nd respondent adopted its brief of argument filed on 31/1/17 and deemed filed on 1/2/17 and in it crafted a single issue as follows-
Whether the Lower Court was right in holding that the trial Court had the jurisdiction to try the case inspite of the reliefs sought by the 1st respondent.

Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent adopted his brief of argument filed on 19/1/17 and also adopted the issue as crafted by the appellant for the determination of the appeal.

All the issues as differently crafted ask me same question which is really whether the

Court below was right in holding that the trial Court had jurisdiction to try the case inspite of the reliefs sought by the 1st respondent.

Pushing forward the position of the appellant, learned counsel, Kazeem Gbadamosi contended that from the totality of the reliefs sought by the 1st respondent, the 1st and 2nd reliefs of the 1st respondent which are declaratory in nature are the main reliefs and the other reliefs are ancillary as they are dependent on the grant of the 1st and 2nd reliefs. That the dichotomy between a main relief and ancillary relief is borne out of whether a relief can be granted independent of the other; while reliefs 1 and 2 can be granted and the other reliefs will follow. That if reliefs 1 and 2 are refused then it follows that all the other reliefs iii – xi and xii, the alternative relief which are dependent, will have to be dismissed. He cited Tukur v Governor of Gongola State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549 at 582-583; Adenuga v Odemeru (2007) SC (Pt.1) 103 at 115-116.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that from the decisions of the Supreme Court cases cited above, reliefs 15 (vii) (x) (xi) and of the 1st

respondents amended statement of claim against the 4th respondent are dependent on reliefs 1 and 2 as the reliefs above are ancillary. That based on that, the lower Court was wrong when it held that reliefs 15 (vii) (x) (xi) and (xii) of the 1st respondent’s amended statement of claim against the 4th respondent are principal reliefs and subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 251 (1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended.

Learned counsel for the appellant stated that as ancillary reliefs cannot stand on their own and cannot metamorphose to become the principal or the main relief. He referred to Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374 at 415-416.

That reliefs 3 and 9 which are against INEC are not fundamental are ancillary claims. That relief 1-8 and all the alternative claims question pre-primary election affairs of the party which no Court has jurisdiction to entertain.

It was concluded for the appellant that this appeal should be allowed on the principle in Kakih v. PDP (supra) and set aside the decision of the lower Court and to hold that the Federal

High Court lacked jurisdiction over the substantive matter placed before it in view of 1st and 2nd reliefs which ought to be the main reliefs.

Mr. Faokunla for the 1st respondent submitted that the Federal High Court, State High Court and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory have jurisdiction in respect of Pre-election matters and so since Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) is at play, the matter of main claim or relief and ancillary claims are not applicable. He cited Jev v Iyortom (2014) AII FWLR (pt 747) 749 at 773-774; Lokpobiri v Ogola & Ors (2015) 10-11 MJSC 74 at 93-94; Section 251 (1)(S) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended).

He stated that the Federal High Court possessed the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the 1st respondents claim in line with the decision of this court in Lokpobiri v Ogola (supra) as the claims are brought under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended).

Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent stated that because of the fundamental importance of the issue of jurisdiction, it could be said at any time and by anybody during the proceedings as time does not run out on the issue of

jurisdiction. That raising the issue at this level of appeal is covered. That jurisdiction of Court is a matter of law, statute and Constitution and it is ascertained by taking a look at the claim of the plaintiff. He referred to the cases of Ibrahim v Lawal (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt.1489) 490 at 524-525; Elugbe v Omokhafe (2004) 18 NWLR (pt.905) 319 at 322; Adani v Igwe (1957) SCNLR 396; Adeyemi v Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31 at 51; Okulate v. Awoosanya (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530 at 555-556.

The 2nd respondent towed the line of 1st respondents argument that it is the claim of the plaintiff that is considered to ascertain if the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, State High Court or High Court of the Federal Capital Territory could be ignited. He relied on Adetayo v Ademola (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1215) 169 at 191, James v INEC (2015) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1474) 538 at 597 etc.

That the trial High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this case because the main claim had nothing to do with the 4th respondent, who though a Federal agency would not suffice in activating the jurisdiction sought. He cited the case of Owners of Mv “Arabella v. NAIC (2008) 11 NWLR

(Pt.1097) 182 at 121.

For the 3rd respondent, it was contended that the Court below ought to have struck out the case for a lack of jurisdiction in line with Kakih v PDP & 3 Ors (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt.1430) 374.

The stance of the appellant in brief is that the appeal be allowed and the decision of the Court below set aside and this Court hold that the trial Court has no Jurisdiction to entertain the 1st respondents claim.

The position of the 1st respondent is that this appeal be dismissed and the two Courts below correct.

The 2nd and 3rd respondents towed the line of the appellant and urged the Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal and order a striking out of this case.

At the Court of trial, it was held on this issue of principal or main or ancillary relief stated thus:-
“It is however my opinion that it is the magnitude of a relief that would determine whether such relief ought to be classified as principal or ancillary and in addition what should determine whether a relief is principal or not is the character of the relief which consist in the substance and weight thereof. Learned counsel to the

applicant has not put forward or convinced me what makes the above referred reliefs auxiliary. I therefore find and hold that reliefs 15 (vii), (x), (xi) and (xii) of the plaintiff’s amended statement of claim against the 4th defendant are principal reliefs and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court by virtue of Section 251 (1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act (as amended). Prayer on the application is hereby refused.

Modupe Fasanmi, learned JCA, of the Court of Appeal affirmed that trial Court’s decision and stated as follows:-
“After a thorough reading of the 1st respondent claim in his amended statement of claim reproduced earlier in this judgment, I am on the same page with the learned trial Judge that reliefs 15 (vii), (x). (xi) and (xii) of the 1st respondents amended statement of claim against the 4th respondent are principal reliefs and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended.”

A revisit of the amended statement of claim of the plaintiff/1st

respondent at the Court of trial would have a refreshing effect to the mind lest we forget what is at stake.
The appellant had sought to guide the Court into the realm of Section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and its limitations towards producing a dichotomizing effect in the main or principal reliefs or ancillary reliefs issue. That is that because according to the appellant and supporters, the 2nd and 3rd respondents, the reference in the claim connecting a Federal Agency, in this instance INEC, the Independent Electoral Commission being ancillary to the main relief which did not connect that Agency, the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court was and cannot be activated in the suit herein.
I shall quote the relevant part of Section 251 of the Constitution which is thus:
Section 251 (1)(s)
“1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High court shall have and exercise Jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil cases and matters.”
(Underlining mine).
“(S) Such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other Court or not

as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.” (Underlining mine).
Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended states:-
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or FCT, for redress.”
In the case of Lokpobiri v Ogola & Ors (2015) 10-11 MJSC Pg. 74 at 93-94, paras G to G, this Court said:-
“I want us to also note that both the opening of Section 251 (1) and Paragraph S of the subsection confer authority on the National Assembly, in addition to the general provision of legislative powers in Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution as amended to enact an Act conferring additional Jurisdiction on the Federal High Court either exclusive or concurrently with State and Federal Capital Territory High Courts.<br< p=””
</br<

It is on the basis of the above constitutional provision particularly Sub-section (1) Paragraph (s) of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution that the National Assembly enacted the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended and conferred concurrent Jurisdiction in pre-election matters on the Federal High Court and State and Federal Capital Territory High Courts in Section 31 (5) and (6) and 87 (9) therefore which provide, inter alia….
Also to be referred is the case of Jev v Ivortvom (2014) All FWLR (pt. 747) pg. 749 at 773 Paras F-A, where the Supreme Court held:
“However, where the political party decides to conduct primary election to choose its flag bearer, any dissatisfied contestant at the primary is now empowered by Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) to ventilate his complaint before the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory; Peoples Democratic Party v Timipre Sylva. The said Section 87 (9) is clear and unambiguous, the Courts are enjoined to give them their ordinary grammatical meaning: Egbe v. Yusuf (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 245) 1.
By inserting this new provision into the

Electoral Act, the legislation has made its intention very clear as to the reason, and purport, that a member of a political party who contested the primary election is entitled to challenge a breach of the party Constitution or Guidelines or Electoral Act, by filing an action at the Federal High Court or State High Court or the Federal Capital Territory High Court, simpliciter.”

The appellant really made a lot of fuss on main or principal relief as against ancillary relief upon which jurisdiction of Court may or may not be activated. Perhaps this Court had in a clairvoyant manner gone to great lengths in dealing with this attempt at creating boundaries of main and ancillary reliefs in relation to jurisdiction of Court in the case of Lokpobiri v Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (pt. 1499) 328 at 366. The Court said:-
“To me, it is erroneous to say that for the Federal High Court to entertain a pre-election matter, the main relief(s) must be shown to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court because both jurisdictions are different. In a concurrent jurisdiction, if Court A has Jurisdiction to hear all the reliefs claimed, it necessarily

follows that Court B must have the same jurisdiction otherwise it means giving something to someone with one hand and taking it away with the other hand.
It is settled law that election and election related matters are sui generic (sic) and that the jurisdiction to hear and determine them is statutory just as the rights and obligations connected therewith or arising there from. It is in that respect that the principles of common law may not be appropriate in election and related matters.
It is not in dispute that in civil actions, the jurisdiction of a Court to hear and determine the plaintiffs action depends on the claim(s) in the writ of summons and his pleadings. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of a Court to hear and determine an election or election related matter is statutory as provided in the statute establishing the cause of action and conferring Jurisdiction on the appropriate or particular Court(s) to hear and determine same.
In terms of election or election related matters, the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to hear and entertain such matter is rooted in the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act,

2010 as amended earlier reproduced in this judgment. In respect of matters relating to post election jurisdiction of the Court, see Section 251 (4) of the 1999 Constitution as amended also supra. If we insist on the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court on pre- election and/or post election matters being exercisable only where the main claim(s) is/are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, it will result in injustice on the litigants which is clearly not the intention of the legislature. It is therefore very clear that the concurrent jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court to hear and determine pre-election and even post election matters is clearly outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution as amended but in addition to the said exclusive jurisdiction and consequently subject to different consideration.
It is therefore my considered opinion when the Federal High Courts pre-election jurisdiction is invoked, the parties claims and relief(s) must be in conformity with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, not under the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999

Constitution as amended. In fact, INEC may be a nominal party or be liable to an ancillary claim in a pre-election or post elections jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
The position I have taken on this issue is advised by the decision of this Court in Jev v Iyortom (2014) 14 NWLR (pt. 1428) 575 at 611-613; 626- 627; 630 and 631-632.
My attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the Respondent to the decision of this Court in PDP v Sylva (2012) 8-13 NWLR (pt. 1316) 85 and Kakih v PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (pt. 1430) 374 said to be in support of their contention that for the Federal High Court to exercise its pre-election jurisdiction under the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, the main claim(s) or reliefs of the plaintiff must be within the purview of the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. A detailed reading of the facts of PDP v Sylva supra does not support that contention. The case simply held that Sylva who was not screened by his party (PDP) for the primaries in question nor participated in the said primaries, failed to bring himself within the provisions of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended and as

such he had no locus standi to institute an action under the Section 87 (9) in any Court in Nigeria as his complaints were within the internal affairs of a political party which are not Justiciable. So, the reliefs claimed in that action were incapable of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court- see pages 127 & 137-139 or the report. It must be pointed out that the effect of the decision in Sylvas case is that the action as constituted was not a pre-election matter and as such, it could not be entertained in any Court. Any other thing said is clearly obiter.
With respect to the decision of this Court in the case of Kakih v PDP, supra. I wish to emphasise that the Court did not hold the Federal High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine pre-election matters. It held that it does but that the jurisdiction so conferred is exercisable by that Court when the main claim of the plaintiff falls within the provisions of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution and not when the claim against an agency of the Federal Government is ancillary.
Having regard to what I have stated earlier in this judgment with respect to the Sui generic

nature of an election or election related matter and the jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain them, which are special statutory jurisdictions, the fact that the Federal High Court, by operation of Section 251 (4) of the 1999 Constitution is also clothed with jurisdiction to entertain post election matters whose claims or reliefs may not necessarily involve/affect the Federal Government or any of its agencies, it is clear that the intention of the legislature in conferring the additional jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in relation to pre-election and post-election matters is clearly that the additional jurisdiction is to be exercised by the Court in accordance with Electoral Act, 2010, as amended, creating the jurisdiction as well as Section 251 (4) of the 1999 Constitution. It is therefore clear that Kakihs case as regard the issue of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in pre-election matters is limited to its peculiar facts and circumstances having regard to the decision in Jev v Iyortvom supra.
It follows therefore that once an aggrieved party comes within the ambit of Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), the

issue of main relief as against an ancillary one does not come into play or arise. Removing jurisdiction for some of the reliefs and endowing for other reliefs to a Court will lead to confusion as one Court will be dealing with a particular relief while the other Court is sorting out the reliefs allotted to it in a severance method that beats the imagination. It would produce a never ending dispute since the facts in the two Courts are the same arising from the same base.
What is obtaining in the matter at hand as 1st respondent as plaintiff has his claim well positioned under Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 as amended, the original claims as captured in the Writ of summons and statement of claim and thereafter the Amended Statement of Claim. The said Section 87 (9), is opened with the word ”aspirant” which the 1st respondent is as defined under Section 156 of the said Electoral Act to mean a person who aspires or seeks or strives to contest an election to a political office.
Also to be noted is that reliefs 15 (vii), (x), (xi) and (xii) in the amended statement of claim which are to direct the 4th defendant, INEC, a Federal Agency not only

to deny recognition to the 1st defendant and party but to direct the said 4th defendant to withdraw the certificate of return already issued to the 1st defendant as candidate of 2nd defendant and to issue the certificate to the plaintiff. Certainly what is sought in those reliefs cannot in all honesty be treated with the levity to which an ancillary claim would be labelled as they are principal or major claims and prayers. Again I seek refuge in the case of this Court in Lokpobiri v. Ogola supra at at page 106 Paras A-D, The Supreme Court said:-
“In Section 251 (1) and (s) of the Constitution (supra) read together with Section 31 (5) and Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act (supra), it is specious and spurious to argue, as the respondent did, that the Federal High Court has no Jurisdiction, if the claim brought pursuant to Section 87 (9) of the Act (supra) does not involve the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party the claim against it must be a principal relief and not a mere subsidiary thereof. This is a fallacy created by skewed construction of the provisions of the Constitution (supra) and the Electoral Act (supra) (Underlining mine).
In my

humble view, the Federal Government or any of its agencies does not have to be a party in suit brought pursuant to Section 31 (5) and 87 (9) of the Electoral Act (supra) before the Federal High Court can exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it.
To hold the contrary view is to render inoperative and unnecessary the underlined portions of Section 251 (1) and (S) of the Constitution (supra).
Clearly, appellant had cited Kakih v PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374 out of con for the facts therein are not on all fours with what we are here faced with.
Indeed, the matter herein is laid to rest as the two Courts below were right in holding that the Federal High Court was seised with jurisdiction to hear the pre-election matter before that Federal High Court pursuant to Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). The controversy on the issue of main or principal or ancillary relief does not arise and this appeal definitely lacks merit as the concurrent findings and conclusion of the two Courts below are not to be tampered with, the exceptions that would have empowered this Apex Court to so interfere, upset, disturb those findings

and conclusion do not exist. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

I award the sum of N250,000,00 as costs to the 1st respondent to be paid by the appellant.

IBRAHIM TANKO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.: I am in agreement with my lord Peter Odili JSC who delivered the leading judgment that the appeal has no merit and that it should be dismissed. I dismiss the appeal. I abide by all orders made in the lead judgment.

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS, J.S.C.: I read in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Peter Odili JSC dismissing the appeal as lacking in merit. I equally find no merit in the appeal and I hereby dismiss it.

The Plaintiff (now 1st respondent) had instituted an action at the Federal High Court, lbadan claiming that he was one of the four candidates who vied for the nomination of the All Progressive Congress (APC) to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency of Oyo State in the February, 2015 General Elections and polled the majority of lawful votes cast in the primary election conducted by the 2nd defendant on 7/12/2014 and was so declared as the winner. Despite his being declared the winner, the 2nd defendant/respondent

submitted the name of the 1st defendant/appellant to the 4th defendant/respondent as the candidate of the Party to contest the election. He thereby lodged a complaint with the 3rd defendant about the manipulation which led to the 2nd defendant forwarding the name of the 1st defendant as candidate for the election but his grievance was not addressed and as a result, he instituted the action in the Federal High Court seeking the following reliefs against the defendants in the amended statement of claim:
(i) A DECLARATION that the plaintiff is the duly elected flag bearer of the 2nd defendant for February, 2015 general elections into the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan, Oyo State having polled a majority of lawful votes cast at the primary election conducted by the 2nd defendant on the 7th December, 2014 and was so declared the winner.
(ii) A DECLARATION that the nomination of the 1st defendant as the 2nd defendants candidate or flag bearer for the February, 2015 general election for the seat of the member of House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency is ultra-vires, null and

void.
(iii) AN ORDER nullifying the nomination of the 1st defendant and the substitution of the plaintiff by the 2nd defendant as its candidate for the election into the National Assembly for the seat of a member of the House of Representatives representing Oluyole Federal Constituency, Ibadan.
(iv) AN ORDER directing the 2nd and 3rd defendants to forthwith accord the plaintiff due recognition as their flag bearer for the February, 2015 general election into the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan.
(v) AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd and 3rd defendants from recognizing, acting or doing anything in recognition of the nomination and selection of the 1st defendant as the 2nd defendants candidate for the forthcoming February, 2015 general election into the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan, Oyo State.
(vi) AN ORDER nullifying the purported nomination of the 1st defendant by the 2nd defendants as its flag bearer to contest for the seat of the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan in the forthcoming general

election scheduled to hold in February, 2015.
(vii) AN ORDER directing the 4th defendant not to recognize or accord any recognition to the name of Hon. Olasumbo Olugbemi or any person other than the name of Hon. Oluyole Adewale Lawrence as the 2nd defendants candidate for the House of Representatives to represent Oluyole Federal Constituency Ibadan, Oyo State.
(viii) AN ORDER of this Honorable Court nullifying the nomination and election of the 1st defendant into the Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislation seat Ibadan, Oyo State of the House of Representatives.
(ix) AN ORDER declaring the claimant as the lawful candidate of the 2nd defendant at the general election held on the 28th day of March, 2015 for Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislative seat (Oyo State) of the House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(x) AN ORDER directing the 4th defendant to immediately withdraw the certificate of return it issued to the 1st defendant as the candidate of the 2nd defendant in the general election held on the 28th day of March, 2015 into the Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislative seat (Oyo State) of

the House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(xi) AN ORDER directing the 4th defendant to immediately issue a certificate of return to the claimant as the lawfully elected candidate of the 2nd defendant in the general election held on the 28th day of March, 2015 for the Oluyole Federal Constituency Legislative seat (Oyo State) of the House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(xii) OR IN ALTERNATIVE to Paragraph XI, above AN ORDER of this Honorable Court ordering the 4th respondent to conduct a fresh general election into the Oluyole, Ibadan, Oyo State, Federal Constituency Legislative seat of the House of Representatives, Federal Republic of Nigeria.”

Reliefs (viii) – (xi) were added after the general election had taken place. At a glance reliefs (vii), (viii), (x) and (xi) are directed at the 4th defendant but before the Statement of Claim was amended it was only relief (vii) that had anything to do with the 4th defendant. It is the spill over of the case after the general election that necessitated the amendment which was granted on 9th December, 2015 the trial Court.

Earlier the appellant (then 1st defendant) had applied by motion on notice dated 11/11/2015 to strike out the suit for being incompetent as the reliefs sought were said to be ungrantable. But in the ruling delivered on 9th December, 2015 by the trial Court refused to accede to the prayers sought in the motion and thereby struck out the application.

The complaint of the 1st respondent (as plaintiff) was that he contested the primaries and secured the highest number of votes and as a result, his party ought to have forwarded his name to the 4th defendant as the candidate of the party for the 2015 general election for the Oluyole Federal Seat of the House of Representatives but instead it was the name of the appellant (as 1st defendant) that was sent. This is the situation envisaged by Section 87(4) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended). Where such a situation occurs, the aggrieved party has a right to seek remedy in the appropriate Court which could be a State High Court or the Federal High Court as stipulated in Section 87(9). The relevant provision is Section 87(3) (4)(c) and (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) and it provides as follows:<br< p=””
</br<

“5.87(3) A political party that adopts the direct primaries procedure shall ensure that all aspirants are given equal opportunity of being voted for by members of the party.
(4) A political party that adopts the system of indirect primaries for the choice of its candidate shall adopt the procedure outlined below:-
(c) In the case of nomination to the position of a senatorial candidate, House of Representatives and State House of Assembly, a political party shall, where it intends to sponsor candidates:-
(i) Hold special congress in the Senatorial district, Federal Constituency and the State Assembly Constituency respectively with delegates voting for each of the aspirant in the designated centre or centres on specified duties.
(ii) The aspirant with the highest number of votes at the end of voting shall be declared the winner of the primaries of the party and the aspirants name shall be forwarded to the independent National Electoral Commission as the candidate of the party.
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of the Act and the

Guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court of a State or FCT for redress.”

The plaintiff complained that he emerged the winner of the primaries held on 7th December, 2014 but instead of forwarding his name to the 4th defendant as the flag bearer of the party, the 2nd respondent sent that of the appellant instead; hence he instituted the action seeking the reliefs which I earlier reproduced in the judgment. The Federal High Court refused the motion to strike out the suit and the appellant appealed to the Court below which dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit and the appellant further appealed to this Court.

As stated by the lower Court at page 265 of the record:-
The jurisdiction of a Court to hear and determine the plaintiffs action depends on the claim(s) in the Writ of Summons and his pleadings.The Amended Statement of claim has made the reliefs against the 4th respondent i.e. INEC principal relief….
Both the learned trial judge and the Court below were right to hold

that reliefs 15(vii), (x), (xi) and (xii) of the 1st respondents amended statement of claim against the 4th respondent are principal reliefs and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 25(1) (i) (r) or the 1999 Constitution and Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act 2010 as amended.

It is on account of this and the more detailed reasons contained in the judgment of my learned brother, Prter Odili, JSC that I found no merit in the appeal and accordingly dismissed it. The appeal is hereby dismissed with N250,000.00 as costs in favour of the 1st respondent against the appellant.

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.: I had a preview of the judgment just delivered by any learned brother Peter-Odili JSC and I agree with him completely that there is no reason to set aside the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts that the Federal High Court, Ibadan had jurisdiction. He said all there is to say, and I will only add a few words of mine.

Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) plays a control role in the Appeal. The said provision opened the doors of the Federal High Court and the

High Courts of the States/FCT to aspirants for political office, who are short-changed in the process of being selected or nominated as candidates to seek redress.
The said Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act clearly says that an aspirant, who claims that any of the provisions of the Electoral Act and guidelines of a political party has not been complied with in the selection and nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court or a High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, for redress.

The question in this case is whether it is Federal High Court, wherein the first Respondent instituted an action challenging the nomination of the Appellant as the candidate or flag bearer of the second Respondent, or Oyo State High Court that has jurisdiction.

It is settled that jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the Plaintiffs claims rather than a Defendants Statement of Defence. In other words, it is the claim before the Court that is examined to see whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on it- seeOhakim v. Agbaso (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226) 172 SC and

Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G. Fed. (20012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) 423 SC.

In this case, in addition to a claims touching on the nomination of the Appellant by the second Respondent as its said candidate, the first Respondent also claimed some four reliefs against INEC which brought on the controversy of which Court had jurisdiction. The such reliefs include prayers for two Orders directing the INEC to immediately withdraw the Certificate of Return it issued to the Appellant; and to immediately withdraw the Certificate of Return to the Claimant as the lawfully elected candidate of the 2nd Defendant” see Paragraph 15 (x) and (xi) of the Amended Statement of Claim.

After the first respondent amended his statement of claim, the Appellant filed an Application praying inter alia for an Order striking out the Suit for being incompetent as the reliefs sought are ungrantable. One of the Grounds for the said Application is that the reliefs sought are not against the 4th Defendant (INEC)”. It was averred in Paragraph 4 of the Affidavit in support thereof that-
The cause of action is an intra-party issue, which the

4th Defendant (INEC) has no business with.
The arguments for and against this Application at the trial Court [Federal High Court, Ibadan] boiled down to whether the claims against the fourth Respondent, were principal or ancillary reliefs. In his Ruling, the learned trial judge Ayo-Emmanuel J. stated-
Four notable Supreme Court cases decided of recent dealt with the referred provisions of the Electoral Act viz:
1) Jev v. Iyortyom (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1428) 575
2) Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374
3) Gbilere v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (PT. 1430) 394
4) Gwede v. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (PT. 1438) 56
All the above cited authorities, aside from kakih v. PDP gave a literal interpretation to Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) and confirmed the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in pre-election cases irrespective of whether the claim against the Agency of the Government made party to the suit is principal or ancillary. However, the case of Kakih v. PDP (supra) in interpreting Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, focused on the specific provision of Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution and further

determined that if the Agency of the Federal Government is made a party to the suit, the principal claims must be against such Agency before Federal High Court can assume jurisdiction. That in my view means that the Court has a duty to ascertain that it is the principal reliefs in the matter that is against the Federal Government or any of its agencies an not the ancillary reliefs. This, therefore, means that each case must be considered upon its peculiar facts and circumstances to determine whether a relief thereof is principal or ancillary.
The learned trial judge examined Reliefs 15 (vii), (x), (xi) and (xii) touching on the 4th Respondent (INEC) and concluded as follows-
It is, however, my opinion that it is the magnitude of a relief that would determine whether such a relief ought to be classified as principal or ancillary and in addition, what should determine whether a relief is principal or not is the character of the relief, which consists in the substance or weight thereof. Learned counsel to the Applicant has not put forward or convinced me what makes the above referred Reliefs ancillary. I therefore find and hold that Reliefs (vii),

(x), (xi) and (xii) of the Plaintiffs Amended Statement of Claim against the 4th Defendant are principal reliefs and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of this Court by virtue of Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act (as amended).
The Appellant appealed but to no avail because the Court below relied on the same authorities as the trial Court, and the case of Lokpobiri v. Ogola & Ors. (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 326 SC. where this Court, per Onnoghen JSC (as he then was) observed-
I want us to also note that both the opening of Section 251 (1) and Paragraph S of Sub-section 1 confer authority on the National Assembly. In addition to the general provision of legislative powers in Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) to enact an Act conferring additional jurisdiction on the Federal High Court either exclusive or concurrently with State and Federal Capital Territory High Courts. It is on the basis of the above constitutional provision particularly Sub-section (1) Paragraph (s) of Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution that the National Assembly enacted the Electoral Act,

2010 (as amended) and conferred concurrent jurisdiction in pre-election matters on the Federal High Court and State and Federal Capital High Courts.
The Court below distinguished the case of Kakih v. PDP (supra) from this case, and said that learned counsel for the Appellant misconceived the Application of the case of Kakih v. PDP (supra) because a pre-election matter is limited to its peculiar facts and circumstances to decide whether a relief is principal or ancillary.
At the end of the day, the Court below aligned itself with the position taken by the trial Court, and it concluded as follows-
After a thorough reading of the 1st Respondents claim in his Amended Statement of Claim …. I am on the same page with the learned trial Judge that Reliefs (vii), (x), (xi) and (xii) of the 1st Respondents Amended Statement of Claim against the 4th Respondent are principal reliefs and, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by virtue of Section 251(1) (r) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act.
As I said at the beginning, I see no reason whatsoever to disturb the concurrent findings of

the two lower Courts on this issue since the Appellant failed to show in what way the reliefs sought by the first Respondent against the fourth Respondent are ungrantable or that the reliefs sought are not against the fourth Respondent, as he put it in the Application asking the suit be struck out.

The way I see it, the arguments proffered by he Appellant cannot stand in the face of authorities that establish the contrary.

In the circumstances, I also dismiss the Appeal, and abide by the consequential orders in the lead judgment including costs.

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI JSC and I agree that the lower Court was right when it held that the Federal High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the FCT and States High Court to hear and determine pre-election matters arising from primary elections of political parties. Section 251 (1)(s) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 clearly conferred authority on the National Assembly in addition to the general provision of legislative

powers in Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution as amended to enact Act conferring additional jurisdiction on the Federal High Court either exclusively or concurrently with the Federal Capital Territory and States High Courts. It is on the basis of this constitutional provision, particularly Sub-section 1 Paragraph S of Section 251 of the Constitution that the National Assembly enacted Section 87 (9) of the Electoral Act 2010 which conferred concurrent jurisdiction in pre-election matters on the Federal High Court. The latest decision of this Court on the issue of the Federal High Court jurisdiction on pre-election matters are the ones delivered in the case of Lokpobiri v. Ogola & Ors (2015) 10-11 MJSC 74; Jev v. Iyortyom (2014) ALL FWLR. These decisions seem to have overruled some aspects of the decisions in PDP v. Sylva (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1316) 85 and Kakih v. PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374 Sections 87(4) of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) provide as follows:-
“A political party that adopts the system of indirect primaries for the choice of its candidates shall adopt the procedure outlined bellow:-
(a) In the case of nomination to the

position of a candidate to the senate, House of Representative and State House of Assembly, a political party shall, where it intends to sponsor candidates:
(i) Hold special congresses in the Senatorial District, Federal Constituency and the State Assembly Constituency, respectively, with delegates voting for each of the aspirant in designated centre on specified dates; and
(ii) The aspirant with the highest number of votes at the end of voting shall be declared the winner of the primaries of the party and the aspirant’s name shall be forwarded to the commission as the candidate of the party.”
The provision of Section 87 of the Electoral Act 2010 as reproduced hereinabove are very clear and holds no ambiguity that will require any interpretation. It is mandatory for political parties to forward only names of the candidates who win their primaries. This is clearly a provision of Electoral Act which is justiciable under Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act. In Uzodinma v lzunaso (No. 2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30 at 60 Paragraph B.E, this Court, per Rhodes-Vivour. JSC said:-
“The nomination of a candidate to contest an election is the sole

responsibility of the political party concerned. The Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide who should be sponsored by any political party as its candidate in an election. But where the political party nominates a candidate for an election contrary to its own Constitution and guidelines a dissatisfied candidate has every right to approach the Court for redress. In such a situation, the Courts have jurisdiction to examine and interpret relevant legislations to see if the political party complied fully with the legislation on the issue of nomination. The Courts will never allow a political party to act arbitrarily or as it likes. Political party must obey their own Constitution and once this is done, there would be orderliness, and this would be good for politics and the country.
The only instance where the name of a candidate other than the candidate that won the primary election will be forwarded to INEC, is where the candidate that won the election withdraws his candidature by notice in writing signed by him and delivered by himself to the political party that nominated him for the election, or where he dies before his name is submitted to INEC

or after the name has been submitted and before the elections. See Section 35 and 36 of the Electoral Act 2010. These substitutions must follow due process.
In the instant case, the complaint is that Section 87(4) (c)(i) (ii) was not complied with. This complaint falls squarely within the provision of Section 87(9) of the Electoral Act, which I have reproduced elsewhere in this judgment. The Federal High Court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this case.

For these few words and the fuller reasons in the lead judgment, I too dismiss the appeal and endorse all the consequential orders made by my learned bother Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC.

Appearances

KAZEEM A. GBADAMOSI For Appellant

AND

OLAKUNLE FAOKUNLA for the 1st Respondent

O. O. OLOWOLAFE for the 2nd Respondent

OTUNBA OLAYINKA BOLANLE for the 3rd Respondent

4th Respondent absent and not represented For Respondent