ALHAJI USMAN BABATUNDE LAWAL V. HON. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS HOUSING & SURVEY OYO STATE (2013)

ALHAJI USMAN BABATUNDE LAWAL V. HON. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS HOUSING & SURVEY OYO STATE

(2013)LCN/6287(CA)

In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

On Tuesday, the 11th day of June, 2013

CA/I/271/2008

JUSTICE

M.B. DONGBAN-MENSEM Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

OBIETONBARA DANIEL-KALIO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria

Between

ALHAJI USMAN BABATUNDE LAWAL – Appellant(s)

AND

HON. COMMISSIONER FOR LANDS
HOUSING & SURVEY OYO STATE – Respondent(s)

RATIO

WHETHER OR NOT A RESPONDENT CAN FRAME HIS OWN ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The state of the law is that a respondent may frame his own issue for determination which may be the same with those framed by the appellant or different from them. The important thing is that the issue so framed must be distilled from and be related to the grounds filed by the appellant.
See NDDC vs. Precision Associates Ltd (2006) 16 NWLR part 1006 page 527 at p.550; Mkpedem v. Udo (2000) 9 NWLR part 673 page 631 at p.643. DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.

THE CONCEPT OF PROPER CUSTODY

IMPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL

By the equitable doctrine of estoppel, a man is not allowed to blow hot and cold,to affirm one time and deny at the other time, that is, to approbate and reprobate. See Ude v. Nwara & Anor, (1993) 2 NWLR part 278 page 638 at 602. See also Section 151 of the Evidence Act, I do not know of any authority which extends that equitable doctrine to the court itself in its decision making process. DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A.

OBIETONBARA DANIEL-KALIO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): Should the High Court in the instant matter on appeal have refused to grant the order of mandamus sought? This is the central question and issue in this appeal. As required by the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Oyo State,1988, the appellant as the applicant filed a motion ex parte in the High Court of Oyo State in December 2007. By it, he prayed the court for leave to apply for an order compelling the respondent i.e. the Honourable Commissioner for Lands, Housing and Survey Oyo State, to forthwith issue him a Certificate of Statutory Right of Occupancy in respect of Plot 4, Block III at the Oyo State New Government Reservation Area, Samoda, Bodija, Ibadan since he had paid all the prescribed fees following the allocation of the plot to him.
The applicant now appellant sometime in 2005 applied for a plot of land at the Oyo State New Government Reservation Area, Samoda, Bodija in Ibadan. Pursuant to that application, he was allocated Plot 4, Block III in the said Government Reservation Area by a letter with Reference No.LLA 6831D dated 16th May, 2005. He then proceeded to pay N500,000 on 23/5/2006; N1,000,000 on 24/5/2006 and N1, 500,000 on 15/5/2007. Those amounts having been paid, he waited for a letter from the respondent informing him of amounts that were outstanding in respect of Development Levy and other incidental fees. When waiting for the letter did not pay off, he went to the Oyo State Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey to make enquiries. There he was informed that he had an outstanding balance of N2, 475,610 to be paid. Armed with this information, he paid the following sums of money: N1, 500,000 on 6/9/2007; N595, 000; N216,510; N154,100 and N10,000 on 24/9/2007. At the time he made this set of payments through the bank, there was an ongoing general strike by workers in the employ of the government of Oyo State. As a result of the strike, he was not able to obtain official receipts for the payments.
When the strike was called off, the appellant went to the said Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey with a view to obtaining Official receipts for the payments aforesaid. In the course of that mission, he got to know that the property file in respect of his application had been moved to the office of the respondent. From his limited knowledge of the workings of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey he got worried. Files, from his smattering knowledge of that ministry were not normally moved to the office of the respondent unless the processes for the issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy had been completed. His expectation was that his file would still be at the stage when it was being processed by subordinate officers. His anxiety got the better of him and he instructed his Solicitors to write to the respondent demanding that the property file be processed for necessary issuance of a Certificate of Occupancy to him. His Solicitors wrote as instructed. However, no reply was received. It was this situation that compelled the appellant to approach the lower court by a motion ex parte for leave to apply for an order of mandamus.
The court granted the leave sought on 11/12/2007 and the appellant i.e. the applicant in the lower court, proceeded to file a motion on notice for an order of mandamus on 13/12/2007. The court granted the order of mandamus on 28/1/2008. The respondent however filed a motion on notice on 15/2/2008 which sought an order of stay of execution of the ruling granting the order of mandamus. On further consideration, the respondent had a change of mind and withdrew the motion for stay of execution. The same was struck out on 18/3/2008. Before then, on 21/2/2008, the respondent filed a motion on notice to set aside the ruling of 28/1/2008 on the ground that he was not aware of the hearing date and as such was denied fair hearing. After a detailed consideration of the said motion, the learned trial Judge on 2/5/2008 set aside his earlier ruling. He then considered the motion on notice for an order of mandamus on the merits. On 30/6/2008, he delivered his ruling. He ruled that the application for the order of mandamus lacked merit and therefore dismissed it.
This appeal is the result of the appellant’s dissatisfaction with that ruling. He filed his Notice of Appeal on 21/8/2008. There, he gave three grounds of appeal and particulars of each ground.
The appellant filed his brief of argument on 2/3/2009. It was prepared by his counsel Chief Iyiola Oladokun. By an order of this court, the brief of argument was deemed as properly filed and served on 3/3/2009. On 17/4/2013 Chief Iyiola Oladokun leading Oladapo Ajila adopted the appellant’s brief. He also adopted the appellant’s reply brief. He urged the court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower court. On that same day i.e. 17/4/2013, Adegboyega Salawu, a Principal State Counsel in the Oyo State Ministry of Justice who appeared with Kuforiji-Kehinde (Miss) a State Counsel of the same ministry, adopted the respondent’s brief filed on 29/9/2009. The brief was deemed as properly filed and served on 8/10/2009. He urged the court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower court.
In the appellant’s brief of argument three issues were identified for determination in this appeal. The issues are-
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he declined to compel the respondent to issue the Certificate of Occupancy in favour of the appellant even after he had found that the respondent did not communicate the revocation of the allocation made to the appellant and when the respondent was still holding on to the appellant’s money. (This issue was tied to ground 1 of the grounds of appeal).
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the appellant was not entitled to ask the court to compel the respondent to issue the Certificate of Occupancy after his lordship had earlier on found that the appellant had satisfied all the conditions required of him by law to succeed in his application. (This issue was tied to ground 3 of the grounds of appeal).
3. Whether Exhibit C1 is admissible in law and ought to be acted upon by the learned trial Judge in denying the appellant his right to the order sought from the lower court. (This issue was tied to ground 2 of the grounds of appeal).
Before I go on to examine the arguments of the appellant’s counsel on the issues raised, I observe that the issue argued as issue 1 is in fact listed as issue 3 for determination. Perhaps the proverbial printer’s devil was responsible for that error.
Issue 3 argued as issue 1 as will be recalled, is whether Exhibit C1 is admissible in law and whether the exhibit should have been relied upon by the trial Judge.
In arguing this issue, appellant’s counsel urged the court to consider the combined effect of Section 4(1) of the National Library Act Cap N.56 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, Section 109, 111 (1) and 116 of the Evidence Act. He urged that the combined effect of the provisions of the sections is that a newspaper published in Nigeria is required to be deposited at the National Library and it is only a copy of such newspaper certified by the Director of the National Library that is deemed to come from proper custody.
Counsel submitted that the trial Judge was wrong when he held that under Section 111(1) of the Evidence Act Exhibit C1 i.e. the newspaper tendered could be certified by the Hon. Commissioner for Information of Oyo State. He referred the court to the case of Chief Gani Fawehinmi v. IGP & 2 Ors (2000) 7 NWLR part 665 page 481.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted that Exhibit C1 violated the provisions of Section 97(e) and 109(b) of the Evidence Act and that the lower court was wrong in admitting it in evidence. He urged the court to expunge it from the record. He cited the case of Anayaebosi vs. RT Briscoe (Nig.) Ltd (1987) 3 NWLR part 29 page 84; Idowu Alase vs. Olori Ilu (1964) ALL NLR part 383 page 390; Owonyin v. Omotoso (1961) ALL NLR part II page 304 at 308.
Issues 1 and 2 erroneously referred to by appellants counsel in his argument as issues 2 and 3, were argued together. Learned Counsel stated in great detail what he considered as the facts that were either not in dispute or that form part of the findings of the lower court. He submitted that the learned trial Judge misdirected himself in law when he relied on the contents of paragraphs 5 and 9 of the further counter-affidavit of the respondent which stated the internal procedure of the office of the respondent which the appellant was not aware of. It was the reliance on the said paragraphs he contended, that made the trial Judge to deny the appellant the order of mandamus which order the trial Judge had earlier found the appellant to be entitled to.
Learned Counsel submitted that before the trial Judge could hold that the appellant was not entitled to be issued a Certificate of Occupancy due to late payment, there ought to have been placed before him evidence that the plot allocated to the appellant had been withdrawn, and allocated to someone else. Counsel submitted that it was late in the day for the respondent to argue and for the trial Judge to hold that the payments by the appellant were not accepted by the respondent when the payments made on the 6th and 24th of September 2007 were made in the same manner as the previous payments and before the respondent wrote his purported letter of withdrawal dated 27/9/2007. He submitted that the findings of the trial Judge amounted to approbating and reprobating. By refusing to grant the order of mandamus he argued, the trial Judge abdicated his primary duty to do Justice to the parties that appeared before him. He cited the case of Alhaji liadi Busari & 2 Ors v. Oba Yishau Goriola Oseni (1992) 2 NWLR part 237 page 557. He urged this court to reverse the decision of the lower court and make an order of mandamus directing the respondent to issue the appellant a Certificate of Occupancy in respect of Plot 4 Block 111, Oyo State New Government Reservation Area, Samonda, Bodija, Ibadan in respect of which the appellant paid the prescribed fees.
The respondent in his brief of argument, formulated only one issue for determination in this appeal. The issue is whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the appellant’s application for an order of mandamus in the lower court.
The state of the law is that a respondent may frame his own issue for determination which may be the same with those framed by the appellant or different from them. The important thing is that the issue so framed must be distilled from and be related to the grounds filed by the appellant.
See NDDC vs. Precision Associates Ltd (2006) 16 NWLR part 1006 page 527 at p.550; Mkpedem v. Udo (2000) 9 NWLR part 673 page 631 at p.643. Although the respondent formulated only one issue as against three formulated by the appellant, I am of the view that the sole issue formulated by the respondent is elastic enough to encompass the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant.
In arguing his only issue, respondent’s counsel submitted that the payments made by the appellant in respect of the land allocation on 23/5/2005 and 15/5/2007 were accepted by the respondent while those made in September 2007 were not and consequently no official receipts were issued in respect of those payments. Counsel referred to the letter of withdrawal of the provisional Letter of Allocation and to a publication in the Nigerian Tribune Newspaper of 13th March 2007 and submitted that the respondent did not waive his right to withdraw the allocation of the plot of land. He argued that the payment made by the appellant after May 2007 were not accepted by the respondent hence the respondent did not issue receipts for those payments.
On the issue of the publication in the Nigerian Tribune Newspaper, learned Counsel contended that the Hon, Commissioner for Information, Culture and Tourism of Oyo State is a fit and proper person to certify the newspaper for use as evidence in court because the Commissioner had custody of the publication in the normal course of his duties. He contended that the National Library Act Cap. N56 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 merely provides that all publications must be deposited in the National Library.
Learned Counsel submitted that the appellant cannot be regarded as the owner of the plot of land since the payments made by him after the withdrawal of the land allocation were not accepted by the respondent. He submitted that the trial Judge was right to have refused the order of mandamus sought because the appellant had consistently refused to comply with the terms of the offer. He urged the court to dismiss the appeal.
In his argument in the reply brief, appellant’s counsel reiterated that the respondent cannot approbate and reprobate having accepted payments after the stipulated date. He insisted that the respondent had initially waived his right and is therefore estopped. He referred to the case of Adetoro vs. UBB Plc. (2007) FWLR part 641, page 643; Joe Iga & Ors vs. Amakiri & Ors. (1976) 11 SC 1 at 12- 13.
On the letter of withdrawal of the allocated plot, learned counsel urged the court to uphold that part of the ruling of the lower court which says that the letter was returned and as such the withdrawal of allocation was not communicated to the appellant.
It seems to me that the other arguments of counsel were a mere rehash of his earlier submissions in the appellant’s brief of argument.
I will proceed to consider this appeal following the issues for determination as formulated by the appellant. I will begin with issue 3 which appellant’s counsel argued as earlier noted, as issue 1. That issue as will be recalled, is whether Exhibit C1 is admissible in law and whether it should have been acted upon by the learned trial Judge in denying the appellant his right to the order sought.
Exhibit C1 is a relevant page of the Nigerian Tribune Newspaper of 13/3/2007 attached to the counter-affidavit before the lower court. The relevant page of the said newspaper was certified by one Mr. S. O. Ayoade an official of the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism of Oyo State and signed by the Hon.Commissioner of that Ministry. The learned trial Judge in his judgment at page 156 of the Record of Appeal was of the view that the provision of Section 111 (1) of the Evidence Act is wide enough to accommodate the certification of Exhibit C1 by the Hon. Commissioner and another official of his Ministry since the newspaper is part of the record kept by the Ministry. I have earlier shown in this judgment that the appellant’s counsel disagreed with the view of the trial Judge.
Appellant’s Counsel submitted that the trial Judge was wrong in admitting the newspaper and that same should be expunged by this court. It was his contention that it is only a copy of a newspaper certified by the Director of the National Library that can be deemed as having come from proper custody. He hinged his argument in part on the provision of Section 4(1) of the National Library Act.
Now, Section 4(1) of the National Library Act Cap N56 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, provides:
“The publisher of every book published in Nigeria shall, within one month after the publication, deliver at his own expense to the National Library three copies of the book, two of which shall be kept in the National Library for permanent preservation and one of which shall be sent by the Director to the Ibadan University Library”.
Subsection (7) of Section 4 defines book to include newspapers and sundry publications listed therein.
The above provision is plain enough. What the section says is simply that a publication such as a newspaper shall be kept by the National Library for permanent preservation. The specific duty given to the Director of that Library in that section is that he is to send a copy of the publication to the University of Ibadan Library and nothing more. However I concede that since the National Library has in its custody such newspaper albeit for the purpose of permanent preservation, the library can certify a copy of it. However the National library does not have a franchise to certify such a newspaper nor does it have a monopoly to do so.

When it comes to the issue of proper custody, the concept of proper custody it must be said, is inextricably linked to a document. See Section 124 and Section 116 – 123 of the Evidence Act Cap E 14 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. One cannot talk about proper custody without talking about a document. Can the National Library produce a newspaper in its custody for the purpose of tendering it in court? Certainly not in my humble view. The newspaper in the custody of the National Library is by an Act of Parliament, to wit, the National Library Act, to be kept for the purpose of preservation only. Scholars, researchers, historians, social anthropologists and the like are expected to use such preserved publication as resource materials. They are also kept there for archival purposes.
It will certainly defeat the purpose of the Act if a publication meant for preservation in the National Library is removed from that preservatory custody and produced in court for the ephemeral purpose of tendering it as evidence in a matter, more so when the number of each publication to be preserved by the National Library is limited to just two.
The appellant’s counsel also argued that Exhibit C1 could not be certified by the Hon. Commissioner for Information under the Evidence Act and as such this court should expunge it.
The provision of Section 124 of the Evidence Act is clear. It reads:
“Documents are said to be in proper custody within the meaning of Sections 116 to 123 of this Act if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom they would naturally be, but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such an to render such an origin probable”.
It is my view that the above provision makes it possible for the court to accept in a case such as this, a newspaper that emanates from the Hon. Commissioner for Information. This is because the section provides that no custody is improper if it is proved to have a legitimate origin.
The publication in the newspaper Exhibit C1 is clearly an advertisement or public notice placed there by the Oyo State Government. It reads;
“MINISTRY OF LANDS, HOUSING AND SURVEY, OYO STATE NOTICE TO PAY UP BALANCE OF REQUISITE FEES BY ALLOTTEES OF STATE LAND AT SAMONDA
Notice is hereby given to all bonafide allottees of State land at Samonda G.R.A. to pay all fees and outstanding balances in respect of their allocations not later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Notice.
At the end of this notice, all offers of plots to defaulters in breach of this notice becomes automatically withdrawn, please.
Signed
Dr. M. A. Adejumo
Hon. Commissioner for Lands,
Housing and Survey, Oyo
State”.
The above advertisement eloquently speaks for itself as to its origin. Its origin is clearly and undoubtedly the government of Oyo State. It seems to me therefore, and I am prepared to hold, that pursuant to Section 124 of the Evidence Act it was not improper for Exhibit C1 to be produced from the custody of the Hon. Commissioner for Information who certified it. I am of the firm view that the learned trial Judge was right in relying on Exhibit C1. Issue 1 is resolved in favour of the respondent and against the appellant.
I will now consider issues 1 and 2 together. Appellant’s Counsel argued them together though erroneously referring to them as issues 2 and 3 as I earlier pointed out. The two issues have to do with whether the learned trial Judge was right in refusing to give the order of mandamus.
In deciding the two issues, it is very essential to examine the nitty-gritty of the case in terms of the facts.
The appellant by a letter of the respondent was allocated a plot of land in Ibadan. It is important to reproduce the salient parts of the letter.
The salient parts read:

“16th April, 2005

Dear Sir/Madam

Provisional Letter of Allocation of State land at Old Aerodrome Bodija:
I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your application in respect of the above and to inform you that the Executive Governor has approved the provisional allocation to you of Plot 4 Block III within the Samonda GRA, Bodija Area, Ibadan.
2. To this end you are requested to pay in full the sum of N750,000 (Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand) and N1,500,000 (One Million and Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as deposits for premium and infrastructural Development Levy respectively within 30 days of this letter. While the deposit for premium could be paid either into the deposit in respect of Development Levy should be paid at….
3. Failure to pay the deposit and providing evidence of same vide official receipt referred to in paragraph 2 above within the stipulated thirty (30) days from the date of this letter would automatically make this provisional offer lapse.
4. On payment of the required deposits, the offer of allocation would be formally confirmed while the required balances in respect of premium, Development Levy and other incidental fees are expected to be paid in full within ninety (90) days of the final letter of offer.
5. The Ministry would not entertain any correspondence on part payment.
6. Please accept my congratulation.
O.O. Okeyode
Honourable, Commissioner for Lands, Housing and Survey.”
After the receipt of the above letter by the Appellant, the following payments were made according to the appellant’s own account in his affidavit in support of motion.
N500, 000 on 23/5/2006;
N1, 000,000 on 24/5/2006;
N1, 500,000 on 15/5/2007;
Receipts were issued for the above amounts of money paid.
Further payments were as follows;
N1, 500,000 on 16/9/2007;
N595, 000 on 24/9/2007;
N216, 510 on 24/9/2007;
N154, 100 on 24/9/2007;
N10, 000 on 24/9/2007;
No receipts were issued by the respondent for the above stated payments which were made through the bank.
The publication in the Tribune Newspaper of 13/3/2007 reproduced earlier in this judgment gave people like the appellant 14 days from the date of the notice to pay up outstanding balances.
A quick look at the above tabulated payments will reveal that the only payments made by appellant that complied with the provisional letter of allocation were the payments made on 23/5/2005 and 24/5/2006. The payment made on 15/5/2007 though made outside the period stated in the provisional letter of allocation was accepted by the respondent. In other words the respondent waived the late payment and the learned trial Judge was right to have held that the respondent waived the late payment in his judgment. See at page 160 of the Record.
As earlier shown and as accepted by both parties, the payments made by the appellant on 6/9/2007 and 24/9/2007 were not accepted by the respondent. The refusal of those payments by the respondent notwithstanding, appellant’s counsel insists that an order of mandamus should be made to compel the respondent to issue the appellant a Certificate of Occupancy. His argument is that since the respondent accepted the payment made on 15/5/2007 which was outside the time stipulated in the provisional letter of allocation, the payments made in September 2007 ought also to be accepted otherwise, the court would be approbating and reprobating. I find the argument of counsel not only strange but also absurd. It is like saying that a law breaker who receives pardon thereby receives a license to continue to break the law.By the equitable doctrine of estoppel, a man is not allowed to blow hot and cold,to affirm one time and deny at the other time, that is, to approbate and reprobate. See Ude v. Nwara & Anor, (1993) 2 NWLR part 278 page 638 at 602. See also Section 151 of the Evidence Act, I do not know of any authority which extends that equitable doctrine to the court itself in its decision making process. Quod approbo non reprobo being an equitable doctrine, one must not forget that aequitas sequitur legem, i.e. equity follows the law. In other words, equity cannot be at war with the law. What is the law here? Simply the consequences of a failure to meet the terms of an offer. The respondent offered the appellant a plot of land. Payment for the plot of land at set periods of time was made of the essence. The appellant breached the term of the offer by failing to make the prescribed payments at the set time. The respondent waived the initial breach of the requirement for prompt payment by accepting a late payment and then gave the appellant and others like him more time to pay the outstanding balance. Again the appellant failed to pay within the extended time given. The result in law is that the offer has lapsed since the offeree was specifically requested to pay up by a specified time. See FGN vs. Zebra Energy Ltd. (2002) 18 NWLR part 798 p.162 at 192.
It is elementary law that for a contract to exist there must be an offer and acceptance of that offer coupled with a consideration. There is therefore no legal plank or basis to ask for an order of mandamus.
To be able to succeed in obtaining an order of mandamus, the appellant must show that he has a legal right. This point was clearly made in the case of Shitta-Bay vs. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1-7 SC p.40 at page 68 -69 SC where Idigbe JSC said thus:
“The way to look at the point in issue is this: for mandamus to be issued, the law is that “there must be a legal right on the part of the applicant to be performed by the person or body against whom he applies, of some duty of a public and not merely private character”. The legal right may be of a personal (i.e. private) or public nature. In my judgment, the touchstone on the topic is to be found in the statement of Lord Ellenborough, J in Rv Archbishop of Canterbury 8 East 22 which I respectfully adopt, that “there ought in all cases to be a specific legal right as well as want of a specific legal remedy, in order to found an application for a mandamus”.
I am quite satisfied that there is no legal right upon which the appellant can found an application for an order of mandamus. I therefore agree with the following conclusion of the trial Judge.
“Since the respondent accepted only N3 Million out of the sum of N5, 475,610.00 paid by the applicant pursuant to the provisional letter of allocation of Plot 4, Block III within Samonda GRA, Bodija Ibadan to the applicant and there is evidence that the sum of N2, 475,610.00 not accepted by the respondent was paid outside the prescribed time, it cannot be said that the applicant is presently entitled to be issued a Certificate of Occupancy”.
I have no reason at all to upset the decision of the trial Judge. I have come to the conclusion that the appeal lack merit. It is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to costs.

MONICA B. DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.: I agree with the lead Judgment prepared by my learned brother Daniel-Kalio, JCA. I adopt the entire decision as mine and dismiss the appeal as lacking in merit.
No order as to cost is made.

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A.: I read in advance the judgment delivered by my learned brother O. Daniel-Kalio, J.C.A, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion arrived at in dismissing the appeal.
I would only chip in that an order of mandamus is an order requiring an act to be done. Also, there must be a public duty to do the act by the person or persons charged to do it. The making of the order is discretionary.
The Appellant is challenging the trial court’s refusal of the order of mandamus sought that the Respondent be compelled to process his property file in view of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy to him.
From the printed records, the letter of allocation dated 16th April, 2005 to the Appellant in respect of the land in question was clearly a provisional one, obviously pending the completion or fulfillment of his side of the contract. The Appellant did not meet up with the deadlines for completion of payment as stipulated in the letter of allocation from the Respondent. Not having fulfilled his part of the contract by prompt payments and completion, the Appellant had no legal basis to expect the trial court to have exercised its discretionary power in his favour.
For mandamus to be issued, the law is that there must be a legal right on the part of the Applicant to the performance, by a person or body against whom he applies of same duty of public nature. The Appellant in the present case is not entitled to this remedy of mandamus; the Respondent cannot be compelled to process his property file in view of issuance of a certificate of occupancy.
The Appellant has no legal interest to protect and has not shown any. See, FAWEHINMI V. I.G.P. (2002) 7 NWLR (PT. 767) 606, R. V. BARKER (1662) 3 BURR 1265 at 1267, SHITTA-BEY V. FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (1981) 1 SC 40 at 53, 68-69.
For these, and the fuller reasons in the leading judgment, I also affirm the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the appeal.
I abide by the order awarding no costs.

Appearances

Iyiola Oladokun with Oladapo AjilaFor Appellant

AND

Adegboyega Salawu
Principal State Counsel, Oyo State Ministry of Justice with Kuforiji-Kehinde State CounselFor Respondent